This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-14-518 
entitled 'Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would 
Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management' which was released on 
June 24, 2014. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate: 

June 2014: 

Combating Terrorism: 

U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced 
Program Management: 

GAO-14-518: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-518, a report to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Events in northwest Africa—-such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's 
seizure of territory in Mali in 2012 and Boko Haram's near-daily 
attacks in Nigeria—-have underscored concerns that the region is 
vulnerable to the spread of violent extremism. TSCTP, a U.S. 
multiagency counterterrorism effort begun in 2005, led by State, and 
primarily coordinated with USAID and DOD, focuses on strengthening 
partner countries' counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the 
spread of terrorist ideology through diplomacy, development, and 
security assistance. 

This report examines (1) the status of TSCTP-related funding and U.S. 
agencies' ability to track such funding; (2) the extent to which U.S. 
agency implementation of TSCTP is consistent with key practices of 
interagency collaboration; and (3) whether U.S. agencies considered 
partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts 
when selecting TSCTP activities. GAO reviewed agency documents, met 
with key officials in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork at the 
U.S. Africa Command in Germany and in Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger. 

What GAO Found: 

Nearly half of the funds allocated for the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) since fiscal year 2009 have been 
disbursed, but TSCTP program managers are unable to readily provide 
data on the status of these funds. As of late 2013, U.S. agencies 
reported disbursing nearly $140 million of the approximately $288 
million allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger were the top three recipients of bilateral 
funding. Although the Department of State's (State) Foreign Affairs 
Manual and federal standards for internal control note that effective 
internal management requires financial information for planning, 
programming, and performance evaluation, TSCTP's program managers do 
not routinely collect and assess data on the status of funding for 
TSCTP, such as the amount of funds unobligated. Consequently, TSCTP's 
program managers may lack the day-to-day access to financial 
information that federal standards for internal control state is 
required to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and 
allocate resources. 

Figure: TSCTP Allocations by Country, Fiscal Years 2009-2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map and vertical bar graph] 

Map of Western Africa. 

Country: Regional: 
Allocation: $81.8 million. 

Country: Mali; 
Allocation: $40.6 million. 

Country: Mauritania; 
Allocation: $34.5 million. 

Country: Niger; 
Allocation: $30.7 million. 

Country: Chad; 
Allocation: $13 million. 

Country: Nigeria; 
Allocation: $12.8 million. 

Country: Morocco; 
Allocation: $11.7 million. 

Country: Algeria; 
Allocation: $10 million. 

Country: Senegal; 
Allocation: $9.8 million. 

Country: Tunisia; 
Allocation: $8.2 million. 

Country: Burkina Faso; 
Allocation: $6.6 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data; Map Resources (map). GAO-
14-518. 

State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and 
Department of Defense (DOD) actions to implement TSCTP are generally 
consistent with most but not all of the key practices of interagency 
collaboration that GAO has identified as important to enhancing 
collaborative agency efforts. For example, agencies have agreed on 
their roles and responsibilities, established a joint strategy, and 
defined a common outcome for TSCTP. However, although agencies have 
taken steps to leverage their resources and establish compatible 
procedures to operate across agency boundaries, the Department of 
Justice has not been fully integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts 
despite its expertise in building law enforcement capacity—one of 
TSCTP's five lines of effort. 

U.S. agencies have used various means to consider partner country 
needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting 
TSCTP activities. These include assessment reports, meetings with host 
governments, and bilateral and multilateral outreach to other donors. 
For example, the United States participates in the Global 
Counterterrorism Forum, a multilateral venue for sharing information 
on the counterterrorism activities of other donor nations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and the Administrator of 
USAID ensure that TSCTP program managers take steps to routinely 
collect and assess information on the status of funds for TSCTP. GAO 
also recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to better 
integrate the Department of Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts. 
State and USAID both concurred with GAO's recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-518]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 
or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Nearly Half of Funds Allocated for TSCTP since 2009 Have Been 
Disbursed, but TSCTP Program Managers Are Unable to Readily Provide 
Data on the Status of Funding: 

TSCTP Implementation Is Generally Consistent with Most Key Practices 
of Interagency Collaboration, but the Department of Justice Can Be 
Better Integrated: 

U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Consider Partner Country Needs, Absorptive 
Capacities, and Other Donor Efforts when Selecting TSCTP Activities: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Examples of Activities Conducted Using Funds Allocated 
for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: 

Appendix III: Examples of Accounts and Programs That Support 
Counterterrorism Activities outside of the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership: 

Appendix IV: Status of Funds Allocated for Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership Activities: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Status of Funding for TSCTP, by Fiscal Year Appropriations 
(2009-2013): 

Table 2: Status of Funding for TSCTP by Funding Account, Fiscal Years 
2009-2013: 

Table 3: Status of Funding for TSCTP Country-Specific and Regional 
Programs, Fiscal Years 2009-2013: 

Table 4: Status of Peacekeeping Operations Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 
2013: 

Table 5: Status of Development Assistance Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of December 
2013: 

Table 6: Status of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 
Related Programs Antiterrorism Assistance Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 
2013: 

Table 7: Status of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 
Related Programs Counterterrorism Finance Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 
2013: 

Table 8: Status of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 
Related Programs Terrorist Interdiction Program Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 
2013: 

Table 9: Status of Economic Support Fund Funding for TSCTP Activities, 
by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 2013: 

Table 10: Status of International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement Funding for TSCTP Activities, by Fiscal Year 
Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 2013: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Terrorist Events Conducted by Select Terrorist Groups in 
TSCTP Countries, 2009-2012: 

Figure 2: Key Terrorist Groups in Northwest Africa and Their Regions 
of Operation, 2009-2014: 

