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Testimony:

Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, 
and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House 
of Representatives:

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT Wednesday, May 19, 
2004:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

Significant Actions Needed to Address Long-standing Financial 
Management Problems:

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, 
Director, Financial Management and Assurance: 
Allen Li, 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-7541T]:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-754T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental 
Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Subcommittee asked GAO to testify on the status of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) financial management 
reform efforts. NASA faces major challenges that if not addressed, will 
weaken its ability to manage its highly complex programs. NASA has been 
on GAO’s high-risk list since 1990 because of its failure to 
effectively oversee its contracts and contractors, due in part to the 
agency’s lack of accurate and reliable information on contract 
spending. GAO’s statement focused on (1) how NASA’s history of clean 
audit opinions served to mask the true extent of the agency’s financial 
management difficulties; (2) the results of NASA’s fiscal year 2003 
financial statement audit, which are a departure from the fiscal year 
2002 results; (3) NASA’s effort to implement an integrated financial 
management system; and (4) the challenges NASA faces in reforming its 
financial management organization. 

Although GAO does not make specific recommendations in this statement, 
GAO previously made several recommendations to improve NASA’s 
acquisition and implementation strategy for its financial management 
system. While NASA ultimately agreed to implement all of the 
recommendations, it disagreed with most of the findings—stating that 
its acquisition and implementation strategy had already addressed GAO’s 
concerns.

What GAO Found:

NASA faces major challenges in fundamentally reforming its financial 
management organization and practices. While some areas needing reform 
relate to automated systems, automation alone is not sufficient to 
transform NASA’s financial management culture. Specifically, NASA needs 
to fully integrate its financial management operations with its program 
management decision-making process. Until that occurs, NASA risks 
addressing the symptoms of its problems without resolving the 
underlying causes. These causes include an agency culture that has not 
fully acknowledged the nature and extent of its financial management 
difficulties and does not link financial management to program 
implications. Historically, NASA management has downplayed the severity 
of its problems and has viewed the agency’s financial operation as a 
function designed to produce clean financial audit opinions instead of 
viewing it as a tool that supports program managers in making decisions 
about program cost and performance.

GAO’s work has identified several areas of concern:

* Clean financial audit opinions masked serious financial management 
problems. Financial audits of NASA during the late 1990s did not 
provide an accurate picture of the agency’s financial management 
operations, and instead masked serious problems that continue to exist 
today, including significant internal control weaknesses and systems 
that do not comply with federal standards. 

* The new financial management system did not address all key 
stakeholder needs. GAO reported in April 2003 that NASA designed and 
implemented the new system’s core financial module without involving 
key stakeholders, including program managers, cost estimators, and the 
Congress. 

* NASA did not follow key best practices in implementing its new 
financial management system. GAO reported in April 2003 and again in 
November 2003 that the new system may do less and cost more than NASA 
expects because the agency did not follow key best practices for 
acquiring and implementing the system. For example, NASA acquired and 
deployed system components without an enterprise architecture and 
lacked discipline in its cost estimating processes. 

* The new financial management system did not provide key external 
reporting capabilities. GAO reported in November 2003 that the system 
would not generate complete and accurate information necessary for 
external reporting of NASA property and budgetary data.

Finally, if NASA is to reap significant benefits from its new financial 
management system, it must transform its financial management 
organization into a customer-focused partner in program results. This 
will require sustained top leadership attention combined with effective 
organizational alignment, strategic human capital management, and 
end-to-end business process improvement. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-04-754T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 
512-9095 or kutzg@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the financial management 
challenges facing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA). Since its inception in 1958, NASA has undertaken numerous 
programs--involving earth and space science, aerospace technology, 
human space flight, and biological and physical research--that have 
resulted in significant scientific and technological advances, 
enhancing the quality of life on earth. In recent years, NASA has 
experienced a number of setbacks with its programs and operations, 
including massive cost overruns associated with the International Space 
Station and, with the Columbia tragedy, the need for the agency to 
develop return-to-flight strategies and mitigate the impact of the loss 
of the shuttle on the construction of the space station.

On January 14, 2004, President Bush outlined a bold new vision for U.S. 
space exploration that will set a new course for NASA. However, to 
successfully execute this new vision, NASA must address a number of 
long-standing financial management challenges that threaten NASA's 
ability to manage its programs, oversee its contractors, and 
effectively allocate its budget across its numerous projects and 
programs. In fact, since 1990 we have identified NASA's contract 
management as an area of high risk, in part because the agency lacked 
effective systems and processes for overseeing contract spending and 
performance. NASA has begun taking action to address many of these 
challenges through its effort to implement a new integrated financial 
management system; however, many of NASA's financial management 
problems are deeply rooted in an agency culture that has not fully 
acknowledged the nature and extent of its financial management 
difficulties and does not view finance as intrinsic to the agency's 
program management decision process.

My testimony today will focus on the results of our recent work related 
to NASA's financial management challenges and the agency's efforts to 
implement an integrated financial management system. Specifically, I 
will discuss (1) how NASA's history of clean audit opinions served to 
mask the true extent of the agency's financial management difficulties; 
(2) the results of NASA's fiscal year 2003 financial statement audit, 
which are a departure from the fiscal year 2002 results; (3) NASA's 
current effort to implement an integrated financial management system; 
and (4) the challenges NASA faces in reforming its financial management 
organization. We have performed work and issued several reports in 
response to legislative mandates and at the request of other interested 
committees. We also reviewed the reports of NASA's Office of Inspector 
General and the independent public accounting firms that audited NASA's 
financial statements for fiscal year 2003 and for several previous 
years. With the exception of NASA's financial statements for fiscal 
year 2002, in which we performed a limited-scope review of the 
financial statement audit performed by NASA's contracted independent 
public accountant (IPA), we did not review the IPA's underlying audit 
work. We performed all work in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. My statement today is drawn from the 
findings and conclusions in GAO's, NASA's Office of Inspector 
General's, and the independent auditors' reports.

