COUNTERNARCOTICS

Overview of U.S. Efforts in the Western Hemisphere
COUNTERNARCOTICS
Overview of U.S. Efforts in the Western Hemisphere

**Why GAO Did This Study**

Western Hemisphere nations such as Mexico and Colombia are major sources of illicit drugs such as cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit fentanyl and other dangerous synthetic drugs often originate in China but typically enter the United States through Canada and Mexico. U.S. agencies implementing the National Drug Control Strategy conduct several activities to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs and dismantle the organizations that control them (see fig.). In December 2016, Congress established the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission to, among other things, evaluate the U.S.-funded counternarcotics programs in the Western Hemisphere.

In this context, GAO was asked to review key issues related to U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. This report examines (1) U.S. agencies’ spending for counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere during fiscal years 2010-2015, the most recent data available; (2) how agencies are gathering and sharing best practices and lessons learned from their counternarcotics efforts domestically and internationally; and (3) mechanisms U.S. agencies have used to address changing drug threats. GAO analyzed agencies’ data and documents, interviewed agency officials, and conducted fieldwork at the U.S. Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task Force South in Florida.

GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. Several agencies provided technical comments on a draft of this report which we incorporated as appropriate.

**What GAO Found**

U.S. agencies implementing the National Drug Control Strategy identified billions in spending for Western Hemisphere counternarcotics efforts in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Agencies that track their counternarcotics spending regionally—the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development—reported spending nearly $5 billion for such activities in the region during this period. Agencies that do not track counternarcotics spending regionally—DHS’s Customs and Border Protection and Coast Guard; and the Department of Justice’s Drug Enforcement Administration and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces—reported spending about $34 billion for counternarcotics activities in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. According to officials of these four agencies, most of their counternarcotics activities are in the Western Hemisphere. We are not reporting Federal Bureau of Investigation counternarcotics spending separately, since it is included as part of Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which coordinates the National Drug Control Program, facilitates the sharing of best practices and lessons learned at meetings such as the North American Drug Dialogue workshop, including Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In addition, 7 of the 10 agencies GAO reviewed described processes they have in place for identifying and collecting best practices or lessons learned from counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. For example, DOD reported using a process, known as the Joint Lessons Learned Program, that consists of five phases: discovery, validation, resolution, evaluation, and dissemination.

U.S. agencies use a variety of mechanisms to address changing narcotics conditions in the Western Hemisphere. ONDCP collaborates with agencies working directly on regional counternarcotics efforts to address emerging threats, as reflected in the annually updated National Drug Control Strategy and the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. In addition, documentary evidence GAO reviewed showed that a variety of interagency groups, task forces, and committees have been created to coordinate the U.S. government’s responses to counternarcotics threats. For example, the National Heroin Coordination Group was established to provide guidance aimed at reducing the growing supply of heroin and illicit fentanyl in the U.S. market.
Table 2: Spending Identified for Western Hemisphere Counternarcotics Activities by Agencies That Track Funds by Region, Fiscal Years 2010-2015 10

Table 3: Counternarcotics Obligations for Agencies That Do Not Track Spending by Region, Fiscal Years 2010-2015 14

Table 4: Department of Defense (DOD) Obligations for Drug Resources in the Western Hemisphere, by Geographic Command, Fiscal Years 2010-2015 43

Table 5: Department of Defense (DOD) Obligations for Country-Specific Train-and-Equip Counternarcotics Activities in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2013-2015 44

Table 6: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Expenditures for Western Hemisphere Counternarcotics Investigations and Intelligence Activities, by Country, Fiscal Years 2010-2015 45

Table 7: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Obligations for Personnel Stationed in Countries in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2010-2015 46

Table 8: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Expenditures for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Program Drug-Related Investigations of Transnational Crime Organizations in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2010-2015 48

Table 9: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Obligations for Counternarcotics Activities in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2010-2015 49

Table 10: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Obligations for Alternative Development Programs in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2010-2015 49

Figure 1: Map of Major Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries in the Western Hemisphere 5
Abbreviations

CBP    Customs and Border Protection
DEA    Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS    Department of Homeland Security
DOD    Department of Defense
DOJ    Department of Justice
FARC   Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI    Federal Bureau of Investigation
HIDTA  High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
HSI    Homeland Security Investigations
ICE    Immigration and Customs Enforcement
INL    Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces
ONDCP  Office of National Drug Control Policy
State  Department of State
USAID  U.S. Agency for International Development

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
October 13, 2017

The Honorable Eliot Engel
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Engel:

Most of the illicit drugs consumed in the United States originate in other Western Hemisphere nations. For example, Mexico is the primary supplier of heroin and a major source of methamphetamine smuggled into this country. Similarly, Colombia is the leading producer of cocaine for the U.S. market. Moreover, illicit drugs or components manufactured in other parts of the world are smuggled into the United States through Western Hemisphere countries. For example, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit fentanyl often originate in China but typically enter the United States through Canada and Mexico.

U.S. government efforts to reduce the trafficking of illicit drugs from other Western Hemisphere countries have included the establishment of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). ONDCP is responsible for, among other things, developing the National Drug Control Strategy (in this report, “the Strategy”) and coordinating the efforts of National Drug Control Program agencies implementing any aspect of the Strategy.1 In addition, to bring attention to these and other challenges posed by illicit drug production and trafficking in the Western Hemisphere and to identify options for strengthening U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the region, Congress mandated the establishment of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission in December 2016.2 The commission is directed to,

---

1“The National Drug Control Program” means programs, policies, and activities undertaken by National Drug Control Program agencies related to their responsibilities under the National Drug Control Strategy, including activities involving demand and supply reduction or state, local, and tribal affairs. “National Drug Control Program agency” means any agency that is responsible for implementing any aspect of the National Drug Control Strategy, subject to certain exceptions regarding intelligence agencies. See 21 U.S.C. § 1701.

among other things, evaluate U.S.-funded international counternarcotics programs in the Western Hemisphere, including drug interdiction, crop eradication, alternative development, drug production surveys, police and justice sector training, demand reduction, and strategies to target drug kingpins.

You asked us to review key issues related to U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. This report describes (1) U.S. agencies’ spending for counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere in fiscal years 2010 through 2015, (2) agencies’ efforts to gather and share best practices and lessons learned from their counternarcotics efforts both domestically and internationally, and (3) mechanisms that agencies have used to address changing drug threats.

To examine U.S. agencies’ counternarcotics spending in the Western Hemisphere, we obtained obligations data from eight U.S. departments, agencies, and components that implement the National Drug Control Strategy (collectively in this report, “agencies”): (1) the Department of Defense (DOD); the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) (2) Customs and Border Protection (CBP), (3) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and (4) Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) (5) DEA and (6) Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF); the Department of State’s (State) (7) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL); and (8) the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We selected these eight agencies because each conducts international counternarcotics efforts in one or more program areas that the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission has been asked to review and because each agency allocated a combined total of $50 million for counternarcotics efforts in the four ONDCP-defined program areas—intelligence, interdiction, international, and investigations—in fiscal year 2015. We worked with agency officials to determine the amounts obligated (i.e., spent) for counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere in fiscal years 2010 through 2015, the most recent data available at the time of our analysis.

3In December 2016, Congress passed legislation (Pub. L. No. 114-323) to establish an independent drug commission, called the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere and to identify policy and program options to improve existing international counternarcotics policy. The legislation directs the commission to review U.S.-funded international illicit drug control programs in the Western Hemisphere, including drug interdiction, crop eradication, alternative development, drug production surveys, police and justice sector training, demand reduction, and strategies to target drug kingpins.
We excluded ONDCP from this analysis because it plays a supporting role as the agency that coordinates the National Drug Control Program and does not conduct counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere. In addition, although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducts counternarcotics-related investigations of transnational criminal organizations in the Western Hemisphere, we are not reporting the FBI’s counternarcotics spending separately because the FBI is reimbursed by OCDETF for its support of drug-related investigations; therefore, we are including the FBI’s counternarcotics spending in OCDETF spending. Because some agencies do not track their counternarcotics spending by region, we were unable to identify obligations specific to these agencies’ counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere. Also, to the extent possible, we excluded spending for activities primarily related to domestically focused U.S. counternarcotics activities. On the basis of our review of the data, our review of each agency’s annual accounting of its drug budget, and interviews with agency officials, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to present obligations that were primarily or partially spent on counternarcotic activities in the Western Hemisphere.

To examine agencies’ efforts to gather and share best practices and lessons learned, we sent a standard set of questions to, and interviewed, officials of the eight selected agencies as well as ONDCP and the FBI regarding any processes they use to identify, collect, disseminate, and share best practices and lessons learned with partner nations and regarding U.S. government–wide efforts to share best practices and lessons learned.

To identify the mechanisms that the eight agencies, ONDCP, and the FBI have used to address changing drug threats, we interviewed agency officials about the mechanisms in place to address these threats. We also reviewed key national documents directing U.S. counternarcotics efforts as well as documents related to various coordination efforts. In addition,

---

4 Transnational criminal organizations are a major threat to national and international security, and these networks are involved in a wide range of illicit activities, including drug trafficking. Proceeds from the sale of illicit narcotics are also a core enabler of the most dangerous transnational organized crime networks that threaten U.S. security interests.

5 All drug control program agencies are required to submit to the Director of ONDCP a detailed accounting, which has been authenticated by the Inspector General of each agency prior to submission, of all funds expended by the agency for their counternarcotics activities during the previous fiscal year. See 21 U.S.C. § 1704(d).
we conducted fieldwork at DOD’s U.S. Southern Command and the Joint Interagency Task Force South in Florida. For a more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to October 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background

Major Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries in the Western Hemisphere

The majority of illicit drugs consumed in the United States is produced in Mexico and South America and enters the United States across the southwest border or through the Caribbean. Among countries in the Western Hemisphere, Colombia and Peru are major producers of illicit drugs, while Bolivia, Jamaica, and Mexico are both major producers and major transit countries, according to State (see fig. 1).

---

6The Foreign Assistance Act defines a major illicit drug-producing country as one in which 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy are cultivated or harvested during a year; 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca are cultivated or harvested during a year; or 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis are cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States (See 22 U.S.C. § 2291(e)(1)). A major drug-transit country is one that is a significant, direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States or through which such drugs or substances are transported (See 22 U.S.C. § 2291(e)(5)).
Figure 1: Map of Major Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries in the Western Hemisphere

Mexico is a major source and transit country for heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana destined for the U.S. market. Jamaica is likewise the largest Caribbean supplier of marijuana for the U.S. market. Colombia is the world’s top producer of cocaine and is the major provider of cocaine available in the United States. While Bolivia and Peru are also major producers of cocaine, cocaine from these countries is generally smuggled into other South American countries for domestic consumption or for shipment to Europe, East Asia, and beyond, according to State.

According to U.S. government estimates, illicit drugs originating in Mexico enter the United States directly through the southwest border, but virtually all cocaine from South America and marijuana from Jamaica are trafficked to the United States through the “Transit Zone”—a 7-million-square-mile area that encompasses Central America, Mexico, the eastern Pacific Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea. The Transit Zone has four principal maritime trafficking routes: the Eastern Pacific, Western Caribbean, Central Caribbean, and Eastern Caribbean. The Transit Zone land route is funneled north through Central America into Mexico, where it splits in several directions up to the U.S. southwest border. Although Canada is not within the Transit Zone, various drugs, including fentanyl, transit through it before entering the United States, according to the Department of State.

### Illicit Drug-Trafficking Shifts and Related Challenges

In recent years, the production, trafficking, and marketing of various illicit substances consumed in the United States have undergone significant shifts. For example, according to the 2016 National Drug Control Strategy, over the previous 8 years, opioid abuse emerged as the greatest drug threat to the nation. This development was complicated by a spike in the supply and purity of heroin, primarily from Mexico, resulting in a combined epidemic of heroin-opioid overdose deaths. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, heroin overdose deaths more than tripled between 2010 and 2015, as powerful synthetic opioids, notably illicit fentanyl, were often mixed with heroin without the user’s knowledge. Similarly, in its 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, State reported various indicators suggesting a significant increase in cocaine production and trafficking from Colombia. For example, according to this report, coca cultivation in Colombia increased by 39 percent in 2014 and by 42 percent in 2015, and the amount of cocaine...
trafficked out of Colombia has reached record levels. Consistent with these reported trends in cocaine production and trafficking, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data indicate that, after falling sharply in the middle of the past decade, overdose deaths related to cocaine have been gradually rising in the United States. Finally, while a significant portion of the marijuana consumed in the United States continues to be smuggled from Western Hemisphere countries, including Canada, Jamaica, and Mexico, the domestic production and marketing of marijuana are undergoing important shifts, as several states and the District of Columbia have passed measures that legalize possession of limited amounts of the drug and provide for regulation of its production, processing, and sales. These shifting trends pose challenges for agencies’ counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere and domestically, as they strive to respond to changing conditions.

### Role of ONDCP in U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in the Western Hemisphere

ONDCP coordinates the National Drug Control Program and develops a 5-year National Drug Control Strategy, which it updates annually, as well as a number of companion strategies that focus on various geographical areas and emerging threats, to articulate the administration’s drug control policy. ONDCP was established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to, among other things, enhance national drug control planning and coordination and represent the drug policies of the executive branch before Congress. In this role, ONDCP is responsible for (1) developing a national drug control policy, (2) developing and applying specific goals and performance measurements to evaluate the effectiveness of national drug control policy and National Drug Control Program agencies’ programs, (3) overseeing and coordinating the implementation of the national drug control policy, and (4) assessing and certifying the adequacy of the budget for national drug control programs.

