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Federal Crime Control Assistance: A Discussion Of The Program And Possible Alternatives

JANUARY 27, 1978
FOREWORD

The purpose of this briefing paper is to assist the Senate Committee on the Budget, and the Congress in general, by providing information which can be used to help focus upon and clarify issues, and to serve as input for further policy and legislative analyses of the programs of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).

To accomplish this purpose, in response to the Committee's request for information we have:

1. Summarized and provided a limited update of reported major accomplishments and reported limitations or shortcomings of the principal components of the program and, where possible, compared reported program results to the legislative mandate.

2. Addressed and discussed the reported advantages and disadvantages of general revenue sharing, so-called "special revenue sharing proposals," as well as other possible program alternatives.

This study is intended to provide the Committee and Congress with a range of options for further consideration of what the Federal role could or should be with respect to crime and delinquency prevention, control, and reduction and improvement of law enforcement and the administration of justice.

Given the relatively short time frame for developing, analyzing, and preparing this information, we have not been able to perform additional new research, evaluation, or audit work, with the exception of updating and summarizing some recent developments occurring in LEAA and the Department of Justice. For the most part we have drawn upon existing reported information and data, much of it available in published form.

Some of these sources include:

—Congressional Research Service
—Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
—Brookings Institution
—Executive Management Service, Inc.
We also examined and considered the viewpoints and positions expressed by a number of agencies, groups, and individuals.

Finally, we interviewed LEAA officials and staff to obtain additional information which describes current and planned activities, programs, initiatives, and recent modifications which have occurred.

However, it must be emphasized that with a few exceptions we were not able, within the time frames of the request, to verify information and data analyses drawn from non-GAO sources. Therefore, it is our view that care must be taken in interpreting the significance of various items of information and in generalizing from specific cases to be representative of conditions and circumstances nationwide.

We have included a bibliography with citations to the sources and relevant publications from which we have drawn much of the material for analysis and synthesis. Given the complexity of many of the issues, problems, and positions taken by many of the authors, we encourage and strongly recommend that these source materials be consulted to obtain a more full and complete assessment. To the fullest extent possible, we have taken great care to clarify the points and
issues raised from the source documents in the context with which they have been presented. Descriptive program and financial information about LEAA and States' activities was provided to the Committee earlier in a separate study entitled "Overview of Activities Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration."

Finally, we wish to emphasize that this paper is not a formal GAO position statement. Rather, it reflects a variety of viewpoints and discusses a number of issues for which there are no simple straightforward answers. We hope that it will prove useful in developing an appropriate conceptual and analytic framework for use by the Congress in considering future legislation.

Victor L. Lowe
Director
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INTRODUCTION

At first blush it would appear to be reasonable to question whether after 9 years of operation the Crime Control Act program has achieved some or all of the purposes for which it was intended. Unfortunately there are no ready answers. At this time, it would not be possible for GAO—or any other group for that matter—to determine whether the LEAA program, overall, has had any measurable impact upon

--preventing, controlling, and/or reducing crime and delinquency; or

--improving the performance of the criminal justice system.

The difficulties associated with attempting to provide answers to these questions, discussed more fully further on, are basically threefold:

(1) Valid and reliable measures of crime and delinquency are lacking.

(2) At present it is not possible to identify and isolate (separate out) the influence of other programs (non-LEAA), on-going activities, policies, and procedural changes from the effects, if any, produced by LEAA-assisted efforts.

(3) Crime and the penal codes of the States which set forth and define what behavior is considered a violation of legal norms vary from one State to the next and from one time period to the next, thereby complicating the problem of defining what it is that the various programs and projects carried out under the Act are attempting to deal with.

Another issue which introduces substantial difficulty in making a determination of the impact of the program, overall in terms of the congressional mandate, is the mandate itself. There is a significant amount of confusion evidenced in the various reports, studies, and debate surrounding the definition of the goals and objectives of the Act. To some, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as amended, is designed to prevent, control, and reduce crime and juvenile delinquency. To others, its goals are less ambitious: to strengthen and improve law enforcement and the administration of justice through technical and financial assistance.
provided by the Federal Government or merely to provide some additional form of fiscal relief. Yet still others think of the goals of the Act in terms of preventing, controlling, and reducing crime and delinquency but differ in their views as to the appropriate means to accomplish these ends.

In large measure, this ambiguity over goals and objectives may be a byproduct of the compromise reached in accommodating the differing points of views of those who were substantively involved in and responsible for the legislation. The critical question which has not been addressed is in defining the ability of the criminal justice system to affect crime and delinquency reduction through some form of deterrence. Deterrence is considered by some to be brought about through the sanctioning strategies employed by the criminal justice system to enforce the criminal law.

The complexity of the issues becomes even more apparent when examining two general models which characterize the operation of the criminal justice system—the "crime control model" and the "due process model." 1/ The "crime control model" holds as its principal goal the suppression of criminal behavior. The "due process model," while not totally ignoring the desirable goal of controlling crime, is more concerned with promoting and reinforcing procedural safeguards against violation of constitutional and human rights; extending concepts of equity, fairness, and efficiency as matters of co-equal importance with the control of crime.

The criminal justice system and the agencies vested with the authority to carry out the enforcement of criminal law tend to operate on principles which are a blend of these two general models. The consequence is what social and political scientists refer to as institutionalized goal and role conflict.

It is not clear to this day whether it is appropriate or feasible to expect the criminal justice system to "solve the crime problem." Equally unclear is the boundary where the limits of criminal justice sanctioning strategies begin or end and where the ultimate responsibility for crime and delinquency problem-solving should reside—i.e., with Federal, State, or local governments, or all three. Thus, in addition

to re-examining some of the earlier assumptions about how best to approach crime and delinquency problem-solving. There is movement toward reassessing the current Federal role and examining a variety of program and resource related policy issues.

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH TO CRIME CONTROL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT

Most of the various programs and processes implementing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as amended, recognize and generally account for the inherent separation of powers and intergovernmental structure of criminal justice activities taking place at Federal, State, and local levels. This framework provides a backdrop for the execution of planning, program development, research, evaluation, education, training, and a variety of supportive services which are structured and carried out on an intergovernmental basis.

In addressing the variety and large number of program activities and services, we have attempted to focus upon the major program activities carried out by LEAA and the States. For convenience we have grouped them under component program headings (block, categorical, research, and evaluation). However, it should be noted that the issues treated transcend the specific program areas in which they have been presented in the discussion. There are a multiplicity of levels and units of government; operating agencies, organizations, and institutions which participate in these various programs in one manner or another. Thus while a specific program and related issues are identified under one component program heading, its origins or ultimate effects may lie with one or more separate programs.

A good example would be the case of developing data bases and statistical procedures to analyze crime and criminal justice data. Unless one critically examines their applicability for planning and program development, research, evaluation, and oversight purposes meaningful interpretation and valid conclusions might suffer or be overlooked.

Further, this issue of applicability noted in the above example also must extend to consideration of the intergovernmental context in which such program activities occur. There are a number of different levels and combinations of governmental units involved. Some related issues also require understanding of the preconditions emanating from the constitutional separation of powers doctrine; such as that between the judicial and executive branches which can result
in jurisdictional conflict. An example here would be identifying the actions of individual members of the judiciary when recording criminal case dispositions for those statistical functions carried out by an executive branch agency.

Thus we will continually but implicitly recognize this common theme of an intergovernmental program which may additionally confront a separation of powers situation. A "total systems" approach to comprehensive criminal justice system planning, a legislative objective of the Act, is possibly the best example in this regard. The legislative branch has responsibility for enacting and revising the criminal code, the executive branch and portions of the judicial branch for executing enforcement, adjudication, and rehabilitation, and constitutional review of the criminal code and its execution is performed by a higher appellate level of the judicial branch.

A more detailed description of the nature and types of funded activities carried out under each component program is outlined and presented along with the relative amount of resources devoted to them in a companion GAO staff study titled "Overview of Activities Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration," which was transmitted earlier. We urge the reader to consult, as needed, this companion study for additional detailed information and description of LEAA supported program activities.

**LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), within the U.S. Department of Justice, represents the major Federal effort to provide financial aid and technical assistance to State and local governments to prevent, control, and reduce crime and juvenile delinquency, and to strengthen and improve State and local law enforcement and criminal justice capabilities. Towards these ends, LEAA administers extensive planning and action grant programs, as well as programs for academic assistance, research, and development support.

LEAA was created by Title I, of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351, Act of June 19, 1968; 82 Stat. 197; 42 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.). Other titles of the Act were unrelated to LEAA program activities, largely affecting certain aspects of Federal criminal law.
Title I has been amended several times, first by Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970. It was amended twice during the 93rd Congress, most significantly by the Crime Control Act of 1973. Further amendments were contained in Title V of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. The Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act of 1976 added a new Part J to Title I, and most recently the Act was amended by Title I of the Crime Control Act of 1976.

The primary objective of the Act is crime control, with emphasis placed upon strengthening and improving law enforcement. Although funds were provided for planning, training, education, and research, a major portion of the funds was in the form of action grants. Eighty-five percent of the action funds are made available in the form of block grants to the States, with block funds subgranted by the States to units of general local government. The remaining 15 percent of action funds are reserved for award at the discretion of the Administrator of LEAA.

Criminal justice expenditures in the United States

Expenditures for criminal justice purposes by Federal, State, and local governments have risen steadily from fiscal year 1971 to fiscal year 1975. These expenditures were $11 billion in fiscal year 1971 and $17 billion in fiscal year 1975—an increase of 55 percent.

LEAA expenditures, which are only a part of the total Federal funds spent for criminal justice activities, represented about 4.6 percent of all State and local criminal justice expenditures during fiscal years 1971-75, as shown below.

1/Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, and Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. Trends in Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, 1971-1975. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1977, SD-EE No. 10 and No. 84. This publication is prepared jointly by LEAA and the Bureau of the Census. It presents statistics on trends in public expenditures and employment for criminal justice activities in the United States. The annual surveys, through which basic figures for this publication were collected, are accomplished through collecting data by field-compilation and mail canvass.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>State expenditures</th>
<th>Local expenditures</th>
<th>LEAA expenditures</th>
<th>Total expenditures</th>
<th>LEAA expenditures as a percent of total expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>$2,681,419</td>
<td>$6,620,807</td>
<td>$232,938</td>
<td>$9,535,164</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>$2,948,091</td>
<td>$7,281,248</td>
<td>$379,230</td>
<td>$10,608,596</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>$3,303,608</td>
<td>$8,052,323</td>
<td>$623,214</td>
<td>$11,979,054</td>
<td>5.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>$3,899,958</td>
<td>$9,092,369</td>
<td>$769,429</td>
<td>$13,761,756</td>
<td>5.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>$4,612,373</td>
<td>$10,448,613</td>
<td>$851,545</td>
<td>$15,912,531</td>
<td>5.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total FY 71-75</td>
<td>$17,445,449</td>
<td>$41,495,269</td>
<td>$2,856,356</td>
<td>$61,797,074</td>
<td>4.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Congress appropriated a total of $5.8 billion during fiscal years 1969–77 (including appropriations under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974). As shown in Table 2, the appropriations increased from $63 million in fiscal year 1969 to a high of $895 million in fiscal year 1975. Thereafter, they decreased to $753 million in fiscal year 1977. The appropriation for fiscal year 1978 is $647,250,000, including juvenile justice.

**PRINCIPAL LEAA PROGRAM COMPONENTS**

The Congress mandated that funds be available to the States for planning (part B) and for block action grants (parts C and E). In addition, funds were also made available for LEAA to award at its discretion and in other "non-block" areas which include technical assistance, educational assistance and special training programs, research, data systems, statistics, and technical assistance. A breakdown of LEAA allocations for FY 1969–78, by legislated program components is provided in Table 3 on page 13.

**Block grant program**

LEAA's block grant program was established by parts B and C of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Eighty-five percent of annual part C appropriations is distributed as block-grants among the States, based on their relative populations. The remaining 15 percent is retained in a discretionary fund to support programs and projects administered in roughly the same manner as other categorical grant programs.

At the State level, the Act is administered by a State planning agency (SPA) for criminal justice, established under the authority and direction of the State chief executive. Each SPA prepares an annual comprehensive plan which must identify law enforcement and criminal justice needs and problems and indicate what planned actions it anticipates undertaking to address those needs and problems on a statewide basis. LEAA approval of a comprehensive State plan triggers a block grant award to the respective State or Territory. The SPA in turn awards moneys in the form of subgrants to local governments, private nonprofit organizations, and other State agencies. Under current legislative provisions each SPA must pass through to localities an amount of part C block grants at least proportionate to the local share of total direct State/local criminal justice expenditures made during the previous fiscal year. However, the specific amount to be awarded to particular jurisdictions
### Table 2

**LEAA Authorizations and Appropriations, 1969-77**

(000 omitted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Amount Authorized</th>
<th>Amount Appropriated (note a)</th>
<th>Percent Increase or Decrease in Appropriations from Year to Year</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>$100,111</td>
<td>$63,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>268,119</td>
<td>325.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>529,000</td>
<td>97.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>698,919</td>
<td>32.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
<td>855,597</td>
<td>22.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>870,675</td>
<td>1.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>895,000</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>809,638</td>
<td>(9.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TQ (note b)</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>204,960</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>880,000</td>
<td>753,000</td>
<td>c/(7.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total FY 69-77: $8,300,111, $5,947,908

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**Notes:**

a/Includes appropriations under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.

b/Transition quarter (July 1 to September 30, 1976).

c/Compared to fiscal year 1976.
and the types of projects to be undertaken are determined by a statutorily created supervisory board which serves as the policy and decisionmaking body of the SPA.

Planning funds

Funds under part B of the 1976 Act are intended to be used for establishing and maintaining State planning agencies; supporting SPA activities enumerated in section 207(b), which include judicial planning committee responsibilities enumerated in section 203(d), the developing of a comprehensive statewide plan, and administering the implementation of State plan activities authorized under parts C and E of the Act.

The SPAs are entitled to an annual "planning" grant of at least $250,000 to carry out their responsibilities. At least $50,000 of this grant—additional funds provided for in the 1976 amendments—must be made available to a judicial planning committee, if one exists. At least 40 percent of the remaining funds must be made available to units of local governments or combinations of such units to permit them to participate in comprehensive planning processes and to support related administrative requirements under the Act.

Federal grants authorized under this part may cover up to 90 percent of the expenses incurred by State and local governments, and up to 100 percent of expenses incurred by the judicial planning committees and regional planning units (RPUs). The States are required to pay not less than 50 percent of the aggregate non-Federal share incurred by local governments. In a large number of States, most of the planning funds that are "passed through," are retained by RPUs, which are single or multicounty area-wide planning bodies. Major metropolitan cities and counties are also entitled to receive funds for planning purposes on a more or less direct basis from the State planning agency. In jurisdictions over 250,000 population, this planning function is usually carried out under the auspices of a criminal justice coordinating council which, in addition to part B planning funds, may receive funding under part C of the Act to carry out a variety of activities.

Action funding—block grants

Because the Congress believed that crime is essentially a local problem that must be dealt with by State and local governments if it is to be controlled effectively, it provided that the bulk of LEAA funds be distributed in block...
grants to the States which have had their comprehensive State plans approved by LEAA. Through these plans, each State is to identify its own needs and establish program priorities.

Federal grants under this section may cover up to 90 percent of the cost of programs and projects except for construction which is limited to 50 percent. Grants may be up to 100 percent for Indian tribes at LEAA's discretion.

States are required to pass through to the units of local government amounts which correspond to the percentage of State and local law enforcement expenditures met by local governments in the preceding fiscal year. The States are also required to buy-in (pay) at least 50 percent of the aggregate non-Federal share incurred by units of local government. Under 1976 amendments enacted to further increase local discretion regarding block grant spending, local governments or combinations thereof with populations of 250,000 or more may apply to the SPA for approval of local plans. The SPA is authorized to subsequently disburse funds to implement these plans as long as they are consistent with the State plan.

Prior to 1971, LEAA awarded funds for correctional programs only under part C, but in 1970 the Congress placed special emphasis upon improving the corrections system. In amending the Safe Streets Act, it authorized a new part E which was to provide funds solely for the purpose of upgrading correctional programs and facilities.

The amount of planning funds allocated under part B has averaged about 10 percent of the action funds that are available to the SPAs.

The categorical program

The categorical program encompasses all grants provided by the agency other than block grants and Law Enforcement Education Assistance grants. Unlike block grants, categorical funds are reserved for direct use by LEAA. There are eight specific types of categorical grants:

--Discretionary, parts C and E
--Juvenile justice and delinquency prevention
--Research, development, and evaluation
Categorical funds are normally distributed to States, localities, and private nonprofit organizations for the implementation of programs and projects to prevent, control, or reduce crime and delinquency and/or to improve and strengthen law enforcement and criminal justice.

The legislative provisions for the categorical program are found in several sections of the Act. Discretionary grants are provided for in two parts of the Act. Fifteen percent of part C funds are reserved for direct use by the Administrator, and 50 percent of part E funds, Grants for Correctional Institutions and Facilities, are similarly reserved. The authorized Federal share of a project's cost is 90 percent with no State buy-in requirement. During fiscal years 1969 to 1977, the allocations for the parts C and E discretionary programs have amounted to about $918.4 million ($582.6 million and $335.8 million, respectively).

There is little indication in the legislation as to the further intended use of discretionary funds. However, recently LEAA has initiated a procedure whereby it expects to use discretionary funds in developing, demonstrating, testing, evaluating, and transferring effective approaches for crime reduction and criminal justice system improvements.

Research, development, and evaluation

The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice is the research arm of LEAA. Part D of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1976 outlines the National Institute's purpose as "* * * improving law enforcement and criminal justice, and developing new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime, and detection and apprehension of criminals * * *" through research and development, evaluation, training, and education.

The National Institute began operations in late 1968 with a staff of four and a budget of $2.9 million. In fiscal
year 1970, its budget increased to $7.5 million where it remained for 2 years. Staff size was expanded to include specialists in many areas of criminal justice and the social and physical sciences. The National Institute's budget in fiscal years 1972 and 1973 increased to $21 and $31 million, respectively. In both fiscal years 1974 and 1975, the National Institute's budget exceeded $40 million.

In the past 2 fiscal years, the trend toward higher budgets has been reversed, reflecting an agencywide fund reduction. In fiscal year 1977, the National Institute's budget was approximately $27 million.

The research and evaluation program, as well as other major LEAA program components will be described and discussed more fully in our summary and review of reported program results. Table 3 summarizes the history of LEAA funding by component programs mandated by the Act.
TABLE 1

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<tr>
<td>Direct assistance (block grants)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning block grants (Part B)</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<td>Corrections block grants (Part B)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juvenile Justice block grants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice block grants (Part C)</td>
<td>84,850</td>
<td>168,750</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>141,625</td>
<td>140,250</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>95,625</td>
<td>97,750</td>
<td>97,750</td>
<td>67,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL block</td>
<td>104,850</td>
<td>200,750</td>
<td>211,000</td>
<td>164,625</td>
<td>160,250</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>113,625</td>
<td>117,750</td>
<td>117,750</td>
<td>137,825</td>
</tr>
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<td>Collateral assistance (discretionary grants and contracts)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal Just. prog. (Part C disc.)</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>80,750</td>
<td>80,750</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>71,544</td>
<td>14,940</td>
<td>55,256</td>
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<td>Correctional programs (Part B disc.)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>56,500</td>
<td>56,500</td>
<td>56,500</td>
<td>47,750</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>36,825</td>
<td>29,649</td>
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<td>Community anti-crime program</td>
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<td>Technical assistance</td>
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<td>Educational assistance and special training programs</td>
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<td>LEAP Educational Development</td>
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<td>21,000</td>
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<td>Transferred to other agencies</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>149</td>
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<td>TOTAL Appropriated</td>
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</table>

*g/Total does not include $14.2 million transferred to the Department of Justice.

| h/Includes $10 million transferred from previous LEAA appropriations.

| g/Total does not include $7.938 million transferred to the Department of Justice.

Source: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF REPORTED PROGRAM RESULTS

PROBLEMS IN DETERMINING CRIME AND DELINQUENCY PROGRAM OUTCOMES

The complexity of crime and delinquency problems is complicated by the lack of readily available, valid, and reliable measures of crime and juvenile delinquency. In addition, there are no commonly accepted standards for gauging criminal justice system performance in dealing with these problems. Further, even if such measures were available, there is a lack of uniform and comparable data from one State or geopolitical jurisdiction to the next which would permit such analyses. Lastly, without substantive knowledge about the origins and nature of crime and delinquency, serious problems occur when one attempts to isolate and differentiate between the influence or impact of LEAA-supported efforts vis-à-vis other non-LEAA supported efforts, as well as a variety of social, economic, and environmental variables operating prior to or at the same time such LEAA-supported activities occur.

Therefore, we are unable—and hasten to add this applies to others—to compare and contrast overall, the results of LEAA programs with the crime and delinquency prevention, control, and reduction mandates of the Act. Further, due to the lack of controlled research and limitations of evaluations previously carried out by LEAA, States, and localities, there are few instances where it is possible to discern the impact and relative effectiveness of different LEAA-supported activities upon improving the performance of the Nation's criminal justice systems.

Therefore, we are constrained by the inadequacies of existing data and available sources of information in addressing reported program results in terms of the two legislative mandates identified above (i.e. (1) crime and delinquency prevention, control, and reduction and (2) criminal justice system improvement). However, we will attempt to summarize, from existing information, the principal reported accomplishments and reported limitations of LEAA and LEAA-supported State and local efforts in implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as amended. In certain instances, such data and information has permitted some writers to address program outcomes. We reiterate that under the time frames permitted we were unable to verify the findings of such studies nor substantiate the interpretations and conclusions reported from non-GAO sources.
We urge the reader to consult these source documents and organizations as necessary to pursue further the implications of findings, interpretations, and conclusions reported by them.

