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United States General Accounting Office: 
GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives. 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 1:00 p.m., EST: 
Thursday, February 28, 2002: 

Export Controls: 

Issues to Consider in Authorizing a New Export Administration Act: 

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

GAO-02-468T: 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the proposed authorization of 
the Export Administration Act (EAA) and to highlight key provisions in 
the House and Senate bills. The law authorizing controls over exports 
of dual use goods and services	those having both commercial and 
military applications-—terminated in 1994 and was extended through law 
and executive order.[Footnote 1] Congress now has before it two 
different bills-—H.R. 2581 and S. 149-—that would enact a new legal 
basis for such controls. 

We examined the two bills to determine how they would balance often 
competing economic, national security, and foreign policy interests at 
key decision points. We also identified issues drawn from our past 
work that demonstrate the need for continuous oversight to ensure that 
the executive branch implements the law as Congress intended. 

Summary: 

A new Export Administration Act will need to balance stakeholder 
interests, assess the national security risks presented by end users, 
and balance the needs of exporters with foreign policy and national 
security interests. Both bills seek to balance these interests by 
involving the departments of Commerce, Defense, and State. In some 
cases, however, the lack of clear provisions raises questions about 
the balance of U.S. foreign policy and national security interests 
with economic interests. 

Overall, in balancing these interests, the House bill places greater 
emphasis on protecting foreign policy and national security interests, 
while the Senate bill emphasizes economic interests. These differences 
are exemplified in the following key areas: 

* The House bill requires the Secretary of Commerce to obtain the 
concurrence of the secretaries of State and Defense when adding or 
removing items from the list of controlled items. In contrast, the 
Senate bill only requires the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. 
However, each bill gives the Secretary of Commerce sole authority to 
remove items from the list without the concurrence of either the 
secretaries of Defense or State, if the secretary determines that 
items are available from foreign sources or on a mass-market basis. 

* The House bill includes a "presumption of denial" provision that 
directs the executive branch to presume that it should deny 
applications under specific conditions. The Senate bill does not 
contain similar language aimed at guiding U.S. licensing decisions. 

Moreover, a series of reports we have issued on export controls 
indicates that new legislation alone will not ensure that regulations 
and practices are implemented as Congress intended. Congress will need 
to oversee executive branch compliance with the law. Our past work has 
identified several instances in which the executive branch has not 
followed congressional direction in implementing export controls or 
has implemented the controls in a confusing or inconsistent manner. 

* The President's January 2001 decision to raise the licensing 
thresholds for high performance computers was not adequately justified 
as required by law. 

* The Department of Commerce's regulations regarding U.S. licensing 
requirements for missile-related exports to Canada are inconsistent 
with the amended Export Administration Act. 

* The Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense have had difficulty 
agreeing on licensing jurisdiction and clear procedures for protecting 
satellite-related technology, which has created confusion and other 
problems for the agencies and exporters. 

* The Department of Commerce has had continuous difficulties in 
monitoring use of sensitive exports, especially in conducting post-
shipment visits. Oversight of this function will continue to be 
necessary, especially when countries restrict U.S. access to 
facilities that receive sensitive U.S. exports. 

Background: 

U.S. policy regarding exports of sensitive dual-use technologies—that 
is, items with military and civilian uses—seeks to balance economic, 
national security, and foreign policy interests. The Export 
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, terminated on August 20, 1994, 
and was extended through several executive orders and law. Under the 
act, the president has the authority to control and require licenses 
for the export of dual use items such as nuclear, chemical, 
biological, missile, or other technologies that may pose a national 
security risk or foreign policy concern. The president also has the 
authority to revise or remove those controls as U.S. concerns and 
interests change. The Commerce Department licenses sensitive dual-use 
items under the Act.[Footnote 2] 

A new Export Administration Act must take into consideration several 
important economic and national security trends: 

* increased globalization of markets and an increasing number of 
foreign competitors, 

* rapid advances in technologies and products, 

* a growing dependence by the U.S. military on commercially available 
dual-use items, and, 

* heightened threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. 

