June 10, 2015

The Honorable John Hoeven  
Chairman  
The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen  
Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Homeland Security  
Committee on Appropriations  
United States Senate  

The Honorable John Carter  
Chairman  
The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard  
Ranking Member  
Subcommittee on Homeland Security  
Committee on Appropriations  
House of Representatives  

Screening Partnership Program: TSA’s Cost and Performance Independent Study

Every day, approximately 1.8 million passengers travel through U.S. commercial airports.¹ As the U.S. agency with primary responsibility for civil aviation security, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes action to ensure the security of such passengers through, among other things, the screening of passengers and baggage traveling by aircraft.² To fulfill this responsibility, TSA maintains a federal workforce of screeners at a majority of the nation’s commercial airports and oversees a smaller workforce of private screeners employed by companies under contract to TSA at airports that participate in TSA’s Screening Partnership Program (SPP). The SPP, established in 2004 in accordance with provisions of the Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA), allows commercial airports an opportunity to opt out of federal screening by applying to TSA to have private screeners perform the screening function.³

The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, directed TSA to allocate resources for an independent study (the Study) of the performance of screening at federalized airports (non-SPP airports) in comparison with the performance of screening at

¹For purposes of this report, the term “commercial airport” includes all airports in the United States at which TSA performs or oversees the performance of security screening activities.


The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, further provided that GAO shall brief the committees on the strengths and weaknesses of the independent study TSA funded on the performance of screening at non-SPP airports compared with screening at SPP airports. On April 14, 2015, we briefed the committees (see enc. I for an updated copy of the briefing) on our findings. In this report, we present findings on (1) the strengths and limitations of the independent study’s comparison of the estimated cost of screening at SPP and non-SPP airports and (2) the strengths and limitations of the independent study’s comparison of the performance of screeners at SPP and non-SPP airports.

To determine the strengths and limitations of the Study’s assessment of the costs of operating SPP and non-SPP airports, we compared the Study’s methodological approach against best practices we identified in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. To determine the strengths and limitations of the Study’s assessment of the performance at SPP and non-SPP airports, we compared the Study’s methodological approach against generally accepted research standards related to study design, measurement, analysis, and reporting. The strengths and limitations included are limited to the information provided in the Study based on the criteria we applied.

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5 The Study included a cost assessment to provide screening at SPP airports and the estimated cost if the same services were conducted under the federal model at these SPP airports. TSA classifies commercial airports in the United States into one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and landings annually, the extent of passenger screening at the airport, and other security considerations. In general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest.

6 Specifically, GAO was to brief the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security and the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security.


We conducted this performance audit from February 2015 through May 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In summary, the Study’s comparison of the costs of providing screening services at SPP and non-SPP airports has some strengths, such as comparing costs consistently between SPP and non-SPP airports. However, based on our comparison of the Study against best practices, our analysis suggests that the Study’s cost assessment has limitations that affect its accuracy and credibility. For example, to develop 5-year estimates, the Study uses data from a single year (fiscal year 2013), which do not account for variables that can change from year to year such as staffing and wages. (see enc. I for additional details).

The Study’s comparison of the performance of screeners at SPP and screeners at non-SPP airports has some strengths, such as recognizing the challenge of assessing performance across unique airports. However, based on generally accepted research standards, our analysis suggests that the Study’s performance comparison has limitations that affect the ability to draw conclusions that are supported by the data analysis. For example, the Study draws conclusions for all airports studied based on an analysis in which data were not available for many airports (see enc. I for additional details).

We are not making any recommendations in this report.
Agency Comments and Third-Party Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the contractor that conducted the study for their review and comment. In an e-mail received May 27, 2015, the DHS Liaison stated that DHS did not have any comments on the report, nor did TSA have any technical comments. However, DHS provided technical comments from the contractor that conducted the study. In general, the contractor’s comments indicated that our draft report did not include some of the study’s strengths and disagreed with some of the limitations we identified. See enclosure I for details on the strengths and limitations we identified. Given the substantive nature of these comments, we summarize the contractor’s comments below.