Finally, it should be noted that this summarization of reported program results and the discussion of alternatives for defining the Federal role which follows, do not constitute a formal statement of GAO's position. Rather it reflects a variety of viewpoints and discusses a number of issues for which there are generally no simple or straightforward answers.

ASSESSMENT OF THE LEAA BLOCK GRANT INSTRUMENT

In theory, a block grant has five major characteristics that distinguish it from a categorical grant:

--- A block grant authorizes Federal aid for a wide range of activities within a broad functional area.

--- Recipients are given substantial discretion in identifying problems and designing programs to deal with them.

--- Administrative, fiscal reporting, planning, and other federally established requirements are geared to keeping grantor intrusiveness to a minimum, while recognizing the need to insure that national goals are accomplished.

--- Grants are distributed on the basis of a statutory formula, which narrows grantor discretion and provides some basis of fiscal certainty for grantees.

--- Eligibility provisions are fairly specific and tend to favor general purpose governmental units.

Program reach

Two important points should be kept in mind throughout this assessment. LEAA expenditures account for only a small

percentage—generally less than 5 percent—of total criminal justice expenditures by State and local governments. In addition, these expenditures are spread across numerous programs, projects, operating agencies and political jurisdictions.

Furthermore, while the overall LEAA budget has decreased substantially since fiscal year 1975—from $905,000,000 in 1975 to $647,250,000 in 1978—the cuts have been experienced disproportionately more often in part C and part E block funds distributed to the States. The amount of parts C and E block funds made available to State and local units of government has decreased from just over 68 percent of LEAA's total appropriation in fiscal year 1971 to 43.81 percent in fiscal year 1978.

Legislative and administrative categorization

As signed into law on June 19, 1968, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act reflected a belief on the part of the Congress that crime is primarily a State and local problem. In its view these problems can best be addressed from a systemwide perspective that attempts to reconcile those problems inherent in a separation of powers and intergovernmental operations; to bridge the gap between police, courts, and correction agencies on the one hand, and geographical and political subdivisions on the other.

Conceptually, the LEAA block grant mechanism was designed to provide State and local discretion in identifying problems and developing programs to deal with them in the areas of crime, delinquency, law enforcement, and criminal justice system reform. This concept is in contrast to a completely categorical grant program which would not have allowed for the tailoring of available assistance to meet the unique needs and problems existing in each State and locality. Funding under the categorical approach would have offered grants in a plethora of narrowly defined categories which may or may not have met the priority needs of individual program participants.

When one looks at the evolution of the current Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, it is quite evident that the original block grant program has become increasingly categorized. By 1973, legislative provisions of the Safe Streets Act program reflected increased "categorization" to achieve representative balance among criminal justice components (agencies) and to stress certain programmatic elements.
The 1971 amendments included a new section part E, earmarking block and discretionary grants for correctional and rehabilitation programs. They also identified, as components of the generic term "law enforcement," criminal court activities; crime and juvenile delinquency prevention and control efforts; and education, treatment, and prevention of narcotics addiction. However, it was the 1973 Act that placed emphasis upon strengthening and improving law enforcement and criminal justice through a "total systems" approach as a major LEAA program objective. Also, LEAA was given a basis for reviewing and approving State comprehensive law enforcement and criminal justice plans. Evidence of "comprehensiveness" in State plans must include a total and integrated analysis of the problems of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies within the State from a systemic point of view requiring greater specificity in stating goals, priorities, and standards.

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 required that LEAA maintain a certain level of the Crime Control Act appropriations for juvenile delinquency projects--a maintenance of effort provision. The Crime Control Act of 1976 established this level at 19.15 percent. The Crime Control Act of 1976 also makes specific provisions for development of State judicial plans by State judicial planning committees, where they exist, as well as priority funding for prosecution, court, and defense related projects. Among other things, the 1976 legislation also established a special emphasis Community Anti-Crime Program with a $15-million authorization, and added the Public Safety Officers Benefits Program, neither of which was accompanied by a supplemental appropriation.

Although this is a rather abbreviated synopsis, it can be readily seen that the initial Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Program has become increasingly "categorized" over the past 8 years in terms of functional areas and specific program areas called into prominence. In addition to the above mentioned categories, States are to give special emphasis to organized crime programs and programs dealing with crimes against the elderly.

According to a study conducted by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 1/ such legislative changes are only a part of the categorization issue.

Almost since the beginning of the program, LEAA has encour-aged the use of functional categories to assure itself, and the Congress, that the States are or would be adequately addressing all components of the criminal justice system. Although SPAs are permitted to develop and use their own functional categories, they have been required to cross-reference the program and funding information in their plans to LEAA's "standard" functional categories. Furthermore, over the years LEAA has required the States to identify separate annual action programs within these functional category designations and report their program and funding activity by these subfunctional annual action program designations as well. The SPA supervisory board is responsible for authorizing the expenditure of funds among these annual action programs, within the broader functional category structure. This ultimately results in a larger number of program categories into which funds are segregated, commonly referred to as "pots." Not more than 15 percent of the funds planned for expenditure in one annual action program category may be transferred to any other category without prior written approval by LEAA. City and county applicants often find that this "administrative" categorization is not responsive to local priorities, initiatives, or emergencies given the time that is frequently required to obtain approval for such changes from LEAA.

As a result, many local officials view the program in practice as being too much like a categorical grant program in terms of the constraints placed on the use of funds.

The role of criminal justice system planning

It is the intent of the Act that each SPA shall

-- develop a comprehensive statewide plan for the improvement of law enforcement and criminal justice throughout the State;

-- define, develop, and correlate programs and projects for the State and the units of general local government in the State, or combinations of States or units, for improvement of law enforcement and criminal justice;

-- establish priorities for the improvement of law enforcement and criminal justice throughout the State; and

--
--assure the participation of citizens and community organizations at all levels of the planning process.

Each SPA has a supervisory board—a policymaking body—which is involved in the decisionmaking functions of the SPA. There are also approximately 450 regional planning units (RPUs) throughout the States. The RPUs participate in the comprehensive planning activities and, to varying degrees, share in the responsibility for allocating Federal funds. Local governments are represented in the RPUs, with city and county government involvement established primarily through the adoption of interlocal agreements and the appointment of members as representatives on RPU supervisory bodies. The 1973 amendments to the Act required that RPU supervisory bodies consist of a majority of locally elected officials, which includes sheriffs, district attorneys, and judges, as defined by LEAA.

The 1971 amendments to the Act required SPAs to "assure that major cities and counties * * * receive planning funds to develop comprehensive plans and coordinate functions at the local level." Thus, the planning structure is cross-functional in that it involves prosecution, defense, courts, police, and corrections officials, and it is intergovernmental because it involves States and localities and combinations of localities, as well as the Federal Government. The Federal role in the block grant effort includes LEAA's review and final approval of comprehensive State plans.

A number of factors have been reported as having limited the effectiveness of the planning process. The first area of criticism pertains to the role of governors and State legislatures in the program. The previously mentioned ACIR study points out that while governors technically have a substantial role in and responsibility for the program, for the most part they have remained fairly uninvolved. Skeptics point out that governors look at the SPA primarily as an agency for planning for and dispensing only Federal and State matching funds. The comprehensive State plan is often reportedly viewed more as a compliance instrument than as a device that, with sufficient gubernatorial and state legislative backing, could help make the SPA an integral part of a State's criminal justice system.

Critics of the program also point to the reported failure of most State legislatures to get involved in the program. The reported effect of limited legislative participation has been to restrict SPA planning to LEAA funded activities. Generally SPAs have not been authorized to prepare
comprehensive plans which are responsive to the overall needs of the criminal justice system and other agencies and programs which have a bearing on crime and delinquency problems in their States. Thus, most State comprehensive plans are directed only at less than 5 percent of the total criminal justice expenditure which LEAA moneys represent. This limits the plans' usefulness. The ACIR study concludes that if the planning process is considered instrumental to achieving the system-building objective of a block grant, then the SPAs must have sufficient authority and time to plan for all activities encompassed within the functional scope of the block grant, including those supported directly by State appropriations.

A major goal of the block grant instrument and its planning structure is to foster better communication and coordination among the fragmented criminal justice system components. This system-building goal applies to building cooperation and coordination among police, prosecution, court, defense, and correctional agencies within individual jurisdictions as well as between cities, counties, and the State. Since 1969, reported progress along these lines has been slow in coming. As part of its 1975 study, ACIR surveyed the SPAs on this point. Replies from three-fourths of the SPAs surveyed indicated that since 1969 the components of the criminal justice system had only just begun to view themselves as interdependent and to operate in that fashion.

We have discussed some of the reported weaknesses in the planning process as it operates. However, the real test is in the quality and the usefulness of the comprehensive State planning process and the State plans themselves. Of course, one major factor which reportedly limits the comprehensive quality of State plans has already been mentioned—the fact that most SPAs control and plan for LEAA funds alone. On this basis the comprehensiveness of State plans certainly has to be questioned. Another reportedly widespread criticism levied against State plans is the fact that in many cases they represent "comprehensive funding" documents rather than "comprehensive planning" documents. Critics have contended that no real comprehensive planning is being conducted by the States. These critics argue that only short-range funding decisions are being made, rather than planning for long-range priorities. According to ACIR's 1975 survey of SPA directors, plans are oriented toward specific projects; an average of 60 percent of the part C funds annually planned for was earmarked for specific projects. However, the amount of funds committed to continuation of previously funded projects has been reported to have grown.
steadily, leaving many SPAs no choice but to base their plans on the projects to which there have been previous commitments for the upcoming year. Also, LEAA's emphasis on using all part C money during the 2-year period it is made available has led many States to focus their efforts upon implementation. Therefore, while discussion of long-range goals and priorities is usually included in the annual State plans, they are not as prominent and specific as the more numerous and explicit program and project descriptions. In a 1976 study prepared by Executive Management Service, Inc., for LEAA, the following conclusion was drawn:

"State plans have shown considerable improvement from their first edition but, generally speaking are still constructed as a blueprint for the use of Federal funds and are project oriented rather than seriously incorporating multi-year plans and forecasts, related plans and systems and progress reports, all of which are essential to the development of an integrated and comprehensive blueprint for reducing crime and improving the criminal justice system in the State." 1/ (Underscoring supplied.)

Another major criticism of State comprehensive plans is that they represent little more than compliance documents. The 1975 ACIR study points out that many complaints of SPA directors, and in some cases, other State, RPU, and local officials are directed at LEAA guidelines for comprehensive plan development. As discussed in several of the case studies contained in the ACIR report, some States believe that proliferation of guidelines, requirements, and "red tape" has reduced the benefits of the program to the point where some States are considering terminating their participation. In their reported view, the time demands imposed by compliance with guideline requirements make it difficult, if not impossible, to develop truly comprehensive plans which would be responsive to State and local needs. Rather, plans are written to conform to LEAA guideline requirements. Some of the many guideline requirements result from other Federal legislation, the provisions of which LEAA is required to enforce, such as the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1968, the Clean Air and Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition


Of course, LEAA is responsible for making the final judgment on a State plan's quality and comprehensiveness. Without LEAA approval, a State cannot receive block grant funds. Rather than terminate funding when a State's plan fails to conform to guideline requirements, LEAA usually places "special conditions" to the plan engaging SPA officials in back-and-forth negotiations, revisions, and "re-writes" by the SPAs. Conditional approval means, in theory, that a State must comply with LEAA's requirement by a certain date or its funding will stop. According to a 1976 report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, LEAA rarely checks to see if a State has complied with the final agreed-upon special conditions. 1/

### Block grant funding

The fact that block grant funds are distributed among the States using a population-based formula gives some degree of funding certainty to the States. However, according to some, there is not necessarily a direct correlation between demonstrated need and gross population levels in the various States. After the award of a block grant, a State is required to "pass through" to local governments an amount based on the local proportion of State and local expenditures for criminal justice during the preceding fiscal year.

It is a major goal of the Act to stimulate new and innovative efforts rather than have the LEAA funds act as a substitute for local revenues in supporting normal operations and existing programs. In an attempt to gauge the nature of the activities supported with LEAA funds, ACIR in 1975 asked the SPAs to describe their projects according to the extent that they were "innovative." In the opinion of 44 SPAs, 9 percent of their projects represented pilot or demonstration efforts that had never been attempted anywhere. Fifty percent were programs that had never been attempted in the State, of which 21 percent were classified as innovative and

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29 percent as "generally accepted" undertakings. The remaining 41 percent represented generally accepted programs and activities that had already been implemented in other parts of the State. These figures are also supported by the results of an analysis of a sample of grants in 10 States selected by ACIR.

Another area of reported criticism since the inception of the LEAA program has been the proportion of funds awarded to the various functional areas of the criminal justice system—the police, courts (including prosecution and defense), and corrections components. Although the major reported criticism was directed at the significantly disproportionate share received by the police function, this has decreased and leveled-cut in recent years. A summary of the proportion of block grant funds, awarded by criminal justice component, shows the following trend. 1/

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</table>

A question frequently asked about LEAA funded programs concerns the extent to which they have been institutionalized and their costs assumed by State and local governments.

1/These figures were obtained from financial records maintained by the LEAA Office of the Controller—Grants Management Information System and are unverified. We have been informed by LEAA officials that there is some question about the total accuracy of these figures.
Available data seem to indicate that the assumption-of-cost percentage has been fairly moderate. In a 1974 GAO assumption-of-cost study, the continuation policies and practices of six States (Alabama, California, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington) were examined. In addition, 33 other States and the District of Columbia were surveyed to determine their assumption-of-cost record. GAO found that out of 440 "long-term" projects initiated with Safe Streets dollars but no longer receiving block grant funds prior to July 1, 1973, 64 percent were continuing to operate at expanded or at about the same levels. Of these 281 operating projects, 253 were being supported with State or local funds, while 28 were being supported with general revenue sharing moneys or Department of Health, Education, and Welfare funds. Of the 159 long-term projects that had either been terminated or reduced in magnitude, 95 merited continuation according to State and project officials. ACIR's 1975 survey of SPAs substantiated GAO's findings with respect to assumption-of-cost. Thus, it appears LEAA has had some success in institutionalizing programs initially supported with block grant funds.

Coordination among block, categorical, and research efforts

It seems natural that there should be some link between basic and applied research, categorical grant, and block grant programs. To be of maximum value, applied research needs to be put into practice by users. In the present LEAA program, such users include LEAA management, SPAs and local governments, as well as criminal justice agencies.

Although the coordination among various LEAA program components will be discussed more fully later, suffice it to say at this point that the linkage between the LEAA research, categorical, and block grant programs is not as strong as it could or should be.

The Categorical Program

The categorical program, as described earlier, encompasses most of the nonblock funding that is administered directly by LEAA. Although LEAA's principal form of fund allocation is through the block grant program, categorical grants represent those activities over which LEAA exercises more direct control.
Eight types of categorical funds have been used to fund a variety of activities, from support of direct action programs and technical assistance, to research, evaluation, and statistical studies.

--Discretionary, parts C and E
--Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
--Research, Development, and Evaluation
--Systems and Statistics
--Technical Assistance
--Training
--Internship
--Community Anti-Crime Program

These funds are expended by several different organizational units within LEAA. The Office of Criminal Justice Programs (OCJP), formerly the Office of Regional Operations, consists of a number of functional area program divisions (e.g., Corrections Division, Adjudication Division) which manage the allocation and expenditure of most of parts C and E discretionary funds. OCJP is also allocated some part F technical assistance funds and a small portion of part D training funds.

The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice utilizes part D allocations designated for research, evaluation, technology transfer, and some training funds.

The National Criminal Information and Statistics Service is allocated systems and statistics funds under part F and also receives some discretionary funding from parts C and E. The Office of Criminal Justice Education and Training (OCJET) administers programs funded by part D education funds which include the Internship and Law-Enforcement Education Program grants. The Office of Operations Support (OOS) receives both part F technical assistance funds and part D training funds. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) administers the discretionary funds allocated under the Juvenile Justice Act, and receives some part C and E discretionary funds. The Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs (CACP) utilizes part D funds for the Community Anti-Crime Program.
This description shows not only the diversity of activities funded but also the organizational opportunities for fragmentation of the management of the categorical program. An LEAA organizational chart is shown on the following page.

The issues surrounding the categorical program vary considerably depending on which type of funds is involved, which LEAA organizational unit is involved, and who the constituent interest groups are. However, one general observation has been made concerning the use of these funds. LEAA makes policy through the ways in which it expends categorical funds. The changing priorities of the agency, or more properly its administrators, are reflected in the shifts in emphasis which have been experienced over the years in the use of categorical funds. Overall, these programs do not show a systematic development of criminal justice policy but rather they illustrate the impact of frequent turnover in top leadership and consequential lack of systematic program development.

The following discussion will cover the eight types of categorical funds, plus the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP), giving examples of programs that have been funded and providing a limited overview of issues related to the use or nonuse of these types of funds. A more detailed description is provided in a companion GAO staff study entitled, "Overview of Activities Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration."
The discretionary program

The discretionary program includes 15 percent of part C moneys, grants for law enforcement purposes, and 50 percent of part E, grants for correctional institutions and facilities. These funds support projects at the "discretion" of the administrator rather than being determined by the States as in the case for block grants. From 1969 to 1977 LEAA has budgeted $582.6 million for part C discretionary programs and $3.58 million for part E discretionary programs. Thousands of projects have been funded under the program which have been implemented by States, localities, and nonprofit organizations.

There is little indication in the legislative history of the program which identifies a specific functional or programmatic intent for the use of these funds. However, some reported general observations made concerning how they have been used follow.

Discretionary funds have been used to fund a variety of activities from major administrative programs to supplementing block grant moneys awarded to the States, to research, evaluation, and technical assistance projects. An analysis of the distribution of discretionary funds from 1969 to 1975 shows that States and private agencies received a larger percentage of discretionary funds than they did of block funds. A comparison of the distribution of discretionary funds among the components of the criminal justice system shows a sizeable amount of funds going to projects that involve combinations of criminal justice agency components, which are generally considered more innovative. Courts also have received a higher percentage of discretionary than block funds. 1/

The administration and direction of the discretionary program has been influenced by the turnover in LEAA leadership. LEAA has had five Administrators during the period of 1968-76. Accompanying changes in the priorities of the agency tend to have been reflected in the discretionary program.

During the early period of the LEAA program (1969-70) the "troika" was administering the agency which did not encourage decisive Federal action. The debate over the strength and intrusiveness of the Federal role in light of the block grant concept also deterred the administration from taking a strong Federal position. Discretionary grant awards were made from LEAA central headquarters after review by each administrator in the "troika." The emphasis for the discretionary program during this period was upon the development of innovative techniques that, if successful, would hopefully influence comparable institutional changes in the criminal justice system. Discretionary funds were also used to supplement block grants in an effort to fill gaps in State block grant funding.

During the time that Jerris Leonard was Administrator (1971-73) the award of discretionary grants was decentralized to 10 LEAA regional offices (these offices were closed in October 1977). The emphasis during this period was to concentrate or focus a relatively larger amount of resources to address specific crime and criminal justice problems. Discretionary grants were used to "demonstrate" the potential impact that Federal funds could have on a particular problem area. The High Impact Anti-crime Program (Impact Cities) funded at this time is one example of the emphases for which discretionary funds were utilized under Mr. Leonard's administration. Although discretionary funds were still used to supplement State programs by filling in gaps of the block grant program during this period, it was not the primary emphasis.

Donald B. Santarelli became the LEAA Administrator in April 1973. Under his leadership, the responsibility for awarding discretionary grants was shifted back to Headquarters. Discretionary funds were used to further four major national initiatives identified during this period:

--A citizens initiative.
--A courts initiative.
--A standards/goals initiative.
--A juvenile delinquency initiative.

The Office of National Priority Programs (now defunct) was established to award discretionary funds in these four national priority areas, to articulate the LEAA role in developing, demonstrating, testing, and evaluating innovative approaches to problems of crime reduction.
Richard Velde was the LEAA Administrator from September 1974 to February 1977. The control of discretionary funds remained primarily with LEAA Headquarters personnel. The emphasis of discretionary funds shifted, however, from supporting major national initiatives toward support for testing specific program concepts through demonstration projects and disseminating the results.

Thus, the direction and emphasis of the discretionary program has changed with each change in LEAA Administrators. A recent survey of local and SPA officials indicates that in their view, discretionary funds have been more often used to support innovative projects and research efforts than to continue existing programs or to build local support for the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act program. 1/

Discretionary funds, as one type of categorical funds, have been expended in significant amounts to support action programs. Although some programs have shown promising results, reportedly too few have been carefully designed, tested, or evaluated to insure their applicability in States and localities on a generalized basis. Other types of categorical funds were expended on research, evaluation (discussed further in the next section), and statistical studies. However, the results of these efforts have not been routinely linked to the development of action programs. As a result a number of national programs have been launched by one LEAA Administration without systematic development and follow through by the next.

In October 1976, a new policy was introduced in LEAA that for the first time required that all LEAA offices involved in the categorical program (this includes the use of discretionary funds) establish linkages between their activities. This policy, called the Action Program Development Process (APDP), was amended on May 20, 1977, and constitutes the current agency approach to the development of action programs. 2/ It entails a cyclical process of planning, testing, and program revision in seven steps.

