



## Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Border and  
Maritime Security, Committee on  
Homeland Security, House of  
Representatives

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# SOUTHWEST BORDER

## Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness of Land- based Surveillance Technology

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland  
Security and Justice

Accessible Version

# GAO Highlights

Highlights of [GAO-17-765T](#), a testimony before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

## Why GAO Did This Study

CBP deploys land-based surveillance technologies to help monitor and secure the border and apprehend individuals who attempt to cross the border illegally. GAO has reported on the progress and challenges DHS and its components have faced implementing its border security efforts.

This statement addresses (1) the status of CBP efforts to deploy land-based surveillance technologies along the southwest border and (2) CBP's efforts to measure the effectiveness of these technologies.

This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies from 2011 through 2016, selected updates conducted in 2017, and ongoing work for this subcommittee related to border surveillance technology. For ongoing work and updates, GAO analyzed technology program documents; interviewed DHS, CBP, and U.S. Border Patrol officials; and conducted site visits to Arizona and Texas to observe technologies.

## What GAO Recommends

GAO has made recommendations to DHS to improve its management of plans and programs for surveillance technologies. DHS has generally agreed. DHS has taken actions or described planned actions to address some of these recommendations. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations could strengthen CBP's management efforts and will continue to monitor CBP's efforts.

View [GAO-17-765T](#). For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or [gambler@gao.gov](mailto:gambler@gao.gov).

July 25, 2017

## SOUTHWEST BORDER

### Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness of Land-based Surveillance Technology

## What GAO Found

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made progress deploying surveillance technology along the southwest U.S. border under its 2011 Arizona Technology Plan (ATP) and 2014 Southwest Border Technology Plan. The ATP called for deployment of a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras in Arizona, and the 2014 Plan incorporates the ATP and includes deployments to the rest of the southwest border, beginning with areas in Texas and California. As of July 2017, CBP completed deployment of select technologies to areas in Arizona, Texas, and California. For example, CBP deployed all planned Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) systems, and 15 of 53 Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems to Arizona. CBP also deployed all planned MSC systems to Texas and California and completed contract negotiations to deploy RVSS to Texas.

#### Mobile Surveillance Capability and Integrated Fixed Tower, Arizona



Source: GAO. | GAO-17-765T

CBP has made progress implementing some, but not all of GAO's recommendations related to managing deployments of its technology programs. In 2014, GAO assessed CBP's implementation of the ATP and recommended that CBP: (1) apply scheduling best practices; (2) develop an integrated schedule; and (3) verify cost estimates for the technology programs. DHS concurred with some, but not all of the recommendations and has taken actions to address some of them, such as applying best practices when updating schedules, but has not taken action to address others, such as developing an integrated master schedule and verifying cost estimates with independent estimates for the IFT program. GAO continues to believe that applying schedule and cost estimating best practices could better position CBP to strengthen its management efforts of these programs.

CBP has also made progress toward assessing performance of surveillance technologies. GAO reported in 2014 that CBP identified some mission benefits, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety, but had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies, as GAO recommended (and CBP concurred) in 2011. GAO has ongoing work examining DHS's technology deployments and efforts to assess technology performance, which GAO plans to report on later this year.

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to acquire and deploy land-based surveillance technology and the extent that DHS measures the effectiveness of these deployed technologies to secure U.S. borders. The southwest border continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, and DHS reported apprehending about 409,000 illegal entrants and making about 14,000 seizures of drugs along the southwest border in fiscal year 2016. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) is the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the national borders between U.S. ports of entry.<sup>1</sup> CBP has divided geographic responsibility for the southwest border among nine Border Patrol sectors.<sup>2</sup>

DHS has deployed a variety of land-based surveillance technologies, which Border Patrol uses to assist its efforts to secure the border and to apprehend individuals attempting to cross the border illegally. In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), which was responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet). Under the SBInet program, CBP acquired 15 fixed-tower systems at a cost of nearly \$1 billion, which are deployed along 53 miles of Arizona's 387-mile border with Mexico. In January 2011, in response to internal and external assessments that identified concerns regarding the performance, cost, and schedule for implementing the systems, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced the cancellation of further procurements of SBInet surveillance systems, though CBP continued operating the existing SBInet systems. That same month, CBP introduced the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (ATP). The ATP

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<sup>1</sup>Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the United States. Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws, and where DHS officers inspect persons entering or applying for admission into, or departing the United States pursuant to U.S. immigration law.