Summary:

NASA has fundamental problems with its financial management operations 
that not only affect its ability to externally report reliable 
information, but more important, hamper its ability to effectively 
manage and oversee its major programs, such as the space station and 
the shuttle program. NASA's financial audits during the 1990s masked 
serious problems with its financial management operations that continue 
today. Specifically, from 1996 through 2000, NASA was one of the few 
agencies to be judged by its independent auditor at the time, Arthur 
Andersen, as meeting all of the federal financial reporting 
requirements. However, our work at NASA during this same period told a 
different story. During this period, we issued a wide range of reports 
that detailed the agency's difficulties associated with (1) overseeing 
its contractors and their financial and program performance, (2) 
controlling program costs and producing credible cost estimates, and 
(3) supporting the amounts that it had reported to the Congress as 
obligated against statutory spending limits for the space station and 
related space shuttle support. We also concluded, based on work we 
performed related to a misstatement in NASA's fiscal year 1999 
financial statements, that Arthur Andersen's work did not meet 
professional standards, and we questioned NASA management's and its 
auditor's determination that the agency's systems substantially 
complied with federal standards.

The results of NASA's fiscal year 2003 financial statement audit 
confirm that NASA's financial management problems continue today. 
NASA's independent auditor, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), disclaimed 
an opinion on NASA's fiscal year 2003 financial statements; reported 
material weaknesses in internal controls; and for the third straight 
year, concluded, just as we reported in November 2003,[Footnote 1] that 
the agency's new financial management system did not comply with the 
requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 
1996 (FFMIA).[Footnote 2] Although NASA attributed the auditor's 
disclaimer of opinion to the agency's implementation of a new financial 
management system, many of the reported problems were long-standing 
issues not related to implementation of the new system.

Recognizing the importance of successfully implementing an integrated 
financial management system, in April 2000, NASA began an effort known 
as the Integrated Financial Management Program (IFMP). Through IFMP, 
NASA has committed to modernizing its business processes and systems in 
a way that if implemented properly, will introduce interoperability and 
thereby improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations as 
well as bring the agency into compliance with federal system 
requirements. NASA has also committed to implementing IFMP within 
specific cost and schedule constraints. In 2003, we issued five 
reports[Footnote 3] outlining the considerable challenges NASA faces in 
meeting its IFMP commitments and providing NASA the necessary tools to 
oversee its contracts and manage its program. For example, in April 
2003, we reported that NASA had deferred addressing the needs of key 
system stakeholders,[Footnote 4] including program managers and cost 
estimators, and was not following key best practices for acquiring and 
implementing the system. We also reported that NASA lacked the 
disciplined requirements management and testing processes needed to 
reduce the risk associated with its effort to acceptable levels. 
Therefore, NASA did not have reasonable assurance that the program 
would meet its cost, schedule, and performance objectives. Then, in 
November 2003, we reported that NASA (1) acquired and deployed IFMP 
system components without an enterprise architecture, or agencywide 
modernization blueprint, to guide and constrain program investment 
decisions; (2) did not use disciplined cost estimating processes or 
recognized best practices in preparing its life cycle cost estimates; 
and (3) had delayed implementation of many key external reporting 
capabilities. We made a number of recommendations in these reports to 
improve NASA's acquisition and implementation strategy for IFMP. While 
NASA ultimately agreed to implement all of our recommendations, it 
disagreed with most of our findings--stating that its acquisition and 
implementation strategy had already addressed many of our concerns.

Finally, NASA faces significant challenges in overcoming its financial 
management difficulties and reforming its financial management 
operations. For example, NASA's independent auditor, PwC, attributed 
many of the agency's financial management problems to a lack of 
understanding by NASA's staff of federal reporting requirements. In 
addition, over the past 4 years, we have issued numerous reports 
highlighting NASA's financial management difficulties and making 
recommendations for improvement. However, NASA management has been slow 
to implement these recommendations and in many cases has denied the 
existence of the problems we and others have identified--instead 
attributing the agency's difficulties to the auditor's sampling 
methodology or the auditor's lack of understanding of NASA's overall 
operations. Until NASA fully acknowledges the nature and extent of its 
financial management difficulties and better integrates the agency's 
financial management operation with its program management decision 
process, NASA will continue to face many of the same financial 
management problems discussed in my testimony today.

Clean Financial Audit Opinions Masked Serious Financial Management 
Problems:

NASA's financial audits during the 1990s masked serious problems with 
its financial management operations that continue today. Specifically, 
from 1996 through 2000, NASA was one of the few agencies to be judged 
by its independent auditor, Arthur Andersen, as meeting all of the 
federal financial reporting requirements. That is, NASA was one of the 
few agencies to receive an unqualified, or "clean," opinion on its 
financial statements, with no material internal control weaknesses 
noted and with financial management systems that were reported to be in 
substantial compliance with the requirements of FFMIA. FFMIA, building 
on previous financial management reform legislation, stresses that 
agencies need to have systems that provide managers with the reliable, 
timely, and accurate financial information that they need to ensure 
accountability on an ongoing basis, as well as to make informed 
decisions on investing resources, managing costs, and overseeing 
programs. Thus, the auditor's report implied that NASA could not only 
generate reliable information once a year for external financial 
reporting purposes but also could provide the kind of information 
needed for day-to-day management decision making. However, as others 
and we have reported, the independent auditor's reports did not provide 
an accurate picture of NASA's financial management systems and failed 
to disclose pervasive financial management problems that existed at 
NASA then and continue today. Ultimately, these unqualified opinions 
and positive reports on NASA's internal controls and systems served 
only to mask the serious financial management problems that existed at 
NASA throughout this period.

