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DD(X) Surface Combatant Program' which was released on July 19, 2005.

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Testimony:

Before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

For Release on Delivery Expected at 3:30 p.m. EDT:

Tuesday, July 19, 2005:

Defense Acquisitions:

Progress and Challenges Facing the DD(X) Surface Combatant Program:

Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing 
Management:

GAO-05-924T:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-924T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Projection Forces, House of Representatives Committee on Armed 
Services: 

Why GAO Did This Study:

In April 2002, the Department of the Navy launched the DD(X) Destroyer 
program to develop a stealthy, multi-mission ship that would provide 
advanced land attack capability to support forces ashore and contribute 
to military dominance in shallow coastal waters. Numbers and costs for 
the DD(X) have changed since the inception of the program. According to 
the program’s official cost estimate, the first ship is expected to 
cost $3.3 billion, with per unit costs decreasing as production 
progresses.

DD(X) is approaching Milestone B and critical design review—two key 
decision points that will shape the future of both the program and the 
Navy itself. This testimony focuses on (1) the challenges the DD(X) 
program is expected to encounter, (2) the program’s approach and 
progress in managing attendant risks, and (3) potential consequences if 
program progress falls short of expectations.

What GAO Found:

Demanding requirements and time frames present substantial challenges 
for the DD(X) program. DD(X)’s revolutionary design and automated 
operations require multiple technological advances. For example, to 
carry out its primary mission of land attacks, DD(X) must be able to 
strike land targets from distances of up to 83 nautical miles (about 96 
miles)—a capability requiring a level of accuracy and range not yet 
achieved in naval gunfire. To meet DD(X)’s stealth requirements, new 
materials, designs, and construction processes are being developed, 
including a radical hull design that reduces the ship’s signature by 
sloping out—not in—from the ship’s deck to the waterline. In addition, 
many traditionally manned functions will be automated to appreciably 
cut crew size and reduce operational costs. At the same time, the DD(X) 
program has imposed a tight schedule—one that calls for concurrent 
development, design, and construction. 

To reduce risk in the DD(X) program, the Navy is building 10 
engineering development models that represent the ship’s most critical 
subsystems and technologies. While use of these models is a sound 
approach, planned testing of the models continues through system design 
and, in some cases, into detailed design and construction, creating 
risk. Any problems identified through testing could require design 
changes and result in delays and cost increases. Past GAO work shows 
that demonstrating technological maturity—that is, the technology has 
been shown to perform in its intended environment—at the start of 
system design and development is key to reducing risk and meeting cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives. In addition, the models are not 
identical in design to the subsystems that will actually be installed 
on the first ships and thus will require additional work to reach the 
final design. 

The consequences of not meeting the challenges facing the DD(X) program 
are significant. If the program fails to demonstrate capabilities, 
develop software, or integrate subsystems as planned, these activities 
will be pushed into the later stages of design and construction. In 
these stages, the cost of work and delays is much higher and the 
schedule much less forgiving than in earlier stages. At the same time, 
the Navy must compete for funding with other programs, while supporting 
existing platforms and deployments, in a time when the discretionary 
budget is constrained. In light of the risks framed by the DD(X)'s 
challenges, decision makers should consider potential trade-offs in 
advance, including accepting reduced mission performance, increased 
costs, delayed shipyard work, and/or additional manning. It would be 
prudent to consider the palatability of such trade-offs now before 
authorizing the construction of the first ship—a commitment the Navy 
plans to make by the end of this fiscal year.

What GAO Recommends:

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-924T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202) 
512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov.

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Navy's 
DD(X) Destroyer program, part of the family of future surface 
combatants. The DD(X) is being developed as a next-generation multi- 
mission destroyer. It is intended to provide advanced land attack 
capability to support forces ashore and contribute to military 
dominance in the shallow coastal water environment known as the 
littorals. The DD(X) program began in April 2002 with the award of a 
design and development contract to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems. Since 
that time, the program has been developing key technologies and a 
system design to meet the requirements established by the Navy. 
Currently DD(X) is approaching key decisions on design and acquisition 
strategy that will shape the future of both the program and the Navy 
itself.

We have published two previous reports on technology development in the 
DD(X) program.[Footnote 1] Today I would like to discuss (1) the 
challenges the DD(X) is expected to meet, (2) the program's approach 
and progress in managing attendant risks, and (3) potential 
consequences if program progress falls short of expectations.

Summary:

The DD(X) program faces a steep challenge that is framed by demanding 
requirements and a tight schedule imposed by industrial base concerns. 
Several demands have been made of the DD(X) program, including multiple 
missions, with a focus on land attack; stealth; manning levels of less 
than half of the predecessor Arleigh Burke destroyer; and a 
construction schedule that must address industrial base priorities. To 
meet these demands, the DD(X) will employ revolutionary designs and 
automated operations, requiring multiple technological advances, to be 
accomplished on a schedule that calls for concurrent development, 
design, and construction.