<sup>2</sup>Each of the nine Southwest Border Patrol sectors (Big Bend, Del Rio, El Centro, El Paso, Laredo, Rio Grande Valley, San Diego, Tucson, and Yuma) has a headquarters with management personnel and these sectors are further divided geographically into varying numbers of stations, with agents assigned to patrol defined geographic areas.

includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help provide security for the Arizona border. In June 2014, CBP developed a separate plan that incorporates the ATP, and includes the rest of the southwest border—the Southwest Border Technology Plan. Under the Southwest Border Technology Plan, CBP has plans to extend land-based surveillance technology deployments to the remainder of the southwest border, beginning with selected areas in Texas and California.

Over the years, we have reported on the progress DHS has made and challenges it faces in implementing its border security efforts. My statement discusses (1) the status of CBP efforts to deploy land-based surveillance technology and (2) CBP's efforts to measure the effectiveness of these technologies.

This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from 2011 through 2016 that examined DHS efforts to secure the U.S. border.<sup>3</sup> It also includes selected updates on DHS's efforts to address our previous recommendations related to the ATP and our ongoing work for this subcommittee on border surveillance technologies. Our reports and testimonies incorporated information we obtained and analyzed from officials from various DHS components. More detailed information about our scopes and methodologies, including which DHS components we interviewed for the work, can be found in our published reports and testimonies.

For the updates on our ATP work and our ongoing work, we reviewed documents from DHS on actions it has taken to address findings and recommendations made in the prior reports on which this statement is based. For updates on the status of selected land-based surveillance technology programs, we reviewed CBP and DHS documents and examined cost and schedule data for each technology program. We also interviewed program managers responsible for the overall activities of these programs, including actions to design, acquire, deploy, and test the

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<sup>3</sup>These include: GAO, *Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness*, [GAO-14-368](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2014), *Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal Actions Needed to Improve Accountability*, [GAO-15-171SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 2015), *Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology, Unmanned Aerial Systems and Other Assets*, [GAO-16-671T](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2016), and *Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate Ongoing Progress*, [GAO-17-346SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2017). See Related GAO Products page for additional reports.

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technology systems, and manage government and contractor efforts. As part of our ongoing work related to the deployment of land-based technology along the southwest border, we conducted site visits to Arizona in November 2016 and April 2017 and to south Texas in March 2017. During these site visits, we observed border surveillance operations and interviewed CBP officials who operate and utilize these technologies.

All of our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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## CBP Has Made Progress Deploying Surveillance Technology along the Southwest Border, but Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Management of Its Programs

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### CBP Has Made Progress toward Completing Milestones for Technology Deployment

Since 2014, we have reported multiple times on the progress CBP has made deploying technologies under the ATP. We reported in May 2016 that CBP had initiated or completed deployment of technology to Arizona for six programs under the ATP.<sup>4</sup> In addition to deploying technologies under the ATP, CBP's 2014 Southwest Border Technology Plan extended technology deployments to the remainder of the southwest border, beginning with selected areas in Texas and California. As of July 2017, CBP completed deployment of select technologies to sectors in Arizona, Texas, and California. For example, in our April 2017 assessment of DHS's major acquisitions programs, we reported that CBP completed deployments of 7 Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems to the Nogales

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<sup>4</sup>The ATP's seven acquisition programs include fixed and mobile surveillance systems, agent portable devices, and ground sensors. The Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) units to be procured under the ATP were redirected to Texas due to changing operational priorities. Its three highest-cost programs, which represent 97 percent of the ATP's estimated cost, are the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC).

Border Patrol station within the Tucson sector in Arizona, and was working to deploy the remaining 46 towers to other sectors in Arizona.<sup>5</sup> As of July 2017, CBP reported deploying an additional 8 IFT systems, for a total of 15 of 53 planned towers. CBP has also made changes to the IFT program. Specifically, rather than expanding IFT capabilities to the Wellton Border Patrol station within the Yuma sector in Arizona as originally planned, CBP now plans to replace 15 existing SBInet fixed-tower systems with IFT systems.<sup>6</sup> CBP also reported that it had completed Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) deployments to Arizona as planned under the ATP, and deployed 32 MSC systems to Texas and California.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, CBP completed contract negotiations with the RVSS program for follow-on contract option periods to deploy RVSS to two stations in the Rio Grande Valley sector in Texas. The deployment status of the IFT, RVSS, and MSC technologies is shown below in table 1. We will plan to report on the deployment status of southwest border surveillance technology, among other topics, in a forthcoming report.