Figure 3: Select Political, Security, and Terrorist Events in TSCTP 
Countries, 2009-2014: 

Figure 4: Overview of the Primary Agencies Participating in the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP): 

Figure 5: Funding Allocations for TSCTP Country-Specific and Regional 
Programs, Fiscal Years 2009-2013: 

Figure 6: Primary Agencies Supporting Each TSCTP Line of Effort: 

Figure 7: State TSCTP-Funded Imam Training and Interfaith Dialogue 
Workshop in Chad: 

Figure 8: USAID TSCTP-Funded Radio Studio in Niger: 

Figure 9: State TSCTP-Funded Radio Equipment for Mauritanian Military 
National Command Center and Body Armor and Night Vision Goggles for 
Mauritanian Special Forces: 

Abbreviations: 

AFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command: 

AQIM : al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: 

DA: Development Assistance: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

ESF: Economic Support Fund: 

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

Justice: Department of Justice: 

NADR: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs: 

PKO: Peacekeeping Operations: 

State: Department of State: 

Treasury: Department of the Treasury: 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 24, 2014: 

The Honorable Robert Menendez: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Bob Corker: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

Several recent events in northwest Africa have underscored concerns 
that the region's vast ungoverned spaces, smuggling routes, porous 
borders, poverty, and fragile states offer a conducive environment for 
the spread of violent extremist ideology. In 2012, the terrorist group 
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies started seizing 
territory in Mali, prompting a French-led military intervention and 
ongoing international military involvement in northern Mali to disrupt 
terrorist activity. AQIM continues to plan and encourage kidnappings 
for ransom of U.S. citizens and other Westerners as its primary means 
of raising funds for operations. In January 2013, an offshoot of AQIM 
attacked a natural gas facility in Algeria, killing dozens of people, 
including three U.S. citizens. In Nigeria, the terrorist group Boko 
Haram has carried out near-daily attacks since conducting a suicide 
car bombing at a United Nations facility in 2011, to include an April 
2014 bus station bombing in Nigeria's capital that killed at least 75 
people and the kidnapping of more than 230 female students in 
northeast Nigeria later that same day, highlighting the continuing 
threat that terrorist groups in the region pose. 

Since 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has 
been the primary U.S. counterterrorism initiative in northwest Africa. 
TSCTP is a Department of State (State)-led effort primarily 
coordinated with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and the Department of Defense (DOD) that focuses on strengthening 
partner country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and 
inhibiting the spread of terrorist ideology in the region through 
diplomacy, development, and security assistance activities in 11 
countries--Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. 

In response to your request that we conduct a follow-on review of 
TSCTP,[Footnote 1] this report examines (1) the status of TSCTP-
related funding and U.S. agencies' ability to track such funding; (2) 
the extent to which U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is consistent 
with key practices of interagency collaboration; and (3) whether U.S. 
agencies considered partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and 
other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP activities.[Footnote 2] 

To address these objectives, we reviewed agency documents related to 
TSCTP--including strategy and planning documents, progress reporting, 
and funding information--as well as relevant documents from U.S. 
implementing partners, other international donors, and related 
multilateral entities, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum. 
[Footnote 3] We also assessed the extent to which agency actions have 
been consistent with key practices GAO has identified for enhancing 
interagency collaboration and discussed U.S. assistance efforts with 
State, USAID, and DOD; the Departments of Justice (Justice), Homeland 
Security (DHS), and the Treasury (Treasury); and intelligence 
community officials in the Washington, D.C., area.[Footnote 4] 
Additionally, we conducted fieldwork at the U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) in Germany in November 2013. We also conducted fieldwork in 
Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger in December 2013, during which we met 
with State, DOD, and USAID officials; U.S. implementing partners; 
representatives of partner country security forces and ministries; and 
international donors. See appendix I for a complete description of our 
scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The United States established TSCTP in 2005 as a result of growing 
concerns about terrorist groups in the region affiliated with al Qaeda 
and the increased efforts of those groups to attract young recruits, 
among other reasons. Since 2005, terrorist activity in the region has 
increased significantly. Figure 1 illustrates the number of terrorist 
events conducted by select terrorist groups in the 11 TSCTP countries 
from 2009 to 2012. 

Figure 1: Terrorist Events Conducted by Select Terrorist Groups in 
TSCTP Countries, 2009-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Western Africa] 

Number of terrorist events: 

0: 
Burkina Faso; 
Cameroon; 
Chad; 
Senegal. 

1-25: 
Mali; 
Mauritania; 
Morocco; 
Niger; 
Tunisia. 

26-50: 
Algeria. 

450-500: 
Nigeria. 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. 

Source: GAO analysis of the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism's Global Terrorism Database; Map 
Resources (map). GAO-14-518. 

Notes: Terrorist events conducted by the following terrorist groups 
are included in this figure: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansaru, 
Boko Haram, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (which 
merged with another group in 2013 to form al-Murabitoun). 

This figure only includes events that the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism identified as events (1) 
aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; 
(2) where there was evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey a message beyond the immediate victims; (3) falling outside 
legitimate warfare activities that are outside the parameters of 
international humanitarian law; and (4) that are not ambiguous as to 
their nature as terrorist incidents. Successful and unsuccessful 
attacks are included. 

Terrorist event information is drawn entirely from publicly available 
materials and reflects what is reported in those sources. (National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. 
(2012). Global Terrorism Database (data file). Retrieved from 
[Hyperlink, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd] on May 5, 2014.) 

While Cameroon did not become a member of TSCTP until January 2014, we 
include it in the figure above for illustrative purposes. 

