STRATEGIC WEAPONS

Nuclear Weapons Targeting Process
The strategic nuclear weapons targeting process consists of four steps:

(1) Presidential direction for the employment of nuclear weapons is provided to the Secretary of Defense through a National Security Decision Directive or Memorandum, which defines national security objectives and sets policy guidance concerning employment of U.S. nuclear weapons.

(2) The Secretary of Defense issues the Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, which establishes the planning assumptions, attack options, and targeting objectives.

(3) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops more detailed guidance for preparation of the SIOP based on guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman's guidance is incorporated in Annex C (Nuclear) of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(4) The Chairman's guidance is used by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in developing the SIOP.
The targeting process is designed to develop a plan that provides the President with a range of options for using U.S. nuclear weapons in response to any level of aggression. To prevent targeting overlap and weapon interference, the plan is coordinated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's nuclear plan and U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapon employment plans.

A damage expectancy calculation is one measure used to judge the effects of SIOP execution. This projection of damage is a function of DOD estimates of the probability that the weapons will arrive on target, detonate, and cause the desired level of damage. In making such difficult estimates, the planners and support personnel tend to be conservative because they want to ensure that the targeting objectives are achieved, if and when nuclear weapons are used.

The SIOP includes four broad categories of targets (p.22). Although the targeting guidance does not assign explicit values or priorities to the categories, the guidance does make clear which categories of targets are the most important.

The decision on which installations will be targeted and which nuclear weapon will be assigned to each target is made by the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff, which uses guidance provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The relationship between the strategic nuclear weapons targeting process and the determination of nuclear weapon and force level requirements and budgets is an indirect one. For example, the SIOP targeting base is used in developing requirements, and the targeting process discloses potential limitations of U.S. nuclear weapons and forces that may need to be addressed in the requirements process. However, the targeting process is primarily intended to determine how best to use existing resources rather than to determine future resource needs.

Civilian oversight of the targeting process and the war plan is provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a regular basis. This oversight is the responsibility of select individuals within the Secretary's Office of International Security Policy.
To prepare this description of the targeting process, we relied on DOD manuals and directives, an overview briefing, and discussions with some of the key participants in the nuclear weapons targeting process representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, which develops the war plan; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Defense Nuclear Agency; and the Department of the Air Force.

We did not have access to the policy documents used by DOD's war planners or the details of the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons targeting plans. This limited our ability to verify that the process of transforming policy into targeting options functions as described by DOD officials. With the exception of the limitations on access to policy documents, we conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix I contains information on the strategic nuclear policy, forces, and war plan. Appendix II discusses the relationship between SIOP development and strategic nuclear weapon requirements. Appendix III shows examples of the types of targets in each target category.

DOD agreed that the information provided in our draft report was a factually accurate description of the strategic nuclear weapons targeting process. DOD also provided technical comments, which have been incorporated into our report where appropriate. Appendix IV is a copy of DOD's response.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this fact sheet until 7 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and appropriate congressional committees. Copies will also be made available to others on request.
This fact sheet was prepared under the direction of Brad Hathaway, Associate Director, Navy Issues, who can be reached on (202) 275-6504 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major contributors were Richard J. Price, Project Director, and Marvin E. Casterline, Project Manager, Navy Issues.

Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
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## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGZ</td>
<td>Desired Ground Zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSTPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIWEP</td>
<td>Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>SIOP</td>
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</table>
The United States has adopted the policy of deterrence regarding the potential for nuclear war. The U.S. nuclear policy includes the following objectives:

- Maintain effective deterrence: An effective deterrent ensures that circumstances do not arise that would lead a potential aggressor to conclude that it could successfully attack the United States or its allies, whatever its objectives.
- Foster strategic stability: Strategic stability is a condition whereby no country feels pressured to use nuclear weapons preemptively.
- Maintain the capability for a flexible response to an aggressor's attack: Maintenance of deterrence requires the capability to respond at a scope and level of our choice and in a manner that denies an aggressor his objectives under any circumstances. The maintenance of flexibility in our forces and plans has been the cornerstone of U.S. policy since 1961.