Key to the management of risk is the building of 10 engineering 
development models that represent the ship's most critical subsystems 
and technologies. Progress is being made on each, and the delay in the 
decision to authorize the first ship has allowed additional work to be 
completed. Tests of several engineering development models resulted in 
successful demonstration of key components and progress toward final 
testing. In other models, tests identified technical problems that will 
need to be overcome before ship installation or that have led to 
changes in the ship design. Although the use of engineering development 
models is a good approach, the timing for their completion entails 
risk. Our work on successful commercial and defense product 
developments shows that demonstrating mature technology at the start of 
system development is key to reducing risk and meeting cost, schedule, 
and performance objectives. In the case of DD(X), testing of the 
engineering development models continues into system design and some 
extend into detailed design and construction. In addition, the models 
are not identical in design to the subsystems that will actually be 
installed on the first ships and thus will require additional work to 
reach the final design.

The Navy has developed a structured approach for meeting the 
challenging demands of the DD(X). At the same time, it must be 
recognized that these challenges are, to some extent, conflicting and 
do not have much give in them. They may not be simultaneously 
achievable regardless of the acquisition strategy. To the extent that 
the large scope of activities remaining for the DD(X) do not go as 
planned, work--in the form of demonstrating capabilities, developing 
software, integrating subsystems, and actual fabrication--will travel 
to the later stages of design and construction. In these stages, the 
cost of work and delays is much higher and the schedule much less 
forgiving than in earlier stages. In light of the risks framed by the 
DD(X)'s challenges, decision makers will have to be prepared to make 
difficult trade-offs. These could include accepting reduced mission 
performance, increased costs, delayed shipyard work, and/or additional 
manning. It is advisable that the palatability of such trade-offs be 
discussed now before the upcoming commitment to authorize construction 
of the first ship is made.

Background:

The DD(X) program is currently in the system design phase, approaching 
two key decision points. One is Milestone B, when the Navy will decide 
on whether to authorize the award of a detail design and construction 
contract for production of the lead ship(s). Milestone B was planned 
for March 2005 but has been delayed several times and is now expected 
to take place before the end of the fiscal year. The other key decision 
point is the critical design review, scheduled for September 2005. This 
review is intended to demonstrate the design maturity of the ship and 
its readiness to proceed to production. Following these decisions, a 
contract will be awarded for detailed design and construction. 
Fabrication is planned to start in 2008. The Navy's most recent cost 
estimate places the cost of the first ship at $3.3 billion, with per 
unit costs decreasing as production progresses.[Footnote 2]

The DD(X) Challenge: Deliver Unprecedented Performance on a Tight 
Schedule:

The DD(X) program faces a steep challenge that is framed by demanding 
requirements and a tight schedule imposed by industrial base concerns. 
Several demands have been made of the DD(X) program. First, the DD(X) 
is required to perform not only its primary mission of land attack, but 
also anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, and mine warfare tasks. For the 
land attack mission alone, the ship must be able to precisely strike 
land targets from distances of up to 83 nautical miles, a capability 
requiring a level of accuracy and range not yet seen in naval gunfire. 
Second, the DD(X) must meet stealth requirements, which affects the 
destroyer's signature across all spectrums (infrared, radar cross 
section, and acoustic). Third, to reduce operational costs, crew size 
must be at least half of historical levels, requiring the automation 
and computerization of many traditionally manned functions. Finally, to 
manage shipyard workloads, the Navy believes construction of the DD(X) 
must begin in 2008.

To meet these demands, performance and schedule objectives, the DD(X) 
will employ revolutionary designs and automated operations, requiring 
multiple technological advances, to be accomplished on a schedule that 
calls for concurrent development, design, and construction. To meet 
stealth requirements, completely new materials, designs, and 
construction processes are being developed, including a revolutionary 
hull design--the tumblehome hull form--which widens as it approaches 
the waterline. Another departure from traditional shipbuilding design 
is the peripheral vertical launch system, which situates missile 
enclosures peripherally instead of centrally. Several new technologies 
are being developed to provide the needed weaponry, radars, signature 
reduction, fire suppression, and propulsion. Advances in automation are 
necessary to replace many manpower-intensive tasks. For example, the 
advanced gun system will be completely automated, requiring crew only 
for the command to fire and replenishment of its magazines. Fire 
suppression will also be highly automated. This level of sophistication 
necessitates a large software development effort--14 to 16 million 
lines of code.

DD(X) Acquisition Strategy Requires Completing Technology Maturity 
During Detail Design and Construction:

To reduce risk in the DD(X) program and demonstrate the ship's 12 
technologies, the Navy is building 10 engineering development models 
that represent the ship's most critical subsystems. The development 
models are described in table 1.

