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United States General Accounting Office: 
GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government 
Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 am. 
Tuesday, June 25, 2002: 

Homeland Security: 

Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But Implementation Will be 
Pivotal to Success: 

Statement of David Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

GAO-02-886T: 

[End of section] 

Madame Chair and Members of Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today 
to discuss one of the most important issues of our time, the 
reorganization of government agencies and the reorientation of their 
missions to improve our nation's ability to better protect our 
homeland. It is important to recognize that this transition to a more 
effective homeland security approach is part of a larger 
transformation that our government must make to address emerging 
fiscal, economic, demographic, scientific, technological and other 
challenges of the 21st century and to meet the expectations of the 
American people for timely, quality and cost-effective public services. 

In the nine months since the horrible events of September 11th, the 
President and the Congress have responded with important and 
aggressive actions to protect the nation - creating an Office of 
Homeland Security (OHS), passing new laws such as the USA Patriot Act 
and an emergency supplemental spending bill, establishing a new agency 
to improve transportation security, and working with unprecedented 
collaboration with federal, state and local governments, private 
sector entities, nongovernmental organizations and other countries to 
prevent future terrorist acts and to bring to justice those 
individuals responsible for such terrible acts. 

More recently, the Congress and the President have sought to remedy 
longstanding issues and concerns in the government's homeland security 
functions by proposing greater consolidation and coordination of 
various agencies and activities. Recent proposals include 
restructuring the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and splitting 
the enforcement and service sections of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). Additionally, Senator Joseph I. 
Lieberman and Representative William M. "Mac" Thornberry have authored 
legislation designed to consolidate many homeland security functions. 
On June 6th, the President announced a proposal to establish a 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and on June 18th transmitted 
draft legislation to the Congress for its consideration. 

In my testimony today, I will focus on two major issues that Congress 
should review in its deliberations on creating a new cabinet 
department principally dedicated to homeland security: (1) the need 
for reorganization and the principles and criteria to help evaluate 
what agencies and missions should be included in or left out of the 
new DHS; and (2) issues related to the transition, cost and 
implementation challenges of the new department. 

Need, Principles And Criteria For Reorganization: 

In response to global challenges the government faces in the coming 
years, we have a unique opportunity to create an extremely effective 
and performance-based organization that can strengthen the nation's 
ability to protect its borders and citizens against terrorism. There 
is likely to be considerable benefit over time from restructuring some 
of the homeland security functions, including reducing risk and 
improving the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of these 
consolidated agencies and programs. Realistically, however, in the 
short term, the magnitude of the challenges that the new department 
faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and will take 
additional resources to make it fully effective. Numerous complicated 
issues will need to be resolved in the short term, including a 
harmonization of information technology systems, human capital 
systems, the physical location of people and other assets, and many 
other factors. Implementation of the new department will be an 
extremely complex task and will ultimately take years to achieve. 
Given the magnitude of the endeavor, not everything can be achieved at 
the same time. As a result, it will be important for the new 
department to focus on a handful of important things, such as: 
articulating a clear overarching mission and core values, developing a 
national strategy, utilizing strategic planning to establish desired 
outcomes and key priorities, and assuring effective communications 
systems. Further, effective performance and risk management systems 
must be established, and work must be completed on threat and 
vulnerability assessments. 

Need for Reorganization: 

GAO and other observers of the federal government's organization, 
performance and accountability for terrorism and homeland security 
functions have long recognized the prevalence of gaps, duplication and 
overlaps driven in large part by the absence of a central policy focal 
point, fragmented missions, ineffective information sharing, and 
institutional rivalries. In recent years, GAO has made numerous 
recommendations related to changes necessary for improving the 
government's response to combating terrorism. Prior to the 
establishment of the OHS, GAO found that the federal government lacked 
overall homeland security leadership and management accountable to 
both the President and Congress. GAO has also stated that 
fragmentation exits in both coordination of domestic preparedness 
programs and in efforts to develop a national strategy.[Footnote 1] 
Based on evaluations prior to September 11th, GAO identified the 
following five actions to improve programs to combat terrorism: 
[Footnote 2] 

* Create a single high-level federal focal point for policy and 
coordination, 

* Develop a comprehensive threat and risk assessment, 

* Develop a national strategy with a defined end state to measure 
progress against, 

* Analyze and prioritize governmentwide programs and budgets to 
identify gaps and reduce duplication of effort, and, 

* Coordinate implementation among the different federal agencies. 
Moreover, in a recent report to Congress on initial concerns about 
organizing for homeland security since September 11th, GAO indicated 
that a definition of homeland security should be developed, preferably 
in the context of the Administration's issuance of a national strategy 
for homeland security, in order to improve the effectiveness and 
coordination of relevant programs.[Footnote 3] 

The recent and on-going actions of the Administration to strengthen 
homeland security functions, including the proposal for establishing 
DHS, should not be considered a substitute for, nor should they 
supplant, the timely issuance of a national homeland security 
strategy. Based on our prior work, GAO believes that the consolidation 
of some homeland security functions makes sense and will, if properly 
organized and implemented, over time lead to more efficient, effective 
and coordinated programs, better intelligence sharing, and a more 
robust protection of our people, borders and critical infrastructure. 
At the same time, the proposed cabinet department, even with its 
multiple missions, will still be just one of many players with 
important roles and responsibilities for ensuring homeland security. 
At the federal level, homeland security missions will be require the 
involvement of the CIA, FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Department 
of Defense (DOD), and a myriad of other agencies. State and local 
governments, including law enforcement and first responder personnel, 
and the private sector all have critical roles to play. If anything, 
the multiplicity of players only reinforces the recommendations that 
GAO has made in the past regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive 
threat, risk and vulnerability assessment and a national homeland 
security strategy that can provide direction and utility at all levels 
of government and across all sectors of the country.[Footnote 4] 

The development and implementation of a national strategy for homeland 
security is vital to effectively leveraging and coordinating the 
country's assets, at a national rather than federal level, to prevent 
and defend against future terrorist acts. A national homeland security 
strategy can help define and establish a clear role and need for 
homeland security and its operational components, to create specific 
expectations for performance and accountability, and to build a 
framework for partnerships that will support the critical role of 
coordination, communication and collaboration among all relevant 
parties and stakeholders with homeland security missions. DHS will 
clearly have a central role in the success of efforts to strengthen 
homeland security, but it is a role that will be made stronger within 
the context of a larger, more comprehensive and integrated national 
homeland security strategy. 

A reorganization of the government's homeland security functions along 
the lines being proposed is a major undertaking and represents one of 
the largest potential reorganizations and consolidations of government 
agencies, personnel, programs and operations in recent history. Those 
involved in this transition should not underestimate the time or 
effort required to successfully achieve the results the nation seeks. 
Numerous comparisons have been made between the proposed DHS and other 
large-scale government reorganizations, including the creation of DOD, 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council as 
part of the National Security Act of 1947. Other analogies include the 
1953 creation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the 
1966 establishment of the Department of Transportation (DOT) or the 
1977 creation of the Department of Energy (DOE). Each of these cabinet 
level restructurings involved the transfer and consolidation of 
disparate functions and the creation of a new cabinet level structure 
in the Executive Branch. 

Often it has taken years for the consolidated functions in new 
departments to effectively build on their combined strengths, and it 
is not uncommon for these structures to remain as management 
challenges for decades. It is instructive to note that the creation of 
DOD, which arguably already had the most similar and aligned missions 
and functions among the reorganizations mentioned, still required 
Congress to make further amendments to its organization in 1949, 1953, 
1958 and 1986 in order to improve its structural effectiveness. 
Despite these and other changes made by DOD, GAO has consistently 
reported over the years that the department - more than 50 years after 
the reorganization - continues to have a number of serious management 
challenges. In fact, DOD has 6 of 22 government wide high risk areas 
based on GAO's latest list.[Footnote 5] This note of caution is not 
intended to dissuade the Congress from seeking logical and important 
consolidations in government agencies and programs in order to improve 
homeland security missions. Rather, it is meant to suggest that 
reorganizations of government agencies frequently encounter start up 
problems and unanticipated consequences that result from the 
consolidations, are unlikely to fully overcome obstacles and 
challenges, and may require additional modifications in the future to 
effectively achieve our collective goals for defending the country 
against terrorism.[Footnote 6] 

Organizational Principles and Criteria: 

The Congress faces a challenging and complex job in its consideration 
of DHS. On the one hand, there exists a certain urgency to move 
rapidly in order to remedy known problems relating to intelligence and 
information sharing and leveraging like activities that have in the 
past and even today prevent the United States from exercising as 
strong a homeland defense as emerging and potential threats warrant. 
Simultaneously, that same urgency of purpose would suggest that the 
Congress be extremely careful and deliberate in how it creates a new 
department for defending the country against terrorism. The urge to 
"do it quickly" must be balanced by an equal need to "do it right" in 
order to ensure a consensus on identified problems and needs, and to 
be sure that the solutions our government legislates and implements 
can effectively remedy the problems we face in a reasonably timely 
manner. It is clear that fixing the wrong problems, or even worse, 
fixing the right problems poorly, could cause more harm than good in 
our efforts to defend our country against terrorism. 