In commenting on the draft report, the contractor identified, as examples, practices in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide that it stated were strengths of the Study but were not included in our report. The contractor noted that cost estimates should include all costs and be independent of funding sources and appropriations. We agree and our report lists the Study’s inclusion of other federal costs in addition to costs that TSA incurs in its cost estimates as a strength of the Study. The contractor also noted the Study’s use of an Engineering Build-Up Method as a strength that was not included in our report. While this methodological choice was reasonable, it is not considered a strength since the Cost Guide discusses several methodologies that can be used to develop cost estimates.

The contractor also disagreed with four of the limitations we identified.

- First, the contractor indicated that the Study’s cost analysis used the most current cost data available at the time the analysis was performed. We disagree. While the Study relied on fiscal year 2013 data for estimates on which it based its conclusions, it also used partial year data for fiscal year 2014 for other purposes in the Study.
- Second, the contractor noted that the Study established a quantifiable analysis that allows for the assessment of the variability of the point estimate. The contractor also identified the inclusion of an uncertainty analysis as a strength of the Study not included in our report. While the Study included a risk and uncertainty assessment, we did not consider this analysis by itself to be a strength because it does not allow for a quantifiable confidence level for each specific airport being examined, consistent with best practices.
- Third, the contractor noted that it could not account for policies and procedures implemented by TSA in its assessment because there was not enough cost data available. We agree and this is noted as a limitation of the Study in our report.
- Finally, the contractor indicated that several internal management reviews were conducted prior to providing TSA with the final study. While the Study indicated that the contractor established processes that allowed review of the data, methodologies, analyses, and conclusions, there was no documentation that showed management approved of or reviewed the assumptions that were used to develop the estimates, a practice consistent with the cost guide.

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In commenting on the draft report, the contractor indicated that the Study’s performance comparison had additional strengths included in GAO’s Designing Evaluations which were not included in our report.\(^{10}\) As examples, the contractor pointed to two steps included in GAO’s guide that it considered strengths. The contractor noted that GAO’s guide states that discussing evaluation plans with agency as well as congressional stakeholders is important throughout the design process, since they have a direct interest in and ability to act on the Study’s findings. We recognize that the Study indicates that the contractor discussed the evaluation plan with the agency, consistent with the guide, and that it is an important step. Additionally, the contractor noted that the guidance states that in selecting sources of evidence to answer the evaluation question, the evaluator must assess whether these sources will provide evidence that is both sufficient and appropriate to support findings and conclusions on the evaluation question. While the Study discusses steps taken to understand and evaluate the selected TSA data, we do not consider this a strength because the Study’s conclusions regarding screener performance were based on incomplete performance data.

The contractor also provided comments that disagreed with three limitations of the Study’s performance comparison:

- First, the contractor noted that the Study determined the screener performance data were reasonably complete and accurate for analysis. According to the contractor, the Study relied on the existing data collected by TSA in 2013 and took reasonable measures to determine their completeness and accuracy. However, we maintain that while the Study assessed the validity and reliability of the data, the evaluation ultimately analyzed outcomes where data were inconsistent or missing. As described in the report, the Study identified inconsistencies in how data on wait times were collected but did not adjust its methods or conclusions to account for the inconsistencies.

- Second, the contractor noted that the Study’s comparison of each SPP airport to its five most similar non-SPP airports allowed for more meaningful conclusions than combining data for all SPP airports and all non-SPP airports. We recognize that this analytical approach better isolates the effect of the unique SPP airport characteristics. However, only comparing individual SPP airports to a selected set of non-SPP airports one at a time does not allow for estimating this controlled effect across the target population of SPP airports. Further analysis that aggregates the individual controlled estimates is necessary to evaluate the overall effect.

- Finally, the contractor noted that the Study’s performance conclusions were linked to the results and the conclusions were only based on analyses for which data were available for certain airports and performance categories. We agree that the Study’s use of a comparison group is a valid approach. However, we maintain that the Study made general conclusions about the overall effects of the SPP program—that the performance of SPP airports was “on par” with the performance of non-SPP airports—without aggregating these controlled comparisons for each SPP airport, as discussed above. In addition, the Study’s general conclusions reflected comparisons of screener performance in categories with incomplete data. Therefore, we continue to find that the Study’s conclusion that, in aggregate, SPP and non-SPP airports are performing similarly across all categories assessed is not supported by the Study’s results and does not include the appropriate caveats to address limitations.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security; the appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7141 or GroverJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in enclosure II.