The Soviet Union remains the primary strategic threat to the security of the United States. Despite positive changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviets still possess the most formidable, modern nuclear arsenal the United States has ever faced. In its September 1990 Soviet Military Power report, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that Soviet policies regarding the employment of nuclear weapons have recently been changed from emphasis on silo-based intercontinental missiles to a more balanced strategic force structure emphasizing accuracy, survivability, mobility, and reliability. This change allows the Soviet leadership to implement its public statements regarding adoption of a new military doctrine and rejection of the first use of nuclear weapons. However, corresponding changes in Soviet force structure and modernization programs have not yet been made. According to DOD's report, the Soviet Union is still developing strategic forces capable of initiating a first strike while continuing its strategic defensive and civil defense efforts.

U.S. strategic nuclear forces are the key to the entire flexible response strategy. The threat of their use gives the U.S. strategy credibility at all levels of escalation. The objective of the program to modernize all three legs of the U.S. nuclear force structure is not only to respond to the Soviet threat, but also to protect the United States from the emerging threat from proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons technology to other countries. The three legs of the U.S. nuclear force structure is commonly known as the triad and includes bombers and land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. The modernization program recognizes that traditional conventional and nuclear deterrence may not be sufficient and includes...
modernization of strategic offensive forces; improvements in command, control, and communications capabilities; arms control; and introduction of strategic defensive initiatives.

The strategic arsenal includes the following: 2,450 warheads on 1,000 land-based intercontinental missiles, 5,056 warheads on 592 submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 5,820 bombs and warheads for delivery by 293 strategic bombers.¹ According to a DOD Official, the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty with the Soviet Union, signed on July 31, 1991, if ratified, would eventually reduce the deployed strategic arsenal of the United States to 6,000 accountable warheads.

Three U.S. commands have strategic nuclear weapons—the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Strategic Air Commands. The Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) are responsible for making annual force level commitments for use in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

The number of weapons on alert is determined by the CINCs based on the size of their forces and operational constraints. The Joint Chiefs of Staff review these force levels. An example of an operational constraint that has affected the alert forces is the 1990 grounding of the Short-Range Attack Missile. These weapons were taken off alert-force bombers when questions were raised about the safety of their aging warheads.

Each CINC also maintains a secure reserve force, which is controlled by the National Command Authority. This force includes strategic weapons that would be held in reserve to provide the United States with an ability to exert influence after a nuclear exchange and prevent coercion from any source. The number of weapons in this force is decided by the CINCs based on operational considerations and guidance from the Joint Staff. This guidance provides objectives for employment of the secure reserve force and gives the CINCs a good idea of how large the force should be, although it gives no specific number of weapons. If the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) or the Joint Staff believes the number of weapons being retained by the CINCs as a reserve force is too great, the Joint Staff can coordinate with the applicable CINC(s) to resolve the issue.

¹ Weapon numbers represent what each leg of the triad is capable of carrying, not current weapon loading.
Appendix I
Strategic Nuclear Policy, Forces, and War Plan

Process Used in Developing the Single Integrated Operational Plan

The United States has developed a coordinated approach for the employment of nuclear weapons. This process has evolved from the time of the first use of a nuclear weapon on August 6, 1945, to the present. The basic structure for decisionmaking was established when President Eisenhower designated the CINC of the Strategic Air Command as the Director of Strategic Target Planning. The Director was given responsibility for preparing a National Strategic Target List and a SIOP for a coordinated attack on a combination of target sets within the Soviet Union and China and their allied countries. The target list and SIOP were to be developed by a newly established JSTPS, using guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

As shown in figure I.1, the current process involves the same basic four steps as originally devised.
Step 1 — Guidance From the President

New administrations generally initiate a review of U.S. national security objectives, including the strategic nuclear targeting policy. After a National Security Council coordinated study, the President decides what the U.S. policy will be. Presidential guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons has been conveyed to DOD through the years by a series of National Security Decision Directives or Memorandums. The guidance provided is generally quite broad and has evolved slowly. The most significant change came during the 1960s when the policy was changed from massive retaliation to flexible response. Massive retaliation provided the President with only two options in the event of an attack against the United States or its allies: do nothing or launch a massive counterattack. Flexible response was intended to provide the President
with options for a range of responses designed to seek war termination before escalation to an all-out nuclear exchange.

The current nuclear weapons employment policy guidance is set forth in a National Security Decision Directive issued in November 1981 by President Reagan. Officials of DOD's Office of Strategic Forces Policy told us that President Bush reaffirmed this guidance shortly after taking office in January 1989. This directive includes the following:

- the requirement for a range of attack options;
- the types of forces desired;
- general targeting objectives;
- broad categories of targets;
- the requirement for survivable command, control, and communications systems; and
- the requirement for a secure reserve force.