1) Policy Planning - During this step a statement of agency goals and objectives is developed as well as a statement of criteria that will be used in making program choices.

1/Ibid., p. 140.


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2) Problem Definition - This includes both describing the problem and analyzing why it happens. The end result is a problem statement.

3) Selection of Response Strategies - This includes the identification of a recommended strategy and an implementation plan to carry out the strategy. The products from this step and from the problem definition step are used in preparing a decision memorandum which is required for the initiation of new programs.

At this point the Administrator must decide whether or not to approve the program strategy and where to assign responsibility for implementation. Several options are open to the Administrator, including multioffice responsibility in the form of a Program Management Team.

4) Program Design - During this step the assumptions about the problem are operationalized and an evaluation plan is developed. The results of this step are documented in a program plan.

5) Testing. - This step includes designing the test project, selecting the site, and implementing the project. The evaluation is then monitored and assessed in determining which program elements work best and whether or not adjustments are needed. In this step LEAA is as interested in finding out what does not work as it is in finding out what does work.

6) Demonstration - The results of testing are installed at a variety of field sites in this step. It is seen as a "broad implementation of a concept that has been proven of value under certain conditions." 1/ After a program has gone through demonstration, it is then determined whether or not to proceed to the next step, marketing.

7) Marketing - This refers to those activities used to transfer programs that have proven to be effective in selected demonstrations to other potential users.

The APDP process is described as a model that may not apply literally to all program development activities in LEAA.

1/Ibid., p. 10.
Some steps may occur simultaneously or out of sequence with others. The policy does state that all action program development must adhere to this model.

An assessment of the impact and potential benefit accruing from this policy is not possible at this time, due to the extended period of time that has been required to achieve implementation. No programs have been fully exposed to the process and the process itself is still evolving. Some positive aspects of the process which may become apparent with full implementation of the APDP policy include the increased coordination between LEAA offices and categorical fund activities that it fosters. The cyclical nature of the program also could tend to encourage a linkage between research and action activities so that action program development affects research priorities, and knowledge gained through research and evaluation activities in turn impacts on the design and implementation of action programs. For example, both research and action program offices may be involved in problem definition and the development of response strategies. The evaluation section of the program plan most likely will be developed by the National Institute. Another positive aspect is that the policy-planning step provides for the generation of linkages between agency priorities and knowledge gained from the testing and demonstration of action programs. It is hoped that this will serve to improve the situation found in the past where reportedly, LEAA's discretionary program could not fend off outside pressure because its priorities were not well defined.

None of these positive aspects are likely to be realized, however, without support of the LEAA Administrator. This is an important point in view of the fact that LEAA does not have an Administrator at the present time. It is up to the LEAA Administrator to determine if he will be committed to the rigor of the APDP process or if he will allow action programs to short circuit the planning, evaluation, testing, and demonstration steps required as part of the program development process.

Also, the Action Program Development Policy as presently stated does not provide for systematic state and local input. This is especially important in view of the fact that State and local government interest groups have indicated their desire to have input to research activities. The success of step seven, "marketing," could be greatly influenced by the amount of involvement States and localities have.
The APDP process is also being tied into the present Management-By-Objectives (MBO) reporting system. However, the two presently are not compatible. The MBO objectives as stated are tied to specific interim products of concern to different LEAA offices. This could tend to reinforce organizational differences and frustrate the allocation of resources toward solving a common problem along functional lines, such as court backlog. The present MBO system will have to be restructured to accommodate the thrust and direction of the program development process under APDP if the management information coming from it is to be useful.

The present budget crunch in LEAA could also affect the implementation of such a rigorous process. Some steps may have to be delegated to outside contractors due to staffing limitations. Also, States may not have funds available to pick up projects coming out of the process, given the dwindling level of appropriations for programs supported with block grant moneys.

It is too soon to tell if the APDP process will overcome and correct some of the reported problems which have prompted criticism of LEAA's discretionary efforts. Much will depend on the support the process is given by the LEAA Administrator, office heads, and staff, and ultimately acceptance of the developed products by States and localities.

Some examples of discretionary programs

In the following discussion we have chosen to highlight two early discretionary action programs, Pilot Cities and Impact Cities and two ongoing action programs, Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime and Career Criminal. A fifth program, Standards and Goals, will also be discussed as an example of a "process type" discretionary program. This selection was made to provide both historical and current temporal vantage points from which to view the discretionary program.

Pilot Cities

The Pilot Cities Demonstration Program was initiated in May 1970 and was LEAA's first major demonstration program. LEAA selected eight medium sized cities to participate in the program. The concept of the program was to install an action-team of law enforcement and criminal justice experts in a city to introduce the best available techniques to reduce crime and improve the quality of justice and also to assist in the development of new techniques. The team was to work
across both functional and governmental boundaries and their efforts were to serve as examples for the rest of the Nation. The cities selected were to be ones receptive to change which had the best possibility of "showing the way." In all, 98 projects were funded either wholly or predominantly through the teams' efforts and a total of $26 million was devoted to these projects. The program ended in June 1975. In February 1975, a GAO report (GGD-75-16) on the Pilot Cities Program recommended a phase out of the program due to the limited national benefits that had been realized. The report stated that although individually the eight cities benefited from the program, from a national standpoint the overall program did not accomplish its goals. Both management and program design problems were found and included:

--Consistent objectives were not agreed upon.

--Teams interpreted the program differently.

--Guidelines were so broad that there was no clear direction as to what was to be accomplished and how.

An evaluation done by the American Institutes for Research endorses GAO's findings in this area but also states that the central concept is sound. It points to Pilot Cities' failures as useful guidance for what to avoid in future projects. 1/

Two other factors contributed to the problems experienced by the Pilot Cities program. The decentralization of responsibility for discretionary funding to the LEAA regional offices, adopted by Jerris Leonard, occurred after the start of the program. This change did not enhance the development of Pilot Cities as a national scope program. Also before Pilot Cities was fully underway, another national program, High Impact Anti-Crime Program (Impact Cities), was developed and was supported by the new LEAA Administrator.

Impact Cities

The High Impact Anti-Crime Program was initiated in 1972 and involved eight cities with avowed serious crime problems. The program had two specific objectives:

To reduce the incidence of five specific "high fear" crimes (murder, rape, assault, robbery, and burglary) by 5 percent in 2 years and by 20 percent in 5 years.

To improve criminal justice capabilities via the demonstration of a comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation, and evaluation process (the COPIE-cycle).

The Impact Cities program was conceived as a government response to a rising trend in crime rates. First and foremost, however, Impact Cities was seen as an action program that focused on short-term, crime-oriented achievement. A total of $160 million was awarded to the eight cities.

The Mitre Corporation has completed a national-level evaluation of the Impact Cities program. However, they were retained to do the evaluation 6 months after the program was initiated and by this time it was too late in most cases to build in rigorous evaluation designs for projects then underway. The national-level evaluator was almost completely dependent upon data and information furnished by the cities or their project-level evaluation contractor, therefore effectively precluding Mitre from being able to validate that data. It was decided that the Mitre Corporation evaluation would not determine program effectiveness but would concentrate instead on the processes employed by the Impact Cities in planning, implementing, and evaluating projects.

It is difficult to determine the success or failure of the Impact Cities program in terms of its specific crime reduction goals. However, the Mitre Corporation did find a number of specific accomplishments. Some of these are:

--35 impact projects were shown to be effective.

--43 percent of the projects funded are expected to continue.

--All cities appear to have made progress in involving the community in the criminal justice process.


2/Ibid.

3/Ibid., pp. 36, 38, and 53.
The Nitre evaluation also states that for future urban anti-crime programs, national level planning and evaluation should be given greater priority. An overall evaluation plan should be developed at the beginning of a national program so that program activities can be linked to outcomes. 1/

Treatment Alternative to Street Crime (TASC)

The TASC program was initiated in late 1972 as a pre-trial intervention program for drug abusing criminal offenders. The program begins with the identification of offenders' drug dependency when they are entering the criminal justice system. Information obtained from the offenders is provided to the court, prosecuting attorney, and defense counsel at the time of arraignment. With concurrence of the prosecution and defense counsels, the court can defer trial and refer selected offenders into community-based treatment facilities. A tracking system monitors treatment progress and provides periodic reports to the judiciary and the prosecutors' office.

The TASC program is one of the largest single discretionary programs funded by LEAA. From fiscal year 1972 to 1977, LEAA has spent $25 million on the program. There have been a total of 54 projects funded and 47 of them are still in operation. Over 33,000 drug-abusing offenders have received treatment.

In December 1976, the Department of Justice issued an internal audit report on TASC. 2/ It made several recommendations to improve the program. The emphasis of the recommendations was on the need for better monitoring of the projects and better data on TASC clients to aid in follow-up after their release from the program. The report stated that there is no quantitative data to support that the TASC program has had a significant impact on the total criminal justice system; however, it was apparent to the auditors that TASC helped establish a closer working relationship between elements of the criminal justice system. They also noted that States have demonstrated a willingness to fund the projects after discretionary funding ceases which is indicative of the program's acceptance.

1/Ibid., pp. 66 and 67.

TASC is also the subject of a National Evaluation Program (NEP) Phase I report. Phase I reports summarize the existing state of knowledge concerning the program. The NEP Phase I TASC report stated that 15 percent of the clients entering TASC programs have successfully matriculated through the program. 1/ Those clients who continued to remain in the TASC program experienced an 8-percent rearrest rate while under the supervision of program staff. However, much of the present analysis of treatment effectiveness is inconclusive. The report cited major gaps in knowledge about TASC-type programs which included lack of data on client outcomes after completion of the program and the absence of standardized process information about project activities and services.

Career Criminal Program

The purpose of the Career Criminal Program is to design and implement model programs which establish priorities to speed the prosecution of those persons whose criminal histories indicate repeated commission of serious criminal acts. The program is based on the hypothesis that the frequency and level of serious crime can be reduced by focusing resources on the career criminal through the establishment of major violator units in the prosecutors office. The program is designed to identify the career criminal, assign the most experienced prosecutor to the case, and bring the violator quickly to trial.

Objectives for cases involving career criminals include:

--Reduce pretrial and trial delay.

--Reduce the number of continuances per case involving career criminals.

--Reduce the number of cases dismissed on grounds other than the merits of the case itself.

In addition to projects which are located in major urban areas, there is a clearinghouse which has the function of covering all such projects. Functions include doing legal—

research, disseminating information, collecting uniform data from the projects, and monitoring the progress of the projects.

LEAA has funded 24 career criminal project sites. According to LEAA, the program has reduced pretrial and trial delay, the number of continuances, and the number of cases dismissed on grounds other than the merits of the case itself.

A national level evaluation of the program is now being performed by the Mitre Corporation in 4 of the 24 sites. The evaluation is now in the data collection stage. It will examine how career criminals are processed and how such processing differs from that employed for persons not designated career criminals who are processed in the same jurisdiction.

LEAA is now planning to expand the scope of the Career Criminal program to include participation by police and correctional agencies. This will carry over the emphasis on the violent repeat offenders to other enforcement and rehabilitative agencies of the criminal justice system.

Standards and Goals

This major initiative was started in 1971. It began with the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. This 22-member commission identified 5 major crime-related goals, 427 standards, and 97 associated recommendations in the areas of police, courts, corrections, and community crime prevention. These are assembled in a series of reports which also include a national strategy to reduce crime and a report on the criminal justice system.

In 1973, LEAA began a national level discretionary program to encourage States to examine the National Advisory Commission Standards and Goals and to develop and adopt their own standards and goals. Forty-six States have received support to initiate a standards and goals development process. The remaining nine have used planning funds for their standards and goals development programs. Funds have also been awarded to 13 States to begin implementing their standards in criminal justice agencies.

In fiscal year 1976, LEAA sponsored a major follow-on effort in standards and goals. Five task forces were established to develop standards and goals in the areas of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention, organized crime, disorders and terrorism, research and development, and privacy and security.
The LEAA focus has been on the concepts and processes of standards and goals efforts rather than on individual standards or recommendations. The findings of the National Advisory Commission have neither been endorsed nor opposed by LEAA. They are seen as advisory only. The operating policy of LEAA on standards and goals states that LEAA will not mandate acceptance of the Commission's recommendations.

Essentially then, LEAA has taken a noninterventionist stance in relation to the development and application of specific standards and goals at State and local levels. They have fostered the development process but have not mandated the acceptance of particular standards even those with broad applicability.

Several GAO reports have illustrated the need for developing and using specific standards and goals for the criminal justice system and for specific types of projects. For example, in a report on the conditions of local jails \(^1\) we noted that even after spending LEAA funds, the overall physical conditions in the jails remained inadequate. We recommended that the States should develop agreed upon standards that must be worked towards, if Federal funds are to be used to improve the conditions of local jails.

LEAA has funded a national level evaluation of the standards and goals development process. It is being performed by the American Institutes of Research which is currently in the process of collecting data. The thrust of the evaluation is to identify those elements in the development process that seem to affect the use of the standards. The effect of external factors on the use of standards will also be explored.

These examples of discretionary programs are not exhaustive of all those that have been cited as being significant. Other programs that have been cited by LEAA include:

--Citizens Initiative Program - Focuses on the citizen and his essential role in an effective criminal justice system. This program includes funding of victim/witness projects which provide services such as notification to appear in court, child care, and call-off services when a case is continued.

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--Operation Sting/Anti-Fencing Units - This program is designed to gather evidence for the arrest and prosecution of those persons involved in organized criminal fencing operations and those persons committing burglaries, larcenies, robberies, and related crimes.

--Unification of State Court Systems - In partnership with such groups as the National Center for State Courts and the American Bar Association, LEAA has actively promoted unification and consolidation of splintered and duplicative State court systems.

--Economic Crime Project - The project provides in 15 participating localities, for the creation and/or expansion of economic crime prosecutorial units which are responsible for investigating and prosecuting white-collar crime and other fraud situations.

Education and Training Programs

Education

LEAA's educational programs are administered by the Office of Criminal Justice Education and Training (OCJET). The four program areas are educational development, internships, graduate research fellowships, and law enforcement education. The educational development program provides funds to a number of institutions to strengthen criminal justice curricula, train instructors, and conduct research and development on methods of educating students or faculty. The internship program provides an opportunity for students on leave from higher educational institutions to get criminal justice work experience. The graduate research fellowships are awarded to doctoral candidates to support students engaged in the writing of a doctoral dissertation in the area of criminal justice.

The largest educational program component is the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP). LEAA has allocated $314.75 million to this program from fiscal year 1969 to 1977. This program provides grants and loans to help finance college educations for in-service officers and for promising students committed for entering criminal justice careers. LEEP is technically excluded from the categorical program definition because it is a loan program. However, it is administered primarily by LEAA rather than the States, so we have included it in the discussion of categorical programs. (For a more detailed description and breakdown of funding information on these educational programs see GAO's companion staff...
In June 1975, GAO issued a report entitled "Problems in Administering Programs to Improve Law Enforcement Education," GGD-75-67. In our report, we determined many persons were attracted to criminal justice careers or improved their occupational activities (police, court, or corrections) because of law enforcement education programs. However, the management of the programs was found to be inadequate. Problems resulted from failures to establish clear-cut goals and objectives, frequent organizational changes and insufficient staff. These problems resulted in untimely distribution of funds to schools, deficiencies in accounting for participants, and insufficient program monitoring. As of November 1974, LEAA had instituted improved accounting procedures which addressed many of the problems noted in our report.

Another point raised in our report was that 48 percent of the graduates of LEEP who had no prior criminal justice experience did not obtain criminal justice employment. A subsequent study, "A Nationwide Survey of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Personnel Needs and Resources," done by the National Planning Association (NPA) indicates that the LEEP program appears to accelerate the trend toward a college educated criminal justice system. 1/ Several other factors also have probably contributed to this pattern. Therefore, it is not possible to measure the direct contribution of the LEEP program to the increase in educational levels of criminal justice personnel.

Another point raised by the NPA report addresses the quality of LEEP-assisted education. It was noted that 15 percent of all criminal justice-related courses in LEEP-supported institutions were found to be specialized training courses rather than educational courses. LEAA has since indicated that there is a need to improve the quality of criminal justice education.

Data Systems and Statistical Programs

The importance of statistics and information systems to criminal justice planning and operations is obvious given

the preceding discussions. The enactment of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and the creation of LEAA
were influenced by the increased rate of reported crimes which
preceded the legislation. Since then, some have judged the
success or failure of LEAA's programs using this same indicator,
despite its reported limitation as a valid and reliable measure
of crime incidence.

The Safe Streets Act mandated that LEAA "* * * collect,
evaluate, publish, and disseminate statistics and other infor-
mation on the condition and progress of law enforcement within
and without the United States." LEAA established the National
Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS)
to carry out these activities. All of the "systems and
statistics" funds and some discretionary funds are admin-
istered by NCJISS which is organized in two divisions, the
Systems Development Division and the Statistics Division.

**Systems Development**

LEAA provides financial and technical assistance to
States for the development and implementation of criminal
justice information and communications systems and promotes
their exchange and transfer among jurisdictions. Some of
LEAA's efforts in this area include:

--- **Project Search** - The first major LEAA-supported effort
in this area includes a uniform format for criminal
history information and a transactional statistics
system which is based on an accounting of individual
offenders proceeding through various stages of the
criminal justice process.

--- **Comprehensive Data Systems Program** - This LEAA effort
is designed to encourage the States to collect compre-
hensive criminal justice information for use in plan-
ing, implementing, managing, and evaluating criminal
justice programs. This program is mainly funded with
discretionary funds.

--- **Transfer of Systems** - LEAA identifies systems which
have been successfully demonstrated and encourages
transfer of these systems to other jurisdictions.
An example is PROMIS, the Prosecutor's Management
Information System.

--- **Security and Privacy** - LEAA has assisted in drafting
and administering regulations placing security restric-
tions on the storage and dissemination of criminal
history, research, and statistical information.
Communications Systems - These efforts are aimed at the advancement of state and local telecommunications networks to meet local, intrastate, and interstate criminal justice needs.

For a more detailed description and breakdown of funding information, see GAO's companion Staff Study, "Overview of Activities Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration."

The Research Triangle Institute completed an evaluation in March 1976, which reviewed the systems development efforts of NCJISS and made the following conclusions:

-- LEAA funds have made a difference in the development rate of information systems.

-- User satisfaction was more influenced by user participation in the design and user familiarity with the system than the amount of funds provided.

-- Systems operators would have used LEAA technical assistance if it had been available. 1/

The Executive Management Service, Inc., study on LEAA activities from 1969 to 1975 noted that the technical assistance that has been made available has been provided by outside consultants. The report then points out the divisiveness that exists among the components of the criminal justice system and the problems this creates for developing certain types of information systems. Because of this, the report concludes, it would seem more appropriate for LEAA and the SPAs to provide such assistance since they have more responsibility for coordination between criminal justice system components. 2/

Statistics

NCJISS is responsible for generating national crime statistics relating to the incidence of crime, to offenders, and to the operation of the criminal justice system. It has developed more than a dozen statistical series covering


2/ op. cit., LEAA Assessment - Integration, p. 67.
victimization, systemwide statistical programs, corrections, judicial, and juvenile justice statistics. The reader is referred to the companion GAO Staff Study previously cited for a more detailed description and funding breakdown of LEAA funding activities in this program area.

The Research Triangle evaluation of the use of NCJISS statistics documents and services found:

-- They had generally met the Federal need for which they were initially designed.

-- They had not kept pace with changing Federal needs.

-- They met few of the needs of State and local agencies. 1/

These conclusions have greater significance when considering the need for valid and reliable statistics in the development of comprehensive criminal justice plans. The program plan for statistics for 1977-81 developed by NCJISS' Statistics Division includes support for users of criminal justice statistics as one of its major objectives. This objective includes conducting a major survey of users of criminal justice statistics and establishing a data archive network to encourage the use of the data.

National Crime Surveys

A major statistical series, the National Crime Panel (victimization surveys), instituted in July 1972, was designed to provide information about the victims of crime, about the number of crimes not reported to the police, and to provide more reliable measures for the types of crimes selected. A national sample survey included 60,000 households and 39,000 business establishments. Plans also called for surveys of individual cities. The Bureau of the Census, through an inter-agency agreement, collects and tabulates the data for LEAA.

The National Academy of Sciences issued a report on the victimization surveys in 1976. 2/ The report contained several findings concerning their methodology and utility:

1/ op. cit., p. 1-3.

The survey design is consistent with the overall objectives established for the National Crime Panel.

Conceptual, procedural, and managerial problems limit the potential application of the data.

There is a need to shift resources to analytic and methodological research to obtain data for policy formulation.

Several recommendations were made that included (1) providing more resources for managerial coordination and data analysis, (2) exploration of different forms and ordering of questions used in the interviews of victims, (3) undertaking a major methodological effort concerning the field and survey design, and (4) identifying local interest in, and use of, victimization survey data. The National Academy of Sciences report also emphasized the need for a continuing series of victimization surveys. As a social indicator, victimization surveys could provide indicators of both the objective and subjective effects of crime on communities.

The surveys could provide information on the distribution of crime not available from present uniform crime report statistics collected by police agencies. It could also be useful for planning, evaluation, decisionmaking, and policy-making functions concerning criminal justice programming. In addition, the victimization survey data, if properly collected could provide social scientists with needed information to examine and test theories of societal reaction to crime.

In a July 26, 1977, memorandum to the Acting Administrator, the Director of the NCJISS Statistics Division proposed to suspend the collection of victimization data. The impetus for this decision was a reduction in NCJISS' budgets for fiscal years 1978 and 1979. The justification for the suspension of data collection advanced was the stated need to change fundamental aspects of the surveys to meet the recommendations advanced in the National Academy of Sciences study and concentrate resources on the analysis of current victimization data. The memorandum was approved by the Acting Administrator.