The federal government has engaged in numerous reorganizations of 
agencies in our nation's history. Reorganizations have occurred at 
various times and for various reasons, and have been achieved through 
executive order, through recommendations by landmark commissions 
subsequently approved by the Congress, such as the Hoover Commission 
chaired by former President Herbert Hoover in the late 1940s, and by 
the Congress through its committee structure. The prevailing consensus 
on organizational management principles changed considerably during 
the course of the 20th century and through the various approaches to 
reorganization, but Hoover's Commission clearly articulated that 
agencies and functions of the executive branch should be grouped 
together based on their major purposes or missions. The government has 
not always followed Hoover's lead uniformly, but in recent years most 
departments except those serving a specific clientele, such as 
veterans, generally have been organized according to this principle. 
[Footnote 7] 

GAO's own work on government restructuring and organization over the 
years has tended to support the overall tendency to emphasize 
consolidations of agencies as ways to improve the economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness of government operations. GAO has previously 
recommended that reorganizations should emphasize an integrated 
approach, that reorganization plans should be designed to achieve 
specific, identifiable goals, and that careful attention to 
fundamental public sector management practices and principles, such as 
strong financial, technology and human capital management are critical 
to the successful implementation of government reorganizations.
[Footnote 8] Similarly, GAO has also suggested that reorganizations 
may be warranted based on the significance of the problems requiring 
resolution, as well as the extent and level of coordination and 
interaction necessary with other entities in order to resolve problems 
or achieve overall objectives.[Footnote 9] 

Of course, there are many lessons to be learned from the private 
sector, which over the past 20 years has experienced an extraordinary 
degree of consolidation through the merger and acquisition of 
companies or business units. Among the most important lessons, besides 
ensuring that synergistic entities can broaden organizational 
strengths more than limit them, is the need to pay critical attention 
to the employees impacted by the reorganization, and to align the 
human capital strategies and core competency components of the 
organization in order to meet expectations and achieve results. 
[Footnote 10] GAO has made similar conclusions and recommendations for 
the federal government.[Footnote 11] These observations are 
particularly apt to the proposed structure of DHS, which would combine 
an estimated 170,000 employees into a single department, making it the 
third largest government department in terms of personnel behind DOD 
and the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

GAO, based on its own work as well as a review of other applicable 
studies of approaches to the organization and structure of entities, 
has concluded that Congress should consider utilizing specific 
criteria as a guide to creating and implementing the new department. 
Specifically, GAO has developed a framework that will help Congress 
and the Administration create and implement a strong and effective new 
cabinet department by establishing criteria to be considered for 
constructing the department itself, determining which agencies should 
be included and excluded, and leveraging numerous key management and 
policy elements that, after completion of the revised organizational 
structure, will be critical to the department's success. The following 
chart depicts the proposed framework: 

Figure 1: Organization and Accountability Criteria: 

[Refer to PDF for image: list] 

Organization and Accountability Criteria For the Department of 
Homeland Security: 

The New Department: 
* Definition; 
* Statutory Basis; 
* Clear Mission; 
* Performance-based Organization. 

Agency Transition: Inclusion/Exclusion: 
* Mission Relevancy; 
* Similar Goals and Objectives; 
* Leverage Effectiveness; 
* Gains Through Consolidation; 
* Integrated Information Sharing/Coordination; 
* Compatible Cultures; 
* Impact on Excluded Agencies. 

Cultural Transformation: Implementation and Success Factors: 
* Strategic Planning; 
* Organizational Alignment; 
* Communications; 
* Building Partnerships; 
* Performance Management; 
* Human Capital Strategy; 
* Information Management and Technology; 
* Knowledge Management; 
* Financial Management; 
* Acquisition Management; 
* Risk Management. 

[End of figure] 

With respect to criteria that Congress should consider for 
constructing the department itself, the following questions about the 
overall purpose and structure of the organization should be evaluated: 

* Definition: Is there a clear and consistently applied definition of 
homeland security that will be used as a basis for organizing and 
managing the new department? 

* Statutory Basis: Are the authorities of the new department clear and 
complete in how they articulate roles and responsibilities and do they 
sufficiently describe the department's relationship with other parties? 

* Clear Mission: What will the primary missions of the new DHS be and 
how will it define success? 

* Performance-based Organization: Does the new department have the 
structure (e.g., COO, etc.) and statutory authorities (e.g., human 
capital, sourcing) necessary to meet performance expectations, be held 
accountable for results, and leverage effective management approaches 
for achieving its mission on a national basis? 

Congress should also consider several very specific criteria in its 
evaluation of whether individual agencies or programs should be 
included or excluded from the proposed department. Those criteria 
include the following: 

* Mission Relevancy: Is homeland security a major part of the agency 
or program mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program? 

* Similar Goals and Objectives: Does the agency or program being 
considered for the new department share primary goals and objectives 
with the other agencies or programs being consolidated? 

* Leverage Effectiveness: Does the agency or program being considered 
for the new department create synergy and help to leverage the 
effectiveness of other agencies and programs or the new department as 
a whole? In other words, is the whole greater than the sum of the 
parts? 

* Gains Through Consolidation: Does the agency or program being 
considered for the new department improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of homeland security missions through eliminating 
duplications and overlaps, closing gaps and aligning or merging common 
roles and responsibilities? 

* Integrated Information Sharing/Coordination: Does the agency or 
program being considered for the new department contribute to or 
leverage the ability of the new department to enhance the sharing of 
critical information or otherwise improve the coordination of missions 
and activities related to homeland security? 

* Compatible Cultures: Can the organizational culture of the agency or 
program being considered for the new department effectively meld with 
the other entities that will be consolidated? Field structures and 
approaches to achieving missions vary considerably between agencies. 

* Impact on Excluded Agencies: What is the impact on departments 
losing components to DHS? What is the impact on agencies with homeland 
security missions left out of DHS? 

In addition to the criteria that Congress should consider when 
evaluating what to include and exclude from the proposed DHS, there 
are certain critical success factors the new department should 
emphasis in its initial implementation phase. GAO over the years has 
made observations and recommendations about many of these success 
factors, based on effective management of people, technology, 
financial and other issues, especially in its biannual Performance and 
Accountability Series on major government departments.[Footnote 12] 
These factors include the following: 

* Strategic Planning: Leading results-oriented organizations focus on 
the process of strategic planning that includes involvement of 
stakeholders, assessment of internal and external environments, and an 
alignment of activities, cores processes and resources to support 
mission-related outcomes. 

* Organizational Alignment: The organization of the new department 
should be aligned to be consistent with the goals and objectives 
established in the strategic plan. 

* Communication: Effective communication strategies are key to any 
major consolidation or transformation effort. 

* Building Partnerships: One of the key challenges of this new 
department will be the development and maintenance of homeland 
security partners at all levels of the government and the private 
sector, both in the United States and overseas. 

* Performance Management: An effective performance management system 
fosters institutional, unit and individual accountability. 

* Human Capital Strategy: The new department must ensure that its 
homeland security missions are not adversely impacted by the 
government's pending human capital crisis, and that it can recruit, 
retain and reward a talented and motivated workforce, which has 
required core competencies, to achieve its mission and objectives. The 
people factor is a critical element in any major consolidation or 
transformation. 

* Information Management and Technology: The new department should 
leverage state-of-the art enabling technology to enhance its ability 
to transform capabilities and capacities to share and act upon timely, 
quality information about terrorist threats. 