Jennifer A. Grover  
Director, Homeland Security and Justice

Enclosures–2
Enclosure I

Briefing on Screening Partnership Program: TSA’s Cost and Performance Independent Study

Screening Partnership Program: TSA’s Cost and Performance Independent Study

Briefing for Congressional Committees
Updated
Introduction

- Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for ensuring the security of the traveling public through, among other things, screening passengers and baggage traveling by aircraft.\(^1\)
- To fulfill this responsibility, TSA maintains a federal workforce of screeners at a majority of the nation’s commercial airports and also oversees a smaller workforce of private screeners employed by companies under contract to TSA at airports that participate in TSA’s Screening Partnership Program (SPP).\(^2\)
- The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, directed TSA to allocate resources for an independent study of the performance of screening at federalized airports (non-SPP airports) in comparison with the performance of screening at privatized airports under the SPP program (SPP airports).\(^3\)
- Specifically, the study was to include, but was not limited to, security effectiveness, cost, throughput, wait times, management efficiencies, and customer satisfaction.

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\(^2\) For purposes of this briefing, the term “commercial airport” includes all airports in the United States at which TSA performs or oversees the performance of security screening activities. In November 2002, in accordance with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA began a 2-year pilot program at five airports using private screening companies to screen passengers and checked baggage. See 49 U.S.C. § 44919. In November 2004, TSA subsequently established the Screening Partnership Program through which all airports with a federal screeners workforce can apply to “opt out” of federal screening in favor of a private screeners workforce. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923.

Introduction (continued)

- In June 2014, TSA awarded a contract to complete an independent study. The study was provided to TSA on November 21, 2014.\(^4\) [Herein referred to as “the Study”]
- The Study included an assessment of the costs of providing screening services at SPP airports and an estimated cost if those airports were to operate as non-SPP airports as well as a comparison of security performance of at least one SPP airport in each security risk category with security performance at a non-SPP airport in each category for fiscal year 2013.\(^5\)
- The Study’s cost assessment concluded that, in general, the cost estimates for non-SPP screeners are higher for larger airports, whereas cost estimates for SPP screeners are generally higher for smaller airports.\(^6\) In addition, the Study concluded that contractors provide wages and benefits to SPP screeners that are comparable to those available to non-SPP screeners.
- The Study’s performance assessment of available data on security effectiveness, throughput, wait time, customer satisfaction, and management efficiencies concluded that SPP airports compared with non-SPP airports in aggregate or at the program level are generally operating at the same level of performance.\(^7\)

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4 BDO USA, LLP, and its partner, Triumph Enterprises, Inc., Transportation Security Administration Screening Partnership Program Study, as prepared for TSA, 2014.

5 TSA classifies commercial airports in the United States into one of five security risk categories (X, II, III, and IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and landings annually, the extent of passenger screening at the airport, and other security considerations. In general, Category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and Category IV airports have the smallest.

6 At the program level, or in aggregate, the fiscal year 2013 estimate for all SPP airports indicated the federal estimate is $15.75 million, or 9.2 percent higher than the SPP contractor estimate.

7 Specifically, the Study concluded that the performance of contractor screeners at the program level appears to be on par with the performance of federal screeners.
Objectives

- The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Public Law 113-76, provides that GAO shall brief the committees on the strengths and weaknesses of the independent study TSA funded on the performance of screening at non-SPP airports compared with screening at SPP airports.  
- The Explanatory Statement specified that GAO is to brief the committees within 90 days of receipt of the report from TSA, which TSA provided on January 13, 2015.
- GAO addressed the following objectives:
  1. What are the strengths and limitations of the independent study’s comparison of the estimated cost of screening at SPP and non-SPP airports?
  2. What are the strengths and limitations of the independent study’s comparison of the performance of screeners at SPP and non-SPP airports?