[End of figure] 

Key terrorist groups in northwest Africa and their regions of 
operation since 2009 are illustrated in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Key Terrorist Groups in Northwest Africa and Their Regions 
of Operation, 2009-2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Western Africa] 

Map depicts the following: 

Historic location of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) senior 
leadership; 
AQIM area of operation; 
al-Murabitoun area of operation; 
Area targeted by Boko Haram and Ansaru; 
Ansar al-Sharia-Tunisia strongholds: 
* Tunis, Tunisia; 
Other Ansar al-Sharia factions' strongholds: 
* Benghazi, Libya; 
* Dema, Libya; 
* Syrte, Libya; 
* Tripoli, Libya. 

Source: GAO analysis of State information; Map Resources (map). GAO-14-
518. 

Note: This figure is current as of June 2014. Countries shaded in gray 
are Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership countries. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3 further illustrates some of the political and security events 
in TSCTP countries since 2009, including coups in Niger, Mauritania, 
and Mali, as well as significant terrorist events, such as Boko 
Haram's August 2011 attack in Nigeria outside the United Nations 
office in Abuja.[Footnote 5] It does not include the numerous 
kidnappings for ransom that have taken place since 2009 or other 
significant regional events that have affected TSCTP countries, such 
as the collapse of the Libyan government in 2011, which resulted in 
the spread of unsecured military-grade weapons and experienced 
fighters throughout the region. 

Figure 3: Select Political, Security, and Terrorist Events in TSCTP 
Countries, 2009-2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

Political and security events: 

February 2009: Burkina Faso becomes a member of TSCTP. 

July 2009: Mauritania: presidential elections held after August 2008 
coup. 

December 2009: Niger: most nonhumanitarian U.S. assistance is 
suspended because of President's attempt to unlawfully extend 
presidential term. 

February 2010: Niger: a military coup overthrows the democratically 
elected government. 

December 2010: Tunisia: protests begin that result in the overthrow of 
the government. 

January 2011: Niger: presidential elections held after 2010 coup. 

March 2011: Niger: restrictions on U.S. assistance are lifted. 

October 2011: Tunisia: elections for the constituent assembly held 
after 2010 unrest. 

January 2012: Mali: separatists in northern Mali rebel against the 
central government. 

March 2012: Mali: a military coup overthrows the democratically 
elected government; U.S. assistance is suspended . 

April 2012: Mali: AQIM and its allies seize territory in northern Mali. 

January 2013: Mali: French-led military intervention initiated to 
combat territorial gains of AQIM. 

July 2013: Mali: presidential elections held after 2012 coup. 

September 2013: Mali: restrictions on U.S. assistance are lifted. 

January 2014: Cameroon becomes a member of TSCTP. 

Select terrorist events: 

June 2009: Mauritania: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kills an 
American citizen in Nouakchott. 

July 2009: Nigeria: Boko Haram attacks a police station in Bauchi 
state, initiating a standoff that results in nearly 700 deaths, the 
public execution of a Boko Haram leader, and a turning point in the 
radicalization of Boko Haram. 

August 2011: Nigeria: Boko Haram conducts suicide car bombing of 
United Nations office in Abuja, killing 23. 

January 2013: Algeria: AQIM-linked terrorists attack a gas facility 
near the Libyan border, taking hundreds hostage and killing 40, 
including 3 Americans. 

May 2013: Niger: AQIM-linked terrorists conduct coordinated attacks 
against a military academy in Agadez and a French-owned mine in Arlit, 
killing 25 people. 

April 2014: Nigeria: Boko Haram bombs a bus station in Abuja, killing 
at least 75 people, the deadliest attack to date in Nigeria's capital. 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and other public information. GAO-14-518. 

Note: This figure does not include the numerous kidnappings by 
terrorist groups in this region since 2009, including the April 2014 
Boko Haram kidnapping of more than 230 female students in northeast 
Nigeria. 

[End of figure] 

To assist partner country efforts to tackle the terrorist threat in 
the region, State, USAID, and DOD have conducted a variety of 
activities using TSCTP-dedicated funding. State's TSCTP activities 
include public diplomacy efforts as well as law enforcement training 
and equipping and criminal justice sector reform. USAID's TSCTP 
activities include efforts to support youth employment, strengthen 
local governance capacity, and improve access to education. DOD's 
TSCTP activities, which are funded by State, include counterterrorism 
training and equipping. See appendix II for additional details as well 
as illustrations of TSCTP activities. 

Funding for TSCTP comes from various appropriation accounts and is 
administered by State or USAID, with DOD assisting in State's 
implementation of one of these accounts.[Footnote 6] These accounts 
include the following: 

* Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)--authorizes the President to furnish 
assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for 
peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance 
of the national security interest of the United States. PKO funds are 
State-and DOD-implemented and are used, in part, to train and equip 
military units tasked with monitoring and controlling border areas and 
territory exploited by terrorist elements. 

* Development Assistance (DA)--authorizes the President to provide 
assistance for various purposes, including agricultural development, 
education and human resources development, grant assistance for 
microenterprises, and a development fund for Africa, among other 
purposes. DA funds are USAID-implemented and are used to support host 
nation efforts to counter radicalization, recruitment, and violent 
extremist organizations. 

* Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs 
(NADR)--authorizes the President to provide antiterrorism assistance, 
nonproliferation and export control assistance, and other assistance 
to foreign countries for various purposes. NADR funds are typically 
State-implemented and are used to support activities designed to 
enhance the law enforcement capacity and antiterrorism skills of 
partner countries by providing training, equipment, and mentoring to 
deter, detect, and respond to terrorism. 

* Economic Support Fund (ESF)--authorizes the President to assist 
countries and organizations in order to promote economic or political 
stability. ESF funds are State-and USAID-implemented and are used, in 
part, to counter violent extremism. 