Balancing Multiple Economic, National Security, and Foreign Policy 
Interests: 

A new Export Administration Act will need to balance stakeholder 
interests, assess the national security risks presented by end users, 
and balance the needs of exporters with foreign policy and national 
security interests. Both bills seek to balance these interests by 
involving the departments of Commerce, Defense, and State. In some 
cases, however, the lack of clear provisions raises questions about 
the balance of U.S. foreign policy and national security interests 
with economic interests. 

Balancing the Needs of Stakeholders: 

Both bills would establish a National Security Control List of 
controlled items that the Department of Commerce would review on a 
continuing basis (section 202). This list serves to control dual-use 
items that countries of concern could use to proliferate weapons of 
mass destruction and promote terrorism. The Senate bill would require 
the Secretary of Commerce to obtain the concurrence of the Secretary 
of Defense before adding or removing items from this list. However, it 
would only require the Secretary of Commerce to consult with the heads 
of other agencies that the secretary deems appropriate. State's 
potential exclusion from this process raises the possibility that U.S. 
foreign policy or national security interests may not be properly 
considered. In contrast, the House bill requires the concurrence of 
the secretaries of State and Defense to modify the list. 

However, Section 211 of each bill gives the Secretary of Commerce sole 
authority to remove items from the list without the concurrence of 
either the secretaries of Defense or State, if the secretary 
determines that items are available from foreign sources or on a mass-
market basis.[Footnote 3] Only the president would be able to reverse 
the Secretary of Commerce's decision. 

In addition, State's role in reviewing where items fall on the control 
list differs in each bill. Where an item falls on the list is 
important because its placement determines what reasons for control 
apply and whether a license is required. The House bill requires the 
Secretary of Commerce to notify the secretaries of State and Defense 
about exporter requests for assistance in determining where an item is 
placed on the list or whether a license is required (subsection 
401(h)(1)). The Senate bill, however, does not include the Secretary 
of State, raising the possibility that Commerce might determine that 
an item is not subject to export licensing requirements without 
State's input. Only the House bill provides a mechanism for resolving 
disputes among the three agencies on this issue. 

Moreover, neither bill provides for a role for the Department of 
Defense in executive branch assessments of the impact of a potential 
export on the military capabilities of a country supporting terrorism. 
Section 310 of both bills would require only the secretaries of State 
and Commerce to conduct such assessments and to notify Congress before 
approving an export license. Without the Department of Defense's input 
into these important military assessments, Congress might receive 
notifications that do not fully reflect the potential military impact 
of these exports. 

Assessing National Security Risks Presented by End Users: 

Section 201 of the House bill places greater emphasis on national 
security interests than on economic interests by establishing an 
additional standard for export applications for certain end users. The 
House bill includes a "presumption of denial" provision that directs 
the executive branch to presume that it should deny applications under 
specific conditions. Applications should be denied to (1) end users 
located in countries not adhering to export control regimes that are 
involved in developing weapons of mass destruction or (2) when the 
export would contribute to a country's military capabilities in a 
manner detrimental to the national security interests of the United 
States or its allies. The Senate bill does not contain similar 
language aimed at guiding U.S. policy, which is to encourage exports 
unless U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives are at 
risk. 

Balancing the Needs of Exporters with Foreign Policy and National 
Security Interests: 

The EAA seeks to balance exporters' need for timely review of export 
license applications with the government's need to thoroughly review 
these applications. Section 401 of the Senate bill places greater 
relative emphasis on exporters' needs, while the House bill shifts the 
balance in favor of the government's need for thorough review. Both 
bills contain provisions establishing timeframes for the government to 
review export license applications and criteria for extending the 
timeframes. Under export administration regulations and executive 
order, agencies have 30 days to review license applications, and the 
entire process must be completed in 90 days. Under the timeframes 
established in both bills, the executive branch has 30 days to decide 
whether to approve or deny an export license application. Section 
401(g) of the House bill contains criteria for extending the export 
licensing review timeframes by up to 60 days based on the complexity 
of the analysis or potential national security or foreign policy 
impact of the export. The House bill also allows for delays of 
unspecified duration necessary to obtain information or assessments 
from intelligence agencies. The Senate bill does not contain these 
provisions. 