Specifically, GAO was to brief the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security and the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security.
Scope and Methodology

- The strengths and limitations included are limited to the information provided in the Study based on the criteria we applied.
- To determine the strengths and limitations of the Study’s assessment of the costs of operating SPP and non-SPP airports, we compared the Study’s methodological approach against best practices we identified in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.\(^9\)
- To determine the strengths and limitations of the Study’s assessment of the performance of SPP and non-SPP airports, we compared the study’s methodological approach against generally accepted research standards related to study design, measurement, analysis, and reporting.\(^10\)

\(^9\) GAO. GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital/Program Costs, GAO-08-336P (Washington, D.C.: March 2008). The methodology outlined in this guide is a compilation of best practices that federal cost-estimating organizations and industry use to develop and maintain reliable cost estimates throughout the life of a government acquisition program. The leading practices were developed in conjunction with government and industry experts in the cost-estimating community. By default, the guide also serves as a guiding principle for our auditors to evaluate the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of government programs.

\(^10\) GAO, Describing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GAO-12-209G (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2012), and other social science methodological research. GAO-12-209G addresses the logic of program evaluation design and generally accepted statistical principles, and describes different types of evaluations for answering varied questions about program performance, the process of designing evaluation studies, and key issues to consider toward ensuring overall study quality.
Summary of Findings

- The Study's comparison of the costs of providing screening services under SPP and non-SPP airport operations as some strengths, such as comparing costs consistently between SPP and non-SPP airports. However, based on our comparison of the Study against best practices, our analysis suggests that the Study's cost assessment has limitations that affect its accuracy and credibility. For example, to develop 5-year estimates, the Study uses data from a single year (fiscal year 2013), which do not account for variables that can change from year to year such as staffing and wages.

- The Study's comparison of the performance of screeners at SPP and screeners at non-SPP airports has some strengths, such as recognizing the challenge of assessing performance across airports, given the unique characteristics of each airport. However, based on generally accepted research standards, our analysis suggests that the Study's performance comparison has limitations that affect the ability to draw conclusions that are supported by the data analysis. For example, the Study draws conclusions for all airports studied based on analysis where data were not available for many airports.
Background

• In November 2004, in accordance with Aviation and Transportation Security Act, all commercial airports became eligible to apply to the SPP.

• While an airport operator may apply to the SPP to use a private company’s screening personnel to screen passengers and checked baggage at its airport, TSA continues to be responsible for overseeing screening operations at SPP airports and for ensuring that contract screening companies provide effective and efficient security operations.

• At the time the Study began, in June 2014, 14 airports were operating with contracted screeners. As of May 2015, there are 21 airports of varying security risk categories in the program.11

11Twenty of the 21 airports are operating with contracted screeners, and the other one is a seasonal airport and plans to have contracted screeners in place when flights resume on June 1, 2015.
Objective 1: Comparison of the Study’s Cost Methodology against Best Practices

The Study’s comparison of the costs of providing screening services at SPP and non-SPP airports has some strengths, but also has limitations that affect its accuracy and credibility. Our analysis of the Study’s cost comparison indicated that the estimates developed did not fully meet the standards of a high-quality and reliable cost estimate which require it to be comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible.\(^\text{12}\)

A reliable and valid cost estimate should be comprehensive

Identified strengths:

- The Study’s cost estimates include other federal costs incurred in addition to what TSA incurs.
- The Study establishes a cost-estimating structure for the SPP and non-SPP airports.\(^\text{13}\)
- The Study documents the assumptions used to develop each cost element structure.
- The Study compares SPP and non-SPP cost estimates consistently and establishes the period of performance for the comparison.

Identified limitations:

- We did not identify any key limitations based on the best practices criteria we applied.

\(^{12}\) A cost estimate is considered reliable if the overall assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are substantially or fully met. If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the cost estimate does not fully reflect the characteristics of a high-quality estimate and cannot be considered reliable.

\(^{13}\) The Study defines a cost breakdown structure as the subdivision of the overall cost into discrete components that can be more easily estimated. These subdivisions are referred to as cost elements.
Objective 1: Comparison of the Study’s Cost Methodology against Best Practices (continued)

A reliable and valid cost estimate should be well documented.

Identified strengths:
• The Study’s documentation provides a brief program description.
• The Study includes the source data used for analysis.

Identified limitations:
• The Study’s documentation is not detailed such that an analyst unfamiliar with the program could understand what was done and replicate it to determine if it is valid and credible, consistent with best practices.
• The Study does not have documented evidence of an internal management review prior to providing TSA with the final study. According to best practices, a cost estimate is not considered valid until it is approved by management.
Objective 1: Comparison of the Study’s Cost Methodology against Best Practices (continued)

A reliable and valid cost estimate should be accurate.