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<sup>5</sup>An IFT system consists of, among other things, ground surveillance radars and surveillance cameras mounted on fixed (that is, stationary) towers.

<sup>6</sup>These 15 SBInet surveillance systems were deployed to the Tucson and Ajo stations within the Tucson sector in Arizona. Border Patrol began using SBInet systems at the Tucson station in February 2010 and at the Ajo station in August 2010.

<sup>7</sup>An RVSS consists of day and night cameras, and a laser designator mounted on monopoles, lattice towers, and buildings and differs from the IFT in, among other things, that the RVSS is an expansion of a legacy system and does not include radars, while the IFT is a new system with radars. An MSC is a stand-alone, truck-mounted suite of radar and cameras mounted 25 feet high on a truck that provides a display within the cab of the truck.

**Table 1: Deployment Status of Select Technologies along the Southwest Border as of July 2017**

Technology Program	Location	Under contract	Deployment		Summary
			Started	Completed	
Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT)	Arizona	Yes	Yes	No	Customs and Border Protection (CBP) completed deployments of IFT systems to the Nogales and Douglas Border Patrol stations in Arizona. Four additional Border Patrol stations are scheduled—Sonoita; Casa Grande; Ajo; and Tucson. In addition, in January 2015, Border Patrol requested that CBP replace the 15 existing Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet, “Block 1”) fixed-tower systems in the Tucson sector (Border Patrol began using these systems at the Tucson station in February 2010 and at the Ajo station in August 2010) with new IFT systems, rather than expanding IFT capabilities and deploying these systems to a new area of responsibility in Yuma, Arizona at the Wellton station, as originally planned.
Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS)	Arizona	Yes	No	Yes	In December 2016, CBP completed deployments of all new and upgraded RVSS systems that it planned to deploy in Arizona.
	Texas-Rio Grande City and McAllen stations within the Rio Grande Valley sector	Yes (under the Arizona contract)	No	No	CBP officials stated they completed a site laydown study for RVSS sites, and according to CBP, the program has been working with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to examine video field of view. CBP signed off on site laydowns in April 2016. CBP also stated that the current contract includes an option to expand RVSS into the Rio Grande Valley sector and that current program funding allows for RVSS to be deployed in the McAllen and Rio Grande City Border Patrol stations.
	Texas and other areas		No	No	CBP plans to deploy RVSS to the remaining planned sites within and outside of Texas. CBP officials stated that this would be a new procurement action; therefore, CBP plans to release a new Request for Proposal and has initiated the development of the acquisition strategy for these remaining areas of responsibility within and outside of Texas.
Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC)	Arizona, Texas and California	Yes	No	Yes	CBP reported that as of December 2016 it had completed deployments of all MSC systems to Arizona, Texas (Big Bend, Del Rio, and El Paso sectors), and California (San Diego and El Centro sectors).

Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. | GAO-17-765T.

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## CBP Has Made Progress in Implementing GAO's Prior Recommendations, but Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Management of Its Programs

In March 2014, we assessed CBP's efforts to develop and implement the ATP.<sup>8</sup> Specifically, we recommended that CBP, among other things, (1) apply scheduling best practices; (2) develop an integrated schedule; and (3) verify life-cycle cost estimates. DHS concurred with some of our recommendations and has taken actions to address some of them, which we discuss below.

**Program Schedules.** In March 2014, we found that CBP had a schedule for deployment for each of the ATP's seven programs, and that four of the programs would not meet their originally planned completion dates. Specifically, we found that the three highest-cost programs (IFT, RVSS, and MSC) had experienced delays relative to their baseline schedules, as of March 2013.<sup>9</sup> We also reported that CBP had at least partially met the four characteristics of reliable schedules for the IFT and RVSS schedules and partially or minimally met the four characteristics for the MSC schedule. Scheduling best practices are summarized into four characteristics of reliable schedules—comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled (i.e., schedules are periodically updated and

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<sup>8</sup>[GAO-14-368](#).