* First in 1990 and then in subsequent years, we identified contract 
management as an area at high risk because of NASA's inability to (1) 
oversee its contractors and their financial and program performance and 
(2) implement a modern, integrated financial management system, which 
is integral to producing accurate and reliable financial information 
needed to support contract management.[Footnote 5] During this period, 
we also issued a wide range of reports that detailed the agency's 
difficulties associated with controlling program costs and producing 
credible cost estimates.

* In 2000, congressional staff members found a $644 million 
misstatement in NASA's fiscal year 1999 financial statements--an error 
not previously detected by NASA or its independent auditor. As we 
reported[Footnote 6] in March 2001, this error resulted because NASA's 
systems could not produce the budgetary data required by federal 
accounting standards. Instead, the agency was relying on an ad hoc, 
year-end data call from its 10 reporting units and the aggregation of 
data using a computer spreadsheet. We concluded that Arthur Andersen's 
work did not meet professional standards, and we questioned NASA 
management's and its auditor's determination that the agency's systems 
substantially complied with the requirements of FFMIA.

* In 2001 and subsequent years, our work in response to a legislative 
mandate revealed that NASA was unable to support the amounts that it 
had reported to the Congress as obligated against statutory spending 
limits for the space station and related space shuttle 
support.[Footnote 7] Here again, NASA's inability to provide this 
detailed obligation data was linked to its lack of a modern, integrated 
financial management system.

* Finally, in February 2002, NASA's new independent auditor, PwC, 
further confirmed NASA's financial management difficulties and 
disclaimed an opinion on the agency's fiscal year 2001 financial 
statements. The audit report also identified a number of material 
internal control weaknesses and stated that contrary to previous 
financial audit reports, NASA's financial management systems did not 
substantially comply with FFMIA.

* Although NASA received an unqualified opinion on its fiscal year 2002 
financial statements,[Footnote 8] NASA's auditor again report material 
weaknesses in NASA's internal controls over its Property, Plant, and 
Equipment (PP&E) and materials, which make up nearly $37 billion, or 85 
percent, of NASA's assets, and over the agency's processes for 
preparing its financial statements and performance and accountability 
report. According to the auditor's report, various deficiencies 
continued to exist within NASA's financial management operations, 
including (1) insufficient resources to address the volume of 
compilation work required to prepare NASA financial reports, (2) lack 
of an integrated financial management system, and (3) lack of 
understanding by NASA staff of federal reporting requirements. The 
nature and extent of the reported material weaknesses highlighted the 
agency's inability to generate reliable data for daily operations and 
decision making. Thus, it is not surprising that the auditor again 
concluded that NASA's financial management systems did not 
substantially comply with the requirements of FFMIA.

NASA's Auditor Disclaims an Opinion on Fiscal Year 2003 Financial 
Statements:

NASA's financial management problems and internal control weaknesses 
continue to exist today. NASA's auditor, PwC, disclaimed an opinion on 
NASA's fiscal year 2003 financial statements. According to the 
auditor's report, NASA was unable to provide PwC sufficient evidence to 
support the financial statements and complete the audit within the time 
frames established by the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, 
for the third straight year, NASA's independent auditor concluded, just 
as we reported in November 2003,[Footnote 9] that the agency's new 
financial management system did not comply with the requirements of 
FFMIA. Although NASA attributed the auditor's disclaimer of opinion to 
the agency's implementation of a new financial management system, many 
of the reported problems were long-standing issues not related to 
implementation of the new system. The auditor reported material 
weaknesses that existed throughout NASA's financial management 
operations.

* First, NASA was unable to provide reliable documentation and an audit 
trail to support the financial statements. NASA's auditor reported that 
in an effort to populate its new financial management system, NASA 
summarized the previous 7 years of transaction-level detail from its 
legacy systems and entered the cumulative amount into the new system as 
if the transactions were current-year activity. As a result, many of 
the accounts supporting the financial statements were overstated by 
billions of dollars. In an effort to correct these errors and balance 
the accounts to the general ledger, NASA made net adjustments totaling 
$565 billion but was not able to provide documentation supporting the 
adjustments.

* Second, NASA's internal controls over its reconciliation of fund 
balance with Treasury accounts were ineffective. Specifically, NASA 
failed to reconcile its fund balance with Treasury accounts during the 
year and resolve all differences. At year-end, NASA's general ledger 
account for fund balance with Treasury was materially overstated and 
did not reconcile to the balance reported by Treasury at year-end. To 
correct the overstatement, NASA made $2 billion in unsupported net 
adjustments to its Fund Balance with Treasury account, which had the 
effect of reducing NASA's recorded balance so it equaled Treasury's 
reported balance. This type of adjustment is similar to forcing the 
balance recorded in your checkbook at the end of the month to reconcile 
with your bank statement. Instead of trying to determine the reason for 
the error and resolve the difference you, simply "plug" the difference 
to your checkbook balance. NASA's failure to perform reconciliation 
procedures throughout the year is a fundamental breakdown in basic 
internal controls and illustrates the human capital challenges NASA 
faces in overcoming its financial management problems.

* Third, NASA's processes for preparing its financial statements 
continue to be ineffective. The continued weaknesses in NASA's 
financial statement preparation processes resulted in major delays and 
errors in preparing fiscal year-end financial statements. For example, 
NASA's auditor reported inconsistencies, such as the significant 
differences between the agency's Fund Balance with Treasury and 
Treasury's balance that should have been identified and corrected by 
NASA as part of the agency's internal quality control review process. 
In addition, NASA's financial statements were not prepared in 
accordance with federal accounting standards. As we reported in 
November 2003, the core financial module did not appropriately capture 
accrued contract costs and accounts payable information in accordance 
with federal accounting standards. Instead, in instances where costs 
and the corresponding liabilities were greater than the associated 
obligations, the differences were transferred outside of the general 
ledger and held in suspense until additional funds were obligated, thus 
understating NASA's reported program costs and liabilities. Although 
NASA officials stated that as of October 1, 2003, they no longer post 
costs in excess of obligations in a suspense account, their current 
solution still does not appropriately capture accrued cost and accounts 
payable in accordance with federal accounting standards.