ONDCP requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit an annual drug control budget, categorized into 10 federal drug control program areas. One program area is international efforts, which ONDCP defines as activities focused on regions outside the United States that are

---

7According to State’s 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, such significant growth in coca cultivation is, at least in part, related to the Colombian government scaling back coca eradication in order to lower the risk of armed conflict in coca-producing areas controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with which the government was negotiating a peace agreement.

8ONDCP refers to these program areas as “drug control functions.”
intended to reduce illegal drug availability in the United States or abroad. Three additional ONDCP drug control program areas—intelligence, interdiction, and investigations—include domestic as well as international efforts, as interdictions may occur at or outside U.S. borders, and intelligence and investigative efforts may target drug organizations operating outside the United States.9

Key Agencies Involved in International Efforts to Combat Illicit Drugs Entering the United States

In addition to ONDCP, eight agencies are involved in the four program areas that support counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere to stop the production and transshipment of illicit drugs or their precursors destined for the United States. These activities include the following:

- interdictions at U.S. borders;
- maritime drug interdictions in international waters and in international interdictions in concert with partner nations in international and territorial waters;
- intelligence gathering to support drug interdictions, investigations, and international activities;
- investigations of drug organizations based in countries outside the United States;
- eradication support and efforts; and
- building foreign partner capacity to conduct counternarcotics activities.

Table 1 shows the eight U.S. government agencies that allocate resources in one or more of the four ONDCP program areas—counternarcotics intelligence, interdiction, international activities, and investigations—that we included in our review. For a detailed description of ONDCP’s program areas, more information on the roles of these agencies, and the countries in which they operate, see appendixes I, II, and III, respectively.

9ONDCP’s six other program priority areas are corrections; prevention; prosecution; research and development; state, local, and tribal law enforcement assistance; and treatment.
### Table 1: U.S. Agencies That Report Allocated Resources for Counternarcotics Intelligence, Interdiction, International, and Investigations Program Areas to ONDCP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program areas</th>
<th>DOD</th>
<th>CBP</th>
<th>ICE</th>
<th>Coast Guard</th>
<th>DEA</th>
<th>OCDETF</th>
<th>INL</th>
<th>USAID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: DOD = Department of Defense  
CBP = U.S. Customs and Border Protection  
ICE = Immigration and Customs Enforcement  
DEA = Drug Enforcement Administration  
OCDETF = Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces  
INL = Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs  
USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development  
“—” = no resources allocated


Note: The information shown reflects data that the eight agencies reported to ONDCP in 2016. ONDCP requires National Drug Control Program agencies to submit an annual drug control budget to be included in a consolidated National Drug Control Budget by program area. The 4 program areas shown are among 10 program areas for which ONDCP requires this submission. Some agencies’ annual reports to ONDCP may not reflect all aspects of their drug control activities by program area; for example, CBP, DEA, ICE, and the Coast Guard conduct international activities that they report under other program areas, such as Interdiction or Investigations. In addition, while other U.S. agencies that report annually to ONDCP may have responsibility for one or more of the 4 program areas, the information shown represents only those agencies we determined support Western Hemisphere counternarcotics efforts. See GAO-18-10, appendix I, for a detailed description of our methodology.

---

U.S. Agencies Identified Billions of Dollars in Spending Primarily or Partially for Western Hemisphere Counternarcotics Efforts for 2010 through 2015
Some Agencies Track Counternarcotics Spending by Region and Identified $5 Billion in Obligations for Activities in the Western Hemisphere

Of the agencies included in our review, DOD, ICE, INL, and USAID track counternarcotics spending on a regional basis and provided data on funds obligated for counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere. As table 2 shows, these agencies obligated more than $5 billion for counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere during fiscal years 2010 through 2015. (See app. III for the agencies’ regional or country-level counternarcotics obligations, as available).

### Table 2: Spending Identified for Western Hemisphere Counternarcotics Activities by Agencies That Track Funds by Region, Fiscal Years 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>2,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and Customs Enforcement</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>5,218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. | GAO-18-10

Note: Because of rounding, numbers in columns and rows may not sum to totals shown.

*a* These data do not include the Department of Defense’s (DOD) obligations levels for counternarcotics intelligence activities conducted by U.S. Northern and Southern Commands. DOD was not able to provide obligations data for these activities for certain fiscal years.

*b* We asked agencies to provide obligations levels because with the variations of funding data across all agencies, we determined that we could provide the most consistent information with obligations levels, which capture each agency’s financial commitments for its counternarcotics activities. However, the amounts shown for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) represent expenditures rather than obligations because ICE’s financial system converts obligations into expenditures once payment has been made, according to agency officials. Therefore, ICE was unable to provide us with obligations data. Expenditures are the issuance of checks, disbursement of cash, or electronic transfer of funds made to liquidate a federal obligation.

Of the agencies in our review, the Coast Guard, CBP, and ICE do not receive appropriations specifically for counternarcotics activities. All DEA and OCDETF funds are counted as part of the National Drug Control Program. DEA receives funds appropriated to the DEA salaries and expenses account as well as from the agency’s Diversion Control Fee Account. OCDETF’s funds are appropriated through the Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement appropriation within annual appropriations measures for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies. DOD’s counternarcotics activities, with the exception of health programs that fund substance abuse treatment for military personnel, are appropriated through the Drug Interdiction and Counter Drug Activities appropriation. INL’s counternarcotics funds are appropriated to the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account. USAID’s funds are appropriated to the Economic Support Funds and Development Assistance accounts.
DOD obligated a total of more than $2.8 billion for counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere for fiscal years 2010 through 2015. According to DOD documents, these activities support U.S. domestic and foreign government efforts to combat drug trafficking and drug-related terrorist activities through detection and monitoring of illicit drug smuggling, information and intelligence sharing, and capacity building. DOD generally tracks its counternarcotics spending by geographic combatant command and various functional areas. A significant portion of DOD’s counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere are conducted by U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command.11 These resources fund DOD’s training and equipment provided to foreign partners conducting counternarcotics activities, surveillance and communications systems, aircraft patrolling the transit zone, and costs associated with operating DOD’s Joint Interagency Task Force South.12 However, the obligations for counternarcotics activities that DOD reported for fiscal years 2010 through 2015 underrepresent its overall obligations for such activities because the reported amounts do not include U.S. Northern Command’s and U.S. Southern Command’s salaries and expenses of its personnel and counternarcotics-related intelligence activities. It also does not include DOD’s agency-wide intelligence gathering and training, as well as aircraft flight hours and ship days in support of counternarcotics activities.13

ICE expended a total of about $212 million for salaries and expenses of Homeland Security Investigations’ (HSI) agents and analysts working on drug cases in various countries in the Western Hemisphere during fiscal

---

11U.S. Northern Command’s area of responsibility covers Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding waters, to include The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility includes the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico, the waters adjacent to Central and South America, and the Caribbean Sea.

12Section 1009 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Pub. L. No. 112-239) required DOD to submit biannual reports to Congress on the use of counternarcotics funds in support of counternarcotics activities of foreign governments. DOD started tracking these figures in 2013. The reporting requirement ceased beginning in fiscal year 2017.

13Although DOD tracks most of its counternarcotics obligations by geographic combatant command and functional area, DOD data also showed spending for agency-wide counternarcotics activities that are not region specific. Because DOD does not track this spending by region, we did not include them in DOD’s obligations.
The Domestic Investigations program covers enforcement efforts to disrupt cross-border criminal activity related to contraband smuggling and the dismantling of the transnational criminal organizations responsible for these activities.

International Operations covers HSI’s international investigations involving transnational criminal organizations and serves as ICE’s liaison to foreign law enforcement counterparts overseas.

The Office of Intelligence provides intelligence services for Domestic Investigations and International Operations to support criminal investigations to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations involved in the transnational drug trade and associated money-laundering crimes.

INL obligated a total of more than $1.5 billion for counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. During this period, INL funded projects that were designed to improve foreign law enforcement and intelligence-gathering capabilities; enhance the effectiveness of criminal justice sectors to allow foreign governments to increase drug shipment interdictions; investigate, prosecute, and convict narcotics criminals; and break up major drug-trafficking organizations. INL also used U.S. federal law enforcement entities to provide technical assistance to its counterparts overseas. Examples of INL’s technical assistance include the following:

- In Mexico, INL’s efforts focused on enhancing the Mexican government’s capacity to interdict illegal narcotics while not impeding the flow of legitimate goods. This included providing detection dogs, equipment, and training to the Mexican Federal Police, Customs, Army, and Navy.

---

14While we report on agencies’ counternarcotics obligations in this report, for ICE, we report on expenditures levels because ICE’s financial system converts obligations into expenditures once payment has been made. Expenditures are the issuance of checks, disbursement of cash, or electronic transfer of funds made to liquidate a federal obligation.
In Colombia, INL’s program focused on aerial eradication of coca plants, land and maritime interdictions, and capacity building for counternarcotics forces.\(^{15}\)

In Peru, INL programs included support for manual eradication of coca plants, interdiction efforts, and drug demand reduction activities.

In Central America, INL efforts included building interdiction capacities such as funding vetted units sponsored by federal law enforcement partners and providing technical assistance and equipment for air and maritime interdiction.\(^{16}\)

In the Caribbean, INL efforts focused on building partner nation interdiction capacity, providing support for vetted units, and enhancing information sharing among partner nations.

**USAID**

USAID obligated a total of about $638 million for Western Hemisphere counternarcotics activities in fiscal years 2010 through 2015, supporting alternative development projects in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.\(^{17}\) According to agency officials, the USAID mission in Colombia is working to create licit alternatives to coca production, including holistic support to viable and lucrative agricultural value chains, such as cacao, specialty coffee, and other products that can be sold on domestic and export markets; provision of rural financial services and credits for licit opportunities; efforts to attract private sector investment into rural regions; and, to a lesser degree, helping communities build infrastructure, such as roads, to help licit products reach markets. USAID’s alternative development program in Peru aims to promote licit incomes and improved governance to sustain coca reductions achieved through forced eradication. In partnership with the Peruvian national drug commission, the USAID mission in Peru facilitates the implementation of alternative development programs in the country, including improving the drug commission’s ability to monitor and evaluate these programs. The mission has also partnered with the private sector to improve processes involved in preparing cacao crops for the market.

---

\(^{15}\)The Colombian government suspended its aerial eradication program on October 1, 2015, primarily due to the perceived health risks associated with the herbicide used in aerial spraying.

\(^{16}\)Vetted units are groups of partner country law enforcement officials who undergo background checks, including polygraph examinations.

\(^{17}\)USAID obligated funds for alternative development programs in Colombia and Peru for fiscal years 2010 through 2015, in Bolivia for fiscal year 2010, and in Ecuador for fiscal years 2010 through 2012.
While the other agencies in our review—CBP, Coast Guard, DEA, and OCDETF—do not track spending specific to their counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere, they conduct most of their counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere or target threats originating in Western Hemisphere countries, according to agency officials. Thus, while the agencies’ overall counternarcotics obligations overstate spending for such activities in the Western Hemisphere, these obligations approximate the Coast Guard’s, CBP’s, and OCDETF’s spending on activities that were primarily for these purposes in the region. However, DEA was not able to identify spending levels for counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere, and the obligations it provided included spending for some domestic and other international counternarcotics activities. These four agencies had total obligations of nearly $34 billion for their overall counternarcotics activities during fiscal years 2010 through 2015 (see table 3).  

### Table 3: Counternarcotics Obligations for Agencies That Do Not Track Spending by Region, Fiscal Years 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard(^a)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>5,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs and Border Protection(^b)</td>
<td>2,038</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>2,216</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>2,451</td>
<td>13,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration(^b)</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>2,178</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>1,965</td>
<td>2,098</td>
<td>2,113</td>
<td>12,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces(^d)</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>2,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,604</td>
<td>4,736</td>
<td>6,038</td>
<td>5,820</td>
<td>6,280</td>
<td>6,154</td>
<td>33,616</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. | GAO-18-10

Notes: Because of rounding, numbers in columns and rows may not sum to totals shown.

---

\(^a\)Where feasible, we excluded funds we determined to have been used primarily for domestic counternarcotics efforts. To further refine our analysis of agencies’ spending on counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere outside the United States, when possible, we excluded counternarcotics activities that targeted U.S.-based organizations—specifically, DEA’s Diversion Control Program, which enforces regulations pertaining to pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals; spending on the expansion and renovation of the El Paso Intelligence Center, a multiagency facility that serves as a clearinghouse for tactical intelligence and collects, analyzes, and disseminates information related to worldwide drug movement and alien smuggling; and support provided to state and local law enforcement. We also excluded OCDETF’s reimbursements to the DOJ’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center because we determined that these agencies’ activities were primarily focused on domestic efforts. For a detailed discussion of our agency selection process, see app. I.
According to Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials, these agencies’ counternarcotics activities occur primarily at U.S. land and sea borders and should be considered specific to the Western Hemisphere; obligations for these activities therefore reflect the agencies’ entire counternarcotics budget. However, these obligations also include these agencies’ interdiction and investigations activities for drugs coming into the United States from outside the Western Hemisphere. In addition, CBP obligations include salaries and expenses for officers preclearing entrants into the United States at airports in countries outside the Western Hemisphere.

