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entitled 'Military and Veterans' Benefits: Observations on the 
Concurrent Receipt of Military Retirement and VA Disability 
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST:



Thursday, March 27, 2003:



Military and Veterans’ benefits:



Observations on the Concurrent Receipt of Military Retirement and VA 

Disability Compensation:



Statement of Cynthia A. Bascetta, Director, 

Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues:



GAO-03-575T:



GAO Highlights:



Highlights of GAO-03 -575T, testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate



Why GAO Did This Study:



Because pending legislation would modify current law, which requires 

that military retirement pay be reduced by the amount of VA disability 

compensation benefit received, the Subcommittee asked GAO to discuss 

the treatment of concurrent benefit receipt in other programs. GAO was 

also asked to discuss its broader work on federal disability programs.



What GAO Found



Three factors are important to weigh in deliberations on the merits of

modifying the military offset provision. First, many benefit programs

use offset provisions when individuals qualify for benefits from more 

than one program. Generally, the provisions are designed to treat 

beneficiaries of multiple programs fairly and equitably in relation 

to all other program beneficiaries, consistent with the program’s 

purpose. Moreover, eliminating the military retirement offset 

provision could establish a precedent for other federal benefit 

programs that could prove costly.



Second, the proposed modifications to the concurrent receipt 

provisions in the military retirement system would have implications 

not only for the Department of Defense’s retirement costs but would 

also increase the demand placed on the Department of Veterans Affairs’

 (VA) claim processing system. This would come at a time when the 

system is still struggling to correct problems with quality assurance 

and timeliness. 



Third, such increased demand would come at a time when the VA 

disability program compensation, along with other federal disability 

programs, is facing the need for more fundamental reform. Modifying 

the concurrent receipt provisions adds to the current patchwork of 

federal disability policies and programs at a time when 

transformation and modernization are needed. While we are not taking 

a position on whether military retirement should be modified, as the 

Congress and other policymakers deliberate this issue, it would be 

appropriate to consider how modifying the offset would affect the 

pursuit of more fundamental reforms.



www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-575T.

To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click 

on the link above. For more information, contact Cynthia A. Bascetta 

at (202) 512-7101.



[End of section]



Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:



Thank you for inviting me to discuss issues involved with the 

concurrent receipt of military retirement pay from the Department of 

Defense (DOD) and disability compensation from the Department of 

Veterans Affairs (VA). Pending legislation would modify current law, 

which requires that military retirement pay be reduced by the amount of 

VA disability compensation benefit received. You asked us to discuss 

the treatment of concurrent benefit receipt in other programs as well 

as our broader work on federal disability programs.



To help you in your deliberations on this matter, I will explain the 

use of offset provisions in other federal benefit programs as well as 

in state and private sector programs. I will also discuss some of the 

implications of modifying the concurrent receipt provisions for the VA 

disability compensation program. In addition, I will address the more 

fundamental problems facing VA’s disability program. My statement is 

based on a review of GAO reports on Workers’ Compensation, Social 

Security, and VA benefit programs and other literature relating to DOD 

retirement and VA disability compensation. I will also draw on our 

broader work on federal disability programs, which we recently 

designated as high-risk because they are not well positioned to provide 

meaningful and timely support to Americans with disabilities (see 

Related GAO Products). Our work for this testimony was conducted in 

March 2003, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.



In summary, three factors are important to weigh in your deliberations 

on the merits of modifying the military retirement offset provision. 

First, many benefit programs use offset provisions when individuals 

qualify for benefits from more than one program. The use of offset 

provisions in numerous benefit programs is a common method for dealing 

with the consequences of beneficiaries qualifying for more than one 

benefit program. The rationales for these offset provisions vary, but 

they are generally designed to treat beneficiaries of multiple programs 

fairly and equitably in relation to all other program beneficiaries, 

consistent with the program’s purpose. Moreover, eliminating the 

military retirement offset provision could establish a precedent for 

other federal benefit programs that could prove costly. Second, the 

proposed modifications to the concurrent receipt provisions in the 

military retirement system would have implications not only for DOD’s 

retirement costs, but would also increase the demand placed on VA’s 

claims processing system. This would come at a time with this system is 

still struggling to correct problems with quality assurance and 

timeliness. Third, the VA disability compensation program, along with 

other federal disability programs, is facing the need for more 

fundamental reform. Modifying the concurrent receipt provision would 

add to the current patchwork of federal disability policies and 

programs at a time when transformation and modernization should be 

considered. While we are not taking a position on whether the military 

retirement offset provision should be modified, as the Congress and 

other policymakers deliberate this issue, it would be appropriate to 

consider how modifying the offset would affect the pursuit of more 

fundamental reforms.