* International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)--
authorizes the President to assist foreign countries and international 
organizations to control narcotics and other controlled substances, or 
for other anticrime purposes. INCLE funds are typically State-
implemented and are used to develop and implement policies and 
programs that maintain the rule of law and strengthen institutional 
law enforcement and judicial capabilities, including combating 
transnational crime. 

The five accounts funding TSCTP also fund other, non-TSCTP 
counterterrorism assistance to TSCTP countries, such as NADR funds 
that have been used to post Department of Justice legal advisers in 
some TSCTP countries. In addition, State, DOD, and other U.S. agencies 
such as Justice, Treasury, and DHS use other accounts to fund non-
TSCTP counterterrorism-related assistance in the TSCTP region. One 
such effort is DOD's Section 1206 program, which provides 
counterterrorism training and equipment globally, including to TSCTP 
countries.[Footnote 7] See appendix III for more information about 
select accounts and programs that support U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts outside of TSCTP. 

Within State, the lead U.S. agency for TSCTP, the Office of Regional 
and Security Affairs within the Bureau of African Affairs is the lead 
coordinator for TSCTP activities across several State bureaus and is 
responsible for managing activities in Burkina Faso, Chad, Cameroon, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, while the Bureau of 
Near Eastern Affairs is responsible for managing activities in 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.[Footnote 8] At the country level, the 
U.S. embassy in each member country has a country team that 
facilitates interagency coordination as well as implementation of 
programs such as TSCTP, as shown in figure 4. Each country team is led 
by and falls under the authority of the U.S. ambassador to that 
country and is generally made up of key officials from State, USAID, 
DOD, and other relevant agencies.[Footnote 9] 

Figure 4: Overview of the Primary Agencies Participating in the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP): 

Figure 4: Overview of the Primary Agencies Participating in TSCTP: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration of agency organizational charts] 

DOD: Program planning: 

Secretary of Defense: 
Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
Africa Command (Germany). 
* Special Operations Command Africa: 
- Military trainers; [Program implementation at country level] 
* Other DOD TSCTP personnel. [Program implementation at country level] 

State (Lead): Program planning: 

Secretary of State: 
Bureau of African Affairs; 
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; 
Bureau of Counterterrorism; 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

Country level: 
Ambassador-Chief of Mission: 
Deputy Chief of Mission: 
* DOD Security Cooperation Officer; 
* DOD Defense Attaché; 
* State Regional Security Officer; 
* State Public Affairs Officer; 
* USAID Officer; 
* Other country team members. 

USAID: Program planning: 

Director of Foreign Assistance/USAID Administrator: 
Bureau for Africa; 
Bureau for the Middle East. 

Source: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD information. GAO-14-518. 

[End of figure] 

USAID's regional office in Accra, Ghana, and its bilateral office in 
Bamako, Mali, manage the agency's TSCTP activities with support from 
USAID bureaus in Washington, D.C.[Footnote 10] DOD's Office of the 
Secretary of Defense is responsible for coordinating the agency's 
TSCTP activities that are undertaken using State's PKO funding. 
[Footnote 11] In addition, DOD representatives under the authority of 
AFRICOM work with country teams in coordinating and implementing 
TSCTP's security assistance activities, as well as other 
counterterrorism-related activities in the region. 

Nearly Half of Funds Allocated for TSCTP since 2009 Have Been 
Disbursed, but TSCTP Program Managers Are Unable to Readily Provide 
Data on the Status of Funding: 

U.S. agencies allocated about $288 million for TSCTP between fiscal 
years 2009 and 2013, of which they have disbursed slightly less than 
half. Although State's Foreign Affairs Manual and federal standards 
for internal control note that effective internal management requires 
financial information, TSCTP's managers at State and USAID do not 
routinely collect and assess data on the status of funds for TSCTP 
activities, such as the amounts of funds unobligated or disbursed--key 
data that could help inform their management of the program.[Footnote 
12] As a result, the process of providing us with a complete, 
sufficiently reliable set of information on the status of funds 
allocated for TSCTP took several months and, according to State and 
USAID officials, was very time-consuming and labor-intensive. 
Consequently, TSCTP's program managers may lack the day-to-day access 
to financial information that federal standards for internal control 
state is required to make operating decisions, monitor performance, 
and allocate resources.[Footnote 13] 

Agencies Have Allocated Almost $288 Million and Disbursed Nearly $140 
Million for TSCTP since 2009: 

While State and USAID could not readily provide data on the status of 
funding for TSCTP (as discussed in more detail later in this report), 
the data they eventually provided to us indicate that about $288 
million was allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. As 
table 1 illustrates, the amount of funds allocated for TSCTP declined 
each year between fiscal years 2010 and 2013, dropping from a high of 
about $80 million in fiscal year 2010 to about $53 million in fiscal 
year 2013. As of late 2013, State and USAID had disbursed about $139 
million, or 48 percent, of the funds allocated for TSCTP between 
fiscal years 2009 and 2013.[Footnote 14] 

Table 1: Status of Funding for TSCTP, by Fiscal Year Appropriations 
(2009-2013): 

Allocated; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $39,650,000; 
2010: $79,796,000; 
2011: $59,622,000; 
2012: $55,607,000; 
2013: $53,021,000; 
Total: $287,696,000. 

Unobligated balance; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $2,108,000[A]; 
2010: $3,331,000[A]; 
2011: $829,000[A]; 
2012: $763,000[A]; 
2013: $22,658,000[B]; 
Total: $29,689,000. 

Unliquidated obligations; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $7,038,000; 
2010: $20,408,000; 
2011: $31,385,000; 
2012: $30,388,000; 
2013: $30,002,000; 
Total: $119,221,000. 