Providing for Congressional Oversight of Longstanding Implementation 
Issues: 

A series of reports we have issued on export controls indicates that 
new legislation alone will not ensure that regulations and practices 
are implemented as Congress intended. Our work has shown that agencies 
do not always comply with the law and that the executive branch has 
not always implemented policies and procedures clearly and consistently.
	
Agencies Do Not Always Comply with the Law: 

Our past reviews of export controls have highlighted instances when 
the executive branch has not implemented policies and procedures as 
Congress intended. In March 2001, we testified that the president's 
decision to raise the licensing thresholds for high performance 
computers was not adequately justified.[Footnote 4] While the 
president's report recognized that high performance computing 
capabilities will become increasingly available to other countries 
through computer clustering, the report failed both to address all 
militarily significant uses for computers at the new thresholds and to 
assess the national security impact of such uses, as required by law. 
The inadequacies of the president's report were further compounded by 
continued use of a flawed measure for assessing computer performance. 

In May 2001, we reported that Commerce's regulations regarding U.S. 
licensing requirements for missile-related exports are inconsistent in 
one instance with the amended Export Administration Act.[Footnote 5] 
Specifically, this act requires an individual license for any export 
of dual-use missile equipment and technology to any country. However, 
Commerce regulations exempt from the licensing regime missile 
equipment and technology to be exported to Canada. Commerce officials 
did not cite any statutory justification for this exemption, which 
predated the amendment. Rather, Commerce officials assumed that 
Congress did not intend to end the licensing exemption. Congressional 
oversight is needed to ensure that Commerce's proposed changes in its 
regulation comply with the law. 

Executive Branch Has Not Always Implemented Policies and Procedures 
Clearly and Consistently: 

Continued congressional monitoring is also needed in examining how the 
executive branch uses the analytical tools available to justify export 
licensing. In February 2002, we reported that the executive branch 
does not have a sound analytical basis for justifying the current 
export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. 
[Footnote 6] Specifically, we found that U.S. agencies have not 
assessed the foreign availability of this technology or the cumulative 
effects of such exports on U.S. national security interests. To remedy 
these shortcomings, we recommended that the Departments of Commerce, 
Defense, and State complete this analysis, which would provide a sound 
basis for an updated policy and the development of new controls, if 
appropriate, for protecting U.S. security interests. 

Jurisdictional disputes and lack of interagency coordination have also 
surrounded the export of satellites and related items for the past 10 
years. In September 1999, we reported that shared licensing 
jurisdiction and unclear roles and responsibilities of each agency in 
licensing and monitoring these exports have created confusion and 
other problems.[Footnote 7] We also found that Commerce, State, and 
Defense have had difficulty agreeing on clear procedures for 
safeguards to protect satellite-related technology to ensure 
compliance by U.S. exporters with U.S. satellite export regulations. 
The House bill (Title VII) would transfer the licensing of satellites 
and related items from State to Commerce but leaves jurisdiction over 
certain defense-related services to State. Regardless of whether a 
change is made in satellite jurisdiction, clear lines of 
responsibility for each agency and clear jurisdiction over components, 
technical data, and services related to satellite exports would be 
beneficial. 

In March 2001, we reported that the end-use monitoring process 
continues to be a weakness of the U.S. export control system.[Footnote 
8] We have also reported several times since 1995 that the U.S. 
government has had difficulties in confirming the appropriate use of 
exported technologies.[Footnote 9] Access problems are often the 
issue, particularly with countries of concern such as China that 
continue to restrict U.S. officials' visits to recipient facilities. 
For example, China has long restricted U.S. officials' access to 
facilities that received U.S. high performance computers. According to 
a Commerce official, these restrictions have resulted in a backlog of 
about 700 post-shipment visits. In addition, the U.S. government makes 
limited efforts to monitor exporters' and users' compliance with the 
conditions set forth in export licenses for high performance 
computers. In an effort to ensure that sensitive U.S. exports are used 
only for intended purposes, section 506 of the bills provide for 
strengthened post-shipment monitoring and clear consequences for 
countries refusing to allow such monitoring. The bill also authorizes 
appropriations of $4.5 million for end-use verifications and increased 
funding to hire 10 additional overseas investigators. Nonetheless, our 
work suggests that there will be a need for continued oversight of 
this issue. 

