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Testimony:



Before the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Committee 

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST:



Wednesday, March 12, 2003:



Coast Guard:



Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and 

Measure Performance for All Missions:



Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director

Physical Infrastructure:



GAO-03-544T:



GAO Highlights:



Highlights of GAO-03-544T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Oceans, 

Atmosphere,  and Fisheries, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation 



Why GAO Did This Study:



The September 11th attacks decidedly changed the Coast Guard’s 
priorities 

and markedly increased its scope of activities.  Homeland security, a 

long-standing but relatively small part of the Coast Guard’s duties, 
took 

center stage.  Still, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many 
other 

missions important to the nation’s interests, such as helping stem the 

flow of drugs and illegal migration, protecting important fishing 

grounds, and responding to marine pollution.  For the past several 
years, 

the Coast Guard has received substantial increases in its budget to 

accommodate its increased responsibilities.  GAO was asked to review 
the 

Coast Guard’s most recent level of effort on its various missions and 

compare them to past levels, analyze the implications of the proposed 

2004 budget for these levels of effort, and discuss the challenges the

Coast Guard faces in balancing and maximizing the effectiveness of all 

its missions.  



What GAO Found:



The most recent levels of effort for the Coast Guard’s various missions 

show clearly the dramatic shifts that have occurred among its missions 

since the September 11th attacks.  Predictably, levels of effort 

related to homeland security remain at much higher levels than before 

September 11th.  Levels of effort for two major nonsecurity missions—

search and rescue and aids to navigational—are now relatively 

consistent with historical levels.  By contrast, several other 

missions—most notably fisheries enforcement and drug interdiction—

dropped sharply after September 11th and remain substantially below 

historical levels.  Although the Coast Guard has stated that its aim 

is to increase efforts in the missions that have declined, continued 

homeland security and defense demands make it unlikely that the 

agency, in the short run, can deliver on this goal.  The 2004 budget 

request contains little that would appear to substantially alter the 

existing levels of effort among missions.  The initiatives in the 

proposed budget relate mainly to enhancing homeland security and 

search and rescue missions.  



Although the 2004 budget request represents a sizeable increase in 

funding (9.6 percent), the Coast Guard still faces fundamental 

challenges in meeting its new security-related responsibilities while 

rebuilding its capacity to accomplish other missions that have 

declined.  Given the likely constraints on the federal budget in 

future years, it is important for the Coast Guard to identify the 

likely level of effort for each of its missions; lay out a plan for 

achieving these levels; and tie these levels to measurable outputs 

and goals, so that the agency and the Congress can better decide how 

limited dollars should be spent.



What GAO Recommends:



In order to monitor resource use and measure performance, GAO 

recommended in November, 2002 that the Coast Guard develop a 

longer-term strategy outlining how resources will be distributed 

across missions, a time frame for achieving this desired balance, 

and a useful format for reporting progress to the Congress.  The Coast 

Guard agreed with the need for such a strategy and has started an 

effort to develop one.



www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-544T.



To view the full testimony, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact JayEtta Hecker at (206) 512-2834 or 

heckerj@gao.gov.



Madame Chair and Members of the Subcommittee:



I am pleased to be here today to discuss the President’s fiscal year 

2004 budget request for the Coast Guard and the challenges the agency 

faces in this and future budgets. Since the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has had to reinvent itself in many 

respects, shifting its focus and resources from many of its traditional 

missions--such as stemming the flow of illegal drugs and protecting 

important fishing grounds--to homeland security. The President’s fiscal 

year 2004 budget request for the Coast Guard is $6.8 billion, a 9.6 

percent increase in nominal dollars from the previous year. If the 

request is approved, about half of the agency’s operating expenses will 

be directed to fulfilling expanded homeland security responsibilities. 

How--and whether--the Coast Guard can continue to meet its 

responsibilities for all of its missions, given the increased emphasis 

on and resources required for homeland security, is a matter of great 

concern to the Congress.



My testimony today, which is based on recently completed work, 

addresses three topics: (1) the most recent levels of effort for the 

Coast Guard’s various missions, and how these levels compare to those 

in the past; (2) the implications of the proposed 2004 budget for these 

various levels of effort; and (3) the challenges the Coast Guard faces 

in balancing its resources among its missions and ensuring and 

maximizing its effectiveness in each of its missions. The scope and 

methodology of our review is described in the appendix.



In summary:



* The most recent levels of effort for the Coast Guard’s various 

missions, as measured by the use of multiple-mission resources such as 

cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft, show clearly the dramatic increase 

in the amount of time spent on homeland security following the 

September 11th attacks. In the months after the attacks, as the initial 

surge in homeland security activities was abating, activity in many 

other missions began returning to pre-September 11th levels, but some 

have not yet recovered. For example, the amount of resource hours 

currently being spent on search and rescue and maintaining aids to 

navigation are fairly consistent with traditional levels over the last 

5 years. However, there have been substantial declines from traditional 

levels of time spent on two law enforcement missions--fisheries 

enforcement and drug interdiction. Although the Coast Guard Commandant 

has stated that the Coast Guard would like to return all law 

enforcement missions to 93 percent of pre-September 11th levels by the 

end of 2003 and 95 percent by the end of 2004, it appears unlikely that 

the Coast Guard can meet these goals. Achieving these goals depends 

heavily on not having to respond to such contingencies as heightened 

terror alerts or deployment of Coast Guard resources in military 

operations. However, in the current environment, such contingencies 

continue to occur, as evidenced by the recent deployment of several 

cutters and patrol boats to the Persian Gulf as part of the Middle East 

buildup.



* The fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Coast Guard contains 

little that would substantially change the levels of effort for most 

missions. The budget request of $6.8 billion represents an increase of 

about $592 million, or almost 10 percent over the previous year. About 

$168 million is earmarked for new initiatives, mainly in homeland 

security and search and rescue missions. Coast Guard officials said 

that some of the new initiatives, such as establishing better 

intelligence networks, would have potential benefit for other security-

related missions, such as migrant and drug interdiction, but the 

initiatives do not directly pertain to augmenting activities or adding 

new capacity in those missions that have seen substantial declines in 

activity.