Disbursed; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $30,504,000; 
2010: $56,057,000; 
2011: $27,408,000; 
2012: $24,456,000; 
2013: $361,000; 
Total: $138,786,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data. GAO-14-518. 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: 

PKO: Peacekeeping Operations: 

DA: Development Assistance: 

NADR: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs: 

ESF: Economic Support Fund: 

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

Notes: The amounts above reflect totals from PKO, DA, NADR, ESF, and 
INCLE funds dedicated for TSCTP activities. Data on PKO, NADR, ESF, 
and INCLE funds are current as of November 2013, and data on DA funds 
are current as of December 2013. For the status of each account's 
balances by fiscal year, see tables 4-10 in appendix IV. 

[A] The unobligated balances from fiscal years 2009 through 2012, 
totaling about $6.9 million, reflect NADR, ESF, and INCLE funds that, 
according to State officials, were not obligated or were deobligated 
and may no longer be available to incur new obligations. Of the 
approximately $6.9 million, nearly $6.7 million is NADR funding, the 
execution of which State officials noted has sometimes been delayed or 
canceled because of political strife and other conditions on the 
ground in partner countries. Once the period of availability for 
obligation has expired, unobligated balances remain available for an 
additional 5 fiscal years for recording and adjusting obligations 
properly chargeable to the appropriations period of availability. For 
example, these funds may remain available for contract modifications 
properly within the scope of the original contract. 

[B] The approximately $22.7 million unobligated balance in fiscal year 
2013 reflects funds that remain available for obligation and that 
State and USAID are in the process of obligating. 

[End of table] 

Of the approximately $288 million allocated in total for TSCTP between 
fiscal years 2009 and 2013, about 62 percent (about $178 million) came 
from the PKO and DA accounts. Table 2 shows the status of funding for 
TSCTP broken down by funding account. See appendix IV for further 
details on funding for TSCTP by funding account. 

Table 2: Status of Funding for TSCTP by Funding Account, Fiscal Years 
2009-2013: 

Account: PKO; 
Allocated: $92,040,000; 
Unobligated balance: [Empty]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $34,784,000; 
Disbursed: $57,256,000. 

Account: DA; 
Allocated: $86,414,000; 
Unobligated balance: $1,907,000[A]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $48,963,000; 
Disbursed: $35,544,000. 

Account: NADR; 
Allocated: $57,511,000; 
Unobligated balance: $18,322,000[A]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $9,498,000; 
Disbursed: $29,691,000. 

Account: ESF; 
Allocated: $29,305,000; 
Unobligated balance: $5,241,000[A]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $10,846,000; 
Disbursed: $13,218,000. 

Account: INCLE; 
Allocated: $22,426,000; 
Unobligated balance: $4,219,000[A]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $15,130,000; 
Disbursed: $3,077,000. 

Account: Total; 
Allocated: $287,696,000; 
Unobligated balance: $29,689,000[A]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $119,221,000; 
Disbursed: $138,786,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data. GAO-14-518. 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: 

PKO: Peacekeeping Operations: 

DA: Development Assistance: 

NADR: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs: 

ESF: Economic Support Fund: 

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

Notes: Data on PKO, NADR, ESF, and INCLE funds are current as of 
November 2013. Data on DA funds are current as of December 2013. 

[A] Of the total unobligated balances shown, approximately $22.7 
million (about $11.6 million of the NADR amount, about $5.2 million of 
the ESF amount, about $4 million of the INCLE amount, and about $1.9 
million of the DA amount) is fiscal year 2013 funding that remains 
available for obligation and that State and USAID are in the process 
of obligating. The remaining approximately $6.9 million in total 
unobligated balances shown (about $6.7 million of the NADR amount, 
about $35,000 of the ESF amount, and about $81,000 of the INCLE 
amount) is funding from fiscal years 2009 through 2012 that, according 
to State officials, was not obligated or was deobligated and may no 
longer be available to incur new obligations. Once the period of 
availability for obligation has expired, unobligated balances remain 
available for an additional 5 fiscal years for recording and adjusting 
obligations properly chargeable to the appropriations period of 
availability. For example, these funds may remain available for 
contract modifications properly within the scope of the original 
contract. 

[End of table] 

Of the approximately $288 million in total allocations for TSCTP 
between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, about $260 million has been 
allocated to country-specific and regional programs.[Footnote 15] 
Figure 5 shows the geographic distribution of allocations for TSCTP 
between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. As the figure demonstrates, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger were the top three recipients of bilateral 
funding, collectively accounting for approximately $106 million of the 
funds allocated. In addition, State and USAID allocated about $82 
million for regionally focused programs. 

Figure 5: Funding Allocations for TSCTP Country-Specific and Regional 
Programs, Fiscal Years 2009-2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map and vertical bar graph] 

Map of Western Africa. 

Country: Regional: 
Allocation: $81.8 million. 

Country: Mali; 
Allocation: $40.6 million. 

Country: Mauritania; 
Allocation: $34.5 million. 

Country: Niger; 
Allocation: $30.7 million. 

Country: Chad; 
Allocation: $13 million. 

Country: Nigeria; 
Allocation: $12.8 million. 

Country: Morocco; 
Allocation: $11.7 million. 

Country: Algeria; 
Allocation: $10 million. 

Country: Senegal; 
Allocation: $9.8 million. 

Country: Tunisia; 
Allocation: $8.2 million. 

Country: Burkina Faso; 
Allocation: $6.6 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data; Map Resources (map). GAO-
14-518. 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: 

PKO: Peacekeeping Operations: 

DA: Development Assistance: 

NADR: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs: 

ESF: Economic Support Fund: 

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

Notes: The amounts above reflect totals from PKO, DA, NADR, ESF, and 
INCLE funds dedicated for TSCTP activities. Data on PKO, NADR, ESF, 
and INCLE funds are current as of November 2013, and data on DA funds 
are current as of December 2013. 