Examples of the four broad categories of targets are shown in appendix III. These categories can be traced to the first war plans, but the order of priorities has changed from time to time.

Former presidential guidance could be quite specific with respect to weapon system requirements. For example, it directed the development of a specific weapon.

Step 2—Guidance From the Secretary of Defense

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, in collaboration with the Joint Staff, prepares DOD's Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP). This 14- to 15-page document, approved by the Secretary of Defense and concurred in by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is used by the military planners in developing detailed guidance for constructing the SIOP.

In preparing and updating NUWEP, representatives from the Office of Strategic Forces Policy of International Security Policy and the Joint Staff use the guidance from the President. The most recent NUWEP was signed in October 1987 by former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. These representatives said that revisions had been made to large portions of NUWEP-87 by former Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. We were told that revisions are most often made to reflect changes either in the threat or during internal review of nuclear weapons employment policy. We were also
Appendix I
Strategic Nuclear Policy, Forces, and War Plan

told that the President is informed of any significant changes to NUEWP.² The NUEWP provides broad guidance on

- basic planning assumptions,
- attack options,
- targeting objectives,
- types of targets within various categories,
- targeting constraints, and
- coordination with theater commanders.

Planning assumptions provide the following guidance:

- range of attack options to provide the President with flexibility in responding to an attack upon the United States or its allies,
- both major and small attack options,
- relationships between certain types of weapons and certain types of targets, and
- statements of what not to assume in preparing operational war plans (for example, do not assume that communications will be perfect).

Targeting objectives provide the specific goals for a particular type of employment of nuclear weapons. They explain the "why" for a particular type of attack or for the concentration on specific types of facilities within a target category, such as the types of industries to be considered within the war-supporting category.

Targeting constraints, such as collateral damage, are included in this guidance to help in preparing targeting plans. These constraints can prevent targeting of an important installation. The guidance further contains several paragraphs that address coordination with theater nuclear forces.

Officials and staff from the Strategic Forces Policy office told us that they closely coordinate with the Joint Staff and JSTPS in developing changes to NUEWP to avoid any misinterpretation of the guidance. Potential changes to the guidance are discussed in advance to determine how JSTPS would interpret the change and what effects the change would have on the SIOP.

²At the time of our meetings with DOD personnel, a major review of the SIOP targeting process, initiated by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1989, was in progress. This review was completed in May 1991. We were told that significant changes had been made to the guidance used to develop the SIOP and that recent events in Eastern Europe had been considered. We were not provided with any details.
While the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not sign NUWEP, any revisions are coordinated through the Chairman before they are submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval. The International Security Policy office tries to accommodate the views of the Chairman, but differences occasionally remain. The Secretary is made aware of these differences by a memorandum when the revisions are submitted to him for approval.

Step 3—Guidance From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff, in conjunction with CINC and service staffs, using NUWEP, prepares Annex C (Nuclear) of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). This annex, which is approximately 250 pages, is used by JSTPS in preparing the SIOP. It is formally revised biannually, providing current guidance to the CINCS for employment of both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Among other things, JSCP provides guidance on:

- the requirement for plans for specific employment options,
- the requirement for a secure reserve force, and
- damage criteria to be used for targeting.

In requiring JSTPS to develop specific major and small attack options for the President, the annex also specifies how many attack options are to be developed and the objective of each. The annex directs under what circumstances the option could be used and what the attack option should accomplish.

Step 4—The Single Integrated Operational Plan

The SIOP is the U.S. war plan for the employment of strategic nuclear forces. A new plan is effected each year on October 1.

Reflecting the targeting guidance provided JSTPS, the SIOP consists of plans and attack options. These options are designed to respond to political guidance and to achieve the desired level of destruction of fixed enemy military or industrial installations.

While the plan is in effect, unanticipated changes in U.S. strategic forces, the target base, or guidance can occur. Revisions are made to the SIOP throughout the year to accommodate minor changes; however, more significant force structure, target, or guidance changes are incorporated in the next SIOP. International Security Policy officials said that to incorporate them in the current SIOP would be too disruptive and could make the plan "unworkable." In the past, revisions resulted principally from...
changes in either U.S. strategic forces or in the target base. More recently, changes in the targeting guidance have required revisions to the SIOP.

Developing a SIOP takes about 18 months. This development process can be divided into the following three phases:

- **Targeting**: identification of specific targets and the allocation of weapons.
- **Application**: assignment and deconfliction of missions.
- **Analysis**: determination of projected damage.