The Coast Guard reported obligating $836 million and $1,406 million for counternarcotics activities in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, respectively, but was unable to provide reasonable assurance that internal controls over all financial reporting processes were operating effectively and could not provide assurances of the reliability of its data for these years.

Obligations shown reflect the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) counternarcotics obligations for the agency’s domestic and international enforcement activities and exclude other strictly domestic activities (i.e., enforcement of pharmaceutical drugs, construction, and assistance to state and local law enforcement). We included obligations for domestic enforcement because these obligations funded DEA’s investigations of drug organizations located outside the United States.

The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) reimburses a number of agencies for drug-related investigations they conduct. We excluded OCDETF’s reimbursements to agencies whose counternarcotics activities are primarily domestic in nature.

The Coast Guard obligated a total of almost $5.3 billion for its drug-interdiction activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2015. As the nation’s principal federal agency for maritime safety, security, and stewardship, the Coast Guard has a drug interdiction objective to reduce the flow of illegal drugs entering the United States by denying smugglers access to maritime routes. The Coast Guard’s counternarcotics obligations in fiscal years 2010 through 2015 covered the agency’s operating expenses, which include costs associated with operating Coast Guard facilities, maintaining capital equipment, improving management effectiveness, and maintaining an active duty military and civilian workforce. These funds also supported reserve training and acquisition, construction, and improvement of capital assets and facilities. The Coast Guard does not maintain data on the portion of the agency’s drug resources that are used for the interdiction of drugs trafficked to or from countries outside the Western Hemisphere. However, according to Coast Guard officials, because the agency’s counternarcotics efforts take place around U.S. maritime borders and in transit zones in the Western Hemisphere, the

This figure was derived from the Coast Guard’s submission of its annual accounting of drug control funds to ONDCP. The Office of the Inspector General, in its annual review of the Coast Guard’s obligations of counternarcotics funds, found that the Coast Guard was unable to provide reasonable assurance that internal controls over all financial reporting processes were operating effectively in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. The Coast Guard acknowledged that pervasive material weaknesses existed in some key financial processes. Consequently, the Coast Guard could not be reasonably certain that its financial statements are reliable or complete. Although the Coast Guard had implemented several improvements to their financial systems, officials were unable to provide accurate and reliable data for these years.
agency’s drug resources are generally expended in the Western Hemisphere.

**CBP**

CBP obligated a total of more than $13 billion for its counternarcotics activities in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. According to the agency’s budget documents, CBP used its counternarcotics spending to carry out its border security mission at and between all ports of entry and to conduct air and marine operations in source, transit, and arrival zones in the Western Hemisphere. The agency also obligated funds to invest in border security technology and infrastructure to detect and monitor suspicious air, maritime, and land traffic. CBP’s counternarcotics funds also were used for training and information technology to support its activities. CBP officials indicated that, because CBP’s mission is to protect U.S. borders, the agency’s counternarcotics spending should generally be considered resources spent in the Western Hemisphere. However, CBP’s reported obligations also include resources dedicated to border protection measures to interdict shipments of drugs and precursor chemicals from countries outside the Western Hemisphere.20

**DEA**

DEA obligated a total of almost $13 billion for its domestic and international enforcement activities in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. DEA is the lead U.S. agency responsible for the development of the overall federal drug enforcement strategy, programs, planning, and evaluation. DEA’s budget includes categories for domestic enforcement, international enforcement, and state and local support. While domestic enforcement accounts for the majority of DEA’s resources, DEA coordinates its domestic and international enforcement activities (i.e., DEA’s foreign offices) to pursue, at the highest level, multinational drug organizations and, at the lowest level, independent drug cells, according to documents.21 With regard to international enforcement, DEA tracks

---

20For example, this includes the cost of CBP officers posted in Ireland and the United Arab Emirates to preclear entrants into the United States.

21Because DEA’s domestic enforcement activities include efforts to target drug organizations outside the United States, we included domestic enforcement in our calculations of DEA obligations. Therefore, this amount overestimates the agency’s counternarcotics enforcement activities targeted toward non-U.S. drug organizations in the Western Hemisphere. We excluded from our calculation DEA’s obligation for three counternarcotics activities that we considered to be primarily focused on domestic issues: enforcement of regulations pertaining to pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals, construction costs associated with the expansion and renovation of an interagency intelligence center in Texas and support provided to state and local law enforcement.
regional spending for salaries and expenses associated with agents and intelligence analysts posted in countries overseas.\footnote{As of September 2016, DEA had 92 offices in 70 countries.} DEA’s international enforcement includes more than $1 billion in obligations for salaries and expenses for personnel posted in Western Hemisphere countries in fiscal years 2010 through 2015.

\textbf{OCDETF}  

OCDETF obligated a total of about $2.1 billion for counternarcotics-related efforts in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. According to OCDETF reports, this funding supported investigations targeting the highest priority drug-related transnational crime organizations. OCDETF’s funds were used to reimburse a number of DOJ components—DEA, the FBI, and the OCDETF Fusion Center, a multiagency intelligence center\footnote{The OCDETF Fusion Center was designed to provide intelligence information for investigations and prosecutions focused on disrupting and dismantling drug-trafficking and money-laundering organizations and helps coordinate these efforts.}—for their support of OCDETF investigations of high-priority targets.\footnote{Of the DOJ components that receive OCDETF reimbursements, the FBI reported on its expenditures of OCDETF reimbursements for drug-related investigations of Central American, South American, Mexican, and Caribbean transnational crime organizations, as well as drug- and money-laundering and alien-smuggling organizations and public corruption cases in the Western Hemisphere during fiscal years 2010 through 2015 (see app. III).} According to a senior OCDETF official, although the agency’s financial system does not contain information that would allow us to ascertain the amounts obligated for investigations of international targets located in the Western Hemisphere, very few OCDETF cases involve drugs coming into the United States from outside the Western Hemisphere. Most OCDETF investigations target drugs coming into the United States from other Western Hemisphere countries.
ONDCP facilitates the sharing of best practices and lessons learned with interagency and foreign partners by including the topic on the agendas of key meetings, according to ONDCP officials. For example, ONDCP officials described the sharing of best practices and lessons learned with stakeholders from Canada, Mexico, and the United States at technical workshops of the North American Drug Dialogue held in March 2017. At these workshops, the Department of State shared with its Mexican partners lessons learned pertaining to Colombia and Peru, including the following:

- **Eradication of coca alone is not sufficient.** A whole-of-government approach that provides security, the incentive of alternative development, the disincentive of eradication, and intelligence-led interdiction efforts that deny harvesters or traffickers the ability to profit from the product is essential.

- **Results take time.** For example, the 90-percent reduction in coca production in San Martin, Peru, took 12 years.

- **Efforts should be geographically targeted and driven by information and intelligence, given scarce resources.** For example, data can be used to allow for planning targeted eradication operations, based on intelligence or other information, and for the planning of complementary interventions, such as rural development or target eradication goals.

---

25There is no formal requirement for ONDCP to collect lesson learned or best practices.
According to ONDCP officials, best practices and lessons learned are also described in the National Drug Control Strategy as well as companion strategies such as the Southwest Border and Caribbean Counternarcotics strategies. For example, according to the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy, lessons learned such as the following can be drawn from Colombia’s experience that might be useful elsewhere:

- **Host-government ownership.** For example, although Plan Colombia required extensive U.S. financial support, the Colombian government demonstrated that it was fully committed to the initiative under consecutive administrations.²⁶

- **Government-wide approach.** Eradication can be an effective deterrent to illicit cultivation and can provide an incentive to move to licit crops. However, eradication must be accompanied by a government presence in rural areas; alternative development to preclude replanting or dispersal of plots; and a focus on rule of law and human rights, humanitarian needs, and social and economic reform to reduce the incentive to revert to illicit crops.

- **Security.** Security is a precondition for the successful expansion of social services and developmental assistance. Security must be maintained to allow the expansion of legal economic activities and the delivery of civilian services, including justice, education, and health, to a population unaccustomed to a significant government presence.

- **Flexibility.** Programs must adapt to changing circumstances, including adjusting programs that are not working as expected and adding new initiatives, if necessary.

- **Long-term approach.** Major counternarcotics programs designed to address complex and long-standing challenges require a multiyear investment in terms of financial resources and political commitment.

²⁶Plan Colombia was the Colombian government’s 1999 strategy to address security and development issues associated with ending the country’s decades-long armed conflict to eliminate drug trafficking and promote economic and social development. The plan aimed to curb trafficking activity and reduce coca cultivation in Colombia by 50 percent over 6 years. In support of Plan Colombia, the United States provided more than $8 billion in assistance from fiscal years 2000 through 2011 and provided additional funding through the U.S.-Colombia Strategic Initiative, which incorporated traditional counternarcotics, alternative development, and capacity-building assistance, according to the Congressional Research Service.
ONDCP has also promoted best practices through other efforts. For example, the 2015 National Drug Control Strategy included an action item to work with the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission to strengthen counterdrug institutions in the Western Hemisphere. As part of this effort, ONDCP and the Department of State participated in the Demand Reduction and the Alternatives to Incarceration meetings, which focused on promoting best practices and expanding host-nation capacity. Reflecting this effort, Organization of American States’ officials cited as a best practice the training of 300 Colombian and Argentinian judges and chief justices, who learned about the Alternatives to Incarceration model, in November 2016.

Officials at 7 of the 10 agencies included in our review reported having processes for identifying and collecting best practices and lessons learned from counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. Officials at each of these seven agencies also reported having mechanisms to share best practices and lessons learned, including through web-enabled systems, and sharing these best practices and lessons learned with other U.S. agencies and foreign partners. In addition, officials at six of the seven agencies reported having a formal review process for determining best practices and lessons learned.

USAID and DOD guidance and officials described comprehensive processes for collecting and sharing information about best practices and lessons learned. For example, according to USAID guidance, its Country Development Cooperation Strategy “should include a summary of lessons learned from the implementation of the previous Country Development Cooperation Strategy or other strategic plans (if applicable) and from previous experiences (e.g., projects and activities).” The guidance states that at least once during the course of implementing the Country Development Cooperation Strategy, USAID missions must collect information by conducting reviews of ongoing efforts and of options for better aligning their programs with changes in the context, agency direction, and lessons learned. In addition, according to USAID officials, other levels of program planning incorporate lessons learned and good practices.

---


programming, such as portfolio reviews and other processes involving the periodic assessment of a particular aspect of a mission or a Washington operating unit’s strategy, projects, or activities. USAID evaluations of its alternative development projects in Colombia include examples of best practices and lessons learned, such as the following:

- The success of a project depends on reducing the appeal of coca by improving the social and economic value of legal alternatives.
- Robust licit economies fueled by productive associations, local and regional market integration, and improved transportation networks can reduce coca cultivation.
- A necessary precondition for successful alternative development is the allocation of resources and personnel to rural areas where coca is cultivated.
- Only those strategies that can be accomplished within predetermined time frames and resource parameters and that have a proven track record of reducing coca cultivation should be implemented.
- Reinforcing local community institutions and providing youth-focused programming can help insulate vulnerable communities against the allure of drug trafficking and coca cultivation.29

DOD reported using a formal process for identifying and collecting best practices and lessons learned through its Joint Lessons Learned Program, which consists of five phases: discovery, validation, resolution, evaluation, and dissemination. According to DOD officials, the collection of best practices and lessons learned relating to counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere through this program is intended to enhance readiness and effectiveness. DOD officials noted that the effort to collect best practices and lessons learned is routine and helps inform policy and budget proceedings. Annual conferences, such as the Counternarcotics and Global Threats Coordination Conference and the Program Objective Memoranda Conference, also offer an opportunity to identify, collect, and disseminate best practices and lessons learned as they relate to DOD’s counterdrug and counter-transnational-organized-crime operations. According to DOD officials, such conferences provide a forum for participants to learn how other relevant DOD components working on counternarcotics efforts are approaching counterdrug, transnational organized crime, and related issues. DOD officials also noted that they

intend to use an interagency-agency-task-forces approach to counternarcotics interdiction that the U.S. Southern Command developed in Guatemala as a model for sharing best practices and lessons learned in the region. According to DOD officials, the U.S. Southern Command’s support included training in interdiction tactics, techniques, and procedures, and maintenance of provided equipment such as intercept boats, tactical vehicles, communications gear, and night vision devices. DOD officials reported that lessons learned include establishing the interagency legal framework early, clearly defining interagency relationships, developing the task force’s intelligence capability, implementing police authority and leadership, identifying measures of success, communicating the task force’s purpose and success to the public, and maintaining equipment. DOD officials said that they plan to use the Guatemalan interagency task force as a model with other foreign partners and new counterdrug units in Guatemala and in the region.