* Finally, NASA continues to lack effective internal controls over PP&E 
and materials. Although NASA reported that a corrective action plan had 
been implemented to address the deficiencies identified in the previous 
year's audit report, subsequent testing identified major errors in 
contractor-held PP&E and materials.

NASA's Effort to Implement New Integrated Financial Management System:

NASA's new financial management system falls short in addressing the 
long-standing financial management issues that have prevented the 
agency from effectively monitoring over 90 percent of its annual budget 
and managing costly and complex programs, such as the International 
Space Station. For years, NASA has cited deficiencies within its 
financial management systems as a primary reason for not having the 
data required to oversee its contractors, accurately account for the 
full cost of its operations, and efficiently produce accurate and 
reliable information needed for both management decision-making and 
external reporting purposes. Recognizing the importance of successfully 
implementing an integrated financial management system, in April 2000, 
NASA began its IFMP effort. When completed, IFMP is planned to consist 
of nine modules[Footnote 10] that will support a range of financial, 
administrative, and functional areas. This is NASA's third attempt at 
modernizing its financial management systems and processes. The first 
two efforts were eventually abandoned after a total of 12 years and a 
reported $180 million. The schedule for implementing IFMP was 
originally planned for fiscal year 2008, but after NASA's new 
Administrator came on board in fiscal year 2002, the timeline was 
accelerated to fiscal year 2006, with the core financial module to be 
completed in fiscal year 2003. As of June 30, 2003, NASA reported that 
it had fully implemented the core financial module at all of its 10 
operating locations.

Through IFMP, NASA has committed to modernizing its business processes 
and systems in a way that if implemented properly, will introduce 
interoperability and thereby improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of its operations as well as bring the agency into compliance with 
federal financial management systems requirements. NASA has also 
committed to implementing IFMP within specific cost and schedule 
constraints. In 2003, we issued five reports[Footnote 11] outlining the 
considerable challenges NASA faces in meeting its IFMP commitments and 
providing NASA the necessary tools to oversee its contracts and manage 
its program. For example, in April 2003, we reported that NASA had 
deferred addressing the needs of key system stakeholders,[Footnote 12] 
including program managers and cost estimators, and was not following 
key best practices for acquiring and implementing the system. Then, in 
November 2003, we reported that NASA (1) acquired and deployed system 
components of IFMP without an enterprise architecture, or agencywide 
modernization blueprint, to guide and constrain program investment 
decisions; (2) did not use disciplined cost estimating processes or 
recognized best practices in preparing its life cycle cost estimates; 
and (3) had delayed implementation of many key external reporting 
capabilities.

IFMP Core Financial Module Will Not Fully Address the Needs of Key 
Stakeholders:

Based on our review of NASA's three largest space flight programs--the 
space station, the space shuttle, and the Space Launch 
Initiative,[Footnote 13] in April 2003 we reported that the core 
financial module, as currently implemented, did not fully address the 
information requirements of stakeholders such as program managers, cost 
estimators, or the Congress. While NASA considers these officials to be 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the system's improvements, they were not 
involved in defining or implementing the system requirements and will 
not have a formal role in defining or measuring its success. As a 
result, NASA has neither reengineered its core business processes nor 
established adequate requirements for the system to address many of its 
most significant management challenges, including improving contract 
management; producing credible cost estimates; and providing the 
Congress with appropriate visibility over NASA's large, complex 
programs. Specific issues for key stakeholders include the following:

* Program managers. To adequately oversee NASA's largest contracts, 
program managers need reliable contract cost data--both budgeted and 
actual--and the ability to integrate these data with contract 
schedule[Footnote 14] information to monitor progress on the contract. 
However, because program managers were not involved in defining system 
requirements or reengineering business processes, the core financial 
module was not designed to integrate the cost and schedule data that 
they need. As a result, program managers told us that they would not 
use the core financial module to manage programs such as the space 
station and space shuttle and instead would continue to rely on hard 
copy reports, electronic spreadsheets, or other means to monitor 
contractor performance.

* Cost estimators. In order to estimate the costs of programs, cost 
estimators need reliable contract cost data at a level of detail 
greater than what the core financial module maintains. Although this 
module is technologically capable of maintaining the detail they need, 
cost estimators were not involved in defining the system requirements 
or reengineering business processes. Reengineering is critical here 
because a driving factor in determining what information cost 
estimators receive from contractors is what level of detail the 
contractors are required to provide, based on the contracts that they 
have negotiated with NASA. As a result, NASA has not determined the 
most cost-effective way to satisfy the information needs of its cost 
estimators. Because the core financial module will not contain the 
sufficiently detailed historical cost data necessary for projecting 
future costs, cost estimators will continue to rely on labor-intensive 
data collection efforts after a program is completed.

* The Congress. Based on our discussions with congressional staffs from 
NASA's authorizing committees, the agency did not consult with them 
regarding their information needs. Consequently, NASA cannot be sure 
that it is implementing a system that will provide the Congress with 
the information it needs for oversight.

According to IFMP officials, they chose to forgo certain system 
capabilities to expedite implementation of the core financial module. 
Thus, while the core financial module software is technologically 
capable of meeting key stakeholders' needs, it has not been configured 
to do so. IFMP officials have stated that these capabilities can be 
added at a later date. We made several recommendations related to 
engaging stakeholders, including cost estimators and program managers, 
in developing a complete and accurate set of requirements. Although 
NASA officials concurred with our recommendations, they disagreed with 
our finding--stating that they had already effectively engaged key 
stakeholders.