Background:



Generally, DOD provides longevity retirement pay to military service 

members upon completion of 20 creditable years of active duty service. 

DOD also provides disability retirement pay to eligible servicemembers 

who are determined unfit for duty-that is, unable to perform their 

military duties. To qualify for military disability retirement, the 

servicemember’s disability must have been determined by DOD medical 

personnel to be permanent and the servicemember must have (1) at least 

20 years of creditable service or (2) an evaluation board determination 

that the servicemember has a physical disability rating of at least 30 

percent,[Footnote 1] and either at least 8 years of creditable service 

or a disability resulting from active duty. Nearly 1.5 million retired 

servicemembers received retirement and disability retirement pay in 

fiscal year 2002. In fiscal year 2000, the average disability retiree 

who had been an officer received about $2,022 per month, while the 

average enlisted disability retiree received about $698 per month.



VA provides monthly disability compensation to veterans who have 

service-connected disabilities to compensate them for the average 

reduction in earnings capacity that is expected to result from injuries 

or diseases incurred or aggravated by military service. The payment 

amount is based on a disability rating scale that begins at 0 for the 

lowest severity and increases in 10-percent increments to 100 percent 

for the highest severity. Many veterans claim multiple disabilities, 

and veterans can reapply for higher ratings and more compensation if 

their disabilities worsen. For veterans who claim more than one 

disability, VA rates each claim separately and then combines them into 

a single rating. About 

65 percent of compensated veterans receive payments based on a rating 

of 30 percent or less and about 8 percent are rated at 100 percent. 

Average monthly compensation payments in 2002 ranged from about $100 

for a 

10-percent rating to over $2,100 for a 100-percent rating.



Military retirees with disabilities incurred during their military 

service may receive military retirement pay (based on either longevity 

or disability, whichever is more financially advantageous to the 

servicemember) from DOD and disability compensation from VA. For 

example, a servicemember who incurs a disability may still be fit for 

duty, depending on the nature and severity of the impairment. If that 

servicemember completes 20 years of creditable service, he or she may 

retire based on longevity and also qualify for VA disability 

compensation for the same impairment or a different impairment that is 

also service-connected. Similarly, a servicemember who incurs a 

disability and is found unfit for duty may receive military retirement 

pay based on disability if he or she meets additional eligibility 

requirements. This servicemember may also qualify for VA disability 

compensation for the same impairment or a different impairment that is 

also service-connected.



Current law requires that military retirement pay be reduced (“offset”) 

by the amount of VA disability benefits received. In 1891, Congress 

passed legislation to prohibit what it regarded to be dual compensation 

for either past or current service and a disability pension. Despite 

the reduction in military retirement pay, it is often to a retiree’s 

advantage to receive VA disability compensation in lieu of military 

retirement pay. These VA benefits provide an after-tax advantage 

because they are not subject to federal income tax, as military 

retirement pay generally is. In addition, the disability compensation 

VA pays can be increased if medical reevaluation of the retiree’s 

condition is found by VA to have worsened. Because VA disability 

compensation is based on the severity of the disability and not on 

actual earnings (as is military retirement pay), the VA benefit may, in 

some instances, be larger than the amount of military retirement pay.



For certain retirees with serious disabilities, the National Defense 

Authorization Act of 2000 provides a cash benefit that is less than 

what they would have received through concurrent receipt of their 

military retirement pay and VA disability compensation. The statute 

states that these special compensation payments are not military 

retirement pay. As such, they are not subject to the offset provisions, 

and the legislation did not change the statute that prohibits 

concurrent receipt. The special compensation payments were reauthorized 

in 2001 and 2002. [Footnote 2]