Identified strengths:
- The Study uses actual program cost data, rather than estimated data.
- The Study discusses baseline assumptions provided by TSA officials to develop the estimate.

Identified limitations:
- The Study does not use the most recent actual data for all airports. Moreover, the Study does not include data for certain airports in its conclusions although the Study had more recent data for those airports. Best practices state that an estimate should be based on the most recent data available.
- The Study uses staffing and cost data for a single year across a 5-year estimate, which does not account for changes in staffing and inflation that could significantly affect the estimate. Best practices state that historical data should be used to check the reasonableness of an estimate.
- The Study does not account for policies and procedures implemented by TSA outside of the selected year, such as expedited screening, which could cause the data in the study to be outdated and, therefore, affect the estimated costs. Best practices state that the estimate should account for background circumstances that could affect the data.

14 The Study states that fiscal year 2013 data were used to estimate all airports except four western Montana airports. The Study used fiscal year 2013 data with projected fiscal year 2014 staffing data for the four western Montana airports that converted to the SPP in fiscal year 2014. A full set of fiscal year 2014 cost data was not available at the time of the study. For this reason, the Study’s cost estimates for the western Montana airports were not used to draw cost conclusions.
Objective 1: Comparison of the Study’s Cost Methodology against Best Practices (continued)

A reliable and valid cost estimate should be credible.

Identified strengths:
- We did not identify any key strengths based on the best practices criteria we applied.

Identified limitations:
- The Study includes a risk and uncertainty assessment, however, it does not establish a quantifiable analysis that allows for the assessment of the variability of the point estimate at each airport, consistent with best practices. Risk and uncertainty refer to the fact that because a cost estimate is a forecast, there is always a chance that the actual cost will differ from the estimate.
- The Study does not show whether crosschecks, as well as a sensitivity analysis, were performed, as called for by best practices.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\)GAO best practices state that the main purpose of cross-checking is to determine whether alternative methods produce similar results. In addition, when a sensitivity analysis to identify the effect of uncertainties associated with different assumptions is not conducted, this increases the chance that decisions will be made without a clear understanding of these impacts on costs.
Objective 2: Comparison of the Study’s Performance Assessment against Generally Accepted Research Standards

The Study’s comparison of the performance of screeners at specific SPP and selected non-SPP airports has some strengths, but is limited in that it did not conduct the analysis necessary to make comparisons of the performance of screeners at SPP and non-SPP airports as called for by generally accepted research standards.  

The study should be designed to fully address the required tasks.

Identified strengths:

- The Study’s selection criteria use available data for comparison of SPP and non-SPP airports.
- The Study includes a discussion on each of the five categories for which the contractor was asked to compare performance across SPP and non-SPP airports.

Identified limitations:

- We did not identify any key limitations based on the best practices criteria we applied.

These standards define a well-documented and clearly presented study, and were accumulated from a number of research organizations, including GAO, the Department of Defense, and private research centers.
Objective 2: Comparison of the Study’s Performance Assessment against Generally Accepted Research Standards (continued)

The measures chosen for evaluation should be valid and reliable.

Identified strengths:
- We did not identify any key strengths based on the best practices criteria we applied.

Identified limitations:
- The Study does not determine if the screener performance data were reasonably complete and accurate for analysis. For example, the Study identifies inconsistencies in how data on wait times were collected but does not adjust its methods or conclusions to account for the inconsistencies.
- The Study does not adequately adjust for data that were not available for many airports. For example, the Study chose to compare utilization of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) when 8 of 14 airports did not have or use AIT equipment in calendar year 2013.
Objective 2: Comparison of the Study’s Performance Assessment against Generally Accepted Research Standards (continued)

The methodology, including statistical techniques, should support accomplishing the objectives of the study.

Identified strengths:
• We did not identify any key strengths based on the best practices criteria we applied.