Table 1: Description of Engineering Development Models:

Engineering development models: Advanced gun system; 
Description: Will provide long-range fire support for forces ashore 
through the use of unmanned operations and the long-range land attack 
projectile.

Engineering development models: Integrated deckhouse and apertures; 
Description: A composite structure that integrates apertures of radar 
and communications systems.

Engineering development models: Dual band radar; 
Description: Horizon and volume search improved for performance in 
adverse environments.

Engineering development models: Integrated power system; 
Description: Power system that integrates power generation, propulsion, 
and power distribution and management.

Engineering development models: Total ship computing environment; 
Description: Provides single computing environment for all ship systems 
to speed command while reducing manning.

Engineering development models: Peripheral vertical launch system; 
Description: Multipurpose missile launch system located on the 
periphery of the ship to reduce damage to ship systems.

Engineering development models: Integrated undersea warfare system; 
Description: System for mine avoidance and submarine warfare with 
automated software to reduce workload.

Engineering development models: Infrared mockup; 
Description: Seeks to reduce ship's heat signature in multiple areas.

Engineering development models: Hull form; 
Description: Designed to significantly reduce radar cross section.

Engineering development models: Autonomic fire suppression system; 
Description: Intended to reduce crew size by providing a fully 
automated response to fires.

Source: DD(X) program office and contractors.

[End of table]

The engineering development models are the most significant aspect of 
the program's risk reduction strategy. They represent a disciplined 
process for generating the information needed for development. In using 
engineering development models, the Navy seeks to achieve increasing 
levels of technology maturity by first defining the requirements and 
risks of a developmental technology and then executing a series of 
tests to reduce these risks and prove the utility of a technology. It 
is these tests that provide confidence in a technology's ability to 
operate as intended. Once the technology is demonstrated, the subsystem 
can be integrated into the ship's system design. The progress of 
technology maturity is recorded and communicated clearly through the 
use of established metrics,[Footnote 3] affording the program manager 
and others readily available information for use in decision making. 
While engineering development models provide the Navy with vital 
information on the progress of technologies, the models are being 
completed later than they should, putting more pressure on the 
remainder of the program.

Our reviews of commercial and Department of Defense acquisition 
programs have identified a number of specific practices that ensure 
that high levels of knowledge are achieved at key junctures in 
development and used to make investment decisions. The most important 
practice is achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start 
of system development. A technology reaches full maturity when its 
performance is successfully demonstrated in its intended environment. 
Maturing a technology to this level before including it into system 
design can reduce risk by creating confidence that a technology will 
work as expected and allows the developer to focus on integrating 
mature technologies into the ship design. This improves the ability to 
establish realistic cost, schedule, and performance objectives as well 
as the ability to meet them. Including the technologies in the system 
design before reaching maturity raises the risk of discovering problems 
late and can increase the cost and time needed to complete design and 
fabrication.

The DD(X) program is based on a concurrent schedule that calls for 
developing and testing key subsystems during system design and into 
detailed design. The schedule for DD(X) and its attendant development 
models is shown in figure 1. Most of the testing of the development 
models takes place during the program's system design, which culminates 
in critical design review. In some cases, the testing of development 
models continues through the start of DD(X) construction. If problems 
are found in testing, as has been the case with other programs, they 
could result in changes in the design, delays in product delivery, and 
increases in product cost.

Figure 1: DD(X) First Ship and Engineering Development Models Schedule:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

As you can see, testing of some engineering development models 
continues through the detailed design and construction phase. Not shown 
here are the events that will follow tests of the development models. 
The development models demonstrate the technologies but are not 
identical in design to the subsystems that will actually be installed 
on the first ships. Tests performed with development models may also 
not demonstrate the full functionality of the systems needed for DD(X). 
In some cases, such as the dual band radar, substantial changes will be 
needed. Results of testing need to be analyzed and integrated into the 
final design, and production plans will need to be finalized and 
approved before the subsystems are manufactured. Testing of the final 
subsystems will take place before and after installation into the ship.

In responding to our September 2004 report,[Footnote 4] the Department 
of Defense stated that it is appropriate to take a reasonable amount of 
risk in developing technologies for the lead ship of DD(X) given the 
long production time associated with shipbuilding. Yet DD(X) will 
proceed from the start of system development to initial capability in 
the same or less time as other major acquisition programs for which DOD 
does call for demonstration of technology maturity before development 
start. Table 2 gives time periods for DD(X) and DDG-51, as well as 
other nonshipbuilding systems.

Table 2: Comparison of Time from System Development to Initial 
Capability:

System: DD(X); 
Start of system development: March 2004; 
Initial capability: January 2013; 
Time elapsed: 8 years, 10 months.

