From the U.S. Government Accountability Office, www.gao.gov Transcript for: Nuclear Facility Security Reporting Description: Audio interview by GAO staff with Shelby Oakley, Director, Natural Resources and Environment Related GAO Work: GAO-17-239: Nuclear Security: DOE Could Improve Aspects of Nuclear Security Reporting Released: April 2017 [ Background Music ] [ Narrator: ] Welcome to GAO's Watchdog Report, your source for news and information from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. It's April 2017. The Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration operate facilities that hold the kind of nuclear material that can be used to make weapons. Due to the sensitive nature of these sites, the Department of Energy must report on the status of their security infrastructure to Congress every year. A team led by Shelby Oakley, a director in GAO's Natural Resources and Environment team, recently reviewed the annual security status reports. Jacques Arsenault sat down with Shelby to talk about what they found. [ Jacques Arsenault: ] Your team looked at physical security challenges around federal nuclear facilities, and I understand there's a bit of an interesting story behind why we're looking at this. Can you give me a little bit of background on these challenges and what brought them to light? [ Shelby Oakley: ] Sure, there is an interesting story surrounding this review. In 2012, three peace activists breached the protected areas of a nuclear facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This nuclear facility really holds the majority of our national stockpile of enriched uranium, which is used to make nuclear weapons. During the break-in, these individuals tripped numerous alarms, and those alarms were ignored, and they weren't detected on cameras because of long-standing and known problems with this equipment, and they were in a protected area of that facility for up to 10 minutes before being apprehended by a single security officer. As a result of this incident at Oakridge, Congress really focused more attention on the security of DOE and NNSA facilities that store and process nuclear material. [ Jacques Arsenault: ] So you mentioned some vulnerabilities that were exposed at Oakridge. Do these apply to nuclear facilities more broadly? [ Shelby Oakley: ] In some cases, yes. In our report, we discuss two principal physical security challenges at DOE and NNSA facilities. First, the physical security infrastructure at these facilities, things like fences and barriers and sensors and cameras are old. They're really difficult to maintain and, in many cases, they need to be replaced. Second, another challenge that DOE is struggling with is the implementation of this 2011 policy change that DOE put in place. This policy change really changed some of the requirements for some nuclear material protections that will be pretty time-consuming and costly to address. And the agency is still figuring out how to address this challenge. [ Jacques Arsenault: ] Well, let me ask you then, how are the agencies handling it? Are they making progress against these vulnerabilities and challenges? [ Shelby Oakley: ] In some cases, yes. DOE's reports do a really good job of identifying the challenges, and, you know, identifying that the physical security infrastructure, at its facilities, is going to need to be addressed. NNSA is a lot further ahead in actually addressing this challenge than DOE is. For example, NNSA already is in the process of developing a plan for how it's going to address its physical security challenges. And is thinking it's going to take almost a billion dollars in 10 years to address these challenges. DOE has not followed suit. DOE currently does not have a plan for addressing its identified physical security infrastructure challenges. [ Jacques Arsenault: ] So, can you tell me what GAO is recommending in this report? [ Shelby Oakley: ] We're making a number of recommendations related to this report, but two recommendations related to the physical security challenges we address in our report are, first, that DOE develop a plan for addressing its physical infrastructure security challenges, similar to the one that NNSA is currently developing. We want this plan to identify the costs and timeframes associated with making the necessary repairs or replacements to address the physical security challenges. This plan would help DOE and the Congress really prioritize funding for these projects. With regard to delays in implementing the 2011 order, we would like DOE to really provide Congress information on why they've been delayed in addressing this order, and the steps that the Department of Energy is taking to actually implement it. As a part of this process, we want DOE to make sure Congress understands any security vulnerabilities that are in play until this order is implemented. [ Jacques Arsenault: ] And, finally, what would you say is the bottom line of this report? [ Shelby Oakley: ] You know, past failures in security have really shined the light on the need to make sure that these facilities that store this really important, critical national security material are secure, and Congress has really taken steps to try and reinforce the Secretary of Energy's accountability for making sure that these facilities are secure. These security challenges that DOE and NNSA have identified in their reports, they didn't happen overnight and addressing them is gonna to take some time, and it's not gonna be cheap. It is important, though, that the agencies really begin to make progress and take steps to address the challenge and keep Congress informed along the way because the next time an incident happens, we might not get so lucky that it's peace activists who have breached our security. [ Background Music ] [ Narrator: ] To learn more, visit GAO.gov and be sure to tune in to the next episode of GAO's Watchdog Report for more from the congressional watchdog, the U.S. Government Accountability Office.