From the U.S. Government Accountability Office, www.gao.gov Transcript for: 2019 NASA Major Projects Quick Look Description: We're catching up on the status of NASA's largest projects. Related GAO Work: GAO-19-262SP: NASA: Assessments of Major Projects Released: May 2019 [ Background Music ] [ Cristina Chaplain: ] It's more imperative than ever for NASA to improve acquisition management. [ Matt Oldham: ] Welcome to GAO's Watchdog Report, your source for news and information from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. I'm Matt Oldham. Every year, GAO reports on how well NASA is planning and executing its major acquisition projects, many with lifecycle costs north of $250 million. I'm here with Cristina Chaplain, a Contracting and National Security Acquisitions director at GAO. And she's here to talk about this year's NASA Quick Look report. Thank you for joining me, Cristina. [ Cristina Chaplain: ] Thank you. Good to be here. [ Matt Oldham: ] Is there anything new with this year's report? [ Cristina Chaplain: ] Yes, there is! The portfolio of NASA's major projects continues to deteriorate in terms of its performance. The average cost increase, for example, for projects increased from about 19 percent to 28 percent, which is pretty significant. And then the average schedule delay is now at 13 months, which is the largest average delay we've reported yet. And it's important to keep in mind that this is the status of NASA systems before the government shutdown. It's likely that the shutdown itself had some impacts on programs and that we might see more cost overruns and schedule delays in next year's Quick Look as a result. And then just one last point is that most of the cost growth and schedule delays are driven by just a few very large programs. Most of the other programs in NASA's portfolios are doing pretty well. [ Matt Oldham: ] So then which of those projects are among the biggest culprits for this performance deterioration? [ Cristina Chaplain: ] Right. The two projects that have the most influence on the cost and schedule overruns are the James Webb telescope and the Space Launch System. And the James Webb telescope is the one that's going to be replacing the Hubble telescope. It'll be helping us to learn about the origins of the universe. It's a very complex telescope. And they've experienced some troubles in recent years. And so we're reporting this year that the schedule delay for James Webb has increased considerably. And that their cost increase they had just over the year is about $800 million. So, we've had previous cost overruns and schedule delays for James Webb. We're now to the point where we're seeing a total delay of seven years. And then Space Launch System is part of a family of systems, human spaceflight systems, designed to help NASA go to deeper in space to explore with people. And the primary component of that is the Space Launch System which is the heavy lift rocket that they're developing. That too had some cost overruns and schedule delays that helped drive the schedule. It had a 19-month delay, for example. And a lot of that is related to just underestimating the complexity of building that rocket, particularly the core stage which is the backbone of the rocket. It's the fuel tank. [ Background Music ] [ Matt Oldham: ] So, it sounds like these project delays and cost overruns continue not just to trend upward, but even grow. We're seeing 28 percent cost growth and an average launch delay of more than a year. Any recommendations for how NASA can reverse their course? [ Cristina Chaplain: ] Yes. We've had some very basic recommendations that we've been pushing for the past 10 years at least. And they can still be adopted more by NASA. So one is just being realistic about costs and schedule up front. And updating those estimates, even in the late stages of development. And we find it's precisely these big projects, James Webb and Orion and Space Launch Systems that are very reluctant to do that. Also, we've been telling NASA that they should manage risks where they can. So, that might mean cost and schedule reserves to help programs manage, you know, risky things that they face. And most programs do build in these kinds of reserves. The human spaceflight systems do not. [ Matt Oldham: ] So, would you like to leave with any final thoughts on this report? [ Cristina Chaplain: ] It's more imperative than ever for NASA to improve acquisition management. They've been challenged to go to the moon, and they were anticipating to do that by 2028, but now that's going to be 2024, because the administration has challenged them to get there quicker. So, they really want that to happen. These old programs, like Space Launch System and Orion, they really have to buckle down and do things right. They can't face more delays going ahead. And then there's a whole slew of new programs for going to the moon, like moon landers and a gateway and a whole bunch of other things. Those need to avoid all these mistakes that have been made by the other human spaceflight systems. And really, it's going to be a lot of pressure on NASA to get this done in time. The best way to do it is to again follow best practices; have good, sound management and oversight; and healthy competition for all these programs going forward. [ Matt Oldham: ] Cristina Chaplain led an annual report looking at the cost and schedule performance for NASA's portfolio of major projects. Thank you for your time, Cristina. [ Cristina Chaplain: ] Thank you. [ Background Music ] [ Matt Oldham: ] Thanks for listening to the Watchdog Report. 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