<sup>9</sup>The baseline schedule is to represent the original configuration of the program plan and to signify the consensus of all stakeholders regarding the required sequence of events, resource assignments, and acceptable dates for key deliverables. The current schedule is to represent the actual plan to date.



progress is monitored).<sup>10</sup> We assessed CBP's schedules as of March 2013 for the three highest-cost programs and reported in March 2014 that schedules for two of the programs at least partially met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied about half of the criterion), and the schedule for the other program at least minimally met each characteristic (i.e., satisfied a small portion of the criterion).<sup>11</sup> For example, the schedule for the IFT program partially met the characteristic of being credible in that CBP had performed a schedule risk analysis for the program, but the risk analysis did not include the risks most likely to delay the program or how much contingency reserve was needed. For the MSC program, the schedule minimally met the characteristic of being controlled in that it did not have valid baseline dates for activities or milestones by which CBP could track progress. We recommended that CBP ensure that scheduling best practices are applied to the IFT, RVSS, and MSC program schedules. DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated that CBP planned to ensure that scheduling best practices would be applied, as outlined in our schedule assessment guide, when updating the three programs' schedules.

In response to our March 2014 recommendation regarding applying scheduling best practices, CBP provided us with updated program schedules for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs. Based on our assessment of updated program schedules for the IFT, RVSS, and MSC that CBP had completed as of January 2017, CBP has made significant improvements in the quality of the programs' schedules, but the programs' schedules had not met all characteristics of a reliable

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<sup>10</sup>GAO, *GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules*, [GAO-16-89G](#) (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2015). We developed this guide through a compilation of best practices that federal agencies and industry use. According to this guide, for a schedule to be comprehensive, among other things, the schedule should (1) capture all activities, as defined in the work breakdown structure; (2) reflect what resources are needed to do the work; and (3) establish the duration of all activities and have specific start and end dates. To be well constructed, among other things, a schedule should have all of its activities sequenced in the order that they are to be implemented with the most straightforward logic possible. To be credible, the schedule should reflect the order of events necessary to achieve aggregated products or outcomes, and activities in varying levels of the schedule map to one another. Moreover, a schedule risk analysis should be conducted to predict a level of confidence in meeting the program's completion date. For a schedule to be controlled, the schedule should be updated periodically using actual progress and logic to realistically forecast dates for program activities, and a baseline schedule should be maintained to measure, monitor, and report the program's progress.

<sup>11</sup>[GAO-14-368](#).

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schedule. For example, CBP has improved the quality of its products for analyzing and quantifying risk to the programs' schedules; however, CBP could improve the documentation of these analyses and the prioritization of the programs' risks. While CBP has taken positive steps, we continue to believe that by ensuring that all scheduling best practices are applied, CBP could help ensure the reliability of its programs' schedules and better position itself to identify and address any potential delays in its programs' commitment dates.

**Integrated Master Schedule.** In March 2014, we also found that CBP had not developed an Integrated Master Schedule for the ATP in accordance with best practices. Rather, CBP had used separate schedules for each program to manage implementation of the ATP, as CBP officials stated that the ATP contained individual acquisition programs rather than integrated programs. However, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP with a combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona border with Mexico, and resources are shared among the programs.<sup>12</sup> We recommended in March 2014 that CBP develop an Integrated Master Schedule for the ATP. CBP did not concur with this recommendation and maintained that an Integrated Master Schedule for the ATP in one file undermines the DHS-approved implementation strategy for the individual programs making up the ATP, and that the implementation of this recommendation would essentially create a large, aggregated program, and effectively create an aggregated "system of systems." DHS further stated at the time that a key element of its plan has been the disaggregation of technology procurements. As we reported in March 2014, this recommendation was not intended to imply that DHS needed to re-aggregate the ATP's seven programs into a "system of systems" or change its procurement strategy in any form. The intent of the recommendation was for DHS to insert the individual schedules for each of the ATP's programs into a single electronic Integrated Master Schedule file in order to identify any resource allocation issues among the programs' schedules. We continue to believe that developing and maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for planned technologies could allow CBP insight into current or programmed

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<sup>12</sup>According to scheduling best practices, an Integrated Master Schedule is a critical management tool for complex systems that involve a number of different projects, such as the ATP, to allow managers to monitor all work activities, how long activities will take, and how the activities are related to one another. We concluded in March 2014 that developing and maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the ATP could help provide CBP a comprehensive view of the ATP and help CBP better understand how schedule changes in each individual program could affect implementation of the overall plan.