System: DDG-51; 
Start of system development: March 1983; 
Initial capability: February 1993; 
Time elapsed: 9 years, 11 months.

System: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet; 
Start of system development: May 1992; 
Initial capability: September 2001; 
Time elapsed: 9 years, 4 months.

System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle; 
Start of system development: December 2000; 
Initial capability: September 2010; 
Time elapsed: 9 years, 9 months.

System: Joint Strike Fighter; 
Start of system development: October 2001; 
Initial capability: March 2012; 
Time elapsed: 10 years, 5 months.

System: F/A-22 Raptor; 
Start of system development: June 1991; 
Initial capability: December 2005; 
Time elapsed: 14 years, 6 months.

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

[End of table]

Other shipbuilding programs have developed acquisition strategies that 
sought to mature key technologies before their inclusion into system 
design, especially if they are vital to the performance or design. The 
CVN-21 program had a risk-reduction strategy that defined a timeline 
for making decisions about a technology in line with the start of 
system design. One example of a technology that followed this strategy 
was the electromagnetic aircraft launching system, an advanced 
technology key to meeting system requirements. While there were other 
technologies not matured to levels as high as the launch system, the 
majority followed the risk-reduction strategy and had options to switch 
to an existing technology should development fail. The Navy tested the 
Virginia class submarine's nonpenetrating periscope at sea before 
including it into requirements, assuring that the submarine's design 
could benefit from that technology while reducing the risk it would 
delay design.

Progress on Engineering Development Models:

Much of the testing to this date has been for components of subsystems, 
for example tests on the turbine engines that supply electricity to the 
integrated power system. Tests of several engineering development 
models resulted in successful demonstration of key components and 
progress toward final testing. One example is the advanced gun system, 
which has been able to rapidly change design or correct deficiencies to 
meet requirements and demonstrate capability. In other cases, tests 
identified technical problems that will need to be overcome before ship 
installation or that have led to changes in the ship design. Examples 
include the integrated power system or the dual band radar. While these 
problems could be considered normal for any developmental program, 
especially when this many new technologies are being developed 
simultaneously, they are occurring as the program approaches a decision 
on starting detail design and construction.

Advanced Gun System:

The advanced gun system is a large caliber, unmanned gun system 
designed to fire long-range projectiles in support of land attack 
missions, such as strikes at specific targets or suppressing fire in 
support of ground troops. The DD(X) design calls for two gun systems 
with approximately 300 rounds in each magazine, as well as an 
additional 320 rounds in an auxiliary magazine. Because the gun system 
provides supporting fire for land attack, a fundamental mission 
objective of the DD(X), it needs to be able to quickly and accurately 
hit a substantial number of land-based targets from a significant 
distance. The system consists of the mount (the gun together with its 
housing and movement mechanisms), a fully automated magazine, and a 
munition known as the long-range land attack projectile. A schedule of 
key events for the advanced gun system can be seen in table 3.

Table 3: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Advanced Gun System:

2004: 
October: Virtual testing of gun system; 
Second quarter: Component testing begins; 
December: First munition guided flight test. 

2005: 
First quarter: Component testing ends; 
April: Factory acceptance testing of the magazine; 
January-February: Munition guided flight tests; 
May: Factory acceptance testing of the mount; 
May: Long-range land attack projectile preliminary design review; 
July: Land-based testing of the mount and magazine; 
April-September: Further guided flight tests of munition. 

2006 and beyond: 
To be determined: Munition firing from gun system.

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

[End of table]

In October 2004 the advanced gun system was tested using a physics- 
based software model that included the software functionality for all 
major components of the advanced gun system and incorporated the 
results of physical testing. Results met or exceeded expectations for 
response time, rate of fire, sustained rate of fire, range, and pallet 
unloading rate. The contractor has begun verifying the results through 
testing of physical components. In April, the magazine component of the 
advanced gun system successfully completed factory acceptance testing 
by demonstrating its ability to meet requirements and has been shipped 
to Dugway, Utah, for integration into further land-based tests. In May, 
the mount component completed similar testing. Land-based tests 
scheduled to begin in mid-July will demonstrate the entire firing 
sequence of the advanced gun system. However, these tests will not 
demonstrate the ability of the gun system to communicate target 
information to the munition or the ability to move the gun side to 
side. The munition will not be tested with the gun until after ship 
installation.

The munition for advanced gun system, known as long-range land attack 
projectile, has completed four flight tests at Point Mugu, California; 
and has successfully demonstrated launch, tail fin deployment, canard 
deployment, rocket motor ignition, global positioning system 
acquisition, and some flight maneuvers. The first guided flight test 
failed when the canards deployed improperly and controlled flight was 
lost. The issue was identified, corrected, and successfully resolved in 
later flight tests. The current schedule calls for completion of an 
additional three flight tests by the end of September 2005. Flight 
testing of the munition will continue after critical design review.