This decision was the subject of hearings on October 13, 1977, of the Subcommittee on Crime, House Committee on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee Chairman expressed concern about the termination of data collection as did other members. Several other witnesses including representatives from the National Academy of Sciences and the American Statistical Association urged against the termination of data collection.
At the time of the completion of our study and preparation of this document, a proposal to extend the collection of victimization data through June 1978 was under consideration by the Acting Administrator.

Technical Assistance

A 1975 A.D. Little report 1/ viewed LEAA's technical assistance activities at that time as being in the following broad areas:

Resource pools -- These pools, in the form of national contracts, are perhaps the most widely known and clearest example of LEAA's technical assistance activity. For example, the courts technical assistance contract with American University provides technical assistance teams upon request for areas such as court personnel, information systems, and court reorganization.

LEAA staff -- Before the closing of LEAA's regional offices, there were specialists in the areas of police, courts, corrections, organized crime, etc., who considered much of what they did on a day-to-day basis as providing technical assistance. The State representatives in these 10 regional offices also reportedly provided technical assistance. Grant managers at LEAA Headquarters also provide technical assistance to some extent in their processing and monitoring of grants.

Technical assistance projects

LEAA reports that it has provided technical assistance to support the following programs during fiscal years 1975 and 1976: career criminal, juvenile justice, citizens' initiative, standards and goals, promising projects, civil rights, international activities, police, courts, corrections, organized crime, and SPA, RPU, and criminal justice agency capacity building.

Technical assistance then, takes many forms and is being administered in part by the majority of LEAA offices. Not all the activities described as technical assistance are funded with technical assistance funds. In fact, in the past there

has been some confusion over the definition of technical assistance in the agency. The present technical assistance definition includes a number of activities which involve assisting State and local agencies in developing comprehensive plans, identifying effective techniques for controlling specific crime problems, and implementing new programs and techniques for the improvement of the criminal justice system.

Technical assistance can be a very important way for LEAA to bring about improvements in the criminal justice system. By being aware of the issues and problems in each of the various components of the system, LEAA can provide or make available technical assistance to help State and local governments and agencies adequately address their crime and delinquency problems and improve law enforcement and criminal justice activities.

The need for LEAA to provide more technical assistance has been discussed in our reports on State and local court problems, long-term impact of LEAA grants, halfway houses, and probation. They indicated that LEAA and the State planning agencies reacted to requests for assistance but did not take the initiative to identify areas where technical assistance was needed and work to find ways to provide it or make it available.

Although the Safe Streets Act of 1968 required the States to demonstrate in their State plans their willingness to contribute technical assistance or services for programs and projects, LEAA did not require them to do so until March 1975. State plans now must outline in detail a strategy or plan that the State planning agency will follow in delivering technical assistance or assuring that technical assistance is provided.


The present technical assistance policy provides for the development of a comprehensive approach to the delivery of technical assistance based on the information drawn from the States' strategies as part of their State plans. However, this policy was issued when the 10 LEAA regional offices were still operational and played an integral part in the development of the approach. Now that the regional offices have been closed, there are plans to revise this policy to accommodate the shift in technical assistance responsibilities back to LEAA Headquarters.

**LEAA RESEARCH PROGRAMS**

The variety, shifts in direction, and focus of emphasis of research programs and evaluation initiatives undertaken by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and its parent organization, LEAA, also parallel in many respects the course of the other categorical program activities previously described.

Research, and particularly evaluation, provisions and legislative requirements of the Crime Control Act are addressed in parts C, D, E, and F of the act and thus involve States and localities, the LEAA administration, as well as the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. The principal focus of research and evaluation program responsibilities pertaining to LEAA are contained in part D of the act (sections 401 to 403). This part is aimed at "** improving law enforcement and criminal justice, and developing new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime, and the detection and apprehension of criminals " **," through training, education, research, and development.

**The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice**

The National Institute is established within the Department of Justice under the general authority of LEAA, headed by a director who is appointed by the Attorney General. Its purpose is to encourage research and development, evaluate the impact and effectiveness of programs and projects, disseminate the results, and assist in the development and support of training programs.

To carry out these broad purposes, the National Institute is authorized under the 1976 act to

1. make grants to or enter into contracts with public and private agencies, organizations, and educational institutions for research and development related to the purposes of this title;
(2) conduct in-house research and development, including studies of the effectiveness of programs and projects carried out under this title;

(3) carry out programs of behavioral research, with emphasis on the causes and prevention of crime;

(4) make recommendations for action to strengthen law enforcement by all levels of government and the private sector;

(5) provide research fellowships for implementing the purposes of this section, and special workshops for the dissemination of information;

(6) assist in conducting local and regional training programs for State and local law enforcement and criminal justice personnel, at the request of a State or unit of local government;

(7) conduct a full-scale program for the collection and dissemination of relevant information; and

(8) establish a research center.

In reauthorizing the Crime Control Act in 1976, the Congress also mandated that the National Institute expand and formalize its evaluation, research, training, information exchange, and dissemination efforts; the Institute is to place renewed emphasis upon evaluation by specifically making itself responsible for evaluating and developing the criteria and procedures for the evaluation of programs and projects funded by LEAA. Consequently, the National Institute is required to

(1) where possible, undertake, and make, receive, and review evaluations of programs and projects to determine their impact and the extent to which they meet the purposes of the title and to disseminate this information to State planning agencies and, on request, to units of general local government;

(2) develop in consultation with the State planning agencies, criteria and procedures for the evaluation of funded activities and report such criteria and procedures to State planning agencies;

(3) identify programs and projects which have demonstrated success and disseminate lists of such projects to State planning agencies, and, upon request, to units of general local government;
(4) serve as a national and international clearinghouse for the exchange of information on the improvement of law enforcement and criminal justice;

(5) undertake research to determine the relationship between drug abuse and crime and to evaluate the success of various drug treatment programs in reducing crime, in consultation with the National Institute on Drug Abuse;

(6) survey existing and future personnel needs and programs in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice, specifically including training and academic assistance programs under the title;

(7) survey existing and future needs in the Nation's correctional facilities to include a determination of the possible impact of the adoption of new sentencing procedures;

(8) assist the administrator of LEAA with his duties relating to the evaluation of the State plans (sec. 515(a)); and

(9) report, annually, on various aspects of its activities to the President, Congress, State planning agencies and, on request, to units of general local government.

States are required in section 303(2)(7) of part C of the act also, to make provision for research and development activities as part of their State comprehensive plans.

Funding

Grants and/or contracts for projects authorized under section 403 of the act may be up to 100 percent of the total cost, but, whenever feasible, the contribution of money, facilities, or services relevant to the project will be required by LEAA.

From 1969 through 1978, the National Institute has been allocated over $240 million. Its budget has grown from $2.9 million in 1969 to a high of $42.5 million in 1975, but experienced a 50 percent cut in available funds when its budget decreased to $21 million in 1978.

There are many different purposes for which such funds are utilized: research, evaluation, data collection, technology development (hard and software), dissemination, innovation,
training, demonstrations, technical assistance, standards development, feasibility studies, and fellowships. In many instances, these categories are not exclusive since any particular award can include different components, for example, research, data collection, evaluation, and dissemination. Table 5 summarizes the distribution of National institute awards for fiscal years 1974 through 1976 by program areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Area</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Crime Prevention</td>
<td>$3,483,160</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>$4,439,293</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Delinquency</td>
<td>1,707,766</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>2,018,611</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policce</td>
<td>1,904,815</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>3,016,855</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>2,061,286</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>3,103,166</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>3,547,819</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>3,190,951</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Technology</td>
<td>6,621,094</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>9,176,516</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Manpower G/</td>
<td>1,274,500</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>1,644,693</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>4,414,003</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>5,306,943</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting Follows</td>
<td>262,850</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>236,906</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Transfer</td>
<td>6,355,595</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>4,502,859</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Agreements</td>
<td>242,946</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>242,946</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total FY 1974-76</td>
<td>$32,645,491</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>$34,619,075</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Education and Manpower Category was listed as the Manpower Category in FY 1976.

This figure includes $9,100,000 to the Drug Enforcement Administration, and $1,225,000 to the DEA Pilot Cities Program, or purchase orders.

This figure includes $9,100,000 to the Drug Enforcement Administration, $2,335,496 in Training and Technical Assistance Funds.

This figure includes $2,335,496 in Training and Technical Assistance Funds.

This figure includes $2,335,496 in Training and Technical Assistance Funds.
Program Emphasis - FY 1977

For fiscal year 1977 the National Institute's field of inquiry includes crime prevention and control and the administration of criminal justice. Additional concerns include the evaluation of criminal justice programs, promotion of "promising" research findings and "successful" practices for adoption, disseminating information to the criminal justice community, and providing assistance to the parent organization (LEAA) in program development. Currently supported research efforts include:

--- Community crime prevention, such as environmental design and citizen involvement.

--- Police, such as preventive patrol, anti-corruption management, and response strategies.

--- Courts, such as speedy trial, innovative sentencing practices, omnibus hearings, plea bargaining, and performance measures.

--- Corrections, such as community-based corrections, victimization in prisons, recidivism measures, fixed sentences, and female offenders.

--- Special programs, such as the National Evaluation Program, and visiting fellowship programs.

--- Exemplary projects and prescriptive packages, including monographs.

In the area of evaluation research, efforts for fiscal year 1977 are focused upon developing operational and impact indicators for the criminal justice system, research on deterrence and incapacitation effects, methodological studies, and selected program evaluations. 1/

1/ An expanded description and specific examples of some National Institute sponsored research is contained in pages 52 through 56 of the companion GAO staff study previously identified.
The National Institute: An assessment

The National Institute's conceptualization was treated in many respects as an afterthought to the parent legislation of 1968. Possibly as a result of such early apathy, the National Institute did not have the formal authority necessary to shape its own program. Until only relatively recently, the National Institute's Director has been appointed by the administrator of LEAA. Its budget is still treated as one element of the larger budget for LEAA, with the LEAA Administrator controlling both personnel funds and the line items containing funds for "technology, analysis, development and dissemination." Final approval of all National Institute awards (i.e., sign-off authority) rests with the Administrator of LEAA. Some consider this structural arrangement as presenting the National Institute Directors and staff with no real alternative to serving at the pleasure of the LEAA action program. 1/

The intellectual heritage of the National Institute was sparse. In the first place, the Congress never clearly articulated its intentions regarding criminal justice research. Questions of whether such Federal research should be directed at local consumption, due to the emphasis placed upon the LEAA block-grant system, or focused instead upon finding a "cure for crime," were not even given serious consideration. The National Institute never had the benefit of extended intellectual debate. Although the report of the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, set the tone and discussed many facets of the crime problem, it focused major attention on shortcomings of the criminal justice system and its parts. That analysis prompted many interpreters to consider the primary focus to be upon "improving the system." 2/ But the academic research community, in largely ignoring the President's Crime Commission report as worthy of serious debate, also reduced their involvement and input to policies about the proper focus of research, whether it be controlling crime or improving the...
criminal justice system. 1/ From the beginning, they viewed the National Institute as simply an arm of LEAA and took a relatively dim view of its intellectual potential. 2/ Since some academic social scientists tend to be more comfortable in dealing with problems like juvenile delinquency and rehabilitation than with law enforcement and control, the academic research community, in short, was not eager to insert itself directly into the crime debate. Consequently, a major source of needed research competence was isolated from the Federal effort in criminal justice research at the outset.

In addition, the National Institute's political heritage was without a broad pluralistic base. 3/ LEAA, and consequently its National Institute, lacked a wide range of social and political constituencies from the start and has continued to attract an asymmetrical set of interest and pressure groups, mostly practitioners and other government fund-seekers. 4/ Therefore, the influence and direction from the user community has been one-sided. For most of LEAA's history, the police--traditionally well organized and considered synonymous with law enforcement--have provided the most visible and effective source of influence. 5/ People in corrections and the courts have only recently developed significant access to LEAA resources. 6/ The views of victims; racial and ethnic minorities, women and other citizens' groups--those whose diverse experience with crime problems could contribute different perspectives on what is needed to control crime--have only recently entered LEAA's field of vision and have had almost no impact on program priorities. 7/ In the past, the National Institute has made few attempts to seek the opinions of groups not originally perceived as its clientele or constituents. Accordingly, its outlook has been unnecessarily narrow and its research agenda has not benefited from a variety of

1/Ibid.
2/Ibid.
3/Ibid.
4/Ibid.
5/Ibid.
6/Ibid.
7/Ibid.
perspectives on criminal justice problems. 1/ Finally, the Federal/State relationship as reflected in the preceding discussion of the block-grant program has some influences on LEAA which often were, in effect, influences on the National Institute even though it disclaims direct participation in that system.

It was pointed out earlier, for example, that the National Institute had been heavily involved and responsible for the management of some major categorical program initiatives, such as the High Impact Anti-Crime Program and the evaluation of the Pilot Cities Demonstration Program. These two program initiatives were more demonstration than research oriented in nature, and some have questioned whether it was appropriate for the National Institute to be as all responsible for such action-oriented demonstration efforts and their evaluation at the same time.

Other reported criticisms of the National Institute and its programs of research have ranged from concerns about pre-occupation with advanced technology and so-called hardware and technological gadgetry, to inadequate concern for addressing critical and basic or fundamental research questions about the etiology of crime and criminal behavior. There are also a variety of issues--administrative, methodological, pragmatic, and political--which lie between these two extremes.

National Academy of Sciences study

The National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences' National Research Council (hereafter the N.A.S. Committee), was requested in 1975 by LEAA to undertake a review of the programs and operations of the National Institute. 2/ The N.A.S. Committee's efforts represent the most recent broad-based review of National Institute sponsored research and programing. The review specifically addressed National Institute efforts for the years 1969–75, utilizing four primary criteria:

—Quality of funded research.

—Usefulness of the products.

1/Ibid.
2/ Ibid., preface, p. 1.
In carrying out its review, the N.A.S. Committee posed two overriding fundamental questions: (1) Should there be research on crime? and (2) Should there be a Federal presence in that research? Committee members concluded that the effort to develop research on crime is one that should be pursued; but it should still adopt an action-research orientation as the correct mode for such research, an important point we shall return to later. Overall the N.A.S. Committee members were not impressed by the results of National Institute research programs and they did not preclude the possibility that further efforts undertaken under the same conditions would also fail.

Quality of funded research

The N.A.S. Committee members rated the quality of National Institute research as "not high," stating in their report that much has been mediocre. However, in their examination of a sample of research projects, the Committee members could label most neither failures nor successes. The principal reported weaknesses were attributed primarily to a lack of attention to research design and related administrative failings. The N.A.S. Committee members felt that the relative frequency of "weak projects" occurred often enough to prompt grave concern over quality control in National Institute monitoring and related review procedures.

Usefulness of research products

The assessment of the utility of National Institute research products was considered problematic due to the relatively few previous attempts to determine whether and how such products were or were not being used. Drawing upon the views of State planning agency staff—an acknowledged and interested primary consumer of National Institute

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1/Ibid., preface, p. 2.
2/Ibid.
3/Ibid.
4/Ibid., summary, p. 2.
5/Ibid.
research results--the N.A.S. Committee report concluded there was little indication or evidence that would suggest that the material disseminated is used in planning or program development by either SPA staff or criminal justice agency practitioners. 1/ In their view, few projects deserved high marks for their utility. 2/

Success in cumulating knowledge

A major criterion of the effectiveness of social action program research is its contribution to building a coherent body of knowledge and focusing that knowledge on problem solving. The N.A.S. Committee study concluded

"Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the committee finds little evidence that the (National) Institute has been committed to this kind of research * * * the (National) Institute's purpose would be better served by a research agenda based on program areas, such as deterrence and rehabilitation within which funding could be focused upon building a coherent body of knowledge." 3/

Effectiveness of research administration

Some of the more serious shortcomings in the organization and management of National Institute efforts pointed out in the N.A.S. Committee report include, but are not limited to

--a weak advisory system that limits access to (research) program development,

--review procedures that range from nonexistent to ineffective,

--a research strategy which tends to exclude a large majority of the existing social science community, and

--vulnerability to pressures that are detrimental to the development of the research program. 4/

1/Ibid.
2/Ibid., p. 3.
3/Ibid.
4/Ibid.
The N.A.S. Committee report considered these and some other weaknesses to be due to a fundamental misjudgment of the most appropriate means and administrative methods whereby research can be made useful to an action program. 1/ In addition, it concluded that this is a general consequence of placing too large a burden upon the National Institute for making LEAA accountable and effective. 2/ In their view, the National Institute has been required to undertake numerous collateral program support and evaluation-related tasks such as providing technical assistance and training to SPAs and operating agencies, conducting or sponsoring project evaluations, and carrying out other direct service obligations, which tend to militate against a directed focus upon basic and related applied research. 3/

The N.A.S. Committee members believe that it is wholly inappropriate for the National Institute to be expected to address directly the goal of reducing crime and to be judged on the basis of meeting such measures of effectiveness as decreasing crime and recidivism rates. 4/ Given the pressures placed upon the National Institute to provide "instant solutions" to complex and long standing problems, the N.A.S. Committee found that in rejecting these larger direct goals, the National Institute has made a substitution of means for ends in that it has "denied the possibility that its programs can contribute in any way to the reduction of crime and has concentrated instead on improving the operation of the criminal justice system." 5/ The N.A.S Committee considers the lack of autonomy of the National Institute from the rest of LEAA as contributing to the general neglect in its "primary mission" to develop knowledge.

"* * * the Institute's role of direct service to LEAA programming has not been successful and probably cannot be adequately undertaken by a national research institute because such a role ties it to the pace and demands of a delivery system." 6/

1/Ibid.
2/Ibid.
3/Ibid.
4/Ibid., p. 4.
5/Ibid.
6/Ibid.
Although often indirect and specified in longer terms, the N.A.S. Committee report concludes that research does have the potential for developing better informed and therefore more realistic and effective public policies on controlling crime.

In summary, the N.A.S. Committee report concluded that the National Institute "* * * has not been the catalyst or sponsor of a first rate and significant research program commensurate with its tasks or its resources." 1/ Although it has had some successes with individual projects and has begun to develop some basic and vital data and a research community, the structural and political constraints have all too often deflected the National Institute from its "* * * true mission—to develop valid knowledge about crime problems." 2/ The N.A.S. Committee members conclude further

"* * * given those same constraints and extrapolating its marginal improvements over the years, the Institute in its present form is not likely to become a significant and quality-oriented research agency." 3/

The N.A.S. Committee recommended that the National Institute "* * * move toward political and administrative independence so that it can become both a more effective research structure and one that can serve users more effectively." 4/

The N.A.S. Committee report set forth 19 basic or primary recommendations for improving the research programs and operations of the National Institute. 5/ The Acting Director of the National Institute is in basic agreement with and reportedly is pursuing the first 14 of these recommendations. All 19 recommendations advanced in the N.A.S. Committee report can be found in appendix I.

Overall the Acting Director of the National Institute felt that many of the issues raised by the N.A.S. Committee study provided some valuable insights and some appropriate suggestions for remedial action. However, he stated that the N.A.S. Committee's description of the most "appropriate"

1/Ibid., p. 1.
2/Ibid.
3/Ibid.
5/Ibid., Chapter V, pp. 1-50.
role for the National Institute as purely research, is not feasible in view of its legislated responsibilities for evaluation, demonstration, dissemination, and other functions.

The principal point of disagreement concerns the advisability of "insulating" the National Institute from "political pressures" and day-to-day demands/requests for assistance and support from other LEAA organizational units. The Acting Director of the National Institute dismissed the criticism and recommendation concerning this issue also as being in conflict with the legislative objectives setting forth the responsibilities, functions, and services to be provided by the National Institute.

As for the criticism that much of the research sponsored by the National Institute has been mediocre, the Acting Director disagrees pointing out that some of the same people who have criticized the quality of sponsored research have also been recipients of research grants. In his view, the basis of comparison in the N.A.S. Committee study of research as "good or bad" was not well identified for comparative purposes.

Reorganization of the National Institute

On September 14, 1977, the Acting Administrator of LEAA approved a reorganization of the National Institute into four offices—Office of Research Programs, Office of Research and Evaluation Methods, Office of Program Evaluation, and Office of Development, Testing and Dissemination. An organizational chart reflecting the new structure of the National Institute is presented on the following page.

This change also provided for the creation of a new unit—Analysis, Planning, and Management—under the administrative direction of the Deputy Director of the National Institute. The Office of Evaluation was split into two new units—Office of Research and Evaluation Methods and Office of Program Evaluation. Also, within the Office of Research Programs a new center for the Study of Crime Correlates and Criminal Behavior was established, with the previous "Special Programs Division" of the Office of Research Programs folded into this new center. The National Institute's Advanced Technology Division was abolished but its functions are now incorporated within the Office of Research Programs under the direction of a new Associate Director for Science and Technology. The previous "Courts Division" of the Office of Research Programs was renamed the "Adjudication Division" to more properly reflect its concern with prosecution, defense, and alternatives to formal processing as well as courts-related research and program initiatives.
The former Office of Technology Transfer was renamed the Office of Development, Testing, and Dissemination to reflect its expanded role in program development processes described on pages 30 to 33.

According to the Acting Director of the National Institute, this reorganization is designed to accomplish three main purposes.

--Focus manpower and resources on the task of basic or fundamental research on the correlates and determinants of crime and criminal behavior.