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allocation of resources for all programs as opposed to attempting to resolve any resource constraints for each program individually.

**Life-cycle Cost Estimates.** In March 2014, we also reported that the life-cycle cost estimates for the technology programs under the ATP reflected some, but not all, best practices. Cost-estimating best practices are summarized into four characteristics—well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible. Our analysis of CBP’s estimate for the ATP and estimates completed at the time of our March 2014 review for the two highest-cost programs—the IFT and RVSS programs—showed that these estimates at least partially met three of these characteristics: well documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In terms of being credible, these estimates had not been verified with independent cost estimates in accordance with best practices.<sup>13</sup> We concluded that verifying life-cycle cost estimates with independent estimates in accordance with cost-estimating best practices could help better ensure the reliability of the cost estimates, and we recommended that CBP verify the life-cycle cost estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs with independent cost estimates and reconcile any differences. DHS concurred with this recommendation, but stated then that it did not believe that there would be a benefit in expending funds to obtain independent cost estimates and that if the costs realized to date continued to hold, there may be no requirement or value added in conducting full program updates with independent cost estimates.<sup>14</sup>

We recognize the need to balance the cost and time to verify the life-cycle cost estimates with the benefits to be gained from verification with independent cost estimates. As part of our updates on CBP’s efforts to implement our 2014 recommendations, CBP officials told us that in fiscal year 2016, DHS’s Cost Analysis Division (CAD) would begin piloting DHS’s independent cost estimate capability on the RVSS program. According to CBP officials, this pilot is an opportunity to assist DHS in developing its independent cost estimate capability. CBP selected the RVSS program for the pilot because the program was at a point in its planning and execution process where it can benefit most from having an

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<sup>13</sup>GAO, *GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs*, [GAO-09-3SP](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).

<sup>14</sup>An independent cost estimate provides an independent view of expected program costs that tests the program office’s estimate for reasonableness. Independent cost estimates frequently use different methods and are less burdened with organizational bias, helping to provide decision makers with insight into a program’s potential costs.

independent cost estimate performed, as these technologies are being deployed along the southwest border beyond Arizona. According to CBP officials, DHS's Cost Analysis Division completed its independent cost estimate for the RVSS program in August 2016, and in February 2017 CBP had completed its efforts to verify the RVSS program cost estimate with CAD's independent cost estimate, which is part of the CAD pilot. However, as of July 2017, CBP has not yet provided us with the final reconciliation of the independent cost estimate and the RVSS program cost estimate, as we recommended in 2014. CBP officials have not detailed similar plans for the IFT. We continue to believe that independently verifying the life-cycle cost estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs and reconciling any differences, consistent with best practices, could help CBP better ensure the reliability of the estimates.

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## CBP Has Made Progress Assessing Performance of Surveillance Technologies, but Has Not Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the Contributions of Its Technologies

We reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified mission benefits of its surveillance technologies to be deployed along the southwest border, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. However, the agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be deployed, as we recommended in November 2011.<sup>15</sup> Further, we also reported in March 2014 that CBP did not capture complete data on the contributions of these technologies, which in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, could be used to better determine the impact of CBP's surveillance technologies on CBP's border security efforts and inform resource allocation decisions. We found that CBP had a field within its Enforcement Integrated Database for data on whether technological assets, such as SBInet surveillance systems, and non-technological assets, such as canine teams, assisted or contributed to the apprehension of illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other contraband; however, according to CBP officials, Border Patrol agents were not required to record these data. This limited CBP's ability to

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<sup>15</sup> [GAO-14-368](#) and *Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding*, [GAO-12-22](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2011).

collect, track, and analyze available data on asset assists to help monitor the contribution of surveillance technologies, including its SBInet system, to Border Patrol apprehensions and seizures and inform resource allocation decisions. We recommended that CBP require data on asset assists to be recorded and tracked within its database, and once these data were required to be recorded and tracked, that it analyze available data on apprehensions and technological assists—in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate—to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security efforts. CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of them. Specifically, in June 2014, CBP issued guidance informing Border Patrol agents that the asset assist data field within its database was now a mandatory data field. Therefore, agents are required to enter any assisting surveillance technology or other equipment.