* Knowledge Management: The new department must ensure it makes 
maximum use of the collective body of knowledge that will be brought 
together in the consolidation. 

* Financial Management: The new department has a stewardship 
obligation to prevent fraud, waste and abuse, to use tax dollars 
appropriately, and to ensure financial accountability to the 
President, Congress and the American people. 

* Acquisition Management: Anticipated as one of the largest of new 
federal departments, the proposed DHS will potentially have one of the 
most extensive acquisition requirements in government. Early attention 
to strong systems and controls for acquisition and related business 
processes will be critical both to ensuring success and maintaining 
integrity and accountability. 

* Risk Management: The new department must be able to maintain and 
enhance current states of homeland security readiness while 
transitioning and transforming itself into a more effective and 
efficient structural unit. The proposed DHS will also need to 
immediately improve the government's overall ability to perform risk 
management activities that can help to prevent, defend against and 
respond to terrorist acts. 

Homeland Security Reorganization: 

Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the United States in 
recent years had made what must be characterized as limited progress 
in strengthening its efforts to protect the nation from terrorist 
attacks. Mainly through the mechanisms of executive orders and 
presidential decision directives (PDD), the President has sought to 
provide greater clarity and leadership in homeland security areas. For 
instance, PDD 39 in June 1995 assigned the Department of Justice, 
through the FBI, responsibility as the lead federal agency for crisis 
management, and FEMA as the lead federal agency for consequence 
management for domestic terrorist attacks. In May 1998, PDD 62 
established the position of national coordinator for terrorism within 
the National Security Council. PDD 63 emphasized new efforts to 
protect the nation's critical infrastructure from attack. Through 
legislation, the federal government increased the availability of 
grants for first responder training and instituted more regular 
tabletop training exercises involving state and local governments. 

A number of blue ribbon panels or commissions were also convened prior 
to September 11th and, after studying the government's structure and 
methods for protecting against terrorism, made many important and 
timely recommendations for improving our approach. Panels led by 
former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, as well as former 
Virginia Governor James Gilmore, made sweeping recommendations about 
remedying the gaps, overlaps and coordination problems in the 
government's ability to detect, prevent, and respond to terrorist 
attacks in a comprehensive manner across both the public and private 
sectors. Indeed, the Hart-Rudman Commission recommended the creation 
of a new department to consolidate many of the government's homeland 
security functions. 

In recent years, GAO has also issued numerous reports and made many 
recommendations designed to improve the nation's approach to homeland 
security. We summarized our work in a report completed just prior to 
the September 11th attacks, in which we found that: (1) overall 
leadership and coordination needed to be addressed; (2) limited 
progress had been made in developing a national strategy and related 
guidance and plans; (3) federal response capabilities had improved but 
further action was still necessary; (4) federal assistance to state 
and local governments could be consolidated; and (5) limited progress 
had been made in implementing a strategy to counter computer-based 
threats.[Footnote 13] We have continued to reiterate that a central 
focal point such as OHS be established statutorily in order to 
coordinate and oversee homeland security policy within a national 
framework.[Footnote 14] Today, we re-emphasize the need for OHS to be 
established statutorily in order to effectively coordinate activities 
beyond the scope of the proposed DHS and to assure reasonable 
congressional oversight. 

As mentioned previously, after the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
Congress and the Administration took a number of actions designed to 
improve our ability to combat terrorism and protect the nation. The 
President created OHS via executive order. Congress passed legislation 
creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to better 
secure transportation and the USA Patriot Act to improve our 
capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist acts. Congress also 
introduced legislation to restructure a variety of homeland security 
related functions, and Senator Lieberman and Representative Thornberry 
proposed legislation to create a new cabinet department to consolidate 
many homeland security functions. 

On June 6th, President Bush announced a new proposal to create a 
Department of Homeland Security and submitted draft legislation to 
Congress on June 18th. Like the congressional approaches to creation 
of a new department, the President's plan also reflected many of the 
recent commissions' suggestions and GAO's recommendations for improved 
coordination and consolidation of homeland security functions. As 
indicated by Governor Ridge is his recent testimony before Congress, 
the creation of DHS would empower a single cabinet official whose 
primary mission is to protect the American homeland from terrorism, 
including: (1) preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; 
(2) reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism; and (3) minimizing 
the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur.[Footnote 15] 

In our initial review of the proposed DHS, we have used the 
President's draft bill of June 18th as the basis of our comments. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that the proposal has already - and will 
continue - to evolve in the coming days and weeks ahead. The 
President's proposal creates a cabinet department with four divisions, 
including: 

* Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. 

* Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures. 

* Border and Transportation Security. 

* Emergency Preparedness and Response. 

Additionally, the proposed DHS would be responsible for homeland 
security coordination with other executive branch agencies, state and 
local governments, the private sector and other entities. The 
legislation transfers to the new department intact the U.S. Secret 
Service and the U.S. Coast Guard. For the organizations transferred to 
the new department, the proposed DHS would be responsible for managing 
all of their functions, including non-homeland security functions. In 
some instances, these other responsibilities are substantial. Finally, 
the proposal would exempt the new department from certain authorities, 
including some civil service protections, the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, and procurement laws, while providing authority to 
authorize new rules by regulation and to reprogram portions of 
departmental appropriations. The new department's Inspector General 
would be modeled on that office in the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Homeland Security Missions: 

One of the most critical functions that the new department will have 
is the analysis of information and intelligence to better foresee 
terrorist threats to the United States. As part of its function, the 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection division of the 
department would assess the vulnerability of America's key assets and 
critical infrastructure, including food and water systems, 
agriculture, health systems, emergency services, banking and finance, 
communications and information systems, energy (including electric, 
nuclear, gas and oil and hydropower), transportation systems, and 
national monuments. 

The President's proposal seeks to transfer to the new department the 
FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center (other than the 
computer investigations and operations center), the National 
Communications System of DOD, the Commerce Department's Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance Office, the Computer Security Division of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the National 
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center of DOE, and the General 
Services Administration's (GSA) Federal Computer Incident Response 
Center. 

The Administration has indicated that this new division would for the 
first time merge under one roof the capability to identify and assess 
threats to the homeland, map those threats against our 
vulnerabilities, issue timely warnings, and organize preventive or 
protective action to secure the homeland. Considerable debate has 
ensued in recent weeks with respect to the quality and timeliness of 
intelligence data shared between and among relevant intelligence, law 
enforcement and other agencies. The proposal would provide for the new 
department to receive all reports and analysis related to threats of 
terrorism and vulnerabilities to our infrastructure and, if the 
President directs, information in the "raw" state that has not been 
analyzed. 

The agencies and programs included in the Administration's proposal to 
consolidate information analysis functions are clear contributors to 
the homeland security mission and, if well coordinated or 
consolidated, could provide greater benefits in incident reporting, 
analysis and warning, and the identification of critical assets. Such 
a critical endeavor, however, will still require detailed planning and 
coordination, including a national critical infrastructure protection 
strategy, both inside and outside the new department, to ensure that 
relevant information reaches the right offices and officials who can 
act upon it. Furthermore, in considering this portion of the 
legislation, Congress ought to evaluate whether the new division as 
proposed, despite the provision stipulating access, will have 
sufficient ability to obtain all necessary information, assistance and 
guidance to make decisions in a timely, effective manner. 

Within this framework, the Congress will likely need to make trade-off 
decisions between concerns over access and utility of information and 
the concerns that some Americans may have about civil rights issues 
associated with any larger consolidation of domestically-oriented 
intelligence operations. It is also important to note that while 
certain cyber/critical infrastructure protection functions are 
proposed for transfer into DHS, a significant number of federal 
organizations involved in this effort will remain in their existing 
locations, including the Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, the 
Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations, and the Computer 
Investigations and Operations Section of the FBI. The homeland 
security proposal is silent on the relationship between those entities 
that will be consolidated and their role in coordinating with the 
entities left out of the new department, and Congress should consider 
addressing this important issue. Ultimately, a greater emphasis on 
strategic planning and information sharing clearly will be necessary 
to resolve the significant shortfalls that the government has faced in 
sharing critical intelligence and infrastructure information in order 
to better achieve homeland security expectations. The consolidation of 
some intelligence functions into DHS may help solve these problems. 