* Although the Coast Guard has received substantial budget increases in 

recent years to deal with its increased responsibilities--a trend that 

continues in the proposed budget--the Coast Guard still faces 

fundamental challenges in being able to accomplish all the 

responsibilities it has been given. The Coast Guard’s Deepwater 

Project, a modernization effort for cutters, patrol boats, and 

aircraft, has already experienced delays in the delivery of key assets, 

jeopardizing the agency’s future ability to carry out a number of 

missions at optimum levels. This situation could worsen because the 

Coast Guard has tied successful completion of the project to levels of 

funding that are beyond what has been available. Another budgetary 

challenge is that, for the foreseeable future, the Coast Guard must 

implement a variety of recently mandated homeland security tasks by 

taking resources from other activities. Similarly, any unexpected 

changes--such as terrorist attacks or extended terror alerts--could 

also result in using resources for homeland security purposes that 

would normally be used for other missions. Such challenges raise 

serious concerns about the Coast Guard’s ability to meet traditional 

expectations across the broad range of all of its missions. In recent 

reports[Footnote 1], we have pointed to several steps that are needed 

in such an environment. One is to continue finding ways to operate more 

efficiently to maximize the existing resources available. Another is to 

develop a comprehensive blueprint for accomplishing mission 

responsibilities. This blueprint needs to recognize the new operating 

reality created by the Coast Guard’s increasing homeland security role 

and translate that reality into establishing realistic level-of-effort 

targets for its all of missions, a plan for achieving these targets, 

and appropriate measurement and reporting of results so that the agency 

and the Congress can better decide how limited dollars can be spent.



Background:



The Coast Guard, which became a part of the Department of Homeland 

Security on March 1, 2003, has a wide variety of both security and 

nonsecurity missions. (See table 1.) The Coast Guard’s equipment 

includes 141 cutters, approximately 1,400 small patrol and rescue 

boats, and about 200 aircraft. Coast Guard services are provided in a 

variety of locations, including ports, coastal areas, the open sea, and 

in other waterways like the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River. The 

Coast Guard’s installations range from small boat stations providing 

search and rescue and other services to marine safety offices that 

coordinate security and other activities in the nation’s largest ports.



Table 1: Security and Nonsecurity Missions of the Coast Guard:



Mission area[A]: Security missions.



Mission area[A]: Ports, waterways, and coastal security; Activities and 

functions within each mission area: Security missions: Conducting 

harbor patrols, vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and 

analysis, and other activities to prevent terrorist attacks and 

minimize the damage from attacks that occur.



Mission area[A]: Drug interdiction; Activities and functions within 

each mission area: Security missions: Deploying cutters and aircraft in 

high drug trafficking areas and gathering intelligence to reduce the 

flow of illegal drugs across maritime boundaries.



Mission area[A]: Migrant interdiction; Activities and functions within 

each mission area: Security missions: Deploying cutters and aircraft to 

reduce the flow of undocumented migrants entering the United States by 

maritime routes.



Mission area[A]: Defense readiness; Activities and functions within 

each mission area: Security missions: Participating with the Department 

of Defense (DOD) in global military operations; deploying cutters and 

other boats in and around harbors to protect DOD force mobilization 

operations.



Mission area[A]: Nonsecurity missions.



Mission area[A]: Maritime safety; Activities and functions within each 

mission area: Security missions: Setting standards and conducting 

vessel inspections to better ensure the safety of passengers and crew 

aboard cruise ships, ferries, and other passenger vessels and 

commercial and fishing vessels; partnering with states and boating 

safety organizations to reduce recreational boating deaths.



Mission area[A]: Search and rescue; Activities and functions within 

each mission area: Security missions: Operating small boat stations and 

national distress and response communication system; conducting search 

and rescue operations for mariners in distress.



Mission area[A]: Living marine resources; Activities and functions 

within each mission area: Security missions: Protecting our nation’s 

fishing grounds from foreign encroachment; enforcing domestic fishing 

laws and regulations through inspections and fishery patrols.



Mission area[A]: Environmental protection; Activities and functions 

within each mission area: Security missions: Preventing and responding 

to marine oil spills; preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and 

garbage into our nation’s waters.



Mission area[A]: Aids to navigation; Activities and functions within 

each mission area: Security missions: Maintaining the extensive system 

of navigation aids in our waterways; monitoring marine traffic through 

traffic service centers.



Mission area[A]: Ice operations; Activities and functions within each 

mission area: Security missions: Conducting polar operations to 

facilitate the movement of critical goods and personnel in support of 

scientific and national security activity; conducting domestic 

icebreaking operations to facilitate year-round commerce.



Source: U.S. Coast Guard.



[A] The Coast Guard’s security and nonsecurity missions are delineated 

in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002).



[End of table]



As an organization that is also part of the armed services, the Coast 

Guard has both military and civilian positions. At the end of fiscal 

year 2002, the agency had over 42,000 full-time positions--about 36,000 

military and about 6,600 civilians. The Coast Guard also has about 

7,200 reservists who support the national military strategy and provide 

additional operational support and surge capacity during emergencies, 

such as natural disasters. In addition, about 36,000 volunteer 

auxiliary personnel assist in a wide range of activities from search 

and rescue to boating safety education.



Overall, after using fiscal year 2003 inflation-adjusted dollars to 

adjust for the effects of inflation, the Coast Guard’s budget grew by 

about 41 percent between fiscal years 1993 and 2003. However, nearly 

all of this growth occurred in the second half of the period. During 

fiscal years 1993-1998, after taking inflation into account, the budget 

remained essentially flat. (See fig. 1.) Significant increases have 

occurred since fiscal year 1998.



