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entitled 'Personnel Security Clearances: Additional Guidance and 
Oversight Needed at DHS and DOD to Ensure Consistent Application of 
Revocation Process' which was released on September 8, 2014. 

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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives: 

September 2014: 

Personnel Security Clearances: 

Additional Guidance and Oversight Needed at DHS and DOD to Ensure 
Consistent Application of Revocation Process: 

GAO-14-640: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-640, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on 
Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Personnel security clearances allow people access to classified 
information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can cause 
exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In light of 
recent events, having a high-quality process to determine whether an 
individual's eligibility to access classified information should be 
revoked has become increasingly important. DOD and DHS grant the most 
clearances in the executive branch, and the Director of National 
Intelligence is responsible for, among other things, oversight of 
clearance eligibility determinations. 

GAO was asked to evaluate revocation processes at DHS and DOD. GAO 
evaluated the extent to which the agencies (1) track data on these 
processes; (2) consistently implement government-wide requirements and 
exercise oversight over these processes; and (3) determine outcomes 
for employees whose clearances were revoked. During this review, GAO 
identified possible inaccuracies in DOD's data on eligible personnel 
with access to classified information and is also reporting on that 
issue. GAO analyzed agency revocation data, reviewed executive orders, 
agency guidance, and documents, and interviewed officials from ODNI, 
DHS, DOD, and their components. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of 
Defense (DOD) both have systems that track varying levels of detail 
related to revocations of employees' security clearances. DHS's and 
DOD's data systems could provide data on the number of and reasons for 
revocations, but they could not provide some data, such as the number 
of individuals who received a proposal to revoke their eligibility for 
access to classified information, which means that the total number of 
employees affected by the revocation process is unknown. 

Inconsistent implementation of the requirements in the governing 
executive orders by DHS, DOD, and some of their components, and 
limited oversight over the revocation process, have resulted in some 
employees experiencing different protections and processes than other 
employees. Specifically, DHS and DOD have implemented the requirements 
for the revocation process contained in Executive Orders 12968 and 
10865 in different ways for different groups of personnel. Although 
certain differences are permitted or required by the executive orders, 
GAO found that implementation by some components could potentially be 
inconsistent with the executive orders in two areas. As a result, some 
employees may not be provided with certain information upon which a 
revocation appeal determination is based, and may not be told that 
they have a right to counsel. These inconsistencies in implementation 
may be in part because neither DHS nor DOD have evaluated the quality 
of their processes or developed performance measures to measure 
quality department-wide. Similarly, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) has only exercised limited oversight by 
reviewing policies and procedures within some agencies. ODNI has not 
established any metrics to measure the quality of the process 
government-wide and has not reviewed revocation processes across the 
federal government to determine the extent to which policies and 
procedures should be uniform. 

DHS and DOD employees whose clearances were revoked may not have 
consistent employment outcomes, such as reassignment or termination, 
because these outcomes are determined by several factors, such as the 
agency's mission and needs and the manager's discretion. Further, most 
components could not readily ascertain employment outcomes of 
individuals with revoked clearances, because these data are not 
readily available, and communication between personnel security and 
human capital offices at the departments varies. 

GAO's comparison of the total number of DOD employees eligible to 
access classified information to the total number of DOD employees in 
fiscal year 2013 suggests that DOD's clearance eligibility totals may 
be inaccurate. Specifically, GAO found that the number of eligible 
employees exceeded the total number of employees in five DOD 
components. DOD officials said this discrepancy could be because DOD's 
eligibility database is not consistently updated when an employee 
separates. As a result, the total number of government employees 
eligible to access classified information that ODNI reports to 
Congress likely overstates the number of eligible DOD employees. 
Inaccurate eligibility data hampers DOD's ability to reduce its number 
of clearance holders to minimize risk and reduce costs to the 
government. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DHS, DOD, and the DNI take several actions to 
improve data quality and oversight related to the personnel security 
revocation process. DHS, DOD, and ODNI generally agreed with GAO's 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-640]. For more 
information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at 202-512-3604 or 
farrellb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DHS and DOD Data Systems Do Not Track Complete Revocation Information: 

Inconsistent Implementation of Revocation Requirements across DHS and 
DOD Is Due in Part to Limited Oversight of the Security Clearance 
Revocation Process: 

Employment Outcomes after Clearance Revocation Are Determined Based on 
Several Factors, and Identification of these Outcomes Is Hindered by 
Lack of Data: 

Data ODNI Provides to Congress on Total Employees Eligible for Access 
to Classified Information May Include Inaccurate DOD Data: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Employees Eligible to 
Access Classified Information and Personnel Security Clearance 
Revocations by Component: 

Table 2: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Personnel Security 
Clearance Revocations by Component, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2013: 

Table 3: DOD and Contractor Personnel Security Clearance Revocations 
by Component, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

Table 4: Comparison of DOD Personnel with Clearance Eligibility and 
DOD Total Employees by Component for Fiscal Year 2013: 

Table 5: Agencies Contacted during Review: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Personnel Security Clearance Revocation Rights and 
Responsibilities Provided by Executive Orders: 

Figure 2: Typical Processes to Revoke DHS, DOD, and Contractor 
Personnel Security Clearances: 

Figure 3: Reasons for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Personnel 
Security Clearance Revocations in Fiscal Year 2013: 

Figure 4: Reasons for DOD Employee and Contractor Personnel Security 
Clearance Revocations in Fiscal Year 2013: 

Abbreviations: 

CAF: Consolidated Adjudications Facility: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DMDC: Defense Manpower Data Center: 

DNI: Director of National Intelligence: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOHA: Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals: 

ISMS: Integrated Security Management System: 

JPAS: Joint Personnel Adjudication System: 

ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 

PSAB: Personnel Security Appeals Board: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 8, 2014: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Thompson: 

Personnel security clearances allow government and contractor 
employees to gain access to classified information that, through 
unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave 
damage to U.S. national security. Events--such as the May 2010 
disclosure of classified documents to Wikileaks, the June 2013 
disclosure of classified documents by a former National Security 
Agency contractor, and the September 2013 shooting at the Washington 
Navy Yard--illustrate the danger that can be posed from insider 
threats, which involve individuals with authorized access to 
government resources and information. While much attention has been 
paid to the processes for granting a personnel security clearance, 
[Footnote 1] equally important are the processes governing whether 
individuals who have personnel security clearances should retain their 
access to classified information. If an individual's circumstances 
change in a manner that raises security concerns regarding whether he 
or she should continue to be entrusted with access to classified 
information, then processes exist to take away, or revoke, an 
individual's eligibility to access classified information, and for 
that individual to appeal that decision. 

After the September 16, 2013, shooting at the Washington Navy Yard, 
several reviews were initiated and conducted to assess the security 
clearance process and facilitate progress in evaluating and improving 
the quality of that process. For example, in February 2014, the Office 
of Management and Budget[Footnote 2] (OMB) issued a report that 
assessed risks inherent in the current security, suitability,[Footnote 
3] and credentialing processes and identified recommended solutions to 
safeguard personnel and protect sensitive information.[Footnote 4] In 
November 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued reports from two 
reviews addressing gaps or deficiencies in DOD programs, policies, and 
procedures regarding security at DOD installations and the granting 
and reviewing of security clearances for DOD employees and contractor 
personnel.[Footnote 5] In these reports, both OMB and DOD made 
recommendations related to improving access to information and 
reducing the number of clearance holders, among other recommendations. 

Further, although the report recommendations have not yet been 
implemented, all three reports recommended continuous evaluation of 
employees and contractors who are eligible for access to classified 
information, which involves automated data checks from sources such as 
credit checks, social media, and personnel records to provide near-
real-time notification of relevant information to help identify 
potential risks to national security. Implementation of continuous 
evaluation could prompt further investigation of events and incidents 
that could lead to an increase in the number of revocations that are 
proposed by government agencies.[Footnote 6] In addition, the 
consistent application of revocation processes across different 
federal agencies has become increasingly important due to the 
requirement for clearance reciprocity, where executive-branch agencies 
are required to accept a background investigation or personnel 
security clearance determination completed by any authorized 
investigative or adjudicative agency, subject to certain exceptions. 
[Footnote 7] 

You asked us to assess the policies and practices associated with the 
security clearance revocation[Footnote 8] process at the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD, the two departments that grant the 
most personnel security clearances in the executive branch. 
Specifically, we evaluated the extent to which (1) DHS and DOD track 
data regarding personnel security clearance revocations, and what 
these data show; (2) DHS and DOD have consistently implemented 
government-wide requirements in their revocation processes, and DHS, 
DOD, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) exercise 
oversight over these processes; and (3) DHS and DOD consistently 
determine the resulting employment outcomes, such as reassignment or 
termination, of their military and federal civilian employees whose 
clearances have been revoked. During the course of our review, when 
analyzing DOD data to determine the proportion of personnel with 
clearance eligibility whose clearances were revoked, we identified an 
issue with the accuracy of DOD's data on the total number of persons 
eligible for access to classified information, and we are also 
reporting on this issue. 

To evaluate how DHS and DOD track revocation data and what these data 
show, we analyzed revocation data for military and federal civilian 
employees from DHS's Office of the Chief Security Officer for fiscal 
years 2011 to 2013; and for military, federal civilian employees, and 
contractor personnel government-wide[Footnote 9] from DOD's Defense 
Manpower Data Center for fiscal years 2009 to 2013. To assess the 
reliability of these data, we reviewed the revocation data and 
supporting documentation and discussed their reliability with agency 
officials. We found DHS's and DOD's data on the number of revocations 
and the reasons for the revocations to be sufficiently reliable for 
our purposes. 

To evaluate the extent to which DHS and DOD have consistently 
implemented government-wide requirements in their revocation processes 
and exercise oversight, along with the DNI, over the process, we 
identified key agency and employee rights and responsibilities in 
Executive Orders 12968 and 10865[Footnote 10] and determined whether 
the agencies were providing employees notice of these rights. We also 
reviewed applicable federal laws and agency regulations and policies 
for revoking an employee's or contractor's eligibility for access to 
classified information, and interviewed personnel security and human 
capital office officials. We reviewed revocation processes for federal 
civilian and military personnel within DHS and DOD, excluding the 
known intelligence community, and for contractor personnel that follow 
DOD guidance and processes. We also met with DHS, DOD, and Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) officials to discuss the 
oversight provided over personnel security revocation processes, their 
suggestions for building quality into the revocation process, and 
whether any metrics or reporting requirements exist related to 
revocations. 

To evaluate how DHS and DOD determine the employment outcomes of 
personnel whose clearances have been revoked, we obtained and analyzed 
DHS and DOD human capital guidance--specifically their guidance for 
misconduct, discipline, and adverse actions--and met with human 
capital office officials to discuss the resulting employment outcomes, 
such as reassignment or termination, for their military and federal 
civilian employees. For this objective on managing employment 
outcomes, within DHS we focused on selected DHS components that had 
the highest number of security clearance revocations from fiscal years 
2011 through 2013: the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and U.S. Secret Service. Within DOD, we reviewed the 
headquarters-level elements of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, 
and the Air Force; the Marine Corps; and Washington Headquarters 
Services, which provides human capital support for several nonservice 
DOD agencies and activities. 

During the course of our review, we identified an issue with the 
accuracy of DOD's data on the total number of persons eligible for 
access to classified information. To examine the accuracy of DOD's 
eligibility data, we compared the total number of DOD employees 
eligible for access to classified information reported by DOD's 
personnel security management system to the total number of DOD 
employees in each component. We did not find DOD's data on the total 
number of current military, federal civilian employees, and 
contractors who are eligible for access to classified information to 
be reliable, and our report provides further information on this 
issue. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is 
provided in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to September 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Roles and Responsibilities of Organizations Involved in Revocation of 
Personnel Security Clearances at DHS and DOD: 

Multiple agencies and organizations within DHS and DOD have key roles 
and responsibilities for different steps of the personnel security 
clearance revocation process. In 2008, Executive Order 13467 
designated the DNI as the Security Executive Agent.[Footnote 11] As 
such, the DNI is responsible for developing policies and procedures to 
help ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of 
background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations 
of eligibility for access to classified information and eligibility to 
hold a sensitive position. 

Within DHS, the Office of the Chief Security Officer develops, 
implements, and oversees the department's security policies, programs, 
and standards, among other things.[Footnote 12] The DHS Chief of 
Personnel Security Division, under the direction of the Chief Security 
Officer, is responsible for issuing department-wide policy for the 
Personnel Suitability and Security Program, maintaining a departmental 
database for tracking personnel security cases, and determining 
employees' eligibility for access to classified information. DHS 
component Chief Security Officers implement personnel security and 
suitability programs within their respective component. 

Within DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is 
responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the 
implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for personnel 
security. The DOD Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) determines 
personnel security eligibility for DOD military and civilian 
personnel. The DOD CAF was created following a Defense Base 
Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation to colocate 10 
different adjudication activities at Fort Meade, Maryland. In May 
2012, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the consolidation of 
the separate functions and resources of seven colocated defense 
adjudication activities into a single organization. Each of DOD's 
three military departments--of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force--
has a personnel security appeals board (PSAB) that reviews appeals of 
cases where a clearance was denied or revoked and makes final 
eligibility determinations regarding access to classified information 
for that department's military and civilian employees. In addition, 
DOD's Washington Headquarters Services has a Clearance Appeal Board, 
which reviews civilian employee cases for personnel of other DOD 
components supported by Washington Headquarters Services. The Defense 
Office of Hearings and Appeals, the largest component of DOD's Defense 
Legal Services Agency, conducts adjudications, hearings, and appeals 
and issues decisions in security clearance cases for contractor 
personnel in the industrial security program,[Footnote 13] including 
DOD and DHS contractor personnel. The Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals also conducts hearings, referred to as personal appearances, 
and issues recommended decisions in security clearance cases for DOD 
military personnel and civilian employees. In addition, the Defense 
Office of Hearings and Appeals has a Security Appeals Board, which 
reviews appeals of cases where a contractor's personnel security 
clearance was denied or revoked. 

Guidance Governing Revocation of Personnel Security Clearances at DHS 
and DOD: 

The overall process for revoking an employee's security clearance is 
primarily established in two executive orders: Executive Order 12968, 
which is applicable to all military or federal civilian employees and 
contractor personnel,[Footnote 14] and Executive Order 10865, which 
provides additional rights only to contractor personnel.[Footnote 15] 
These executive orders establish two parallel processes for revoking 
eligibility for access to classified information, with one process 
applicable to military and civilian employees and a different process 
applicable to contractors. Figure 1 summarizes the agency's 
responsibilities and the rights that must be provided to employees who 
are subject to a security clearance revocation in accordance with 
these two executive orders. 

Figure 1: Personnel Security Clearance Revocation Rights and 
Responsibilities Provided by Executive Orders: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Executive Order 12968: Civilian, Military, and Contractor Personnel: 

Agency Responsibilities: 
Agencies must provide employee with the following: 

* Written explanation for basis of revocation action, as detailed as 
permitted by national security interests and applicable law; 

* Any documents upon which revocation is based within 30 days of 
request, to the extent that documents would be provided under the 
Freedom of Information Act or Privacy Act. 

* Written notice of and reasons for results of review; 

* Identity of deciding authority; 

* Written notice of right to appeal; 

* Final written decision by appeal panel. 

In addition, if the employee chooses a personal appearance, the agency 
must make a written summary or recording of the personal appearance 
part of the employee's security record. 

Employee Rights: 
Employees have the following rights in the process: 

* Representation by counsel at employee's expense; 

* Request any documents on which revocation is based, and entire 
investigative file, as permitted by national security and other 
applicable law; 

* Reply in writing to determination; 

* Request review of determination; 

* Opportunity to appeal in writing to three member high level appeal 
panel; 

* Request a personal appearance before adjudicative authority. 

Executive Order 10865: Contractor Personnel: 

Agency Responsibilities: 
In addition to the responsibilities listed in Executive Order 12968, 
agencies must provide employee with the following: 

* Reasonable time to prepare for personal appearance. 

Employee Rights: 
In addition to the rights listed in Executive Order 12968, employees 
are entitled to the following rights: 

* Reply in writing to determination under oath or affirmation; 

* Opportunity to cross-examine persons who have made adverse oral or 
written statements relating to a controverted issue, subject to 
certain exceptions. 

Source: GAO analysis of Executive Orders 12968 and 10865. GAO-14-640. 

[End of figure] 

DHS and DOD also provide supplemental guidance and clarification 
regarding the revocation process to their respective components. DHS 
Headquarters and its components follow DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-
007,[Footnote 16] and some DHS components have additional guidance. 
[Footnote 17] DOD and its components follow DOD Regulation 5200.2-R. 
[Footnote 18] DOD contractors are subject to the personnel security 
policies and procedures in DOD Directive 5220.6,[Footnote 19] and 
related DOD guidance for contractors to safeguard classified 
information under the National Industrial Security Program.[Footnote 
20] The Secretary of Defense has entered into agreements with 27 other 
federal agencies, including DHS, to adhere to the DOD guidance for 
their contractor workforces. Furthermore, the military departments and 
Washington Headquarters Services provide supplementary guidance and 
clarification of the revocation appeal process found in the DOD 
regulation.[Footnote 21] According to officials from the Defense 
Office of Hearings and Appeals, by mutual agreement, 23 other federal 
agencies, including DHS, use the Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals for adjudications, hearings, and appeals of security clearance 
revocation cases for contractors working in the National Industrial 
Security Program. 

Personnel Security Clearance Revocation Process: 

DHS and DOD can revoke an employee's eligibility for access to 
classified information based on 13 adjudicative guidelines.[Footnote 
22] While the personnel security clearance revocation process varies 
by agency and type of employee, the general process for DHS and DOD 
military and federal civilian personnel, and for government 
contractors, is summarized in figure 2. According to DHS officials, 
the revocation process will end if the employee chooses to resign 
before a decision has been made; if a DOD military or civilian 
employee has initiated an appeal of a revocation decision, the appeal 
will be decided even if an employee has separated.[Footnote 23] 

Figure 2: Typical Processes to Revoke DHS, DOD, and Contractor 
Personnel Security Clearances: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Department of Homeland Security: Military and civilian personnel: 
Adverse information received: Component or headquarters personnel 
security office: 
* Receives and reviews adverse information; 
Proposal to revoke clearance: Component or headquarters personnel 
security office; 
* Issues proposal to revoke clearance to employee; 
Employee has 30 days to respond and refute, clarify, or explain the 
adverse information; 
Decision to revoke clearance: Component personnel security office 
official or headquarters Chief of Personnel Security Division: 
* Reviews case file; 
* Issues decision; 
Employee has 15 days to request documentation used in making decision 
and 30 days to appeal after receiving documentation; or 30 days to 
appeal if no documentation requested; decision becomes final if not 
appealed; 
Appeal of revocation decision: Initial Appeal: Supervisory personnel 
security official, Chief Security Officer, or designee: 
* Reviews case file and additional information provided by employee in 
writing or during personal appearance; 
* Issues decision; 
Employee has 15 days to appeal and 30 days to provide information to 
appeals board;
Final Appeal: Security Appeals Board: 
* Reviews case file and any additional written information provided by 
employee
* Issues final decision. 