The division of the new department responsible for chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures will consolidate 
several important scientific, research and development programs, 
including the select agent registration enforcement programs and 
activities of the Department of Health and Human Services (BHS), 
programs at DOE dealing with chemical and biological national security 
and nonproliferation supporting programs, the nuclear smuggling 
programs, the nuclear assessment program, energy security and 
assurance activities, and life science activities of DOE's biological 
and environmental research program related to microbial pathogens. 
Also proposed for transfer are the Environmental Measurements 
Laboratory, portions of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
the Plum Island Animal Diseases Center of the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), and DOD's National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis 
Center, which is not yet operational. 

The proposal seeks to remedy the current fragmented efforts of the 
government and its private sector partners to counter and protect 
against the threat of weapons of mass destruction. To the extent that 
this division would develop or coordinate the development of national 
policy to strengthen research and development in the areas of 
countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
weapons, such a goal conforms to previous recommendations we have 
made.[Footnote 16] As with the information analysis division discussed 
previously, this division would also have extensive needs to 
coordinate with other similar programs throughout the government - 
programs which are not included in the new department. For example, 
there are civilian applications of defense related research and 
development underway at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and 
the National Institutes of Health (NM) has some on-going 
responsibility for bioterrorism research. Whether such programs ought 
to be considered for inclusion in the new department, or whether these 
issues can be coordinated simply through improved interaction, are 
also questions that should be considered in the larger context of the 
legislation. The proposal also calls for transferring elements of the 
Lawrence Livermore Lab to the new department. At this point, without 
sufficient additional information, it is not clear what the impact 
that such a shift would have on the lab's overall research program or 
the significant contract workforce that is engaged in much of the 
activities. Congress may also need to further explore whether the 
relationships the proposal would establish between the new 
department's secretary and the Secretary of BHS will efficiently and 
effectively result in the desired outcomes for civilian research, as 
the nature of the agreements and delegations to implement such 
functions are not clear. Nevertheless, despite some unresolved 
ambiguity, it will be important for the Congress to capture the 
synergy that potentially can be created by combining compatible 
research and development activities. 

One of the larger divisions of the new department would handle Border 
and Transportation Security, and would include the transfer of the 
U.S. Customs Service, INS, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS) of USDA, the Coast Guard and TSA, both from DOT, and 
GSA's Federal Protective Service. The proposal seeks to bring together 
under one department all of the border control functions, including 
authority over the issuance of visas, in order to consolidate 
operations for border controls, territorial waters and transportation 
systems. This effort is designed to balance prevention of terrorist 
activities against people, food and other goods, and transportation 
systems with the legitimate, rapid movement of people and commerce 
across borders and around the country. Under the proposed transfer, 
APHIS and Plum Island (as part of the Infrastructure division) would 
be moved from USDA, but other units would remain. In addition, no Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) food safety functions were identified 
for transfer. Thus, the focus appears to be on enhancing protection of 
livestock and crops from terrorist acts, rather than on protecting the 
food supply as a whole. In previous reports, GAO has described our 
current fragmented federal food supply safety structure and, in the 
absence of a single food safety agency, Congress may wish to consider 
whether the new department would be able to prevent, detect, and 
quickly respond to acts of terrorism in the food supply. Another issue 
that Congress may need to consider is the organizational separation of 
facilities management functions and building security responsibilities 
contained in the Federal Protective Service's mission. Since the 
provision of security is a key facilities management function, 
security needs to be integrated into decisions about the location, 
design and operation of federal facilities. Moreover, many federal 
agencies provide their own building security. The proposal does not 
address the coordination or further consolidation of such functions, 
and it is also silent on GSM role in leading the Interagency Security 
Committee, which develops the federal government's security policies 
and oversees the implementation of such policies in federal facilities. 

Finally, the last division, Emergency Preparedness and Response, would 
combine the government's various agencies and programs that provide 
assistance, grants, training and related help to state and local 
governments, to first responder personnel and support other federal 
agencies that may confront terrorist attacks, major disasters and 
other emergencies. The proposal would transfer to the new department 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness and the Domestic Emergency Support Teams of the Justice 
Department and National Domestic Preparedness Office of the FBI, as 
well as the Strategic National Stockpile and certain public health 
preparedness responsibilities of HHS. This consolidation would allow 
the secretary of the new department to oversee federal government 
assistance in the domestic disaster preparedness training of first 
responders and would coordinate the government's disaster response 
efforts. Although certain other disaster response functions are not 
specifically included in the proposed department, the DHS secretary 
would have the authority to call on other response assets, such as 
DOE's nuclear incident response teams. Additionally, Congress might 
wish to examine the likely impact of establishing agreements between 
the DHS and BHS secretaries that retain authority for the conduct of 
certain public health related activities at DHS but the execution of 
the activities would be left to BHS. 

Impact on Other Functions: 

The legislation for the new department indicates that DHS, in addition 
to its homeland security responsibilities, will also be responsible 
for carrying out all other functions of the agencies and programs that 
are transferred to it. In fact, quite a number of the agencies 
proposed to be transferred to DHS have multiple functions - they have 
missions directly associated with homeland security and missions that 
are not at all related to homeland security. In our initial review of 
the impacted agencies, we have not found any missions that would 
appear to be in fundamental conflict with the department's primary 
mission of homeland security. However, the Congress will need to 
consider whether many of the non-homeland security missions of those 
agencies transferred to DHS will receive adequate funding, attention, 
visibility and support when subsumed into a department that will be 
under tremendous pressure to succeed in its primary mission. As 
important and vital as the homeland security mission is to our 
nation's future, the other non-homeland security missions transferred 
to DHS for the most part are not small or trivial responsibilities. 
Rather, they represent extremely important functions executed by the 
federal government that, absent sufficient attention, could have 
serious implications for their effective delivery and consequences for 
sectors of our economy, health and safety, research programs and other 
significant government functions. Some of these responsibilities 
include: 

* maritime safety and drug interdiction by the Coast Guard, 

* collection of commercial tariffs by the Customs Service, 

* regulation of genetically engineered plants by APHIS, 

* advanced energy and environmental research by the Lawrence Livermore 
and Environmental Measurements labs, 

* responding to floods and other natural disasters by FEMA, and, 

* authority over processing visas by the State Department's consular 
officers. 

These examples reveal that many non-homeland security missions are 
likely to be integrated into a cabinet department overwhelmingly 
dedicated to protecting the nation from terrorism. Congress may wish 
to consider whether the new department, as proposed, will dedicate 
sufficient management capacity and accountability to ensure the 
execution of non-homeland security missions, as well as consider 
potential alternatives to the current framework for handling these 
important functions. 

Likewise, Congress may wish to consider the impact that the proposed 
transfer of certain agencies and programs may have on their "home" 
departments. Both the Department of the Treasury and the DOT will see 
significant reductions in size and changes to their overall 
departmental missions, organization, and environments if the 
legislation is enacted. As a result, these changes provide an 
opportunity for Congress and the Administration to consider what is 
the proper role for these and other federal government entities. As 
the impact of reductions of missions and personnel are contemplated at 
several cabinet departments, it is appropriate for Congress to 
reconsider the relevance or fit of federal programs and activities. 
This process requires that we ask important, yet sometimes tough 
questions, such as: 

* What is the national need? 

* How important is it relative to other competing needs and available 
resources? 

* What is the proper federal role, if any? 

* Who are the other key players (e.g., state and local government, non-
government organizations, private sector)? 

* How should we define success (e.g., desired outcomes)? 

* What tools of government create the best incentives for strong 
results - (direct funding, tax incentives, guarantees, regulation, 
enforcement)? 

* What does experience tell us about the effectiveness of any current 
related government programs? 

* Based on the above, what programs should be reduced, terminated, 
started or expanded? 

In fact, given the key trends identified in GAO's recent strategic 
plan for supporting the Congress and our long range fiscal challenges, 
now is the time to ask three key questions: (1) what should the 
federal government do in the 21st century? (2) how should the federal 
government do business in the 21st century? and (3) who should do the 
federal government's business the 21st century? These questions are 
relevant for DHS and every other federal agency and activity. 