--Focus manpower and resources on the task of program development, with special emphasis on defining and articulating appropriate Institute involvement in the new agency-wide program development process; particularly the problem identification, selection of response strategies, program design, and testing stages.

--Focus heavily on the evaluation of tests and demonstration program efforts initiated under the new program development process.

In addition, the new Analysis, Planning, and Management staff unit is anticipated to provide the Director of the National Institute with examinations and analyses of the results of various programs and projects in terms of their relevant research and policy implications.

At the present time there are 91 staff positions authorized for the Institute. Seventy-six of these positions are staffed on a permanent or acting basis and 15 are vacant.

Recent developments

It should be emphasized that the reorganization of the National Institute has occurred almost 1-1/2 years after the National Academy of Sciences completed its field research. In some areas which were subjected to critical evaluation by the National Academy of Sciences' Committee, the Acting Director of the National Institute believes progress is being made. For example, a "research utilization committee" has been formed to review research reports to determine the potential audiences and types of publication and formats most expeditious to the utilization of research information. Another area--formalization of research priorities based upon broad research program areas--has begun to be addressed by the National Institute. In September of 1977,
the Acting Director of the National Institute circulated a "tentative agenda" consisting of 10 broad primary research categories to over 500 persons (including mayors, city managers, county executives, criminal justice planners and practitioners, as well as members of the research community), asking them to rate the importance of each priority area with respect to their (1) propriety as priorities for a long-range research agenda, and (2) inclusiveness or lack of finite scope. Respondents were encouraged to add, clarify, or discuss alternative priority issues and emphases as they saw fit. These 10 tentative research program areas are:

1. Correlates and determinants of criminal behavior.
2. Deterrence.
5. Career criminal.
6. Utilization and deployment of police resources.
7. Pre-trial process: consistency and delay reduction.
8. Sentencing.
9. Rehabilitation.
10. Violent crime and the violent offender.

When finalized, the Acting Director of the National Institute proposes to utilize these 10 or some modified form as the research agenda for the next 3 to 5 years. Sixty percent of current National Institute funds are presently allocated to carry out research within these 10 broad priority areas.

Responses to a report of the Department of Justice Study Group on LEAA tend to reflect a general concern, also identified in the report of the N.A.S. Committee, that users of research and evaluation results and information should have greater access and input in establishing the research agenda and that there be a formal mechanism to accomplish this. The preceding survey appears to be a well intentioned step in this direction. However, most recent efforts to identify users' needs have been "paper-based" reviews by contractors of sections of State plans and planning grant documents which are to address research and evaluation needs.
The N.A.S. Committee recommendation that the National Institute establish formal peer review panels is inconsistent with the Administration's curtailment of the formation of more advisory panels, according to the Acting Director of the National Institute. He stated that the National Institute has established a new advisory system, which has three distinct elements.

1. Review of all concept papers and proposals by separate contractors.

2. The Advisory Committee of the National Institute is now more directly involved in the development of research program priorities.

3. A new mailing process has been adopted to broaden the peer review of research products.

Although these three efforts do represent a change, they are not wholly consistent with the recommendations of the N.A.S. Committee concerning peer review.

The Acting Director of the National Institute is basically in agreement with the N.A.S. Committee finding of a lack of cumulative research. In his view, this has been partly due to the belief of earlier National Institute Directors that one cannot order the way knowledge will be accumulated.

**LEAA EVALUATION PROGRAMS**

Evaluation responsibilities, functions, program activities, and procedures have been assumed by, and in certain instances specifically assigned to, a number of different organizational units within LEAA.

Both the 1968 act and the 1970 amendment authorized but did not require LEAA and the National Institute to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs funded. Likewise, the States were not required to evaluate; they were required merely to provide for research and development in their annual plans.

However, congressional disillusionment with LEAA's failure to aggressively use the evaluation authority it was granted led to a mandate in the 1973 Crime Control Act requiring LEAA—through the National Institute—to evaluate the impact of its programs on the quality of law enforcement and criminal justice. Section 402 of the 1973 act mandated that:
"The Institute shall undertake, where possible, to
evaluate the various programs and projects carried
out under this title to determine their impact upon
the quality of law enforcement and criminal justice
and the extent to which they have met or failed to
meet the purposes and policies of this title; and
shall disseminate such information to State planning
agencies and upon request, to units of general local government. In addition, the Institute
shall provide annually to the President, the Congress, and the States the results of these evaluations."

In addition, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention Act of 1974 made provision for the thorough and
prompt evaluation of all federally assisted juvenile delin-
quency programs; requiring the Administrator of LEAA to (1)
conduct and support evaluations and studies of the perfor-
manee and results achieved by Federal juvenile delinquency
programs and activities, and (2) determine what performance
and results might be achieved by alternative programs and
activities supplementary to or in lieu of those currently being administered.

Furthermore, the 1974 act established a separate Na-
tional Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention, which is empowered to provide for the evaluation of
all juvenile delinquency programs assisted under the act to
determine the results and the effectiveness of programs and
disseminate the results of such evaluations to persons act-
ively working in the field of juvenile delinquency.

The 1976 Crime Control Act defined the term "evaluation"
as "* * * the administration and conduct of studies and ana-
lyses to determine the impact and value of a project or pro-
gram in accomplishing the statutory objectives of this
title." 1/ The Congress in enacting this legislation placed
renewed emphasis upon four principal elements in setting the legislaive mandate for evaluation activities in the LEAA
program.

(1) The National Institute must receive, review, and
disseminate evaluations carried out under State and
local auspices; as well as conduct evaluations of
programs and projects to determine their impact and

extent to which they meet the legislative purposes of the act—to reduce, prevent, and control crime and juvenile delinquency, and improve and strengthen law enforcement and criminal justice.

(2) LEAA is explicitly required to provide both technical and financial assistance for State and local evaluation efforts.

(3) The LEAA administration must determine whether the comprehensiveness and impact of programs funded are likely to contribute to the reduction and prevention of crime and juvenile delinquency, improving law enforcement and criminal justice, and whether such programs once implemented have achieved their goals. To accomplish this, in part, the act mandates the establishment of necessary rules and regulations to assure proper auditing, monitoring, and evaluation.

(4) The LEAA administration must report annually to the President and to the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and House of Representatives on its activities and their results, some of which include:

--a description of the procedures followed in order to evaluate, monitor, and audit programs and projects,

--a description and enumeration of program and project areas which have achieved the purposes for which they were intended and those that failed to do so; and

--a summary of the measures taken by the LEAA Administrator to determine the impact and value of the programs funded under the act.

Evaluation responsibilities of the States

Both the 1973 act and the 1976 act assigned specific evaluation responsibilities to the States. The Congress provided for evaluation activities to be performed by the States under both part B (Planning) and part C and E (Action) grant funds, and gave recognition of its intention that grants funded under part C and E be evaluated by including the term evaluation in sections 301(b), 302(a) and (b), and in section
303(a) of the 1976 act, which set out general elements of necessary activity.

Section 301(b)(1) of the act provides:

"(b) The Administrator is authorized to make grants to States having comprehensive State plans approved by it under this part, for:

(1) Public protection including the development, demonstration, evaluation, implementation, and purchase of methods, devices, facilities, and equipment designed to improve and strengthen law enforcement and reduce crime in public and private places." (Underscoring added for emphasis.)

Section 303(a)(12) of the 1976 act requires States to

"provide for such funding, audit, monitoring, and evaluation procedures as may be necessary to keep such records as the administration shall prescribe to assure fiscal control, proper management, and disbursement of funds received under this title." (Underscoring added for emphasis.)

However, it is in section 303(a)(17) of the 1976 act that the full impact of the intent of the Congress regarding the provision for cogent evaluation is spelled out requiring the States to

"** provide for the development and, to the maximum extent feasible, implementation of procedures for the evaluation of programs and projects in terms of their success in achieving the ends for which they were intended, their conformity with the purposes and goals of the State plan, and their effectiveness in reducing crime and strengthening law enforcement and criminal justice **."*

National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

In response to the 1976 mandate, the National Institute expanded its evaluation efforts. All four offices within the National Institute are substantively involved in evaluation efforts; the Office of Program Evaluation, Office of Research and Evaluation Methods, the Office of Research
Programs and the Office of Development, Testing, and Dissemination. In addition, an Evaluation Clearinghouse has been designated within the National Criminal Justice Reference Service of the National Institute.

National Evaluation Program

The National Evaluation Program (NEP) is the cornerstone of LEAA's "knowledge program" and is designed to utilize the intergovernmental action grant program as a basis for meeting the congressional mandate to determine what has been learned about reducing crime through the LEAA program. The purpose of the NEP is to produce and disseminate information about the level of effectiveness, cost, and problems of various law enforcement and criminal justice programs.

Initiated in fiscal year 1975, NEP was designed to consist of a series of "two-phased" evaluation studies of various criminal justice programs and projects, including those which are supported through the block grant program. Each evaluation study is to concentrate on a specific "topic area" consisting of similar on-going projects. In a "phase I" study, existing information and results of prior studies related to the topic area are collected and assessed and a design is developed for further indepth evaluation necessary to fill significant gaps in present knowledge. Each phase I assessment, expected to last between 6 to 8 months, is to result in the following:

--A state-of-the-art review.

--Descriptive material documenting the typical internal operations of projects in that topic area.

--An analysis of available information drawing conclusions about the efficiency and effectiveness of projects in the topic area.

--A design for an indepth ("Phase II") evaluation of the topic area to fill gaps in existing knowledge.

--An evaluation design for typical projects in the topic area.

Where appropriate, the design for an indepth evaluation will be implemented as an intensive Phase II evaluation.
As of October 1977, 27 grants for Phase I studies had been awarded, 26 Phase I assessments had been completed, with the results of 19 available through the LEAA National Criminal Justice Reference Service's Document Loan Program as of April 27, 1976. No Phase II evaluation studies have been completed; however, two Phase II efforts are now on-going, with a third planned as part of a national test/demonstration effort.

Model Evaluation Program

The National Institute has had the responsibility for assisting the States in improving their evaluation efforts through the model evaluation program. This $2 million competitive program was designed to stimulate the development of model evaluation systems in State Planning Agencies and sub-State Regional Planning Units (RPUs) to demonstrate different approaches to evaluation and share the experience with other groups of States and RPUs. Eleven of 12 proposals were selected and grants were awarded by LEAA under this program to six SPAs and five RPUs. In addition, a $336,000 grant was awarded to a private contractor, a portion of which has been allocated to provide assistance to LEAA in the implementation of this program effort and to evaluate its success. The evaluation of this effort is to be completed by the Urban Institute and reported out in December 1977. This program has been discontinued effective fiscal year 1978.

Program Evaluations

The National Institute has also been responsible for providing for the evaluation of major LEAA programs. Two such evaluation efforts completed are the evaluation of the Pilot Cities Demonstration Program and the National Level Evaluation of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program, described in a previous section.

Exemplary Projects Program

LEAA's Exemplary Projects Program is designed to identify "outstanding" criminal justice programs, verify their achievements, and publicize them widely with the goal of encouraging their adoption by States and localities.

Screening procedures have been established to sort out programs which warrant adoption on a broad scale. To be eligible for consideration as "exemplary," projects must
be operational for at least a year,

have significantly reduced crime or measurably
improved the operations and quality of the criminal
justice system,

be cost effective, and

be adaptable to other jurisdictions.

To further test their applicability for nationwide
usage, LEAA has funded replications of selected exemplary
projects to evaluate their results in conjunction with the
"Demonstration Project Program."

Planning for Evaluation
in Juvenile Justice

Evaluation in the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention involves several efforts, including the
establishment of an evaluation planning group comprised of
staff from the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (Juvenile Justice Institute) and
a "group of outside experts" under contractual arrangements,
which is represented in the planning of program initiatives
under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 1974.

OJJDP's "Status Offender Program" has been the focus of
the first of these efforts, with a grantee selected to per-
form similar evaluation planning tasks for the "Diversion
Program."

A major part of the Juvenile Justice Institute's basic
research program is intended to provide support for the de-
development of the major LEAA/OJJDP program initiatives, which
include the National Evaluation Program studies and other
knowledge assessments.

Evaluation research

To promote the development of new techniques, measures,
and methods for use in evaluating criminal justice programs,
the National Institute Office of Research and Evaluation
Methods planned five evaluation methodology initiatives, for
implementation in 1977.

--Development and testing of Operational and Impact
Indicators for Criminal Justice System Evaluations.
Deterrence program to develop effective methodologies for detecting and measuring deterrent and incapacitation effects associated with crime control efforts.

Methodology studies to develop and validate new and improved methods of drawing inferences from criminal justice program experiences.

Survey of state-of-the-art and evaluation needs through the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Rehabilitation.

Assessment of cost and utility of employing an LEAA standardized project data reporting system.

Training and technical assistance in evaluation

Technical assistance in evaluation was offered by LEAA in two ways: (1) planner-evaluators in each LEAA regional office (which are now closed) were to provide assistance on request to State planning agencies, to sub-State regional planning units, and to local governments in evaluation design and techniques and (2) through a contractor, the Urban Institute, several days of technical assistance were to be provided to State planning agencies.

Two kinds of evaluation training are now under development. The National Institute is developing a program to train evaluators whose purpose will be to measure the effectiveness of corrections programs. The Training Division of the Office of Operations Support is developing, in cooperation with other offices in LEAA, a 1-week course designed to teach monitoring and evaluation skills to 345 trainees from States and localities in fiscal year 1977.

Other evaluation activities

In addition to these evaluation initiatives, LEAA called for the evaluation of discretionary grant projects as part of its new agency-wide Action Program Development policy, previously described.

LEAA's Office of Planning and Management is responsible for evaluation oversight and policy development and issues the evaluation guidelines for discretionary and State planning agency grants.

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Evaluation policy

A formal statement of LEAA evaluation policy was issued in the form of an instruction to all LEAA professional personnel on May 20, 1976. The recommendations of the Evaluation Policy Working Group, which were subsequently approved by the Administrator in this instruction, collectively represent a five point strategy:

--Issuing of a policy statement in the form of a directive to clarify LEAA office roles and responsibilities regarding evaluation and to hold offices accountable for performance.

--Monitoring of LEAA's implementation of evaluation policy directives by the LEAA Office of Planning and Management.

--Developing capability to manage evaluation responsibilities, analyze evaluation results, and work with evaluators in program and evaluation design activities within each major office having program responsibilities.

--Systematically evaluating the discretionary program through involvement of National Institute staff in the design of selected programs to insure their evaluability.

--Improving SPA and RPU evaluation capabilities through evaluation training and technical assistance to be offered by or through LEAA.

Results of LEAA and State evaluation program activities

GAO, in testifying before the House Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Crime in February of 1976, provided the preliminary results of its management audit of evaluation programs, activities, and results in LEAA and selected States.

Although conclusions should be considered tentative at this time, the indications were that LEAA and State evaluation activities and information are not meeting planning, decisionmaking, and policymaking needs of many users at different levels of the intergovernmental block grant Crime Control Act Program.
The amount and types of evaluation work have not been adequate

Three of the four States GAO visited did not have a fully established evaluation program and, in GAO's view, were not meeting LEAA guideline requirements for maintaining an adequate evaluation capability.

The quality of evaluation work was questionable

GAO's analysis of a sample of evaluation reports indicated evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations are frequently imprecise; and evaluation work performed has significant deficiencies.

Evaluation information needs of users were not being met

Few State decisionmakers are consulted in advance by LEAA and State Planning Agencies to identify and define their evaluation information needs. None of the four States visited had established systematic procedures for the dissemination and timely feedback of evaluation results for decisionmaking, State comprehensive planning, and policy formulation; and much information which had been generated had limited utility. Consequently, policies made at the State and local levels regarding continued Federal funding or assumption of costs by States or localities are frequently unaffected by the results of evaluations which have been conducted.

Resources allocated for evaluation were inadequate

In fiscal year 1975 the States collectively allocated less than 1 percent of the LEAA funds available to them for evaluation activities. For fiscal year 1976, LEAA allocated less than 60 percent of the evaluation funding recommended by its 1974 Evaluation Policy Task Force.

Organization of evaluation functions lacks direction and effective management control

State Planning Agencies' management and planning processes do not systematically incorporate evaluation activities and results; and decisions to do and use evaluations are not based upon State comprehensive planning needs. There is little or no integration of evaluation activities into the SPAs' overall management structure and the organizational placement of the evaluation function is too far removed from top management in LEAA and the States to be effective.
Better coordination of evaluation program efforts is needed

There were also indications of significant problems in the coordination of evaluation activities at the national, State, and local levels. Limited State and local participation in LEAA evaluation program decisions and inadequate assessment of State and local users' needs restrict the efficacy of LEAA evaluation initiatives.

At the time of our review, it was not clear that LEAA and the States were any further along in

-- knowing which specific programs and project strategies have been successful, and importantly, which have not; or

-- determining what cumulative impact Federal funding may have had upon the effectiveness and efficiency of Federal, State, and local government programs and services, in reducing crime and improving criminal justice system performance.

Answers to these questions are essential and must be made available to all persons who are responsible for planning, decisionmaking, and policymaking involving the allocation of resources designed to reduce, control, and prevent crime and juvenile delinquency. LEAA must place greater emphasis upon building evaluation into programs and projects in advance of their implementation, at the Federal, State, and local levels. LEAA must exercise greater leadership by providing assistance and coordination of evaluation functions and activities both within its organization and between it and the States, regional planning units, and units of local government to insure that the needs of evaluation information users are being met.
ALTERNATIVES IN DEFINING
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN CRIME CONTROL AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENT

At this time, it would be premature on our part to attempt to isolate any "best" programmatic approach and/or funding strategy for achieving the broad purposes set forth in the Crime Control Act Program. The short time frames necessitated in carrying out this staff study precluded in-depth policy analysis and forecasting of all the possible effects and likely impacts which could be experienced with different program and funding strategies. Furthermore, it is our view that before any appropriate decision can be made as to which funding implementation strategies and mechanisms would have the greatest applicability, a reexamination of legislative goals and a reassessment of the needed/desired Federal role is first in order.

In essence what we are suggesting is that the legislative goals and consideration of an appropriate Federal role must be advanced first, in a substantive manner, before an appropriate decision can be made as to which funding implementation strategies and mechanisms would be most appropriate and may have the greatest potential for achieving legislative objectives. The intent here is an attempt to subordinate the consideration of alternative funding mechanisms to broader conceptual and policy issues which we believe must precede the identification of an "appropriate funding vehicle."

The two key policy issues here appear to be:

— Should the Federal Government continue to pursue the mandated goals of the 1976 Crime Control Act, as stated (i.e., crime control, prevention, and reduction and criminal justice systems improvement)?

— Should the Federal Government restrict its role to providing the States and localities with general fiscal relief for criminal justice purposes and/or crime problem-solving?
Of course there are a large number and variety of collateral programmatic and fiscal policy issues involved in either or both of the above, which cannot be fully addressed in the scope and time frames of this staff study. However, we hope that the following discussion of reported advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and strategies will prove of value in structuring the proper conceptual framework for the higher-level policy analyses required.

RETAINING THE BLOCK GRANT APPROACH

If Congress decides to continue the Crime Control Act program beyond 1979 and reaffirms the use of a block grant mechanism as the most appropriate means for distributing funds to the States, then consideration should be given to addressing some of the more significant block grant issues previously discussed. Since we have dwelt on these at some length earlier, the following reported policy-relevant options are directed at achieving improvements by working within the block grant concept.

Funding Threshold

If the block grant is expected to produce short-term changes in intergovernmental or functional relationships and show progress in tackling problems it was designed to address, then the funding threshold might have to be increased substantially, relative to State-local direct outlays, to generate a "critical mass" for change; or the basic objectives will have to be prioritized to avoid further dilution of available resources. Since block grant funds account for only about 5 percent of State-local criminal justice expenditures, it may be difficult to produce demonstrable impact with LEAA funds unless some minimum level of funding is achieved.

Aggressive Federal Leadership

Although it affords recipients flexibility in determining the use of Federal funds, the block grant instrument does not excuse the Federal administering agency from developing and enforcing performance standards, conducting substantive reviews and evaluations of recipients' plans and activities, and exercising other oversight responsibilities—even if this leads to a withholding of funds. Also, LEAA needs to take an aggressive leadership role in showing the States what works. Even if the States plan for their own priorities, LEAA can do more to influence the
successful outcome of such planning through research, testing, and comprehensive evaluation of demonstration programs developed on the basis of the results of sound research efforts. (See pp. 108 to 113 for an expanded discussion of this issue.)

Authority and Responsibility for "Total System Building"

If the planning process is considered instrumental to achieving the "total system-building" objective of a block grant, then the State and local agencies responsible for comprehensive planning must have sufficient authority and time to plan for all activities encompassed within the functional scope of the block grant. These functions would also include those supported directly by State appropriations, as well as those which are addressed in other program areas by States and localities which have implicit significance and relevance for crime problem-solving.

Decategorization

If States and localities require maximum flexibility to plan for their respective needs and priorities, then eliminating some of the categorical funding constraints should be considered. Decategorization refers to eliminating some or all of the functional program emphases and requirements of the Act. Examples of these program categories include part E corrections funding and emphasis on organized crime programs as well as the 19.15 percent maintenance-of-effort requirement for juvenile justice projects. Although a lifting of these constraints might result in the traditional categories receiving more or less emphasis, the extent to which these funding shifts would take place is not predictable.