Recently, the design of the advanced gun system was changed to support 
ease of production for DD(X). The advanced gun system will now be 
constructed as a single modular unit, transported to the shipyard, and 
installed as a block. This redesign has added some weight, which has 
been accounted for in the current design.

Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures:

Integrated deckhouse and apertures refers to the superstructure on the 
deck of the ship and the openings in which radar, sensor, and 
communication equipment are placed. The deckhouse is dependant on the 
use of recently developed composite materials to meet requirements for 
weight. A major focus of deckhouse design is to reduce the ship's radar 
cross section signature. A separate technical challenge, referred to as 
co-site interference, involves placing apertures in precise locations 
to ensure the signals from the multitude of antennas do not interfere 
with one another. The contractor, Northrop Grumman, is building two 
test articles to fulfill requirements for the testing of the deckhouse. 
One is a fire and shock test article that will be subjected to 
underwater explosions; the other is an integrated deckhouse article 
that will be tested for radar cross section and antenna placement. A 
schedule for key events for the integrated deckhouse can be seen in 
table 4.

Table 4: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Integrated Deckhouse:

2004: 
August: Begin antenna predelivery tests; 
November: Begin fire and shock testing (postponed). 

2005: February: End antenna predelivery tests; 
March: Shielding effectiveness tests; 
April: Lightning-protection tests; 
June: Co-site interference tests; 
July: End fire and shock testing (postponed); 
September: Radar cross section tests. 
 
2006 and beyond: 
To be determined: Fire and shock testing (postponed).

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

[End of table]

Construction on the fire and shock test article continues to be delayed 
due to questions about the material properties of the composites 
involved, and lack of adequate test facilities. Further time is needed 
to conduct analysis of composite properties regarding issues such as 
structural strength, corrosion, toxicity of fumes when composites catch 
fire, and ability to bind composites with the steel hull. The program 
office states that the ability of the deckhouse design to meet 
requirements will continue to be analyzed in support of the critical 
design review. In addition, facilities for shock testing of large-scale 
articles, such as those needed for testing of the deckhouse, are not 
available until 2006. Testing of the fire and shock article has been 
delayed until the next contract period, after DD(X) critical design 
review.

Since May 2004, a series of changes involving equipment, antenna size, 
and positioning have been made to the deckhouse, which has caused 
changes in the placement of apertures. The integrated deckhouse test 
article was scheduled to begin testing for radar cross section in May, 
including all deckhouse antennas and the multifunction radar (half of 
the dual band radar system), and for co-site interference in June.

The deckhouse has experienced some problems remaining within its 
margins for weight. To reduce weight, the program has made a number of 
changes to the design including modifications to fragmentation 
protection, and redesigned power and cooling systems for the radars and 
other components. The program office states that the deckhouse is now 
in compliance with its weight budget.

Dual Band Radar:

The dual band radar monitors airborne and surface activities, guides 
weaponry to targets, and conducts environmental mapping. The dual band 
radar is made up of two major radar systems, the multifunction radar 
and the volume search radar, unique technologies that are brought to 
bear jointly on a range of critical tasks to improve overall depth and 
quality of battlespace vision. The volume search radar specializes in 
providing information on aircraft, missiles, and other activities in 
the vast, open sky environment. In contrast, the multifunction radar is 
designed to monitor airspace at horizon or near the surface levels for 
threats such as low-flying antiship cruise missiles. Key events for the 
dual band radar can be seen in table 5.

Table 5: - Schedule of Key Events Relating to Dual Band Radar:

2004: 
September-October: Multifunction radar tests for clutter rejection and 
sensitivity. 

2005: 
September: Multifunction radar cross section tests. 
 
2006: 
February: Integration and test of volume search radar array; 
February-May: Multifunction radar at sea tests; 
May: Engineering development model "string" test for the volume search 
radar; 
June: Volume search radar Array delivery. 
 
2007 and beyond: 
August: Dual band radar land-based tests; 
To be determined: Continued development of volume search radar to meet 
requirements.

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

[End of table]

Testing and development of the multifunction radar is proceeding well. 
There have been a number of design changes, including a power/cooling 
system redesign that reduced weight. These changes will be validated in 
land based tests with the volume search radar in August 2007. Tests of 
the multifunction radar's clutter rejection capabilities and firm track 
range, two key functions required for demonstration, have been proven 
in demonstrations with realistic targets. In a simulated scenario, the 
multifunction radar has demonstrated the ability to guide an Evolved 
Sea Sparrow Missile against an inbound cruise missile. Testing of the 
radar's ability to communicate with one of its own outbound missiles 
will take place in 2007, when the fully assembled dual band radar 
undergoes land-based tests. A significant risk remaining is ensuring 
that the shape and placement of the multifunction radar meets radar 
cross section requirements.