As the proposal to create DHS indicates, the terrorist events of last 
fall have provided an impetus for the government to look at the larger 
picture of how it provides homeland security and how it can best 
accomplish associated missions. Yet, even for those agencies that are 
not being integrated into DHS, there remains a very real need and 
possibly a unique opportunity to rethink approaches and priorities to 
enable them to better target their resources to address our most 
urgent needs. In some cases, the new emphasis on homeland security has 
prompted attention to longstanding problems that have suddenly become 
more pressing. For example, we've mentioned the overlapping and 
duplicative food safety programs in the federal government.[Footnote 
17] While such overlap has been responsible for poor coordination and 
inefficient allocation of resources, these issues assume a new, and 
potentially more foreboding, meaning after September 11th given the 
threat from bio-terrorism. A consolidated approach can facilitate a 
concerted and effective response to new threats. 

The federal role in law enforcement, especially in connection with 
securing our borders, is another area that is ripe for re-examination 
following the events of September 11th. In the past 20 years, the 
federal government has taken on a larger role in financing criminal 
justice activities that have traditionally been viewed as the province 
of the state and local sector. Given the daunting new law enforcement 
responsibilities, and limited budgetary resources at all levels, it is 
important to consider whether these additional responsibilities should 
encourage us to reassess criminal justice roles and responsibilities 
at the federal, state and local level. 

Management Concerns: 

As Congress considers legislation for a new homeland security 
department, it is important to note that simply moving agencies into a 
new government organizational structure will, by itself, be 
insufficient to create the dynamic environment that will be required 
to meet performance expectations for protecting and defending the 
nation against terrorism. It is critical to recognize the important 
management and implementation challenges the new department will face. 
These challenges are already being faced at TSA, which is under 
considerable pressure to build a strong workforce and meet numerous 
deadlines for integrating technology and security issues. Moreover, 
Congress should be aware that some fundamental problems currently 
exist with certain of the agencies that are slated to become part of 
the new department. DHS will need to pay special attention to these 
agencies to ensure that they can maintain readiness and confront 
significant management problems simultaneously. 

For example, several of the agencies currently face challenges in 
administering their programs, managing their human capital, and 
implementing and securing information technology systems. Absent 
immediate and sustained attention to long-standing issues, these 
problems are likely to remain once the transfer is complete. Our past 
work has demonstrated that these management challenges exist within 
INS, APHIS, and FEMA. Program management and implementation has been a 
particular challenge for INS, which has a dual mission of enforcing 
laws regarding illegal immigration and providing immigration and 
naturalization services for aliens who enter and reside legally in the 
U.S. This "mission overload" has impeded INS from succeeding at either 
of its primary functions. In 1997, the bipartisan Commission on 
Immigration Reform stated that INS' service and enforcement functions 
were incompatible and that tasking one agency with carrying out both 
functions caused problems, such as competition for resources, lack of 
coordination and cooperation, and personnel practices that created 
confusion regarding mission and responsibilities. For example, INS 
does not have procedures in place to coordinate its resources for 
initiating and managing its programs to combat alien smuggling. In 
several border areas, multiple antismuggling units exist that operate 
autonomously, overlap in jurisdiction, and report to different INS 
officials. In addition, INS field officials lack clear criteria on 
which antismuggling cases to investigate, resulting in inconsistent 
decision-making across locations.[Footnote 18] 

Managing human capital also remains a challenge for INS, APHIS, and 
FEMA. For INS, issues in managing its human capital management have 
impacted various functions. Because of cut backs or delays in 
training, a large portion of INS' staff will be relatively 
inexperienced and inadequately trained for processing visas for 
specialty occupations. Furthermore, while INS officials believe they 
need more staff to keep up with the workload, they could not specify 
the types of staff needed or where they should be located because of 
the lack of a staff allocation model and procedures. APHIS, one of the 
three primary agencies responsible for monitoring the entry of cargo 
and passengers into the U.S., has struggled to keep pace with its 
heavy workload at ports of entry.[Footnote 19] These conditions have 
led APHIS inspectors to shortcut cargo inspection procedures, thereby 
jeopardizing the quality of the inspections conducted. In addition, 
APHIS has little assurance that it is effectively deploying its 
limited inspection resources because of weaknesses in its staffing 
models. Likewise, FEMA still struggles with using its disaster relief 
staff in an effective manner although it has reported progress in 
improving its Disaster Field Office operations through convening a 
review council to study its operations and the implementation of 
corrective actions.[Footnote 20] 

Agencies' management efforts to implement information technology 
systems, as well as utilize and secure the information within these 
systems, have also proved challenging. For example, INS lacks an 
agencywide automated case tracking and management system to help it 
monitor and coordinate its investigations. Further, INS' antismuggling 
intelligence efforts have been hampered by an inefficient and 
cumbersome process for retrieving and analyzing intelligence 
information and by the lack of clear guidance to INS staff about how 
to gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information. Within 
APHIS, no central automated system has been implemented to allow for 
agency-wide access to information on the status of shipments on hold 
at ports, forcing inspection staff to use a manual record keeping 
system that does not reliably track this information. For FEMA, 
material weaknesses in its access controls and program change controls 
have contributed to deficiencies within its financial information 
systems. 

Keys To Successful Implementation: 

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security will be one of the 
largest, most complex re-structurings ever under taken. The department 
and its leaders will face many challenges, including organizational, 
human capital, process, technology and environmental issues that must 
be sorted out at the same time that the new department is working to 
maintain readiness. Strategic planning will be critical to maintaining 
readiness, managing risk, and balancing priorities, and the 
department's broad mission will depend on many partners to ensure 
success. Moreover, sound management systems and practices will be 
integral to the department's ability to achieve its mission 
effectively and to be held accountable for results. 

Though faced with enormous management challenges, one must also look 
at the building of a new department as an opportunity to create a high 
performance organization As indicated earlier, the President's 
proposal includes many management flexibilities to allow rapid and 
fluid responses to events and to obtain sufficient personnel for the 
new department. Given the enormous management challenges, it is clear 
that some degree of flexibility will be necessary for the new 
department to minimize transition problems. However, in providing 
flexibility, mechanisms must also be established to provide some 
protections to prevent abuse and appropriate transparency and 
accountability mechanisms. The government's management laws, such as 
the Chief Financial Officers Act, the Clinger-Cohen Act, the Inspector 
General Act, and the Government Performance and Results Act, for 
instance, provide an effective foundation for the management structure 
of the new department and a basis for ensuring performance and 
accountability. These laws, as well as the following management 
practices, will be critical to the ultimate success of the new 
department. 

Strategic Planning: 

A strategic plan should be the cornerstone of DHS' planning structure. 
It should clearly articulate the agency's mission, goals, objectives, 
and the strategies the department will use to achieve those goals and 
objectives. It provides a focal point for all planning efforts, and is 
integral to how an organization structures itself to accomplish its 
mission. In addition, a comprehensive transition plan that clearly 
delineates timetables and resource requirements will be vital to 
managing this re-organization A consolidation of this magnitude cannot 
be accomplished in months. As shown by past experience, it will take 
years to truly consolidate the programs, functions and activities 
being brought under the umbrella of DHS. The President has taken a 
significant first step by establishing a transition planning office in 
the Office of Management and Budget. Congress should consider 
requiring a comprehensive transition plan and periodic progress 
reports, as part of its oversight of the consolidation actions. 

The magnitude of the challenges that DHS faces calls for comprehensive 
and rigorous planning to guide decisions about how to make the 
department work effectively and achieve high performance. Leadership 
will be needed to establish long-range plans, to direct and coordinate 
the actions of the department's various interrelated policies and 
functions, and to achieve its goals and objectives. Management also 
must develop specific short-range plans to efficiently direct 
resources among functions and to assist in making decisions regarding 
day-to-day operations. DHS must define priorities, goals and plans in 
concert with other agencies, Congress, and outside interest groups, 
while also leveraging the potential and dynamism of its new units. 
[Footnote 21] 

Organizational Alignment: 

Leading organizations start by assessing the extent to which their 
programs and activities contribute to meeting their mission and 
intended results. An organization's activities, core processes, and 
resources must be aligned to support missions and help it achieve its 
goals. It is not uncommon for new leadership teams to find that their 
organization structures are obsolete and inadequate to modern demands, 
or that spans of control and field to headquarters ratios are 
misaligned, and that changes are required. For example, the agencies 
proposed to be included in DHS have unique field structures, the 
integration of which will be a significant challenge given the natural 
tension between organizational, functional and geographic 
orientations. Flexibility will be needed to accomplish this difficult 
management task, as well as many others. 