Department of Defense: Military and civilian personnel: 
Adverse information received: Consolidated Adjudication Facility (CAF) 
adjudicator; 
* Receives and reviews adverse information; 
Proposal to revoke clearance: CAF adjudicator: 
* Issues proposal to revoke clearance to employee; 
Employee has 30 days to respond and refute, clarify, or explain the 
adverse information; 
Decision to revoke clearance: CAF adjudicator: 
* Reviews employee's response; 
* Issues decision; 
Employee has 10 days to indicate intent to appeal either in person or 
in writing; decision becomes final if not appealed; 
Appeal of revocation decision: Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals 
(DOHA) Administrative Judge: 
* Presides over personal appearance if employee chooses in-person 
appeal; 
* Submits nonbinding recommendation to relevant service Personnel 
Security Appeals Board (PSAB); 
PSAB: 
* Written appeals: reviews case file and new information provided by 
employee; 
* Appeals with personal appearance: reviews the administrative 
judge's recommendation and case file; 
* Issues final decision. 

Contractors: 
Adverse information received: CAF adjudicator: 
* Receives and reviews adverse information; 
Proposal to revoke clearance: CAF adjudicator: 
* Issues proposal to revoke clearance to contractor; 
Employee has 20 days to respond and refute, clarify, or explain the 
adverse information; 
Decision to revoke clearance: DOHA Administrative Judge: 
* Reviews case file and additional information; 
* Presides over personal appearance, if employee chooses to have a 
personal appearance; 
* Issues decision; 
Employee has 15 days to appeal the decision; decision becomes final if 
not appealed; 
Appeal of revocation decision: DOHA Appeal Board: 
* Reviews case file and appeal brief; 
* Issues final decision. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS and DOD information. GAO-14-640. 

[End of figure] 

[End of figure] 

The process begins with adverse information that can come from a 
variety of sources, including but not limited to individual self-
reporting, federal or contract investigators who are conducting an 
investigation, Inspector General channels, hotlines, civilian law 
enforcement agencies, and reporting by persons such as security 
officers. According to DHS and DOD officials, the steps and time 
frames associated with investigating and verifying the credibility of 
the adverse information can vary considerably according to the nature 
and source of the adverse information. Some of these steps may include 
notifying the employee that adverse information was reported against 
him or her, allowing the employee an opportunity to provide a 
response, obtaining information from other government agencies, and 
conducting an updated background investigation to obtain court 
records, criminal records, and financial checks. 

The February 2014 OMB report found that clear and consistent 
requirements do not exist across government for employees or 
contractors to report information that could affect their continued 
fitness, suitability, or eligibility for federal employment and that 
there was not consistent guidance in place to direct contractors or 
contract managers to report noteworthy or derogatory information 
regarding employees.[Footnote 24] The report recommended acceleration 
of the implementation of a continuous evaluation program that would 
notify security officials of noteworthy events or incidents in near-
real time. If incident reporting increases as a result of these 
recommendations, it raises the potential that such incidents could 
lead to an increase in the number of revocation cases in the future. 
As part of an ongoing review on the quality of the personnel security 
background investigation process, we are examining the implementation 
status of the recommendations in this OMB report. 

DHS and DOD Data Systems Do Not Track Complete Revocation Information: 

DHS's and DOD's data systems track varying levels of detail related to 
personnel security clearance revocations. DHS's and DOD's data systems 
could provide data on the number of and reasons for revocations, but 
they could not provide some data, such as the number of individuals 
who received a proposal to revoke their eligibility for access to 
classified information, which means that the total number of employees 
affected by the revocation process is unknown. 

DHS Revoked Clearances of Fewer than 1 Percent of Employees Eligible 
to Access Classified Information, but It Is Believed That Many 
Employees Resign before Final Determination Is Made: 

DHS data show that about 125,000 DHS civilian and military employees 
were eligible to access classified information as of March 2014, and 
that DHS revoked access to classified information for 113 employees, 
or less than 1 percent, in fiscal year 2013. An official from the DHS 
Office of General Counsel explained that many employees resign before 
the final determination is made to revoke their security clearance. 
Importantly, the total population affected by the revocation process 
is unknown because the number of individuals who received a proposal 
to revoke their eligibility for access to classified information is 
unknown, as discussed below. Table 1 shows the number of DHS employees 
eligible to access classified information as of March 2014, and the 
number of personnel security clearance revocations for each DHS 
component in fiscal year 2013, with the U.S. Coast Guard having the 
largest number of revocations. Coast Guard officials stated that the 
increase in the number of revocations for Coast Guard military 
personnel in fiscal year 2013 could be explained in part because that 
was the first year the Coast Guard enforced the use of position 
sensitivity codes.[Footnote 25] They said that, as a result, some 
administratively withdrawn clearances were counted as revoked, which 
artificially inflated the revocation number.[Footnote 26] 

Table 1: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Employees Eligible to 
Access Classified Information and Personnel Security Clearance 
Revocations by Component: 

DHS component: U.S. Coast Guard--military; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
49,614; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 39.63%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 75; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 66.37%. 

DHS component: Transportation Security Administration; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
20,234; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 16.16%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 1; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 0.88%. 

DHS component: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
15,106; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 12.07%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 4; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 3.54%. 

DHS component: U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
12,699; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 10.14%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 3; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 2.65%. 

DHS component: DHS Headquarters; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
10,005; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 7.99%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 10; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 8.85%. 

DHS component: U.S. Secret Service; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
6,428; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 5.13%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 9; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 7.96%. 

DHS component: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
5,479; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 4.38%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 6; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 5.31%. 

DHS component: U.S. Coast Guard--civilian; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
2,859; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 2.28%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 0; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 0.00. 

DHS component: Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
2,768; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 2.21%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 5; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 4.42%. 

DHS component: Total; 
Employees eligible to access classified information as of March 2014: 
125,192; 
Percentage of total DHS employees eligible to access classified 
information: 100.00%; 
Revocations in fiscal year 2013: 113; 
Percentage of total DHS revocations: 100.00%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from DHS Office of the Chief Security 
Officer, Personnel Security Division. GAO-14-640. 

Note: These data were provided by DHS's Office of the Chief Security 
Officer using the Integrated Security Management System (ISMS), the DHS 
system for managing and standardizing personnel security data. 

[End of table] 

Table 2 provides additional information on the number of personnel 
security clearance revocations for each DHS component in fiscal years 
2011 through 2013. 

Table 2: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Personnel Security 
Clearance Revocations by Component, Fiscal Years 2011 through 2013: 

DHS Component: U.S. Coast Guard--military personnel; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 33; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 27; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 75; 
Total: 135. 

DHS Component: U.S. Coast Guard--civilian personnel; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 0; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 5; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 0; 
Total: 5. 

DHS Component: Transportation Security Administration; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 5; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 6; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 1; 
Total: 12. 

DHS Component: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 12; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 14; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 4; 
Total: 30. 

DHS Component: U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 0; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 3; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 3; 
Total: 6. 

DHS Component: DHS Headquarters; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 3; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 5; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 10; 
Total: 18. 

DHS Component: U.S. Secret Service; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 9; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 13; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 9; 
Total: 31. 

DHS Component: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 1; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 4; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 6; 
Total: 11. 

DHS Component: Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 1; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 0; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 5; 
Total: 6. 

DHS Component: Total; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 64; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 77; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 113; 
Total: 254. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from DHS Office of the Chief Security 
Officer, Personnel Security Division. GAO-14-640. 

[End of table] 

DHS data show that personal conduct, financial considerations, and 
criminal conduct were the most common reasons personnel security 
clearances were revoked in fiscal year 2013. Figure 3 provides details 
about the issues underlying personnel security clearance revocations 
for each DHS component in fiscal year 2013. 

Figure 3: Reasons for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Personnel 
Security Clearance Revocations in Fiscal Year 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph with associated table] 

Revocations: 

Personal Conduct: 81; 
Financial Considerations: 60; 
Criminal Conduct: 36; 
Alcohol Consumption: 20; 
Foreign Influence: 12; 
Drug Involvement: 11; 
Use of Information Technology Systems: 10; 
Sexual Behavior: 9; 
Handling Protected Information: 6; 
Psychological Conditions: 4; 
Foreign Preference: 0; 
Allegiance to United States: 0; 
Outside Activities: 0. 

Component: U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 1; 
2: 1; 
3: 1; 
4: 0; 
5: 0; 
6: 1; 
7: 1; 
8: 0; 
9: 0; 
10: 0; 
11: 0; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: DHS Headquarters; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 7; 
2: 0; 
3: 3; 
4: 0; 
5: 0; 
6: 2; 
7: 2; 
8: 1; 
9: 1; 
10: 0; 
11: 0; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 5; 
2: 1; 
3: 3; 
4: 0; 
5: 2; 
6: 0; 
7: 3; 
8: 2; 
9: 2; 
10: 0; 
11: 0; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: Transportation Security Administration; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 1; 
2: 0; 
3: 0; 
4: 1; 
5: 0; 
6: 1; 
7: 0; 
8: 0; 
9: 0; 
10: 0; 
11: 0; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: U.S. Coast Guard; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 54; 
2: 53; 
3: 23; 
4: 17; 
5: 9; 
6: 7; 
7: 2; 
8: 4; 
9: 2; 
10: 2; 
11: 0; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 4; 
2: 2; 
3: 1; 
4: 2; 
5: 0; 
6: 0; 
7: 2; 
8: 0; 
9: 1; 
10: 0; 
11: 0; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: U.S. Secret Service; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 9; 
2: 3; 
3: 5; 
4: 0; 
5: 1; 
6: 0; 
7: 0; 
8: 2; 
9: 0; 
10: 2; 
11: 0; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office 
of the Chief Security Officer, Personnel Security Division data. GAO-
14-640. 

Note: Revocation cases may involve more than one reason; therefore, 
there are more reasons cited in this figure than the total number of 
revocation cases in fiscal year 2013. DHS provided us with data about 
the revocation reasons at the Transportation Security Administration; 
however, because that component only had one clearance revocation case 
in fiscal year 2013, we are not reporting those reasons due to privacy 
concerns. 

[End of figure] 

DHS employees whose access to classified information was revoked can 
first appeal the adverse decision with an initial appeal to a second-
level deciding authority, and then appeal this decision with a final 
appeal to a three-person Security Appeals Board. DHS data show that, 
in fiscal year 2013, 24 employees appealed a revocation decision to 
the DHS Security Appeals Board. Of those 24 employees, 1 had his or 
her security clearance reinstated. 

DOD Revoked Clearances of More than 16,000 Employees and 2,500 
Contractors from Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

DOD data show that DOD revoked eligibility for access to classified 
information for more than 16,000 military and civilian employees from 
fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and for almost 2,500 contractors 
government-wide during this same period. Because of potential 
inaccuracies in DOD eligibility data, which are discussed below, we 
were unable to determine the percentage of DOD clearance holders whose 
clearances were revoked. However, as we found with DHS, the total 
population affected by the revocation process is unknown because the 
number of individuals who received a proposal to revoke their 
eligibility for access to classified information is unknown, as 
discussed in the next subsection in this report. Table 3 shows the 
number of personnel security clearance revocations in fiscal years 
2009 through 2013 for each DOD component, with Army military personnel 
having the largest number of revocations, and for contractors 
government-wide working in the industrial security program. 

Table 3: DOD and Contractor Personnel Security Clearance Revocations 
by Component, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

DOD Component: Air Force military personnel[A]; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 315; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 317; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 249; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 238; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 192; 
Total: 1,311. 

DOD Component: Air Force civilian personnel; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 81; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 86; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 59; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 79; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 68; 
Total: 373. 

DOD Component: Army military personnel[A]; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 354; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 1,177; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 2,338; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 3,092; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 2,342; 
Total: 9,303. 

DOD Component: Army civilian personnel; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 104; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 140; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 236; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 210; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 218; 
Total: 908. 

DOD Component: Marine Corps military personnel[A]; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 225; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 244; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 360; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 329; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 333; 
Total: 1,491. 

DOD Component: Marine Corps civilian personnel; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 1; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 0; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 1; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 2; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 0; 
Total: 4. 

DOD Component: Navy military personnel[A]; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 423; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 354; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 354; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 379; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 297; 
Total: 1,807. 

DOD Component: Navy civilian personnel; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 148; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 124; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 139; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 160; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 105; 
Total: 676. 

DOD Component: Washington Headquarters Services civilian personnel[B]; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 42; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 43; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 34; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 30; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 44; 
Total: 193. 

DOD Component: Other[C]; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 26; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 16; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 19; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 11; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 8; 
Total: 80. 

DOD Component: DOD Total; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 1,719; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 2,501; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 3,789; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 4,530; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 3,607; 
Total: 16,146. 

DOD Component: Industry; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 529; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 415; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 498; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 528; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 529; 
Total: 2,499. 

DOD Component: Total; 
Fiscal Year 2009: 2,248; 
Fiscal Year 2010: 2,916; 
Fiscal Year 2011: 4,287; 
Fiscal Year 2012: 5,058; 
Fiscal Year 2013: 4,136; 
Total: 18,645. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
GAO-14-640. 

[A] Military personnel data include counts for active-duty and all 
reserve categories (Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired 
Reserve), including the National Guard. 

[B] Washington Headquarters Services civilian personnel includes 
personnel employed by other defense agencies supported by Washington 
Headquarters Services. 

[C] The "Other" category includes persons who were assigned to a 
service in the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) (e.g., Air 
Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy), but were not assigned to a category 
type such as civilian, military, or reserves. Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC) officials stated that these persons would be personnel 
such as presidential appointees, congressional staff, or Red Cross 
employees. 

[End of table] 

The most common reasons for revoking a personnel security clearance 
for DOD civilian and military personnel in fiscal year 2013 were 
criminal conduct, drug involvement, and personal conduct. The most 
common reasons for revocation of security clearances for contractor 
personnel in fiscal year 2013 were financial considerations, personal 
conduct, and criminal conduct. Figure 4 provides details about the 
issues underlying personnel security clearance revocations for each 
DOD component and for contractors in fiscal year 2013. 

Figure 4: Reasons for DOD Employee and Contractor Personnel Security 
Clearance Revocations in Fiscal Year 2013: 

Revocations: 

Criminal Conduct: 2,768; 
Drug Involvement: 1,697; 
Personal Conduct: 1,694; 
Financial Considerations: 1,495; 
Alcohol Consumption: 795; 
Psychological Conditions: 274; 
Foreign Influence: 233; 
Sexual Behavior: 212; 
Use of Information Technology Systems: 54; 
Handling Protected Information: 45; 
Foreign Preference: 27; 
Allegiance to United States: 4; 
Outside Activities: 4. 

Component: Army civilian personnel; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 119; 
2: 411; 
3: 108; 
4: 138; 
5: 45; 
6: 15; 
7: 17; 
8: 16; 
9: 6; 
10: 2; 
11: 2; 
12: 0; 
13: 1. 

Component: Army military personnel; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 1,842; 
2: 1,118; 
3: 1,102; 
4: 750; 
5: 517; 
6: 151; 
7: 86; 
8: 131; 
9: 12; 
10: 14; 
11: 7; 
13: 2; 
13: 0. 

Component: Air Force civilian personnel; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 28; 
2: 8; 
3: 41; 
4: 49; 
5: 14; 
6: 6; 
7: 11; 
8: 5; 
9: 2; 
10: 3; 
11: 1; 
12: 1; 
13: 1. 

Component: Air Force military personnel; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 94; 
2: 25; 
3: 117; 
4: 147; 
5: 34; 
6: 17; 
7: 35; 
8: 7; 
9: 5; 
10: 1; 
11: 4; 
12: 1; 
13: 1. 

Component: Navy civilian personnel; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 70; 
2: 44; 
3: 48; 
4: 67; 
5: 34; 
6: 15; 
7: 12; 
8: 7; 
9: 7; 
10: 9; 
11: 0; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: Navy military personnel; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 242; 
2: 161; 
3: 102; 
4: 149; 
5: 59; 
6: 38; 
7: 34; 
8: 22; 
9: 7; 
10: 6; 
11: 6; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: Marine Corps military personnel; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 305; 
2: 262; 
3: 83; 
4: 83; 
5: 64; 
6: 21; 
7: 11; 
8: 14; 
9: 4; 
10: 3; 
11: 3; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: WHS civilian personnel; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 13; 
2: 7; 
3: 20; 
4: 28; 
5: 2; 
6: 5; 
7: 7; 
8: 1; 
9: 4; 
10: 1; 
11: 1; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: Other; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 7; 
2: 6; 
3: 4; 
4: 4; 
5: 0; 
6: 1; 
7: 2; 
8: 0; 
9: 1; 
10: 0; 
11: 1; 
12: 0; 
13: 0. 

Component: Industry; 
Reasons for security clearance revocation: 
1: 48; 
2: 25; 
3: 69; 
4: 80; 
5: 26; 
6: 5; 
7: 18; 
8: 9; 
9: 6; 
10: 6; 
11: 2; 
12: 0; 
13: 1. 

WHS: Washington Headquarters Services. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense Manpower Data Center data. GAO-14-640. 

Note: Revocation cases may involve more than one reason; therefore, 
there are more reasons cited in this figure than the total number of 
revocation cases in fiscal year 2013. 

[End of figure] 

DHS's and DOD's Systems Do Not Capture All Revocation-Related Data, 
Including the Total Population Affected by the Revocation Process: 

Although DHS's and DOD's data systems could provide data on the number 
of and reasons for revocations, neither department is currently 
required to track or report security clearance revocations data or any 
related metrics outside of the DHS and DOD elements of the 
intelligence community.[Footnote 27] As a result, neither system could 
provide data on how many individuals separated before a revocation 
decision was made, appeals, and time to complete a revocation case. 
Notably, neither the DHS nor the DOD system was able to provide data 
about the total number of individuals who received a proposal to 
revoke their security clearance, which would likely exceed the total 
number of revocations. Therefore, we are unable to comment on the 
total number of employees who might be affected by the revocation 
process. In order for organizations to measure performance, it is 
important that they have sufficiently complete, accurate, and 
consistent data to document performance and support decision making, 
while balancing the cost and effort involved in gathering and 
analyzing data.[Footnote 28] DHS's system for managing and 
standardizing personnel security data, the Integrated Security 
Management System (ISMS), has not typically been used to track 
additional information about security clearance revocations, such as 
(1) the number of employees who received a proposal to revoke their 
clearance, (2) the number of employees who separated from the 
department before a revocation decision was made, (3) the number of 
employees that filed an initial appeal of a revocation decision, and 
(4) the length of time to complete a revocation case. 

First, DHS officials could not provide us with data on the number of 
individuals who had received a proposal to revoke their clearance. 
They said that this information could be recorded in ISMS, but that 
this capability may not be used by all of the components. Second, DHS 
officials said that ISMS does not track cases where an individual 
separated from the department before a decision was made regarding a 
proposal to revoke a personnel security clearance. For example, DHS 
officials said that if an employee was issued a proposal to revoke his 
or her clearance and he or she resigned and never responded to the 
proposal, then the security clearance was never revoked and the case 
would not be counted as a revocation. Once an initial decision is made 
to revoke a clearance, the decision is entered into ISMS and that 
decision will become final even if the employee does not respond, so 
those cases would be counted. Third, DHS data on the number of 
employees that filed an initial appeal of a revocation decision were 
not available. Officials from the Office of the Chief Security Officer 
told us that ISMS has a module that could provide this information, 
but because use of this module is not required, only a few DHS 
components use it. Finally, while officials at DHS components stated 
that the entire revocation process can take over a year to complete, 
DHS data on the average amount of time it takes to complete a 
revocation case were not available. Officials from the Office of the 
Chief Security Officer said that while ISMS can identify this 
information in individual records, it cannot track this type of data 
as a whole across the DHS components, because each appeal level would 
be saved as a different module entry. They said they try to complete a 
revocation case as quickly as possible. However, in some cases, 
employees request extensions of time in order to obtain representation 
or to obtain documents to refute or explain the revocation decision, 
which lengthens the process time. Until DHS considers whether tracking 
additional revocation and appeals information would be beneficial, and 
modifies its system to provide such information as is deemed 
beneficial, the department will continue to lack visibility over 
certain aspects of the security clearance revocation and appeal 
process, which may hinder its ability to effectively oversee these 
processes. 