NASA Was Not Following Key Best Practices for Acquiring and 
Implementing IFMP:

We reported in April 2003 that NASA's approach to implementing its new 
system did not optimize the system's performance and would likely cost 
more and take longer to implement than necessary. Specifically, NASA 
was not following key best practices for acquiring and implementing the 
system, which may affect the agency's ability to fully benefit from the 
new system's capabilities. First, NASA did not analyze the 
relationships among selected and proposed IFMP components to understand 
the logical and physical relationships among the components it 
acquired. By acquiring these IFMP components without first 
understanding system component relationships, NASA increased its risks 
of implementing a system that will not optimize mission performance and 
will cost more and take longer to implement than necessary. Second, 
although industry best practices and NASA's own system planning 
documents indicate that detailed requirements are needed as the basis 
for effective system testing, NASA did not require documentation of 
detailed system requirements prior to system implementation and 
testing. NASA's approach instead relied on certain subject matter 
experts' knowledge of the detailed requirements necessary to evaluate 
the functionality actually provided.

We made several recommendations to focus near-term efforts on 
stabilizing the operational effectiveness of deployed IFMP components. 
While NASA officials concurred with our recommendations, they disagreed 
with our findings--stating that they had already implemented effective 
processes related to performing dependency analysis and requirements 
and testing.

IFMP Components Deployed without an Enterprise Architecture:

We reported in November 2003 that NASA had acquired and deployed system 
components of IFMP without an enterprise architecture, or agencywide 
modernization blueprint, to guide and constrain program investment 
decisions--actions that increased the chances that these system 
components will require additional time and resources to be modified 
and to operate effectively and efficiently. During the course of our 
review of IFMP, NASA implemented some of these key architecture 
management capabilities, such as having an enterprise architecture 
program office; designating a chief architect; and using an 
architecture development methodology, framework, and automated tools. 
However, at the time, NASA had not yet established other key 
architecture management capabilities, such as designating an 
accountable corporate entity to lead the architecture effort, having an 
approved policy for developing and maintaining the architecture, and 
implementing an independent verification and validation function to 
provide needed assurance that architecture products and architecture 
management processes are effective.

As NASA proceeds with its enterprise architecture effort, it is 
critical that it employs rigorous and disciplined management practices. 
Such practices form the basis of our architecture management maturity 
framework,[Footnote 15] which specifies by stages the key architecture 
management controls that are embodied in federal guidance and best 
practices, provides an explicit benchmark for gauging the effectiveness 
of architecture management, and provides a road map for making 
improvements. GAO made several recommendations to ensure that NASA had 
the necessary agencywide context within which to make informed IFMP and 
other systems modernization decisions. NASA agreed that improvements 
were needed and reported that it had efforts under way, consistent with 
our recommendations, to develop an architecture and ensure that IFMP 
proceeded within the context of the architecture. We have not evaluated 
NASA's progress on these commitments.

IFMP Further Challenged by Questionable Cost Estimates and an 
Optimistic Schedule:

Questionable cost estimates, an optimistic schedule, and insufficient 
processes for ensuring adequate funding reserves have put IFMP at an 
even greater risk of not meeting program objectives. In preparing its 
life cycle cost estimates for IFMP,[Footnote 16] NASA did not use 
disciplined cost estimating processes as required by its standards and 
recognized best practices. For example, NASA's current IFMP life cycle 
cost estimate--which totals $982.7 million and is 14 percent, or $121.8 
million, over the previous IFMP life cycle cost estimate--was not 
prepared on a full-cost basis. The estimate included IFMP direct 
program costs, NASA enterprise support, and civil service salaries and 
benefits, but it did not include the cost of retiring the system, 
enterprise travel costs, the cost of nonleased NASA facilities for 
housing IFMP, and other direct and indirect costs likely to be incurred 
during the life of the program. In addition, NASA did not consistently 
use breakdowns of work in preparing the cost estimate, although NASA 
guidance calls for breaking down work into smaller units to facilitate 
cost estimating and project and contract management as well as to help 
ensure that relevant costs are not omitted. In cases where work 
breakdowns were used, the agency did not always show the connection 
between the work breakdown estimates and the official program cost 
estimate. This has been a weakness since the inception of the program. 
Without a reliable life cycle cost estimate, NASA will have difficulty 
controlling program costs.

In addition, NASA's schedule may not be sufficient to address program 
challenges, such as personnel shortages. To address personnel shortages 
during the implementation of the core financial module, NASA paid 
nearly $400,000 for extra hours worked by center employees and avoided 
a slip in IFMP's compressed schedule. However, the schedule for 
implementing the budget formulation module has slipped because IFMP 
implemented this module simultaneously with the core financial module-
-an action advised against by a contractor conducting a lessons-learned 
study--placing heavy demand on already scarce resources.

Finally, the program did not consistently perform in-depth analyses of 
the potential cost impact of risks and unknowns specific to IFMP, as 
required by NASA guidance. Instead, the program established funding 
reserves on the basis of reserve levels set by other high-risk NASA 
programs. As a result, reserve funding for IFMP contingencies may be 
insufficient--which is particularly problematic, given the program's 
questionable cost estimates and optimistic schedule. As we were 
completing our audit work, one module--budget formulation--was already 
experiencing shortfalls in its reserves, and project officials 
expressed concern that the module's functionality may have to be 
reduced. Moreover, the program did not quantify the cost of high 
criticality risks--risks that have a high likelihood of occurrence and 
a high magnitude of impact--or link these risks to funding reserves to 
help IFMP develop realistic budget estimates. We made recommendations 
to provide NASA the necessary tools to accurately estimate program cost 
and predict the impact of program challenges. Although NASA concurred 
with our recommendations for corrective action, NASA indicated that its 
current processes were adequate for preparing work breakdown structure 
cost estimates, estimating life-cycle costs, and establishing reserves 
based on IFMP-specific risks.