In addition, the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314) 

authorized a new category of “special compensation” for retirees with 

disabilities, including those who received a Purple Heart or have a 

disability due to “combat-related” activities. Under the new law, 

eligible retirees would now be able to receive the financial equivalent 

of concurrent receipt, although, again, the legislation did not repeal 

the statute prohibiting concurrent receipt.[Footnote 3] Military 

retirees may become eligible for this special compensation if (1) their 

disability is attributable to an injury for which the member was 

awarded the Purple Heart, and is not rated less than a 10-percent 

disability by DOD or VA; or (2) they receive a disability rating of at 

least 60 percent from either DOD or VA for injuries that were incurred 

due to involvement in “armed conflict,” “hazardous service,” “duty 

simulating war” and through an instrumentality of war.[Footnote 4] 

Retirees who are eligible under this new special compensation category 

will no longer be entitled to the special compensation payments first 

enacted in 2000. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that 

this new special compensation would cost about $6 billion over 10 

years. 

Table 1 shows the 2003 monthly payments amounts of the special 

compensation enacted in 2000 as well as the monthly payment amounts for 

the new category of special compensation.



Table 1: Special Compensation Monthly Payment Amounts for Service-

Connected Disabilities in Addition to Military Retirement Pay:



VA disability rating: 60%; 2003 payment amounts for special 

compensation enacted in 2000: $50; 2003 payment amounts for new 

category of special compensation[A]: $790.



VA disability rating: 70%; 2003 payment amounts for special 

compensation enacted in 2000: $100; 2003 payment amounts for new 

category of special compensation[A]: $995.



VA disability rating: 80%; 2003 payment amounts for special 

compensation enacted in 2000: $125; 2003 payment amounts for new 

category of special compensation[A]: $1,155.



VA disability rating: 90%; 2003 payment amounts for special 

compensation enacted in 2000: $225; 2003 payment amounts for new 

category of special compensation[A]: $1,299.



VA disability rating: 100%; 2003 payment amounts for special 

compensation enacted in 2000: $325; 2003 payment amounts for new 

category of special compensation[A]: $2,163.



Source: Congressional Research Service and Department of Veterans 

Affairs.



[A] Payment is equivalent to the base amount of the VA disability 

compensation for each rating category. Amounts do not reflect 

allowances for eligible family members. The table does not reflect 

payment amounts for eligible Purple Heart recipients with disability 

ratings of less than 60 percent.



[End of table]



Current proposals before Congress pertaining to concurrent receipt 

would, if enacted, expand the number of those eligible to 

simultaneously receive the equivalent of their full retirement pay and 

compensation for a disability beyond the 2003 National Defense 

Authorization Act. CBO estimated that an earlier version of these 

proposals would cost about $46 billion over 10 years. Over a longer 

time horizon, the additional financial liability would be of even 

greater significance because of mounting concerns about the long-term 

fiscal consequences of federal entitlements.



Many Programs Use Offset Provisions When Individuals Are Eligible for 

Benefits from More than One Program:



Among the programs that provide benefits to individuals based on their 

previous work experience or their inability to continue working because 

of disability, many use offset provisions when an individual qualifies 

for benefits under more than one program. The specific rationales for 

these offset provisions vary, but they generally focus on restoring 

equity and fairness by treating beneficiaries of more than one program 

in a similar manner as beneficiaries who qualify for benefits under 

only one of the programs. Table 2 provides examples of benefit programs 

that include offset provisions. (See app. I for a description of these 

programs.):



Table 2: Examples of Offset Provisions in Benefit Programs:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Research Service and GAO reports.



[End of table]



Some programs use offset provisions to ensure that the total benefits 

received from two programs do not exceed the total income received 

while working. For example, the Social Security Disability Insurance 

(DI) program provides benefits to insured persons to replace the income 

lost when they are unable to work because of physical or mental 

impairments. In addition to DI benefits, some individuals may also be 

eligible for workers’ compensation (WC) if the illness or injury is 

work-related. WC benefits are designed to replace the loss of earnings 

resulting from work-related illnesses or injuries. Each state and the 

District of Columbia generally requires employers operating in its 

jurisdictions to provide WC insurance for their employees.[Footnote 5] 

The Social Security Administration (SSA) generally requires that DI 

benefits be reduced for persons who also receive WC.[Footnote 6] This 

offset applies when combined DI and WC benefits exceed 80 percent of 

the injured worker’s average current earnings. The reduction can apply 

even if the DI and WC benefits are for unrelated injuries or illnesses. 