Similarly, DOD's Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) system, 
which is designated as DOD's system of record for personnel security 
management to record and document personnel security actions, 
[Footnote 29] also captures varying levels of detail related to 
security clearance revocations. We found certain JPAS data fields 
partially completed or incomplete, such as fields showing whether an 
employee received a proposal to revoke his or her clearance, whether 
the employee chose to appeal the revocation decision in writing or in 
person, the time taken at different stages of the employee's 
revocation appeal, and the number of employees who separated from the 
department before a revocation decision was made. For example, 
although more than 16,000 military and federal civilian employees had 
their personnel security clearances revoked from fiscal years 2009 
through 2013, JPAS data reflected that fewer than 3,000 individuals 
had received a statement of reasons, which is DOD's initial proposal 
to revoke a personnel security clearance, because the JPAS field to 
record this information had not been filled. 

The JPAS system of record notice, dated May 3, 2011, states that the 
categories of records in JPAS include records documenting the 
personnel security adjudicative and management process.[Footnote 30] 
However, officials from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DOD's 
JPAS administrator, and the DOD CAF stated that DOD users instead 
generally used component-specific case-management systems to keep 
track of adjudication information.[Footnote 31] DMDC officials 
explained that the final eligibility determination, and not all the 
other adjudication data, from the different case-management systems 
was uploaded to JPAS. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Intelligence, which is responsible for overseeing DOD's 
personnel security program, stated that their oversight efforts have 
been hindered by the lack of available data in JPAS, and that they do 
not have access to the component-specific case-management systems. 
DMDC officials stated that JPAS and the different case-management 
systems are going to be replaced, by 2016 and the end of fiscal year 
2014, respectively. ODNI officials stated that it would be important 
for DOD to improve the data in JPAS before the new systems are 
implemented. 

DOD is already aware that data in JPAS are not being updated as 
frequently as needed. For example, the November 2013 DOD report in 
response to the Navy Yard shooting found that DOD does not have 
policies addressing roles, responsibilities, and standards for 
security managers to ensure the upkeep of data in JPAS.[Footnote 32] 
The report recommended that the department establish, reinforce, and 
enforce roles and responsibilities for updates to JPAS. Similarly, in 
April 2014, the DOD Inspector General issued a report assessing the 
personnel security clearance processes for contractors in four defense 
intelligence agencies. This report found a lack of effective 
recordkeeping that occurred because the appropriate investigative and 
personnel security databases, including JPAS, were not being reliably 
populated with investigative and security information. The report 
recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
direct the defense intelligence agencies to review the procedures used 
to ensure that JPAS and other systems are being properly populated. 
The report also found that DOD did not have any overarching policy 
documents governing JPAS operation, and recommended that DOD develop 
and issue an overarching policy for JPAS.[Footnote 33] DOD officials 
acknowledged that the department needed to improve the data in JPAS. 
Until DOD takes steps to ensure that information is recorded and 
updated in its systems, the department will continue to lack 
visibility over the security clearance revocation and appeal process, 
which may hinder its ability to effectively oversee these processes. 

Inconsistent Implementation of Revocation Requirements across DHS and 
DOD Is Due in Part to Limited Oversight of the Security Clearance 
Revocation Process: 

Inconsistent implementation of the requirements in the governing 
executive orders by DHS, DOD, and some of their components, and 
limited oversight over the revocation process, have resulted in 
employees in some agency components and workforces experiencing 
different protections and processes than employees in other agency 
components and workforces. DHS and DOD have implemented the 
requirements in Executive Orders 12968 and 10865 in different ways for 
different groups of personnel, but these differences are required or 
permitted by the executive orders. However, some components' 
implementation of the clearance revocation process could potentially 
be inconsistent with the executive orders in two areas: having an 
opportunity to be provided with certain information upon which a 
revocation appeal determination is based, and communicating the right 
to counsel. Although DHS and DOD have performed some oversight over 
the revocation process at the component level, they have not evaluated 
the quality of the process or developed performance measures to 
measure quality department-wide. Finally, while ODNI has exercised 
oversight of security clearance revocations by reviewing policies and 
procedures within some agencies, ODNI has not established any metrics 
to measure the quality of the process government-wide and has not 
reviewed revocation processes across the federal government to 
determine the extent to which policies and procedures should be 
uniform. 

DHS and DOD Have Implemented Executive Order Requirements in Different 
Ways: 

DHS and DOD have implemented some requirements in the governing 
executive orders in different ways for different groups of personnel, 
but these differences are required or permitted by the executive 
orders. The areas of inconsistency include implementation of the 
personal appearance requirement, cross-examination of witnesses, and 
administration of the appeal boards within DOD. 

DHS and DOD Implementation of Personal Appearance Requirement Provides 
Different Protection for Contractors than Military and Civilian 
Personnel: 

The right to a personal appearance during the personnel security 
clearance revocation process has been implemented differently across 
the two departments in a manner that provides different protections 
for contractors than for military and civilian personnel in two areas: 
the timing of the personal appearance and the information provided to 
the employee about the rationale supporting the revocation decision 
and the effect of the personal appearance. Executive Order 12968 
provides that employees shall be provided an opportunity to appear 
personally at some point in the process before an adjudicative or 
other authority; it does not specify when during the process this 
personal appearance should occur. Executive Order 10865 provides that 
a contractor shall be provided an opportunity to appear personally 
after he or she has provided a written reply to the proposal to revoke 
eligibility to access classified information. Defense Office of 
Hearings and Appeals officials explained that the personal appearance 
is a significant opportunity to refute, explain, extenuate or mitigate 
critical facts, and stated that the later timing of this significant 
procedural protection for military and civilian personnel can 
adversely affect the individual's continued employment while the 
appeal process is completed. 

The timing of the personal appearance for contractors is earlier in 
the revocation process than for DHS employees and DOD military and 
civilian employees. Contractors who receive a proposal to revoke their 
clearance may choose to respond to the proposal by requesting a 
personal appearance before an administrative judge. The administrative 
judge, in turn, issues a written decision to revoke or sustain the 
clearance after the employee has had his or her hearing. The 
contractor can appeal this decision to an appeal board. Thus, 
contractors have their personal appearance before the revocation 
decision is made. In contrast, military and civilian personnel within 
DHS and DOD who receive a notice that their clearance may be revoked 
can only submit written documentation prior to a revocation decision. 
Adjudicators issue a written decision to revoke or sustain the 
clearance before any personal appearance by, and without any in-person 
discussion with, the employee. The employee can appeal this written 
decision and request a personal appearance during the appeal process. 

Furthermore, DHS military and civilian employees, and contractor 
employees government-wide, have a better opportunity than DOD military 
and civilian employees to understand the rationale for the revocation 
decision and the effect their personal appearance may have had on the 
revocation decision. DHS military and civilian employees receive a 
written decision letter to revoke or sustain the clearance from the 
individual who presided over the personal appearance. Similarly, 
contractors government-wide are also provided a copy of the 
administrative judge's written decision. However, for DOD military and 
civilian employees, the administrative judge who presided over the 
personal appearance during the appeal makes a written recommendation 
rather than a decision. This recommendation is sent directly to one of 
DOD's Personnel Security Appeals Boards (PSAB), based on the agency to 
which the employee is assigned, and the recommendation generally is 
not shared with the DOD military or civilian employee. The DOD PSABs 
consider the administrative judge's recommendation and other evidence 
when they reach and issue a final written decision regarding the 
security clearance to the employee, but they are not required to 
follow the judge's recommendation. The employee is provided a final 
written decision from one of the three military department PSABs, 
which cannot be appealed, but the employee generally is not privy to 
the administrative judge's recommendation. An exception is the 
Washington Headquarters Services appeal board which, in its written 
decision, typically provides the employee with a copy of the 
administrative judge's recommendation and the hearing transcript. Army 
PSAB officials explained that providing the judge's recommendation to 
the employee could be misleading because the individual might assume 
that was the final decision, and would be disappointed if the PSAB 
reached a different decision. 

The level of detail contained in the written decisions received by 
employees after the personal appearance also varied, with contractors 
having more information about the rationale for the decision than 
military and federal civilian personnel in the military departments. 
When we reviewed Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals administrative 
judge decisions that are provided to contractors, we found that they 
contained detailed findings of fact, discussions of applicable law and 
policy, and analysis, which provides an employee an in-depth 
understanding of the rationale for the judge's decision. In reviewing 
versions of the PSAB decisions that are provided to military and 
civilian employees, however, we found that the Army and Air Force PSAB 
decisions were in a short memorandum format that state that case 
records have been reviewed and the board either sustains the 
revocation decision or reinstates eligibility for access to classified 
information. We found that only the Navy PSAB decisions provided a 
more detailed explanation of the rationale for the revocation of a 
security clearance. DOD guidance states that the PSAB's written 
decision will provide the reasons that the PSAB either sustained or 
overturned the original determination of the adjudication facility, 
and that the PSAB's final written determination shall state its 
rationale.[Footnote 34] 

According to Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals officials, DOD's 
process for its military and civilian workers provides less 
transparency, quality, and accountability compared to contractor 
personnel. Specifically, these officials stated that DOD's process for 
military and civilian employees makes it difficult to determine by 
reviewing the decision how or why component PSAB cases are decided the 
way they are. The officials also stated that they would like more 
transparency with regard to whether the component PSABs agreed or not 
with the administrative judge's recommendation, and stated that as of 
summer 2013, they are now able to track this information. 

DHS and DOD Employees Experience Different Rights to Cross-examine 
Witnesses during the Revocation Process: 

DHS and DOD employees are provided different rights to present and 
cross-examine witnesses during personal appearances, as the 
departments have implemented the executive orders differently, 
resulting in contractors, DOD employees, and some DHS employees 
receiving greater opportunities to cross-examine witnesses than other 
DHS employees. Executive Order 10865 explicitly provides contractors 
the opportunity to cross-examine persons who have made oral or written 
statements adverse to the employee, subject to certain exceptions. In 
contrast, Executive Order 12968, which covers military and civilian 
employees and contractors, is silent on the opportunity to do so. DOD 
military and civilian employees are permitted to cross-examine 
witnesses according to a memorandum from the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence issued in November 2007.[Footnote 35] 
Officials from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals and the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence stated that 
this was done as a matter of fundamental fairness, to give military 
and civilian employees an opportunity that had been provided to 
contractors for years. 

However, the applicable DHS instruction is vague on this topic and has 
been interpreted by some DHS components to allow cross-examination of 
witnesses, while other DHS components do not permit cross-examination. 
The DHS instruction states that the personal appearance "proceeding 
need not allow for the testimony or cross-examination of witnesses." 
[Footnote 36] This language has led to different witness testimony and 
cross-examination opportunities at different DHS components. For 
example, according to DHS officials, employees at some DHS components--
such as DHS Headquarters, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. 
Secret Service--have not been allowed to call or cross-examine 
witnesses during the personal appearance, while employees at other DHS 
components, such as U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have been allowed to cross-
examine witnesses during the personal appearance. U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement officials stated that employees were allowed to 
call and question witnesses during the personal appearance on a case-
by-case basis. DHS officials from the Office of the Chief Security 
Officer told us that all employees should be treated the same across 
DHS's components. They said that they would clarify the wording in the 
instruction, a draft of which has been under revision for more than a 
year; however, the officials had not decided whether they would revise 
the instruction to allow or prohibit the testimony or cross-
examination of witnesses, and they could not tell us when the revised 
instruction would be finalized. Until the processes are consistent for 
all employees, and such processes are finalized in an instruction, 
employees within DHS may continue to have different rights concerning 
cross-examination of witnesses during the revocation process, 
depending on which component they work for. 

DOD and the Military Departments Disagree on Legal Authority, Risks, 
and Benefits of Consolidating Multiple Appeals Boards: 

Each of DOD's three military departments--of the Army, the Navy, and 
the Air Force--has a PSAB that reviews cases and makes final 
eligibility determinations for access to classified information for 
that department's military and civilian employees.[Footnote 37] A 
fourth appeals board is administered by DOD's Washington Headquarters 
Services, which reviews civilian employee cases for all other DOD 
agencies. A fifth appeals board is administered by the Defense Office 
of Hearings and Appeals, which reviews cases for all contractors in 
the industrial security program, including DOD and DHS. We have 
previously reported that overlap occurs when programs have similar 
goals, devise similar strategies and activities to achieve those 
goals, or target similar users, and duplication occurs when two or 
more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or 
provide the same services to the same beneficiaries.[Footnote 38] 
While overlap in efforts may be appropriate in some instances, 
especially if agencies can leverage each others' efforts, in other 
instances overlap may be unintended, may be unnecessary, or may 
represent an inefficient use of U.S. government resources. DOD's 
multiple different PSABs could constitute inefficient overlap because 
more than one component within DOD provides the same service. 

In 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed a series of initiatives 
designed to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess and instill a 
culture of savings and cost accountability across the department. As 
part of this initiative, in March 2011, the Secretary approved a 
recommendation to colocate and consolidate the overlapping security 
clearance appeal boards[Footnote 39] with the Defense Legal Services 
Agency,[Footnote 40] similar to the colocation and consolidation of 
the service adjudication activities that were previously directed by 
the base realignment and closure process and the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense. The Secretary directed a completion date of September 30, 
2011, for this recommendation. However, this recommendation had not 
been implemented at the time of our review. A Defense Office of 
Hearings and Appeals official explained that this direction had not 
been canceled, but it had not been implemented because of opposition 
from the military departments. Officials from the Navy PSAB stated 
that the direction had not been implemented because the PSABs had not 
received any instructions or guidance to implement this direction from 
the Defense Legal Services Agency. Similarly, the Army PSAB attributed 
the lack of action to a focus on completing the consolidation of DOD's 
adjudication facilities as well as the absence of policy direction 
from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

An official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence explained that there has been an impasse since 2011 over 
a legal question regarding whether the PSAB consolidation directed by 
the Secretary of Defense is consistent with Executive Order 12968. 
Specifically, Army and Air Force PSAB officials stated that PSAB 
consolidation is not consistent with Executive Order 12968, explaining 
that the review proceedings outlined in the executive order provide an 
employee with revoked access to classified information the opportunity 
for a final appeal in writing to an agency head-appointed high-level 
panel. Army and Air Force PSAB officials stated that "agency head" 
refers to the Secretary of the Military Departments, not the Secretary 
of Defense. Air Force PSAB officials stated that the Secretary of 
Defense direction for PSAB consolidation would require modifying 
section 5.2 of Executive Order 12968, and that removing PSABs from the 
services would neither enhance due process nor national security. Air 
Force PSAB officials also explained that the procedures used to review 
the DOD efficiency proposals did not include the opportunity for the 
service Secretaries to review and comment, and thus the memo directing 
consolidation of the PSABs was signed before military department 
equities in maintaining their department PSABs were captured for 
consideration. 

However, an official from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals 
explained that the term "agency head" as used in the executive order 
includes the Secretary of Defense. Further, an official from the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence explained 
that by law, the Secretary of Defense has authority, direction, and 
control over the Department of Defense,[Footnote 41] to include the 
Secretaries of the military departments,[Footnote 42] and the 
Secretary of Defense's efficiency decisions are decisions as the head 
of DOD and apply to all subordinate components of the department, 
including the Secretaries of the military departments. This official 
stated that the interpretation of the language in the executive order 
was ultimately a legal question. DOD guidance provides that the DOD 
General Counsel shall provide advice and guidance as to the legal 
sufficiency of procedures and standards involved in implementing the 
DOD personnel security program.[Footnote 43] 

In addition to the disagreement about the legal authority to 
consolidate the PSABs, there is disagreement within the department 
about the risks and benefits of implementing the Secretary of Defense 
direction to consolidate the PSABs. Officials from the Army, the Navy, 
and the Air Force PSABs explained that consolidating PSABs would limit 
the military department Secretary's ability to consider circumstances 
and risk in light of that specific service's special or sensitive 
programs, missions, or needs. Washington Headquarters Services 
officials stated that separate PSABs were more likely to be sensitive 
to their component's special programs, missions, and needs than a 
central DOD PSAB. Air Force PSAB officials stated that, from their 
past experience, the DOD Consolidated Adjudications Facility's (CAF) 
statement of reasons for revoking access to classified information is 
often narrowly focused and fails to weigh all issues appropriately, 
and that in personal hearings the Defense Office of Hearings Appeals 
administrative judges sometimes fail to challenge statements made by 
employees that immediately raise flags with PSAB members based on 
their background and experience. They stated that with the DOD CAF 
making initial DOD-wide risk assessments for the military departments, 
the final revocation appeals should be decided by the individual 
departments. 

In contrast, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and the Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals agree that DOD PSAB consolidation is in keeping with the 
principles of reciprocity where risk is managed DOD-wide, not on a 
component basis. They stated that with the DOD CAF, the components 
have already lost their ability to manage risk with respect to 
favorable adjudications because the CAF is making those decisions for 
the component when personnel security clearances are initially 
granted. Officials from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals 
stated that the requirement that agencies grant clearance 
reciprocity[Footnote 44] has removed the role that service-specific 
programs may play in clearance determinations that were completed by 
another agency. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence explained that consolidation would bring 
standardization and consistency of quality, objectivity, and 
experience to the process for personnel security appeals, and would 
result in legal expertise being part of every appeal process, which 
would help ensure that national security needs and procedural fairness 
are appropriately balanced. Further, Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals officials stated that contractors have the benefit of 
independent fact-finding and an independent written decision by 
officials who do not work for the component, which provides an 
important check against unfairness and the taint of undue influence. 
These officials stated that having decision makers outside of the 
component's chain of command helps to reduce the opportunity for the 
perception or reality that those in the individual's component or 
chain of command can influence the outcome of the process. 

Officials from the DOD CAF cautioned that DOD needs to study the 
implications of moving to a consolidated appeal board to make an 
informed decision on any process modifications, efficiencies, and 
resource implications prior to executing the direction to consolidate 
the appeal boards. Army officials also suggested that establishment of 
a working group to review the efficiencies, feasibility, way ahead, 
and timelines would be beneficial in formulating a course of action in 
implementing the direction to consolidate the PSABs. Until DOD General 
Counsel resolves the disagreement within the department about the 
legal authority to consolidate the PSABs, and collaborates with the 
PSABs and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to address 
any other obstacles to consolidation, the department will continue to 
face delays implementing the Secretary of Defense's direction. 

Implementation of Some Revocation Processes by Components Is 
Potentially Not Consistent with Executive Orders or Agency Policy: 

Our review of DHS and DOD department-and component-level guidance, as 
well as the components' communication letters to employees undergoing 
a revocation proceeding, found that both departments generally 
provided information to employees about their rights under the two 
executive orders. However, some components' implementation of the 
clearance revocation process could potentially be inconsistent with 
the executive orders or agency policy in two areas: having an 
opportunity to be provided any additional information upon which a 
revocation appeal determination is based, and communicating the right 
to counsel. 

Navy and Army Policies Could Result in PSABs Collecting New 
Information without Sharing It with the Employee or Providing the 
Employee with an Opportunity to Respond: 

Navy and Army policies could allow the Navy and Army PSABs to collect 
and consider new information related to the revocation decision 
without informing the employee or giving the employee the opportunity 
to review or respond to the new information. For example, Navy Manual 
M-5510.30 strongly encourages the employee's command to submit 
additional information directly to the Navy PSAB after military and 
civilian personnel have made their personal appearance in front of the 
administrative judge.[Footnote 45] This creates the potential for 
important information, upon which an appeal of a revocation decision 
might be denied, to be introduced without the individual's awareness. 
Executive Order 12968, however, states that employees who are 
determined not to meet the standards for access to classified 
information shall be provided with a reasonable opportunity to reply 
in writing to and request a review of the determination, and to 
request any documents, records, and reports upon which a revocation is 
based, to the extent that the documents would be provided under the 
Freedom of Information Act or Privacy Act. 