Core Financial Module Does Not Address Long-standing External Reporting 
Issues:

The core financial module, as currently implemented, also does not 
address many of the agency's most challenging external reporting 
issues. Specifically, the core financial module does not address NASA's 
past external reporting problems related to property accounting and 
budgetary accounting. Such shortcomings limit the ability of the 
Congress and other interested parties to evaluate NASA's performance on 
an ongoing basis because NASA's financial management systems do not 
provide a complete accounting of its assets and how funds were spent. 
If these issues are not addressed, NASA will continue to face risks in 
its ability to adequately oversee its programs, manage their costs, and 
provide meaningful information to external parties, such as the 
Congress.

* Property accounting. The core financial module has not addressed the 
problems I discussed previously related to material weaknesses in 
NASA's internal controls over PP&E and materials. NASA's PP&E and 
materials are physically located throughout the world, at locations 
including NASA centers, contractor facilities, other private or 
government-run facilities, and in space. NASA's most significant 
challenge, with respect to property accounting, stems from property 
located at contractor facilities, which accounts for almost $11 
billion, or about one-third, of NASA's reported $37 billion of PP&E and 
materials and consists primarily of equipment being constructed for 
NASA or items built or purchased for use in the construction process. 
NASA has not reengineered the agency's processes for capturing contract 
costs associated with PP&E and material, and therefore, does not record 
these property costs in the general ledger at the transaction level. 
Instead, according to NASA officials, the agency plans to continue to 
(1) record the cost of PP&E and materials as expenses when initially 
incurred, (2) periodically determine which of those costs should have 
been capitalized, and (3) manually correct these records at a summary 
level. Because NASA does not maintain transaction-level detail, the 
agency is not able to link the money it spends on construction of its 
property to discrete property items and therefore must instead rely 
solely on its contractors to periodically report summary-level 
information on these assets to NASA.

* Budgetary accounting. The software NASA selected, and is now using, 
for its core financial module does not capture and report certain key 
budgetary information needed to prepare its Statement of Budgetary 
Resources. As a result, NASA continues to rely on manual compilations 
and system queries to extract the data needed to prepare the Statement 
of Budgetary Resources--just as it did using its legacy general ledger 
system. According to NASA officials, a "patch" release or software 
upgrade in October 2003 has addressed the issues we identified related 
to budgetary accounting. However, we have not verified NASA's assertion 
and previously reported that NASA had implemented similar "patch" 
releases that did not fully address this issue. As we reported in March 
2001, this cumbersome, labor-intensive effort to gather the information 
needed at the end of each fiscal year was the underlying cause of a 
$644 million misstatement in NASA's fiscal year 1999 Statement of 
Budgetary Resources. Although the software that NASA purchased for the 
core financial module was certified by the Joint Financial Management 
Improvement Program (JFMIP) as meeting all mandatory system 
requirements, NASA may have relied too heavily on the JFMIP 
certification. JFMIP has made it clear that its certification, by 
itself, does not automatically ensure compliance with the goals of 
FFMIA. Other important factors that affect compliance with Federal 
Financial Management System Requirements include how well the software 
has been configured to work in the agency's environment and the quality 
of transaction data in the agency's feeder systems. As I mentioned 
previously, NASA did not use the disciplined requirements management 
and testing processes necessary to reduce the risks associated with its 
implementation efforts to acceptable levels. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that NASA found that the system was not providing the 
desired functionality or performing as expected.

Core Financial Module Does Not Comply with FFMIA:

As I mentioned previously, in November 2003,[Footnote 17] we reported 
that NASA's new core financial module did not comply substantially with 
the requirements of FFMIA. At the time, NASA disagreed with our 
conclusions and recommendations regarding its financial management 
systems and stated that many of the problems we identified as of June 
30, 2003, had been resolved by September 30, 2003. However, in February 
2004, after NASA's independent auditor also concluded that NASA's 
financial management system, at September 30, 2003, did not 
substantially comply with the requirements of FFMIA, NASA reversed its 
position and concurred with all of our recommendations. Specifically, 
NASA agreed to implement a corrective action plan that will engage key 
stakeholders in developing a complete and accurate set of user 
requirements, reengineering its acquisition management processes, and 
bringing its systems into compliance with FFMIA.

FFMIA stresses the need for agencies to have systems that can generate 
timely, accurate, and useful financial information with which to make 
informed decisions, manage daily operations, and ensure accountability 
on an ongoing basis. Compliance with FFMIA goes far beyond receiving a 
"clean" opinion on financial statements. Instead, FFMIA provides 
agencies with the building blocks needed to reform their financial 
management organization and practices, and to support program managers 
in making wise decisions about program cost and performance. However, 
as we reported in April 2003 and in November 2003, NASA's core 
financial module did not provide program managers, cost estimators, or 
the Congress with managerially relevant cost information that they need 
to effectively manage and oversee NASA's contracts and programs, such 
as the International Space Station. NASA's continuing inability to 
provide its managers with timely, relevant data on contract spending 
and performance is a key reason that we continue to report NASA's 
contract management as an area of high risk. Because this information 
is not available through the core financial module, program managers 
will continue to rely on hard copy reports, electronic spreadsheets, or 
other means to monitor contractor performance. Consequently, NASA risks 
operating with two sets of books--one that is used to report 
information in the agency's general-purpose financial reports and 
another that is used by program managers to run NASA's projects and 
programs.