Figure 1: Annual Budgets for the Coast Guard, Fiscal Years 1993-2003:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



The events of September 11th caused the Coast Guard to direct its 

efforts increasingly into maritime homeland security activities, 

highlighted by the Coast Guard’s establishing a new program area: 

Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (coastal security). Prior to 

September 11th, activities related to this area represented less than 

10 percent of the Coast Guard’s operating budget, according to Coast 

Guard officials. In the fiscal year 2004 request, Coastal Security 

represents about one-quarter of the Coast Guard’s operating budget. 

Other mission areas, most notably drug interdiction, have declined 

substantially as a percentage of the operating budget.



Security Emphasis Continues to Affect Levels of Effort in Some 

Missions:



The emphasis the Coast Guard placed on security after September 11th 

has had varying effects on its level of effort among all of its 

missions, as measured by the extent to which multiple-mission resources 

(cutters, other boats, and aircraft) are used for a particular mission. 

The most current available data show that some security-related 

missions, such as migrant interdiction and coastal security, have grown 

significantly since September 11th. Other missions, such as search and 

rescue and aids to navigation remained at essentially the same levels 

as they were before September 11th. However, the level of effort for 

other missions, most notably the interdiction of illegal drugs and 

fisheries enforcement, is substantially below pre-September 11th 

levels.



Missions with Increased Levels of Resources:



Missions such as ports, waterways, and coastal security, and migrant 

interdiction have experienced increased levels of effort. Coastal 

security has seen the most dramatic increase from pre-September 11th 

levels. (See fig. 2.) For example, it went from 2,400 resource 

hours[Footnote 2] during the first quarter of 1999, peaked at 91,000 

hours during the first quarter of fiscal year 2002 (immediately after 

September 11, 2001), and most recently stood at nearly 37,000 hours for 

the first quarter of fiscal year 2003. In figure 2, as well as the 

other resource hour figures that follow, we have added a line developed 

by using a linear regression[Footnote 3] to show the general trend for 

the period. It is important to note that while such lines depict the 

trend in resource hours to date, they should not be taken as a 

prediction of future values. Other activity indicators, such as sea 

marshal[Footnote 4] boardings, also demonstrate an increased emphasis 

in this area. Before September 11th, such boardings were not done, but 

as of the first quarter of 2003 there have been over 550 such 

boardings. Similarly, vessel operational control actions[Footnote 5] 

have risen by 85 percent since the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2001.



Figure 2: Number of Resource Hours Spent on Ports, Waterways, and 

Coastal Security, by Quarter, October 1998 - December 2002:



[See PDF for image]



Note: GAO analysis of data from the Coast Guard’s Abstract of 

Operations includes resource hours for cutters, boats, and aircraft. 

Figures shown are for the first quarter of fiscal year 1999 and 2003, 

respectively. The dotted line shows actual quarter-by-quarter totals; 

the thicker line is a regression line showing the general trend.



[End of figure]



Given the emphasis on homeland security, it is not surprising that 

efforts to interdict illegal immigrants have also increased. For 

example, during the first quarter of 2003, the level of effort in this 

area was 28 percent higher than it was for the comparable period in 

1998.



Missions with a Steady State of Resources:



Some of the Coast Guard’s traditional missions, such as aids to 

navigation and search and rescue, have been the least affected by the 

increased emphasis on security. While resource hours for both of these 

missions have declined somewhat since the first quarter of fiscal year 

1998, the overall pattern of resource use over the past 5 years has 

remained consistent. Although search and rescue boats and buoy tenders 

were used to perform homeland security functions immediately after 

September 11th, their doing so did not materially affect the Coast 

Guard’s ability to carry out its search and rescue or aids to 

navigation missions. Search and rescue boats were initially redeployed 

for harbor patrols after the terrorist attacks, but the impact on the 

mission was minimal because the deployments occurred during the off-

season with respect to recreational boating.[Footnote 6] Similarly, 

some boats that normally serve as buoy tenders--an aids to navigation 

function--were used for security purposes instead, but they were among 

the first to be returned to their former missions. For the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2003, the number of resource hours spent on 

these missions was very close to the number spent during the comparable 

quarter of fiscal year 1998.



Figure 3: Number of Resource Hours Spent on Search and Rescue and Aids 

to Navigation, by Quarter, October 1997-December 2002:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Performance measurement data further demonstrates the relatively 

minimal impact on these missions resulting from the Coast Guard’s 

emphasis on homeland security. For example, for search and rescue, the 

Coast Guard was within about half a percentage point of meeting its 

target for saving mariners in distress in 2002 (84.4 percent actual, 85 

percent goal). Likewise, data show that with respect to its aid to 

navigation mission, in 2002 the Coast Guard was about 1 percent from 

its goal of navigational aid availability (98.4 percent actual, 99.7 

percent goal).



Missions with a Decline in Resource Hours:



A number of missions have experienced declines in resource hours from 

pre-September 11th levels, including drug interdiction, fisheries 

enforcement (domestic and foreign), marine environmental protection, 

and marine safety. In particular, drug enforcement and fisheries 

enforcement have experienced significant declines. Compared with the 

first quarter of 1998, resource hours for the first quarter of fiscal 

year 2003 represent declines of 60 percent for drug interdiction and 38 

percent for fisheries enforcement. (See fig. 4.) In fact, resource 

hours for these areas were declining even before the events of 

September 11th, and while they briefly rebounded in early 2002, they 

have since continued to decline. A Coast Guard official said the recent 

decline in both drug enforcement and fisheries can be attributed to the 

heightened security around July 4, 2002, and the anniversary of the 

September 11th terrorist attacks, as well as the deployment of 

resources for military operations. They said the decline will likely 

not be reversed during the second quarter of 2003 because of the 

diversion of Coast Guard cutters to the Middle East and the heightened 

security alert that occurred in February 2003.



Figure 4: Number of Resource Hours Spent on Drug Interdiction and 

Fisheries Enforcement, by Quarter, October 1997-December 2002:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



The reduction in resource hours over the last several years in drug 

enforcement is particularly telling. In the first quarter of 1998, the 

Coast Guard was expending nearly 34,000 resource hours on drug 

enforcement, and as of first quarter of 2003, the resource hours had 

declined to almost 14,000 hours--a reduction of nearly two-thirds. 

Also, both the number of boardings to identify illegal drugs and the 

amount of illegal drugs seized declined from the first quarter of 

fiscal year 2000. The Coast Guard’s goal of reducing the flow of 

illegal drugs based on the seizure rate for cocaine has not been met 

since 1999. During our conversations with Coast Guard officials, they 

explained that the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) set 

this performance goal in 1997, and although they recognize they are 

obligated to meet these goals, they believe the goals should be 

revised.



Our review of the Coast Guard’s activity levels in domestic fishing 

shows U.S. fishing vessel boardings and significant violations[Footnote 

7] identified are both down since 2000. The Coast Guard interdicted 

only 19 percent as many foreign vessels as it did in 2000.[Footnote 8] 

The reduced level of effort dedicated to these two missions is likely 

linked to the Coast Guard’s inability to meet its performance goals in 

these two areas. For instance, in 2002 the Coast Guard did not meet its 

goal of detecting foreign fishing vessel incursions,[Footnote 9] and 

while there is no target for domestic fishing violations, there were 

fewer boardings and fewer violations in 2002 than in 2000.



Recently, the Coast Guard Commandant stated that the Coast Guard 

intends to return law enforcement missions (drug interdiction, migrant 

interdiction, and fisheries enforcement) to 93 percent of pre-September 

11th levels by the end of 2003 and 95 percent by the end of 2004. 

However, in the environment of heightened security and the continued 

deployment of resources to the Middle East, these goals will likely not 

be achieved, especially for drug interdiction and fisheries 

enforcement, which are currently far below previous activity levels.



Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request Will Not Substantially Alter Current 

Levels of Effort:



The Coast Guard’s budget request for fiscal year 2004 does not contain 

initiatives or proposals that would substantially alter the current 

distribution of levels of effort among mission areas. The request for 

$6.8 billion represents an increase of about $592 million, or about 9.6 

percent in nominal dollars, over the enacted budget for fiscal year 

2003. The majority of the increase covers pay increases for current or 

retired employees or continues certain programs already under way, such 

as upgrades to information technology. About $168.5 million of the 

increase would fund new initiatives, most of which relate either to 

homeland security or to search and rescue. Another $20.8 million of the 

increase is for the capital acquisitions request,[Footnote 10] which 

totals $797 million. The capital acquisition request focuses mainly on 

two projects--the Deepwater Project for replacing or upgrading cutters, 

patrol boats, and aircraft, and the congressionally mandated 

modernization of the maritime distress and response system.



Operating Expenses Would Increase by $440 Million:



About $440 million of the $592 million requested increase is for 

operating expenses[Footnote 11] for the Coast Guard’s mission areas. 

This requested increase in operating expenses is 10 percent higher than 

the amount for operating expenses in the enacted budget for fiscal year 

2003. The requested increase is made up of the following:



* pay increases and military personnel entitlements: $162.5 

million;[Footnote 12]



* funding of continuing programs and technical adjustments: $81 

million; (These are multiyear programs that the Coast Guard began in 

previous years. Examples include continuing development of information 

technology projects and operating new shore facilities started with 

funds from previous budgets. Technical adjustments provide for the 

annualization of expenditures that received only partial-year funding 

in the prior fiscal year.):



* Reserve training: $28 million; and:



* new initiatives: $168.5 million. (These initiatives are described in 

more detail below.):



New Initiatives Relate Primarily to Search and Rescue and Homeland 

Security:



The Coast Guard’s budget request includes three new initiatives--one 

for search and rescue and two for homeland security. (See table 2.) As 

such, these initiatives do not represent substantial shifts in current 

levels of effort among missions. The search and rescue initiative is 

part of a multiyear effort to address shortcomings in search and rescue 

stations and command centers. In September 2001, the Department of 

Transportation Office of the Inspector General reported that readiness 

at search and rescue stations was deteriorating.[Footnote 13] For 

example, staff shortages at most stations required crews to work an 

average of 84 hours per week, well above the standard (68 hours) 

established to limit fatigue and stress among personnel. The initiative 

seeks to provide appropriate staffing and training to meet the 

standards of a 12-hour watch and a 68-hour work week. The Congress 

appropriated $14.5 million in fiscal year 2002 and $21.7 million in 

fiscal year 2003 for this initiative. The amount requested for fiscal 

year 2004 ($26.3 million) would pay for an additional 390 full-time 

search and rescue station personnel and for 28 additional instructors 

at the Coast Guard’s motor lifeboat and boatswain’s mate schools.



Table 2: New Initiatives in the Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request for 

Operational Expenses:



New Initiative: Maritime Search and Rescue/Personnel Safety; 390 new 

full time personnel for search and rescue stations and command centers; 

Additional Instructors and Training Enhancements; Amount (in millions): 

$26.3.



New Initiative: Maritime Domain Awareness; Intelligence program; 

Information sharing and systems; Amount (in millions): $33.5.



New Initiative: Homeland Security Operations; 6 new marine safety and 

security teams; 51 sea marshals; 43 small response boats; 2 port 

security units; Establish stations at Washington, D.C. and Boston; 

Amount (in millions): $108.7.



New Initiative: Total fiscal year 2004 new initiatives; Amount (in 

millions): $168.5.



Source: U.S. Coast Guard.



[End of table]:



Coast Guard officials said the two initiatives designed mainly for 

homeland security purposes would help the Coast Guard in other mission 

areas as well. For example, the information-sharing effort under 

maritime domain awareness is designed to improve communications between 

cutters and land stations. It also pays for equipping cutters with the 

universal automated identification system, which allows the Coast Guard 

to monitor traffic in its vicinity, including the vessel name, cargo, 

and speed. These capabilities are important not only for homeland 

security missions, but also for law enforcement and search and rescue, 

according to Coast Guard officials. Likewise, the units being added as 

part of the homeland security operations initiative will focus 

primarily on security issues but will also serve other missions, 

according to Coast Guard officials. For example, the new stations that 

would be established in Washington and Boston would be involved in 

search and rescue, law enforcement, and marine environmental 

protection.



Capital Acquisition Budget Focuses on Two Main Projects:



The capital acquisition budget request for fiscal year 2004 is $797 

million, an increase of $20.8 million in nominal dollars over fiscal 

year 2003. The majority of the request will go to fund two projects--

the Integrated Deepwater System and the Coast Guard’s maritime distress 

and response system, called Rescue 21. Other acquisitions include new 

response boats to replace 41-foot utility boats which serve multiple 

missions, more coastal patrol boats, as well as a replacement 

icebreaker for the Great Lakes. (See table 3.):



Table 3: Fiscal Year 2004 Capital Acquisition Budget Request:



Item: Integrated Deepwater System; Amount (in millions): $ 500.0.



Other systems:



Item: Rescue 21; Amount (in millions): $ 134.0.



Item: Defense Message System implementation; Amount (in millions): $ 

4.5.



Vessels and critical infrastructure projects:



Item: Great Lakes icebreaker replacement; Amount (in millions): $ 2.0.



Item: 41’ utility boat replacement; Amount (in millions): $ 12.0.



Item: Additional coastal patrol boats to enforce security zones; Amount 

(in millions): $ 52.5.



Item: Personnel and related support costs; Amount (in millions): $ 

70.0.



Item: Research, development, testing, and evaluation; Amount (in 

millions): $ 22.0.



Item: Total; Amount (in millions): $ 797.0.



Source: U.S. Coast Guard.



[End of table]:



At $500 million, the Deepwater Project accounts for about 63 percent of 

the amount requested for capital acquisitions. This project is a long-

term (20 to 30 years) integrated approach to upgrading cutters, patrol 

boats, and aircraft as well as providing better links between air, 

shore, and surface assets. When the system is fully operational, it 

will make the Coast Guard more effective in all of its missions, 

particularly law enforcement where deepwater cutters and aircraft are 

key to carrying out critical functions such as drug and migrant 

interdiction and fisheries enforcement.



Rescue 21, the second major program, provides for the modernization of 

the command, control, and communication infrastructure of the national 

distress and response system. The current system suffers from aging 

equipment, limited spare parts, and limited interoperability with other 

agencies. Of particular concern to the Coast Guard and the maritime 

community are the current system’s coverage gaps, which can result in 

missed maritime distress calls. The Congress has mandated that this 

system be completed by the end of fiscal year 2006. The $134 million 

request for fiscal year 2004 would keep the project on schedule, 

according to Coast Guard officials.



Significant Challenges Raise Concerns About Coast Guard’s Ability to 

Accomplish Its Diverse Missions:



Despite the billion-dollar (19 percent) budget increase it has received 

over the past 2 years, the Coast Guard faces fundamental challenges in 

attempting to accomplish everything that has come to be expected of it. 

We have already described how the Coast Guard has not been able, in its 

current environment, to both assimilate its new homeland security 

responsibilities and restore other missions, such as enforcement of 

laws and treaties, to levels that are more reflective of past years. 

The fiscal year 2004 budget request does not provide substantial new 

funding to change these capabilities, except for homeland security and 

search and rescue. In addition, several other challenges further 

threaten the Coast Guard’s ability to balance these many missions. The 

first is directly tied to funding for the Deepwater Project. The 

project has already experienced delays in delivery of key assets and 

could face additional delays if future funding falls behind what the 

Coast Guard had planned. Such delays could also seriously jeopardize 

the Coast Guard’s ability to carry out a number of security and 

nonsecurity missions. Similarly, for the foreseeable future, the Coast 

Guard must absorb a variety of new mandated homeland security tasks by 

taking resources from existing activities. To the extent that these 

responsibilities consume resources that would normally go elsewhere, 

other missions will be affected. Finally, in its new environment, the 

Coast Guard faces the constant possibility that terror alerts, 

terrorist attacks, or military actions would require it to shift 

additional resources to homeland security missions.



Such challenges raise serious concerns about the Coast Guard’s ability 

to be “all things to all people” to the degree that the Coast Guard, 

the Congress, and the public desire. In past work, we have pointed to 

several steps that the Coast Guard needs to take in such an 

environment. These include continuing to address opportunities for 

operational efficiency, especially through more partnering; developing 

a comprehensive strategy for balancing resource use across all of its 

missions; and developing a framework for monitoring levels of effort 

and measuring performance in achieving mission goals. The Coast Guard 

has begun some work in these areas; however, addressing these 

challenges is likely to be a longer-term endeavor, and the success of 

the outcome is not clear.



Continued Funding Shortfalls Could Delay the Deepwater Project and 

Adversely Affect the Coast Guard’s Mission Capabilities:



Under current funding plans, the Coast Guard faces significant 

potential delays and cost increases in its $17 billion Integrated 

Deepwater Project. This project is designed to modernize the Coast 

Guard’s entire fleet of cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft over a 20-

year period. Given the way the Coast Guard elected to carry out this 

project, its success is heavily dependent on receiving full funding 

every year. So far, that funding has not materialized as planned. 

Delays in the project, which have already occurred, could jeopardize 

the Coast Guard’s future ability to effectively and efficiently carry 

out its missions, and its law enforcement activities--that is, drug and 

migrant interdiction and fisheries enforcement--would likely be 

affected the most, since they involve extensive use of deepwater 

cutters and aircraft.



Under the project’s contracting approach, the responsibility for 

Deepwater’s success lies with a single systems integrator and its 

contractors for a period of 20 years or more. Under this approach, the 

Coast Guard has started on a course potentially expensive to alter. It 

is based on having a steady, predictable funding stream of $500 million 

in 1998 dollars over the next 2 to 3 decades. Already the funding 

provided for the project is less than the amount the Coast Guard 

planned for. The fiscal year 2002 appropriation for the project was 

about $28 million below the planned level, and the fiscal year 2003 

appropriated level was about $90 million below the planning estimate. 

And even the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Coast 

Guard is not consistent with the Coast Guard’s deepwater funding plan. 

If the requested amount of $500 million for fiscal year 2004 is 

appropriated, this would represent another shortfall of $83 million, 

making the cumulative shortfall about $202 million in the project’s 

first 3 years, according to Coast Guard data. If appropriations hold 

steady at $500 million (in nominal dollars) through fiscal year 2008, 

the Coast Guard estimates that the cumulative shortfall will reach $626 

million.[Footnote 14]



The shortfalls in the last 2 fiscal years (2002 and 2003) and their 

potential persistence could have serious consequences. The main impact 

is that it would take longer and cost more in the long run to fully 

implement the deepwater system. For example, due to funding shortfalls 

experienced to date, the Coast Guard has delayed the introduction of 

the Maritime Patrol Aircraft by 19 months and slowed the conversion and 

upgrade program for the 110-foot Patrol Boats. According to the Coast 

Guard, if the agency continues to receive funding at levels less than 

planned, new asset introductions--and the associated retirement of 

costly, less capable Coast Guard legacy assets--will continue to be 

deferred.



The cost of these delays will be exacerbated by the accompanying need 

to invest additional funds in maintaining current assets beyond their 

planned retirement date because of the delayed introduction of 

replacement capabilities and assets, according to the Coast Guard. For 

example, delaying the Maritime Patrol Aircraft will likely require some 

level of incremental investment to continue safe operation of the 

current HU-25 jet aircraft. Similarly, a significant delay in the 

scheduled replacement for the 270-foot Medium Endurance Cutter fleet 

could require an unplanned and expensive renovation for this fleet.



System performance--and the Coast Guard’s capability to effectively 

carry out its mission responsibilities--would also likely be impacted 

if funding does not keep pace with planning estimates. For example, 

Coast Guard officials told us that conversions and upgrades for the 

110-foot Patrol Boat would extend its operating hours from about 1,800 

to 2,500 per year. Once accomplished, this would extend the time these 

boats could devote to both security and nonsecurity missions. Given the 

funding levels for the project, these conversions and upgrades have 

been slowed. Coast Guard officials also said that with significant, 

continuing funding shortfalls delaying new asset introductions, at some 

point, the Coast Guard would be forced to retire some cutters and 

aircraft--even as demand for those assets continues to grow. For 

example, in 2002, two major cutters and several aircraft were 

decommissioned ahead of schedule due to their deteriorated condition 

and high maintenance costs.



Some New Homeland Security Duties Are Not Fully Factored into the Coast 

Guard’s Distribution of Resources:



A second challenge is that the Coast Guard has been tasked with a 

myriad of new homeland security requirements since the fiscal year 2004 

budget request was formulated and will have to meet many of these 

requirements by pulling resources from other activities. Under the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA),[Footnote 15] signed into 

law in November 2002, the Coast Guard must accomplish a number of 

security-related tasks within a matter of months and sustain them over 

the long term. MTSA requires the Coast Guard to be the lead agency in 

conducting security assessments, developing plans, and enforcing 

specific security measures for ports, vessels, and facilities. In the 

near term, the Coast Guard must prepare detailed vulnerability 

assessments of vessels and facilities it identifies to be at high risk 

of terrorist attack. It must also prepare a National Maritime 

Transportation Security Plan that assigns duties among federal 

departments and agencies and specifies coordination with state and 

local officials--an activity that will require substantial work by 

Coast Guard officials at the port level. The Coast Guard must also 

establish plans for responding to security incidents, including 

notifying and coordinating with local, state, and federal authorities.



Because the fiscal year 2004 budget request was prepared before MTSA 

was enacted, it does not specifically devote funding to most of these 

port security responsibilities. Coast Guard officials said that they 

will have to absorb costs related to developing, reviewing, and 

approving plans, including the costs of training staff to monitor 

compliance, within their general budget.[Footnote 16] Coast Guard 

officials expect that the fiscal year 2005 budget request will contain 

funding to address all MTSA requirements; in the meantime, officials 

said that the Coast Guard would have to perform most of its new port 

security duties without additional appropriation, and that the funds 

for these duties would come from its current operations budget. The 

costs of these new responsibilities, as well as the extent to which 

they will affect resources for other missions, are not known.



External Uncertainties Place Additional Strain on Resources:



Security alerts, as well as actions needed in the event of an actual 

terrorist attack, can also affect the extent to which the Coast Guard 

can devote resources to missions not directly related to homeland 

security. Coast Guard officials told us that in the days around 

September 11, 2002, when the Office of Homeland Security raised the 

national threat level from “elevated” to “high” risk, the Coast Guard 

reassigned cutters and patrol boats in response. In February 2003, when 

the Office of Homeland Security again raised the national threat level 

to “high risk,” the Coast Guard repositioned some of its assets 

involved in offshore law enforcement missions, using aircraft patrols 

in place of some cutters that were redeployed to respond to security-

related needs elsewhere. While these responses testify to the 

tremendous flexibility of a multi-mission agency, they also highlight 

what we found in our analysis of activity-level trends--when the Coast 

Guard responds to immediate security needs, fewer resources are 

available for other missions.



The Coast Guard’s involvement in the military buildup for Operation 

Enduring Freedom in the Middle East further illustrates how such 

contingencies can affect the availability of resources for other 

missions. As part of the buildup, the Coast Guard has deployed eight 

110-foot boats, two high-endurance cutters, four port security units, 

and one buoy tender to the Persian Gulf. These resources have come from 

seven different Coast Guard Districts. For example, officials from the 

First District told us they sent four 110-foot patrol boats and three 

crews to the Middle East. These boats are multi-mission assets used for 

fisheries and law enforcement, search and rescue, and homeland security 

operations. In their absence, officials reported, the First District is 

more flexibly using other boats previously devoted to other tasks. For 

instance, buoy tenders have taken on some search and rescue functions, 

and buoy tenders and harbor tug/icebreakers are escorting high-interest 

vessels. Officials told us that these assets do not have capabilities 

equivalent to the patrol boats but have been able to perform the 

assigned mission responsibilities to date.



Several Types of Actions Needed to Address Challenges:



In previous work, we have examined some of the implications of the 

Coast Guard’s new operating environment on the agency’s ability to 

fulfill its various missions.[Footnote 17] This work, like our 

testimony today, has pointed to the difficulty the Coast Guard faces in 

devoting additional resources to nonsecurity missions, despite the 

additional funding and personnel the agency has received. In 

particular, we have suggested that the following actions need to be 

taken as a more candid acknowledgement of the difficulty involved:



* Opportunities for increased operational efficiency need to be 

explored. Over the past decade, we and other outside organizations, 

along with the Coast Guard itself, have studied Coast Guard operations 

to determine where greater efficiencies might be found. These studies 

have produced a number of recommendations, such as shifting some 

responsibilities to other agencies. One particular area that has come 

to the forefront since September 11th is the Coast Guard’s potential 

ability to partner with other port stakeholders to help accomplish 

various security and nonsecurity activities involved in port 

operations. Some effective partnerships have been established, but the 

overall effort has been affected by variations in local stakeholder 

networks and limited information-sharing among ports.

:



* A comprehensive blueprint is needed for setting and assessing levels 

of effort and mission performance. One important effort that has 

received relatively little attention, in the understandable need to 

first put increased homeland security responsibilities in place, is the 

development of a plan that proactively addresses how the Coast Guard 

should manage its various missions in light of its new operating 

reality. The Coast Guard’s adjustment to its new post-September 11th 

environment is still largely in process, and sorting out how 

traditional missions will be fully carried out alongside new security 

responsibilities will likely take several years. But it is important to 

complete this plan and address in it key elements and issues so that it 

is both comprehensive and useful to decision makers who must make 

difficult policy and budget choices. Without such a blueprint, the 

Coast Guard also runs the risk of continuing to communicate that it 

will try to be “all things to all people” when, in fact, it has little 

chance of actually being able to do so.



The Coast Guard has acknowledged the need to pursue such a planning 

effort, and the Congress has directed it to do so. Coast Guard 

officials told us that as part of the agency’s transition to the 

Department of Homeland Security, they are updating the agency’s 

strategic plan, including plans to distribute all resources in a way 

that can sustain a return to previous levels of effort for traditional 

missions. In addition, the Congress placed a requirement in MTSA for 

the Coast Guard to submit a report identifying mission targets, and 

steps to achieve them, for all Coast Guard missions for fiscal years 

2003-2005. However, this mandate is not specific about the elements 

that the Coast Guard should address in the report.



To be meaningful, this mandate should be addressed with thoroughness 

and rigor and in a manner consistent with our recent recommendations--

it requires a comprehensive blueprint that embodies the key steps and 

critical practices of performance management. Specifically, in our 

November 2002 report on the progress made by the Coast Guard in 

restoring activity levels for its key missions, we recommended an 

approach consisting of a long-term strategy outlining how the Coast 

Guard sees its resources--cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel--

being distributed across its various missions, a time frame for 

achieving this desired balance, and reports with sufficient information 

to keep the Congress apprised not only of how resources were being 

used, but what was being accomplished. The Coast Guard agreed that a 

comprehensive strategy was needed, and believes that they are beginning 

the process to develop one. Table 4 provides greater explanation of 

what this approach or blueprint would entail.



Table 4: Elements of an Approach for Setting and Assessing Levels of 

Effort and Mission Effectiveness:



Element: Setting realistic targets for levels of effort in 

each mission area; Explanation: Targets need to take into account the 

finite Deepwater and other resources available in the near to medium 

term and the likely homeland security scenarios based on resource 

requirements needed to respond to various potential terrorist threats 

and attacks.



Element: Developing an action plan for achieving 

targets; Explanation: Action plan needs to include:; * an analysis of 

the mix of resources needed and timetables required to achieve level-

of-effort targets;; * strategies for partnering with other public and 

private sector organizations to accomplish mission activities;; * 

contingency plans for addressing responsibilities for all of its 

missions during prolonged “high alert” periods;; * new approaches and 

techniques, including the use of new technology, for achieving mission 

responsibilities; and; * identifying operational efficiencies that 

would free up funds for more mission-enhancing needs, such as keeping 

the Deepwater Project on schedule.



Element: Establishing realistic performance measures 

for all missions; Explanation: Includes two steps:; * completing 

performance measures for homeland security, and; * evaluating and 

revising, where necessary, performance measures, such as those for drug 

interdiction, for all missions.



Element: Collecting sufficiently complete, accurate, and consistent 

performance data to measure effectiveness in meeting performance 

targets; Explanation: Includes data on:; * resources being applied to 

each mission (money, personnel, and capital assets),; * output measures 

that describe what is being done with these resources (e.g., numbers of 

patrols and inspections conducted), and; * outcome data on the extent 

that program goals are being achieved.



Source: GAO.



[End of table]



The events of recent months heighten the need for such an approach. 

During this time, the budgetary outlook has continued to worsen, 

emphasizing the need to look carefully at the results being produced by 

the nation’s large investment in homeland security. The Coast Guard 

must be fully accountable for investments in its homeland security 

missions and able to demonstrate what these security expenditures are 

buying and their value to the nation. At the same time, recent events 

also demonstrate the extent to which highly unpredictable homeland 

security events, such as heightened security alerts, continue to 

influence the amount of resources available for performing other 

missions. The Coast Guard needs a plan that will help the agency, the 

Congress, and the public understand and effectively deal with trade-

offs and their potential impacts in such circumstances.



Madame Chair, this concludes my testimony today. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may 

have at this time.



Contacts and Acknowledgments:



For information about this testimony, please contact JayEtta Z. Hecker, 

Director, Physical Infrastructure, at (202) 512-2834, or 

heckerj@gao.gov, or Margaret T. Wrightson, at (415) 904-2200, or 

wrightsonm@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony include Steven Calvo, Christopher M. Jones, Sharon Silas, 

Stan Stenersen, Eric Wenner, and Randall Williamson.



[End of section]



Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:



To determine the most recent levels of effort for the Coast Guard’s 

various missions and how these levels compare to those in the past, we 

reviewed the data from the Coast Guard’s Abstract of Operations. These 

data, reported by crews of cutters, boats, and aircraft, represent the 

hours that these resources spent in each of the Coast Guard’s mission 

areas. We reviewed these data to identify how resources were utilized 

across missions both before and after September 11th, and to identify 

any trends in resource utilization. In addition, we spoke with Coast 

Guard officials at headquarters about the use of Coast Guard resources 

both before and after September 11th.



To determine the implications of the proposed fiscal year 2004 budget 

request for these various levels of effort, we reviewed the President’s 

fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Coast Guard, as well as the 

enacted budget for the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2003. We used the 

Department of Commerce’s chain-weighted price index for gross domestic 

product to adjust nominal dollare figures for the effect of inflation. 

In addition, we spoke with Coast Guard officials within the Coast 

Guard’s Office of Programs and Operations Directorate, the Marine 

Safety Directorate, and the Integrated Deepwater Systems Program 

Office.



To identify the challenges the Coast Guard faces in balancing its 

resources among its missions and ensuring and maximizing its 

effectiveness in each of its missions, we reviewed our previous reports 

on performance management and developing performance measures. We also 

reviewed Coast Guard strategic documents and discussed these with staff 

in the Coast Guard’s Program Management and Evaluation Division. In 

addition, we met with officials from the Coast Guard’s Department of 

Homeland Security Transition team to discuss strategic planning and 

transition issues.



FOOTNOTES



[1] Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of 

Effort for All Missions. GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002), 

and Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as it 

Transitions to the New Department. GAO-03-467T (Washington, D.C.: Feb 

12, 2003)



[2] The Coast Guard maintains information, on a mission-by-mission 

basis, about how cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft are used. Each 

hour that these resources are used in a mission is called a resource 

hour. Resource hours do not include such things as the time that the 

resource stands idle or the time that is spent maintaining it.



[3] Linear regression estimates the coefficients of the linear 

equation, involving one or more independent variables, that best 

predict the value of the dependent variable.



[4] Sea marshals are armed Coast Guard personnel who board selected 

vessels operating in and around U.S. ports and harbors and take 

position on the ship’s bridge and other areas determined to be 

necessary to vessel safety. These teams provide additional security to 

ensure that only authorized personnel maintain control of the vessel at 

all times. 



[5] Vessel operational control actions are efforts to control vessels 

and can include captain of the port orders, administration orders, 

letters of deviation, and safety and the designation of security zones.



[6] Search and rescue resources are subject to seasonal cycles, with 

more resources being used during the summer months when boating is at 

its peak. 



[7] The Coast Guard defines significant violations as any or all of the 

following: (1) significant damage or impact to the resource or the 

fisheries management plan, (2) significant monetary advantage to the 

violator over the competition, or (3) a high regional interest of 

emotional or political nature as determined by regional fisheries 

councils.



[8] Activity data for foreign fishing vessels is a comparison of fourth 

quarters in 2000 and 2002.



[9] In fiscal year 2002, the Coast Guard’s goal was to detect 250 

foreign fishing vessel incursions into U.S. fishing waters. Only 202 

were detected that year.



[10] For fiscal year 2004, the Capital Acquisition account includes 

funding previously requested in the Coast Guard Acquisition, 

Construction, and Improvement account, and Research, Development, Test 

and Evaluation accounts, as well as the Alteration to Bridges account. 

We have reflected this change when making comparisons to the fiscal 

year 2003 enacted budget.



[11] For fiscal year 2004, the Operating Expense account consolidates 

funding previously requested in the Coast Guard Operating Expenses, 

Environmental Compliance and Restoration, and Reserve Training 

accounts. We have reflected this change when making comparisons to the 

fiscal year 2003 enacted budget.



[12] This does not include an increase of $131 million in pay for 

retired personnel. Because retirees are not part of ongoing operations, 

their pay is not considered to be an operating expense. However, the 

$131 million increase for retired pay is included in the overall 

requested increase of $592 million. 



[13] Audit of the Small Boat Station Search and Rescue Program. MH-

2001-94 (Washington, D.C.: Sept 14, 2001).



[14] The $28 million shortfall is expressed in 2002 dollars, the $90 

million shortfall in 2003 dollars, and the $202 million shortfall in 

2004 dollars. The $626 million dollar shortfall is expressed in 2008 

dollars. 



[15] Pub. L. 107-295, Nov. 25, 2002.



[16] The Coast Guard had already begun work on two aspects of the 

legislation; these aspects are accounted for in the fiscal year 2004 

budget request. These two items are requirements to (1) create marine 

safety and security teams and (2) to dispatch armed officers as sea 

marshals for some port security duties. 



[17] Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond 

GAO-02-588T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 2002), and Coast Guard: 

Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All 

Missions GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002).