Under the DOD regulation[Footnote 46] and the Navy manual, this 
opportunity is provided to military and civilian personnel before the 
case reaches the PSAB. Accordingly, DOD officials explained that the 
Navy manual encourages submission of new information at a point in the 
process after the employee has received and responded to all 
information upon which the revocation was based. As a result, the Navy 
manual may be inconsistent with this provision of the executive order. 
The Navy manual is silent on whether the individual will be provided 
an opportunity to see the command's submission or address the 
information contained in it. A Navy PSAB official explained that, to 
ensure due process, both parties are informed, with the employee being 
informed through his or her agency security manager or point of 
contact. The official further stated that most commands do not provide 
a recommendation or position paper to the PSAB, but acknowledged that 
the Navy manual needs to be updated. Until the Navy manual is updated 
to specify that all information provided to the Navy PSAB by the 
command must also be shared with the individual, along with an 
opportunity to respond to this information, the Navy PSAB could 
potentially deny an employee some of the protections provided in the 
executive order. 

Similarly, Army Regulation 380-67 could allow the Army PSAB to collect 
information without informing the employee or giving the employee the 
opportunity to respond to the new information. The Army regulation 
regarding appeal of a revocation decision requires the employee to 
respond to the decision through his or her immediate commanding 
officer.[Footnote 47] The Army regulation further requires that the 
commanding officer must recommend for or against reinstatement of the 
security clearance, and provide a rationale addressing the issues in 
the decision. As written, the Army regulation is silent on whether the 
comments will be provided to the individual to review and respond to 
the information contained in it. Army PSAB officials said that the 
PSAB is not responsible for providing employees with this information. 

Further, Army PSAB officials noted that in cases where a security 
clearance was revoked because of financial considerations, the Army 
PSAB would request additional documentation concerning any actions 
that the employee has taken to resolve delinquent debts, but stated 
that the Army PSAB will obtain credit reports directly from the credit 
reporting bureaus and compare them to the documents in the appeal 
package. Army PSAB officials explained that the credit report is 
accessed solely to verify the existence or resolution of disqualifying 
financial information that formed the basis of an unfavorable 
determination by the DOD CAF, so it is not routinely provided to the 
employees, but they said that it would be provided upon request. This 
raises concerns about whether the employee has an opportunity to 
review or respond to information in the credit reports obtained 
directly by the PSAB, because credit reports may not always be 
accurate. Until the Army regulation is revised to specify that all 
information provided to the Army PSAB by the command or obtained by 
the Army PSAB itself must also be shared with the individual, along 
with an opportunity to respond to this information, the Army PSAB 
could potentially deny employees some of the protections provided in 
the executive order. 

U.S. Coast Guard Did Not Communicate Right to Counsel to Its Military 
Personnel: 

DOD security clearance revocation prehearing memorandums provided to 
employees inform all types of employees--military personnel, DOD 
civilians, and contractors--of their right to obtain legal 
representation, and allow for discussion of any relevant issues. In 
contrast, at the time of our review, one DHS component--the Coast 
Guard--was not notifying its military personnel of their right to be 
represented by counsel or other representative at their own expense, 
but rather was erroneously informing military personnel that they had 
no right to counsel. While Executive Order 12968 and DHS Instruction 
Handbook 121-01-007 specify that employees shall be informed of their 
right to be represented by counsel or other representative at their 
own expense, letters the Coast Guard sent its military personnel 
appealing to the second-level deciding authority stated "you may not 
have an attorney or anyone else with you during this administrative 
process." The existing Coast Guard Instruction states that if the 
final decision results in a revocation, the employee will be advised 
of his or her rights, but does not specify what these rights are. 
[Footnote 48] 

During our review, the Coast Guard Security Center Director 
acknowledged this disparity and stated the letters would be changed to 
provide the required notification to military personnel that they have 
a right to be represented by counsel or other representative at their 
own expense during the personal appearance before the second-level 
deciding authority. We subsequently reviewed a revised letter, and it 
had been modified to inform military personnel of their right to be 
represented by counsel. In addition, the Director said he would 
advocate for modifying the Coast Guard instruction to formalize this 
change. Currently, this Coast Guard instruction is undergoing 
revision, and the updated version is expected to be published in the 
fall of 2014. According to a Coast Guard official, the revised 
instruction will address this issue, but we have not reviewed the 
revision to determine whether this change was included. 

In addition, although the Coast Guard's communication letters inform 
Coast Guard civilian employees of their right to be represented by 
counsel or other representative at their own expense during the 
personal appearance, they impose some stipulations. The Coast Guard 
letters, unlike those sent by other DHS components, state that only 
the employee's account of the issues can be heard during the meeting, 
the employee's counsel or representative cannot instruct the employee 
during the meeting, and the employee is limited to only 30 minutes to 
appear in person and present any relevant information. The Coast Guard 
Security Center Director said these stipulations are imposed because 
the intent is to avoid allowing the administrative review from 
becoming a protracted and adversarial legal proceeding where 
objections are injected or cross-examinations are sought. To his 
knowledge, the "30 minutes" has never been enforced and is now under 
review for removal from the Coast Guard instruction. However, until 
the Coast Guard instruction and related communication letters are 
revised to clearly and consistently communicate rights provided by the 
executive orders, military and civilian employees within the Coast 
Guard are at risk of not being treated similarly to one another or to 
employees in other DHS components. 

DHS and DOD Have Performed Some Oversight over Revocation Process at 
Component Level but Have Not Evaluated Quality of Revocation Process 
at Department Level: 

DHS has taken recent steps in response to recommendations made in a 
December 2013 DHS Office of Inspector General report,[Footnote 49] and 
individual DHS and DOD components perform some oversight over aspects 
of the revocation process. But neither department has performed an 
overarching, department-wide evaluation of the quality of the 
revocation process or has developed performance measures and collects 
data to measure the quality of the process. 

DHS has taken some recent steps to improve the quality of the 
revocation process. Specifically, the DHS Office of Inspector General 
report found that appointments to the DHS Security Appeals Board and 
the composition of the board had not been made in accordance with DHS 
policy. For example, it found that one member[Footnote 50] served on 
the Security Appeals Board when an employee in his chain of command 
was the appellant, even though DHS guidance provides that board 
members cannot have a current supervisory relationship with the 
employee whose appeal is being heard.[Footnote 51] The Inspector 
General report recommended that the Director of the U.S. Secret 
Service ensure that the Uniformed Division Assistant Chief, or other 
officials in the agency's chain of command, do not rule on appeals by 
Uniformed Division employees. In March 2014, the Secret Service issued 
a new directive describing the composition of the board and how a 
board member would be replaced if a case involved an employee in his 
or her chain of command.[Footnote 52] 

Further, some DHS component officials told us that their component 
provides oversight during the revocation process. For example, 
officials from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services said that 
revocation data are reviewed throughout the process, at the initial 
stage of determining whether the action is warranted and by management 
at the initial stage and each subsequent stage, and by legal counsel 
prior to approval and signature of the revocation letter. Similarly, 
at DHS Headquarters, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, officials stated that revocation 
determinations undergo multiple stages of review, including by the 
adjudicator's first-line supervisor, the Personnel Security Division 
Director, and an attorney. Other components, such as Transportation 
Security Administration and DHS Headquarters, perform reviews after 
the process has been completed to determine whether policies and 
procedures were consistently followed prior to reaching the final case 
determination. In addition, DHS Headquarters officials said that they 
review all DHS component case files before the cases are sent to the 
Security Appeals Board. 

Within DOD, although the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
is responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the 
implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for personnel 
security, the extent of oversight over the clearance revocation 
process and the use of related metrics varies across the department. 
Officials explained that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Intelligence conducts annual quality reviews of DOD security 
clearance adjudicative determinations, but explained that their 
oversight efforts have been hindered by the lack of available data in 
JPAS, as we previously discussed. They explained that they do not have 
access to the agency-specific case-management systems, and that they 
have sent out manual data requests in the past, but have experienced 
difficulties in receiving responses to these requests that all have a 
consistent interpretation of the data. Furthermore, officials from the 
four PSABs we met with stated they collect appeal data--such as number 
of cases reviewed, favorable decisions, unfavorable issues, and number 
of days to process an appeal--and that they generated and submitted 
internal reports with this information to their respective leadership, 
but these appeal board officials did not elaborate how the information 
provided to their superiors was used to perform oversight. 

ODNI Has Exercised Some Oversight over Security Clearance Revocations, 
but Has Not Reviewed the Extent That Clearance Revocation Process 
Should Be Uniform across the Federal Government: 

ODNI has exercised some oversight of security clearance revocations by 
reviewing policies and procedures within some agencies; however, it 
has not established any metrics to measure the quality of the process 
government-wide and has not reviewed security clearance revocation 
processes across the federal government to determine the extent to 
which policies and procedures should be uniform. In addition to DHS 
and DOD, ODNI also has oversight responsibility for the security 
clearance process government-wide. In June 2008, Executive Order 
13467[Footnote 53] designated the DNI as the Security Executive Agent 
to, among other things, direct the oversight of determinations of 
eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a 
sensitive position, and assigned the DNI responsibility for developing 
uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the 
effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and 
adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to 
classified information or to hold a sensitive position. Executive 
Order 13467 also provides the DNI the authority to issue guidelines 
and instructions to the heads of agencies to ensure appropriate 
uniformity, centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, and timeliness 
in processes relating to determinations by agencies of eligibility for 
access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive 
position. This executive order further states that agency heads shall 
assist in carrying out any function under the order, which includes 
implementing any policies or procedures developed pursuant to the 
order.[Footnote 54] 

ODNI has exercised some oversight of security clearance revocations to 
determine whether the processes are being followed. ODNI officials 
explained that they have reviewed personnel security clearance 
revocation policies and processes within select agencies to determine 
the extent that agencies are in compliance with current laws and 
executive orders. In particular, ODNI officials said that they have 
conducted seven joint reviews of the security clearance process, along 
with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),[Footnote 55] between 
April 2013 and June 2014. Although these reviews are not specifically 
focused on the revocation process, ODNI officials stated that these 
reviews look at the entire security clearance process, to include 
security clearance revocations. In April 2014, ODNI issued a memo that 
formally established this review process, called the Security 
Executive Agent National Assessments Program. In addition, ODNI is 
developing a survey for agencies as part of this program to help ODNI 
ensure that agencies' policies are consistent with national security 
and there is fairness in the processes. ODNI officials said the survey 
is currently in testing and that it is expected to be launched across 
the federal government at the end of fiscal year 2014. A draft of this 
survey contained one question about clearance revocations, asking 
agencies to enumerate how many revocations resulted from continuous 
evaluation activities. ODNI officials said that a subsequent draft of 
the survey included a separate section, with six questions, that was 
added to address an agency's process to deny or revoke a clearance. 

Despite these efforts at the component level, neither DHS, DOD, nor 
ODNI have evaluated the quality of the revocation process across the 
specific departments or government-wide. DHS and DOD do not perform 
overarching, department-wide oversight over the revocation process, 
and neither department has developed metrics or collected data to 
measure the quality of the revocation process. Furthermore, ODNI 
officials acknowledged that metrics have not been established to 
measure the quality of the security clearance revocation process. In 
November 2013, we testified that executive-branch agencies do not 
consistently assess quality throughout the personnel security 
clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and 
implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the personnel 
security clearance process.[Footnote 56] Having assessment tools and 
performance metrics in place is a critical initial step toward 
instituting a program to monitor and independently validate the 
effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures. Our work has 
also found that agency managers need performance information as a 
basis for decision making to improve programs and results, identify 
problems in existing programs and develop corrective actions, and 
identify priorities and make resource decisions.[Footnote 57] 

ODNI officials stated that they currently report some limited metrics 
on revocations for the intelligence community as part of their 
reporting in response to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010.[Footnote 58] They said that they would like to establish 
and make more robust metrics for reciprocity, quality, and out-of-
scope periodic reinvestigations, and from there it would be a natural 
progression to look at developing some metrics for revocations and 
denials, and other areas. However, they stated that due to constrained 
resources and other priorities they were uncertain whether they could 
make a business case to allocate the resources. The absence of data on 
the number of persons who receive a proposal to revoke their 
eligibility to access classified information, as discussed above, 
combined with the likelihood that the shift to increase continuous 
evaluation may result in increased instances of revocation proposals, 
make it increasingly important for agencies to have performance 
measures and data to ensure a high-quality revocation process. Without 
performance measures and data to assess the quality of the personnel 
security clearance revocation process, individual departments, such as 
DHS and DOD, and ODNI lack information to identify and resolve 
potential problems in the process, and make informed decisions about 
potential changes to the program. 

Furthermore, the security clearance revocation process implementation 
differences we identified at DHS and DOD continue in part because ODNI 
has not reviewed security clearance revocation processes across the 
federal government to determine the extent to which policies and 
procedures should be uniform. Specifically, ODNI has not assessed 
whether the existing security clearance framework, with its parallel 
processes for contractors and government employees, or a single 
process applicable to all types of employees would best facilitate the 
effective, efficient, consistent, and timely completion of security 
clearance revocation proceedings. When asked about the different 
processes, ODNI officials stated that the executive orders provide 
broad guidelines that give agencies the flexibility to implement a 
review and appeal process that best fits the agency's needs, and there 
is no single solution that all agencies must follow. Additionally, 
Executive Orders 12968 and 10865 do not require a uniform government-
wide process, and in fact establish two parallel processes, one for 
contractors and one for government employees.[Footnote 59] The ODNI 
officials explained that from an efficiencies perspective, 
standardization of the security clearance revocation process makes 
sense, but said that ODNI has not had a reason or purpose to perform 
an extensive review of the revocation processes. The ODNI officials 
stated that they had not heard complaints regarding fairness while 
conducting their reviews, and had only heard anecdotal concerns that 
the process took too long. Furthermore, ODNI has not established any 
policies and procedures to facilitate government-wide consistency in 
security clearance revocation proceedings. ODNI officials stated that 
publishing guidance for the appeal process might be worth pursuing, 
but would have to be prioritized in light of competing priorities and 
limited resources. Given the inconsistencies we have identified in the 
revocation processes at DHS and DOD discussed previously, combined 
with the requirement of clearance reciprocity and the recommendations 
to implement continuous evaluation, the DNI's new role as Security 
Executive Agent places ODNI in a unique position to examine whether 
any changes to the existing structure with its parallel revocation 
processes might be warranted. Until ODNI reviews the effectiveness and 
efficiency of all aspects of the security clearance revocation 
process, and DHS and DOD take specific actions, it is difficult to 
determine whether the existing structures, with different processes 
for military and civilian personnel and for contractors, are the most 
appropriate approach to meet national security needs. 

Employment Outcomes after Clearance Revocation Are Determined Based on 
Several Factors, and Identification of these Outcomes Is Hindered by 
Lack of Data: 

DHS and DOD employees whose eligibility to access classified 
information has been revoked may not have consistent employment 
outcomes, such as reassignment or termination, because these outcomes 
are generally dependent on several factors, including the agency's 
mission and needs and the manager's discretion. Communication between 
personnel security and human capital offices at DHS and DOD varies, 
because human capital and personnel security processes are 
intentionally managed separately, and most components could not 
readily ascertain the employment outcomes of individuals whose 
clearances had been revoked. 

Employment Outcomes for DHS and DOD Employees with Revoked Clearances 
Generally Is at Discretion of Employee's Supervisor or Commander: 

Employment outcomes, such as reassignment or termination, for DHS and 
DOD civilian and military employees whose personnel security clearance 
has been revoked are generally dependent on a number of factors, 
including the agency's mission and needs. Key to the decision is the 
judgment of the employee's supervisor or commander, and also whether 
there is a job available that the employee is qualified to perform and 
the supervisor or commander considers it appropriate or possible to 
reassign the employee. DHS officials elaborated that if an 
individual's clearance was revoked, then he or she is no longer 
qualified to perform the job he or she was hired for, and so, 
depending on the policies at the component where the employee works, 
the agency may have no obligation to reassign the individual to 
another position or find another position for the employee. DOD 
officials stated that in many places within the department, all 
positions are sensitive, so there may be no positions to which an 
employee could be reassigned. DHS officials stated that in such 
agencies where all positions require a clearance, holding a clearance 
is usually a condition of employment. 

Components within DHS and DOD varied as to whether they reassign an 
employee after a security clearance revocation. Officials from five 
DHS components--U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, and Transportation Security Administration--
stated that management at their component could decide whether to 
reassign a civilian employee to a position with duties not requiring 
access to classified information. For two DHS components, U.S. Secret 
Service and DHS Headquarters, reassignment is generally not an option 
because all or almost all positions in these components require a 
security clearance. A DHS Headquarters general counsel official stated 
that DHS has no official policy regarding reassignment, so that it can 
preserve its administrative options. However, for DHS military 
personnel, Coast Guard officials said their component has guidance 
stating that in cases where a clearance is terminated for cause and 
the employee is not recommended for separation from the Coast Guard, 
the employee will be reassigned to a position that does not require a 
security clearance. 

For most DOD civilian and military personnel, officials said that 
supervisors or commanders have discretionary authority to determine 
how to treat employees whose security clearance has been revoked. For 
DOD civilian employees, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Washington 
Headquarters Services officials stated that supervisors have 
discretion to reassign employees, while Navy officials said that 
civilian employees will undergo a removal action after all appeals are 
completed if access to classified information is revoked. 
Additionally, while DOD department-level and Air Force guidance does 
not require separation of officers whose clearances have been revoked, 
with DOD guidance stating that officers may be separated from military 
service,[Footnote 60] Army and Navy guidance requires the discharge of 
an officer who receives a final revocation of a security clearance. 
[Footnote 61] However, two Army regulations concerning officers appear 
to contradict each other. While one Army regulation states that 
revocation of an officer's security clearance requires that the 
officer be discharged, and further states that this requirement cannot 
be waived,[Footnote 62] a different Army regulation regarding 
reassignment of officers provides guidance for the reassignment of 
officers whose security clearance has been revoked.[Footnote 63] 

For enlisted military personnel whose security clearance has been 
revoked, officials from the military services stated that the Army and 
the Marine Corps reassign military personnel to the extent that an 
alternative position is available, and the Air Force may reassign 
military personnel, while the Navy will generally only reassign 
military personnel until a final revocation decision is made by the 
PSAB.[Footnote 64] Army officials noted, however, that a clearance 
revocation should affect a soldier's ability to reenlist, because as 
of 2005 all soldiers enlisting in the Army are subject to an 
investigation for eligibility to access classified information at the 
secret level, regardless of the access requirements of their position. 
Navy officials said that since 2011, all Navy positions require secret 
clearance eligibility as a condition of employment, regardless of 
whether the position requires access to classified information. As a 
result, a sailor who has lost his or her security clearance generally 
will be separated from the Navy.[Footnote 65] 

Given the component's policies and procedures regarding reassignment, 
officials from four DHS components--U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, and Transportation Security Administration--told 
us that it would be possible for similarly situated employees under 
investigation for the same infraction to be treated differently if 
their clearances were revoked. When asked how the quality of the 
process could be improved once a final revocation decision has been 
made, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials suggested that the 
agency could identify a single human capital deciding official to 
review all employment outcomes, to ensure consistency of employment 
status decisions across the agency. The officials explained that 
knowing and tracking the employment outcomes of individuals who lost 
their clearances would benefit the agency, because disparate treatment 
would not be an appropriate outcome. For DHS Headquarters and the 
Secret Service, which do not reassign personnel whose clearances have 
been revoked, all employees will be treated similarly because 
employees who lose their clearances will be terminated. Given the 
varying policies and procedures at DOD components, similarly situated 
civilian and military personnel whose security clearances have been 
revoked may be treated differently. 