While the precise allocation amount for Algeria is slightly less than 
$10 million, we rounded the amount to $10 million for the purposes of 
the figure above. 

Cameroon did not become a member of TSCTP until January 2014. 
Consequently, it did not receive any funds allocated for TSCTP between 
fiscal years 2009 and 2013. 

[End of figure] 

As shown in table 3, about $133 million, or 51 percent, of the 
approximately $260 million allocated for country-specific and regional 
programs has been disbursed.[Footnote 16] 

Table 3: Status of Funding for TSCTP Country-Specific and Regional 
Programs, Fiscal Years 2009-2013: 

Country/regional: Regional activities; 
Allocated: $80,962,000; 
Unobligated balance: $1,605,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $40,865,000; 
Disbursed: $38,492,000. 

Country/regional: Mali; 
Allocated: $40,580,000; 
Unobligated balance: $1,391,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $14,780,000; 
Disbursed: $24,409,000. 

Country/regional: Mauritania; 
Allocated: $34,464,000; 
Unobligated balance: $3,453,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $9,635,000; 
Disbursed: $21,376,000. 

Country/regional: Niger; 
Allocated: $30,749,000; 
Unobligated balance: $3,052,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $15,174,000; 
Disbursed: $12,523,000. 

Country/regional: Chad; 
Allocated: $13,026,000; 
Unobligated balance: $2,116,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $5,474,000; 
Disbursed: $5,436,000. 

Country/regional: Nigeria; 
Allocated: $12,831,000; 
Unobligated balance: $2,587,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $5,380,000; 
Disbursed: $4,864,000. 

Country/regional: Morocco; 
Allocated: $11,683,000; 
Unobligated balance: $1,242,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $4,306,000; 
Disbursed: $6,135,000. 

Country/regional: Algeria; 
Allocated: $9,981,000; 
Unobligated balance: $752,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $4,785,000; 
Disbursed: $4,444,000. 

Country/regional: Senegal; 
Allocated: $9,835,000; 
Unobligated balance: $1,009,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $1,543,000; 
Disbursed: $7,283,000. 

Country/regional: Tunisia; 
Allocated: $8,990,000; 
Unobligated balance: $673,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $3,322,000; 
Disbursed: $4,995,000. 

Country/regional: Burkina Faso; 
Allocated: $6,583,000; 
Unobligated balance: $1,349,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $1,725,000; 
Disbursed: $3,509,000. 

Country/regional: Total; 
Allocated: $259,684,000[A]; 
Unobligated balance: $19,229,000[B]; 
Unliquidated obligations: $106,989,000; 
Disbursed: $133,466,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data. GAO-14-518. 

[End of table] 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: 

PKO: Peacekeeping Operations: 

DA: Development Assistance: 

NADR: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs: 

ESF: Economic Support Fund: 

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

Notes: The amounts above reflect totals from PKO, DA, NADR, ESF, and 
INCLE funds dedicated for TSCTP activities. Data on PKO, NADR, ESF, 
and INCLE funds are current as of November 2013, and data on DA funds 
are current as of December 2013. 

Because Cameroon did not become a member of TSCTP until January 2014, 
it did not receive any funds allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 
2009 and 2013. 

[A] Total allocations shown above exclude approximately $10.5 million 
in fiscal year 2013 funding that remains available for obligation and 
that State and USAID are in the process of allocating and obligating 
to country-specific and regional programs and about $17.6 million in 
program management costs. The total amount allocated for TSCTP from 
fiscal years 2009 to 2013 was about $288 million. 

[B] Total unobligated balances shown above exclude approximately $10.5 
million in fiscal year 2013 funding that remains available for 
obligation and that State and USAID are in the process of allocating 
and obligating to country-specific and regional programs. Of the total 
unobligated balances shown, approximately $12.2 million is fiscal year 
2013 funding that remains available for obligation and that State and 
USAID are in the process of obligating. The remaining approximately 
$6.9 million in total unobligated balances is funding from fiscal 
years 2009 through 2012 that, according to State officials, was not 
obligated or was deobligated and may no longer be available to incur 
new obligations. Once the period of availability for obligation has 
expired, unobligated balances remain available for an additional 5 
fiscal years for recording and adjusting obligations properly 
chargeable to the appropriations period of availability. For example, 
these funds may remain available for contract modifications properly 
within the scope of the original contract. 

[C] Total unliquidated obligations shown above exclude approximately 
$12.2 million in program management costs. 

[D] Total disbursements shown above exclude approximately $5.3 million 
in program management costs. 

[End of figure] 

State and USAID Program Managers Do Not Routinely Collect and Assess 
Data on the Status of Funds Allocated for TSCTP: 

State's Foreign Affairs Manual notes that effective internal 
management requires financial information for planning, programming, 
budgeting, performance evaluation, and reporting.[Footnote 17] 
Further, federal internal control standards state that financial 
information is required on a day-to-day basis to make operating 
decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources.[Footnote 18] 
Various entities involved in TSCTP implementation, such as embassies 
and State's functional bureaus, track data on the status of funding 
for TSCTP--such as the amounts unobligated and disbursed--from the 
respective accounts that they manage. However, TSCTP's program 
managers in State's Bureaus of African Affairs and Near Eastern 
Affairs and at USAID do not routinely collect and assess such data to 
develop a complete picture of the status of TSCTP-dedicated funding. 
Program managers in both State bureaus said that their efforts to 
compile the status of funding for TSCTP to fulfill our request was the 
first time they had done so. One program manager explained that State 
currently lacks a system for routinely requesting and collecting such 
data from the various embassies and State bureaus involved in TSCTP 
implementation. Program managers in both regional bureaus added that, 
given other priorities, State currently lacks the manpower to develop 
such a system. Furthermore, officials from State's Bureaus of 
Counterterrorism and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs stated that although they track data on the status of TSCTP-
dedicated funding from the accounts that they manage, they typically 
do not provide and have generally not been asked to provide such data 
to TSCTP program managers. Regarding USAID, officials there stated 
that the agency does not routinely track the status of its funding for 
TSCTP and therefore is not in a position to readily generate such 
data. Overall, the process of providing us with a complete, 
sufficiently reliable set of information on the status of funds 
allocated for TSCTP took several months and, according to State and 
USAID officials, was very time-consuming and labor-intensive. 
Consequently, TSCTP's program managers may lack the day-to-day access 
to financial information that federal standards for internal control 
state is needed to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and 
allocate resources.[Footnote 19] 