Communication/Building Partnerships: 

The President's proposal will consolidate many homeland security 
functions and activities. However, the new department ultimately will 
be dependent on the relationships it builds both within and outside 
the department for its ultimate success. As we indicated, the recently 
reported intelligence sharing challenges provide ample illustration of 
the need for strong partnerships and full communication among critical 
stakeholders. 

There is a growing understanding that any meaningful results that 
agencies hope to achieve are accomplished through matrixed 
relationships or networks of governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations working together toward a common purpose. These matrixed 
relationships exist on at least three levels. First, they support the 
various internal units of an agency. Second, they include the 
relationships among the components of a parent department as well as 
those between individual components and the department. Matrixed 
relationships are also developed externally, including relationships 
with other federal agencies, domestic and international organizations, 
for-profit and not-for-profit contractors, and state and local 
governments, among others. 

Internally, leading organizations seek to ensure that managers, teams, 
and employees at all levels are given the authority they need to 
accomplish their goals and work collaboratively to achieve 
organizational outcomes. Communication flows up and down the 
organization to ensure that line staff has the ability to provide 
leadership with the perspective and information that the leadership 
needs to make decisions. Likewise, senior leadership keeps line staff 
informed of key developments and issues so that the staff can best 
contribute to achieving the organization's goals. There is no question 
that effective communication strategies are key to any major 
consolidation or transformation effort. 

Collaboration, coordination, and communication are equally important 
across agency boundaries. However, our work also has shown that 
agencies encounter a range of barriers when they attempt 
coordination.[Footnote 22] In our past work, we have offered several 
possible approaches for better managing crosscutting programs - such 
as improved coordination, integration, and consolidation-to ensure 
that crosscutting goals are consistent, program efforts are mutually 
reinforcing, and where appropriate, common or complementary 
performance measures are used as a basis for management.[Footnote 23] 

The proposed legislation provides for the new department to reach out 
to state and local governments and the private sector to coordinate 
and integrate planning, communications, information, and recovery 
efforts addressing homeland security. This is important recognition of 
the critical role played by nonfederal entities in protecting the 
nation from terrorist attacks. State and local governments play 
primary roles in performing functions that will be essential in 
effectively addressing our new challenges. Much attention has already 
been paid to their role as first responders in all disasters, whether 
caused by terrorist attacks or natural disasters. State and local 
governments also have roles to play in protecting critical 
infrastructure and providing public health and law enforcement 
response capability. The private sector's ownership of energy and 
telecommunications is but one indicator of the critical role that the 
corporate sector must play in addressing threats to our homeland. 

Achieving national preparedness and response goals hinge on the 
federal government's ability to form effective partnerships with 
nonfederal entities. Therefore, federal initiatives should be 
conceived as national, not federal in nature. The new department needs 
to gain the full participation and buy-in of partners in both policy 
formulation and implementation to develop effective partnerships. DHS 
will need to balance national interests with the unique needs and 
interests of nonfederal partners. One size will not, nor should it, 
fit all. It is important to recognize both the opportunities and risks 
associated with partnerships. While gaining the opportunity to 
leverage the legal, financial and human capital assets of partners for 
national preparedness, each of these nonfederal entities has goals and 
priorities that are independent of the federal government. In 
designing tools to engage these actors, the department needs to be 
aware of the potential for goal slippage and resource diversion. For 
instance, in providing grants to state or local governments for 
training and equipment, federal officials should be alert to the 
potential for these governments to use grants to substitute for their 
own resources in these programs, essentially converting a targeted 
federal grant into a general revenue sharing initiative. Maintenance 
of effort provisions can be included to protect against such risk. 
Designing and managing the tools of public policy to engage and work 
constructively with third parties has become a new skill required of 
federal agencies, and one that needs to be addressed by the new 
department. 

A good illustration of the relevance of partnerships involves the 
protection of the nation's borders against threats arriving aboard 
shipping cargo. The Customs Service currently inspects only two 
percent of the cargo arriving in American ports and it is probably 
unrealistic to expect significant increases in coverage through 
inspections even with higher numbers of federal inspectors. Rather, a 
more effective strategy calls for the federal government to work 
proactively with shipping companies to gain their active buy-in to 
self-inspections and more rigorous protection of cargo. Partnerships 
with foreign ports are also critical in preventing the shipping of 
suspicious items in the first place. Although critical to national 
security, the protection of our ports illustrates the critical role 
played by partnerships spanning sectors of the economy and nations. 

Performance Management: 

A performance management system that promotes the alignment of 
institutional, unit and individual accountability to achieve results 
will be an essential component for success of the new department. High-
performing organizations know how the services and functions they 
deliver contribute to achieving the results of their organizations. 
Our work has shown that there are three characteristics for high-
performing, results-oriented organizations. These organizations: (1) 
define clear missions and desired outcomes; (2) measure performance to 
gauge progress; and (3) use performance information as a basis for 
decision-making.[Footnote 24] These characteristics are consistent 
with the Government Performance and Results Act, and should be the 
guide to developing a strong performance management system for the new 
department. 

The first step for the department's leadership will be to define its 
mission and desired outcomes. Activities, core processes and resources 
will have to be aligned. This will require cascading the department's 
goals and objectives down through the organization. Further, an 
effective performance management system will require involvement of 
stakeholders and a full understanding of the environment in which the 
department operates. 

A good performance management system fosters both institutional, unit 
and individual accountability. One way to inculcate a culture of 
excellence or results-orientation is to align individual employees' 
performance expectations with agency goals and desired outcomes so 
that individuals understand the connection between their daily 
activities and their organization's success. High-performing 
organization have recognized that a key element of a fully successful 
performance management system is to create a "line of sight" that 
shows how individual responsibilities contribute to organizational 
goals. These organizations align their top leadership's performance 
expectations with organizational goals and then cascade performance 
expectations to lower organizational levels.[Footnote 25] 

Human Capital Strategy: 

An organization's people are its most important asset. People define 
an organization, affect its capacity to perform, and represent the 
knowledge-base of the organization. In an effort to help agency 
leaders integrate human capital considerations into daily decision-
making and in the program results they seek to achieve, we have 
recently released an exposure draft of a model of strategic human 
capital management that highlights the kinds of thinking that agencies 
should apply and steps they can take to manage their human capital 
more strategically.[Footnote 26] The model focuses on four 
cornerstones for effective human capital management -leadership; 
strategic human capital planning; acquiring, developing, and retaining 
talent; and results-oriented organization culture. The new department 
may find this model useful in helping guide its efforts. 

One of the major challenges DHS faces is the creation of a common 
organizational culture to support a unified mission, common set of 
core values, and organization-wide strategic goals, while 
simultaneously ensuring that the various components have the 
flexibility and authorities they need to achieve results. When I have 
discussed the need for government-wide reforms in strategic human 
capital management, I have often referred to a three-step process that 
should be used in making needed changes. This process may be helpful 
to Congress as it considers the human capital and other management 
authorities it will provide the department. Like other departments, 
DHS should be encouraged to make appropriate use of all authorities at 
its disposal. We often find that agencies are not taking full 
advantage of the tools, incentives, and authorities that Congress and 
the central management agencies have provided. DHS will also find it 
beneficial to identify targeted statutory changes that Congress could 
consider to enhance DHS's efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., 
additional hiring and compensation flexibility for critical skill 
areas, targeted early out and buyout authority). In this regard, 
Congress may wish to consider the approach it used in forming TSA, 
which included provisions for a progress report and related 
recommendations for congressional action. 

Information Management and Technology: 

The new department will face tremendous communications and systems and 
information technology challenges. Programs and agencies will be 
brought together in the new department from throughout the government. 
Each will bring their communications and information systems. It will 
be a tremendous undertaking to integrate these diverse systems to 
enable effective communication and share information among themselves, 
as well as those outside the department. Further, considering the 
sensitivity of the data at the proposed department, securing its 
information systems and networks will be a major challenge. Since 
1996, we have reported that poor information security is a widespread 
federal government problem with potentially devastating consequences. 