Communication Varies between Personnel Security and Human Capital 
Offices: 

Communication between personnel security and human capital offices at 
DHS and DOD varies, but lack of communication between these offices 
could result in adverse employment actions being taken prematurely or 
in inappropriate use of personnel security or human capital processes. 
According to DHS and DOD officials, the personnel security revocation 
processes and human capital disciplinary or adverse action processes 
are intended to be separate and distinct processes, to help ensure 
independence and protect national security. DHS and DOD officials 
stated that an adverse disciplinary personnel action could be taken 
based on the same underlying offense that led to the revocation 
proceeding, and if that were to occur, the misconduct and personnel 
security processes can run in parallel or they can run consecutively. 
However, after a final decision is made to revoke a personnel security 
clearance, DHS and DOD personnel security officials said that their 
role in the process is over, and that it is a human capital decision 
as to what next happens to the individual. A DHS Headquarters general 
counsel official further stated that any personnel actions that result 
due to the revocation of a personnel security clearance are based 
exclusively on the fact that the individual is no longer qualified for 
his or her position, not on the reasons underlying the revocation 
action. 

Good human capital policies and practices, to include appropriate 
practices for evaluating, counseling, and disciplining personnel, are 
critical factors that affect the quality of internal controls. 
Moreover, to run and control operations and achieve goals, agencies 
must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to 
internal as well as external events; effective communications should 
occur in a broad sense, with information flowing down, across, and up 
the organization.[Footnote 66] Personnel security offices at some DHS 
and DOD components said they worked very closely with human capital 
officials throughout the personnel security clearance revocation 
process, while at other components there was very little interaction 
between the offices. For example, Secret Service officials said that 
they have excellent communication between the personnel security and 
the human capital offices, and that personnel from both offices meet 
at every step of the process. Similarly, Coast Guard officials stated 
that their human capital and personnel security offices work closely 
with each other throughout the revocation process with respect to 
civilian employees. 

In contrast, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials stated that 
they are unaware of any specific DHS human capital policies and 
procedures that align or support the security process. These officials 
also stated that better coordination and communication between human 
capital and personnel security offices is needed during the revocation 
process, and that increased coordination and communication could 
improve the quality of the process. Similarly, DHS Headquarters 
employee relations officials said that their office is not involved or 
informed by the personnel security office throughout the security 
revocation and appeal process, which includes the initial decision to 
revoke an employee's security clearance through the three levels of 
appeal. They explained that their office gets involved after the 
decision to revoke the employee's security clearance is final, and the 
human capital office communicates with the personnel security office 
when a personnel action is necessary. They explained that this 
communication is not to share the details of the underlying offense, 
but to notify the human capital office or supervisor of the status of 
the investigation. An official from the DHS Office of General Counsel 
stated that the office is involved throughout the revocation process 
to provide legal sufficiency reviews of clearance determinations and 
to advise management during any clearance-related personnel action. 

Within DOD, Army human capital officials stated that the appropriate 
offices are not informed of the revocation of the security clearance 
due to weaknesses in information sharing with other Army offices. They 
explained that there is no standard time frame or process for the 
civilian personnel office to be notified about a civilian employee's 
clearance revocation, but the office is typically notified when the 
supervisor seeks advice regarding what action to take now that the 
employee's clearance has been revoked. In contrast, Navy human capital 
officials stated that the nature of the adverse information may 
trigger employee misconduct actions as well as actions to revoke a 
security clearance, thus making communication among the commanding 
officer, security manager, and the serving human resource office 
essential. They said that, generally, the security officer and the 
human resource office interact at all stages of the incident. 
Similarly, Marine Corps headquarters officials stated that its human 
resources office works with the local command and includes its local 
security manager into the process from the very beginning of the 
revocation process. Air Force officials stated the local human capital 
office is normally informed by the organization when the employee's 
security clearance is revoked. Washington Headquarters Services human 
capital officials stated that their personnel security office and 
occasionally the local component security manager notifies their human 
capital office when an employee's security clearance has been revoked. 

A lack of communication between the human capital and personnel 
security offices could result in adverse employment actions being 
taken prematurely or in the inappropriate use of personnel security 
processes in lieu of human capital processes. For example, DOD 
officials stated that one issue that can arise is that human capital 
officials could fire an individual before all of the appeals 
associated with a revocation action are completed. If the termination 
was based upon a separate adverse action proceeding, that action would 
be appropriate; however, if the action was based on the clearance 
revocation, then, under DOD regulation, subject to certain exceptions, 
termination should not take place until after the revocation decision 
is final, after all appeals have been completed.[Footnote 67] Defense 
Office of Hearings and Appeals and other DOD officials stated that 
some components are inappropriately terminating employees due to loss 
of a security clearance before the personnel security clearance appeal 
process is completed. In addition, ODNI officials explained that some 
agencies could use the personnel security process to handle personnel 
disciplinary issues, which is not appropriate. For example, Defense 
Office of Hearings and Appeals Officials said that retaliation against 
whistleblowers is perceived, fairly or not, as a continuing problem in 
the personnel security clearance arena. Ordinarily, most federal 
civilian employees[Footnote 68] have a right to appeal serious adverse 
employment actions[Footnote 69] taken against them to the Merit 
Systems Protections Board. However, in the security clearance context, 
federal case law[Footnote 70] has limited the scope of the board's 
review of adverse actions. Specifically, the board may review appeals 
of adverse employment actions resulting from a denial or revocation of 
a security clearance or a determination that an employee is not 
eligible to hold a sensitive position for specific procedural issues, 
[Footnote 71] but the board cannot review the substance of a security 
clearance denial or revocation, or a finding that an employee is not 
eligible to hold a sensitive position. DOD officials said that the 
personnel security and human capital processes are designed and 
intended to be separate in part to protect the employee from someone 
trying to exercise undue influence over the disciplinary process, as 
well as to protect national security. ODNI officials stated that there 
are legal restrictions on the type of information that can be shared 
between the human capital and personnel security offices, but said 
that further review of what information should be shared between the 
two offices could be beneficial. Until DHS and DOD develop guidance 
specifying what information can and should be communicated between 
human capital and personnel security officials, and at what decision 
points during the revocation process that information should be 
communicated, DHS and DOD will be hampered in their ability to combat 
the perception that the personnel security process is being used to 
circumvent procedural protections ordinarily provided to federal 
employees subject to adverse employment actions, and that individuals 
are not being treated in a fair and consistent manner. 

DHS and DOD Do Not Readily Know Employment Outcomes of Individuals 
with Revoked Clearances Because Data Are Not Readily Available: 

DOD and most DHS components cannot readily ascertain the employment 
outcomes of individuals whose clearances had been revoked, because 
these data are not readily available. Within DOD, officials 
representing all DOD civilian and military personnel--in the Army, the 
Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and Washington Headquarters 
Services[Footnote 72]--stated that they do not track and would not be 
able to report the human capital outcomes of employees with revoked 
security clearances. For example, Army officials explained that there 
is a resignation code in their human capital database, but that code 
covers all resignations for any reason, and there may or may not be a 
remark on the agency's personnel action form (known as an SF-50) that 
would relate the resignation to a security clearance issue. Moreover, 
Army officials explained that if an individual were removed as a 
result of a security clearance revocation, the removal code could be 
attributed to failing to meet any one of several conditions of 
employment, if maintaining eligibility for a security clearance was 
one of the requirements listed in an individual's position 
description. An official from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness explained that the separation 
codes applied for military personnel are similarly broad in nature, 
and would include separations for reasons other than revocation of a 
security clearance. 

Officials in some DHS components said they could manually gather 
information about employment outcomes from clearance revocations, but 
they explained that doing this would be labor-intensive because their 
human capital system would need to be cross-referenced against the 
personnel security system. For example, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement officials commented that there is no DHS or Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement policy that requires the collection of data 
and reporting of outcomes for employees with revoked security 
clearances, but stated that they could determine the employment 
outcomes on a piecemeal basis by making a data query for each employee 
record. However, Coast Guard officials said that they maintain a 
spreadsheet of all disciplinary and adverse actions taken against its 
civilian employees. Similarly, Transportation Security Administration 
personal security officials also stated that their component can 
identify the outcomes of employees with revoked security clearances 
with help from human capital officials. 

Data ODNI Provides to Congress on Total Employees Eligible for Access 
to Classified Information May Include Inaccurate DOD Data: 

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the 
President to submit an annual report to Congress on, among other 
things, the total number of personnel security clearances across the 
government, categorized by government employees and contractors who 
held or were approved for a security clearance.[Footnote 73] In 
response to this requirement, ODNI has prepared and submitted a report 
each year, with the most recent report being issued for fiscal year 
2013. However, we found that the DOD data that are included in this 
report to Congress likely overstate the total number of DOD employees 
eligible to access classified information, in part because JPAS does 
not have up-to-date information about the current population of DOD 
employees. Without accurate data, DOD's ability to reduce the total 
population of clearance holders and minimize risk and reduce costs to 
the government will be hampered. To measure performance, it is 
important that organizations have sufficiently complete, accurate, and 
consistent data to document performance and support decision making. 
Further, one of the five internal control standards that define the 
minimum level of quality acceptable for internal control in the 
federal government states that information should be recorded within a 
time frame that enables management to carry out responsibilities, and 
that operational information is needed in part to determine whether 
the agency is complying with applicable laws and regulations.[Footnote 
74] 

When we compared the number of employees eligible to access classified 
information in fiscal year 2013[Footnote 75] as reported in JPAS to 
the total number of employees who served or worked in DOD[Footnote 76] 
for that same fiscal year, we found that the number of DOD employees 
who were eligible to access classified information exceeded the total 
number of DOD employees in five components. As shown in table 4, the 
number of employees eligible to access classified information exceeded 
the total number of employees in the following groups: Air Force 
active-duty military and federal civilian personnel, Navy active-duty 
military and federal civilian personnel, and Marine Corps active-duty 
military personnel. However, Executive Order 12968 provides that the 
number of employees that each agency determines is eligible for access 
to classified information shall be kept to the minimum required for 
conduct of agency functions. 

Table 4: Comparison of DOD Personnel with Clearance Eligibility and 
DOD Total Employees by Component for Fiscal Year 2013: 

Component: Air Force; 

Employee type: Civilian; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 225,269; 
Total personnel[C]: 187,207; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 120%. 

Employee type: Military--Active; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 551,127; 
Total personnel[C]: 356,982; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 154%. 

Employee type: Military--Reserves[B]; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 154,712; 
Total personnel[C]: 310,418; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 50%. 

Component: Army: 

Employee type: Civilian; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 296,481; 
Total personnel[C]: 300,098; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 99%. 

Employee type: Military--Active; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 563,694; 
Total personnel[C]: 624,392; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 90%. 

Employee type: Military--Reserves[B]; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 268,086; 
Total personnel[C]: 867,344; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 31%. 

Component: Marine Corps: 

Employee type: Civilian; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 7,542; 
Total personnel[C]: 21,675; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 35%. 

Employee type: Military--Active; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 355,030; 
Total personnel[C]: 229,537; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 155%. 

Employee type: Military--Reserves[B]; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 40,329; 
Total personnel[C]: 134,395; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 30%. 

Component: Navy: 

Employee type: Civilian; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 237,191; 
Total personnel[C]: 189,444; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 125%. 

Employee type: Military--Active; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 356,153; 
Total personnel[C]: 355,453; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 100%+. 

Employee type: Military--Reserves[B]; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 81,512; 
Total personnel[C]: 166,813; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 49. 

Component: DOD Military Services Total; 

Employee type: All personnel total; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 
3,137,126; 
Total personnel[C]: 3,743,758; 
Percentage of employees with eligibility: 84%. 

Component: Washington Headquarters Services[D]; 

Employee type: Civilian; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 
131,877; 
Total personnel[C]: Unavailable[E]. 

Employee type: Military; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 209. 

Employee type: All personnel total; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 132,086. 

Component: Industry; 

Employee type: Contractors government-wide; 
Total employees eligible to access classified information[A]: 930,446; 
Total personnel[C]: Unknown[F]. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense Manpower Data Center data. GAO-14-460. 

[A] Total persons eligible to access classified information includes 
all employees without a separation date recorded in the Joint 
Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) by the end of fiscal year 2013, 
who had eligibility for confidential, secret, top-secret, and SCI-
level personnel security clearances. If a person had eligibility in 
more than one employee type, persons were only counted once, using the 
following ranking: (1) industry, (2) civilian, (3) active military, 
and (4) reserve military. We believe that these numbers are inaccurate. 

[B] Reserve data includes counts for all Reserve component categories 
(Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve), including the 
National Guard. 

[C] Total personnel is the number of employees who, at any time during 
the fiscal year, served as a part-time or full-time federal civilian 
employee, served in an active component, or served in a reserve 
component. The totals for each group were calculated by adding the 
totals from 12 monthly files for fiscal year 2013 from the 
Appropriated Fund Civilians, Automated Extract of Active Duty Military 
Personnel Records, and the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data 
System databases, and then dropping duplicate personnel based on 
Social Security number and service. 

[D] Washington Headquarters Services provides human capital support 
and manages the personnel security process for several DOD components 
and agencies. 

[E] The total personnel data for the Washington Headquarters Services 
and other defense agencies did not include personnel for five 
organizations that were included in the JPAS eligibility data. 

[F] The total number of contractor employees working for the federal 
government is unknown, because agencies often contract for a service 
to be performed rather than for a specified number of individuals. In 
May 2014, we reported that DOD, the federal government's largest 
purchaser of contractor-provided services, reported having an 
estimated 670,000 contractor full-time equivalent employees in fiscal 
year 2012. See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Update on DOD's Efforts to 
Implement a Common Contractor Manpower Data System, GAO-14-491R (May 
19, 2014), and Human Capital: Additional Steps Needed to Help 
Determine the Right Size and Composition of DOD's Total Workforce, GAO-
13-470 (May 29, 2013). 

[End of table] 

When we asked DMDC officials for their opinions on why the number of 
employees eligible to access classified information was greater than 
the total number of employees for some of the DOD components, they 
provided some possible explanations for the discrepancy. For example, 
DMDC officials explained that the database includes individuals who 
have newly enlisted into the military services but who may not have 
begun their enlistment period yet, and this would not be included in 
the employee totals. However, we reviewed data reported by the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness for fiscal years 2010 
through 2012, and found that the total number of all personnel who 
joined each year (not just those who joined with a delayed entry date) 
each year ranged from about 43,000 to 44,000 for the Air Force and 
around 40,000 to 42,000 for the Marine Corps,[Footnote 77] which is 
too few to explain the discrepancy of almost 200,000 for Air Force 
military personnel and 125,000 for Marine Corps military personnel. 

Furthermore, DOD officials said that the information in JPAS may not 
reflect changes in personnel status such as separations due to 
retirements, employee job transfers, and deaths. DMDC officials 
explained that JPAS receives data from the components' personnel 
centers, and DMDC is dependent on the components to send separation 
information. As a result, the number of DOD clearance holders included 
in the report to Congress likely overstates the total number of DOD 
employees eligible to access classified information because it may 
include people whose clearance eligibility has not yet expired, but 
who have separated from the department, since JPAS was not updated to 
reflect that separation information. ODNI officials stated that 
because DOD has the largest number of eligible persons in the federal 
government, any overstatement of DOD's data will have a greater effect 
on the reported totals than for other agencies. 

DMDC officials stated that since management of JPAS transitioned to 
DMDC in June 2010, DOD has conducted an extensive study on the quality 
of JPAS data. Specifically, they stated that DMDC has conducted more 
than 127 data-quality initiatives affecting 165 million records. These 
initiatives include examining records where the access level did not 
match the eligibility level (such as where a person has top-secret 
access but only secret eligibility) and identifying duplicate records. 
In addition, a DMDC official said that the team working on the 
migration from JPAS to the new system has identified data-quality 
issues that they are working to resolve. 

Until DOD takes steps to review and analyze the discrepancies in the 
total number of employees and the number of employees eligible to 
access classified information, and address any problems identified, 
DOD will be unable to rely on the information provided by JPAS to get 
an accurate understanding of the total number of DOD employees 
eligible to access classified information. The lack of visibility over 
this total will impede the department's ability to implement 
recommendations to improve the security clearance process. For 
example, the February 2014 OMB report on the security, suitability, 
and credentialing processes recommended that federal agencies reduce 
the total population of clearance holders to minimize risk and reduce 
costs.[Footnote 78] However, until DOD has an accurate baseline of the 
number of clearance holders in the department, DOD will be unable to 
determine the extent that it can or has reduced the number of 
clearance holders in accordance with this recommendation. Furthermore, 
having inaccurate data about the number of clearance holders within 
DOD will hinder the department's ability to provide oversight and 
accurate, complete information about security clearance eligibility to 
Congress as required by statute, to other offices within the 
department, and to interagency stakeholders. 

Conclusions: 

In an environment where reciprocity of personnel security clearances 
is required among federal agencies, the consistent and transparent 
application of the processes governing whether individuals should 
retain their access to classified information has become increasingly 
important, so that all agencies can have reasonable assurance that 
only trustworthy individuals obtain and keep security clearances. 
Moreover, with the proposed implementation of continuous evaluation, 
the workload of agencies' security offices could significantly 
increase, making it critical for agencies to have a high-quality 
clearance revocation process in place. In the absence of requirements 
to track or report security clearance eligibility data and related 
metrics, DHS and DOD do not have key revocation data, such as the 
number of proposed revocations, to help oversee the revocation process 
or determine their workload for planning purposes. 

Although both DHS and DOD are generally meeting their responsibilities 
and providing information to employees about most of their rights 
under the two executive orders governing the revocation process, until 
Army, Navy, and Coast Guard guidance is updated, some employees could 
potentially be denied some of the protections provided in the 
executive orders. Additionally, given the different interpretations of 
the executive order and other obstacles to implementation of the 
Secretary of Defense's direction to consolidate DOD's PSABs, in the 
absence of a resolution of these issues by the DOD General Counsel, 
DOD will be unable to implement the Secretary of Defense's direction 
to eliminate the overlap in this function. 

Further, DHS, DOD, and some of their components have implemented the 
requirements from the executive orders in different ways. Without 
consistent processes for all employees, regardless of which component 
they work for, employees within DHS may experience different 
opportunities to cross-examine witnesses during the revocation 
process. In addition, without performance measures to assess the 
quality of the personnel security clearance revocation process, the 
ODNI, DHS, and DOD lack information to identify and resolve potential 
problems in the process, and make informed decisions about potential 
changes to the program. Further, until the DNI, as the Security 
Executive Agent, reviews the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
existing revocation processes, it is unknown whether having different 
processes, for military and civilian personnel and for contractors, 
and having inconsistencies among DHS and DOD, is the most appropriate 
approach to meet national security needs. Finally, without specific 
guidance from DHS and DOD on what information should be shared between 
personnel security and human capital offices, and when that 
information should be shared, DHS and DOD cannot ensure that 
individuals are treated in a fair and consistent manner. Similarly 
situated individuals who lose their security clearance may lose their 
employment or remain employed and be reassigned, based on their 
supervisor's discretion. 

Moreover, without accurate data about the number of current DOD 
military and federal civilian employees eligible to access classified 
information, DOD is not well positioned to provide the information 
Congress has requested. DOD also will be hindered in implementing 
recommendations to reduce the total population of clearance holders in 
order to minimize risk and reduce cost. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, 
and the Director of National Intelligence take the following 13 
actions. 