Program Managers See Value in Routinely Collecting TSCTP-Related 
Funding Data: 

Notwithstanding these difficulties, TSCTP program managers outlined 
several ways in which having such data readily available would be 
useful for their management of TSCTP. For example, one program manager 
stated that the status of funding would be a valuable tool to have on 
hand at TSCTP's quarterly senior-level meetings for the purpose of 
providing agency leadership with progress reports on the execution of 
TSCTP-dedicated funds, including details on the extent to which funds 
from different accounts are being executed. Program managers in both 
regional bureaus also stated that through their efforts to compile the 
status of funding at our request, they identified millions of dollars 
in unobligated balances of which they were previously unaware. 
Specifically, as noted earlier, nearly $7 million in NADR, INCLE, and 
ESF funding from fiscal years 2009 through 2012 was not obligated or 
was deobligated[Footnote 20] and, according to State officials, may no 
longer be available to incur new obligations. One program manager 
explained that having routine access to such data would help him to 
identify funds for which the period of availability for obligation 
would soon expire, which would then prompt him to work with the 
respective bureaus to develop other, more expedited options for using 
the funds in support of TSCTP. This official added that the Bureau of 
African Affairs is exploring the possibility of hiring additional 
staff to assist with TSCTP program data collection and analysis. 
Similarly, another program manager stated that he believes the data 
could be useful for program management purposes in ways that State has 
not yet anticipated, and that he plans to recruit staff to further 
analyze the data collected at our request to identify how else the 
data can inform TSCTP program management. 

TSCTP Implementation Is Generally Consistent with Most Key Practices 
of Interagency Collaboration, but the Department of Justice Can Be 
Better Integrated: 

In implementing TSCTP, State, USAID, and DOD actions are generally 
consistent with most but not all the key practices of interagency 
collaboration that we previously reported as important to enhancing 
and sustaining collaborative agency efforts.[Footnote 21] 
Specifically, in regard to these key practices, agencies have (1) 
agreed on their roles and responsibilities, (2) established a joint 
strategy, (3) defined a common outcome, (4) developed consistent goals 
to reinforce agency accountability, and (5) taken steps to evaluate 
their results. However, although agencies have taken steps to (6) 
leverage their resources and (7) establish compatible procedures to 
operate across agency boundaries, State could do more to integrate 
Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts.[Footnote 22] 

Agencies Agree on Roles and Responsibilities and Have a Joint TSCTP 
Strategy That Defines a Common Outcome Consistent with Agency Goals: 

Officials at State, USAID, and DOD said that they understand and agree 
on their respective roles and responsibilities related to TSCTP 
implementation--a key practice that facilitates decision making and 
assists agencies in organizing their efforts. Officials noted that 
State is the lead U.S. agency for TSCTP and that the National Security 
Council articulated TSCTP agency roles and responsibilities in 2005. 
In part to assist in implementation of TSCTP and to facilitate 
decision making, officials said that in 2013 they established a 
quarterly meeting at the deputy assistant secretary level. Through 
these meetings, senior leaders have approved an interagency guiding 
strategy for TSCTP, agreed on expanding TSCTP membership, and 
discussed coordination opportunities with other international donors. 
[Footnote 23] We confirmed these practices during our review of agency 
documents and in our discussions with agency officials. 

Agencies have also taken action to address the key practice of 
establishing a joint strategy, as demonstrated by the January 2014 
State-, USAID-, and DOD-approved TSCTP Guiding Strategy. Because this 
is a joint strategic document that also defines a common outcome and 
is consistent with agency goals, it addresses three key practices that 
we have previously reported assist in agency efforts to overcome 
differences in missions, cultures, and established ways of doing 
business; help agencies align activities and resources; and can 
reinforce agency accountability.[Footnote 24] Figure 6 depicts the 
five lines of effort articulated in the joint 2014 TSCTP strategy, 
which also provides a common outcome for U.S. agencies participating 
in TSCTP. Additionally, the TSCTP strategy is consistent with agency 
goals articulated in other strategic documents, such as State and 
USAID's Mission Resource Requests and DOD's Northwest Africa Campaign 
Plan, which outline complementary counterterrorism goals. 

Figure 6: Primary Agencies Supporting Each TSCTP Line of Effort: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

TSCTP purpose: 
Assist partners in northwest Africa to increase their immediate and 
long-term capabilities to address terrorist threats. 

Lines of effort: 

Build law enforcement capacity: State; 
Support efforts to counter terrorist financing: State; 
Reinforce military capacity to counter terrorism: State; DOD; 
Enhance regional capacity to secure borders: State; DOD; 
Counter the spread of violent extremist ideology: State; DOD; USAID. 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. 

Source: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD information. GAO-14-518. 