In 1971, the Supreme Court validated the WC offset provision stating 

that it was intended to provide an incentive for injured employees to 

return to work because the Congress did not believe it was desirable 

for injured workers to receive disability benefits that, in combination 

with their WC benefits, exceeded their preinjury earnings.[Footnote 7]



Some programs use offset provisions to adjust benefit computation 

formulas that were not originally designed to account for individuals 

or their dependents working under more than one retirement system. An 

example is Social Security’s Government Pension Offset (GPO) provision, 

enacted in 1977 to equalize the treatment of workers covered by Social 

Security and those with government pensions not covered by Social 

Security. The Social Security Act requires that most workers be covered 

by Social Security benefits.[Footnote 8] In addition to paying 

retirement and disability benefits to covered workers, Social Security 

also generally pays benefits to spouses of retired, disabled, or 

deceased workers. Although state and local government workers were 

originally excluded from Social Security, today about two-thirds of 

state and local government workers are covered by Social 

Security.[Footnote 9] Prior to 1977, a spouse receiving a pension from 

a government position not covered by Social Security could receive a 

full pension benefit and a full Social Security spousal benefit as if 

he or she were a nonworking spouse. The GPO prevents spouses from 

receiving a full spousal benefit in addition to a full pension benefit 

earned from noncovered government employment.[Footnote 10]



Offset provisions are also used by state governments. For example, 

29 states and the District of Columbia permit insurers to reduce WC 

cash payments when the beneficiary also receives other types of 

benefits, such as those from Social Security retirement, survivor, or 

disability programs or from government or private pension plans. In 

addition, as required by federal law, states must deduct from 

unemployment compensation the value of pensions, retirement pay, or 

annuities based on previous work in certain situations. The purpose of 

this offset is to reduce the incentive for retirees who receive 

pensions to file for unemployment compensation and increase their 

incentive to seek work.



Private sector insurers also use offsets. Our study of three large 

private disability insurers[Footnote 11] found that nearly two-thirds 

of those receiving private long-term disability benefits from the three 

private insurers also received DI benefits.[Footnote 12] In such cases, 

the private disability benefit payments were generally reduced by the 

amount of the DI benefit payment.



Modifying the Concurrent Receipt Provisions Has Implications for the VA 

Disability Compensation Program:



In addition to the cost of the benefits, allowing concurrent receipt 

would have implications for VA program management. Allowing concurrent 

receipt of military retirement pay and VA disability compensation could 

provide new incentives for military retirees to file for VA 

compensation or to seek increases in their disability ratings for VA 

compensation that they are already receiving. These new claims could 

further tax VA’s claims processing system. We recently reported that VA 

faces long-standing challenges to improve the timeliness and quality of 

disability claims decisions. In addition to creating delays in 

veterans’ receipt of entitled benefits, untimely, inaccurate, and 

inconsistent claims decisions can negatively affect veterans’ receipt 

of other VA benefits and services, including health care, because VA’s 

assigned disability ratings help determine eligibility and priority for 

these benefits.[Footnote 13] While the cost of these new benefits and 

VA’s administrative challenges in processing the claims may not provide 

sufficient bases to retain the offset, they warrant consideration in 

weighing this matter.



VA Disability Programs Face Fundamental Problems:



While VA has had difficulty making decisions in a timely and consistent 

manner, VA’s disability programs also face more fundamental problems. 

Our concerns about the long-standing challenges that VA faces in claims 

processing contributed to our recent decision to place federal 

disability programs, including VA’s programs, on our high-risk list of 

programs that need urgent attention and transformation to ensure that 

they function in the most economical, efficient, and effective manner 

possible.[Footnote 14] This designation was based in part on our 

finding that these programs use outmoded criteria for determining 

disability. For example, VA’s disability ratings schedule is still 

primarily based on physicians’ and lawyers’ judgments made in 1945 

about the effect service-connected conditions had on the average 

individual’s ability to perform jobs requiring manual or physical 

labor. Although VA is revising the medical criteria for its Schedule 

for Rating Disabilities, the estimates of how impairments affect 

veterans’ earnings have generally not been reexamined. As a result, 

changes in the nature of work that have occurred over the last half-

century--which potentially affect the extent to which disabilities 

limit one’s earning capacity--are overlooked by the program’s criteria. 