The transmit/receive units, the individual radiating elements that are 
the essence of the volume search radar, encountered difficulties when a 
key component failed in testing. Officials believe they have identified 
a solution to the problem, but a further design iteration is needed to 
fully satisfy performance requirements for the engineering development 
model. Additional iterations of design will be necessary before ship 
installation.

The schedule for construction of the dual band radar is already 
challenging, with the radar for the first DD(X) scheduled for placement 
after the ship is already afloat. Additional delay in development of 
the volume search radar could affect the schedule for ship construction.

Integrated Power System:

The integrated power system centrally generates and distributes power 
to the ship for all functions, including propulsion. This design allows 
greater flexibility in power use and will allow the integration of high-
energy weapons in the future. The integrated power system consists of 
three primary components: turbine generator sets, a power distribution 
system, and propulsion motors. A significant technical challenge is 
development of the propulsion motors, which are used to turn the shaft 
and propeller. To reduce risk the program carried two designs of 
propulsion motor, the permanent magnet motor and the advanced induction 
motor. A schedule of events for the integrated power system can be seen 
in table 6.

Table 6: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Integrated Power System:

2004: 
October: Main turbine generator set factory acceptance test; 
October: Advanced induction motor factory acceptance test; 
November: Auxiliary turbine generator factory acceptance test. 

2005: 
January: Auxiliary turbine generator factory acceptance test; 
January: Permanent magnet motor test failure; 
July-September: Land-based testing of integrated power system. 

2006 and beyond: 
To be determined: Full power load test; 
To be determined: Integration and testing with ship control system.

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

[End of table]

The program has completed initial testing on propulsion motors for 
DD(X). The program carried two designs of propulsion motor, the 
permanent magnet motor and the advanced induction motor. The program 
preferred to use the permanent magnet motor due to its ability to meet 
requirements with less weight and noise, but carried the advanced 
induction motor as a backup. Recently, the permanent magnet motor 
failed to demonstrate the speed needed to produce the required power. 
The advanced induction motor tested successfully in October 2004 and 
has now been selected as the propulsion motor for DD(X). Carrying a 
backup to a critical new technology is a smart strategy and paid off on 
the propulsion motor. This change does have has implications for design 
as the advanced induction motor is heavier and less efficient than the 
permanent magnet motor, will require more space, and operates at a 
different voltage. It will take two advanced induction motors linked 
together to replace one permanent magnet motor.

Navy officials stated that the advanced induction motor will be tested 
this summer to 18.25 megawatts, half of what the ship requires per 
propeller and half of what the permanent magnet motor was to 
demonstrate. The advanced induction motor will also demonstrate half of 
the torque needed per propeller. While two advanced induction motors 
will be needed to turn one shaft in the final design, program officials 
state that there is little risk in simply adding a second motor to 
reach full power. During demonstrations this summer, the advanced 
induction motor will also be tested for integration with the power 
distribution system.

Factory acceptance tests on turbine generators were performed to 
demonstrate their ability to produce the power needed for DD(X). The 
design for DD(X) requires two main turbine generators and two auxiliary 
turbine generators that are tested to similar requirements. The main 
turbine generator set, a Rolls-Royce MT-30 turbine and a generator 
produced by Curtiss-Wright, was tested in October 2004. Due to 
limitations of contractor facilities, the turbine engine and the 
generator were tested separately. Some problems with heat were 
experienced in testing of the turbine engine, but program officials 
have stated these issues have been resolved. The program tested two 
different turbine engines for the auxiliary generator sets, a Rolls- 
Royce MT-5 and a General Electric LM-500. Both turbine generator sets 
demonstrated they were able to produce the power necessary and actually 
produced more power than predicted.

Design of the power distribution system was also changed to reduce 
weight and improve performance. According to officials, the Navy will 
use a system it has been developing called "integrated fight through 
power," which includes the use of solid state components and rapid 
switching technologies.

Total Ship Computing Environment:

Program officials estimate that DD(X) will require 14 to 16 million 
lines of new and reused software code. The total ship computing 
environment, which accounts for a large portion of the software, will 
provide a common architecture for major ship systems to facilitate 
integration and to speed command and control while reducing manning. A 
schedule of events for the total ship computing environment can be seen 
in table 7.

Table 7: Schedule of Events Relating to Total Ship Computing 
Environment:

2003: 
September: Preliminary design review. 

2004: 
May: Critical design review; 
June: Software release 1 certification. 
 
2005: 
March: Software release 2 certification; 
May-September: Land-based tests; 
September: Software release 3 certification. 