NASA Faces Significant Challenges in Reforming Its Financial Management 
Operations:

Many of NASA's financial management problems are deeply rooted in an 
agency culture that has not fully acknowledged the nature and extent of 
its financial management difficulties and does not see finance as 
intrinsic to the agency's program management decision process. Over the 
past 4 years, we have issued numerous reports highlighting NASA's 
financial management difficulties and making recommendations for 
improvement. However, NASA management has been slow to implement these 
recommendations and in many cases has denied the existence of the 
problems we and others have identified--instead attributing the 
agency's difficulties to the auditor's sampling methodology or the 
auditor's lack of understanding of NASA's operations. For example:

* In response to our August 2001 and April 2002 reports on NASA's 
compliance with the International Space Station and shuttle support 
cost limits, NASA management disagreed with our finding that NASA was 
unable to support the amounts that it had reported to the Congress as 
obligated against the statutory spending limits for the space station 
and related space shuttle support costs. At the time, NASA asserted 
that the obligations were verifiable and that our audit methodology was 
the problem. We planned to use statistical sampling, which is a 
standard, widely used methodology that enables auditors to draw 
conclusions about large populations of transactions by testing a 
relatively small number of those transactions. In order for a 
statistical sample to be valid, the complete population of items of 
interest must be subject to selection and every transaction must have a 
chance to be selected for testing. However, after nearly a year, NASA 
was not able to provide us with a complete population of transactions 
from which to draw our sample. Consequently, we were unable to verify 
the accuracy of the amount NASA reported against the cost limits.

* In a March 20, 2002, statement before this subcommittee NASA 
management attributed its failure to obtain an unqualified opinion on 
the agency's fiscal year 2001 financial statements to its auditor's 
newly required protocol for sampling. However, the only thing new about 
the sampling protocol was that NASA's previous auditor, Arthur 
Andersen, had not employed a similar approach. In fact, to test amounts 
reported on NASA's fiscal year 2001 financial statements, NASA's new 
financial statement auditor, PwC, attempted to use standard 
transaction-based statistical sampling similar to the methods we had 
attempted in our effort to audit the underlying support for amounts 
charged to the spending limits. In its audit report, PwC noted that 
successive summarization of data through NASA's various financial 
systems impeded NASA's ability to maintain an audit trail down to the 
detailed transaction-level source documentation. For this and other 
reasons, PwC concluded that it was unable to audit NASA's financial 
statements.

* In response to our April 2003 report on the status of NASA's 
implementation of IFMP, NASA management disagreed with all of our 
findings, including our concerns that NASA program managers and cost 
estimators were not adequately involved in defining system requirements 
and, therefore the system did not fully address their information 
needs. In its written comments, NASA dismissed these concerns and 
stated that the problem was a lack of understanding not a lack of 
information, and that it was incumbent upon program managers and cost 
estimators to learn and understand the capabilities of the new system 
and take advantage of them for their specific purposes.

* Finally, in response to our November 2003 report on IFMP's external 
reporting capabilities, NASA management disagreed with all of our 
conclusions and recommendations, including our conclusion that the core 
financial module, as implemented in June 2003, did not comply 
substantially with FFMIA. In its written comments, dated October 31, 
2003, NASA asserted that many of the problems we identified in June 
2003 were resolved by September 30, 2003. However, NASA's assertions 
did not prove to be accurate. In January 2004, NASA's independent 
financial statement auditor confirmed that the problems we identified 
in June 2003 related to NASA's accrued costs, budgetary accounting, and 
property accounting still existed at September 30, 2003, and that the 
system was not in compliance with FFMIA requirements. NASA reversed its 
position in February 2004 and concurred with our recommendations that 
it implement a corrective action plan that will engage key stakeholders 
in developing a complete and accurate set of user requirements, 
reengineering its acquisition management processes, and bringing its 
systems into compliance with FFMIA.

The challenges that NASA faces in reforming its financial management 
operations are significant, but not insurmountable. As our prior 
work[Footnote 18] shows, clear, strong leadership will be critical for 
ensuring that NASA's financial management organization delivers the 
kind of analysis and forward-looking information needed to effectively 
manage its many complex space programs. Further, in order to reap the 
full benefit of a modern, integrated financial management system, NASA 
must (1) routinely generate reliable cost and performance information 
and analysis, (2) undertake other value-added activities that support 
strategic decision making and mission performance, and (3) build a 
finance team that supports the agency's mission and goals.

Conclusion:

Until NASA fully acknowledges the nature and extent of its financial 
management difficulties and better integrates its financial management 
operations with its program management decision process, it will 
continue to face many of the same financial management problems I have 
discussed today. While modernizing NASA's financial management system 
is essential to enabling the agency to provide its managers with the 
kind of timely, relevant, and reliable information that they need to 
manage cost, measure performance, make program funding decisions, and 
analyze outsourcing or privatization options, NASA cannot rely on 
technology alone to solve its financial management problems. Rather, 
transforming NASA's financial management organization will also require 
sustained top leadership attention combined with effective 
organizational alignment, strategic human capital management, and end-
to-end business process reengineering. This goes far beyond obtaining 
an unqualified audit opinion and requires that agency financial 
managers focus on their overall operations in a strategic way and not 
be content with an automated system that helps the agency get a "clean" 
audit opinion once a year without providing additional value to the 
program managers and cost estimators who use its financial data.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be 
pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the 
Subcommittee may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgments:

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact 
Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-9095 or [Hyperlink, kutzg@gao.gov] or 
Allen Li at (202) 512-3600 or [Hyperlink, lia@gao.gov] or Diane 
Handley at (404) 679-1986 or [Hyperlink, handley@gao.gov]. Individuals 
making key contributions to this testimony included Fannie Bivins and 
Francine DelVecchio.

[End of section]

Related GAO Products:

Business Modernization: Disciplined Processes Needed to Better Manage 
NASA's Integrated Financial Management Program. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-118] 
Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2003.

Business Modernization: NASA's Integrated Financial Management Program 
Does Not Fully Address External Reporting Issues. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-151] 
Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2003.

Information Technology: Architecture Needed to Guide NASA's Financial 
Management Modernization. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-43] 
Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2003.

Business Modernization: Improvements Needed in Management of NASA's 
Integrated Financial Management Program. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-507] 
Washington D.C.: April 30, 2003.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-114] 
Washington, D.C.: January 2003.

NASA: Compliance With Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-504R] 
Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2002.