For example, in an increasingly knowledge-based economy, one could 

consider whether physical impairments such as the loss of an extremity 

still reduce earning capacity by 40 to 70 percent.[Footnote 15]



These outdated concepts persist despite scientific advances and 

economic and social changes that have redefined the relationship 

between impairments and the ability to work. Advances in medicine and 

technology have reduced the severity of some medical conditions and 

have allowed individuals to live with greater independence and function 

in work settings. Moreover, the nature of work has changed as the 

national economy has become increasingly knowledge-based. Without a 

current understanding of the impact of physical and mental conditions 

on earnings given labor market changes, VA and other agencies 

administering federal disability programs may be overcompensating some 

individuals while undercompensating or denying benefits to other 

individuals because of outdated information on earning capacity. At the 

same time, the projected slowdown in growth of the nation’s labor force 

makes it imperative that those who can work are supported in their 

efforts to do so.



In reexamining the fundamental concepts underlying the design of 

federal disability programs, approaches used by other disability 

programs may offer valuable insights. For example, our prior review of 

three private disability insurers shows that they have fundamentally 

reoriented their disability systems toward building the productive 

capacities of people with disabilities, while not jeopardizing the 

availability of cash benefits for people who are not able to return to 

the labor force. As we previously reported, to fully incorporate 

scientific advances and labor market changes into the disability 

programs would require more fundamental change, such as revisiting the 

programs’ basic orientation from incapacity to capacity. Reorienting 

programs in this direction would align them with broader social changes 

that focus on building and supporting the work capacities of people 

with disabilities. Such a reorientation would require examining complex 

program design issues such as beneficiaries’ access to medical care and 

assistive technologies, the benefits offered and their associated 

costs, and strategies to return beneficiaries to work. Moreover, 

reorientation of the federal disability programs would necessitate the 

integration of the many programs and policies affecting people with 

disabilities, including those of DOD and VA.



Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to 

answer any questions that you or the other Subcommittee members might 

have.



Contacts and Acknowledgments:



For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at 

(202) 512-7101 or Carol Dawn Petersen at (202) 512-7215. Suit Chan, 

Beverly Crawford, and Shelia Drake also contributed to this statement.



[End of section]



Appendix I: Benefits and Eligibility Requirements for 

Programs Containing Offset Provisions:



Program: Social Security benefits; Benefits provided: Cash benefits to 

workers and their dependents who qualify as beneficiaries under the 

Old-Age Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) programs of the 

Social Security Act. OASDI replaces a portion of earnings lost as a 

result of retirement, disability, or death.; Eligibility: The worker 

and his/her eligible family members must meet different sets of 

requirements for each type of benefit. An underlying condition of 

payment of most benefits is that the worker has contributed to Social 

Security for the required period of time..



Program: Social Insurance for Railroad Workers (Railroad retirement 

benefits); Benefits provided: Cash benefits to retired or disabled 

railroad workers, their dependents and survivors. Railroad workers may 

also receive sickness and unemployment benefits.; Eligibility: Railroad 

worker must have had at least 120 months of creditable railroad service 

or 60 months of creditable railroad service if such service was 

performed after 1995..



Program: Coal Mine Workers’ Compensation (Black Lung benefits); 

Benefits provided: Cash benefits to coal miners who have become totally 

disabled due to coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, and to widows and other 

surviving dependents of miners who have died of this disease; 

Eligibility: Coal miner must have worked in the nation’s coal mines or 

a coal preparation facility and become totally disabled from 

pneumoconiosis..



Program: Federal Employees Retirement System; Benefits provided: Cash 

benefits to retired or disabled federal employees, and survivors of 

federal employees and retirees.; Eligibility: Federal employees whose 

initial federal employment began after December 31, 1983, or who 

voluntarily switched from Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) to 

FERS. The worker must have at least 5 years of creditable civilian 

service. Survivor and disability benefits are available after 18 months 

of civilian service.



Program: Workers’ Compensation; Benefits provided: Various cash and 

medical benefits to workers injured while working or who have 

occupational diseases.; Eligibility: Specific eligibility requirements 

and benefit amounts vary from state to state..