2006 - 2009: 
Completion of remaining 3 software releases.

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

[End of table]

While not a physical technology, the magnitude of software development 
for DD(X) still needs time for development, design, testing, and 
correction like the other engineering development models. An 
engineering development model for the computing environment is being 
developed for testing and includes three of six software releases. 
These three releases include the critical infrastructure functionality 
needed, as well as some functionality for anti-air, undersea, and land 
attack missions. To prove the functionality of the computing 
environment, it will be tested in a software integration center and 
connected with data from other engineering development models.

Computing environment development plans include many of the software 
best practices identified in our past work, including developing 
software in an evolutionary environment, following disciplined 
development process, and using meaningful metrics to measure progress. 
While robust development plans are in place, the computing environment 
is on a tight schedule that continues beyond the start of construction 
and has limited margin for correction of defects found in testing. 
While the total ship computing environment has not experienced 
significant challenges thus far, a demanding effort lies ahead. About 
three-quarters of the software development effort occurs during the 
detail design and construction phase.

Additional engineering development models:

Our review of the remaining engineering development models has been 
less extensive. Nonetheless, I would like to highlight a few aspects of 
these systems.

The peripheral vertical launch system consists of the missile launcher, 
referred to as the advanced vertical launch system, and the enclosure 
for the launcher, referred to as the peripheral vertical launch system. 
The system is located on the sides of the ship to improve 
survivability, rather than the more traditional central positioning. A 
demonstration in May 2004 to test the peripheral vertical launch system 
against expected threats resulted in destruction of the test article 
that necessitated redesign and further testing. A second test 
replicating the same conditions with the new design and representative 
materials was held in June 2005.

The integrated undersea warfare system is used to detect mines and 
submarines in the littorals and consists of medium and high-frequency 
arrays, towed arrays, and decision-making software to reduce workload. 
Tests for the demonstration of mine warfare systems were scheduled for 
May, and were to take place on a vessel modified to carry DD(X) sonar 
and processing equipment. Submarine warfare tests were scheduled for 
June. According to program officials, at-sea tests of algorithms for 
antisubmarine warfare, a key component in reducing manning, have been 
changed to laboratory testing due to a lack of test ships. Significant 
advances in the automation of submarine detection and tracking may be 
required to meet manpower goals.

As a part of requirements for signature management, the DD(X) program 
seeks to reduce the heat signature of the ship using material 
treatments on the deckhouse and passive air cooling for engine exhaust. 
The use of subsystems or materials to reduce heat signature has changed 
due to design trade-offs for performance, weight, and cost. A sheeting 
water system for the hull has been deleted from the ship design and 
replaced with an alternate system. Program officials have determined 
that further testing of exhaust suppressors for the main turbine 
generator is no longer necessary. Program officials stated that the 
operational requirements are still achievable using the new design.

DD(X) uses a radically new hull design to reduce the radar cross 
section of the ship. Development also includes design of a new 
propeller. Scale models of the hull form are currently being tested for 
factors like resistance, efficiency of the propeller, and capsize 
probability. Development of the software model used to predict hull 
form behavior is continuing.

The autonomic fire suppression system utilizes new technologies, such 
as smart valves, flexible hosing, nozzles, sensors, and autonomic 
operations to reduce the crew and time needed for damage control. This 
system is vital for meeting requirements for ship survivability and 
manning. Testing for the system was performed on two Navy test ships 
and has been successful. An initial test aboard the ex-Peterson, a 
former destroyer used as a test ship, successfully demonstrated the 
system's ability to detect damage and control fires. Tests aboard the 
ex-Shadwell, another larger test ship, demonstrated the same abilities 
for specific ship environments. Because the exact components used in 
testing aboard the ex-Shadwell may not be the ones used in ship 
construction, Navy officials state that it is unclear how the 
engineering development model will translate into final ship design.

Consequences of Not Meeting DD(X) Challenges Must Be Discussed Early:

The Navy developed a structured approach for meeting the challenging 
demands of the DD(X) --multiple mission requirements, stealth, reduced 
manning, and industrial base timeframes. This strategy builds in some 
margins for risk, such as for additional weight and manning, should 
they become necessary. At the same time, it must be recognized that 
these challenges are, to some extent, conflicting and do not have much 
give in them. They may not be simultaneously achievable, regardless of 
the acquisition strategy.

The DD(X) strategy relies on multiple activities occurring concurrently 
to meet its schedule. To the extent things do not go as planned, work-
-in the form of demonstrating capabilities, developing software, 
integrating subsystems, and actual fabrication--will travel to the 
later stages of design and construction. In these stages, the cost of 
work and delays is much higher and the schedule much less forgiving 
than in earlier stages. In light of the risks framed by the DD(X)'s 
challenges, decision makers will have to be prepared to make difficult 
trade-offs. For example,

* If technologies do not perform as expected or have unintended 
consequences, such as additional weight, will the user accept lower 
performance or will more time and money be allocated to delivering 
required performance?