The application phase overlaps both the targeting and analysis phases. Periodic maintenance is also conducted on the current SIOP while the new SIOP development process is under way. These maintenance cycles allow for changes of an immediate and minor nature to be made.

### Targeting Phase

The targeting phase involves identifying targets for each of the options specified in the JSCP Annex C (Nuclear). This phase includes (1) developing a target base, (2) constructing aimpoints (desired ground zeros (DGZS)), and (3) allocating weapons against DGZS.

In developing a target base, JSTPS uses the Target Data Inventory managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. This inventory contains information on potential targets that are of immediate military interest. From this inventory, JSTPS develops the National Target Base, which comprises the installations JSTPS believes fit the targeting guidance provided to them. For example, if the guidance calls for targeting specific installations, they are included in the base. The final step consists of assigning specific weapons to aimpoints selected to cover installations in the target base. This final step also includes development of the National Strategic Target List.

The targeting staff uses a computer model to construct DGZS where the lowest yield nuclear weapon can be delivered to inflict the desired damage. In constructing its DGZS, JSTPS considers guidance such as damage level criteria; weapons data such as yield, accuracy, and height of burst; and target installation data such as location and hardness. Also, constraints such as collateral damage can affect targeting. We were told by Strategic Forces Policy officials that as a result of these constraints, a strategically important installation might not be targeted in a specific attack option.
Application Phase

In deciding which weapon to apply to which target, the target staff considers (1) the JSCP guidance (for example, targeting options and time sensitivity of targets); (2) the characteristics of the weapons available (for example, range, yield, accuracy, and timeliness of delivery); and (3) the characteristics of the targets (for example, location, vulnerability, and hardness).

In assigning weapons to targets under the various options, the target staff maintains "attack option purity," that is, all targets assigned to a bomber or ballistic missile are in one option. They are not assigned different targets under different options.

In the application of weapons and weapon systems, JSTPS routes and assigns specific sorties and accomplishes the timing and overlap avoidance process. The purpose of this phase is to avoid having the effects of one SIOP weapon interfere with the effectiveness of another. This phase can be accomplished through such actions as varying weapons' launch times and changing delivery characteristics, such as slowing down or speeding up an incoming aircraft.

JSTPS relies on the CINCS responsible for nuclear weapons to provide planning information on U.S. forces for use in constructing the SIOP. This information will include the reliability of the U.S. weapon systems and pre-launch survivability estimates.

At the end of the application phase, JSTPS briefs International Security Policy staff and the Joint Staff. In this briefing, the staff provides information on the specific targets selected and the determination of DGZs. The briefing also provides the opportunity for problems to be addressed before the plan is completed and ready for approval.

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, also has a war plan for the employment of nuclear weapons assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). To avoid conflict between the plans, JSTPS reviews the European Command's plan. Several years ago, DOD and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, looked at the issue of overlap in the two plans. We were told by an International Security Policy official that overlaps identified during that review were eliminated, and steps were incorporated to prevent future overlaps. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Director of Strategic Target Planning establishes criteria to be used by the two organizations in targeting nuclear weapons for the purpose of preventing overlaps. The French do not commit forces to NATO, and
Appendix I
Strategic Nuclear Policy, Forces, and War Plan

their plans for employment of their nuclear weapons are not reviewed for overlaps with the SIOP.

Analysis Phase

Damage expectancy is used to measure the effects of SIOP execution. It is a function of the probability that the weapon will arrive on target, detonate, and will cause the desired level of damage. Both probability of arrival and probability of damage consist of various components. Probability of arrival is comprised of the estimates of weapon system pre-launch survivability, reliability, and penetration probability. Probability of damage considers weapon effects as determined by yield, accuracy, height of burst, size and hardness of targets, and the proximity of the target to the aimpoints. (See fig. 1.2.)
If the damage expected from a single weapon does not meet the damage level specified in the JSCP Annex C (Nuclear), multiple weapons can be assigned to a single aimpoint. A target may also be considered as high priority, and thus it can be cross-targeted with weapons from different delivery systems.
JSTPS uses a consequences of execution model to estimate the expected damage to be achieved under the planned application of weapons except for the application of weapons on strategic relocatable targets. A damage expectancy is determined for each option in the SIOP. However, there is no specified damage expectancy that each option must achieve. A 60-percent damage expectancy means that there is a 60-percent probability of damaging any eligible target to the level specified in the guidance. The other 40 percent could experience damage ranging from something just short of the specified level to no damage at all.