State’s report, “Lessons Learned from the Mérida Initiative and Plan Colombia with Regard to Judicial Reform Efforts,” provides specific examples of operational and tactical lessons, as follows:

- **Political will is critical.** According to State, one of the clearest symbols of political will was Mexico’s and Colombia’s dedication of additional resources (to initiatives under the Mérida Initiative and Plan Colombia). In addition, according to State, the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras created a joint regional plan, the Plan of Alliance for Prosperity, underscoring their political will and significant commitment to improve economic opportunities, governance, and public safety. For example, these governments identified $2.6 billion in their 2016 budgets to, among other things, target criminal networks, tackle corruption, and strengthen government institutions.

- **No lasting security without enhanced access to justice.** The governments of Colombia and Mexico have undertaken efforts to expand access to justice in their countries. Since 2008, the government of Mexico has been working to improve the transparency and efficiency of its judicial system by implementing an oral-based accusatorial system.30

---

30According to DOJ, in an inquisitorial system, a judge generally is actively involved in investigating the facts of a case. In the typical accusatorial model, parties are entitled to be present and to retain attorneys who appear before a judge, who moderates the proceedings, to present evidence and arguments in a case.
Partnership across agencies is critical. Plan Colombia represented a whole-of-government approach, with a broad U.S. interagency presence to work across the breadth of the Colombian government. This U.S. interagency presence built linkages at all levels and ensured continuity of vision through leadership transitions in the U.S. and Colombian governments.

U.S. Agencies Use Various Mechanisms to Address Changing Counternarcotics Conditions in the Western Hemisphere

ONDCP Strategies Lay Out Key Efforts to Respond to Emerging Counternarcotics Threats

ONDCP works with agencies to coordinate responses to changing conditions in a variety of ways. ONDCP is responsible for developing (1) the National Drug Control Strategy, which sets forth a comprehensive plan to reduce illicit drug use through programs intended to prevent or treat drug use or reduce the availability of illegal drugs; and (2) several associated companion strategies, which target government efforts to respond to emerging counternarcotics threats for key geographic areas.

The Strategy issued in 2010 laid out the administration’s 5-year blueprint for combatting drug use and included a section on counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. The 2010 Strategy described an approach that reflected two core focus areas: (1) disrupting domestic drug trafficking and production and (2) strengthening international partnerships to reduce the availability of foreign-produced drugs in the United States. The Strategy, including the portions associated with counternarcotics

31 The President is required to submit annually a National Drug Control Strategy, setting forth a comprehensive plan to reduce illicit drug use and the consequences of such illicit drug use in the United States by reducing the supply of, and demand for, illegal drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 1705. The Director of ONDCP is responsible for promulgating the Strategy. See 21 U.S.C. § 1703(b).

32 The agencies we reviewed provided various documents that contained their planning for Western Hemisphere counternarcotics efforts. See app. IV for descriptions of these documents.
efforts in the Western Hemisphere, is updated annually to reflect current priorities and conditions.\textsuperscript{33} According to ONDCP officials, an example of a key change since 2010 is the developing focus on the opioid crisis. In 2010, the President’s first National Drug Control Strategy emphasized the need for action to address opioid use disorders and overdose, while ensuring that individuals with pain receive safe, effective treatment. On April 19, 2011, the White House released its national Prescription Drug Abuse Prevention Plan, which outlined its goals for addressing prescription drug abuse and overdose.\textsuperscript{34}

The 2016 Strategy continued the previous administration’s focus on the opioid crisis but recognized the growing threats from drug-trafficking organizations involved in manufacturing and distributing cocaine and synthetic drugs, including novel psychoactive substances such as synthetic cannabinoids. To address these efforts, the Strategy described U.S. agencies’ interdiction activities, and DEA led efforts to disrupt synthetic drug production and trafficking. The 2016 Strategy also noted U.S. collaboration with China to limit the export of precursor chemicals associated with the production of psychoactive substances.

ONDCP also develops companion strategies with a geographic focus, such as the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, the Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy, and the Caribbean Border Counternarcotics Strategy. The 2015 Strategy acknowledges the companion strategies and indicates that the efforts they describe will be carried out. These strategies include objectives such as enhancing intelligence, interdicting drugs and drug proceeds, ensuring prosecution, disrupting and dismantling drug-trafficking organizations, and improving cooperation with international partners.

The companion strategies have provided opportunities for more targeted responses to address emerging threats in specific geographic areas, which include the following:

\textsuperscript{33}The key chapters addressing counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere are chapter 5, Disrupt Domestic Drug Trafficking and Production, and chapter 6, Strengthen Law Enforcement and International Partnerships to Reduce the Availability of Foreign-Produced Drugs in the United States.

\textsuperscript{34}Most recently, in March 2017, the current administration established a commission to address drug addiction and the opioid crisis. The commission’s mission is to study the scope and effectiveness of the federal response to drug addiction and the opioid crisis and to make recommendations to the President for improving that response.
• National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. The 2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy focused primarily on U.S. government efforts to prevent the trafficking of illicit drugs—heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and foreign-produced marijuana—across the U.S.-Mexican border. The strategy also addressed the illegal outbound movement of weapons and bulk currency from the United States, both of which are associated with activities of narcotics traffickers. As an example of the growing threat posed by the trafficking of heroin from Mexico, the quantity seized on the southwest border nearly tripled, from 1,080 kilograms in 2010 to 3,158 kilograms in 2015.\(^\text{35}\) To address these threats, ONDCP expanded the focus of the 2011 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy to provide border communities with enhanced prevention and drug treatment assistance, in the context of maintaining strong and resilient communities. The 2013 strategy stressed the same basic goals and objectives: substantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of violence across the southwest border as well as maintain strong and resilient communities. This strategy also included indicators related to seizures of drugs at the border. The 2016 strategy differed slightly from the 2013 strategy by elaborating on the threats of various illicit drugs. It also noted that “anything that affects one part of the border affects the entire border” and noted that, for this reason, the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy must be synchronized with the other companion strategies, and the Heroin Availability Reduction Plan.

• National Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy. The 2012 National Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy, which ONDCP first issued that year, parallels the National Southwest Counternarcotics Border Strategy and focuses on ongoing efforts to reduce transnational organized crime threats on both sides of the border between the United States and Canada, specifically the movement of illicit drugs such as marijuana, ecstasy, methamphetamine, and cocaine, and the proceeds from the sale of those drugs. The 2014 strategy emphasizes enhanced federal collaboration with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. The legislation mandating that ONDCP publish the National Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy requires that this document be

released biannually; as of June 2017, the 2016 version had not been released.

- **Caribbean Border Counternarcotics Strategy.** The Caribbean Border Counternarcotics Strategy, issued in January 2015, is substantially equivalent to the national counternarcotics strategies for the southwest and northern borders, according to ONDCP. The strategy identifies cocaine as the principal drug threat and a source of associated violence in the Caribbean region and notes that the documented cocaine flow via the Caribbean to the United States more than doubled from 2011 to 2013, rising from 38 metric tons to 91 metric tons. According to DEA, over 90 metric tons of cocaine was trafficked from South America using sea routes through the Caribbean corridor, primarily toward the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, in 2014.

**Interagency Groups, Task Forces, and Committees Coordinate Government Response to Emerging Counternarcotics Threats**

**Interagency Working Groups**

ONDCP facilitates a number of interagency working groups to address emerging threats. According to ONDCP’s 2016 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, interagency working groups relevant to counternarcotics efforts allow agencies with different authorities and resources to address common concerns, create a common operating picture, identify resource and capability gaps, and leverage resources. ONDCP has created working groups, such as groups focused on heroin and cocaine, to develop actions, goals, and measures to reduce the

---


37 According to an ONDCP official, the report was not completed prior to the change in administrations. This official told us that ONDCP typically does not submit a new strategy in the first year of an administration, as the strategy would essentially be the work product of the previous administration.

38 Consolidated Counterdrug Database, June 6, 2014.

supply of those drugs in the U.S. market as a part of the overall effort to address treatment and demand, as noted in the following examples:

- In November 2015, ONDCP established the National Heroin Coordination Group in coordination with the National Security Council\textsuperscript{40} to provide guidance on interagency activities aimed at reducing the supply of heroin and illicit fentanyl in the U.S market.\textsuperscript{41} The working group includes agencies with federal law enforcement responsibilities and their components, select High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA),\textsuperscript{42} the U.S. embassy in Mexico, and other federal agencies and state entities. In June 2016, the group produced the 5-year Heroin Availability Reduction Plan as part of the administration’s effort to prevent and treat heroin abuse.\textsuperscript{43}

- In January 2016, ONDCP created an internal working group on methamphetamine and synthetic drugs to coordinate efforts across drug control agencies. The group’s priorities included working in

\textsuperscript{40}The National Security Council is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials and disseminates national security directives. The National Security Council also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

\textsuperscript{41}According to ONDCP officials, the plan deliberately conflates heroin and fentanyl into a single problem as (1) traffickers who add fentanyl as an adulterant to boost the effect of heroin, or who mix it with dilutents to create and sell as synthetic heroin, and use the same supply chain and distribution mechanisms for both drugs; (2) both heroin and fentanyl can be manufactured by the same drug-trafficking organizations, and those traffickers can bring drugs into the country using the same trafficking routes; and (3) addressing these drugs as a single problem provides the ability to address the heroin crisis without inadvertently compounding the fentanyl crisis.

\textsuperscript{42}The HIDTA program was established in 1988 and is a federally funded program administered by ONDCP that brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies into task forces that conduct investigations of drug-trafficking organizations in designated areas. The HIDTA program is mainly focused on counternarcotics; however, HIDTA resources may be used to assist law enforcement agency investigations and activities related to terrorism and the prevention of terrorism.

\textsuperscript{43}In February 2016, the administration announced that it would provide $1.1 billion to prevent and treat heroin abuse. The Heroin Availability Reduction Plan (HARP) is focused on reducing the number of heroin-involved deaths in the United States; a disruption in the heroin and fentanyl supply chains; a decrease in the availability of those drugs in the U.S. market; and the effects of international engagement, law enforcement, and public health efforts. According to the HARP, it synchronizes multiagency, multijurisdictional actions, including investigations and prosecutions, against the organizations manufacturing and distributing heroin and illicit fentanyl. The HARP does not have new authorities, new actions, or new funding but rather coordinates existing strategies, according to ONDCP officials.
In September 2016, ONDCP created a National Cocaine Coordination Group to address emerging threats from cocaine brought on by the spike in coca cultivation and production as well as the associated increase in its trafficking and use in the United States. In addition to employing three permanent staff, the interagency group draws from expertise in intelligence, public health, and international demand reduction at DOJ, the FBI, other federal partners, and various parts of ONDCP.

**Interagency Task Forces**

Agencies use task forces to enhance the interagency coordination needed to respond to emerging threats, according to officials. For example, to address the smuggling of illicit drugs over the southwest border, in May 2014 DHS established three new joint task forces—Joint Task Force–East, Joint Task Force–West, and the Joint Task Force for Investigations—in support of its Southern Border and Approaches Campaign. The task forces coordinate operations to combat transnational criminal organizations and counter illegal drug flows at maritime approaches and in between ports of entry. All three joint task forces incorporate elements of the Coast Guard, CBP, and ICE as well as DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Joint Task Force–East is responsible for the southern maritime border and approaches, Joint Task Force–West is responsible for the southern land border and the West Coast, and the Joint Task Force for Investigations focuses on investigations in support of the geographic task forces.

---

44DHS has Border Enforcement Security Task Forces, which were created in 2006 in response to cross-border crime. These task forces leverage federal, state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement resources in an intelligence-driven effort to identify, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations.

45Task forces typically consist of prosecutor and law enforcement personnel from a variety of agencies who work together in the same location.
Task forces also enhance coordination, deconfliction,\textsuperscript{46} and information sharing by colocating representatives from different entities, which facilitates interaction and enables information sharing, as we previously reported.\textsuperscript{47} For example, Joint Interagency Task Force South includes 26 agencies and 20 foreign partners that work together to detect and monitor illicit trafficking in the air and maritime domains, facilitating international and interagency interdiction and apprehension.\textsuperscript{48} Information sharing is a critical aspect of the Joint Interagency Task Force South’s strategic approach in supporting national and foreign partner nation law enforcement and promoting regional stability in the Western Hemisphere. As part of this effort, Joint Interagency Task Force South uses a tool known as the Cooperative Situational Information Integration system to share strategic communications and information with foreign partner nations, according to Joint Interagency Task Force South officials. In addition, U.S. Tactical Analysis Teams, which are posted at U.S. missions overseas, and liaison officers from foreign partner nations, provide for a high level of integrated information, according to officials at Joint Interagency Task Force South. Officials indicated that Tactical Analysis Teams and liaison officers provide the information that results in 60 to 70 percent of all task force cases, directly contributing to 50 to 60 percent of all Joint Interagency Task Force South drug seizures. The task force reported that its efforts resulted in 80 percent of total U.S. cocaine seizures (282 of 338 metric tons) in fiscal year 2016.

According to Joint Interagency Task Force South, the advantages of working as a task force include the ability to use the participants’ various legal authorities (see the text box for an example):

- DOD brings detection and monitoring authorities.

\textsuperscript{46}Deconfliction is the act of searching available data to determine whether multiple law enforcement agencies are investigating the same target individual, organization, communications device, or other uniquely identifiable entity. If so, the interested parties coordinate to prevent duplicative work or “blue on blue” situations (i.e., where personnel from two or more law enforcement agencies unwittingly encounter each other during a law enforcement operation, such as an undercover situation).