* If costs increase, will more money be provided or will performance 
trade-offs be considered to reduce cost?

* If the schedule will not allow the ship, as currently scoped, to be 
ready for in-yard fabrication, will scope be reduced to maintain 
schedule or will industrial base consequences attendant to a schedule 
delay be accepted?

* If the ship actually demands a larger crew than planned, can the 
manning be afforded and accommodated aboard ship or will workload be 
reduced to meet planned crew size?

In planning for such contingencies, there are a number of factors that 
should be considered. Earlier this year, we issued a report on cost 
growth experienced by previous shipbuilding programs.[Footnote 5] One 
of the key factors in cost growth was the extent to which the maturity 
of design affects costs. In the course of doing this work, shipbuilders 
emphasized the importance of properly sequencing work to achieve cost 
efficiency. They pointed out that the cost of performing a task 
increases if it is delayed further into the construction process. For 
example, one shipbuilder estimated that the same task performed early 
in the construction process at a steel, electrical or other shop is 3 
times more expensive when delayed until assembling units or sections of 
the ship at the dock, and 8 times more expensive if the ship is afloat. 
According to another shipbuilder, before construction begins on a 
particular section of the ship, firm information is needed on equipment 
and components including such information as the dimensions, weight, 
and power and cooling requirements. When technologies are still being 
developed and tested, the Navy's ability to gather this information and 
finalize design is constrained. When firm information is not available 
and construction proceeds, the potential exists that work will not be 
done in the most efficient sequence and that changes will lead to 
redoing work already completed, increasing cost and delaying delivery.

Another factor is the DD(X) does not have fallback technologies that 
could mitigate changes to design and performance. The program has 
passed the decision point for inclusion of the two viable fallback 
technologies the program began with, a different hull form and the 
advanced induction motor. If the other technologies embodied in the 
engineering development models run into difficulties, they cannot be 
substituted. Thus, their consequences, whether in performance, weight, 
or manning, would have to be ameliorated through trade-offs.

When considering the possibility of cost growth, it must be taken into 
account that spending on the program comes at a time when the Navy is 
also procuring Virginia class submarines, Littoral Combat Ships, 
amphibious vessels, support vessels, and the last of the Arleigh Burke 
class destroyers. In addition to DD(X) the Navy is also developing new 
aircraft carriers and aircraft, and may soon start development of new 
cruisers and submarines. The Navy must compete for funding for these 
programs with other services, while simultaneously supporting existing 
platforms and deployments, at a time when the discretionary budget is 
constrained.

Finally, delays in the schedule for DD(X) construction would reduce the 
flow of work to the shipyards at the time that DDG-51 construction is 
drawing to a close. This could result in declining workloads, revenues, 
and employment levels.

As the cost, schedule, and capabilities of a program change, the 
business case for that program changes as well. The business case for 
DD(X), or a similar capability, has already changed multiple times 
since the Navy launched the future destroyer development effort in 
1995. Originally, under the DD-21 program, the Navy planned to build 32 
ships at an average cost of approximately $1 billion when the cost of 
development is also included. After the program transitioned to DD(X) 
the number of ships required changed repeatedly with numbers ranging 
from 24 ships to 16 to 8. The latest program baseline, released in 
April 2004, outlines a purchase of 8 ships at an average cost of around 
$2.9 billion with the inclusion of development costs.[Footnote 6] A new 
life cycle cost estimate, released in March of 2005, presents different 
figures on number of ships and costs. Even this estimate does not 
reflect the current acquisition strategy proposed by the Navy. The Navy 
will have to decide what constitutes an acceptable business case for 
the DD(X) and at what point the business case becomes unacceptable.

It is important that these contingencies be confronted now and 
discussed because once the detail design and construction phase begins, 
it will be very difficult to change course on the program.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

Contact Information:

For further information on this testimony, please contact Paul L. 
Francis at (202) 512-4841.

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Karen 
Zuckerstein, J. Kristopher Keener, and Marc Castellano.

FOOTNOTES

[1] GAO, Progress of the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-05-752R 
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2005); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 
Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-04-973 (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 3, 2004).

[2] The quoted estimate assumes alternating production at two shipyards 
beginning in fiscal year 2007.

[3] One metric utilized by the DD(X) program office is technology 
readiness levels. This metric incorporates many of the factors that 
determine technology maturity, including form, fit, and function, into 
a single digit numerical score.

[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer 
Program, GAO-04-973 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 2004).

[5] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could Help 
Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-05-183 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005)

[6] Amounts are in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars.