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Testimony:



Before the Committee on Finance and 

Committee on Environment and Public Works

U.S. Senate:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT Wednesday

 September 25, 2002:



Transportation Infrastructure:



Alternative Financing Mechanisms for Surface Transportation:



Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:



GAO-02-1126T:



Mr. Chairman and members of the committees:



We are pleased to be here today to discuss alternative financing for 

surface transportation infrastructure projects. As Congress considers 

reauthorizing the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-

21) in 2003, it does so in the face of a continuing need for the nation 

to invest in its surface transportation infrastructure and at a time 

when both the federal and state governments are experiencing severe 

financial constraints.[Footnote 1] Many observers are concerned that a 

significant gap exists between the availability of funds and immediate 

needs. In the longer term, questions have been raised about the 

financial capacity of the Highway Trust Fund to sustain current and 

future levels of highway and transit spending. This is of particular 

concern since Congress has by law established a direct link between 

Highway Trust Fund revenues and surface transportation spending levels.



In recent years, as transportation needs have grown, Congress provided 

states--in the National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 (NHS) 

and TEA-21--additional means to make highway investments through 

alternative financing mechanisms. These alternative mechanisms 

included State Infrastructure Banks (SIBs)--revolving funds to make or 

guarantee loans to approved projects; Grant Anticipation Revenue 

Vehicles (GARVEEs)--which are state issued bonds or notes repayable 

with future federal-aid; and credit assistance under the Transportation 

Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA)--including loans, 

loan guarantees, and lines of credit. All are part of the Federal 

Highway Administration’s (FHWA’s) Innovative Finance Program. As the 

time draws nearer to reauthorizing TEA-21, information is needed about 

the performance of these tools and the potential for these and other 

proposed tools to help meet the nation’s surface transportation 

infrastructure investment needs.



At the request of your Committees, we are examining a range of surface 

transportation financing issues, including FHWA’s Innovative Finance 

Program and proposed alternative financing approaches. My testimony 

today is based on the preliminary results of our work and discusses (1) 

the use and performance of existing innovative financing tools and the 

factors limiting their use, and (2) the prospective costs of current 

and newly proposed alternative financing techniques for meeting surface 

transportation infrastructure investment needs. I will also discuss 

issues concerning the potential costs and benefits of expanding 

alternative financing mechanisms to meet our nation’s surface 

transportation needs. My testimony is based on our review of applicable 

laws, FHWA’s evaluation studies and other reports concerning its 

Innovative Financing Program, and interviews with FHWA officials, 

transportation officials in eight states, and bond rating companies. It 

is also based on a cost comparison we conducted of four current and 

newly proposed financing techniques.



In summary:



* A number of states are using existing alternative financing tools 

such as State Infrastructure Banks, GARVEE bonds, and TIFIA loans. 

These tools can provide states with additional options to accelerate 

projects and leverage federal assistance--they can also provide greater 

flexibility and more funding techniques. However, a number of factors 

can limit the use of these tools, including some states’ preference not 

to use the tools, restrictions in state law on using them, and 

restrictions in federal law on the number of states and types of 

projects that can use them.



* Federal funding of surface transportation investments includes 

federal-aid highway program grant funding appropriated by Congress out 

of the Highway Trust Fund, loans and loan guarantees, and bonds that 

are issued by states and that are exempt from federal taxation. In 

addition, the use of tax credit bonds--where investors receive a tax 

credit against their federal income taxes instead of interest payments 

from the bond issuers--have been proposed for helping to finance 

surface transportation investments. Because each of these financing 

mechanisms is structured differently, we determined that the total cost 

of providing $10 billion in infrastructure investment using each of 

these existing or proposed mechanisms ranges from $10 billion to over 

$13 billion (in present value terms). The mechanisms that involve 

greater borrowing from the private sector, such as tax-exempt bonds and 

tax credit bonds, require the least amount of public outlays up front. 

However, those same mechanisms have the highest long-term costs to the 

public sector participants in the investments because the latter must 

compensate the private investors for the risks that they assume. With 

respect to the federal government’s contribution, tax credit bonds are 

the most costly mechanism, while TIFIA loans and tax exempt bonds are 

the least costly.



* Expanding the use of alternative financing mechanisms has the 

potential to stimulate additional investment and private participation. 

But expanding investment in our nation’s highways and transit systems 

raises basic questions of who pays, how much, and when. How alternative 

financing mechanisms are structured determines how much of the needs 

are met through federal funding and how much are met by the states and 

others. The structure of these mechanisms also determines how much of 

the cost of meeting our current needs are met by current users and 

taxpayers versus future users and taxpayers.



Background:



The federal-aid highway program is financed through motor fuel taxes 

and other levies on highway users. Federal aid for highways is provided 

largely on a cash basis from the Highway Trust Fund. States have 

financed roads primarily through a combination of state revenues and 

federal aid. Typically, states raise their share of the funds by taxing 

motor fuels and charging user fees. In addition, debt financing--

issuing bonds to pay for highway development and construction--

represents about 10 percent of total state funding for highways, 

although some states make greater use of borrowing than others.



Federal-aid highway funding to states is typically in the form of 

grants. These grants are distributed from the Highway Trust Fund and 

apportioned to states based on a series of funding formulas. Funding is 

subject to grant-matching rules--for most federally funded highway 

projects, an 80-percent federal and 20-percent state funding ratio. 

States are subject to pay-as-you-go rules where they obligate all of 

the funds needed for a project up front and are reimbursed for project 

costs as they are incurred.



In the mid-1990s, FHWA and the states tested and evaluated a variety of 

innovative financing techniques and strategies.[Footnote 2] Many 

financing innovations were approved for use through administrative 

action or legislative changes under NHS and TEA-21. Three of the 

techniques approved were SIBs, GARVEEs, and TIFIA loans.[Footnote 3] 

SIBs are state revolving loan funds that make loans or loan guarantees 

to approved projects; the loans are subsequently repaid, and recycled 

back into the revolving fund for additional loans. GARVEEs are any 

state issued bond or note repayable with future federal-aid highway 

funds. Through the issuance of GARVEE bonds, projects are able to meet 

the need for up-front capital as well as use future federal highway 

dollars for debt service. TIFIA allows FHWA to provide credit 

assistance, up to 33 percent of eligible project costs, to sponsors of 

major transportation projects. Credit assistance can take the form of a 

loan, loan guarantee, or line of credit. See appendix II for additional 

information about these financing techniques.



According to FHWA, the goals of its Innovative Finance Program are to 

accelerate projects by reducing inefficient and unnecessary constraints 

on states’ management of federal highway funds; expand investment by 

removing barriers to private investment; encourage the introduction of 

new revenue streams, particularly for the purpose of retiring debt 

obligations; and reduce financing and related costs, thus freeing up 

the savings for investments into the transportation system itself. When 

Congress established the TIFIA program in TEA-21, it set out goals for 

the program to offer sponsors of large transportation projects a new 

tool to leverage limited Federal resources, stimulate additional 

investment in our nation’s infrastructure, and encourage greater 

private sector participation in meeting our transportation needs.



Alternative Financing Mechanisms Offer States Options, But Factors 

Limit Their Use:



Over the last 8 years, many states have used one or more of the FHWA-

sponsored alternative financing tools to fund their highway and transit 

infrastructure projects. As of June 2002:



* 32 states (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) have 

established SIBs and have entered into 294 loan agreements with a 

dollar value of about $4.06 billion;



* 9 states (including the District of Columbia and Commonwealth of 

Puerto Rico) have entered into TIFIA credit assistance agreements for 

11 projects, representing $15.4 billion in transportation investment; 

and



* 6 states have issued GARVEE bonds with face amounts totaling $2.3 

billion.



These mechanisms have given states additional options to accelerate the 

construction of projects and leverage federal assistance. It has also 

provided them with greater flexibility and more funding techniques.



Accelerate Project Construction:



States’ use of innovative financing techniques has resulted in projects 

being constructed more quickly than they would be under traditional 

pay-as-you-go financing. This is because techniques such as SIBs can 

provide loans to fill a funding gap, which allows the project to move 

ahead. For example, using a $25 million SIB loan for land acquisition 

in the initial phase of the Miami Intermodal Center, Florida 

accelerated the project by 2 years, according to FHWA. Similarly, South 

Carolina used an array of innovative finance tools when it undertook 

its “27 in7 program”--a plan to accomplish infrastructure investment 

projects that were expected to take 27 years and reduce that to just 7 

years. Officials in the states that we contacted that were using FHWA 

innovative finance tools noted that project acceleration was one of the 

main reasons for using them.



Leverage Federal Investments:



Innovative finance--in particular the TIFIA program--can leverage 

federal funds by attracting additional nonfederal investments in 

infrastructure projects. For example, the TIFIA program funds a lower 

share of eligible project costs than traditional federal-aid programs, 

thus requiring a larger investment by other, non-federal funding 

sources. It also attracts private creditors by assuming a lower 

priority on revenues pledged to repay debt. Bond rating companies told 

us they view TIFIA as “quasi-equity” because the federal loan is 

subordinate to all other debt in terms of repayments and offers debt 

service grace periods, low interest costs, and flexible repayment 

terms.



It is often difficult to measure precisely the leveraging effect of the 

federal investment. As a recent FHWA evaluation report noted, just 

comparing the cost of the federal subsidy with the size of the overall 

investment can overstate the federal influence--the key issue being 

whether the projects assisted were sufficiently credit-worthy even 

without federal assistance and the federal impact was to primarily 

lower the cost of the capital for the project sponsor.



However, TIFIA’s features, taken together, can enhance senior project 

debt ratings and thus make the project more attractive to investors. 

For example, the $3.2 billion Central Texas Turnpike project--a toll 

road to serve the Austin-San Antonio corridor--received a $917 million 

TIFIA loan and will use future toll revenues to repay debt on the 

project, including revenue bonds issued by the Texas Transportation 

Commission and the TIFIA loan. According to public finance analysts 

from two ratings firms, the project leaders were able to offset 

potential concerns about the uncertain toll road revenue stream by 

bringing the TIFIA loan to the project’s financing.



Provide Greater Flexibility And Additional Financing Techniques:



FHWA’s innovative finance techniques provide states with greater 

flexibility when deciding how to put together project financing. By 

having access to various alternatives, states can finance large 

transportation projects that they may not have been able to build with 

pay-as-you-go financing. For example, faced with the challenge of 

Interstate highway needs of over $1.0 billion, the state of Arkansas 

determined that GARVEE bonds would make up for the lack of available 

funding. In June 1999, Arkansas voters approved the issuance of $575 

million in GARVEE bonds to help finance this reconstruction on an 

accelerated schedule. The state will use future federal funds, together 

with the required state matching funds and the proceeds from a diesel 

fuel tax increase, to retire the bonds. The GARVEE bonds allow Arkansas 

to rebuild approximately 380 miles, or 60 percent of its total 

Interstate miles, within 5 years.



Factors Can Limit the Use of Finance Tools:



Although FHWA’s innovative financing tools have provided states with 

additional options for meeting their needs, a number of factors can 

limit the use of these tools.



* State DOTs are not always willing to use federal innovative financing 

tools, nor do they always see advantages to using them. For example, 

officials in two states indicated that they had a philosophy against 

committing their federal aid funding to debt service. Moreover, not all 

states see advantages to using FHWA innovative financing tools. For 

example, one official indicated that his state did not have a need to 

accelerate projects because the state has only a few relatively small 

urban areas and thus does not face the congestion problems that would 

warrant using innovative financing tools more often. Officials in 

another state noted that because their DOT has the authority to issue 

tax-exempt bonds as long as the state has a revenue stream to repay the 

debt, they could obtain financing on their own and at lower cost.



* Not all state DOTs have the authority to use certain financing 

mechanisms, and others have limitations on the extent to which they can 

issue debt. For example, California requires voter approval in order to 

use its allocations from the Highway Trust Fund to pay for debt 

servicing costs. In Texas, the state constitution prohibits using 

highway funds to pay the state’s debt service. Other states limit the 

amount of debt that can be incurred. For example, Montana has a debt 

ceiling of $150 million and is now paying off bonds issued in the late 

1970s and early 1980s and plans to issue a GARVEE bond in the next few 

years.



* Some financing tools have limitations set in law. For example, five 

states are currently authorized to use TEA-21 federal-aid funding to 

capitalize their SIBs. Although other states have created SIBs and use 

them, they could not use their TEA-21 federal-aid funding to capitalize 

them. Similarly, TIFIA credit assistance can be used only for certain 

projects. TIFIA’s requirement that, in general, projects cost at least 

$100 million restricts its use to large projects.



Costs and Risks of Alternative Financing Mechanisms Vary:



We assessed the costs that federal, state and local governments (or 

special purpose entities they create) would incur to finance $10 

billion in infrastructure investment using four current and newly 

proposed financing mechanisms for meeting infrastructure investment 

needs. [Footnote 4] To date, most federal funding for highways and 

transit projects has come through the federal-aid highway grants--

appropriated by Congress from the Highway Trust Fund. Through the TIFIA 

program, the federal government also provides subsidized loans for 

state highway and transit projects. In addition, the federal government 

also subsidizes state and local bond financing of highways by exempting 

the interest paid on those bonds from federal income tax. Another type 

of tax preference--tax credit bonds--has been used, to a very limited 

extent, to finance certain school investments. Investors in tax credit 

bonds receive a tax credit against their federal income taxes instead 

of interest payments from the bond issuer.[Footnote 5] Proposals have 

been made to extend the use of this relatively new financing mechanism 

to other public investments, including transportation projects.



The use of these four mechanisms to finance $10 billion in 

infrastructure investment result in differences in (1) total costs--and 

how much of the cost is incurred within the short term 5-year period 

and how much of it is postponed to the future; (2) sharing costs--or 

the extent to which states must spend their own money, or obtain 

private investment, in order to receive the federal subsidy; and (3) 

risks--which level of government bears the risk associated with an 

investment (or compensates others for taking the risk). As a result of 

these differences, for any given amount of highway investment, combined 

and federal government budget costs will vary, depending on which 

financing mechanism is used.



Total Costs--And Short And Long Term Costs--Differ:



Total costs--and how much of the cost is incurred within the short term 

5-year period and how much of it is postponed to the future--differ 

under each of the four mechanisms. As figure 1 shows, grant funds are 

the lowest-cost method to finance a given amount of investment 

expenditure, $10 billion.[Footnote 6] The reason for this result is 

that it is the only alternative that does not involve borrowing from 

the private sector through the issuance of bonds. Bonds are more 

expensive than grants because the governments have to compensate 

private investors for the risks that they assume (in addition to paying 

them back the present value of the bond principal). However, because 

the grants alternative does not involve borrowing, all of the public 

spending on the project must be made up front. The TIFIA direct loan, 

tax credit bond, and tax-exempt loan alternatives involve increased 

amounts of borrowing from the private sector and, therefore, increased 

overall costs.



Grants entail the highest short term costs as these costs, in our 

example, are all incurred on a pay-as-you-go basis. The tax-exempt bond 

alternative, which involves the most borrowing and has the highest 

combined costs, also requires the least amount of public money up 

front.[Footnote 7]



Figure 1: Present Value Costs of Financing $10 Billion of Spending on 

Transportation, Using Alternative Approaches:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis.



[End of figure]



Alternatives Result in Different Shares of the Cost:



There are significant differences across the four alternatives in the 

cost sharing between federal and state governments. (See fig. 2). 

Federal costs would be highest under the tax credit bond alternative, 

under which the federal government pays the equivalent of 30 years of 

interest on the bonds. Grants are the next most costly alternative for 

the federal government. Federal costs for the tax-exempt bond and TIFIA 

loan alternatives are significantly lower than for tax credit bonds and 

grants.[Footnote 8]



Figure 2: Present Value of Federal, State, and Other Costs of Financing 

$10 Billion of Spending on Transportation, Using Alternative 

Approaches:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAO analysis.



[End of figure]



In some past and current proposals for using tax credit bonds to 

finance transportation investments, the issuers of the bonds would be 

allowed to place the proceeds from the sales of some bonds into a 

“sinking fund” and, thereby, earn investment income that could be used 

to redeem bond principal. This added feature would reduce (or 

eliminate) the costs of the bond financing to the issuers, but this 

would come at a significant additional cost to the federal government. 

For example, in our example where states issue $8 billion of tax credit 

bonds to finance highway projects, if the states were allowed to issue 

an additional $ 2.4 billion of bonds to start a sinking fund, they 

would be able to earn enough investment income to pay back all of the 

bonds without raising any of their own money. However, this added 

benefit for the states could increase costs to the federal government 

by about 30 percent--an additional $2.7 billion (in present value), 

raising the total federal cost to $11.7 billion.



The Federal Role in Bearing Investment Risk Varies:



In some cases private investors participate in highway projects, either 

by purchasing “nonrecourse” state bonds that will be repaid out of 

project revenues (such as tolls) or by making equity investments in 

exchange for a share of future toll revenues.[Footnote 9] By making 

these investments the investors are taking the risk that project 

revenues will be sufficient to pay back their principal, plus an 

adequate return on their investment. In the case where the nonrecourse 

bond is a tax-exempt bond, the state must pay an interest rate that 

provides an adequate after-tax rate of return, including compensation 

for the risk assumed by the investors. By exempting this interest 

payment from income tax, the federal government is effectively sharing 

the cost of compensating investors for risk. Nevertheless, the state 

still bears some of the risk-related cost and, therefore has an 

incentive to either select investment projects that have lower risks, 

or select riskier projects only if the expected benefits from those 

projects are large enough to warrant taking on the additional risk.



In the case of a tax credit bond where project revenues would be the 

only source of financing to redeem the bonds and the federal government 

would be committed to paying whatever rate of credit investors would 

demand to purchase bonds at par value, the federal government would 

bear all of the cost of compensating the investors for risk.[Footnote 

10] States would no longer have a financial incentive to balance higher 

project risks with higher expected project benefits. Alternatively, the 

credit rate could be set equal to the interest rate that would be 

required to sell the average state bonds (issued within the same 

timeframe) at par value. In that case, states would bear the additional 

cost of selling bonds for projects with above-average risks.



In the case of a TIFIA loan for a project that has private sector 

participation, the federal loan does not compensate the private 

investors for their risk; instead, the federal government assumes some 

of the risk and, thereby, lowers the risk to the private investors and 

lowers the amount that states have to pay to compensate for that risk.



In summary, Mr. Chairman, alternative financing mechanisms have 

accelerated the pace of some surface transportation infrastructure 

improvement projects and provided states additional tools and 

flexibility to meet their needs--goals of FHWA’s Innovative Finance 

Program. FHWA and the states have made progress to attain the goal 

Congress set for the TIFIA program--to stimulate additional investment 

and encourage greater private sector participation--but measuring 

success involves measuring the leverage effect of the federal 

investment, which is often difficult. Our work raises a number of 

issues concerning the potential costs and benefits of expanding 

alternative financing mechanisms to meet our nation’s surface 

transportation needs. Congress likely will weigh these potential costs 

and benefits as it considers reauthorizing TEA-21.



Expanding the use of alternative financing mechanisms has the potential 

to stimulate additional investment and private participation. But 

expanding investment in our nation’s highways and transit systems 

raises basic questions of who pays, how much, and when. How alternative 

financing mechanisms are structured determines how much of the needs 

are met through federal funding and how much are met by the states and 

others. The structure of these mechanisms also determines how much of 

the cost of meeting our current needs are met by current users and 

taxpayers versus future users and taxpayers.



While alternative finance mechanisms can leverage federal investments, 

they are, in the final analysis, different forms of debt financing. 

This debt ultimately must be repaid, with interest, either by highway 

users--through tolls, fuel taxes, or licensing and vehicle fees--or by 

the general population through increases in general fund taxes or 

reductions in other government services. Proposals for tax credit bonds 

would shift the costs of highway investments away from the traditional 

user-financed sources, unless revenues from the Highway Trust Fund are 

specifically earmarked to pay for these tax credits.



Mr. Chairman this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 

to answer any questions you or other members of the Committees have.



Contact and Acknowledgments:



For further information on this testimony, please contact JayEtta Z. 

Hecker (heckerj@gao.gov) or Steve Cohen (cohens@gao.gov). 

Alternatively, they may be reached on (202) 512-2834. Individuals 

making key contributions to this testimony include Lynn Filla-Clark, 

Jennifer Gravelle, Gail Marnik, Jose Oyola, Eric Tempelis, Stacey 

Thompson, and Jim Wozny.



[End of section]



Appendix I: Methodology for Estimating the Costs of Transportation 

Financing Alternatives:



We estimated the costs that the federal, state or local governments (or 

special purpose entities they create) would incur if they financed $10 

billion in infrastructure investment using each of four alternative 

financing mechanisms: grants, tax credit bonds, tax-exempt bonds, and 

direct federal loans. The following subsections explain our cost 

computations for each alternative. We converted all of our results into 

present value terms, so that the value of the dollars spent in the 

future are adjusted to make them comparable to dollars spent 

today.[Footnote 11] This adjustment is particularly important when 

comparing the costs of bond repayment that occur 30 years from now with 

the costs of grants that occur immediately.



The Cost of Grants:



We estimated the cost to the federal and state governments of 

traditional grants with a state match. We assume the state was 

responsible for 20% of the investment expenditures. We then found the 

percentage of federal grants such that the federal grant plus the state 

match totaled $10 billion. This form of matching resulted in the state 

being responsible for $2 billion of the spending and the federal 

government being responsible for $8 billion.



The Cost of Tax Credit Bonds:



We estimated the cost to the federal and state governments of issuing 

$8 billion in tax credit bonds with a state match of $2 billion. The 

cost to the federal government equals the amount of tax credits that 

would be paid out over a given loan term.[Footnote 12] We estimated the 

amount of credit payment in a given year by multiplying the amount of 

outstanding bonds in a given year by the credit rate. We assumed that 

the credit rate would be approximately equal to the interest rates on 

municipal bonds of comparable maturity, grossed up by the marginal tax 

rate of bond purchasers.[Footnote 13] For the results presented in 

figures 1 and 2 we assumed that the bonds would have a 30-year term and 

would have a credit rating between Aaa and Baa. The cost to the issuing 

states would consist of the repayment of bond principal in future 

years, plus the upfront cost of $2 billion in state appropriations for 

the matching contribution.



The Cost of Tax-Exempt Bonds:



The cost of tax-exempt bonds to the state or local government (or 

special purpose entity) issuers would consist of the interest payments 

on the bonds and the repayment of bond principal. The cost to the 

federal government would equal the taxes forgone on the income that 

bond purchasers would have earned form the investments they would have 

made if the tax-exempt bonds were not available for purchase. For the 

results presented in figures 1 and 2 we made the same assumptions 

regarding the terms and credit rating of the bonds as we did for the 

tax credit bond alternative. We computed the cost of interest payments 

by the state by multiplying the amount of outstanding bonds by the 

current interest rate for municipal bonds with the same term and credit 

rating. We assumed that the pretax rate of return that bond purchasers 

would have earned on alternative investments would have been equal to 

the municipal bond rate divided by one minus the investors’ average 

marginal tax rate. Consequently, the federal revenue loss was equal to 

that pretax rate of return, multiplied by the amount of tax-exempt 

bonds outstanding each year (in this example), and then multiplied by 

the investors’ average marginal tax rate.



Direct Federal Loans:



In order to have our direct loan example reflect the financing packages 

typical of current TIFIA projects, we used data from FHWA’s June 2002 

Report to Congress[Footnote 14] to determine what shares of total 

project expenditures were financed by TIFIA direct loans, federal 

grants, bonds issued by state or local governments or by special 

purpose entities, private investment, and other sources. We assumed 

that the $10 billion of expenditures in our example was financed by 

these various sources in roughly the same proportions as they are used, 

on average, in current TIFIA projects. We estimated the federal and 

nonfederal costs of the grants and bond financing components in the 

same manner as we did for the grants and tax-exempt bond examples 

above. To compute the federal cost of the direct loan component, we 

multiplied the dollar amount of the direct loan in our example by the 

average amount of federal subsidy per dollar of TIFIA loans, as 

reported in the TIFIA report. In the results presented in figure 1, 

this portion of the federal cost amounted to $130 million. The 

nonfederal costs of the loan component consist of the loan repayments 

and interest payments to the federal government. We assumed that the 

term of the loan was 30 years and that the interest rate was set equal 

to the federal cost of funds, which is TIFIA’s policy. The private 

investment (other than through bonds), which accounted for less than 

one percent of the spending, and the “other” sources, which accounted 

for about three percent of the spending, were treated as money spend 

immediately on the project.



Sensitivity Analysis:



A number of factors--including general interest rate levels, the terms 

of the bonds or loans, the individual risks of the projects being 

financed--affect the relative costs of the various alternatives. For 

this reason, we examined multiple scenarios for each alternative. In 

particular, current interest rates are relatively low by historical 

standards. In our alternative scenarios we used higher interest rates, 

typical of those in the early 1990s. At higher interest rates, the 

combined costs of the alternatives that involve bond financing would be 

higher, while the costs of grants would remain the same. If we had used 

bonds with 20-year terms, instead of 30-year terms in the examples, the 

costs of the three alternatives that involve bond financing would be 

lower, but they would still be greater than the costs of grants.



[End of section]



Appendix II: States’ Use of Innovative Financing Tools:



State Infrastructure Banks:



One of the earliest techniques tested to fund transportation 

infrastructure was revolving loan funds. Prior to 1995, Federal law did 

not permit states to allocate federal highway funds to capitalize 

revolving loan funds. However, in the early 1990s, transportation 

officials began to explore the possibility of adding revolving loan 

fund capitalization to the list of eligible uses for certain federal 

transportation funds. Under such a proposal, federal funding is used to 

“capitalize” or provide seed money for the revolving fund. Then money 

from the revolving fund would be loaned out to projects, repaid, and 

recycled back into the revolving fund, and subsequently reinvested in 

the transportation system through additional loans. In 1995, the 

federally capitalized transportation revolving loan fund concept took 

shape as the State Infrastructure Bank (SIB) pilot program, authorized 

under Section 350 of the NHS Act. This pilot program was originally 

available only to a maximum of 10 states, but then was expanded under 

the 1997 U.S. DOT Appropriations Act, which appropriated $150 million 

in federal general funds for SIB capitalization. TEA-21 established a 

new SIB pilot program, but limited participation to four states--

California, Florida, Missouri, and Rhode Island. Texas subsequently 

obtained authorization under TEA-21. These states may enter into 

cooperative agreements with the U.S. DOT to capitalize their banks with 

federal-aid funds authorized in TEA-21 for fiscal years 1998 through 

2003. Of the states currently authorized, only Florida and Missouri 

have capitalized their SIBs with TEA-21 funds.



Table 1: State’s use of SIBs:



State: Alabama; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement amount:

[Empty] ; Disbursements to date: [Empty].



State: Alaska; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: $2,737; 

Disbursements to date: $2,737.



State: Arizona; Number of agreements: 37; Loan agreement amount: 

$424,287; Disbursements to date: $216,104.



State: Arkansas; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: $31; 

Disbursements to date: $31.



State: California; Number of agreements:[Empty]  ; Loan agreement 
amount:

[Empty] ; Disbursements to date: [Empty].



State: Colorado; Number of agreements: 2; Loan agreement amount: $400; 

Disbursements to date: $400.



State: Connecticut; Number of agreements: [Empty]; Loan agreement 
amount: 

[Empty]; Disbursements to date: [Empty].



State: Delaware; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$6,000; Disbursements to date: $6,000.



State: D.C.; Number of agreements: [Empty]; Loan agreement amount: 

[Empty]; Disbursements to date: [Empty].



State: Florida; Number of agreements: 32; Loan agreement amount: 

$465,000; Disbursements to date: $98,600.



State: Georgia; Number of agreements: [Empty]; Loan agreement amount: 

[Empty]; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Hawaii; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement amount: 

[Empty] ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Idaho; Number of agreements:  ; Loan agreement amount:  ; 

Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Illinois; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement amount: 

[Empty] ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Indiana; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: $3,000; 

Disbursements to date: $1,122.



State: Iowa; Number of agreements: 2; Loan agreement amount: $2,874; 

Disbursements to date: $2,874.



State: Kansas; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Kentucky; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Louisiana; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement 
amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Maine; Number of agreements: 23; Loan agreement amount: $1,758; 

Disbursements to date: $1,478.



State: Maryland; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Massachusetts; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement 
amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Michigan; Number of agreements: 23; Loan agreement amount: 

$17,034; Disbursements to date: $13,033.



State: Minnesota; Number of agreements: 15; Loan agreement amount: 

$95,719; Disbursements to date: $41,000.



State: Mississippi; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement 
amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Missouri; Number of agreements: 11; Loan agreement amount: 

$73,251; Disbursements to date: $67,801.



State: Montana; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Nebraska; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$3,360; Disbursements to date: $3,360.



State: Nevada; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: New Hampshire; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement 
amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: New Jersey; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement 
amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: New Mexico; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$541; Disbursements to date: $541.



State: New York; Number of agreements: 2; Loan agreement amount: 

$12,000; Disbursements to date: $12,000.



State: North Carolina; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$1,575; Disbursements to date: $1,575.



State: North Dakota; Number of agreements: 2; Loan agreement amount: 

$3,565; Disbursements to date: $1,565.



State: Ohio; Number of agreements: 39; Loan agreement amount: $141,231; 

Disbursements to date: $116,422.



State: Oklahoma; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Oregon; Number of agreements: 12; Loan agreement amount: 

$17,471; Disbursements to date: $17,471.



State: Pennsylvania; Number of agreements: 23; Loan agreement amount: 

$17,403; Disbursements to date: $17,403.



State: Puerto Rico; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$15,000; Disbursements to date: $15,000.



State: Rhode Island; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$1,311; Disbursements to date: $1,311.



State: South Carolina; Number of agreements: 6; Loan agreement amount: 

$2,382,000; Disbursements to date: $1,124,000.



State: South Dakota; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$11,740; Disbursements to date: $11,740.



State: Tennessee; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$1,875; Disbursements to date: $1,875.



State: Texas; Number of agreements: 37; Loan agreement amount: 

$252,013; Disbursements to date: $225,461.



State: Utah; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: $2,888; 

Disbursements to date: $2,888.



State: Vermont; Number of agreements: 3; Loan agreement amount: $1,023; 

Disbursements to date: $1,000.



State: Virginia; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$18,000; Disbursements to date: $18,000.



State: Washington; Number of agreements: 1; Loan agreement amount: 

$700; Disbursements to date: $385.



State: West Virginia; Number of agreements: [Empty] ; Loan agreement 
amount:

[Empty]  ; Disbursements to date: [Empty] .



State: Wisconsin; Number of agreements: 3; Loan agreement amount: 

$1,814; Disbursements to date: $1,814.



State: Wyoming; Number of agreements: 8; Loan agreement amount: 

$77,977; Disbursements to date: $42,441.



State: Total; Number of agreements: 294; Loan agreement amount: 

$4,055,578; Disbursements to date: $2,067,432.



Source: FHWA, June 2002:



[End of table]



Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) credit 

assistance:



As part of TEA-21, Congress authorized the Transportation 

Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 (TIFIA) to provide 

credit assistance, in the form of direct loans, loan guarantees, and 

standby lines of credit to projects of national significance. The TIFIA 

legislation authorized $10.6 billion in credit assistance and $530 

million in subsidy cost to cover the expected long-term cost to the 

government for providing credit assistance. TIFIA credit assistance is 

available to highway, transit, passenger rail and multi-modal project, 

as well as projects involving installation of intelligent 

transportation systems (ITS).



The TIFIA statute sets forth a number of prerequisites for 

participation in the TIFIA program. The project costs must be 

reasonably expected to total at least $100 million, or alternatively, 

at least 50 percent of the state’s annual apportionment of federal-aid 

highway funds, whichever is less. For projects involving ITS, eligible 

project costs must be expected to total at least $30 million. Projects 

must be listed on the state’s transportation improvement program, have 

a dedicated revenue source for repayment, and must receive an 

investment grade rating for their senior debt. Finally, TIFIA 

assistance cannot exceed 33 percent of the project costs and the final 

maturity date of any TIFIA credit assistance cannot exceed 35 years 

after the project’s substantial completion date.



Table 2: State’s use of TIFIA credit assistance:



State: California; Project name: SR 125 Toll Road - 1999; Project 

description: Highway/ Bridge Construct-ion of 11 mi 4-lane toll road in 

San Diego; Project cost: $455; Instrument type: Direct loan

 Line of credit; Credit amount: $94.000 

 $33.000; Primary revenue pledge: User

Charges.



State:  ; Project name: San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge - 2002; 

Project description: Replacement of SF-Oakland Bay Bridge east span; 

Project cost: $3,305; Instrument type: Direct loan; Credit amount: 

$450.000; Primary revenue pledge: Toll 

surcharge.



State: D.C.; Project name: Washington Metro - 1999; Project 

description: Transit capital improvement program; Project cost: $2,324; 

Instrument type: Guarantee; Credit amount: $600.000; Primary revenue 

pledge: Other.



State: Florida; Project name: Miami Intermodal Center - 1999; Project 

description: Multi-modal center for Miami Intern’l Airport, including 

car rental garage, intermodal center, people mover, and roadways.; 

Project cost: $1,349; Instrument type: Direct loan

Direct loan; Credit amount: $269.076 $163.676; Primary revenue pledge: 

Tax revenue

 User charges.



State: Nevada; Project name: Reno Rail Corridor; Project description: 

Intermodal; Project cost: $280; Instrument type: Direct loan; Credit 

amount: $73.500; Primary revenue pledge: Other.



State: New York; Project name: Farley Penn Station - 1999; Project 

description: Intermodal; Project cost: $800; Instrument type: Direct 

loan Line of credit; Credit amount: $140.000 $20.000; Primary revenue 

pledge: Other 

Other.



State:  ; Project name: Staten Island Ferries - 2000; Project 

description: Transit; Project cost: $482; Instrument type: Direct loan; 

Credit amount: $159.068; Primary revenue pledge: Other.



State: Puerto Rico; Project name: Tren Urbano - 1999; Project 

description: Transit rail line; Project cost: $1,676; Instrument type: 

Direct loan; Credit amount: $300.000; Primary revenue pledge: Tax 

revenues.



State: South Carolina; Project name: Cooper River Bridge - 2000; 

Project description: Replace double bridges over the Cooper River, 

connecting Charleston and Mt. Pleasant; Project cost: $668; Instrument 

type: Direct loan; Credit amount: $215.000; Primary revenue pledge: 

Other.



State: Texas; Project name: Central Texas Turnpike - 2001; Project 

description: Construct 120+ mi. toll facilities to ease I-35 

congestion; Project cost: $3,220; Instrument type: Direct loan; Credit 

amount: $917.000; Primary revenue pledge: User

charges.



State: Washington; Project name: Tacoma Narrows Bridge - 2000; Project 

description: Construct new parallel bridge, toll plaza, and approach 

roadways.; Project cost: $835; Instrument type: Direct loan

Line of credit; Credit amount: $240.000 $30.000; Primary revenue 

pledge: User

charges

(both).



State: Total; Project name: [Empty]; Project description: [Empty]; 

Project cost: $15,393; Instrument type: [Empty]; Credit amount: 

[Empty]; Primary revenue pledge: [Empty].



Source: FHWA, June 2002.



[End of table]



Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicles (GARVEEs):



Grant anticipation revenue vehicles (GARVEEs) are another tool states 

can use to finance highway infrastructure projects. GARVEE bonds are 

any bond or note repayable with future federal-aid highway funds. The 

NHS Act and TEA-21 brought about changes that enabled states to use 

federal-aid highway apportionments to pay debt service and other bond-

related expenses and strengthened the predictability of states’ 

federal-aid allocation. While GARVEEs do not generate new revenue, the 

new eligibility of bond-related costs for federal-aid reimbursement 

provides states with one more option for repaying debt service. 

Candidate projects are typically large enough to merit borrowing rather 

than pay-as-you-go grant funding; do not have access to a revenue 

stream (such as local taxes or tolls) or other forms of repayment 

(state appropriations); and have support from the state’s DOT to 

reserve a portion of future year federal-aid highway funds to fund debt 

service. In some cases, states may elect to pledge other sources of 

revenue, such as state fuel tax revenue, as a backstop in the event 

that future federal-aid highway funds are not available.



Table 3: State’s use of GARVEE bonds:



State: Alabama; Date of issuance: Apr-02; Face amount: $200 million; 

Projects: County Bridge Program; Backstop financing: All federal 

construction reimbursements. Also insured.



State: Arizona; Date of issuance: Jun-00 May-01; Face amount: $39.4 

million

 $142.9 million; Projects: Maricopa freeway projects; Backstop 

financing: Certain sub-account transfers.



State: Arkansas; Date of issuance: Mar-00

Jul-01; Face amount: $175 million

 $185 million; Projects: Interstate highways; Backstop financing: Full 

faith and credit of state, plus state motor fuel taxes.



State: Colorado; Date of issuance: May 00

Apr-01

Jun-02; Face amount: $537 million

 $506.4 million

$208.3 million; Projects: Any project financed wholly or in part by 

Federal funds; Backstop financing: Federal highway funds as allocated 

annually by CDOT; other state funds.



State: New Mexico; Date of issuance: Sep-98

Feb-01; Face amount: $100.2 million

 $18.5 million; Projects: New Mexico SR 44; Backstop financing: No 

backstop; bond insurance obtained.



State: Ohio; Date of issuance: May-98 Aug-99 Sep-01; Face amount: $70 

million

$20 million 

$100 million; Projects: Spring-Sandusky project and Maumee River Bridge 

Improvements; Backstop financing: Moral obligation pledge to use state 

gas tax funds and seek general fund appropriations in the event of 

federal shortfall.



State: Total; Date of issuance: [Empty]; Face amount: $2,301.7 million; 

Projects: [Empty]; Backstop financing: 



Source: FHWA, June 2002:



FOOTNOTES



[1] Performance Budgeting: Opportunities and Challenges. (GAO-02-

1106T, Sept.19, 2002).



[2] FHWA uses the term “innovative finance” to refer to any funding 

measure other than grants to states appropriated from the Highway Trust 

Fund. Most of the innovative measures entail debt financing. The term 

is used to contrast that approach with traditional methods of funding 

highway projects. 



[3] FHWA’s test and evaluation research initiative (TE-045) evaluated a 

number of other innovations, including flexible match, toll credits, 

advance construction, partial conversion of advance construction, and 

tapered match. Many of these techniques were subsequently approved for 

use.



[4] In deriving our comparisons we use current rules and practices 

relating to state matching expenditures. Specifically, when computing 

the costs associated with grants we assume that states pay for 20 

percent of the investment expenditures; we assume a similar matching 

rate would be applied if a tax credit bond program were introduced. Our 

tax-exempt bond example represents independent investments by the state 

or local governments (or special purpose entities) with no federal 

support other than the tax subsidy. In the case of the direct loan 

program, we assume that the $10 billion of expenditures is financed by 

approximately the same combination of federal loans, federal grants, 

state, local or special purpose entity bonds, state appropriations, and 

private investment as the average project currently financed by TIFIA 

loans. (See app. I for further details of our methodology). However, it 

is important to note that the current rules and practices could be 

revised so that any desired cost sharing between the federal and state 

governments could be achieved through any of the mechanisms.



[5] The only tax credit bonds currently in existence are Qualified Zone 

Academy bonds. State or local governments may issue these bonds to 

finance improvements in public schools in disadvantaged areas. The 

issuance limit for these bonds is set at $400 million for 2002 and is 

allocated to the states on the basis of their portion of the population 

below the poverty level.



[6] We present our results in present value terms so that the value of 

dollars spent in the future are adjusted to make them comparable to 

dollars spent today. 



[7] The results presented in figure 1 were computed using current 

interest rates, which are relatively low by historical standards. At 

higher interest rates, the combined costs of the alternatives that 

involve bond financing would be higher, while the costs of grants would 

remain the same. If we had used bonds with 20-year terms, instead of 

30-year terms, in our examples, the costs of the three alternatives 

that involve bond financing would be lower, but they all would still be 

greater than the costs of grants.



[8] Using different assumptions could produce different results. For 

example, Congress could reduce the federal cost differences across the 

four alternatives by establishing higher state matching requirements 

for those programs. In the case of tax credit bonds, setting the rate 

of credit to substitute for only a fraction of the interest that bond 

investors would demand would require states to pay the difference.



[9] A nonrecourse bond is not backed by the full faith and credit of 

the state or local government issuer. Purchasers of such bonds do not 

have recourse to the issuer’s taxing authority for bond repayment.



[10] In the case of Qualified Zone Academy Bonds the statute calls for 

the credit rate to be set so that the bonds sell at par. Selling at par 

means that the issuer can sell a bond with a face value of $1,000 to an 

investor for $1,000. If, alternatively, the credit rate were set at an 

average interest rate, bonds for riskier projects would have to be sold 

below par (e.g., a bond with a $1,000 face value might sell for only 

$950), meaning that the issuer receives less money to spend for a given 

amount of bonds issued. Conversely, bonds sold for less risky projects 

could be sold above par, so that issuers receive more funds than the 

face value of the bonds issued.



[11] For example, current interest rates on long-term bonds indicate 

that, to the government and investors, the present value of a dollar to 

be spent 30 years from now is less than 25 cents.



[12] Although the credits that investors earn on tax credit bonds are 

taxable, we assume that any tax the federal government would gain from 

this source would be offset by the tax that investors would have paid 

on income from the investments they would have made if the tax credit 

bonds were not available for purchase.



[13] For the tax credit and tax-exempt bond computations we based our 

rates on municipal bond interest rates reported in the August 22, 2002 

issue of the Bond Buyer.



[14] U.S. Department of Transportation, TIFIA Report to Congress, June 

2002.