\textsuperscript{47}See GAO, Combatting Illicit Drugs: DEA and ICE Interagency Agreement Has Helped to Ensure Better Coordination, GAO-11-763 (Washington, D.C.; July 28, 2011).

\textsuperscript{48}Cocaine is a key maritime threat, as is transnational crime; in calendar year 2016, cocaine accounted for 99 percent of drug movement in the task force area of responsibility. See app. V for additional information about efforts by U.S. agencies to work with their counterparts in other countries to reduce drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere.
DOJ and DHS bring anticrime authorities.

The Coast Guard brings its maritime law enforcement authorities.

DEA, the FBI, and HSI bring drug and finance laws enforcement authorities.

CBP and HSI bring customs and immigration authorities.

Partner nations bring multiple authorities from their countries.

A typical case that illustrates how the various authorities of component agencies work together in the Joint Interagency Task Force South could start with receipt of actionable law enforcement information from the Drug Enforcement Administration. This information prompts the deployment of a Customs and Border Protection or Coast Guard plane that subsequently detects and monitors a suspect vessel until Joint Interagency Task Force South can deploy a Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, or allied government’s ship with an on-board law enforcement detachment to investigate. When the deployed ship arrives at the vessel’s location, the Coast Guard assumes control of the investigation. If the suspect vessel is not registered in the United States, the Coast Guard commander implements a bilateral agreement with the vessel’s country of registration to confirm the vessel’s nationality and to stop, board, and search the vessel for drugs. If drugs are found, the State Department, Department of Justice, and the vessel’s country of registry coordinate jurisdiction over, and disposition of, the vessel, drugs, and crew.

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Overview of Coast Guard Drug and Migrant Interdiction, testimony of Rear Admiral Wayne E. Justice, Assistant Commander for Capabilities, before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, March 18 2009.

OCDETF has also established multiagency Strike Forces (i.e., a type of task force) in 12 key cities around the country. According to OCDETF’s fiscal year 2017 report to Congress, the Strike Forces aggressively target the highest-level trafficking organizations and function as central points of contact for OCDETF agents and federal prosecutors nationwide, gathering intelligence and disseminating investigative leads throughout neighboring areas. The report states that Strike Force members are colocated in offices separate from their parent agencies and interact with each other on a daily basis using the resources and support of their parent agencies. According to OCDETF’s report, Strike Force efforts help further counternarcotics investigations by combining the resources and expertise of all OCDETF participating investigators and prosecutors. The report also states that, in recognition of the nationwide heroin threat, OCDETF adjusted its resources to target heroin investigations and that

49Department of Justice, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, FY 2017 Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement Congressional Submission.
when heroin use was rising in 2014 and 2015, the percentage of indictments with heroin charges likewise increased over the same time frame. According to OCDETF’s report, Strike Force effectiveness is reflected in the caseload of active investigations linked to OCDETF’s Consolidated Priority Organization Targets. OCDETF reported that, in fiscal year 2015, 45 percent of Strike Forces’ active investigations were linked to OCDETF Consolidated Priority Organization Targets; in contrast, 22 percent of all OCDETF investigations addressing transnational organized crime were linked to these targets.

Interagency Policy Committees

The National Security Council has a number of interagency policy committees that prioritize counternarcotics, including changing conditions, in the Western Hemisphere. National Security interagency policy committees are the primary day-to-day forums for interagency coordination of national security policy, according to Presidential Decision Directive 1. National Security Presidential Directive 25 directs U.S. government agencies to attack the vulnerabilities of drug-trafficking organizations and disrupt key business sectors and weaken the economic basis of the drug trade. For example, the Transborder Security and Western Hemisphere Directorates interagency policy committee on Mexico Security Priorities directed ONDCP to establish the National Heroin Coordination Group. The agencies represented on the interagency policy committees vary, but the core group involved in addressing heroin and fentanyl include ONDCP, State, DOJ, DOD, DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (as appropriate), and the Office of Management and Budget.

Several interagency policy committees related to addressing heroin include (1) Transborder Security and Western Hemisphere, (2) Fentanyl Surge, and (3) the Heroin Availability Reduction Plan. Among the topics discussed at the committee meetings were the formation of the National Heroin Coordination Group, which created the Heroin Availability Reduction Plan, as well as approval of the plan, and deliberate and tangible actions the interagency policy committees could take under the Heroin Availability Reduction Plan to visibly disrupt the fentanyl supply chain coming into the United States. There were also various efforts set up to address common issues related to illicit opioids among the United

---

States, Mexico, and Canada, which were addressed in forums such as the North American Drug Dialogue or the U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Group. Subinteragency policy committees include the U.S.-Mexico Security Group; North American Drug Dialogue; and Fentanyl-Asia, Fentanyl-Cyber, Fentanyl Screening, and Fentanyl Sub-Interagency Policy Committees. Among the topics discussed were the fentanyl threat and sources of supply into the United States, tangible actions to disrupt the fentanyl supply chain, Asia’s role in the fentanyl supply and actions that could be taken to address it, and an examination of the purchase and sale of fentanyl over the Internet for shipment through the mail services and actions taken to detect such shipments. The interagency policy committees that address cocaine and methamphetamine generally involve the same agencies that are involved in the interagency policy committees addressing heroin.

**Agency Comments**

We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to the DOD, DHS, DOJ, ONDCP, State, and USAID for review and comment. We received technical comments from DHS, DOJ, ONDCP, and State, which we incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 12 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State; the Attorney General of the United States; and the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at [http://www.gao.gov](http://www.gao.gov).
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6991 or farbj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Jessica Farb
Director, International Affairs and Trade
This report examines (1) U.S. agencies’ spending for counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere in fiscal years 2010 through 2015, (2) agencies’ efforts to gather and share best practices and lessons learned from their counternarcotics efforts both domestically and internationally, and (3) mechanisms that agencies have used to address changing drug threats.

To examine U.S. agencies’ spending for counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere in fiscal years 2010 through 2015—our first objective—we selected eight U.S. departments and components (collectively, in this report, “agencies”) that implement aspects of the National Drug Control Strategy and conduct counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere: (1) the Department of Defense (DOD); the Department of Homeland Security’s (2) Customs and Border Protection (CBP), (3) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and (4) Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) (5) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and (6) Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF); the Department of State’s (7) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL); and (8) the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). To select these eight agencies, we used the following two criteria:

1. **Agencies that have international counternarcotics efforts in one or more of the areas that the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission has been asked to review.** The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which coordinates the National Drug Control Program, requires all National Drug Control Program agencies to

---

1“The National Drug Control Program” means programs, policies, and activities undertaken by National Drug Control Program agencies related to their responsibilities under the National Drug Control Strategy, including activities involving demand and supply reduction, or state, local, and tribal affairs. “National Drug Control Program agency” means any agency that is responsible for implementing any aspect of the National Drug Control Strategy, subject to certain exceptions regarding intelligence agencies. See 21 U.S.C. § 1701.

2In December 2016, Congress passed legislation, establishing an independent drug commission, called the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere and to identify policy and program options to improve existing international counternarcotics policy. The legislation directs the commission to review U.S.-funded international illicit drug control programs in the Western Hemisphere, including drug interdiction, crop eradication, alternative development, drug production surveys, police and justice sector training, demand reduction, and strategies to target drug kingpins. See Pub. L. No. 114-323, §§ 601 et seq.
submit an annual drug budget identifying the amounts the agencies plan to spend on counternarcotics efforts for the upcoming fiscal year. The agencies report spending for such efforts in 10 program areas: Corrections, Intelligence, Interdiction, International, Investigations, Prevention, Prosecution, Research and Development, State and Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Assistance, and Treatment. On the basis of ONDCP’s definitions of these program areas, we determined that four of these areas—Intelligence, Interdiction, International, and Investigations—were relevant to the areas that the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission has been directed to examine.3

2. Agencies that allocated a combined total of at least $50 million for their counternarcotics efforts for the Intelligence, Interdiction, International, and Investigations program areas in fiscal year 2015. The following summarizes ONDCP’s definitions of these four program areas:

- **Intelligence.** Intelligence efforts encompass several drug control areas. Such efforts include providing strategic drug-related intelligence support, including the collection, analysis, and dissemination of drug-related information regarding structure, membership, finances, communications, and activities of drug-trafficking organizations and the identification of drug-related threats. Other activities facilitate the sharing among U.S. agencies of domestic and foreign intelligence information on the production and trafficking of drugs in the United States and foreign countries; analysis of the willingness and ability of partner nation governments to carry out drug control programs; federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement initiatives to gather, analyze, and disseminate information among domestic law enforcement agencies; and all other activities that provide intelligence and other information for use by national policy makers, strategic planners, and local law enforcement.

- **Interdiction.** Interdiction activities are intended to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the United States or abroad by targeting transportation links. Interdiction efforts encompass the interception of shipments of illegal drugs and their precursors and the disruption of trafficking networks and their proceeds; such efforts may include air and maritime seizures and deterring transport via air, sea, and land routes. Other efforts involve accurate assessment and monitoring of

---

3 Three of these program areas—Intelligence, Interdiction, and Investigations—also include domestic efforts. However, we eliminated agencies whose counternarcotics activities in these areas had a primarily domestic focus.
interdiction programs; enhancing the ability of nations that are drug sources to interdict drugs; interdicting the flow of drugs, weapons, and bulk currency along borders; and other air and maritime activities that disrupt illegal drug-trafficking operations.

- **International.** International activities are primarily focused on areas outside the United States and are intended to reduce illegal drug availability in the United States or abroad. Activities may include source-country programs designed to help international partners manage the consequences of drug production, trafficking, and consumption in their own societies, including programs to train and equip security forces; efforts to raise awareness of science-based practices and programs to prevent, treat, and provide recovery from substance abuse; and support for economic development programs to help reduce the production or trafficking of illicit drugs. These efforts may also include assessment and monitoring of international drug production programs and policies; coordination and promotion of compliance with international treaties, including those directed at the eradication of illegal drugs and the production and transportation of illegal drugs; involvement of other nations in international law enforcement programs and policies to reduce the supply of drugs; and all other overseas drug law enforcement efforts to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.

- **Investigations.** Investigations activities are designed to develop a prosecutable case against individuals and organizations responsible for the production and distribution of illegal drugs, including identifying profits and assets from drug-related criminal enterprises in order to seize them; identifying the leaders of illegal drug and other criminal organizations; gathering information about drug-related criminal activity; ensuring that legitimate controlled substances are handled, manufactured, and distributed in accordance with federal laws and regulations; and all other drug law investigative efforts to identify, disrupt, and dismantle drug smuggling in the United States.

We requested and obtained data on spending for counternarcotics activities from these eight agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which OCDETF reimburses for international
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

counternarcotics investigations. We also reviewed each agency’s annual accounting for its counternarcotics budget. In addition, we interviewed agency officials to understand their counternarcotics budgets as they are reported in the annual ONDCP budget and performance summary reports and to determine the extent to which the agencies could identify the funding they had obligated for counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere. Our methodology for identifying counternarcotics spending varied by agency, since some of the agencies—DOD, ICE, INL, and USAID—track such spending by region, while other agencies—the Coast Guard, CBP, OCDETF, and DEA—do not. Moreover, with the exception of DEA’s and OCDETF’s counternarcotics activities, the agencies’ counternarcotics activities represent only one aspect of their larger missions. On the basis of our review of the data, our review of each agency’s annual accounting of its drug budget, and interviews with agency officials, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes. The following summarizes the Western Hemisphere counternarcotics activities reflected in the funding data we present for each agency. (The data we present for OCDETF include its reimbursements to the FBI.)

- **DOD.** All DOD counternarcotics activities under U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command.
- **CBP.** All CBP counternarcotics spending. Given that the agency’s jurisdiction is triggered by the illegal movement of criminal goods across national borders, the agency considers all of its efforts to be

4The FBI is not a National Drug Control Program agency component and therefore does not submit a counternarcotics budget to ONDCP. However, we included the FBI in our review because it receives reimbursements for its investigations of cases with a drug nexus. We excluded ONDCP, because, as the agency that coordinates the U.S. drug control program, it plays a supporting, rather than an active, role in counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere.

5We asked agencies to provide obligations levels because, with the variations of spending data across nine agencies, we determined that we could provide the most consistent information with obligations levels, which capture each agency’s financial commitments for its counternarcotics activities.

6DEA tracks some of its counternarcotics spending by region, while the FBI tracks its counternarcotics spending by type of drug organization, which sometimes identifies the region.

7Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 1704(d), all drug control program agencies are required to submit to the Director of ONDCP a detailed accounting, which has been authenticated by the Inspector General of each agency prior to submission, of all funds expended by the agency for counternarcotics activities during the previous fiscal year.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

specific to the Western Hemisphere. However, the agency’s spending also includes interdictions and intelligence gathering to support these interdictions of drugs coming from all locations outside the United States.

- **ICE.** The portion of ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations’ spending for investigation of Western Hemisphere drug organizations.

- **Coast Guard.** All Coast Guard counternarcotics spending. Given that the Coast Guard’s interdictions occur in Western Hemisphere waters, the agency considers all of its counternarcotics efforts to be specific to the Western Hemisphere.