Potential Effects of Decreased Appropriation Levels on States and Localities

On July 14, 1976, the President signed the Fiscal Year 1977 Appropriations Bill, H.R. 14239, allocating $753 million for spending under the Crime Control Act of 1976 and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 in that fiscal year. The appropriations bill levied a $57 million, 7-percent cut on the crime control and juvenile justice and delinquency prevention programs and their administering agency, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration below the Fiscal Year 1976 level.
As allotted by LEAA among the various program and budget categories of the LEAA program, more than $29 million, 51 percent of that overall $57 million, was borne in reductions to two of the three program categories, "parts", under which States and Territories receive block grant funds to support criminal justice improvement programming.

LEAA's appropriation for part C block allocations to States and Territories in Fiscal Year 1977 was $306,039,000, a $99,373,000 or 24.5 percent reduction from Fiscal Year 1976. The part E block allocation, a special category of funds for correctional programming, was cut from $47,739,000 in Fiscal Year 1976 to $36,005,000 in Fiscal Year 1977, a total reduction of $11,734,000 or 24.6 percent. The aggregate cuts in the Fiscal Year 1977 parts C and E block allocation were passed along to the individual States and Territories as follows:
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Part C figures exclude small state supplement.

Note: Part C funds are for general law enforcement and criminal justice grants. Part E funds are for grants related to corrections.
The following table provides a breakdown of the distribution of LEAA funds to the States under parts C and E for fiscal year 1978, for the purposes of comparison.

### TABLE 7

LEAA Distribution of Part C and E Block Funds for Fiscal Year 1978

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<td>2,674</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>554</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5,383</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>4,599</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>Mississippi</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>1,811</td>
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<td>Virgin Islands</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** $253,717 $29,849

**Note:** Part C funds are for general law enforcement and criminal justice grants. Part E funds are for grants related to corrections.

**Source:** Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
Unless the block grant provides substantial amounts of Federal funds on some stable basis, constructively decentralizes authority to make resource allocation decisions, or offers expanded opportunities to address crime, delinquency, and criminal justice problem-solving, thereby filling a major program void, generalists will be reluctant to make the time and intellectual commitments necessary for effective involvement. Otherwise, functional specialists and professional staff will dominate policymaking.

A January 10, 1977, report of the National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators outlined what State officials believe to be the programmatic impacts of further cuts in funding received by the States under the block grant instrument, upon State and local jurisdictions. 1/ Survey respondents were asked a variety of questions ranging from their role within State government to the identity of individual criminal justice projects on which reductions in part C and E funds have had the greatest impact and the extent of that impact. In the 42 responses received to the survey, 39 States and Territories indicated that the 7 percent cut in LEAA funds from FY 1976 to FY 1977 limited the expansion and continuation of some programs and resulted in a reduction in criminal justice activities in specific instances. 2/ Forty-one of 42 responding jurisdictions reported a notable and negative impact of reduction in funding allocations. 3/ A variety of strategies have been employed by the States to cope with the reduction in available Federal funds, such as:

--Across the board percentage cuts in the aggregate to certain funding categories in which action programs are supported, or cuts were passed along to State agencies, RPUs and local jurisdictions.

--Prioritization or reprioritization within specific program categories.


2/Ibid., p. 2.

3/Ibid.
In nine States no new programs were initiated with LEAA funding, with allocations devoted entirely to continuation or minimal expansion of existing programs (i.e., a negative impact on innovations).

Modification of State and local policies governing the duration and amount of continuation funding support and assumption of costs from other revenue sources.

Eighteen States responding to the survey said that State agencies and local units of government were not prepared to assume the costs of projects which the SPAs were forced to curtail or discontinue prior to the previously agreed upon period of continuation funding.

Fourteen States indicated varying degrees of impact on employment within their jurisdictions as a result of project cuts necessitated by decreased allocations. 1/

In addition, there is some indication that further decreases will not only reinforce the negative impacts as exemplified above, but further reduce the capabilities of States and localities to insure program accountability. Eleven States responding to the survey reported that the reduction in part C funds negatively affects their efforts to evaluate programs funded with LEAA monies. 2/ As pointed out by the National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators, this situation could present additional problems and difficulties among the States in carrying out their evaluation responsibilities under the Act. 3/

The States estimated that 74 percent of part C and 69 percent of part E 1978 block grant allocations will be devoted to continuing existing efforts previously implemented with LEAA funds. 4/ Few jurisdictions will

1/Ibid., p. 2-7.
2/Ibid.
3/Ibid.
4/Ibid.
expand "successful" prototype projects and many will undertake no new programs in any area of the criminal justice system. These reductions in funding can be interpreted as creating a situation of stagnation in the program. In their report, the National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators state:

"While the LEAA program is premised on the significance of State and local initiative in nationwide efforts to reduce crime and improve the criminal justice system, by far the greatest impact in the overall cut to LEAA Fiscal Year 1977 budget was borne in disproportionate reductions in the resources under which the states and territories can implement these initiatives and test the validity of that premise.

Appropriations to the LEAA programs have never in the history of that program been approved at the full level authorized by Congress in the enabling legislation and now the total appropriation to that program is decreasing. Further reductions in that appropriation must be carefully considered against what has occurred in the wake of the Fiscal Year 1977 budget cut particularly where it seems likely the brunt of such cuts will continue to be borne in the planning and programming allocations to states and territories." 2/ 3/

In their view, Congress should give the States and localities a firm and stable program for a minimum of five years with estimated yearly appropriations figures that can be relied upon for long-term planning. Without this long-term commitment by Congress, the States will continue to find many local jurisdictions and State criminal justice agencies unwilling to undertake multi-year experimental and innovative programs, and unwilling to make the commitments to assume the costs of programs over time. Without a

1/Ibid.
2/Ibid.
3/See table 7 on p. 85.
commitment by the Federal Government to long-term and stable funding, State and local governments are unlikely to give a similar commitment.

Of course, while it is not possible for us to identify all the possible social, economic, and political side-effects of further cuts in Federal crime control spending upon State and local jurisdictions, there appears to be a funding threshold below which many former grant recipients may not be willing to participate further in the program, regardless of the specific form in which such funding is provided under the block grant program.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Authorization</th>
<th>Budget Request</th>
<th>Appropriation</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>$100,111</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>$532,200</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>$1,175,000</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975$f$</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$886,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>$1,250,000</td>
<td>$769,784</td>
<td>$809,638</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>$695,000$a$</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>$615,000$g$</td>
<td>$704,500</td>
<td>$647,250</td>
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</tbody>
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**Notes:**

- **Authorizations** for fiscal years 1968-1970 are found in P.L. 90-351, Sec. 120 (82 Stat. 208); for fiscal years 1971-1973 in P.L. 91-644, Sec. 7(b) (86 Stat. 1886); for fiscal years 1974-1976 in P.L. 93-83, Sec. 2, amending Sec. 502 (88 Stat. 214); and for fiscal years 1977-1978 in P.L. 94-503, Sec. 126(a) amending Sec. 520 (90 Stat. 2423).
- **b** The 1969 budget request was made by the Johnson Administration; no budget request was made for fiscal year 1968 because the enabling legislation was not enacted until June 19, 1968. Subsequent budget requests have been made by the Nixon (1970-1975), Ford (1976-1977), and Carter (1978) Administrations.
- **c** Includes any supplemental appropriations added for the fiscal year.
- **d** The initial fiscal year 1971 budget request and appropriation was $480 million. After passage of the 1971 LEAA amendments, an additional $52.2 million was requested, and $49 million was appropriated in a supplemental appropriations act.
- **e** The initial fiscal year 1973 appropriation was $850,597,000. Subsequently, the administration requested and received a supplemental appropriation of $5 million.
- **f** The initial fiscal year 1975 appropriation was $880,000,000; an additional $15 million was appropriated in a supplemental appropriation act "...to carry out title II of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, to remain available until August 31, 1975." (P.L. 94-332)
- **g** Includes $15 million authorized for grants to be administered by the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs within LEAA, in addition to LEAA's title I authorization.
SHARING FEDERAL REVENUES WITH
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A central issue that becomes evident in any discussion of Federal assistance to State and local governments is the question of appropriate balance between national priorities and spending priorities of these subnational governments. With respect to crime control, if "** crime is essentially a local problem that must be dealt with by State and local governments if it is to be controlled effectively **," to what degree and in what manner should the Federal Government assist in these efforts?

To date the method chosen to provide the financial assistance has been the block grant—lump sum grants to States awarded on the basis of relative population and the submission and approval of a State plan; moneys from the grant are then suballocated on the basis of an approved Statewide comprehensive plan. The "categorization" of the block grant over the years, and various studies questioning the adequacy of LEAA performance have resulted in a serious debate on the appropriate Federal financial role in State and local crime control and criminal justice system improvement efforts. Some of these questions include

--- what are the intended/desired/appropriate goals of the program?

--- who should receive Federal funds?

--- how much and under what conditions?

--- what should be required of recipients of Federal funds (e.g., accountability, acceptance of national leadership, some measurable level of achievement)?

Admittedly, these few questions fail to exhaust many of the issues relative to defining the appropriate Federal role. Collateral issues include (1) basic questioning of the need for Federal involvement in State and local planning, research, and training; (2) focusing Federal dollars upon broad-based national objectives; and (3) the availability of undertaking short and long-range responsibilities for providing fiscal relief and tax stabilization.
At this point suffice it to state that there are no easy answers. Merely selecting one funding mechanism over another—for example General Revenue Sharing, Special Revenue Sharing, the block grant or something else—does not really focus upon the broader issues and questions which were alluded to above. However, it is clear that with each mechanism there are some general advantages and disadvantages to be considered. In one sense there are a series of tradeoffs with one financing scheme meeting some objectives or needs and deemphasizing or failing to address others. In the last analysis, any funding mechanism is merely a delivery system selected to minimize the cost of transferring Federal revenues to subnational governments, consistent with the attainment of legislative goals.

The extent to which the mechanism will be successful is largely contingent upon the care exercised in its selection as the best or most appropriate method by which to achieve specific congressionally mandated objectives. The real chore lies in the development and articulation of realistic medium and long-term program goals and priorities and then, and only then, in determining how best to minimize counterproductive Federal incursion into State and local prerogatives.

In a paper presented at the 1976 National Conference of the American Society of Public Administrators, Carl Stenberg and David Walker suggest that each of the various types of federal funding mechanisms possess a number of characteristics differentiating one from the other 1/. Ranking these various funding schemes according to the flexibility given recipients in fiscal, administrative, program, and accountability matters would result in the following progression:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexibility/Discretion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Least</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorical grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General revenue sharing

At the far end of the spectrum, giving State and local governments the most flexibility and discretion over the use of Federal revenue with a minimum of direct Federal intrusion is general revenue sharing. General revenue sharing was established by Title I of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. This Act appropriated $30.2 billion for distribution to State and local governments, according to specified formulas, for a 5-year program period beginning January 1, 1972. In considering the Act, the Congress concluded that both State and local governments faced severe financial problems which required solution if the Federal system of government was to operate successfully.

General revenue sharing represented a new approach to Federal assistance because State and local governments were given wide discretion in deciding how to use the funds. The Act and implementing regulations placed only minimal restrictions and requirements on the use of the funds. Prior to this, other Federal aid to State and local governments, although substantial, had been allocated primarily for more narrowly defined purposes. The Congress concluded that funds made available under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act should provide recipient governments with broader flexibility to use the funds for whatever they consider to be their most vital needs.

The Office of Revenue Sharing, Department of the Treasury, is responsible for administering the Act. The Act also directs the Comptroller General to review the work of the Department of the Treasury, State governments, and local governments to enable the Congress to evaluate compliance and assess operations.

Allocation of funds to States and localities by formula

A State's revenue sharing entitlement is determined by applying two formulas and then using the formula that yields the higher amount. One-third of what a given State receives is allocated to the State government, and the remaining two-thirds is allocated to local governments. The one-third/two-thirds division was adopted because local governments generally appeared to need money more critically than State governments and accounts for about two-thirds of total State and local spending.
Intrastate allocation

The local share is distributed to local governments in a complex sequence of computational steps and substeps, using a three-factor formula as its basis. The formula recognizes population, relative income, and tax effort and is designed to help most communities with the greatest need. The relative income factor is designed to result in higher allocations to lower income areas which generally have difficulties in providing services. The tax effort factor is designed to result in larger allocations for those places which impose relatively high taxes.

The Congress concluded that, because of the great diversity of local governments, no single allocation method could be used without occasionally producing extreme results. To ensure that one local government did not receive an inordinately large amount of funds while another government received almost no funds, minimum and maximum limits were placed on the allocations. As a result, no local government, except county governments, can receive less than 20 percent nor more than 145 percent of the per capita amount available for distribution to all local governments within the State. In addition, no local government, including county governments, can receive more than 50 percent of the sum of its adjusted taxes and intergovernmental transfers.

Restrictions and requirements applicable to use of funds

Although a major provision of general revenue sharing is to provide recipient governments substantial freedom in determining how to use the funds, recipients must observe some restrictions and administrative procedures. To receive its full allocation, a State government generally must provide its local governments with fiscal assistance that equals or exceeds such assistance prior to revenue sharing.

The funds may not be used in ways which discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin. A further restriction prohibits a government, under certain circumstances, from using the funds either directly or indirectly to match Federal funds under programs which make Federal aid contingent on the government's contribution. 1/

1/This provision was deleted by the 1976 amendments to the Act.
sharing funds must be paid at least at the same wage rates as the other government employees in similar occupations. Further, laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors to work on a construction project for which 25 percent or more of the project costs are paid with revenue sharing funds must be paid not less than prevailing rates determined by the Secretary of Labor under the Davis-Bacon Act.

To help insure that revenue sharing funds are spent in accordance with the act and regulations, each government must create a trust fund in which it must deposit all such funds received and any interest earned. Funds must be spent in accordance with the laws and procedures applicable to the expenditure of the recipient government's own revenues. Each government must follow the fiscal, accounting, and auditing guidelines established by the Office of Revenue Sharing.

Finally, each government must periodically report to the Office of Revenue Sharing on how it used its revenue sharing funds and how it plans to use future funds. The reports must be published in the press and made available to other news media.

**Direct uses of funds**

Under the original legislation local governments could directly use revenue sharing funds only for priority expenditures which the act defined as (1) ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by law and (2) operations and maintenance expenses for public safety, environmental protection, public transportation, health, recreation, libraries, social services for the poor or aged, and financial administration 1/.

In establishing these categories, the Congress emphasized those areas which it felt had priority in terms of National objectives. Local governments may not use the funds for direct welfare payments or for operations and maintenance related to education. Although these two areas often have high priority, the Congress concluded that there

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1/These priority expenditure categories were deleted by the 1976 Amendments to the Act. Effective January 1, 1977, revenue sharing funds may be spent in any area where recipients' own funds are authorized.
were better ways to deal with them. Also, local governments could not spend the funds directly for general administration (as distinguished from financial administration), for interest on debt, or for retirement of debt unless the debt was incurred on or after January 1, 1972, for expenditures in the priority categories specified in the act.

However, the priority categories cover most local functions. Moreover, within each priority area the funds could be spent for various activities to insure local governments' discretion in deciding how to use the funds. For example, "public safety" includes police; prosecution; courts and defense; corrections; crime and delinquency prevention; fire protection; civil defense; and inspection of buildings, plumbing, electrical facilities, gaslines, boilers, and elevators.

Summing up briefly then, the mechanics of transferring general revenue sharing funds to State and local governments contrast markedly with those of the LEAA block grant.

--Block grant legislation requires 85 percent of appropriated funds to be distributed as "action grants" in specific criminal justice system program areas; the remaining 15 percent to be used as discretionary grants by LEAA to support and encourage the development of specific State and local law enforcement projects. Once awarded, general revenue sharing may be used in a general unconstrained manner for a host of various projects in different functional areas (i.e., health, public safety, transportation, recreation, etc.).

--LEAA block grants are directly awarded only to State governments, not to localities. These awards are based totally on population, are dependent upon Federal approval of a comprehensive State plan and subject to a 10 percent hard-cash matching requirement (in the case of local projects one half of this matching requirement must be met by States) except for capital uses which are subject to a 50 percent match. General revenue sharing funds are awarded to about 39,000 State and local governments based on a complex formula considering the governments' tax collections, population, and per capita income. Submission
of comprehensive plans and matching monies are not required in general revenue sharing.

--The block grant mechanism requires that States allocate to local governments that portion of the total grant equal to the aggregate local outlay of State-local law enforcement expenditures in the preceding year. However, the specific amount going to a specific local unit is generally not based on a guaranteed distributional formula but is generally contingent upon approval of subgrant applications which are consistent with an approved State comprehensive plan determined by a supervisory board whose composition must include representatives of units of local government /1/. In 1976, 573 local government officials were members of such decision and policymaking bodies. On the other hand, two-thirds of a State's general revenue sharing funds are allocated to local governments, with each local government guaranteed a specific amount according to the legislated formula; the State is allowed no discretion in this matter.

**Impact of general revenue sharing funds**

Having briefly considered the various characteristics of general revenue sharing legislation and some of the distinctions between it and the block grant mechanisms the logical next step might be to address the primary question: what have been the major fiscal impacts of general revenue sharing funds in the criminal justice system?

In 1976, the Brookings Institution performed an assessment of general revenue sharing funds and their use.

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/1/There are variations in the method of distributing block grant funds in certain States, such as Ohio, which has adopted a "mini-block" grant approach to distributing block grant funds received by the State directly to units of general local government and combinations of such units.
for law enforcement purposes during 1973 and 1974. ¹/ This analysis reportedly resulted from research associates' field observations, national statistics on State and local finances and employment, and reports from the Office of Revenue Sharing, GAO, and other research groups. The study points out that for 1973-74, 23 percent of general revenue sharing funds have been officially reported in Treasury's Actual-Use reports to have been expended in public safety functions--primarily law enforcement and fire protection. Brookings employed a methodology which compared these "reported" uses of 65 selected non-random jurisdictions (stratified sample) with subjective assessments of on-site observers on the "net effects" or new spending uses of the same funds. Judgementally, these actual use assessments fall into nine "net fiscal effects" categories:

I. New Spending

1. New capital expenditures--spending for capital (facility construction and land purchases) or major equipment purchases, either of which would not have occurred at all, or which would have occurred at least a year later.

2. New or expanded operations--operating expenditures began or expanded with shared revenues (new or expanded existing programs), excluding pay and benefit increases.

3. Increased pay and benefits--pay and benefit increases that would not have been possible at all or at the approved levels.

¹/Richard P. Nathan et al., Where have all the dollars gone? Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, December 1976. Here law enforcement was defined in the general sense, including the activities of police, prosecution, court administration, defense, detention and correctional agencies.
II. Substitution Effects

1. **Program maintenance**—Funds directed to ongoing programs, which without revenue sharing would have been reduced in scope or totally eliminated.

2. **Tax cut**—financing ongoing programs and freeing the jurisdictions' own resources to permit tax reductions.

3. **Tax stabilization**—funds used to finance ongoing programs while avoiding a tax increase that would otherwise have been approved.

4. **Avoidance of borrowing**—using the funds to substitute for borrowing that otherwise would have been required.

5. **Increased fund balances**—simply using the shared revenue while husbanding the jurisdictions' own revenues.

6. **"Restoration" of federal aid**—using the funds to offset anticipated or actual reductions of other federal aid.

As such, the Brookings' study provides a general analysis of State and local major revenue sharing decisions vs. an accounting of dollars.

"It's done with smoke and wires"

In analyzing revenue sharing dollars devoted to public safety for 1973 and 1974 Brookings associates were asked to distinguish between police, fire and "other" public safety functions (Note: Generally, "other" is defined as law enforcement—including prosecution, defense, courts, and corrections). This data was then compared with officially reported information for the same categories, and resulted in the following:
Proportion of general revenue sharing (GRS) devoted to Law Enforcement according to Brookings field research estimates of New Spending allocations for sample jurisdictions (unweighted mean percentage)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using this and other data for further analysis Brookings concludes that

"** officially reported expenditures of shared revenue on law enforcement compiled by the Treasury Department's Office of Revenue Sharing were six times greater than raw (emphasis added) allocations for this purpose identified in the Brookings field research in 1973; the ratio for 1974 was 4:1. Differences are greater for larger units, those under greatest fiscal pressure, those located in the Northeast, and for Municipal governments generally. The principal reason for this pattern of variation is that classes of units just described tended to have especially high substitution uses of shared revenue ** **".

In his analysis of the Brookings study and other research on this subject Mark Alger also points out that the very little actual program increase in the criminal justice system resulting from general revenue sharing has been for capital purposes and traditional operations. He also points out that as financial pressures increase, general revenue sharing funds for criminal justice tend to be used for police program maintenance. This is the same area of criminal justice funding that the LEAA

*Applies to all cases with net-effects allocations and reported expenditures; 46 localities in 1973; 52 in 1974.

program has been criticized for "over funding" in the past relative to the other components of the criminal justice system.

In many respects, this outcome pivots on the question of "fungibility." In their book Revenue Sharing: The Second Round, Richard Nathan and Charles Adams, Jr., point out that "*all forms of Federal aid to states and localities are fungible," and that no matter how restrictive the requirements placed on the use of grant funds, recipients in fact exercise a good deal of discretion in their ultimate use. 1/ How the funds are used is therefore determined to varying degrees by the preference recipients have for the goods and services for which the grants are theoretically aimed. 2/

The Brookings study heavily focuses on this aspect of the problem and points out that general "revenue sharing funds are not radioactive; they can be difficult to trace." 3/ Echoing these same sentiments Mark Alger states that when State and local officials substitute or displace their own revenues with general revenue sharing funds the resulting effect "dissipates much of the importance of revenue sharing for law enforcement." 4/

In our April 25, 1974, report on revenue sharing and its use and impact on local governments, GAO noted that revenue sharing funds, Federal categorical aid, and States' and local governments' own revenues can often be used or mixed to provide the same services. Local governments tend to consider their total available resources when budgeting funds to meet perceived needs. When a government spends revenue sharing monies for activities previously financed (or that would have been financed) from local or


2/Ibid.


other revenues, great latitude exists for "freeing" local funds by spending revenue sharing funds. To a generally high degree, these resulting "substitution" effects that occur are analogous to those same categories used for the Brookings field research analysis mentioned earlier. (See p. 93.)