Effective leadership and focused management control will be critical 
to meeting these challenges. We recommend that a CIO management 
structure as prescribed by the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 be 
established to provide the leadership necessary to direct this 
complex, vital function. Further, it will be critical that an 
enterprise architecture be developed to guide the integration and 
modernization of information systems. Enterprise architecture consists 
of models that describe how the enterprise operates now and how it 
needs to operate in the future. Without enterprise architecture to 
guide and constrain IT investments, stovepipe operations and systems 
can emerge, which in turn lead to needless duplication, 
incompatibilities, and additional costs. By its very nature, the 
combining of organizations will result in stovepipes. It will require 
strong leadership, re-engineering of business processes to meet 
corporate goals, and effective planning to integrate, modernize and 
secure the new department's information systems. 

Knowledge Management: 

Effective knowledge management captures the collective body of 
information and intellect within an organization, treats the resultant 
knowledge base as a valued asset, and makes relevant parts of the 
knowledge base available to decisionmakers at all levels of the 
organization. Knowledge management is closely aligned with enterprise 
architecture management, because both focus on systematically 
identifying the information needs of the organization and describing 
the means for sharing this information among those who need it. The 
people brought together in the new department will have diverse skills 
and knowledge. It will be critical for the new department to build an 
effective knowledge management capability. Elements involved in 
institutionalizing this function include: 

* Deciding with whom (both internally and externally) to share 
organizational knowledge; 

* Deciding what knowledge is to be share, through performing a 
knowledge audit and creating a knowledge map; 

* Deciding how the knowledge is to be share, through creating 
apprenticeship/mentoring programs and communities of practice for 
transferring tacit knowledge, identifying best practices and lessons 
learned, managing knowledge content, and evaluating methods for 
sharing knowledge; and; 

* Sharing and using organizational knowledge, through obtaining 
sustained executive commitment, integrating the knowledge management 
function across the enterprise and embedding it in business models, 
communications strategies, and measuring performance and value. 

Financial Management: 

The events of September 11th and the efforts of the Administration and 
Congress to protect the country from future terrorist attacks have 
generated enormous demands on resources in a short period of time. The 
FY2002 appropriations and the nearly simultaneous transmission of an 
emergency supplement and FY2003 budget request were followed shortly 
by a second FY2002 supplemental. This rapid growth in spending for 
homeland security has shifted budget priorities in ways that we are 
only beginning to understand. As Congress considers the resource 
implications of the proposed Department, both budget and 
accountability issues need to be addressed. 

It will be important for both OMB and the Congress to develop a 
process to track the budget authority and outlays associated with 
homeland security through the President's budget proposals, 
congressional budget resolution, and the appropriations process. 
[Footnote 27] A tracking system is vital for Congress to address the 
total spending for homeland security as well as to ensure that the 
total allocations are in fact implemented subsequently in the 
authorization and appropriations process. In addition, DHS must also 
track the spending for the non-homeland security missions of the 
department. 

As we have indicated, many important activities relevant to homeland 
security will continue to be housed in other agencies outside the 
department, such as the protection of nuclear power plants and 
drinking water, and require the new department to work 
collaboratively. The proposed legislation addresses this challenge in 
several instances by authorizing the new department to transfer and/or 
control resources for some of these related programs. For instance, 
the department is given authority to set priorities for research on 
bioterrorism by the Department of Health and Human Services, but it is 
unclear how this will occur. 

Although consolidating activities in one department may produce 
savings over the longer term, there will be certain transition costs 
in the near term associated with setting up the new agency, acquiring 
space, providing for new information systems, and other assorted 
administrative expenses. Some of these costs, such as developing new 
systems, may be one time in nature, while others, such as the overhead 
necessary to administer the department will be continuing. Congress 
may very well decide that these new costs should be absorbed from the 
appropriations of programs and agencies being consolidated into the 
department. Indeed, it appears that the Administration's proposal 
seeks to facilitate this by authorizing the Secretary to draw up to 
five percent of unobligated balances from accounts to be included in 
the new department after notification to the Congress. While these 
transfers may be sufficient to fund the transition, the costs of the 
transition should be transparent to Congress up front as it considers 
the proposed new department. 

The initial estimated funding for the new department is $37.7 billion. 
This estimate reportedly includes the total funds, both for homeland 
and non-homeland security missions of the incoming agencies and 
programs. Agencies and programs migrating to the new department have 
different financial systems, as well as financial management 
challenges. Further, the new department would have numerous financial 
relationships with other federal departments, as well as state and 
local government and the private sector. It will be essential that the 
department have very strong financial stewardship to manage these 
funds. It is important to re-emphasize that the department should be 
brought under the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act and related 
financial management statutes. A Chief Financial Officer, as provided 
by the CFO Act, would be a significant step to ensuring the senior 
leadership necessary to cut across organizational boundaries to 
institutionalize sound financial systems and practices and provide 
good internal controls and accountability for financial resources. 
Systems that produce reliable financial information will be critical 
to managing day-to-day operations and holding people accountable. 

Acquisition Management: 

Sound acquisition management is central to accomplishing the 
department's mission. While the details are still emerging, the new 
department is expected to spend billions annually to acquire a broad 
range of products, technologies, and services from private-sector 
companies. Getting the most from this investment will depend on how 
well the department manages its acquisition activities. Our reports 
have shown that some of the government's largest procurement 
operations are not always particularly well run. In fact, three 
agencies with major procurement operations - DOD, DOE and NASA - have 
been on our high-risk list for the last 10 years.[Footnote 28] 

To ensure successful acquisition outcomes, and effectively integrate 
the diverse organizational elements that will comprise the new 
department, we believe the department needs to adopt a strategic 
perspective on acquisition needs, including the establishing a Chief 
Acquisition Officer. Key elements of a strategic approach involve 
leadership, sound acquisition strategies, and a highly skilled 
workforce. Our acquisition best practices work[Footnote 29] shows that 
a procurement executive or chief acquisition officer plays a crucial 
role in implementing a strategic approach to acquisition. At the 
leading companies we visited, such officials were corporate executives 
who had authority to influence decisions on acquisitions, implement 
needed structural process or role changes, and provide the necessary 
clout to obtain buy-in and acceptance of reengineering and reform 
efforts. Good acquisition outcomes start with sound acquisition 
strategies. Before committing substantial resources, the department 
should look across all of its organizational elements to ensure that 
requirements are linked to mission needs and costs and alternative 
solutions have been considered. Finally, having the right people with 
the right skills to successfully manage acquisitions is critical to 
achieving the department's mission. Many agencies are experiencing 
significant skill and experience imbalances. This will be a particular 
leadership challenge for the acquisition function. 

The administration's proposal would allow the department to deviate 
from the normal federal acquisition rules and laws. Certainly, there 
could be situations where it might be necessary to expedite or 
streamline procurement processes so that the department is not 
handicapped in its ability to protect American citizens against 
terrorism. We support such flexibilities in these situations. However, 
it is not clear from our review of the administration's proposal 
exactly what flexibilities are being requested. Moreover, depending on 
how far-reaching such flexibilities go, we are concerned about whether 
the department will have an acquisition workforce with the skills and 
capabilities to execute the acquisition function outside of the normal 
procurement structure. 

Risk Management: 

A risk assessment is central to risk management and involves the 
consideration of several factors. Generally, the risk assessment 
process is a deliberate, analytical approach to identify which threats 
can exploit which vulnerabilities in an organization's specific 
assets. The factors to consider include analyzing the vulnerabilities, 
identifying and characterizing the threat, assessing the value of the 
asset, identifying and costing countermeasures, and assessing risks. 
After these factors are considered, an organization can decide on 
implementing actions to reduce the risk. It is very difficult to rank 
threats. However, it is more constructive to consider a range of 
threats and review the vulnerabilities and criticality of assets when 
contemplating decisions on resource allocations toward homeland 
security. As a nation, we must be able to weather a variety of threat-
oriented scenarios with prudent planning and execution. Therefore it 
is very important to ensure that the right resources are applied to 
the most appropriate areas based on a risk based management approach. 

In summary, I have discussed the reorganization of homeland security 
functions and some critical factors for success. However, the single 
most important element of a successful reorganization is the 
commitment of top leaders. Top leadership involvement and clear lines 
of accountability for making management improvements are critical to 
overcoming an organization's natural resistance to change, marshaling 
the resources needed to improve management, and building and 
maintaining organization-wide commitment to new ways of doing 
business. Organizational cultures will not be transformed, and new 
visions and ways of doing business will not take root without strong 
and sustained leadership. Strong and visionary leadership will be 
vital to creating a unified, focused organization, as opposed to a 
group of separate units under a single roof. 