- **DEA.** DEA obligations for Investigations, Intelligence, and International program areas for domestic and international enforcement activities. DEA was also able to provide its obligations for salaries and expenses for investigations and intelligence-gathering activities conducted by agents posted in overseas locations in the Western Hemisphere (see app. III).

- **OCDETF.** OCDETF reimbursements for drug investigations conducted by DEA, the FBI, and ICE as well as OCDETF contributions to the OCDETF fusion center.

- **FBI.** OCDETF reimbursements for investigations of transnational crime organizations with a drug nexus. (App. III details the FBI’s expenditure of OCDETF funds).

- **INL.** International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds for counternarcotics activities for Western Hemisphere countries.

- **USAID.** Economic Support Funds and Development Assistance funds for alternative development activities in Western Hemisphere countries.

To examine how agencies gather and share best practices and lessons learned from their counternarcotics efforts both domestically and internationally—our second objective—we reviewed the National Drug Control Strategy and companion strategies for examples of best practices as well as other agency documents that identify best practices and lessons learned. We also sent the eight selected agencies, the FBI, and ONDCP a standard set of questions. These questions addressed how the agencies collected and identified best practices and lessons, whether they had formal definitions of best practices and lessons learned, whether their efforts to identify and collect this information were routine, whether they had review processes to assess the information, and whether they shared these practices with other agencies and with international partners. In addition, we asked the agencies to identify best practices
related to counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. Further, we conducted interviews with agency officials, seeking clarification to written responses as appropriate and asking whether the agencies had any policies or strategies regarding best practices, and we reviewed the documents that were provided to us in response.

To identify the mechanisms U.S. agencies have used to address changing drug threats—our third objective—we reviewed key U.S. government-wide and agency-specific documents pertaining to U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere, including those that encompass counternarcotics efforts as part of broader national security areas. These documents include the National Drug Control Strategies, Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategies, Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategies, the Caribbean Border Counternarcotics Strategy, the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, and the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. Agency-specific strategic plans included CBP’s *Vision and Strategy 2020*, Homeland Security Investigations’ Strategic Plan, ICE’s Strategic Plan, DOJ’s Strategic Plan, DEA’s Strategic Plan, OCDETF’s Strategic Plan, the Department of State’s Functional Bureau Strategies and the Western Hemisphere Affairs and Latin America and the Caribbean Joint Regional Strategy, and USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategies for Colombia and Peru. We also interviewed ONDCP and agency officials about the development of these strategies. We interviewed ONDCP officials about, and obtained documentation describing, the roles of the National Heroin Coordination Group and the Cocaine Coordination Group, and we identified the roles of other working groups through agency interviews and documents. To understand how agencies coordinated efforts and cooperate with foreign partners, we visited the U.S. Southern Command and the Joint Interagency Task Force South in Miami and Key West, Florida, and interviewed officials at both locations. Additionally, in discussions with officials from the other agencies we reviewed, we asked whether the agencies cooperated with foreign partners.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2016 to October 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: U.S. Agencies That Conduct Western Hemisphere Counternarcotics Activities

The Office of National Drug Control Policy coordinates the National Drug Control Program and develops the National Drug Control Strategy, which is implemented by a number of U.S. government agencies. The following summarizes the Western Hemisphere counternarcotics activities of key National Drug Control Program agencies and their components as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

- The **Department of Defense** (DOD) maintains the lead role in detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States and plays a key role in collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs with U.S. law enforcement and international security counterparts. DOD supports other interdiction activities with the use of its assets. DOD also provides counternarcotics foreign assistance to train, equip, and improve the counternarcotics capabilities of relevant agencies of foreign governments.

- The **Department of Homeland Security** (DHS) is responsible for U.S. policies related to interdiction of illegal drugs entering the United States from abroad. Key agencies within DHS that participate in counterdrug activities include the following:

  - **Customs and Border Protection** (CBP) is the lead agency for border security and is responsible for, among other things, keeping terrorists and their weapons; criminals and their contraband, including drugs; and inadmissible aliens out of the country. CBP is responsible for border security at ports of entry; the 6,000 miles of land borders between ports of entry; and nearly 2,700 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida Peninsula and Puerto Rico.

  - **Immigration and Customs Enforcement's** (ICE) primary mission is to promote homeland security and public safety through the enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. ICE’s office of Homeland Security Investigations investigates immigration crime; human rights violations and human smuggling; smuggling of narcotics, weapons, and other types of contraband; financial crimes; cybercrime; and export enforcement issues.
• **The Coast Guard** is the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction in the Transit Zone. The Coast Guard provides resources to the Joint Interagency Task Force South, generally including major cutters, maritime patrol aircraft, and helicopters capable of deploying airborne use of force.

• The **Department of Justice** (DOJ) is responsible for federal law enforcement and to ensure public safety against foreign and domestic threats, including illegal drug trafficking. The following are DOJ’s primary agencies that focus on international drug control activities:

  • The **Drug Enforcement Administration** (DEA) is the nation’s federal agency dedicated to drug law enforcement and, accordingly, works to disrupt and dismantle the leadership, command, control, and financial infrastructure of major drug-trafficking organizations. DEA operates around the world to disrupt drug-trafficking operations; dismantle criminal organizations; enforce the drug-related laws of the United States; and bring to justice those organizations and individuals involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of illicit drugs destined for the United States.

  • The **Federal Bureau of Investigation** (FBI) conducts its counternarcotics activities under the agency’s broader strategy to counter transnational criminal organizations by targeting their command-and-control structures as well as the support networks that facilitate the smuggling of illicit goods, including drugs, into the United States. The FBI is not a National Drug Control Program agency component but receives reimbursements from the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) for conducting drug-related investigations.

  • The **Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces’** (OCDETF) primary goal is to identify, investigate, and prosecute the transnational, national, and regional criminal organizations most responsible for the illegal drug supply in the United States, the diversion of pharmaceutical drugs, and the violence

---

1According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, illicit drugs coming to the United States from South America pass through a 7-million-square-mile area called the Transit Zone, roughly twice the size of the continental United States. The Transit Zone includes the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean.

2The FBI is not a National Drug Control Program agency component but receives reimbursements from the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) for conducting drug-related investigations.
associated with the drug trade. It effectively leverages the resources and expertise of its seven federal agency members.³

- The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs develops, funds, and manages counternarcotics and law enforcement assistance programs to help reduce the entry of illicit drugs into the United States and minimize the impact of international crime on the United States.

- The U.S. Agency for International Development supports the U.S. counternarcotics effort through alternative development programs that help farmers find legal sources of income through licit crops such as cacao and coffee and that provide technical assistance, such as training in modern farming techniques and access to capital for investment in equipment.

³OCDETF’s seven member agencies are DEA; the FBI; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service; the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation Division; ICE; and the Coast Guard. OCDETF works in cooperation with DOJ’s Criminal Division, the 94 U.S. Attorneys’ offices, and state and local law enforcement.
The Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided data showing their obligations for counternarcotics activities in the Western Hemisphere. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) provided data showing a portion of its counternarcotics obligations for salaries and expenses associated with DEA agents posted overseas.

### DOD

DOD data show obligations for counternarcotics activities by the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Southern Command, which have responsibility over the Western Hemisphere. Table 4 contains the commands’ counternarcotics obligations for fiscal years 2010 through 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Northern Command</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>2,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>486</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>2,832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. | GAO-18-10

Note: Because of rounding, numbers in columns and rows may not sum to totals shown. These data do not include DOD obligations levels for counternarcotics intelligence activities conducted by the U.S. Northern and Southern Commands. DOD was not able to provide obligations data for these activities for certain fiscal years.

Table 5 shows the U.S Northern Command’s and U.S. Southern Command’s counternarcotics obligations in support of foreign partners in the Western Hemisphere, by country, for fiscal years 2013 through 2015.¹

¹Section 1009 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Pub. L. No. 112-239) requires DOD to submit biannual reports to Congress on the use of counternarcotics funds in support of counternarcotics activities of foreign governments. DOD started tracking these figures in 2013. This reporting requirement ceased in fiscal year 2017.
Table 5: Department of Defense (DOD) Obligations for Country-Specific Train-and-Equip Counternarcotics Activities in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2013-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic command/country</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2013-2015 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Northern Command</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>2,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>66,038</td>
<td>44,643</td>
<td>45,787</td>
<td>156,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Southern Command</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>2,805</td>
<td>3,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>3,264</td>
<td>5,893</td>
<td>4,815</td>
<td>13,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>69,316</td>
<td>55,639</td>
<td>54,551</td>
<td>179,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2,069</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>2,522</td>
<td>4,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curacao</td>
<td>26,130</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>26,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>3,296</td>
<td>2,754</td>
<td>6,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>3,541</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>4,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>11,973</td>
<td>2,156</td>
<td>6,240</td>
<td>20,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>8,971</td>
<td>13,792</td>
<td>23,148</td>
<td>45,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>5,359</td>
<td>5,683</td>
<td>18,996</td>
<td>30,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,865</td>
<td>3,938</td>
<td>5,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>3,265</td>
<td>7,479</td>
<td>11,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>2,143</td>
<td>6,304</td>
<td>9,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>6,452</td>
<td>5,039</td>
<td>7,567</td>
<td>19,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Hemisphere total</strong></td>
<td>206,713</td>
<td>145,537</td>
<td>187,828</td>
<td>540,078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: “—” denotes zero obligations for the corresponding country and fiscal year.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents | GAO-18-10

Note: Because of rounding, numbers in columns and rows may not sum to totals shown.
Appendix III: Selected Agencies’ Obligations for Counternarcotics Activities in Fiscal Years 2010-2015

Table 6 shows ICE expenditures for counternarcotics investigations and intelligence activities conducted by ICE agents for Western Hemisphere drug cases, by country, during fiscal years 2010 through 2015.\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anguilla</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5,389</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbados</td>
<td>24,993</td>
<td>11,840</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>36,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antilles (Netherlands)</td>
<td>106,995</td>
<td>134,939</td>
<td>455,926</td>
<td>134,885</td>
<td>4,679</td>
<td>3,676</td>
<td>841,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>99,499</td>
<td>886,900</td>
<td>485,885</td>
<td>369,854</td>
<td>1,197,454</td>
<td>756,931</td>
<td>3,796,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>69,737</td>
<td>131,102</td>
<td>173,753</td>
<td>142,486</td>
<td>396,312</td>
<td>387,536</td>
<td>1,300,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>320,613</td>
<td>594,455</td>
<td>407,497</td>
<td>322,528</td>
<td>124,794</td>
<td>170,079</td>
<td>1,939,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>29,880</td>
<td>60,090</td>
<td>27,765</td>
<td>100,561</td>
<td>77,469</td>
<td>36,758</td>
<td>332,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>2,918</td>
<td>6,737</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>20,365</td>
<td>22,877</td>
<td>2,262</td>
<td>55,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>31,296</td>
<td>313,345</td>
<td>450,184</td>
<td>456,102</td>
<td>322,180</td>
<td>331,953</td>
<td>1,905,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>42,686</td>
<td>83,204</td>
<td>9,349</td>
<td>70,294</td>
<td>49,691</td>
<td>10,179</td>
<td>265,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>110,878</td>
<td>111,619</td>
<td>50,167</td>
<td>61,741</td>
<td>155,799</td>
<td>221,143</td>
<td>711,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
<td>24,510</td>
<td>120,718</td>
<td>103,417</td>
<td>9,663</td>
<td>23,917</td>
<td>75,008</td>
<td>357,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,132,999</td>
<td>2,128,543</td>
<td>1,942,907</td>
<td>2,954,308</td>
<td>2,686,760</td>
<td>2,085,915</td>
<td>12,931,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>4,669</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>20,344</td>
<td>26,516</td>
<td>74,930</td>
<td>126,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2,715,276</td>
<td>4,650,577</td>
<td>6,314,050</td>
<td>5,926,659</td>
<td>7,774,886</td>
<td>6,759,895</td>
<td>34,141,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>392,864</td>
<td>331,421</td>
<td>327,035</td>
<td>193,752</td>
<td>286,956</td>
<td>528,791</td>
<td>2,060,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>2,985</td>
<td>31,236</td>
<td>33,233</td>
<td>38,288</td>
<td>107,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>5,120</td>
<td>107,371</td>
<td>137,839</td>
<td>24,146</td>
<td>18,125</td>
<td>292,601</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>841,063</td>
<td>1,483,994</td>
<td>1,962,119</td>
<td>1,898,868</td>
<td>2,270,755</td>
<td>2,344,754</td>
<td>10,801,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>347,988</td>
<td>311,966</td>
<td>791,131</td>
<td>1,175,754</td>
<td>1,409,841</td>
<td>496,669</td>
<td>4,533,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>47,768</td>
<td>97,557</td>
<td>34,281</td>
<td>11,078</td>
<td>31,103</td>
<td>11,869</td>
<td>233,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>352,497</td>
<td>532,023</td>
<td>715,527</td>
<td>1,022,471</td>
<td>1,938,022</td>
<td>794,784</td>
<td>5,355,324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\)We are reporting ICE expenditures rather than obligations, because ICE’s financial system converts obligations into expenditures once payments have been made, according to agency officials.
### Appendix III: Selected Agencies’ Obligations for Counternarcotics Activities in Fiscal Years 2010-2015

#### Table 7: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Obligations for Personnel Stationed in Countries in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2010-2015