Reports we have issued since 1995 indicate that limitations of both 
government and private industry screening of proposed end users of 
sensitive American exports has long been an issue.[Footnote 10] For 
example, the Commerce Department does not have complete intelligence 
information on license applicants that may serve as fronts for 
proliferators or terrorists engaged in illicit activities.[Footnote 
11] Also, the U.S. government increasingly relies on industry to 
determine whether an export needs to be licensed, even though industry 
has raised questions about its capability and willingness to make this 
assessment without government support. 

Conclusion: 

In conclusion, I would like to stress that export controls are just 
one of several policy instruments that the United States relies upon 
to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, address 
the threat of terrorism, and secure U.S. national security interests. 
Other U.S. nonproliferation policy instruments include international 
treaties (such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), multilateral 
export control regimes, and programs aimed at helping former Soviet 
states control and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction. Each 
instrument is important, but each has limitations. The challenge now 
facing Congress is to develop an export control process that will 
reinforce and complement these instruments, while balancing broader 
U.S. security, foreign policy, and economic interests. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may 
have. 

Contact and Acknowledgments: 

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Joseph
Christoff at (202) 512-8979. Stephen M. Lord, Lynn Cothern, Jeffrey D. 
Phillips, Pierre R. Toureille, Anne Marie Lasowski, and Mark Speight 
made key contributions to this testimony. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Export Controls: Reengineering Business Processes Can Improve 
Efficiency of State Department License Reviews. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-203]. December 31, 2001. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for Combating 
Proliferation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-226T]. 
November 7, 2001. 

Export Controls: Clarification of Jurisdiction for Missile Technology 
Items Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-120]. 
October 9, 2001. 

Defense Trade: Information on U.S. Weapons Deliveries to the Middle 
East. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1078]. September 
21, 2001. 

Export Controls: State and Commerce Department License Review Times 
Are Similar. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-01-528]. June 
1, 2001. 

Export Controls: Regulatory Change Needed to Comply with Missile 
Technology Licensing Requirements. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-530]. May 31, 2001. 

Export Controls: System for Controlling Exports of High Performance 
Computers Is Ineffective. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-10]. December 20, 2000. 

Defense Trade: Observations on Issues Concerning Offsets. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-278T]. December 15, 2000. 

Defense Trade: Data Collection and Coordination on Offsets. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-83R] October 26, 2000. 

Defense Trade: Contractors engage in Varied International Alliances. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-213]. September 
7, 2000. 

Defense Trade: Analysis of Support for Recent Initiatives. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD00-191]. August 31, 2000. 

Foreign Military Sales: Changes Needed to Correct Weaknesses in End-
Use Monitoring Program. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-208]. August 24, 2000. 

Defense Trade: Status of the Department of Defense's Initiatives on 
Defense Cooperation. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-190R]. July 19, 2000. 

Defense Trade: Identifying Foreign Acquisitions Affecting National 
Security Can Be Improved. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-144]. June 29, 2000. 

Export Controls: Challenges and Changes For Controls on Computer 
Exports. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-00-187]. May 
26, 2000. 

Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions to Controls on 
Computer Systems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-00-139]. March 23, 2000. 

Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions To Controls on 
Computers. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-00-104]. 
February 28, 2000. 

Foreign Military Sales: Efforts to Improve Administration Hampered by 
Insufficient Information. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-37]. November 22, 1999. 

Export Controls: Statutory Reporting Requirements for Computers Not 
Fully Addressed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-00-45]. 
November 5, 1999. 

Export Controls: Implementation of the 1998 Legislative Mandate for 
High Performance Computers. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-00-53]. October 28, 1999. 

Foreign Military Sales: Review Process for Controlled Missile 
Technology Needs Improvement. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-231]. September 29, 1999. 

Export Controls: 1998 Legislative Mandate for High Performance 
Computers. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-99-208]. 
September 24, 1999. 

Export Controls: Better Interagency Coordination Needed on Satellite 
Exports. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-99-182]. 
September 17, 1999. 