Identified limitations:
• The data analysis is not adequate to support performance comparisons between SPP and non-SPP airports. For example, the Study’s design, which compared only the specific SPP airports with the selected comparison non-SPP airports, instead of comparing combined data for all of the SPP airports with all of the non-SPP airports limits the ability to make general conclusions about the SPP program as a whole.
Objective 2: Comparison of the Study’s Performance Assessment against Generally Accepted Research Standards (continued)

The study should report all methodological limitations, including their potential effect on the results.

Identified strengths:
• The Study recognizes several methodological limitations for comparing performance of SPP and non-SPP airports such as airport layouts, number of security checkpoints and types of screening equipment available.

Identified limitations:
• The Study does not thoroughly address the impact of the limitations identified in the results. For example, the Study identifies the challenge of obtaining complete data for smaller airports (categories III and IV) where few or no data points were available, but does not address this limitation when making conclusions about the performance of SPP screeners compared with that of non-SPP screeners.
• The Study’s assessment is limited to comparison of TSA performance measure data for a single calendar year and does not identify how this limitation affected its results.
Objective 2: Comparison of the Study’s Performance Assessment against Generally Accepted Research Standards (continued)

The reported conclusions of a study should be linked to the results.

Identified strengths:
We did not identify any key strengths based on the best practices criteria we applied.

Identified limitations:

• A high-quality study should link results to the conclusions with appropriate caveats where limitations exist. The Study's conclusion that, in aggregate, SPP and non-SPP airports are performing similarly across all categories assessed is not supported by the Study’s results and does not include the appropriate caveats to address limitations. For example, the Study concludes that, based on available data, the performance of SPP screeners is generally on par with that of non-SPP screeners but does not include that this conclusion was based on an analysis in which data were unavailable for many airports.
TSA’s Response to the Study

In a letter transmitting the study to GAO, TSA provided its comments on the Study.

Regarding the final independent assessment of SPP versus non-SPP costs, TSA plans to incorporate several aspects of the Study’s methodology into TSA’s Federal Cost Estimate (FCE) used to estimate operational costs. However, TSA disagreed with three areas of the Study’s cost methodology:

• The Study’s use of staffing and cost data for a single year across a 5-year estimate that does not account for changes in staffing and inflation, which could affect the estimate. We agree that this is a limitation of the study and make similar observations in our assessment.

• The Study does not separate imputed costs such as unfunded retirement liabilities and general liability insurance as non-TSA costs, for which TSA is not allocated money in its appropriation acts, in its estimates. We recognize that TSA is not allocated funds to pay contractors for non-TSA costs. However, for the purposes of providing a comprehensive cost estimate, we consider the inclusion of other federal costs and not solely those costs incurred by TSA as a strength of the Study that is in line with best practices.

• The Study’s estimate of indirect overhead costs did not take into account fiscal year 2013 cuts due to sequestration. According to TSA, the estimated overhead costs are likely overstated by millions of dollars. While we did not specifically look at the extent to which sequestration was addressed, we agree that this is a potential limitation of the Study.
TSA’s Response to the Study (continued)

TSA concurred with the overall assessment that, generally, the performance of SPP airports appears to be equivalent to the performance of non-SPP airports. However, TSA highlighted limitations including the following:

- Several performance measures chosen for analysis in the Study, such as the percentage of passengers screened by AIT, are dependent on factors other than performance and are therefore not a standalone measure of the airport’s performance. We agree that this is a limitation of the Study.

- Operational changes outside of the airports control affected data elements. For example, according to TSA, airports processing more passengers through TSA Pre✓™ operate more efficiently than those with fewer participants, diminishing the accuracy of the comparison. We agree that this is a limitation of the Study.

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17 TSA Pre✓™ is the program through which TSA designates passengers as low risk for expedited screening in advance of their arrival at the passenger screening checkpoint. Expedited screening typically includes walk-through metal detector screening and X-ray screening of the passenger’s accessible property, but unlike in standard screening, travelers do not have to, among other things, remove their belts, shoes, or light outerwear. Managed Inclusion operates only at checkpoints with TSA Pre✓™ lanes.
Enclosure II

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

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Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact listed above, key contributors to this report were Glenn Davis (Assistant Director), Charles Bausell, Amanda Goolden, Kevin Heinz, Susan Hsu, Brandon Jones, Jason Lee, Jennifer Leotta, Brian J. Lipman, Thomas Lombardi, Amanda Miller, and Jeff M. Tessin.