To help ensure that the respective DHS and DOD data systems contain 
sufficiently complete and accurate information to facilitate effective 
oversight of the personnel security clearance revocation and appeal 
process, we recommend that: 

* the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Chief Security Officer 
to assess the benefits and associated costs of tracking additional 
revocation and appeals information, and take any steps necessary to 
modify the Integrated Security Management System (ISMS) to track such 
information as is deemed beneficial; and: 

* the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence to take steps to ensure that data are recorded and 
updated in the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) and the 
department's new systems, so that the relevant fields are filled. 

To help ensure that all employees within DHS receive the same 
protections during their personal appearance, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Chief Security Officer to 
revise and finalize the DHS instruction regarding the personnel 
security program to clarify whether or not employees are allowed to 
cross-examine witnesses during personal appearances. 

To help ensure independence and the efficient use of resources, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the DOD General Counsel 
to take the following two actions: 

* first, resolve the disagreement about the legal authority to 
consolidate the PSABs and, in collaboration with the PSABs and the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, address any other 
obstacles to consolidating DOD's PSABs; and: 

* second, if the General Counsel determines that there are no legal 
impediments and that other obstacles to consolidation can be 
addressed, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Defense Legal Services Agency to take steps to implement the Secretary 
of Defense's direction to consolidate DOD's PSABs. 

To help ensure that all employees within DOD receive the same rights 
during the revocation process, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense: 

* direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise Secretary of the Navy 
Manual M-5510.30 to specify that any information collected by the Navy 
PSAB from the employee's command will be shared with the employee, who 
will also be given the opportunity to respond to any such information 
provided; and: 

* direct the Secretary of the Army to revise Army Regulation 380-67 to 
specify that any information collected by the Army PSAB from the 
employee's command or by the Army PSAB itself will be shared with the 
employee, who will also be given the opportunity to respond to any 
such information provided. 

To help ensure that all employees are treated fairly and receive the 
protections established in the executive order, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant, U.S. Coast 
Guard, to revise the Coast Guard instruction for military personnel to 
specify that military personnel may be represented by counsel or other 
representatives at their own expense. 

To facilitate department-wide review and assessment of the quality of 
the personnel security clearance revocation process, we recommend that 
the DNI, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland 
Security, develop performance measures to better enable them to 
identify and resolve problems, and direct the collection of related 
revocation and appeals information. 

To help ensure that similarly situated individuals are treated 
consistently, and to facilitate oversight and help ensure the quality 
of the security clearance revocation process, we recommend that the 
DNI review whether the existing security clearance revocation process 
is the most efficient and effective approach. In this review, the DNI 
should consider whether there should be a single personnel security 
clearance revocation process used across all executive-branch agencies 
and workforces, with consideration of areas such as the timing of the 
personal appearance in the revocation process, and the ability to 
cross-examine witnesses. Further, to the extent that a single process 
or changes to the existing parallel processes are warranted, the DNI 
should consider whether there is a need to establish any policies and 
procedures to facilitate a more consistent process, and recommend as 
needed any revisions to existing executive orders or other executive-
branch guidance. 

To facilitate coordination between personnel security and human 
capital offices regarding how a security clearance revocation should 
affect an employee's employment status, and to help ensure that 
individuals are treated in a fair and consistent manner, we recommend 
that: 

* the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for 
Management to review and revise policy regarding coordination between 
the personnel security and human capital offices to clarify what 
information can and should be communicated between human capital and 
personnel security officials at specified decision points in the 
revocation process, and when that information should be communicated; 
and: 

* the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, to review and revise policy regarding 
coordination between the personnel security and human capital offices 
to clarify what information can and should be communicated between 
human capital and personnel security officials at specified decision 
points in the revocation process, and when that information should be 
communicated. 

To help ensure that the DNI report to Congress contains accurate data 
about the number of current DOD military and federal civilian 
employees eligible to access classified information, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness to review and analyze the discrepancies in the total number 
of employees and the number of employees eligible to access classified 
information, and take immediate steps to address the problems. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, and ODNI for review 
and comment. Written comments from DHS, DOD, and ODNI are reprinted in 
their entirety in appendices II, III, and IV respectively. All three 
agencies generally concurred with our recommendations and provided 
additional technical comments, which we incorporated in the report 
where appropriate. 

In its written comments, DHS concurred with our four recommendations 
directed to it, and stated it has already taken steps to implement two 
of our recommendations. 

* First, regarding our recommendation to assess the benefits and 
associated costs of tracking additional revocation and appeals 
information, DHS concurred, stating that the Office of the Chief 
Security Officer has established an estimated completion date of 
December 2014 to conduct a review to consider what additional data 
would be valuable for collection. 

* Second, with respect to our recommendation to revise and finalize 
the DHS instruction regarding cross-examination of witnesses, DHS 
concurred, commenting that the Office of the Chief Security Officer 
has revised its personnel security instruction with unambiguous 
language on cross-examination of witnesses, and intends to issue the 
revised instruction by the end of the year. 

* Third, for our recommendation to revise the Coast Guard instruction 
to specify that military personnel may be represented by counsel, DHS 
concurred, stating that the Coast Guard, pending the update of the 
Commandant Instruction on Personnel Security, issued an interim 
memorandum in May 2014 advising that individuals may have counsel or 
other representatives present at the second-level review at their own 
expense. DHS also stated that it believes the Coast Guard's actions to 
implement our recommendation regarding the revision of its instruction 
to specify that military personnel may be represented by counsel 
fulfill the intent of the recommendation, and requested that this 
recommendation be closed as implemented. While we are encouraged by 
the actions the Coast Guard has already taken, we continue to believe 
that it is important that the change be formalized in the updated 
Commandant instruction before we close out our recommendation. 
Moreover, the revision made by the Coast Guard in its interim 
memorandum appears to extend the right to counsel only to the personal 
appearance, and does not make clear how employees will be informed of 
their right to counsel, but under Executive Order 12968 the right to 
counsel is not limited to one specific stage of the revocation 
process, and the order requires that employees be informed of this 
right. 

* Finally, regarding our recommendation to review and revise policy 
regarding coordination between the personnel security and human 
capital offices, DHS concurred, commenting that the DHS Office of the 
Chief Human Capital Officer concurs with the concept of facilitating 
coordination between the personnel security and human capital offices, 
and will assess the process to determine appropriate communication 
points and provide appropriate guidance. DHS established an estimated 
completion date of March 2015 for this action. Further, in its 
technical comments, DHS noted that this recommendation would be more 
appropriately directed to the DHS Under Secretary for Management, who 
oversees both the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer and the 
Office of the Chief Security Officer. As a result, we have modified 
the recipient of this recommendation as suggested. 

In its written comments, DOD fully concurred with all but one of our 
seven recommendations directed to it, and partially concurred with one 
of our recommendations. 

* First, with respect to our recommendation to ensure data are 
recorded and updated in JPAS and DOD's new systems, DOD concurred, 
stating that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence will incorporate monitoring of data fields pertaining to 
the personnel security clearance revocation and appeal process into 
its quarterly oversight of DOD Personnel Security Program metrics. 

* Regarding our two recommendations to revise Navy and Army guidance, 
respectively, about sharing information collected by the respective 
PSABs with the employee, DOD concurred with both recommendations. DOD 
commented that the Navy plans to issue interim guidance by October 1, 
2014, and issue the final revised Navy Manual by October 1, 2015. DOD 
further stated that the Army Regulation is under revision and will 
specify that the PSAB will provide any documents it obtains to the 
subject and allow a period of time for response. 

* With respect to our recommendation to review and revise policy 
regarding coordination between the personnel security and human 
capital offices, DOD concurred, stating that the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, with support from 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, will 
identify the way forward to review and revise policy and procedures 
regarding coordination between the personnel security and human 
capital offices as appropriate. 

* Finally, regarding our recommendation to review and analyze the 
discrepancies in the total number of employees and the number of 
employees eligible to access classified information, DOD concurred, 
commenting that within 30 days of the release of the final report, the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will convene 
a meeting of action officers and analysts to identify strategies for 
reviewing, analyzing, and resolving the discrepancies in the total 
number of employees and the number of employees eligible to access 
classified information. 

DOD partially concurred with our draft recommendation for the DOD 
General Counsel to resolve the disagreement about the legal authority 
to consolidate the PSABs and address any other obstacles to 
consolidation, and to implement the Secretary of Defense's direction 
to consolidate DOD's PSABs if there are no legal or other impediments 
to consolidation. DOD agreed with us to review legal or other 
impediments to consolidation, and stated that the DOD Office of 
General Counsel will address any unresolved disagreements about legal 
authority for consolidation of PSABs. DOD further commented that the 
DOD Office of General Counsel will work closely with the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to address other issues 
concerning consolidation of PSABs. However, DOD commented that some 
DOD components disagreed with PSAB consolidation. Specifically, DOD 
stated that of the eleven components that provided responses to the 
draft report, eight concurred or had no issues or comments, while the 
remaining three components noted that the PSABs should remain at the 
component level and not be consolidated. One of these three components 
also commented that the perceived efficiencies from consolidation 
described in our report should be validated and that all models for 
consolidation should be evaluated before a decision is made that would 
consolidate the PSABs. DOD's comments reflect internal disagreement, 
which corroborates our finding that there is disagreement within DOD 
on the legal authority, risks, and benefits of consolidating the 
department's multiple appeals boards. As we also note in our report, 
the Secretary of Defense has already directed this consolidation. 
However, in light of statements from some DOD officials that DOD needs 
to study the implications of moving to a consolidated appeal board to 
make an informed decision, we clarified our recommendation to clearly 
separate the two actions to be taken by the DOD General Counsel: first 
to resolve the disagreement about the legal authority for 
consolidation and address other obstacles, and second to take steps to 
implement the consolidation if there are no legal impediments and the 
other obstacles to consolidation can be addressed. We believe this 
language addresses the need for DOD to fully consider and resolve the 
components' concerns about consolidation. 

In its written comments, ODNI concurred with our two recommendations 
directed to it, for ODNI to develop performance measures and direct 
the collection of related revocation and appeals information, and to 
review whether the existing security clearance revocation process is 
the most efficient and effective approach. ODNI stated it established 
the Security Executive Agent National Assessment Program in April 2014 
to conduct oversight of personnel security processes across the 
Executive Branch. ODNI said that this program includes gathering and 
analyzing data to establish standard processes as appropriate and 
developing performance measures against those standards. ODNI further 
commented that DHS and DOD have implemented revocation processes in 
different ways, which warrant additional ODNI oversight of agency 
revocation policies. DOD also concurred with our recommendation 
directed to ODNI regarding development of performance measures and 
collection of related revocation and appeals information, stating that 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence would 
ensure that ODNI receives a copy and is made aware of this 
recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense, and the 
DNI. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

This report assesses the policies and practices that the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DOD) use when 
revoking personnel security clearances. The scope of our work focused 
on the revocation of personnel security clearances for federal 
civilian employees and military personnel within DHS and DOD, as well 
as federal government contractors. Known intelligence community 
military and civilian personnel and contractors were excluded from our 
scope, because they follow different processes and guidance than other 
DOD personnel. Table 5 provides a complete list of the agencies we 
contacted for our review. 

Table 5: Agencies Contacted during Review: 

Agency: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Officer; 
Associated offices and components: 
Office of the Chief Security Officer; 
Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Transportation Security Administration; 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; 
U.S. Coast Guard; 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection; 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

Agency: Department of Defense (DOD); 
Associated offices and components: 
Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; 
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals; 
Defense Security Service; 
Defense Manpower Data Center; 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility; 
Headquarters Department of the Army; 
Army Personnel Security Appeals Board; 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy; 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations; 
Navy Personnel Security Appeals Board; 
Headquarters Marine Corps; 
Headquarters Air Force; 
Air Force Personnel Security Appeal Board; 
Washington Headquarters Services. 

Agency: Office of the Director of National; Intelligence (ODNI). 

Source: GAO. GAO-14-640. 

To examine the extent to which DHS and DOD track data to oversee their 
revocation processes, and what these data show, we analyzed relevant 
executive orders and DHS and DOD personnel security clearance 
revocation policies to identify the extent to which they are required 
to maintain or report data and documentation on their security 
clearance revocation and appeals processes. We compared those 
requirements to leading practices, and assessed the extent that the 
policy requirements comply with these leading practices.[Footnote 79] 
In addition, we requested and obtained DHS and DOD personnel security 
clearance revocation and appeal data. 

Revocation data for DHS was provided by DHS's Office of the Chief 
Security Officer using its system for managing and standardizing 
personnel security processes and data, the Integrated Security 
Management System (ISMS). Personnel security records maintained in 
ISMS include suitability and security clearance investigations, which 
contain information related to background checks, investigations, and 
access determinations. The reported DHS security clearance revocation 
and appeals data include DHS military personnel and federal civilian 
employees within DHS Headquarters and the DHS operational components. 
DHS revocation cases for its contractor employees are processed by DOD 
and were not included in the DHS data. Although we requested data from 
fiscal years 2009 through 2013, DHS officials from Office of the Chief 
Security Officer could only provide revocation data for fiscal years 
2011through 2013, because not all of the DHS operational components 
had been using ISMS to manage personnel and administrative security 
case records until recently. DHS Headquarters migrated data from its 
legacy system into and began using ISMS in May 2008; Federal Emergency 
Management Agency migrated to ISMS in May 2009; U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection migrated in October 2009; U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement migrated in December 2009; U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services migrated in December 2009; U.S. Coast Guard 
migrated in July 2011; Transportation Security Administration migrated 
in December 2012; and U.S. Secret Service migrated in May 2013. 

To provide the revocation data we requested regarding the number of 
revocations and the reasons for the revocation under the adjudicative 
guidelines, DHS queried ISMS and then validated those results with 
each of its operational components. The components made changes to the 
ISMS data when they determined that the data entered into ISMS did not 
track with what they had tracked elsewhere. DHS officials said that 
the differences were likely based on data entry and system use issues. 
The total number of revocation cases and the total number of 
revocation cases that went to the Security Appeals Board represents 
DHS military and civilian employees' revocation cases that were closed 
in that particular fiscal year. We found that the total number of 
cases where a revocation proceeding was initiated could be higher 
because ISMS does not track cases where a person separated from the 
agency before a final decision was made on a proposal to revoke a 
personnel security clearance. In addition, the total number of 
military and civilian employees eligible to access classified 
information represents a current snapshot in time as ISMS does not 
track historical security clearance numbers. To corroborate the 
accuracy of the ISMS total number of DHS employees eligible to access 
classified information at each component, we compared this information 
to the total number of employees at six DHS components (U.S. Coast 
Guard, Transportation Security Administration, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection). We found that in all six components, the total number of 
employees was greater than the number of employees eligible to access 
classified information, as not all DHS employees need eligibility for 
access. 

Furthermore, while we requested DHS data on the number of employees 
that filed an initial appeal and the average amount of time it takes 
to complete a revocation case, these data were not available. 
Officials from the Office of the Chief Security Officer told us that 
ISMS has a module, called the Appeals Case, that could provide 
information about the number of initial appeals, but because use of 
this module is not required, only a few DHS components use it. 
Furthermore, officials from the Office of the Chief Security Officer 
told us that ISMS cannot track case timeliness data as a whole across 
the DHS components, because each appeal level would be saved as a 
different appeals case module entry, but the officials explained that 
they could determine this information for a particular case by looking 
at the individual ISMS records. We analyzed the DHS revocation data 
and supporting documentation, and discussed its reliability with DHS 
officials, and found the data to be sufficiently reliable to report on 
the number of employees whose personnel security clearance was revoked 
in DHS, and the reasons for the revocations. 

Revocation data for DOD military and federal civilian personnel and 
for industry or contractor personnel government-wide was provided by 
the Defense Manpower Data Center from DOD's Joint Personnel 
Adjudication System (JPAS), which is DOD's system of record for 
personnel security management to record and document personnel 
security actions. DOD security clearance revocation and appeals data 
include military personnel and federal civilian employees within the 
military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and the 
defense agencies (referred to as Washington Headquarters Services). 
Data for government-wide contractors (also referred as industry 
personnel) is collectively grouped as one entity because Defense 
Manpower Data Center officials informed us that data on contractor 
personnel do not indicate the agency with which an individual's 
contract is associated. We met with officials from the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (the administrator of JPAS) to discuss the approach for 
our data request and to get their feedback. We requested JPAS data 
extracts showing the total number of persons eligible to access 
classified information, the number of security clearance revocations, 
the reasons for a revocation decision, the number of appeals, the 
number of favorable and unfavorable appeal decisions, the type of 
appeal selected by the individual (personal appearance or in writing), 
and the time values at different intervals of the revocation and 
appeal process. We requested that all of these data be broken out by 
each DOD component for DOD military personnel, DOD federal civilian 
employees, and government-wide contractor employees for fiscal years 
2009 through 2013. 

Furthermore, while we requested DOD data on the number of employees 
that filed an appeal, appeal outcomes, and the average amount of time 
it takes to complete a revocation case, these data were not available. 
Although there are fields in JPAS where this information can be 
recorded, we found that these fields were not consistently being used 
in JPAS. Defense Manpower Data Center officials initially provided 
mock-ups of the data request that excluded these data fields or left 
them blank. When we asked about this, Defense Manpower Data Center 
officials stated that it is their agency's practice not to provide 
information from data fields with less than 50 percent fill rates. We 
asked that Defense Manpower Data Center to provide all the requested 
data along with an additional worksheet to show the data fill rate 
percentage, so we could report on the extent that these data fields 
had not been used. 

To corroborate the accuracy of the JPAS revocation data for DOD 
military and civilian employees, we asked DOD officials from the DOD 
Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) to provide us with the 
number of revocations processed by their adjudicators for the military 
departments' military and civilian employees for fiscal years 2009 
through 2013. We compared the JPAS data received from Defense Manpower 
Data Center with the data provided by the DOD CAF and we found that 
the data did not match. We determined that the discrepancy with the 
DOD CAF data was likely caused by a difference in the periods and 
populations included in the counts. 

To corroborate the accuracy of the JPAS revocation data for contractor 
personnel, and data regarding the personal appearance for DOD military 
and civilian employees, we asked DOD officials from Defense Office of 
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) to provide information on the number of 
contractor hearings and appeals performed, and their outcomes, for 
fiscal years 2009 through 2013 and the number of personal appearances 
for DOD military and civilian employees and their outcomes for fiscal 
years 2009 through 2013. We compared the JPAS data received from the 
Defense Manpower Data Center with the data provided by DOHA and we 
found that the data did not match. We determined that the discrepancy 
with the contractor data from DOHA was a result of the inclusion of 
clearance denials, which the DOHA database was unable to separate from 
clearance revocations. Security clearance denials were not part of the 
scope of this review. We analyzed the DOD revocation data and 
supporting documentation, and discussed their reliability with DOD 
officials, and found the data to be sufficiently reliable to report on 
the number of military personnel and federal civilian employees and 
contractors whose personnel security clearances were revoked in DOD, 
and the reasons for the revocations. 