Madame Chair, this concludes my written testimony. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee 
may have at this time. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Homeland Security: 

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 
Uncertainty Remains [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-610], June 7, 2002. 

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and 
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-811T], June 7, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving 
National Goals [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-627T], 
April 11, 2002. 

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and 
Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy 
for Homeland Security [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-621T], April 11, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National 
Preparedness Strategy [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-549T], March 28, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership 
Sought [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-490T], March 12, 
2002. 

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and 
Long-Term National Needs [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-160T], November 7, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness 
Efforts [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-208T], October 
31, 2001. 

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA's Role in Strengthening Federal 
Preparedness [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-145T], 
October 15, 2001. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-150T], October 12, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Issues 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1158T], September 21, 
2001. 

Combating Terrorism: 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development 
of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-550T], April 2, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National 
Preparedness Strategy [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-549T], March 28, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to 
Enhance State and Local Preparedness [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-548T], March 25, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National 
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-547T], March 22, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance 
State and Local Preparedness [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-473T], March 1, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Considerations For Investing Resources in 
Chemical and Biological Preparedness [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-162T], October 17, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-822], September 20, 
2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Antiterrorism 
Program Implementation and Management [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-909], September 19, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President's 
Council on Domestic Preparedness [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-555T], May 9, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal 
Response [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-660T], April 
24, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and 
National Strategy [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-556T], March 27, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating 
Preparedness and Response [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-15], March 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 
Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-14], November 30, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145], April 6, 
2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Training [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-64], March 21, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and 
Biological Terrorism [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50], October 20, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk 
Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-16], September 7, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181], June 9, 
1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response 
Equipment and Sustainment Costs [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-NSIAD-99-151], June 9, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-110], May 21, 
1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism 
Operations [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-135], 
May 13, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat 
Terrorism [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107], March 11, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness 
Program Focus and Efficiency [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-NSIAD-99-3], November 12, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic 
Preparedness Program [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16], October 2, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize 
and Target Program Investments [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-74], April 9, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires 
Better Management and Coordination [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-39], December 1, 1997. 

Public Health: 

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Role in 
Public Health Protection [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-235T], November 15, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-149T], October 10, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-141T], October 10, 2001). 

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-129T], October 5, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-915], September 28, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and 
Inventory Management Are Needed [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-667], September 28, 2001. 

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HEHS-00-180], September 
11, 2000. 

Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and 
Biological Attacks [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-163], September 7, 1999. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation 
Should Follow Results Act Framework [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-159], August 16, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public 
Health Initiatives [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112], March 16, 1999. 

Aviation Security: 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 
Screening Security Operations [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1171T], September 25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 
Assigning Screening Responsibilities [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1165T], September 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 
Aviation Security [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1166T], September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 
Security at the Nation's Airports [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1162T], September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners' 
Performance [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-00-75], June 
28, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener 
Performance Problems [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-RCED-00-125], March 16, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-term Attention Is 
Needed [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/T-RCED-98-190], May 14, 
1998. 

Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-97-111R], May 1, 1997. 

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives 
Detection Devices [hyperlink, 
ttp://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-97-119R], April 24, 1997. 

Aviation Security: Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262], 
September 19, 1996. 

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-RCED/NSIAD96-251], September 11, 1996. 

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237], August 
1, 1996. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 
Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer-
Based Attacks [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1168T], 
September 26, 2001. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 
Protecting Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning 
Capabilities [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1132T], 
September 12, 2001. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 
Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1005T], July 25, 2001. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 
Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-769T], May 22, 2001. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 
Developing National Capabilities [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-01-323], April 25, 2001. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a 
Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/T-AIMD-00-268], July 26, 2000. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber 
Security Information Act of 2000 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-AIMD-00-229], June 22, 2000. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information 
Systems Protection [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/AIMD-00-90R], February 11, 2000. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for 
Information Systems Protection [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-AIMD-00-72], February 1, 2000. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to 
Assure Security of Federal Operations [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-AIMD-00-7], October 6, 1999. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on 
Year 2000 Experiences [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/AIMD-00-1], October 1, 1999. 

Disaster Assistance: 

Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration 
Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-01-837], August 31, 2001. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes 
and Addressing Major Management Challenges [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-832], July 9, 2001. 

FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-850], August 13, 2001. 

Budget and Management: 

Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1084SP], August 2001. 

Managing for Results: Federal Managers' Views on Key Management Issues 
Vary Widely Across Agencies [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-592], May 2001. 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High, Risks 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-159SP], November 2000. 

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission 
Fragmentation and Program Overlap [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-97-156], August 29, 1997. 

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal 
Missions and Approaches [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-AIMD-95-161], June 7, 1995. 

Government Reorganization: Issues and Principals [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-GGD/AIMD95-166], May 17, 1995. 

Reorganization: 

FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad Transformation 
Needed [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-865T], June 21, 
2002. 

Grant Design: 

Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and 
Performance Information [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-98-137], June 22, 1998. 

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go 
Further [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-97-7], 
December 18, 1996. 

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-95-226], September 1, 
1995. 

Management: 

A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP], March 15, 2002. 

High Risk Series: An Update [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-263], January 2001. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and 
National Strategy, March 27, 2001 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-556T]. 

[2] Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the 
Federal Response, April 24, 2001[hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-660T]. 

[3] Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts are Underway but 
Uncertainty Remains, June 7, 2002 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-610]. 

[4] Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Recommendations, 
September, 2001 [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-822]. 

[5] High Risk Series: An Update, January 2001 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-263]. 

[6] Implementation: The Missing Link in Planning Reorganizations, 
March 20, 1981[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-GGD-81-57]. 

[7] Reorganizing the Executive Branch in the 20th Century: Landmark 
Commissions (Congressional Research Service, June 10, 2002) and 
Principles of Federal Organization (National Academy of Public 
Administration, January, 1997). 

[8] Government Reorganization Issues and Principles, May 17, 1995 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-GGD/AILVID-95-166]. 

[9] Environmental Protection: Observations on Elevating the EPA to 
Cabinet Status, March 22, 2002 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-522T]. 

[10] R.J. Kramer, Post Merger Organization Handbook (The Conference 
Board, 1999); and A.R. Lajoux, The Art of M&A Integration (McGraw 
Hill, 1998) and James Brian Quinn, Intelligent Enterprise: A Knowledge 
and Service Based Paradigm for Industry (Free Press, 1992). 

[11] Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, 
September 2000 [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/OCG-00-14G]. 

[12] Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Government wide 
Perspective, January 2001 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-241]. 

[13] Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Recommendations, 
September 20, 2001 [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-822]. 

[14] Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for 
Achieving National Goals, April 11, 2002 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-627T]. 

[15] The Department of Homeland Security: Making Americans Safer, 
Written Statement of Governor Tom Ridge before the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 20, 2002. 

[16] Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 
Recommendations, September 20, 2001 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-822]. 

[17] Food Safety: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure Safe Food, 
October 10, 2001 [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-47T]. 

[18] Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 
Justice, January 2001 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-250]. 

[19] Agricultural Inspection: Improvements Needed to Minimize Threat 
of Foreign Pests and Disease, May 5, 1997 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RED-97-102]. 

[20] Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key 
Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges, July 9, 2001 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-832]. 

[21] Management Reform: Elements of Successful Improvement 
Initiatives, October 15, 1999 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-GGD-00-26]. 

[22] Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination, March 
29, 2000 [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-01-106]. 

[23] Using the Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation and 
Program Overlap, August 29, 1997 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AI-MD-97-146]. 

[24] Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, June 1996 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118]. 

[25] Managing for Results: Emerging Benefits From Selected Agencies' 
Use of Performance Agreements, October 20, 2000 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-115]. 

[26] A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, March 15, 2002 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP]. 

[27] OMB issues an annual report that provides funding and programming 
information on the federal government's efforts to combat terrorism. 
However, this report is issued after appropriations occur. 

[28] High-Risk Series: An Update, January 1, 2001 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-263]. 

[29] Best Practices: Taking a Strategic Approach Could Improve DOD's 
Acquisition of Services, January 18, 2002 [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-230].