Dollars in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>3,855</td>
<td>3,934</td>
<td>3,443</td>
<td>2,213</td>
<td>2,794</td>
<td>2,925</td>
<td>19,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>10,172</td>
<td>9,019</td>
<td>10,433</td>
<td>10,456</td>
<td>10,693</td>
<td>10,073</td>
<td>60,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>2,924</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>3,608</td>
<td>17,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>2,379</td>
<td>2,402</td>
<td>1,682</td>
<td>1,968</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>2,257</td>
<td>12,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>-83</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 8: Selected Agencies’ Obligations for Counternarcotics Activities in Fiscal Years 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>9,695</td>
<td>10,714</td>
<td>11,494</td>
<td>10,481</td>
<td>11,079</td>
<td>12,603</td>
<td>66,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>2,840</td>
<td>2,834</td>
<td>2,882</td>
<td>3,408</td>
<td>17,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1,855</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>11,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>40,782</td>
<td>45,145</td>
<td>45,711</td>
<td>52,032</td>
<td>44,379</td>
<td>52,822</td>
<td>280,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>3,219</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>2,999</td>
<td>3,068</td>
<td>17,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>4,694</td>
<td>4,731</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>5,860</td>
<td>6,389</td>
<td>7,526</td>
<td>34,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>7,392</td>
<td>8,455</td>
<td>8,496</td>
<td>8,317</td>
<td>9,712</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>54,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>2,051</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td>2,178</td>
<td>12,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>3,281</td>
<td>3,128</td>
<td>3,387</td>
<td>4,147</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,232</td>
<td>23,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>2,084</td>
<td>1,754</td>
<td>2,227</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>19,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1,801</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>3,101</td>
<td>2,257</td>
<td>3,436</td>
<td>14,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3,093</td>
<td>2,797</td>
<td>3,292</td>
<td>3,230</td>
<td>3,164</td>
<td>3,536</td>
<td>19,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>28,205</td>
<td>31,223</td>
<td>31,276</td>
<td>31,510</td>
<td>32,710</td>
<td>38,390</td>
<td>193,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherland Antilles</td>
<td>1,917</td>
<td>2,037</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>2,402</td>
<td>12,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2,078</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>2,172</td>
<td>1,945</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>2,596</td>
<td>13,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>3,961</td>
<td>4,581</td>
<td>5,790</td>
<td>5,978</td>
<td>6,512</td>
<td>8,872</td>
<td>35,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>4,251</td>
<td>4,127</td>
<td>4,567</td>
<td>3,678</td>
<td>3,322</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td>23,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>18,941</td>
<td>19,362</td>
<td>19,902</td>
<td>23,654</td>
<td>18,620</td>
<td>24,936</td>
<td>125,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>3,098</td>
<td>3,047</td>
<td>2,844</td>
<td>2,625</td>
<td>2,568</td>
<td>16,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Croix</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>087</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Thomas</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad/Tobago</td>
<td>2,921</td>
<td>2,754</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>2,621</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0,522</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>1,976</td>
<td>2,255</td>
<td>6,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>2,272</td>
<td>11,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>171,290</strong></td>
<td><strong>179,225</strong></td>
<td><strong>184,665</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,035</strong></td>
<td><strong>187,503</strong></td>
<td><strong>217,904</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,135,621</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: "—" denotes zero obligations for the corresponding country and fiscal year.

Source: DEA. | GAO-18-10

Note: Because of rounding, numbers in columns and rows may not sum to totals shown.

Table 8 shows OCDETF reimbursements to the FBI for expenditures related to its investigations of transnational Central American, South American, Mexican, and Caribbean crime organizations; drug-smuggling and money-laundering organizations; alien-smuggling organizations; and drug-related public corruption cases in the Western Hemisphere, as well
as headquarters administration expenses, for fiscal years 2010 through 2015.\(^3\)

### Table 8: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Expenditures for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Program Drug-Related Investigations of Transnational Crime Organizations in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2010-2015

Dollars in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central/South American organizations</td>
<td>14,407</td>
<td>13,749</td>
<td>16,822</td>
<td>15,083</td>
<td>14,805</td>
<td>12,825</td>
<td>87,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican criminal enterprises</td>
<td>47,638</td>
<td>55,545</td>
<td>60,496</td>
<td>58,387</td>
<td>65,357</td>
<td>63,864</td>
<td>351,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean organizations</td>
<td>4,473</td>
<td>5,703</td>
<td>5,246</td>
<td>6,998</td>
<td>7,067</td>
<td>6,047</td>
<td>35,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alien-smuggling organizations</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug-smuggling/money-laundering organizations</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>2,077</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>10,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other organizations</td>
<td>6,898</td>
<td>5,886</td>
<td>8,827</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>5,436</td>
<td>4,191</td>
<td>38,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters administration</td>
<td>8,393</td>
<td>8,386</td>
<td>9,238</td>
<td>9,602</td>
<td>9,754</td>
<td>10,390</td>
<td>55,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>83,817</td>
<td>91,727</td>
<td>102,603</td>
<td>99,440</td>
<td>103,953</td>
<td>98,560</td>
<td>580,101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. | GAO-18-10

Note: Because of rounding, numbers in columns and rows may not sum to totals shown.

Table 9 shows INL obligations for counternarcotics activities in 13 Western Hemisphere countries and for two regional programs in the Western Hemisphere, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, during fiscal years 2010 through 2015.

\(^3\)The FBI has a law enforcement and intelligence mission, and its counternarcotics efforts fall under its broader strategy to counter transnational organized crime. The Western Hemisphere transnational criminal organization threat encompasses a range of U.S. activities, including drug-trafficking, money-laundering, human-trafficking, alien-smuggling, public corruption, weapons-trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, theft of natural resources and cultural property such as art and antiquities, insurance fraud, and health care fraud. All OCDETF investigations and accompanying funding are investigations of transnational criminal organizations and must have a drug nexus. Therefore, all OCDETF funding supports counternarcotics efforts, though the respective investigation frequently involves criminal offenses beyond narcotics possession and distribution.
Appendix III: Selected Agencies’ Obligations for Counternarcotics Activities in Fiscal Years 2010-2015

Table 9: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Obligations for Counternarcotics Activities in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2010-2015

Dollars in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>18,092</td>
<td>10,670</td>
<td>4,317</td>
<td>3,320</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>36,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,801</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>196,676</td>
<td>165,632</td>
<td>134,006</td>
<td>107,835</td>
<td>80,156</td>
<td>69,442</td>
<td>753,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2,142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>3,929</td>
<td>3,414</td>
<td>2,187</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>17,101</td>
<td>2,889</td>
<td>2,567</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>24,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>165,087</td>
<td>20,588</td>
<td>58,183</td>
<td>32,838</td>
<td>18,042</td>
<td>30,433</td>
<td>325,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>31,100</td>
<td>34,773</td>
<td>30,096</td>
<td>37,857</td>
<td>21,380</td>
<td>13,676</td>
<td>168,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere regional programs (Central America Regional Security Initiative, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative)</td>
<td>49,321</td>
<td>37,722</td>
<td>30,126</td>
<td>30,270</td>
<td>34,324</td>
<td>22,434</td>
<td>204,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>484,823</td>
<td>277,504</td>
<td>265,583</td>
<td>217,423</td>
<td>154,844</td>
<td>135,985</td>
<td>1,536,162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: “—” denotes zero obligations for the corresponding country and fiscal year.

Source: INL | GAO-18-10

Note: Because of rounding, numbers in columns and rows may not sum to totals shown.

Table 10 lists USAID’s obligations for alternative development projects in four countries in the Western Hemisphere during fiscal years 2010 through 2015.

Table 10: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Obligations for Alternative Development Programs in the Western Hemisphere, Fiscal Years 2010-2015

Dollars in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>17,419</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>17,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>101,021</td>
<td>96,431</td>
<td>85,245</td>
<td>77,738</td>
<td>52,980</td>
<td>52,400</td>
<td>465,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>12,334</td>
<td>4,114</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>17,586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USAID
### Appendix III: Selected Agencies’ Obligations for Counternarcotics Activities in Fiscal Years 2010-2015

#### Dollars in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>22,943</td>
<td>23,455</td>
<td>19,872</td>
<td>27,125</td>
<td>23,425</td>
<td>20,830</td>
<td><strong>137,650</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>153,717</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>106,255</td>
<td>104,863</td>
<td>76,405</td>
<td>73,230</td>
<td><strong>638,470</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: “—” denotes zero obligations for the corresponding country and fiscal year.

Source: USAID. | GAO-18-10

Note: Because of rounding, numbers in columns and rows may not sum to totals shown.
Appendix IV: U.S. Agencies’ Planning for Western Hemisphere Counternarcotics Efforts

National Drug Control Program agencies’ planning for counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere is represented in a variety of strategic documents, which may be broad or targeted, depending on their mission. For example, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2011 Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy focuses primarily on the department’s efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime. DOD officials indicated that they are currently updating the strategy. Similarly, the Coast Guard’s 2014 Western Hemisphere Strategy includes counternarcotics as part of the agency’s broader regional mission. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard does not plan to update its strategy.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has several strategic documents that relate to its components’ counternarcotics activities, as described below:

- Customs and Border Protection’s Vision and Strategy 2020 incorporates counternarcotics efforts as part of its mission to facilitate legitimate trade and safeguard land, air, and maritime borders.¹

- Immigration and Customs Enforcement also has a specific goal, protecting the homeland against illicit trade, travel, and finance, including an objective targeting drug-trafficking organizations in its Homeland Security Investigations’ Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2012-2016.²

The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Fiscal Years 2014-2018 Strategic Plan includes the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) goal of disrupting and dismantling major drug-trafficking organizations within a much broader set of law enforcement missions.³

- DEA’s Fiscal Years 2009-2014 Strategic Plan indicates the agency has focused on international and domestic drug-trafficking and money-laundering organizations identified as having the most significant impacts internationally and domestically, known as “Consolidated Priority Organization Targets” and “Priority Targeted


³Department of Justice, Fiscal Years 2014-2018 Strategic Plan.
In addition, DEA’s Drug Flow Attack Strategy, developed in 2009, identifies vulnerable chokepoints to disrupt the flow of drugs. DEA officials indicated they are updating the strategy.

- DOJ also released a Strategy for Combating the Mexican Cartels in January 2010, which was designed to be consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy and the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. The DOJ strategy’s 10 objectives include (1) reduce the flow of narcotics and other contraband entering the United States, (2) strengthen Mexico’s operational capacities and enhance its law enforcement institutions, (3) increase bilateral cooperation between Mexico and the United States on fugitive capture and extradition activities, and (4) increase intelligence and information sharing among law enforcement agencies in the United States and Mexico to achieve focused targeting of the most significant criminal organizations.

- DOJ’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) has a long-term drug enforcement strategy for using its prosecutor-led, multiagency task forces in the field to conduct intelligence-driven, coordinated, multijurisdictional prosecutions and investigations. Specifically, OCDETF member agencies focus on Consolidated Priority Organization Targets—that is, “command and control” organizations representing the most significant drug-trafficking and money-laundering organizations threatening the United States. OCDETF member agencies also pursue organizations identified as regional priorities because they have a significant impact on the illicit drug supply within a specific region.

Officials in the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) stated that the bureau uses

---

4Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Fiscal Years 2009-2014 Strategic Plan.

5Department of Justice, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, Fiscal Years 2016-2018 Organized Crime Drug and Enforcement Task Forces Strategic Plan (Draft). OCDETF officials indicated that, owing to the change in the administration, the plan had not been finalized.

6OCDETF issued new program guidelines in January 2017 expanding its investigative and prosecutorial efforts to include the highest-priority transnational criminal organizations that the OCDETF agencies agreed pose the greatest threat to public safety and national security. The updated guidelines also expanded the OCDETF member agencies to include representatives from the Attorney General’s Organized Crime Council agencies that were not already OCDETF member agencies.
a variety of strategic planning documents in its efforts to address counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere.  

- INL’s Functional Bureau Strategy includes the broad objective of reducing illicit drug production and drug demand, along with other activities such as working with the United Nations Office of Drug and Crime.  

- The Western Hemisphere Affairs and Latin America and the Caribbean Joint Regional Strategy, which focuses on a goal of a secure and democratic future for all citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean, includes interdiction goals for specific drugs such as opium gum (used for producing heroin) and cocaine. 

- Integrated Country Strategies at posts and INL Country Plans are focused strategies, targeting, for example, the eradication of a specific number of hectares of coca or the seizure of a certain number of metric tons of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) does not have a specific strategy related to counternarcotics and instead relies on the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s National Drug Control Strategy to help guide its alternative development activities in countries confronting illicit drug production and trafficking, according to USAID officials. USAID’s targeted efforts are described in its Country Development Cooperation Strategies for Colombia and Peru, where alternative development efforts are currently underway. The Colombia strategy describes the U.S. government’s development assistance in support of Colombian efforts to continue its transition out of conflict. According to the Colombia strategy, investments under several of its development objectives would help create conditions for alternative livelihoods and legal behaviors, contributing to broader U.S. and Colombian efforts to address drug trafficking. The Peru strategy includes alternatives to illicit coca cultivation as a development objective in specific regions, supporting

---

7 State also listed its U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, developed in September 2014, as related to its counternarcotics efforts. This strategy focuses on addressing the violence and migration associated with illicit drugs.