To examine the extent to which DHS and DOD consistently implemented 
government-wide requirements in their revocation processes, we 
obtained and reviewed the policies and procedures DHS, DOD, and their 
components use when revoking an employee's access to classified 
information, interviewed DHS and DOD officials about whether these 
processes are being uniformly applied within each department and 
across the departments, and discussed the officials' suggestions for 
improving the revocation process. In addition, we reviewed Executive 
Orders 12968 and 10865, which establish the overall process for 
revoking an employee's security clearance, to identify agency and 
employee rights and responsibilities during the clearance revocation 
process. We then analyzed DHS and DOD template or redacted sample 
communication letters sent to employees during the revocation and 
appeal process by each component within DHS and DOD to determine 
whether they provide employees notice of their security clearance 
revocation rights and responsibilities under Executive Orders 12968 
and 10865. Two analysts independently reviewed and assessed the DHS 
and DOD communication letters to determine whether they contain the 14 
key rights and responsibilities for military, civilian, and contractor 
employees provided by Executive Order 12968 and the three additional 
rights for contractor employees provided by Executive Order 10865. 
[Footnote 80] For DHS military and civilian employees, we reviewed the 
Notice of Determination, the Notice of Review, and the Security 
Appeals Board decision letter. For DOD military and civilian 
employees, we reviewed the Statement of Reasons, the Letter of 
Revocation, and the PSAB decision letter. For contractor employees 
government-wide, we reviewed a Statement of Reasons, the 
administrative judge's decision letter, and the DOHA Appeal Board 
decision letter. The analysts then compared their results to identify 
any disagreements and reached agreement on all items through 
discussion. We reviewed processes for civilian and military personnel 
within DHS and DOD, excluding the intelligence community, and for 
industry or contractor personnel that are part of the 23 executive-
branch agencies that follow the DOD guidance and process. 

Additionally, we interviewed officials from DHS, DOD, and their 
respective components to discuss (1) how they are following their 
policies, (2) how employee rights and responsibilities factor into the 
security clearance revocations process, and (3) how and under what 
circumstances they communicate with employees who are subject to the 
security clearance revocation process. When we identified 
discrepancies in following policies or communicating with employees, 
we contacted appropriate DHS and DOD officials to determine the 
reasons for such discrepancies and their potential effect. We also met 
with DHS, DOD, and ODNI officials to discuss the oversight they 
provide over executive-branch agencies' personnel security revocation 
processes, their suggestions for building quality into the revocation 
process, and whether there are currently any metrics or reporting 
requirements related to personnel security clearance revocations. 

To examine the extent to which DHS's and DOD's respective human 
capital and personnel security clearance revocation policies enable 
the departments to determine the employment status of their federal 
civilian and military employees subject to revocation in a consistent 
manner, we analyzed department-level and component level DHS and DOD 
human capital guidance--specifically their respective guidance for 
misconduct, discipline, and adverse actions, such as a table of 
penalties[Footnote 81]--and personnel security guidance. We assessed 
the extent that this guidance could be used to systematically 
determine what actions the agencies should take regarding the 
employment status of individuals subject to the clearance revocation 
and appeals processes, and what employment actions, such as 
reassignment or separation, are typically taken if an employee's 
personnel security clearance is revoked. In addition, we assessed the 
extent to which the different sources of guidance are linked or are 
cross-referenced, and assessed what communication is required to take 
place between an agency's personnel security office and human capital 
office during the course of a clearance revocation proceeding. We also 
interviewed human capital officials at DHS, DOD, and their components 
to obtain their perspectives on the extent that DHS and DOD's human 
capital practices regarding the employment status of individuals 
subject to revocation are linked to and aligned with personnel 
security policies related to security clearance revocation, and the 
extent that there is communication between an agency's personnel 
security office and a human capital office during the course of a 
clearance revocation proceeding. 

In addition, we analyzed DHS's, DOD's, and the components' guidance to 
determine whether the departments required tracking of any data 
regarding the employment outcomes of individuals whose personnel 
security clearances were revoked. We also discussed with DHS and DOD 
officials what data regarding employment outcomes were available at 
the department and component level. For this objective, within DHS, we 
focused on the three DHS components that had the largest number of 
personnel security clearance revocations from fiscal years 2011 
through 2013, which were the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Secret Service. Within DOD, our review 
included the headquarters-level elements of the Departments of the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Marine Corps, and the 
Washington Headquarters Services. Contractor personnel were not 
included in the scope of this objective, as the human capital policies 
applicable to contractors would be those of their private-sector 
employers. 

To assess whether DOD's personnel security management system 
accurately reports the total number of DOD employees eligible for 
access to classified information, we compared the total number of DOD 
employees eligible for access to classified information reported by 
DOD's personnel security management system to the total number of DOD 
employees in each component. To corroborate the accuracy of the JPAS 
total number of military and federal civilian employees eligible to 
access classified information, we compared this information with total 
military personnel end strength and civilian personnel full-time 
equivalents from the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller's National 
Defense Budget Estimates (Green Book). We assumed that the total 
number of military and civilian employees in each component should be 
higher than the total number of military and civilian employees who 
were eligible to access classified information, because not all DOD 
employees should be required to have clearance eligibility. However, 
we found that the total number of military and civilian employees 
eligible to access classified information in fiscal year 2013 as 
reported by JPAS was higher than the total number of military and 
civilian employees listed in the fiscal 2013 military personnel end 
strength and civilian personnel full-time equivalent data found in the 
DOD Green Book. We met with officials from Defense Manpower Data 
Center to discuss the discrepancies. Regarding the disparity in the 
revocation data, the Defense Manpower Data Center officials stated 
that they could not speak for the accuracy of the data derived from 
the Green Book, since full-time equivalents would undercount the total 
number of individuals employed, due to issues such as two part-time 
individuals occupying one full-time position. As a result, they 
believed that it would not be appropriate to compare these data 
against the total number of persons eligible to access classified 
information. DMDC officials subsequently agreed to provide us with 
counts for the total numbers of DOD active-duty and reserve military 
personnel and federal civilian employees for fiscal year 2013. 

To determine the total number of DOD active-duty military personnel 
who were employed at any time in each active component during fiscal 
year 2013, data were taken from the Automated Extract of Active Duty 
Military Personnel Records. DMDC calculated the total number of active-
duty military personnel by adding the totals from all 12 monthly files 
for fiscal year 2013 that were counted and reported as part of 
official active component strength.[Footnote 82] After combining the 
12 files, duplicate personnel were dropped based on Social Security 
number and service. This methodology could potentially double-count 
individuals if someone transferred from one active service to another 
active service (e.g., if an individual transferred from active duty in 
the Army to active duty in the Navy). 

To determine the total number of DOD reserve personnel who were 
employed at any time in each component during fiscal year 2013, data 
for reserve personnel were taken from the Reserve Components Common 
Personnel Data System. Reserve personnel data includes all Reserve 
categories in the Reserve and National Guard (Ready Reserve, Standby 
Reserve, and Retired Reserve). DMDC calculated the total number of 
reserve personnel by adding the totals of all members of the reserve 
components from all 12 monthly files for fiscal year 2013.[Footnote 
83] After combining the 12 files, duplicate personnel were dropped 
based on Social Security number and service. 

To determine the total number of DOD federal civilian employees who 
were employed at any time in each component during fiscal year 2013, 
data for federal civilian personnel were taken from the Appropriated 
Fund Civilians data files. DMDC calculated the total number of federal 
civilian employees by adding the totals from all 12 monthly files for 
fiscal year 2013 that were counted and reported on direct-hire 
civilians paid exclusively from DOD appropriated funds, which includes 
full-time permanent and non-full-time permanent employees.[Footnote 
84] After combining the 12 files, duplicate personnel were dropped 
based on Social Security number and service. This methodology could 
potentially double-count individuals if someone transferred from one 
agency to another agency (e.g., if an individual transferred from an 
Army civilian position to a Navy civilian position). 

Using these total employee counts, we still found that the number of 
DOD employees who were eligible to access classified information in 
five components exceeded the actual number of DOD employees in those 
components. Regarding the disparity in the revocation data, Defense 
Manpower Data Center officials stated that JPAS completeness and 
accuracy of the data is dependent on the users entering the data. They 
further stated that information in JPAS may not reflect the loss of 
personnel--due to changes such as retirements, employee job transfer, 
and deaths--in the different agencies in DOD, because the department's 
personnel centers can only send in separation dates for their 
personnel for a limited period and the personnel centers may not enter 
or correct an employee's status during this period. As a result, we 
did not find the JPAS data on the number of current military personnel 
and federal civilian employees and contractors who are eligible to 
access classified information to be reliable. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to September 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

August 5, 2014: 

Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-14-640, "Personnel Security Clearances: Additional
Guidance and Oversight Needed at DHS and DOD to Ensure Consistent 
Application of Revocation Process" 

Dear Ms. Farrell: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

DHS is pleased to note GAO's recognition that the Department has taken 
steps to improve the quality of the security clearance revocation 
process. DHS appreciates GAO's detailed discussion of the revocation 
process and understands the importance of establishing guidance and 
oversight of such processes. In particular, DHS notes GAO's 
responsiveness to agency comments throughout the audit and commends 
its attention to detail in capturing the nuance and challenges 
inherent to personnel security. DHS remains committed to continuing to 
improve its personnel security processes and procedures. 

The draft report contained four recommendations for DHS, with which 
the Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security: 

Recommendation 1: Direct the Chief Security Officer to assess the 
benefits and associated costs of tracking additional revocation and 
appeals information, and take any steps necessary to modify ISMS to 
track such information as is deemed beneficial. 

Response: Concur. The DHS Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) 
uses the Integrated Security Management System (ISMS) to track 
specific information on security clearance revocations and appeals. 
OCSO will conduct a review to consider what additional data would be 
valuable for collection as well as the technical and usage 
requirements of such a change. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): 
December 31, 2014. 

Recommendation 2: Direct the Chief Security Officer to revise and 
finalize its instruction to clarify whether or not employees are 
allowed to cross-examine witnesses during the personal appearance. 

Response: Concur. OCSO has revised its personnel security instruction 
with unambiguous language on cross-examination of witnesses during the 
appeals process personal appearance. The instruction is in the final 
stages of review and will be issued by the end of the year. ECD: 
December 31, 2014. 

Recommendation 3: Direct the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, to revise 
the U.S. Coast Guard Instruction for military personnel to specify 
that military personnel may be represented by counselor other 
representative at their own expense. 

Response: Concur. The U.S. Coast Guard has already taken steps to 
implement this recommendation. Effective 2013, the Deputy Commandant 
for Mission Support no longer restricts military personnel from 
employing legal counsel. Pending the update of Commandant Instruction
5520.12C on Personnel Security, this was communicated in an interim 
memorandum dated May 15, 2014, advising that "individuals may have 
counselor other representative present at the second level review at 
the member's own expense. Members are responsible for providing a 
signed statement designating such representation, as consent to such 
presence." We believe these actions fulfill the intent of the 
recommendation and request that it be closed as implemented. 

Recommendation 4: Direct the Chief Human Capital Officer, in 
consultation with the Chief Security Officer, to review and revise 
policy regarding coordination between the personnel security and human 
capital offices to clarify what information can and should be 
communicated between human capital and personnel security officials at 
specified decision points in the revocation process, and when that 
information should be communicated. 

Response: Concur. The DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer 
concurs with the concept of facilitating coordination between the 
personnel security and human capital offices and will assess the 
process to determine appropriate communication points and provide 
appropriate guidance. ECD: March 31, 2015. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Intelligence: 
5000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, Dc 20301-5000: 

August 20, 2014: 

Ms. Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Farrell: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report. GAO-14-640, "Personnel 
Security Clearances: Additional Guidance and Oversight Needed at DRS 
and DoD to Ensure Consistent Application of Revocation Process," dated 
July 9, 2014 (GAO Code 351813)." The enclosure provides the DoD 
responses to the specific recommendations in the report. 

DoD components concurred or stated no issues with all but one of the 
recommendations of the report. The one exception pertained to 
consolidation of personnel security appeals boards (PSABs) within the 
DoD. While some DoD Components disagreed with PSAB consolidation,
they did agree with - or did not object to - the GAO's recommendation 
for a review of legal or other impediments to consolidation. 

My point of contact for this effort is Dr. Kelly Buck, (703) 604-1130 or
kelly.r.buck2.civ@mail.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael G. Vickers: 

Attachments: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report Dated July 9, 2014: 
GAO-14-640 (GAO Code 351813): 

“Personnel Security Clearances: Additional Guidance And Oversight 
Needed At DHS and DOD To Ensure Consistent Application Of Revocation 
Process” 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: To help ensure that the DoD data systems contain
sufficiently complete and accurate information to facilitate effective 
oversight of the personnel security clearance revocation and appeal 
process, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) to take steps to ensure that data 
is recorded and updated in JPAS and the department's new systems, so
that the relevant fields are filled. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (OUSD(I)) will incorporate monitoring of data fields 
pertaining to the personnel security clearance revocation and appeal 
process into its quarterly oversight of DoD Personnel Security Program 
metrics. 

Recommendation 2: To help ensure independence and the efficient use of
resources, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the DoD 
General Counsel to resolve the disagreement about the legal authority 
to consolidate the PSABs and, in collaboration with the PSABs and the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, address any other 
obstacles to consolidating DOD's PSABs. If the General Counsel 
determines that there are no legal or other impediments to 
consolidation, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Defense Legal Services Agency to take steps to implement the Secretary 
of Defense's direction to consolidate DOD's PSABs. 

DoD Response: Partially Concur. Of the eleven components that provided
responses to the draft report, eight concurred or had no issues or 
comments. Of the remaining three Components, two respondents non-
concurred, and one took a similar view. One non-concurred for the 
following reason: PSABs conducted under the authority of the Head of 
an Intelligence Community Element (HICE) should remain under the 
operation and control of that particular agency and not consolidated 
into a single PSAB. This component believes that consolidation would 
prevent the HICE from exercising its authority to render final 
eligibility determinations in support of unique mission requirements.
Another response supported the recommended DoD General Counsel review 
of authorities that govern the establishment of PSABs within DoD. They 
also stated, however, that even if such a review resulted in a 
conclusion that law and policy would not preclude the consolidation of 
DoD PSABs, this component would not support it because they believe 
their PSAB must maintain the authority to exercise this important risk-
based determination. A third response noted that PSABs should remain 
at the component level, but also stated that the perceived 
efficiencies from consolidation described in the report should be 
validated and that all models for consolidation should be evaluated 
before a decision is made that would consolidate the PSAB within the 
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals. All other coordinators, 
concurred with this recommendation as written or had no comments. The 
DoD Office of General Counsel will address any unresolved 
disagreements about legal authority for consolidation of PSABs and
will work closely with USD(I) to address other issues concerning 
consolidation of PSABs. 

Recommendation 3: To help ensure that all employees within DoD receive 
the same rights during the revocation process, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise 
Secretary of the Navy Manual M-5510.30 to specify that any information 
collected by the Navy PSAB from the employee's command will be shared 
with the employee, who will also be given the opportunity to respond to
any such information provided. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Navy plans to issue interim guidance by
October 1, 2014. They expect to issue the final revised Navy Manual M-
5510.30 by October 1, 2015. 

Recommendation 4: To help ensure that all employees within DoD receive 
the same rights during the revocation process, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to revise Army 
Regulation 380-67 to specify that any information collected by the 
Army PSAB from the employee's command or by the Army PSAB itself will 
be shared with the employee, who will also be given the opportunity to
respond to any such information provided. 

DoD Response: Concur. Army Regulation 380-67, Army Personnel Security
Program, is under revision, and will specify that the PSAB will 
provide any documents it obtains after receipt of the personnel 
security file to the subject and allow the subject a period of time to 
respond to such information prior to rendering a PSAB decision. 

Recommendation 5: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take the
following action: To facilitate department-wide review and assessment 
of the quality of the personnel security clearance revocation process, 
GAO recommends that the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, 
develop performance measures to better enable them to identify and 
resolve problems, and direct the collection of related revocation and 
appeals information. 

DoD Response: Concur. As soon as the GAO final report is released, the
OUSD(I) will ensure that the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence receives a copy and is made aware of this recommendation. 

Recommendation 6: To facilitate coordination between personnel 
security and human capital offices regarding how a security clearance 
revocation should affect an employee's employment status, and to help 
ensure that individuals are treated in a fair and consistent manner, 
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), to review and revise 
policy regarding coordination between the personnel security and human 
capital offices to clarify what information can and should be 
communicated between human capital and personnel security officials at
specified decision points in the revocation process, and when that 
information should be communicated. 

DoD Response: Concur. Upon release of the final GAO report, OUSD(P&R),
with OUSD(I)'s support, will identify the way forward for reviewing 
and revising policy and procedures, as appropriate, to ensure that 
individuals are treated in a fair and consistent manner. 

Recommendation 7: To help ensure that the DNI report to Congress 
contains accurate data about the number of current DOD military and 
federal civilian employees eligible to access classified information, 
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness to review and analyze the discrepancies in 
the total number of employees and the number of employees eligible to 
access classified information, and take immediate steps to address the 
problems. 

DoD Response: Concur. Within 30 days of the release of the final GAO
report, OUSD(I) will convene a meeting of action officers and analysts 
from both organizations to identify strategies for reviewing, 
analyzing, and resolving the discrepancies, as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence: 

Office of The Director of National Intelligence: 
Washington, DC 20511: 

August 8, 2014: 

Ms. Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Farrell: 

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) appreciates 
the opportunity to respond to the Government Accountability Office's 
(GAO) draft report, Personnel Security Clearances: Additional Guidance 
and Oversight Needed at DRS and DOD to Ensure Consistent Application 
of Revocation Process (GAO-14-640). GAO recommended that the ODNI, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DoD), 
take several actions to improve data quality and oversight related to 
the personnel security revocation process. As GAO notes, DHS and DoD 
have implemented security revocation processes in different ways which 
warrant additional ODNI oversight of agency revocation policies as 
well as collection of related metrics. We concur with GAO's formal 
recommendations for ODNI action. 

The DNI, as Security Executive Agent, established the Security 
Executive Agent National Assessment Program (SNAP) in April 2014 to 
conduct oversight of personnel security processes across the Executive 
Branch. As a first step, the DNI has requested baseline data from
agencies on personnel security clearance related processes. SNAP 
consists of annual agency self-assessments, on-site visits by the 
program office, and analysis of the data gathered. It complements the 
collection and analysis of security clearance performance metrics in 
place since 2008. Data gathered will be analyzed to establish standard 
processes as appropriate and to develop performance measures against 
these standards. 

We have also enclosed technical comments on the draft GAO report from 
our National Counterintelligence Executive for your consideration. If 
you require additional information, please contact the Office of 
Legislative Affairs at (703) 275-2474. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Deirdre M. Walsh: 
Director of Legislative Affairs: 

Enclosure: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Margaret A. Best (Assistant 
Director), Renee S. Brown, Grace Coleman, Sara Cradic, Randy DeLeon, 
Cynthia Grant, Mary Jo LaCasse, Amie Lesser, David E. Moser, Kelly 
Rubin, and Michael Willems made major contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Personnel Security Clearances: Actions Needed to Ensure Quality of 
Background Investigations and Resulting Decisions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-138T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
11, 2014. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Actions Needed to Help Ensure Correct 
Designations of National Security Positions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-139T]. Washington, D.C.: November 
20, 2013. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to Improve Quality 
Throughout the Process. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-186T]. Washington, D.C.: November 
13, 2013. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Full Development and Implementation of 
Metrics Needed to Measure Quality of Process. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-157T]. Washington, D.C.: October 
31, 2013. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the 
Process and Realize Efficiencies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-728T]. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 
2013. 

Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority 
Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-174]. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 
2013. 

Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for 
Determining Civilian Position Requirements. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-800]. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 
2012. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Continuing Leadership and Attention Can 
Enhance Momentum Gained from Reform Effort. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-815T]. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 
2012. 

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 
Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-342SP]. Washington, D.C.: February 
28, 2012. 

Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to 
Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-197]. Washington, D.C.: February 
28, 2012. 