NASA: Leadership and Systems Needed to Effect Financial Management 
Improvements. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02- 551T] 
Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002.

NASA: International Space Station and Shuttle Support Cost Limits. GAO-
01-1000R. 
Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.

Financial Management: Misstatement of NASA's Statement of Budgetary 
Resources. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-438] 
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001. 

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FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Business Modernization: NASA's 
Integrated Financial Management Program Does Not Fully Address Agency's 
External Reporting Issues, GAO-04-151 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 
2003).

[2] FFMIA requires auditors to report whether agencies' financial 
management systems comply with federal financial management systems 
requirements, applicable federal accounting standards (U.S. generally 
accepted accounting principles), and the U.S. Government Standard 
General Ledger at the transaction level.

[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Business Modernization: 
Improvements Needed in Management of NASA's Integrated Financial 
Management Program, GAO-03-507 (Washington D.C.: Apr. 30, 2003); 
Information Technology: Architecture Needed to Guide NASA's Financial 
Management Modernization, GAO-04-43 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2003); 
Business Modernization: Disciplined Processes Needed to Better Manage 
NASA's Integrated Financial Management Program, GAO-04-118 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2003); Business Modernization: NASA's 
Challenges in Managing Its Integrated Financial Management Program, 
GAO-04-255 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2003); and GAO-04-151.

[4] NASA defined those in the financial accounting arena as the 
system's users who, under NASA's plan, would determine the system's 
requirements, guide its implementation, and define and measure its 
success. Those who would benefit from the system's new capabilities 
were identified as stakeholders. Under NASA's plan, they would be the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the system improvements, but would not have a 
role in setting requirements or measuring and determining the success 
of the system's implementation.

[5] At that time, we began a special effort to review and report on the 
federal program areas that our work had identified as high risk because 
of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. We first 
issued our High-Risk Series in December 1992 and have continued to 
include NASA's contract management as an area of high risk since. See 
U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: NASA Contract 
Management, GAO/HR-93-11 (Washington, D.C.: December 1992) and Major 
Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, GAO-03-114 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Management: Misstatement 
of NASA's Statement of Budgetary Resources, GAO-01-438 (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2001).

[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, NASA: International Space Station 
and Shuttle Support Cost Limits, GAO-01-1000R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
31, 2001), and NASA: Compliance with Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified, 
GAO-02-504R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2002).

[8] We conducted a limited scope review of NASA's fiscal year 2002 
financial statement audit performed by NASA's IPA, PwC, to assist in 
planning future audits of the U.S. government's consolidated financial 
statements. Based on our review of PwC's supporting audit evidence, we 
would not have been able to rely on its work for the purpose of 
fulfilling our responsibilities related to the audit of the U.S. 
government's consolidated financial statements. We reported in March of 
2004 to the NASA Inspector General that our review of PwC's supporting 
audit evidence revealed deficiencies in audit documentation, audit 
planning, and testing. Specifically, adequate audit tests were not 
performed for major balance sheet line items such as Fund Balance with 
Treasury; property, plant, and equipment (PP&E); and materials. It was 
not our intent to determine whether the audit opinion rendered was 
appropriate or to reperform any of the auditor's work. Our procedures 
consisted of an evaluation of evidence obtained from the auditor's 
fiscal year 2002 audit documentation and discussions with audit 
personnel. We did not independently test, reperform, or make 
supplemental tests of any of the account balances.

[9] GAO-04-151. 

[10] The nine modules are core financial, resume management, travel 
management, position description management, human resource 
management, payroll, budget formulation, contract administration, and 
asset management.

[11] GAO-03-507, GAO-04-43, GAO-04-151, GAO-04-118, and GAO-04-255.

[12] NASA defined those in the financial accounting arena as the 
system's users who, under NASA's plan, would determine the system's 
requirements, guide its implementation, and define and measure its 
success. Those who would benefit from the system's new capabilities 
were identified as stakeholders. Under NASA's plan, they would be the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the system improvements, but would not have a 
role in setting requirements or measuring and determining the success 
of the system's implementation.

[13] During the time of our review, NASA was pursuing a program--known 
as the Space Launch Initiative--to build a new generation of space 
vehicles to replace its aging space shuttle. This was part of NASA's 
broader plan for the future of space travel--known as NASA's Integrated 
Space Transportation Plan. On October 21, 2002, NASA postponed further 
implementation of the program to focus on defining the Department of 
Defense's role, determining future requirements of the International 
Space Station, and establishing the agency's future space 
transportation needs. In November 2002, the administration submitted to 
the Congress an amendment to NASA's fiscal year 2003 budget request to 
implement a new Integrated Space Transportation Plan. The plan made 
investments to extend the space shuttle's operational life and 
refocused the Space Launch Initiative program on developing an 
orbital space plane--which provides crew transfer capability to and 
from the space station--and next generation launch technology. The 
President's vision on space exploration, announced in January 2004, may 
alter that plan.

[14] The term "schedule" incorporates both the concept of status of 
work and whether a project or task is being completed within planned 
time frames. Depending on the nature of the work being performed, the 
method of measuring work progress varies. Work is measured in terms of 
tasks when a specific end product or result is produced. But when work 
does not produce a specific end product or result, level-of-effort or a 
more time-oriented method of measurement is used. 

[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: A 
Framework for Assessing and Improving Enterprise Architecture 
Management (Version 1.1), GAO-03-584G (Washington, D.C.: April 2003).

[16] Fiscal years 2001 through 2010.

[17] GAO-04-151.

[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Creating Value 
Through World-class Financial Management, GAO/AIMD-00-134 (Washington, 
D.C.: April 2000). Our executive guide was based on practices used by 
nine leading organizations--Boeing; Chase Manhattan Bank; General 
Electric; Pfizer; Hewlett-Packard; Owens Corning; and the states of 
Massachusetts, Texas, and Virginia.