Program: Federal-State Unemployment Insurance Program (Unemployment 

compensation); Benefits provided: Temporary financial assistance to 

eligible workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own and 

are actively engaged in job search.; Eligibility: Worker must meet the 

state requirements for wages earned or time worked during an 

established period of time, and be determined unemployed through no 

fault of his/her own, and meet other eligibility requirements of his/

her state law..



Program: Private disability insurance; Benefits provided: Short-or 

long-term disability insurance, or both, to replace income lost by 

employees because of injuries and illnesses.; Eligibility: Specific 

eligibility requirements vary from plan to plan..



[End of table]



Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Research Service and GAO reports.



[End of section]



Related GAO Products:



Social Security: Congress Should Consider Revising the Government 

Pension Offset “Loophole.” GAO-03-498T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 

2003.



Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the 

Veteran Affairs. GAO-03-110. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.



High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119. Washington, D.C.: January 

2003.



Veterans’ Benefits: Claims Processing Timeliness Performance Measures 

Could Be Improved. GAO-03-282. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2002.



Veterans’ Benefits: Quality Assurance for Disability Claims and Appeals 

Processing Can Be Further Improved. GAO-02-806. Washington, D.C.: 

August 16, 2002.



SSA and VA Disability Programs: Re-Examination of Disability Criteria 

Needed to Help Ensure Program Integrity. GAO-02-597. Washington, D.C.: 

August 9, 2002.



Veterans’ Benefits: Despite Recent Improvements, Meeting Claims 

Processing Goals Will Be Challenging. GAO-02-645T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 26, 2002.



Workers’ Compensation: Action Needed to Reduce Payment Errors in SSA 

Disability and Other Programs. GAO-01-367. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 

2001:



SSA Disability: Other Programs May Provide Lessons for Improving 

Return-to-Work Efforts. GAO-01-153. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2001.



FOOTNOTES



[1] A disability rating is essentially an indication of medical 

severity of an impairment: the more severe the medical condition, then 

the higher the percentage of the disability rating, which can range 

from 0 to 100 percent.



[2] The monthly dollar amounts of “special compensation” at each 

disability level of 70 percent or more will increase by $25 per month 

on October 1, 2004. 



[3] As before, the statute states that these special compensation 

payments are not military retirement pay. As such, they are not subject 

to the offset provisions.



[4] To date, regulations have not been promulgated to implement this 

provision, including definitions for these terms.



[5] These programs established a mechanism to pay injured workers 

predictable levels of compensation without delay. Although WC programs 

exist in all states, the programs are not federally mandated, 

administered, or regulated. Rather, they evolved throughout the 20th 

century under state laws with the support of labor and management. 



[6] SSA cannot offset disability benefits if the state WC program 

allows the insurers to reduce the amount of WC benefits they would 

normally pay to an injured worker when the worker also receives Social 

Security DI benefits. In 1981, the Congress limited recognition of such 

exceptions to the 14 states that had established them by Feb. 18, 1981.



[7] Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).



[8] Workers contribute to Social Security through payroll taxes.



[9] Starting in the 1950s, state and local governments had the option 

of selecting Social Security coverage for their employees or retaining 

their noncovered status. In 1983, state and local governments in the 

Social Security system were prohibited by law from opting out of it. 



[10] If both spouses worked in positions covered by Social Security, 

each may not receive both the benefits earned as a worker and a full 

spousal benefit; rather each member of the couple would receive the 

higher amount of the two. 



[11] In 1997, these three companies covered about half of the long-term 

U.S. private disability insurance market.



[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, SSA Disability: Other Programs May 

Provide Lessons for Improving Return-to-Work Efforts, GAO-01-153 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2001).



[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and 

Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs, GAO-03-110 (Washington, 

D.C.: Jan. 2003).



[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, 

GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003)



[15] GAO-03-110. VA recognizes that there have been significant changes 

in the nature of work, but does not believe that these changes need to 

be reflected in the disability ratings. VA contends that the disability 

rating schedule, as constructed, represents a consensus among Congress, 

VA, and the veteran community, and that the ratings generally represent 

an equitable method to determine disability compensation. We continue 

to believe, as we have said in the past, that the current estimates of 

the average reduction in earning capacity should be reviewed. Further, 

we believe that updating disability criteria is consistent with the 

law. U.S. General Accounting Office, SSA and VA Disability Programs: 

Re-Examination of Disability Criteria Needed to Help Ensure Program 

Integrity, GAO-02-597 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 2002).