GAO's 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-394T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
17, 2011. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278]. Washington, D.C.: February 
16, 2011. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to 
Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-232T]. Washington, D.C.: December 
1, 2010. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve 
Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-65]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 19, 2010. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress 
on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-185T]. Washington, D.C.: November 
16, 2010. 

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and 
Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide 
Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-117T]. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 
2009. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays 
but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform 
Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-684T]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009. 

Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed 
to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-488]. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 
2009. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete 
Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further 
Improve the Clearance Process. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400]. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 
2009. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January 
2009. 

Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint 
Reform Efforts to Improve the Government wide Clearance Eligibility 
Process. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1050T]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008. 

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance 
Process. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-776T]. 
Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008. 

Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD's 
Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-551T]. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 
2008. 

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform 
Security Clearance Processes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-352T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
27, 2008. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts 
to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-470T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
13, 2008. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More 
Informed Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-350]. Washington, D.C.: February 
13, 2008. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found 
for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-842T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 
2007. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310]. Washington, D.C.: January 
2007. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve 
the Security Clearance Process. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1070]. Washington, D.C.: September 
28, 2006. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances 
for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-748T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 
2006. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments 
Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-747T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 
2006. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing 
Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-233T]. Washington, D.C.: November 
9, 2005. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles 
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk 
Designation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-842T]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207]. Washington, D.C.: January 
2005. 

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs 
and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry 
Personnel. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-202T]. 
Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] We have conducted a large body of work on issues related to the 
personnel security clearance process going back over a decade. For 
more information about GAO's past work on personnel security 
clearances, please see the list of related GAO products at the end of 
this report. 

[2] Executive Order 13467 appointed the Deputy Director for Management 
at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as the Chair of the 
Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council. 
Executive Order 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for 
Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and 
Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information 
(June 30, 2008). This council is responsible for, among other things, 
ensuring the alignment of security and suitability investigative and 
adjudicative processes, holding agencies accountable for 
implementation of these processes, and establishing annual goals and 
progress metrics on results. 

[3] Determinations of suitability for government employment in 
positions in the competitive service, certain positions in the 
excepted service, and for career appointment in the Senior Executive 
Service include consideration of aspects of individuals' character or 
conduct that may have an effect on the integrity or efficiency of the 
service. 

[4] Office of Management and Budget, Suitability and Security 
Processes Review: Report to the President (February 2014). 

[5] Department of Defense, Internal Review of the Washington Navy Yard 
Shooting: A Report to the Secretary of Defense (Nov. 20, 2013); 
Security From Within: Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard 
Shooting (November 2013). 

[6] For example, a DOD continuous evaluation pilot program found that 
3 percent of the cases in the pilot had serious derogatory information 
that resulted in a revocation or suspension of a security clearance. 

[7] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-458, § 3001 (2004) (codified as amended in relevant part at 
50 U.S.C. § 3341). 

[8] For purposes of this report, references to revocation of an 
employee's security clearance means revocation of an employee's 
eligibility to access classified information. 

[9] For purposes of this report, references to contractors government-
wide means contractors for DOD or one of the 27 other federal agencies 
that follow DOD guidance and processes because the Secretary of 
Defense has entered into agreements for them to adhere to the DOD 
guidance for their contractor workforces. 

[10] Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information (Aug. 2, 
1995, as amended); Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information Within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960, as amended). 

[11] Executive Order 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability 
for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and 
Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information 
(June 30, 2008). 

[12] DHS's current organizational structure includes a headquarters 
component comprised of directorates and other offices that provide 
resources, analysis, equipment, research, policy development, and 
support to its seven operational components: the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency; Transportation Security Administration; U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services; U.S Coast Guard; U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and 
U.S. Secret Service. 

[13] The National Industrial Security Program was established by 
Executive Order 12829 to safeguard classified information that is 
released outside of federal agencies, for example, to contractors. 
Executive Order 12829, National Industrial Security Program (Jan. 6, 
1993). The Secretary of Defense has entered into agreements with 27 
departments and agencies for the purpose of rendering industrial 
security services. One such industrial security service is provided by 
the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, which provides 
adjudications, hearings, and appeals of security clearance cases for 
private-sector employees (contractors) working in the National 
Industrial Security Program. 

[14] Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information (Aug. 2, 
1995, as amended). 

[15] Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within 
Industry (Feb. 20, 1960, as amended). 

[16] DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-007, The Department of Homeland 
Security Personnel Suitability and Security Program (June 2009), 
Chapter 6. 

[17] For example, see U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of 
Internal Affairs, Personnel Security Division, HB1400-07A, Personnel 
Security Handbook (August 2011); U.S. Secret Service, Human Resources 
and Training Manual, Section RPS-02 (02): Suspension, Denial, or 
Revocation of Access to Classified Information-Interim Procedures (May 
30, 2003); U.S. Coast Guard COMDTINST M5520.12C, Personnel Security 
and Suitability Program (Mar. 18, 2010). 

[18] DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program (January 
1987, incorporating administrative change Feb. 23, 1996). This 
regulation is being revised, and DOD officials stated that it will be 
replaced by a two-volume DOD manual, which is currently in draft. The 
DOD directive that this regulation had implemented has recently been 
reissued as a DOD instruction. See DOD Instruction 5200.02, DOD 
Personnel Security Program (Mar. 21, 2014), cancelling DOD Directive 
5200.2, DOD Personnel Security Program (Apr. 9, 1999). 

[19] DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (Jan. 2, 1992, incorporating administrative 
change Apr. 20, 1999) as modified by Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence Memorandum, Implementation of Adjudicative Guidelines for 
Determining Eligibility For Access to Classified Information (Aug. 30, 
2006). 

[20] DOD Manual 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program 
Operating Manual (Feb. 28, 2006, incorporating change Mar. 28, 2013). 

[21] Army Regulation 380-67, Personnel Security Program (Aug. 4, 
2011); Secretary of the Navy Manual M-5510.30, Department of the Navy 
Personnel Security Program (June 2006); Air Force Instruction 31-501, 
Personnel Security Program Management (Jan. 27, 2005, incorporating 
through change 2, Nov. 29, 2012); Washington Headquarters Services 
Administrative Instruction 23, Personnel Security Program and Civilian 
Personnel Suitability Investigation Program (Dec. 20, 2006). 

[22] The adjudicative guidelines base security clearance decisions 
upon consideration of the following 13 areas: allegiance to the United 
States; foreign influence; foreign preference; sexual behavior; 
personal conduct; financial considerations; alcohol consumption; drug 
involvement; psychological conditions; criminal conduct; handling 
protected information; outside activities; and use of information 
technology systems. 

[23] If an employee resigns after a revocation has been proposed but 
prior to a revocation decision, DOD officials said that for 
contractors and DOD personnel, the DOD personnel security clearance 
database should show an eligibility status called "Loss of 
Jurisdiction." Such designation would notify other agencies that the 
employee has undetermined status for access to classified information, 
according to ODNI officials. DHS officials said that DHS's personnel 
security clearance database would change the eligibility status of an 
employee if the employee's clearance was suspended prior to a 
revocation decision. If the clearance was not suspended prior to a 
revocation decision, then there would not be a change in eligibility 
in the DHS database that would notify other agencies that a DHS 
employee may have an unresolved issue unless a DHS security specialist 
manually inserts a message such as "please call." 

[24] Office of Management and Budget, Suitability and Security 
Processes Review: Report to the President (February 2014). 

[25] Position sensitivity codes determine what type of security 
investigation is required and how closely an individual is screened 
for a position. These codes are determined by the position 
designation, which is an overall assessment that involves 
consideration of the position's duties and responsibilities as they 
affect specific programs, national security interests, and operations 
within the Coast Guard. 

[26] Coast Guard officials explained that they did not have an 
accurate way of counting which clearances were administratively 
removed versus which were revoked for cause without doing a manual 
review of all of the revocation cases. They stated that a Coast Guard 
trend analysis supported that the number of revocations for cause in 
fiscal year 2013 was similar to the number of revocations in fiscal 
years 2011 and 2012. 

[27] The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-259, § 367 (2010) (codified in relevant part at 50 U.S.C. § 
3104), established a requirement that the President annually report to 
Congress the percentage of reviews during the preceding fiscal year 
that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance for 
each element of the intelligence community. However, this reporting 
requirement does not apply to executive-branch agencies outside of the 
intelligence community, such as the nonintelligence components within 
DOD and DHS. Our review excluded known intelligence community military 
and civilian personnel and contractors. 

[28] GAO, Assessing the Reliability of Computer-Processed Data, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-680G] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2009), and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 
Government Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996), pp. 24, 27. 

[29] JPAS is used by the military departments, defense agencies, and 
industry to manage employee eligibility for access to classified 
information and is managed by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). 
DMDC is a component of the DOD Human Resources Activity, which is 
under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

[30] 76 Fed. Reg. 24863 (May 3, 2011). DMDC officials stated that a 
new draft system of record notice for JPAS has been developed, but has 
not yet been approved for publication. 

[31] In an April 2009 memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence designated the Army's case management system as the DOD 
non-intelligence community system for case management and 
adjudication, and identified it as the preferred solution for 
receiving investigations and performing initial adjudications. 
However, this memorandum only designates this system for performing 
initial adjudications, and does not specify where adjudication appeals 
information should be recorded. Moreover, this memorandum precedes the 
May 2011 JPAS system of record designation, which states that JPAS 
includes records documenting the personnel security adjudicative and 
management process. DOD CAF officials explained that the different 
versions of the case management systems will be replaced by a single 
case management system by the end of fiscal year 2014. 

[32] DOD, Internal Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting, p. 41. 

[33] Department of Defense, Inspector General, An Assessment of 
Contractor Personnel Security Clearance Processes in the Four Defense 
Intelligence Agencies, DODIG-2014-060 (Apr. 14, 2014), p. 4. 

[34] DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program, Appendices 
12 and 13, sections 12.1.8 and 13.1.6 respectively (January 1987, 
incorporating administrative change Feb. 23, 1996). 

[35] Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum, Amendment 
to DOD Regulation 5200.2-R to Delete Bar on Witnesses (Nov. 19, 2007). 

[36] DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-007, The Department of Homeland 
Security Personnel Suitability and Security Program (June 2009). 

[37] DOD guidance provides for the establishment of eight PSABs: Army, 
Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Agency, 
Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington Headquarters Services, and 
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals. DOD Regulation 5200.2-R. The 
scope of our review excluded the intelligence community (National 
Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency) and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 

[38] GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, 
Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-342SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb, 28, 2012). 

[39] Security clearance appeals boards are also referred to as 
Personnel Security Appeal Boards (PSAB). 

[40] The Defense Legal Services Agency is one of the defense agencies, 
and is under the authority, direction, and control of the General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense, who serves as the agency's 
Director. The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals is the largest 
component of the Defense Legal Services Agency. 

[41] 10 U.S.C. § 113. 

[42] See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b). 

[43] DOD Instruction 5200.02, DOD Personnel Security Program (Mar. 21, 
2014). 

[44] In this context, reciprocity means that executive-branch agencies 
must accept a background investigation or personnel security clearance 
determination completed by any authorized investigative or 
adjudicative agency, subject to certain exceptions. See The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, § 3001 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3341). 

[45] Secretary of the Navy Manual M-5510.30, Department of the Navy 
Personnel Security Program (June 2006), Chapter 8, § 8-5.3.i and 8-
5.4.d (pages 8-11, 8-12), For cases where the individual elects a 
personal appearance, the guidance states that "commands are strongly 
encouraged to submit a position paper directly to the (Navy) Personnel 
Security Appeal Board." For cases where the individual elects to 
appeal directly in writing to the PSAB, the guidance states that 
"Commands will provide a command perspective by submitting an 
endorsement to the individual's written appeal." 

[46] DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program (January 
1987, incorporating administrative change Feb. 23, 1996). 

[47] Army Regulation 380-67, Personnel Security Program, Chapter 8, § 
8-6(b)(4) (August 2011). 

[48] Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant's 
Instruction M5520.12C, Personnel Security and Suitability Program, 
Chapter 3, § P.1 (Change 1 Mar. 18, 2010). 

[49] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 
Adequacy of USSS Efforts to Identify, Mitigate, and Address Instances 
of Misconduct and Inappropriate Behavior (Redacted), OIG-14-20 
(December 2013). 

[50] The Assistant Chief of the Secret Service Uniformed Division is 
responsible for ensuring fairness in the administration of procedures 
with regard to discipline, and sees every discipline case and engages 
in discussions with his subordinates about what discipline should be 
proposed. 

[51] DHS Instruction Handbook 121-01-007, The Department of Homeland 
Security Personnel Suitability and Security Program (June 18, 2009). 
All members of the board over the last 10 years have been Secret 
Service employees and thus were involved with the appeals cases of 
Secret Service employees. Nearly 30 percent (15 of 50) of the DHS 
cases that went to the appeals board from fiscal years 2011 through 
2013 involved Secret Service employees, which could result in 
employees facing a board that might not be independent. 

[52] The new directive provides that two of the Security Appeals Board 
members can be either DHS or Secret Service employees, and must be 
outside the personnel security field. U.S. Secret Service, Suspension, 
Denial, or Revocation of Access to Classified Information, HRT-2014-16 
(Mar. 14, 2014). This directive revises section RPS-02(02) of the 
Secret Service's Human Resources and Training Manual. 

[53] Executive Order 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability 
for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and 
Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information 
(June 30, 2008). 

[54] Executive Order 12968 assigns agency heads responsibility to 
direct and administer the agency's personnel security program and to 
promulgate policies and processes for access determinations and 
revocations consistent with national policy. Executive Order No. 
12968, Access to Classified Information (Aug. 2, 1995, as amended). 
ODNI officials explained that this means that agency heads may 
disagree with ODNI prescribing specific processes that do not align to 
the structure of their agency, processes, or mission. They also stated 
that while ODNI does not mandate that agencies follow specific 
processes, ODNI is tasked with ensuring that each agency promulgates 
policies that are not only fair, but are consistent with national 
security. 

[55] Executive Order 13467 designated the Director of OPM as the 
Suitability Executive Agent, responsible for developing and 
implementing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure 
the effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and 
adjudications relating to determinations of suitability for government 
employment. Executive Order 13467, Reforming Processes Related to 
Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor 
Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security 
Information (June 30, 2008). 

[56] GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to 
Improve Quality Throughout the Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-186T] (Nov. 13, 2013). 

[57] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance 
Information for Management Decision Making, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-927] (Sept. 9, 2005). 

[58] The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-259, § 367 (2010) (codified in relevant part at 50 U.S.C. § 
3104). 

[59] The requirements of executive orders 10865 and 12968, which 
govern the personnel security clearance revocation processes, were 
established in 1960 and 1995, respectively, prior to DNI's designation 
as the security executive agent responsible for oversight of the 
process. Since that designation, the DNI's role has evolved as it 
began executing its new responsibilities. 

[60] DOD Instruction 1332.30, Separation of Regular and Reserve 
Commissioned Officers, Enclosure 2, § 3 (Nov. 25, 2013); Air Force 
Instruction 36-2101, Classifying Military Personnel (Officer and 
Enlisted), section 4.1 (June 25, 2013, incorporating change 1 Nov. 18, 
2013). 

[61] Army Regulation 600-8-24, Personnel-General: Officer Transfers 
and Discharges, Chapter 4 § 4-1(c) (Apr. 12, 2006, Rapid Action 
Revision Sept. 13, 2011); Navy Personnel Command (NAVPERS) 15560D, 
Naval Military Personnel Manual, Article 1301-227, § 1.b. (Aug. 22, 
2002, incorporating changes through Apr. 24, 2013). 

[62] Army Regulation 600-8-24, Personnel-General: Officer Transfers 
and Discharges, Chapter 4, § 4-1(c) (Apr. 12, 2006, Rapid Action 
Revision Sept. 13, 2011). 

[63] Army Regulation 614-100, Officer Assignment Policies, Details, 
and Transfers, Chapter 5, § 5-1(b)(5) (Jan. 10, 2006). 

[64] Washington Headquarters Services officials explained that they do 
not make employment decisions regarding military personnel. Upon 
notification of a security clearance revocation, the agency would 
return the servicemember to his or her respective service, which would 
then determine the appropriate action. 

[65] Navy officials also explained that this change has had a 
detrimental effect on the Navy's ability to retain foreign nationals 
who are servicemembers. They explained that there are a large number 
of foreign national servicemembers in the Navy; however, foreign 
nationals do not have clearance eligibility. As a result, the 
requirement that all positions require secret clearance eligibility 
has created complications for the Navy in handling these 
servicemembers. 

[66] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-AIMD-00-21.3.1] (November 
1999), pp. 9-10, pp. 18-19. 

[67] DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program (January 
1987, incorporating administrative change Feb. 23, 1996). 

[68] The specific categories of federal civilian employees eligible to 
appeal adverse actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board vary to 
some extent depending on the status of the employee and the action 
being appealed. 

[69] The adverse actions that may be appealed include, among other 
things: removals, suspensions of more than 14 days, reductions in 
grade or pay, furloughs of 30 days or less, performance-based removals 
or reductions in grade, denials of within-grade salary increases, 
reduction-in-force actions, and OPM suitability determinations. 

[70] See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), and Kaplan 
v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied by Northover 
v. Archuleta, 134 S.Ct. 1759 (Mar. 31, 2014). 

[71] For example, the Merit Systems Protection Board may review, among 
other things, whether the clearance was actually denied or revoked, 
whether the employee received certain procedural protections, or 
whether a transfer to a nonsensitive position was feasible. 

[72] Washington Headquarters Services officials explained that they do 
not make employment decisions regarding military personnel. Upon 
notification of a security clearance revocation, the agency would 
return the servicemember to their respective service, who would then 
determine the appropriate action. 

[73] The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-259, § 367 (2010) (codified in relevant part at 50 U.S.C. § 
3104), 

[74] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Nov. 
1999), pp. 18, 19. 

[75] The number of employees eligible to access classified information 
was obtained from JPAS, and includes all employees who had an active 
or valid confidential, secret, top secret, or sensitive compartmented 
information eligibility at the end of fiscal year 2013, and who did 
not have a separation date recorded in JPAS prior to the end of the 
fiscal year. 

[76] To determine the total number of active-duty, reserve, and 
federal civilian employees in each component during fiscal year 2013, 
DMDC added the totals of all personnel who were employed during each 
month in fiscal year 2013. To avoid double-counting, personnel whose 
Social Security number had already been included in a prior month's 
report were removed from each service's monthly totals. 

[77] These figures include both enlisted and officer accessions for 
the active and reserve components. Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Personnel and Readiness, Population Representation in the 
Military Services: Fiscal Year 2012 Summary Report. 

[78] Office of Management and Budget, Suitability and Security 
Processes Review: Report to the President. 

[79] GAO, Assessing the Reliability of Computer-Processed Data, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-680G] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2009), and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 
Government Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[80] Executive Order No. 12968, Access to Classified Information (Aug. 
2, 1995, as amended); Executive Order No. 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information Within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960, as amended). 

[81] A table of penalties establishes an appropriate range of 
punishment for an offense, and also may identify mitigating and 
exacerbating factors that a commander or supervisor should consider in 
making decisions. 

[82] This count includes strength and nonstrength accountable 
personnel, such as prisoners of war, missing personnel, deserters, 
prisoners in civil or military confinement for 6 months or more, and 
personnel on appellate leave (with or without pay). 

[83] This count excludes reserve personnel who were counted within the 
active end strengths of the components, which is usually those who 
serve on active duty for more than 180 days. 

[84] This count includes civilian personnel who are U.S. citizens in 
U.S. and non-U.S. duty locations, non-U.S. citizens in U.S. duty 
locations, and military technicians. 

[End of section] 

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