In view of changing budget priorities and fluctuations in the amount of revenues available to a locality, it would be impossible to identify those funds displaced as a result of revenue sharing and for what purposes such resources were used. We believe the original general revenue sharing act's requirements for priority category expenditure are illusory. Our past reports, testimony, and numerous meetings with congressional staff on this issue contributed to the elimination of the ineffectual restriction of priority categories for general revenue sharing expenditures in the 1976 amendments to the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act.

Impact of adding LEAA funds to general revenue sharing

So far, we have identified the primary characteristics of general revenue sharing, how these contrast, generally speaking, with block grants, and some indications on how recipients view and make general revenue sharing expenditure decisions for law enforcement. Logically then, the next question might be raised: what are the implications of transferring the amount of funds appropriated for the LEAA block grant program to a general revenue sharing program. A definitive answer to this would require comparable data on the fungibility or substitution effects of LEAA block funds used to replace State and local funds which otherwise may have been devoted to criminal justice functions. While such data is not readily available there are certain indications—albeit theoretical—that can be deduced from the foregoing analysis.

Distribution of funds

General revenue sharing funds are distributed quarterly to about 39,000 State and local governments based on a formula which considers a government's tax collections and population and the per capita income of its residents. Generally, governments with high tax efforts and low resident per capita income receive larger portions of the revenue sharing funds. This methodology distributes funds automatically without a direct demonstration of need. The amount of "LEAA funds" received by any one government could
be expected to vary considerably (i.e., higher or lower) when delivered through GRS from the amount it currently receives under the block grant.

Use of funds

A common characteristic of both the revenue sharing and LEAA programs is the decentralization of the deci

A common characteristic of both the revenue sharing and LEAA programs is the decentralization of the decision-making responsibility for the use of funds from the Federal Government to State and local governments. This is achieved in varying degrees because general revenue sharing funds can be used by recipient governments for essentially any expenditure that is permissible under State or local law, but LEAA monies must be used only for expenditures relating to crime and delinquency prevention, control and reduction and improving and strengthening the criminal justice function. Because general revenue sharing funds can be used for a larger variety of functions, the amount of Federal funds used for new or innovative criminal justice and crime and delinquency problem-solving purposes would probably be reduced if restrictions on the use of LEAA funds were broadened to permit their expenditure for those purposes authorized for use of general revenue sharing monies.

Attempts to determine the amount of this reduction would be conjectural, highly speculative, and would depend on the extent to which State and local recipients determined other uses to be of higher priority.

Citizen participation

The general revenue sharing and LEAA programs have requirements for citizen participation in decisions regarding the uses of the available funds. Before preparing its proposed budget for a fiscal period, a revenue sharing recipient is required to have a public hearing to permit citizens to provide written and oral comments on possible uses of revenue sharing funds. After the proposed budget has been prepared, the body responsible for enacting the budget is required to have a hearing on the proposed use of revenue sharing funds in relation to the entire budget. The funds could be used in essentially any functional category in the budget.

A panel composed of elected local and State officials, criminal justice agency representatives and interested citizens reviews projects proposed for funding with LEAA funds. Program funds are then generally allocated to governments that have projects considered to be the most deserving of need and support based upon an approved State
comprehensive plan. If the LEAA uses were determined in accordance with the citizen participation requirements applicable to revenue sharing, criminal justice projects would have to compete with projects in other functional areas such as health, social services, and education based on perceptions of their merits by localities. Again, the amounts of money that would ultimately be directed to new or innovative projects might be expected to differ from those LEAA funds currently expended for these purposes.

Planning and jurisdictional fragmentation

Revenue sharing funds are paid automatically and directly to State and local government recipients, but LEAA block grant funds are awarded initially to the State and the funds are then transferred to certain governments and other grant recipients within the State that are determined to meet the provisions of the annual comprehensive plan.

The block grant planning process brings together officials of the various functional (police, courts, corrections) and jurisdictional (States, cities, counties, etc.) elements of the criminal justice system to focus and prioritize their resources to meet their most important needs. To the extent that this planning and coordination results in the most appropriate expenditure of Federal funds, eliminates duplication and reduces interjurisdictional conflict, the collapsing of LEAA funds into general revenue sharing may eliminate these benefits. On the other hand, the jurisdictional elements may view the planning and coordination functions to have such importance or value to continue funding these activities with their general revenue sharing funds. We suspect, however, that with so many independent actors under general revenue sharing and the loss of "enforced" planning, the criminal justice system might operate in a more fragmented fashion.

Pursuit of national goals

Under the block grant, recipients are required to spend the funds for crime and delinquency prevention and control, and to effect improvements in criminal justice system activities—-with specific allocations and balance—-given to certain components or activities (i.e. courts, juvenile justice). Congressionally mandated emphasis on national goals must be demonstrated to receive funds. Under general revenue sharing recipients have almost unlimited latitude in the ultimate use of funds—-across the whole spectrum of governmental functions. Where State
and local objectives and priorities coincide or converge with those of the Federal government, it can be expected that national goals will be pursued. However, where and when recipient government budget priorities and program interest fluctuate it can be expected that these local decisions will be pursued to the possible exclusion of national goals.

"Special" Revenue sharing

By early 1971 the Nixon administration was seriously concerned with the financial difficulties of State and local governments. Equally worrisome was the increasing proliferation of Federal categorical grants—perceived as an unacceptable intrusion into the prerogatives of State and local governments—with their reported attendant confusion, delay, and attached bureaucratic strings.

Reacting to these concerns, President Nixon set forth six "Special Revenue Sharing" proposals on March 2, 1971. These proposals reportedly 1/ were designed to fold approximately 130 existing categorical grant programs into six broad financing schemes—providing $11 billion with few restrictions and no State and local matching requirements in education, law enforcement, manpower training, rural community development, transportation, and urban community development. While all six possess common characteristics, each had some unique features. For the purposes of this discussion we will focus on that proposal which would have amended the LEAA block grant program into "special revenue sharing for law enforcement."

Reportedly, 2/ this change would have been accomplished by removing matching, buy-in, maintenance of effort provisions, and Federal plan approval requirements for part C (action) block grants. Payments were to be made to States on the basis of population and the submission of a comprehensive plan to LEAA for review, comment, and recommendation—not approval. However, the proposed bill did not change the part C pass-through formula, the percent set

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aside for LEAA discretionary uses, the part E program (corrections emphasis), nor did it eliminate grants for research, statistics and technical assistance.

It would be a mistake at this juncture to view this proposal as a "no strings attached" instrument. Special revenue sharing would not have eliminated the 10 percent match requirements for law enforcement and criminal justice planning grants (analogous to part B of the Crime Control Act), nor eliminated the State/local matching requirement when using funds earmarked for correctional facilities (part E). (Note: Special Revenue Sharing Fund could have been used to cover the non-Federal share of these match requirements at the local level.) Additionally, "strings" or Federal influence on the use of these funds included:

- mandatory pass-thru of 40 percent of planning funds from States to localities;
- "flexible pass-thru" of action grants from States to localities based on a formula using the aggregate State-local law enforcement and criminal justice expenditures of the preceding year;
- statutory requirements that State comprehensive plans allocate an adequate share of funds to areas of high crime incidence and law enforcement activity;
- provisions that high priority be given to organized crime and riot and civil disorder programs, and that SPAs provide their major counties and cities sufficient funds for preparing comprehensive plans and coordinating anti-crime efforts; and
- prohibiting the use of more than one-third of any action grant for personnel compensation.

Whether this new Federal-State partnership would have withstood the close scrutiny of the legislative process is at best speculative. The Congress held no hearings on the proposal and took no action during 1971 and 1972.

With the knowledge that the authorizing legislation for the LEAA program would expire at the end of FY 1973, the Administration again tried to convert the program to
special revenue sharing. In March 1973 the President sent a special message to the Congress, accompanied by the second law enforcement revenue sharing proposal (H.R. 5613 and S. 1234). In addition to insuring a 70 percent pass-thru of the appropriated funds from State to local governments, a number of other changes were offered. As the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations' analysis points out:

"The Administration's 1973 law enforcement revenue sharing proposal also: (1) removed matching requirements and replaced them with maintenance of effort provisions; (2) eliminated the funding limitations for police salaries; (3) dropped the "troika" arrangement in favor of a single administrator; (4) deleted the requirement that states establish planning agencies to draw up comprehensive plans and administer Safe Streets funds and substituted a general requirement for a "multi-jurisdictional planning and policy development organization" to perform these tasks; (5) mandated that 50 percent of the supervisory board of any criminal justice planning body be composed of elected city and county officials; (6) authorized LEAA to comment on state plans and make such comments public; (7) removed the requirements that a specific portion of block grant allocations be earmarked for corrections; (8) required strict program evaluation and auditing; and (9) added two new categories of allowable spending (diagnostic services for juveniles and court administration, including law referee programs within civil courts). Generally the President's proposal substantially reduced LEAA's authority over the states and allowed the SPAs more discretion in the administration and use of Safe Streets funds." 1/

After a good deal of debate and opposition from both the House and Senate, the Congress rejected the Administration's plan for special revenue sharing and retained an "amended" LEAA block grant program.

1/ Ibid., p. 22
"A rose by any other name . . ."

There is a belief held by some that special revenue sharing was a completely new program, distinguished from general revenue sharing by its high law enforcement focus, and from the block grant by its broadened latitude for state/local decisionmaking and relaxed fiscal, program, and reporting requirements. Illustrating the primary contrast with block grants it is noted that under special revenue sharing

--matching on the part of grantees was not required;

--once funds were allocated in accordance with the statutory formula they would essentially be paid automatically with no need for detailed application; and

--Federal intrusiveness over the use of funds was to have been minimal, with no LEAA plan approval required to receive aid.

We believe, however, that each of these major elements may to varying degrees be deceptive or illusory.

Matching requirements

While it is true that the 1971 Special Revenue Sharing proposal would have eliminated the LEAA block grant matching requirement, at least two of the four other current Federal block grant programs (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act and the Community and Economic Development Block Grant) do not have matching provisions. As such, the absence or presence of a "matching funds" provision does not necessarily make special revenue sharing unique. It is also noteworthy that the proposed deletion of the matching requirement would have eliminated only 10 percent of the total money being made available. Further, the 1973 revenue sharing bill proposed state/local "maintenance of effort" as a requirement for receipt of funds. In part, this may have been an attempt by the Federal Government to legislate a show of good faith on the part of recipient government and to diminish the potentially large impact of substitution effects—at again the fungibility phenomenon.

Nonetheless, the lack of matching funds requirements in the 1971 proposal does tend to make it appear to lean in the direction of general revenue sharing.
Application and fund disbursement

While it is also true that under the special revenue sharing proposals 85 percent of LEAA funds would have been distributed to the States in proportion to their population, the actual amount eventually received by any specific local recipient (city or county) was not assured nor clearly delineated in the legislation. A similar lack of legislative clarity exists with the LEAA block grant program.

As previously described, under the block grant program the initial award of funds is to the States. However, the legislation does not indicate the specific amount or proportion of a State's block award a given geopolitical jurisdiction will receive. While the Safe Streets Act requires an emphasis be placed upon "high crime" areas (implying fund flow to major metropolitan areas within each State), there is no legislatively established level of direct entitlement due a specific unit of local government. Rather the law specifies that the localities, in the aggregate, are entitled to part, C block funds in an amount equal to the proportion of State/local general revenues they expended for all the law enforcement and criminal justice activity during the preceding year. In practice, this provision has had nearly the same effect as the pre-1973 pass-through requirement that 75 percent of the funds be made available to units of local government.

The critical determinants on local receipt of LEAA block grant funds are the supervisory board of the State planning agency and supervisory bodies of sub-State regional planning units (RPUs). As pointed out earlier, the SPA supervisory membership includes representatives of local government, and is the only body which is able to authorize the expenditure of block grant funds. Thus, to a large degree the representatives of localities and the State together are ultimately responsible for deciding "who gets what and how much." In practice, the role of the RPUs enters into the process in many States. By law the RPU supervisory bodies are composed of a majority of locally-elected officials. This body often exercises the decision on which specific jurisdictions are going to receive some specified amount of the money consistent with RPU plans and programming as part of the overall Statewide plan. Generally, the SPA supervisory board will accept the RPU supervisory body's views unless there are major departures from State law or established policy.
To the extent that special revenue sharing would have operated in a similar fashion, there may really have been no appreciable difference between it and the process of sub-awarding of block grant funds to units of local government under the LEAA program.

Since the Special Revenue Sharing proposal did not become law, we do not know what, if any, LEAA guidelines and implementing regulations would have been promulgated. However, to the extent that receipt of funds by units of local government would have been conditioned on a sizeable planning effort and State approval process, it could hardly be said that fund disbursement would have been automatic. Although not assigned specific veto power over local efforts, State governments appear to exercise some policy direction over LEAA-funded local efforts by virtue of their responsibilities for approving local and areawide plan submissions and developing a Statewide plan. Indeed, the requirement for State submission of a detailed, comprehensive plan as a condition for any financial assistance certainly calls into question the ease with which States could have obtained funding.

Elimination of Federal plan approval

Section 204(b) of the 1973 special revenue sharing proposal limited LEAA's role in State/local planning to reviewing, commenting, and offering recommendations. However, in practice public comments and recommendations by Federal agencies disbursing large amounts of aid often have the force of mandates. As noted earlier, under special revenue sharing, State comprehensive plans would still have been required to demonstrate compliance with several fund restrictions or uses, including (1) State/local pass-thru formula, (2) share of funds to areas of high crime incidence and law enforcement activity, (3) priority to organized crime, riot and civil disorder control, and (4) city and county planning functions for anti-crime efforts.

Failing complete compliance with these or other requirements, it remains a matter of speculation whether LEAA's comments and recommendations would have had the same force as the "special conditions" which must currently be addressed by grant recipients under the block grant. Perhaps the major difference between the block grant and special revenue sharing on this issue may be perceived as putting States and localities in a better bargaining position with LEAA. Theoretically, at
least, the burden of proof would have shifted to LEAA to demonstrate lack of substantial compliance on the part of the States.

"Neither fish nor fowl"

Admittedly this discussion on the differences between special revenue sharing and the LEAA block grant appears to muddy the water and raise more questions than it answers. The problem results from attempting an analysis of legislation that never came to fruition; consequently LEAA never developed any implementing regulations which would have transformed legislative theory into action.

Nonetheless, special revenue sharing—as proposed—appears to be not so special. Rather it may have been something very similar to the block grant. Supporting this proposition, Richard Nathan of the Brookings Institution suggests "**we would all be better off if we forgot the term special revenue sharing and used the term block grants**" underlining the point "**a block grant means different things to different people."** 1/

David Walker of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations takes the opposite position pointing out that the different kinds and quality of Federal intervention provide the principal distinction between the two types of grants. He believes that no Federal block grant in any way resembles special revenue sharing because the latter reflects minimal Federal intrusion. 2/

Taking the middle ground, William Mirengoff of the National Academy of Sciences suggests that perhaps it is not possible to "classify things so precisely" and that we may be "**dealing with a continuum that extends all the way from revenue sharing to categorical programs. If you [sic] were to identify four or five criteria, they may appear on different points on a continuum. Where a program comes to rest on the continuum depends on several factors including Congressional intent, Administration policy, and bureaucratic style."** 3/

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2/Ibid.

3/Ibid.
Summing up then, the special revenue sharing proposals (1971 and 1973) embodied a number of elements that are markedly similar to those of the block grant instrument. In addition, those characteristics that have been pointed out as being dramatically different—or more similar to general revenue sharing—tend to wilt or blur under close scrutiny. Of course, these differences may have come into sharp relief with the development of implementing guidelines and regulations had the legislation been passed. Since that did not occur, the questions on whether this program would have significantly reduced Federal intrusiveness and "red tape" or resulted in crime and delinquency reduction or measurable improvements in the criminal justice system remain open.

SOME OTHER PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES

Of course there are any number of possible options by which the actual transfer of payments could be accomplished. However, the primary question again is whether a given funding mechanism is the most effective and efficient method to achieve specified national goals. The current mandate of the 1976 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act emphasizes a plurality of program goals. This raises three related questions which should be considered.

1) Are the goals of the Act and various objectives of the program compatible with one another? That is, does the pursuit of one or more objectives of the program have a neutralizing effect or in some way limit the accomplishment of all and/or restrict the opportunities for reaching national goals?

2) Are the "reach" and focus of the current program sufficient in scope and depth to address all relevant programs, services, and problems which have a bearing upon crime and delinquency prevention and the administration of justice?

3) How best can the Federal government approach and resolve the problems of crime and delinquency, and insure efficient, just, and humane handling of the accused by the agencies of the criminal justice system in a cost effective manner?
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary in February 1976, GAO presented its views of the progress and problems of the LEAA program. GAO stated that a change is needed in the program's emphasis.

"There has not been sufficient systematic planning, testing, and evaluation of efforts to adequately advance the Nation's knowledge of how to effectively fight crime. Much more systematic research and evaluation are needed into what works. The Federal Government should play a more active role in searching how to reduce crime. More Federal dollars should be spent by government--Federal, State, and local--to test theories and approaches and evaluate their results, rather than on State or local projects which are not part of controlled research efforts to advance the state of the art."

In general, GAO anticipated by more than a year and one-half the recommendations of the Department of Justice Study Group on LEAA which called for a shift in emphasis of the program along the general lines advanced above by GAO.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, DEMONSTRATION,
TEST, AND EVALUATION

We previously pointed out that LEAA funds constitute a very small proportion (less than 5 percent) of crime and delinquency prevention, control and criminal justice expenditures annually. Without substantially increasing the amount of the current Federal investment, one possible approach to consider is placing the emphasis of the program upon an expanded research, development, demonstration, test, and evaluation role by LEAA, which provides for the continued and significant involvement of States and localities.

A national strategy to reduce, prevent, and control crime under this approach would build upon the relative strengths of current, planned, and to be developed programs which can be empirically demonstrated to produce significant crime and delinquency reduction outcomes based upon rigorously controlled research. However, in GAO's view it was considered vital that States and localities participate fully in the planning, implementation, and
management of projects which are consistent with program strategies which are factually proven to have merit. Although a different ratio of block and categorical funds may be necessary at first, this approach would encourage and support systematic-planned-variation in testing different intervention strategies which "build-in" the evaluation research requirements before implementing individual project activities.

After a number of action/research program efforts have been empirically demonstrated to have crime and delinquency reduction payoff, they can be replicated and funded in a larger number of settings with ongoing evaluation of their relative effectiveness. This should enable States and localities, as well as the Federal government, to know under what conditions and for whom different action intervention strategies are the most cost effective.

"Successful" programs could then be assumed (institutionalized) on a relatively permanent basis by States and localities with increased confidence of their value and impact upon the crime problem.

The specific form and structure such an approach would require would of course be dependent upon a variety of factors, not the least of which includes those questions raised earlier on page 107.

Historically the Federal role in crime, delinquency, and criminal justice research has come about as part of a much larger action program effort. However, it is important to be clear about the nature of the relationship between the two. Congress established a centralized structure for the purpose of performing some functions that were not considered feasible at the State level, principally a national crime statistics center and a research and development (R&D) effort within LEAA. Since it was assumed from the beginning that the national interest in crime was to serve State and local needs, a Federal research, development, and demonstration effort was not designed with the view in mind of solving crime problems at the national level. Rather it was to help State and local jurisdictions deal with their crime problems. A basic premise of the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, therefore, was that the Federal effort was to service State and local planning and action programming.
Consequently there has not been much impetus for direct Federal initiatives in the crime and delinquency field utilizing the research, development, demonstration, test, and evaluation program methodology (hereafter RDDT&E) until very recently. Presuming that there is some merit to exploring this approach, the question becomes one of identifying which of several broad program and funding implementation strategies would be most suitable. There are several possibilities in addressing this question.

One is to assume that serving State and local planning and action program development means providing information to the administrators of block-grant funds (the State planning agencies) about which programs being considered for funding are likely to be effective. The "what works and what doesn't work?" question has been posed incessantly to the National Institute by SPAs from the earliest days of the LEAA program and indicates at least that they perceive the National Institute's role in terms of providing some leadership and information that can be utilized in their planning efforts.

A second possibility would be to place the National Institute and LEAA in the role of assisting the States and localities in developing alternative program intervention strategies using carefully designed and controlled action research, but without the pressure to develop immediate "quick-fix" solutions. Such a strategy could keep LEAA and its National Institute in its direct service relationship with the block-grant structure and thereby focus its efforts on the programmatic concerns of States and localities which have the primary responsibility for dealing with the problems of crime and delinquency. However, because of the nature of block-grant funding this strategy would require some overall policy direction to insure that the National Institute's efforts would not be predominantly oriented toward traditional practitioner needs to the exclusion of others.

A third variation in this theme could put the National Institute in the primary business of planning and implementing large demonstration projects. Such a strategy would have the mixed purpose of synthesizing research results (from any source), testing appropriate implementations, and disseminating model programs to practitioners. However, unless due care were exercised, it could tie the
National Institute's efforts to the exigencies and political pressures of SPA programming, more so than would the first two strategies.