Further, as part of our updates on CBP’s efforts to implement our 2014 recommendations, we found that in May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed under the ATP. However, CBP officials stated at that time that this set of performance metrics was under review as the agency continued to refine the key attributes for metrics to assess the contributions and impacts of surveillance technology on its border security mission.<sup>16</sup> In our April 2016 update on the progress made by agencies to address our findings on duplication and cost savings across the federal government, we reported that CBP had modified its time frame for developing baselines for each performance measure and that additional time would be needed to implement and apply key attributes for metrics.<sup>17</sup> According to CBP officials, CBP expected these performance measure baselines to be developed by the end of calendar year 2015, at which time the agency planned to begin using the data to evaluate the individual and collective contributions of specific technology assets deployed under the ATP. Moreover, CBP planned to use the baseline data to establish a tool that explains the qualitative and quantitative impacts of technology and tactical infrastructure on situational awareness in specific areas of the border environment by the end of fiscal year 2016. Although CBP had

<sup>16</sup>[GAO-15-404SP](#).

<sup>17</sup>GAO, *2016 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits*, [GAO-16-375SP](#), (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2016).

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initially reported it had expected to complete its development of baselines for each performance measure by the end of calendar year 2015, as of March 2016, it was adjusting the actual completion date, pending test and evaluation results for recently deployed technologies to the southwest border.

In our April 2017 update on the progress made by agencies to address our findings on duplication and cost savings across the federal government, we reported that CBP had provided us a case study that assessed technology assist data, along with other measures such as field-based assessments of capability gaps, to determine the contributions of surveillance technologies to its mission.<sup>18</sup> This is a helpful step in developing and applying performance metrics. However, the case study was limited to one border location and the analysis was limited to select technologies. To fully implement our recommendation, CBP should complete its efforts to fully develop and apply key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies deployed and begin using the data to evaluate the individual and collective contributions of specific technologies, fully assess its progress in implementing planned technologies, and determine when mission benefits have been fully realized. Until CBP completes this effort it will not be well positioned to fully assess its progress in implementing the ATP and determining when mission benefits have been fully realized.

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

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## GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or [gablerr@gao.gov](mailto:gablerr@gao.gov). In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors to this testimony are Jeanette Espinola (Assistant Director), Yvette Gutierrez (Analyst in Charge), Charlotte Gamble, Ashley Davis, Claire Peachey, Marycella Mierez, and Sasan J. "Jon" Najmi.

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<sup>18</sup>GAO, *2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits*, [GAO-17-491SP](#), (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2017).

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## Related GAO Products

*2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.*

[GAO-17-491SP](#). Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2017.

*2017 Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate Ongoing Progress.* [GAO-17-346SP](#). Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2017.

*Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology, Unmanned Aerial Systems and Other Assets.* [GAO-16-671T](#). Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2016.

*2016 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.*

[GAO-16-375SP](#). Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2016.

*Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management, but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure.* [GAO-16-338SP](#).

Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016.

*Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess Resource Deployment and Progress.* [GAO-16-465T](#). Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2016.

*GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules.*

[GAO-16-89G](#). Washington, D.C.: December 2015.

*Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Implement and Assess Infrastructure and Technology.* [GAO-15-595T](#). Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2015.

*Homeland Security Acquisitions: Addressing Gaps in Oversight and Information is Key to Improving Program Outcomes.* [GAO-15-541T](#).

Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2015.

*Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal Actions Needed to Improve Accountability.* [GAO-15-171SP](#). Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2015.

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*2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits.* [GAO-15-404SP](#). Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015.

*Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness.* [GAO-14-411T](#). Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.

*Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness.* [GAO-14-368](#). Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014.

*Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and Assessment Efforts.* [GAO-13-653T](#). Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013.

*Border Security: DHS's Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. Borders.* [GAO-13-414T](#). Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.

*U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan.* [GAO-12-106R](#). Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.

*Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding.* [GAO-12-22](#). Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2011.

*GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs.* [GAO-09-3SP](#). Washington, D.C.: March 2009.



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