JSTPS presents its final plan in a decision brief to the Joint Staff and then to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for approval. A summary presentation is also given to Strategic Forces Policy staff, who review it for compliance with the guidance. The damage expectancy is included in these briefings along with other information on the consequences of execution. If significant issues are raised during the review process, they are resolved by the staff from Strategic Forces Policy and the Joint Staff working together.

We were told by a Strategic Forces Policy official that the President was briefed on the SIOP in 1989 and 1990.
The relationship between the process DOD uses in developing the SIOP and the determination of its strategic nuclear weapon and force structure requirements is indirect. The targeting process and the guidance provided to construct the SIOP typically looks several years into the future and attempts to arrive at targeting options that will make efficient and effective use of nuclear weapons in the arsenal during that timeframe. The nuclear weapon requirements process and the guidance used in determining those requirements focus on assessments of the threat, potential defense policy changes, technological innovations, and projections of U.S. capabilities and budgets 5 to 10 years or more in the future. This process attempts to identify the nuclear force structure that the United States will need to meet its national security objectives.

While the two processes are different, the SIOP does have an impact on nuclear weapon requirements in at least two important ways. First, the process of both identifying the forces required to accomplish the strategic forces mission and identifying any deficiency in that force structure begins with the CINCs responsible for nuclear weapons. For example, in developing its strategic nuclear weapon force structure projections and identifying specific mission deficiencies, the Strategic Air Command develops a future target base and future aimpoints or DGZs. In accomplishing this, the current SIOP target base is used, and adjustments are made to include anticipated future threats and exclude threats that are expected to diminish or disappear.

Second, in developing and analyzing the SIOP, deficiencies in the strategic weapons force structure can be identified. While damage expectancy levels are calculated, the SIOP does not have specifically required damage expectancy levels. If the SIOP's projected damage expectancy levels were to begin dropping to what, in the judgment of military planners and policymakers, would be unacceptable levels, force structure planning requirements would quite likely be increased. Thus, the estimates and judgments behind the many variables that enter into computing the expected damage against both specific targets and for each SIOP option are important. These variables include the pre-launch survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, probability of the weapon penetrating to the target, reliability of the weapon system, accuracy of delivery of the weapon, hardness of the target, radius of the target, desired damage level, yield of the nuclear warhead, and the height of the nuclear burst.

In estimating damage expectancy, the Defense Nuclear Agency is responsible for characterizing the impacts of U.S. nuclear weapons effects, and the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories.
are responsible for projecting the yields of U.S. nuclear weapons. The JSTPS is responsible for assigning weapons to targets.

In addition, the estimates for some of the variables that are used in determining damage expectancy can and do change, and these changes can affect requirements. For example, the estimates of the hardness of some Soviet targets have changed several times, and only one of these changes was the result of Soviet actions to harden targets. The others were changes in Defense Intelligence Agency estimates of how hard the targets are based on results of nuclear effects tests, computer modeling studies, or additional intelligence data. If the hardness of targets is estimated to be greater, the damage expectancy level will be lower. Military judgment could translate this into the need for either an improved weapon or more weapons.
There are four broad categories of targets: nuclear forces and supporting command and control, military and political leadership, other military forces and supporting command and control, and industrial and economic activities that support a war. The following are examples of types of targets within each category:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear Forces</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Other Military Forces</th>
<th>War Supporting Industrial and Economic Factories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and their launch facilities and control centers</td>
<td>Command posts</td>
<td>Barracks</td>
<td>(a) Industrial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear weapons storage sites</td>
<td>Key communications facilities</td>
<td>Supply depots</td>
<td>Ammunition factories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfields supporting nuclear-capable aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>Marshalling points</td>
<td>Tank and armored personnel carrier factories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic missile submarine bases</td>
<td></td>
<td>Airfields not supporting nuclear forces</td>
<td>Petroleum refineries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Industrial
- Ammunition factories
- Tank and armored personnel carrier factories
- Petroleum refineries
- Railway yards and repair facilities

(b) Economic
- Coal
- Basic steel
- Basic aluminum
- Electric power

In response refer to:
I-91/27628

MR. Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
National Security and International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Conahan:


The DoD reviewed the report and found it to be factually accurate (with a few minor exceptions, which were conveyed informally to your staff). The DoD has no further comment. The department appreciates the opportunity to review the draft report.

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Hadley
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