A fourth RDDT&E approach could make the program more directly responsive to ongoing congressional and Federal executive branch input and oversight to emphasize those aspects of the "Safe Streets" legislation that encourages innovative anti-crime programming and, therefore, focus program activities on developing and testing alternative approaches to solving crime problems. Such a program could de-emphasize operational questions, except insofar as they were directly related to crime control (e.g., patrol strategies), and concentrate on examining new as well as traditional approaches to dealing with crime and criminal behavior in an effort to develop a new understanding of crime. It could attempt to bring to bear thinking and research from a variety of disciplines not now focusing on crime and encourage multidisciplinary research efforts and concentrate on testing hypotheses under experimental and quasi-experimental conditions to obtain results that are reliable for use in developing sound action programs. This strategy may also have the advantage of tying the National Institute more closely to the research community and permit resources to be allocated on grounds that are largely independent of political demands or system pressures. If encouraged to develop properly, this strategy could eventually serve State and local crime control needs far better than the more agency- or practitioner-dominated alternatives that have characterized past LEAA efforts.

Relationship between research and action programming

Attempting to compare and contrast alternative RDDT&E strategies reveals some important features of the relationship between research and action programming in LEAA. The role of SPAs is to plan, allocate, and administer the block-grant funds, which amount to approximately 5 percent of the total criminal justice expenditures in any State. Consequently, if the LEAA program is to have any impact under the current block grant instrument, the SPA must use action funds in strategic and innovative ways. To do so requires careful analysis of local crime problems, existing community and criminal justice system response patterns, and a variety of competing resource allocation questions. While few SPAs have yet developed this kind of analytical capacity, those that have find it both necessary and natural to conduct their own "immediate solution" research. The critical connection is between programming and research.
Research, in this context, becomes totally a tool for planners with specific problems to solve. The case is similar for evaluation. The SPAs need to be able to evaluate particular programs with an eye both to refunding decisions and introducing changes to make existing programs more effective.

While this kind of research and evaluation has not yet developed extensively in the SPAs, it is clearly an appropriate and productive function. However, in order for a national research institute to be able to perform effectively, the relationship between a particular program's need for information and the deployment of resources to obtain the required knowledge calls for mechanisms and policies to insure proper balance in intra-/inter-organizational response. To place the responsibility for responding in the hands of a research institute alone is to ignore the natural pressures on States and localities to "get to the bottom line." A further complication is the fact that the canons of valid scientific research often conflict with the needs and style of program administrators. Since the basis of the relationship has been and continues to be upon service, the likelihood is that research canons will be compromised more often than administrators inconvenienced unless some fundamental and formal change in program emphasis and policy is enacted to clarify expectations and appropriate roles.

In the past, the relationship between SPAs and the National Institute has ranged from indifference to hostility. The SPAs have resisted programming that is not developed to meet a specific and immediate need. They also tend to resent the intrusion of the Federal presence whenever the National Institute and LEAA funds a demonstration or evaluation program in their State. By the same token, the National Institute has resented SPAs' expectations that it should be providing readily applicable knowledge for local programming, as well as the perception that they lack understanding of the nature of needed research.

The National Academy of Sciences study suggested another way to view the National Institute's role in serving State and local needs. 1/ Rather than intruding

upon the relationship between research and programming, which occurs most often at the SPA level where it is part of the dynamics of planning, the Federal research effort could concentrate on developing and testing innovative approaches to crime problems. This strategy is quite similar to the one that was outlined by GAO earlier. Because a major research commitment is often required in order to thoroughly develop and adequately test new approaches to crime problems, the scale of such a commitment—both in resources and timeframes—is frequently beyond the capacities of SPAs. Second, the range and degree of scientific competence necessary to mount a highly sophisticated research effort are not normally available at the SPA level. Third, an undertaking that has a long-range timeframe but no clearly specifiable product, and is risky as well, is simply inappropriate for an action oriented agency, such as an SPA, to take on alone. This is not to say that all research, development, demonstration, test, and evaluation work be of "long-term" nature. There is much valuable "immediate solution" evaluation and research that could and should be done. In short, the nature of a Federal research role in crime problem solving will depend not only on the needs to be served but also on the capacities that are developed and articulated within a cogent program and funding strategy which will serve all levels of the intergovernmental crime control system.

**EXPANDED FEDERAL PROGRAM SCOPE**

To the extent that specific program intervention strategies transcend the traditional boundaries of criminal justice system agency functions (i.e., enforcement, prosecution, adjudication, defense, rehabilitation, and general and special deterrence), other Federal, State, and local human service programs and agencies which are determined to have influence upon crime and delinquency problems should be more directly involved. To date the majority of LEAA supported programs have tended to restrict their operational sphere of influence to specific criminal justice system-based remedies. At present we just do not know what are the reasonable expectations of the enforcement of criminal law in achieving some desired and demonstrated level of crime and juvenile delinquency reduction. Some of the literature developed over the past 10 to 15 years suggests that in making the criminal justice process address too wide and complex a range of socially unacceptable behaviors can have the opposite effect of that which was originally intended. Also, it is only in
the past few years that there has been serious renewed study of the deterrent and incapacitative effects of the sanctioning strategies employed by the criminal justice system to control "illegal" behavior.

In laymen's terms, it is fairly well acknowledged that there are a broad range of social, economic, psychological, and environmental forces which collectively operate in the genesis of criminal and delinquent behavior. Poverty, unemployment, inadequate educational opportunities, population density, high rates of geographic mobility and a high proportion of youthful "crime prone" individuals in the age structure of American society have all been raised, along with a variety of other forms of social pathology, as "causes" of crime and juvenile delinquency.

At present it is not clear just how much money the Federal Government allocates to programs and services, aside from LEAA and Federal criminal justice agencies, that have or could have a bearing upon crime and delinquency problems. However, if the amount of money involved is as great as some believe, then there is a strong possibility that no significant additional new resources would be required in expanding Federal program scope to address criminogenic (crime causing) influences which reside outside the traditional boundaries of the criminal justice system. Again there are a number of different possible ways one could approach expanding Federal program scope.

Interdepartmental policy and program planning

Establishment of executive branch procedures and a policy-planning-steering capability at a hierarchical level above executive branch department levels might be one avenue to affect interdepartmental planning, joint program development, implementation, and evaluation. Further, there is no reason why an "expanded Federal scope" approach could not also utilize a research, development, demonstration, test, and evaluation strategy to help better target and utilize existing Federal, State, and local resources (non-LEAA) as well as LEAA-funds to develop some "critical mass" with respect to ameliorating some of the criminogenic influences mentioned above,
Community-based approach

And of course it may be an area where appropriate new legislation might be warranted, which mandates cooperative joint ventures across Federal agencies. Such an initiative might also emphasize, for example, taking a community-based or focused approach in marshalling existing and limited new resources to effect "true community" crime and delinquency prevention intervention strategies which are designed to "fit" a given locale's particular crime and delinquency problem. Here again there is also an appropriate opportunity to consider the advantages and limitations of a research, development, demonstration, test, and evaluation program methodology which places its emphasis upon systematic-panned-variation of different types of action program strategies under controlled research conditions.

It was pointed out earlier in this staff study that LEAA has initiated a new action program development process which has some general similarities to the RDDT&E notions previously discussed. However, there is still a significant degree of inter-departmental inertia which LEAA quite probably would not be able to overcome on its own initiative if it were to address an "expanded Federal program scope" approach, which would be dependent upon the support, cooperation, and involvement of other Federal, State, and local human services agencies.

Regardless of the number of different Federal, State, and local agencies, programs, and services which would be required to pursue an "expanded Federal scope" approach, it is important that crime and delinquency prevention and reduction and criminal justice system improvement strategies be considered together. If pursued with a community-based focus, prevention efforts would or should address three basic forms of prevention--(1) punitive, (2) mechanical/incapacitative, and (3) corrective. 1/

Punitive prevention strategies rely upon deterrence of crime generally, or specifically by inhibiting new or repeat offenses through the enlightened and effective use of criminal justice sanctioning strategies. Mechanical and/or

incapacitative prevention strategies and techniques generally attempt to restrict or deny the opportunity to commit law violations. Some examples include target hardening through block-watch and environmental design activities, property marking, and a variety of mechanical and protective devices as well as the incapacitation of serious habitual offenders.

Corrective prevention is designed to get at and ameliorate the criminogenic (crime causing) factors and forces in the larger sociocultural system and "correction" of the individual offender through effective programs of rehabilitation involving a variety of resocialization techniques.

These three forms of prevention, taken together, by definition extend beyond the traditional boundaries and authority of criminal justice agencies. A wide range of human services programs and agencies would be involved. However, it seems appropriate to consider the balance and mix of these three basic forms of prevention in any true "total system" approach to crime and delinquency problem solving. Under the present legislation, it would be unrealistic to expect LEAA and the State planning agencies as they currently operate under block and categorical grant programs to be able to systematically identify, plan, and develop coordinated program strategies which would require broader based involvement at Federal, State, and local levels.

Therefore, an "expanded Federal scope" approach would necessitate much more intensive conceptual development and policy planning than could be addressed within the scope of this staff study.

The magnitude and complexity of crime and delinquency problems may indeed require a total reassessment of the fundamental premises and assumptions which undergird the present Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Even though we are not in a position to articulate specifically and precisely in what manner and which particular program and funding strategy would best lend itself to the task, the issues should not be dismissed simply because they are complex and difficult to grasp conceptually and organizationally. Finding a balanced approach which offers some measure of hope in dealing with the Nation's crime and delinquency problem may not be simple and straightforward, but then again neither is crime and juvenile delinquency.
REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS

The Spectrum of Change Alternatives

As noted earlier, to date the LEAA program has maintained a semblance of its original planning, block grant financing instrument, and research and education structure. But it has also taken on a variety of special planning, categorical funding mechanisms, and complex program procedures and processes. In spite of a national trend over the years toward Federal grant simplification ("revenue sharing" thinking) and emphasis on local decisionmaking, the LEAA program has increased its controls, complexity, program assignments, and special funding preferences. It is from this perspective that the following reported views on revamping LEAA are presented.

The National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators

In 1976, the National Conference of State Criminal Justice Planning Administrators (e.g., SPA Directors) issued a report on LEAA and its part in Federal crime control assistance to the States and localities. This study concluded that the "Safe Streets" block grant approach was fundamentally sound and should be reauthorized for 5 years. In support of this position, a number of changes were suggested calling for a "refocus" on distinct State and Federal responsibilities:

(1) transition from yearly to multiyear comprehensive plans, with annual updating for programmed changes in strategies and projects;

(2) authorizing the SPAs to act as executive branch agencies under the governors' jurisdiction, with complete authority to plan and budget for the total integrated State criminal justice system;

(3) authorizing each State to develop and implement its own goals, objectives, and standards for crime reduction, and administration of justice;
(4) granting States complete discretion in the character and makeup of State supervisory boards;

(5) refocusing LEAA efforts primarily on the effective development of efficient, rational research, test, evaluation, and technical assistance information for State use.

This position might be viewed as a considered "keep the block grant" proposition—with a refocusing or fine-tuning of Federal/State responsibilities.

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)

In 1976, ACIR completed a detailed, comprehensive review of LEAA's seven year experience with the block grant. From this study emerged a clearcut prescription for revamping LEAA: Decategorization.

Simply put, ACIR envisioned a return to the basic block grant concept with elimination of "red tape" through five-year plan submissions (rather than annual plans) with annual implementation statements; quality control through clear plan standards; and better leadership through close State legislature involvement and oversight; and State planning agency (SPA) assumption of the entire statewide planning and budgeting function for all criminal justice agency components.

As its primary theme, ACIR cautioned the Federal government to stop establishing new planning and action grant assistance categories and to eliminate those that already existed (e.g., corrections and juvenile delinquency). Also, ACIR recommended the allocation of all formula funds through the comprehensive criminal justice block grant mechanism. Finally, ACIR recommended (1) removal of the statutory ceiling for personnel compensation; (2) LEAA development of standards and performance criteria to evaluate State plans and to monitor and assess State performance in implementing the plans; (3) greater attention to the needs of the courts through increased funding and greater participation on SPA supervisory boards; and (4) clear LEAA definition of "local elected officials" for purposes of membership on the regional planning unit supervisory boards.
This position may be viewed as a "return to the fundamentals" or "purification" of the block grant mechanism.

Twentieth Century Fund Task Force

In 1975-76, the Twentieth Century Fund performed an analysis of the LEAA program and offered a number of recommendations on the appropriate degree of Federal involvement in local criminal justice activity. In contrast to those proposing retention of the block grant mechanism, the Fund advocated block grant elimination in favor of a "special revenue sharing" concept—essentially unrestricted federal monies granted directly to State, county, and municipal governments. At the onset, this would entail a basic reclarification of the Federal mandate, eliminating the "crime reduction" goal and establishing LEAA's primary purpose as a stimulator of State and local criminal justice agency effectiveness in dealing with crime.

The centerpiece of the Fund's prescription was the recommendation that LEAA's regional offices be abolished and one half of the LEAA program funds be disbursed through special revenue sharing with no requirement for State and local matching funds. This money would flow directly to State, county, municipal governments based on a statutory formula.

The proposal also argued for a transformation of LEAA into a new entity having primary responsibility for research, experimentation, and evaluation at the national level. This "new" agency would be directly responsible to the Attorney General and control the remaining 50 percent of LEAA funds. These funds would be directed toward research, evaluation, and demonstration projects; the establishment of a quality "in-house" research capability, and the development of reliable, consistent criminal justice statistics.

Further changes proposed by the study included: (1) elimination of required State comprehensive planning to be substituted by financial incentives for those jurisdictions that wish to plan for the total State criminal justice budgets. Those taking advantage of these planning incentives would prepare 5-year plans and associated annual

1/A private, non-profit organization which performs economic, political, and social issue research.
implementation statements; (2) allowing LEAA recipients of higher education subsidies to select the college and curriculum of their own choice; (3) aside from funding emphasis on organized crime and corruption in government, earmarking of funds should be eliminated; (4) selective endorsement of certain proposed criminal justice standards and financial rewards or incentives for those jurisdictions choosing to implement them.

Thus, the Twentieth Century Fund position was to allow recipients greater latitude in using a guaranteed one half of the program funds and sharply focus the Federal agency role on research, evaluation, demonstration, and leveraging States' adoption of standards and planning through "carrot-on-the-stick" incentive schemes.

Center for National Security Studies

Perhaps one of the most critical reviews of LEAA's overall performance we reviewed is embodied in the 1976 report Law and Disorder IV, sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies. This study called for abolishing the LEAA program as constituted, and proposed the creation of a national-level research capability--insulated from political pressures--to explore the causes and prevention of criminal behavior and develop techniques of translating successful research findings into operational programs. Such research would also focus on the ways other non-law enforcement social service programs in education, health, community development, etc., relate to or can be redirected to more effectively prevent crime.

Along with the research function, special emphasis was also urged on Federal creation and support of a statistical program component to measure the volume and kinds of crime occurring as well as the characteristics of victims and offenders. Again the key element was insulating this activity from political pressures.

Lastly, while skeptical that broad fiscal relief for State/local criminal justice activities is necessary, the study suggested that if a genuine case could be made for such financial assistance, the funds should be distributed through general revenue sharing, giving local officials the authority to fund areas most in need of support and minimizing unwanted Federal meddling.

Thus, the proposed solution may be seen as abandoning national criminal justice formula assistance and reverting
to a quality research, statistics, evaluation, and policy-analysis role for the Federal government.

While by no means exhaustive, the foregoing proposals tend to range across the gamut of possibilities available to Congress in considering LEAA reorganization. Viewed from one perspective, the proposals are not as radically different or unique as might be believed. At some point, pure "block grants" begin to merge with "special revenue sharing." Incentives for planning can come very close to becoming mandates for planning if incentives are large enough.

In a country used to Federal assistance in meeting hard pressed budgets, totally dropping large scale aid initially qualifies as a "large" change. Even here, however, if the slack were taken up by a compensating increase in general revenue sharing revenues, the net fiscal "pinch" may be negligible.

Federal aid and Federal attempts to influence State and local governments date back to our Nation's beginnings. Although Federal assistance to subnational governments was small in earlier times, it was as controversial then as it is now. State and local governments have always wanted to be as free from Federal control as possible and have found this freedom increasingly curtailed as Federal involvement in domestic programs has increased. On the other hand, the goal of keeping the Federal government at arms length must be reconciled with the responsibility of Congress and the President to do all they can to assure that national goals and objectives are satisfactorily achieved. Striking an acceptable balance between the needs of State and local governments and the goals and responsibilities of the Federal government is the essential nub of the issue—and one for which there are no easy answers.

There are, however, a number of sub-issues which may help define the appropriate Federal role in crime and juvenile delinquency problem solving and in improving criminal justice and law enforcement and which underpin any eventual program design and associated funding mechanism. These include:

--- What should the stated legislative mandate be? What are the priorities? How specific should it be and how should success in achieving it be measured? Over what period of time? By whom?

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--Do we know what causes crime and how to stop it? Is research necessary? Basic or applied? Who should do it? What should its objectives and priorities be? Who should receive its results? When? How?

--Should State/local comprehensive planning be required or should the Federal level grant incentives for those choosing to plan? Annual or multiyear?

--Should the Federal government deal directly with all grant recipients (counties or cities) or should the States be the official conduit for funds used by local units? What are the tradeoffs?

--Should the Federal government require balance in programming and funding the separate criminal justice components (police, courts, and corrections) or allow States to decide appropriate allocation?

In the last analysis, the answers to these questions should reflect the extent to which the Congress believes subnational units of government have the capability and determination to identify their mutual and separate problems, find appropriate solutions, and rigorously employ resulting strategies in the most equitable, humane, and efficient manner while giving priority to national objectives and goals.
APPENDIX I

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES FOR IMPROVING THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

1. Develop more research programs that are cumulative in nature.

2. Use a longer-range set of priorities to guide individual project choices, which are not dependent solely on promises of immediate payoff.

3. Use devices for making funding choices which force examination and review of related research that has already been undertaken, tighten research designs, and determine appropriate and competent grantees and contractors.

4. Require all grantees and contractors, upon completion of their projects, to make available their data for secondary analysis, replication, and verification.

5. Use announcements of areas of interest as the primary means of generating concept papers and proposals, rather than relying heavily on solicitations with precise specifications of research design.

6. Place emphasis upon granting rather than contracting as a method of obtaining research. Contracting should be limited to a chosen set of priorities and specific research interests with projects having precise and known deliverable products.

7. Use a variety of mechanisms to establish more positive relationships with a broadly defined research community, and to enrich the dialogue between staff and quality researchers through

   --raising the visibility of the National Institute in various potential grantee communities;

   --making use of extended leave and exchange programs to give researchers
experience in grant development and administration and to give administrators who have been trained in research the opportunity to engage in research in academic settings;

---articulating clearly, its priority settings and funding procedures to the research community.

8. The budget of the National Institute should not be increased in the near future. There should first be a change in emphasis to smaller proposals within specified program areas or of a pilot nature; and the National Institute should reassess its position with respect to the knowledge it will have developed in 3 to 5 years.

9. Establish formal peer review procedures and an overall advisory panel for general program planning within structure of a three-tiered advisory system

---a statutory Advisory Board on Criminal Justice Research to set overall priorities;

---program planning panels for each of the selected set of program areas;

---individual project review panels.

10. Employ a less obtrusive monitoring system to permit grantees more flexibility.

11. Create a framework for program administration and budget allocation based on substantive program areas. Functional divisions, whether they relate to criminal justice operations (police, courts, corrections) or Institute mandates (dissemination, evaluation, and technology) should serve only to provide particular expertise to program and project development, not to suggest substantive divisions.

12. Funding levels should not be rigidly fixed within such substantive areas.

13. Strict funding cycles--two or three a year--should be established and adhered to.
14. The structure of the National Institute research program should have appropriate evaluation, dissemination, and technology development functions integrated into the major research effort. Components should be represented on whatever decisionmaking mechanisms are developed to set the research agenda.

The Acting Director of the National Institute takes issue with the next five recommendations pertaining to the operating conditions and organizational placement made by the National Academy of Sciences Committee.

15. In order to enhance the integrity of the National Institute and its program, and to increase its ability to contribute objectively to LEAA from an appropriate distance, LEAA's domination over the National Institute must be eliminated. At the very least, the Director must have full processing and sign-off authority over all National Institute awards, control over the National Institute's administrative budget and personnel, and detailed program review. The Director should be at the level of Assistant Attorney General and should be appointed by the Attorney General of the United States.

16. In order to assure the National Institute's functional independence from LEAA, protection from the politicization of the Attorney General's role, and guidance in its work by the principles of scientific excellence, overall program priorities should be set by a statutorily authorized criminal justice research advisory board.

17. The Director of the National Institute should be chosen from candidates with significant experience and recognition in both research and research administration.

18. In order to ensure coordination among the various activities closely related to the research mission of the National Institute and to ensure the creation of an integrated intellectual and administrative base, the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and Project Search should all be in
the National Institute structure. The National Academy of Sciences Committee also endorses the idea of a bureau of criminal justice statistics; the ideal arrangement would be to locate this bureau within an independent National Institute.

19. Major functions and activities that are extraneous to the National Institute's substantive research program, such as formalized technical assistance to criminal justice planners and practitioners in designing and performing project evaluations, or the packaging and marketing aspects of dissemination, should be located within LEAA's Office of Regional Operations (now the Office of Criminal Justice Programs), rather than in the National Institute.
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