8 The most recent INL functional bureau strategy is the U.S. Department of State, Functional Bureau Strategy, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Calendar Year 2015-2018.

the overall goal of strengthening stability and democracy through increased social and economic inclusion, reductions in illicit coca cultivation, and the illegal exploitation of natural resources.\textsuperscript{10} USAID conducted operations focused on alternative development in Bolivia until May 2013, when the mission closed.

Cooperation with foreign partners is a crucial element in addressing changing narcotics conditions in the Western Hemisphere. For example, the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP); and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) work with host nation counterparts on a variety of counternarcotics efforts.

U.S. assistance programs to disrupt the flow of cocaine and other harmful products are designed to build capacity of judicial, law enforcement, and treatment institutions in partner countries, according to INL’s 2017 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*. These programs are carried out through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSi), the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and the Mérida Initiative. Key activities of these programs include drug interdiction cooperation, especially maritime-based efforts in Central America and the Caribbean; law enforcement capacity building; anticorruption initiatives and support; and enhanced prosecution and judicial reform strengthening efforts. For example:


2. The Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSi) was designed as a partnership between the United States and the region. From fiscal years 2008 through 2016, the U.S. government appropriated at least $1.2 billion to Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama for CARSi and its predecessor. The initiative seeks to address the impact of narcotics and weapons-trafficking, gangs, organized crime, porous borders, public safety, and rule of law issues that exist in many Central American countries.

3. The United States created the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative in 2009 with the goals of reducing illicit trafficking, advancing public safety and security, and promoting social justice and by strengthening Caribbean partner nations’ capabilities in maritime security, law enforcement, information sharing, border and migration control, transnational crime, and criminal justice. An estimated $444 million in funding has been provided for the program in fiscal years 2010 through 2016.

4. The Mérida Initiative is a bilateral security cooperation agreement between Mexico and the United States aimed at supporting Mexico’s law enforcement and judicial institutions, helping to counteract the illegal trade in narcotics, and strengthening border security. From 2008 through 2016, the Mérida Initiative provided $1.9 billion in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding for equipment, training, and capacity-building assistance to the government of Mexico, according to State.
In Mexico, as of September 2016, Mérida Initiative funding had supported 238,000 federal, state, and municipal police officers’ standardized training in their role as first responders in the country’s new criminal justice system, according to INL’s report. The report also stated that as of 2016, Mexico had seized over 230 metric tons of illegal drugs and over $50 million in illegal currency with Mérida-funded equipment and training.

In Central America, State has provided targeted assistance to help enhance the ability of local partners to interdict drug shipments, disrupt trafficking networks, and control domestic production, according to State officials. For example, State officials reported that State had partnered with DEA to support local vetted police units to interdict drug shipments and investigate traffickers. According to the officials, the 20-officer Maritime Interdiction Vetted Unit in Costa Rica interdicted 1,151 kilograms of cocaine in April 2017, and similar units in Guatemala seized 2,532 kilograms of cocaine in June 2017. In addition, according to State officials, INL assisted the Guatemalan counternarcotics police in developing an opium poppy eradication program that resulted in the destruction of 1,000 acres of poppy cultivation in a 2-month period in the spring of 2017. Moreover, State officials reported that a State-provided wiretapping system and associated training allowed Costa Rican prosecutors to convict seven Sinaloa cartel members in May 2017, shutting down an operation that, according to State officials, had been sending 14 metric tons of cocaine per year to the United States.

USAID also relies on international partnerships to implement its alternative development activities. For example, USAID reported that it plans to continue its mitigation of drug-related security threats in Peru by replicating successes it had in the country’s San Martin region and in other coca-growing regions in collaboration with the government of Peru and other U.S. government agencies, in its Peru Country Development Cooperation Strategy for 2012 through 2016. Results from the Monzon Valley in Peru also demonstrate how foreign partnerships can impact the illicit drugs trade. USAID focused its alternative development assistance on the coca stronghold of the Monzon Valley, which once supported about 10,000 hectares of coca, from 2013 to 2015. The average income was about $1.89 per day per person, well below the national extreme.

poverty line of $2.20 per day per person in 2013. Households that remained under assistance during the strategy period saw a 53-percent increase in income. Moreover, the percentage of assisted families in extreme poverty dropped by 25 percent, from 55 percent to 30 percent. Coca cultivation dropped by more than 91 percent in all areas where recent coca eradication was followed by sustained alternative development assistance, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The Central Intelligence Agency’s Crime and Narcotics Center recorded a less robust, but still impressive, reduction of 64 percent over the same period, according to USAID officials. Furthermore, USAID officials noted that while its resources for alternative development in Peru diminished, the budget for the National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs, Peru’s development organization, grew from $15 million in 2011 to $38 million during 2014 and 2015.

In Colombia, USAID reported in its 2014-2018 Country Development Cooperation Strategy that it is trying to address the need for licit economic opportunities by supporting cocoa, specialty coffee, rubber, and dairy sectors in former coca-growing areas, which would help create the conditions for alternative livelihoods and legal behaviors for small producers in areas vulnerable to coca cultivation and drug production, contributing to broad U.S. government and Colombian efforts to address drug trafficking. This alternative development work increased under Plan Colombia, with USAID and the government of Colombia working together on several large-scale rural development projects. Three programs evolved that incorporate public and private partnerships to facilitate economic growth from 2006 to 2017. The first program reportedly generated 250,000 new jobs by investing in agricultural sectors such as rubber, cacao, and African palm enterprises as well as hotels and tourism. The second program supported the provision of grant subsidies to agricultural value-chains, linking small farmer associations with national

---


7The programs were (1) More Investment in Sustainable Alternative Development project, 2006-2010, to develop licit economic options through hands-on, implementer-delivered technical assistance, credit, market alliances, and cooperative support; (2) Consolidated and Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative, 2012-2015, to extend and solidify a state presence in marginalized rural municipalities through small-scale, community-driven economic projects designed to build the capacity of local governments; and (3) Rural Economic Growth program, 2014-2017, to provide sustainable, inclusive rural economic growth by encouraging private-sector investment in target areas by reducing and mitigating costs and risks.
and international private-sector buyers. In the 2013 selection round, for example, more than 30 selected projects included crops and products such as cacao, rubber, fruits, dairy, and meat. In the third program, USAID carried sustainable development by encouraging private-sector investment in target areas. For example, USAID focused on developing alliances with key private-sector leaders in the coffee and cacao sectors in the former sector by raising yields and quality and addressing infrastructure needs especially in conflict-prone zones. Today, Colombia is the world’s largest producer of premium-quality Arabica beans, according to USAID. Likewise, fine cocoa is a successful crop in Colombia, with a growing world demand, according to USAID. The Colombian cocoa industry is relatively small, with 25,000 farmers producing about 42,000 tons, or 0.2 percent of the global market. However, about 85 percent of Colombian cocoa is from “fine” species, giving Colombia a 3-percent share of global fine cocoa exports. USAID also developed a private investment equity fund, providing capital to small- and medium-sized enterprises in Colombia. The fund is now an independent, for-profit enterprise providing small- and medium-sized Colombian enterprises with capital and operational support.

The Coast Guard’s efforts to support foreign partners include its Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summits, where U.S. and foreign partners meet to discuss operational and legal issues. The summits are attended by U.S. agencies including, among others, DEA, CBP, the Department of Defense’s Joint Interagency Task Force South, State, and DOJ. Representatives from Western Hemisphere countries, including Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru, among others, also attend the summits. For example, at a summit held in May 2016, Mexico briefed about its judicial system’s transition to an adversarial system, and Honduras briefed about its successes using increased penalties for money-laundering violations, when it is proven that the money is from drug trafficking, according to a Coast Guard document. On the operational side, Panama made presentations on regional operations, and the U.S. Coast Guard presented on capacity building for counterdrug operations, among other efforts. Other issues—such as how to leverage increased maritime awareness regionally resulting from investments by partner nations in radar and the linking of vessel-tracking technologies along their coastlines with the Joint Interagency Task Force South’s Cooperative Situational Information Integration system—are discussed at these meetings.
ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations works with foreign partners to (1) coordinate criminal investigations, including those related to counternarcotics; (2) disrupt criminal efforts to smuggle people and material, including drugs into the United States; and (3) build international partnerships through outreach and training. In ONDCP’s fiscal year 2017 Budget and Performance Summary report, ICE established a target of 29 percent of transnational drug investigations resulting in the disruption or dismantlement of high-threat, transnational drug-trafficking organizations or individuals for fiscal year 2015. According to the report, ICE fell short at 15 percent but indicated there were several reasons, including a methodology that allowed double counting; as a result, the methodology was revised.8

CBP also has a network of attachés and advisors, who serve in U.S. diplomatic missions9 and act as liaisons between law enforcement components such as DEA; the FBI; and DOJ’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Attachés and advisors also work with foreign partners building capacity and provide training, technical assistance, and mentoring on border security, according to CBP officials. For example, CBP has trained over 1,000 Panamanian customs and law enforcement officers since 2014. Also, since February 2017, CBP helped vet, train, and mentor a unit of Peruvian intelligence analysts. Twenty tons of cocaine have been seized since the unit was created, according to CBP officials.

CBP’s National Targeting Center hosts representatives from participating foreign agencies and works with these international liaisons and other U.S. government agencies to detect and disrupt narcotic-smuggling operations, drug-trafficking organizations, and their associates. According to agency officials, in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the center’s efforts with foreign partners led to results in the Western Hemisphere such as

- discovery and seizure of over 100 kilograms of cocaine,

---

8Executive Office of the President of the United States, FY 2017 Budget and Performance Summary.

9Attachés are located in Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago.
• identification of a previously unknown foreign company suspected of narcotics involvement, and

• seizure of counterfeit identification documents destined to the United States with links for possible bank fraud and the illicit money laundering.

DOJ works with foreign country counterparts to conduct bilateral investigations and support joint counterdrug operations, among other things, such as the following:

• DEA’s special agents, who work at embassies or consulates overseas, conduct bilateral investigations with their foreign counterparts. These special agents also carry out institution-building activities with their counterparts.

• DEA reported that it provides investigative equipment and training, in large part through its Sensitive Investigative Units in selected countries, including Mexico and Colombia. The Sensitive Investigative Units seek to create focused, well-trained, and vetted drug investigative and intelligence units, targeting the most significant drug-trafficking organizations affecting the United States. DEA sees the program’s impact as building international cooperation, facilitating institution building and professional development, and improving judicial processes.

• DEA’s International Drug Enforcement Conference is another venue for cooperation with foreign partners. The conference brings senior international drug law enforcement officials together, in regional and bilateral meetings where, according to DEA, topics such as cross-border coordination of operations, intelligence sharing, and joint training activities are addressed. 10 According to INL’s 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, at a meeting in Peru, in April 2016, geographical regional and multiregional working groups identified collective targets, agreed upon multilateral counterdrug enforcement and interdiction operations, and assessed the progress and evaluated intelligence on existing and emerging targets. 11

10 Established in 1983, the International Drug Enforcement Conference was originally focused on the Western Hemisphere and acted as a liaison and policy forum. It has expanded to a global conference and is now an operational and strategic planning platform.

2015 Caribbean Border Counternarcotics Strategy noted that the DEA-led International Drug Enforcement Conference is a forum for building coalitions between U.S. federal law enforcement and foreign counterparts and that within the Caribbean, law enforcement officials from over 20 nations participate in the annual meetings to discuss regional investigative targeting efforts.

- One measure DEA tracks as contributing to ONDCP’s National Drug Strategy is the number of international, domestic, and diversion priority targets linked to consolidated priority organization targets it disrupts or dismantles. In ONDCP’s fiscal year 2017 Budget and Performance Summary, DEA reported that in fiscal year 2015, it set a goal of disrupting or dismantling 440 targets linked to consolidated priority organization targets and achieved 356 of these targets. DEA indicated that it did not achieve its goal due to budgetary constraints.

- FBI legal attachés carry out capacity-building programs, providing equipment and training to enhance foreign partners’ ability to combat criminal activity connected to transnational criminal organizations, according to FBI officials. These officials stated that FBI-trained and -vetted investigative units in Colombia and the Dominican Republic target the most significant criminal organizations affecting the United States.

- The FBI conducts multiple trainings with Mexican law enforcement as a means of developing contacts and fostering cooperative relationships with its law enforcement counterparts in Mexico, according to FBI officials. These officials noted that the FBI’s ability to advance investigations with a nexus south of the border is greatly enhanced through these contacts. According to these officials, the FBI also sponsors numerous trainings throughout Latin America to enhance its foreign partners’ ability to deal with the increasing transnational organized crime threat.

---

12According to ONDCP, “disrupted” means impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in the organizational leadership or changes in methods of operation; and “dismantled” means destroying the organization’s leadership, financial base, and supply network such that the organization is incapable of reconstituting itself.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Jessica Farb, (202) 512-6991, or farbj@gao.gov

Staff

In addition to the individual named above, Juan Gobel (Assistant Director), Julie Hirshen (Analyst-in-Charge), Lynn Cothern, Martin De Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Mark Dowling, Reid Lowe, and Shirley Min made key contributions to this report. Dawn Locke and Diana Maurer provided technical support.
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm.

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube. Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov and read The Watchblog.

Contact:
Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149, Washington, DC 20548