Defense Trade: Department of Defense Savings From Export Sales Are 
Difficult to Capture. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-191]. September 17, 1999. 

Defense Trade: Status of the Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-30]. December 21, 
1998. 

Defense Trade: U.S. Contractors Employ Diverse Activities to Meet 
Offset Obligations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-35]. December 18, 1998. 

Defense Trade: Weaknesses Exist in DOD Foreign Subcontract Data.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-8]. November 13, 
1998. 

Export Controls: Information on the Decision to Revise High 
Performance Computer Controls. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-98-196]. September 16, 1998. 

Export Controls: Changes in Controls Applied to the Export of High 
Performance Computers. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-98-250]. September 16, 1998. 

Export Controls: National Security Issues and Foreign Availability for 
High Performance Computer Exports. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-98-200]. September 16, 1998. 

China: Military Imports From the United States and the European Union 
Since the 1989 Embargoes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-98-176]. June 16, 1998. 

China: U.S. and European Union Arms Sales Since the 1989 Embargoes. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-98-171]. April 28, 
1998. 

Hong Kong's Reversion to China: Effective Monitoring Critical to 
Assess U.S. Nonproliferation Risks. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-97-149]. May 22, 1997. 

Export Controls: Sales of High Performance Computers to Russia's 
Nuclear Weapons Laboratories. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-97-128]. April 15, 1997. 

Export Controls: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two 
Sensitive Dual-Use Items. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-24]. January 14, 1997. 

Export Controls: Sensitive Machine Tool Exports to China. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-4]. November 19, 1996. 

Defense Conversion. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-96-230R]. September 30, 1996. 

Nuclear Weapons: Russia's Request for the Export of U.S. Computers for 
Stockpile Maintenance. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-96-245]. September 30, 1996. 

Export Controls: Some Controls Over Missile-Related Technology Exports 
to China Are Weak. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-95-82]. April 17, 1995. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Under Executive Order 12924, issued August 19, 1994 (59 Fed. Reg. 
43437), the president, to the extent permitted by law, extended the 
application of the act. Most recently, application of the act was 
extended by Executive Order 13222, August 17, 2001 (66 Fed. Reg. 
44025). 

[2] The State Department licenses munitions items under the Arms 
Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629). 

[3] Section 211(b) establishes a petition process by which the 
Secretary of Commerce evaluates an item's foreign availability or mass-
market status in consultation with the departments of Defense and 
State, other appropriate agencies, and the Office of Technology 
Evaluation. 

[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: System for 
Controlling Exports of High Performance Computers Is Ineffective, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-10] (Washington, D.C.: 
December 20, 2000). 

[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Regulatory Change 
Needed to Comply with Missile Technology Licensing Requirements, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-530] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 31, 2001). 

[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Rapid Advances in 
China's Semiconductor Industry Underscore Need for Fundamental U.S. 
Policy Review, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-151] 
(Washington, D.C.: February l9, 2002 FOUO). 

[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Better 
Interagency Coordination Needed on Satellite Exports, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-182] (Washington, D.C.: 
September 17, 1999). 

[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Inadequate 
Justification for Relaxation of Computer Controls Demonstrates Need 
for Comprehensive Study, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-534T] (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2001). 

[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Some Controls 
Over Missile-Related Technology Exports to China Are Weak, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-95-82] (Washington, D.C.: April 
17, 1995); Export Controls: Information on the Decision to Revise High 
Performance Computer Controls, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-196] (Washington, D.C.: 
September 16, 1998); Hong Kong's Reversion to China: Effective 
Monitoring Critical to Assess U.S. Nonproliferation Risks, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-149] (Washington, D.C.: May 
22, 1997); Export Controls: Challenges and Changes For Controls on 
Computer Exports, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-NSIAD-00-187] (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 
2000). 

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Some Controls 
Over Missile-Related Technology Exports to China Are Weak, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-95-82] (Washington, D.C.: April 
17, 1995); Export Controls: Information on the Decision to Revise High 
Performance Computer Controls, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-196] (Washington, D.C.: 
September 16, 1998). 

[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for Combating Proliferation, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-226T] (Washington, D.C.: November 
7, 2001). 

[End of section]