[End of figure] 

Agencies Have Taken Steps to Evaluate the Progress of Some TSCTP 
Efforts and Plan to Conduct a Holistic Evaluation: 

State, USAID, and DOD have taken steps to evaluate the progress of 
their TSCTP efforts and plan to conduct a holistic evaluation of TSCTP 
within a year. We have previously reported that evaluating and 
reporting on results is a key practice that can assist interagency 
efforts to identify areas for policy and operational improvement. 
[Footnote 25] To date, agencies have taken various steps to evaluate 
the progress of some TSCTP efforts. Examples of these steps include 
the following: 

1. Agency efforts to measure progress of specific programs that are a 
part of TSCTP: 

* State conducts assessments of its NADR-funded Antiterrorism 
Assistance program in TSCTP countries. Such assessments are conducted 
prior to providing assistance to a country and every 2-3 years 
thereafter to measure progress. According to State officials, 
Antiterrorism Assistance assessments have been conducted in every 
TSCTP country and assist State in tailoring assistance. For example, 
State officials noted that the 2013 assessment in one TSCTP country 
found that the partner country forces were not effectively using the 
U.S. equipment provided. As a result, the officials stated that future 
assistance to that country will focus more on training and less on 
equipping. 

* USAID periodically conducts evaluations and assessments of its Peace 
through Development program, which is primarily DA-funded and accounts 
for the majority of USAID's TSCTP activities. Such reviews have been 
either regional or country-specific in nature and have identified 
areas of progress as well as areas for improvement. One impact 
evaluation completed in 2011 concluded that USAID activities in Niger, 
Chad, and Mali had some positive effects on program participants. For 
example, the evaluation identified that media and messaging programs 
have made moderate progress in reaching vulnerable populations and are 
more effective in combination with other USAID activities. 
Recommendations from the evaluation included expanding assistance to 
insecure areas and considering whether program suspension could 
undermine U.S. objectives when designing activities.[Footnote 26] 

2. Agency and interagency efforts to measure progress toward 
counterterrorism goals that are not specific to TSCTP efforts: 

* State conducts public opinion polls annually in most TSCTP 
countries. While these polls may be influenced by factors beyond U.S. 
counterterrorism assistance, they have shown that since 2008 favorable 
opinions toward the United States have generally increased in TSCTP 
countries and that the United States has made progress in reducing 
perceptions that it is fighting Islam rather than terrorism. 

* State and USAID track counterterrorism measures in their annual 
Foreign Operations Performance Reports and, prior to fiscal year 2015, 
some country-specific Mission Resource Requests.[Footnote 27] For 
example, the fiscal year 2014 Foreign Operations Performance Report 
showed that State and USAID had met or exceeded their 2012 performance 
targets related to countering threats to the United States. Such 
performance targets include goals for the number of new groups or 
initiatives created to resolve conflict or drivers of conflict and the 
number of students trained through the Antiterrorism Assistance 
program, neither of which is specific to TSCTP countries, but both of 
which State and USAID exceeded in fiscal year 2012. 

* DOD conducts periodic classified assessments of DOD assistance 
efforts in northwest Africa to determine progress made toward the 
objectives outlined in DOD's Northwest Africa Campaign Plan.[Footnote 
28] 

* The National Counterterrorism Center conducts an interagency 
assessment, generally annually, of progress made through U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts toward achieving the strategic goals of the 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This assessment also 
identifies areas where adjustments or changes are needed to ensure 
that U.S. goals are achieved. 

Although agencies have taken some steps to evaluate their TSCTP 
efforts, they have not completed a comprehensive evaluation of the 
program. Additionally, agencies have not conducted and documented 
evaluations of all TSCTP activities that are funded from two of the 
five accounts that support TSCTP: PKO and ESF. For these accounts, 
agency officials said they primarily rely on informal feedback from 
posts to determine progress. Agency officials recognize that a more 
holistic evaluation of TSCTP-specific assistance is needed, noting 
that they plan to develop progress benchmarks for TSCTP within the 
next year to facilitate such an evaluation, consistent with a 
requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014.[Footnote 29] 

Agencies Have Established Ways to Leverage Resources and Operate 
across Boundaries but Can Do More to Integrate the Department of 
Justice: 

State, USAID, and DOD have taken several actions consistent with the 
key practices of leveraging resources and facilitating operations 
across agency boundaries, but can do more to integrate the Department 
of Justice. We have previously reported that leveraging resources and 
operating across agency boundaries can assist agencies with 
identifying opportunities to obtain additional benefits that would not 
be available if they were working separately and to prevent 
misunderstandings between the agencies.[Footnote 30] Agencies have 
taken numerous actions consistent with these key practices. For 
example, State, USAID, and DOD rotate the hosting of an annual TSCTP 
conference, where U.S. embassy officials implementing TSCTP in partner 
countries and in Washington, D.C., meet and coordinate with their 
interagency and headquarters counterparts and with representatives 
from other international donors, such as France. U.S. embassy 
officials who have participated noted that this conference was 
particularly useful for identifying important points of contact and 
gaining a better understanding of TSCTP. We observed the interagency 
interaction during the most recent TSCTP conference, held in 
Washington, D.C., in October 2013. 

Agencies have also developed interagency working groups that meet 
regularly in Washington, D.C., as well as at U.S. embassies in partner 
countries.[Footnote 31] These working groups provide an opportunity 
for agency officials to discuss potential activities as well as 
activities that will be initiated, thereby facilitating activity 
coordination and helping agencies to avoid conflicting or duplicative 
efforts. Other interagency efforts include the joint State and DOD 
process for selecting TSCTP security assistance activities to 
implement using PKO funds. To coordinate, State and DOD conduct 
regular meetings to jointly identify and prioritize which 
counterterrorism-focused security assistance activities to implement 
in Africa. 

While the agency actions described can enhance interagency 
collaboration, Justice--a key agency for building law enforcement 
capacity, with expertise in combating transnational crime and building 
the capacity of foreign prosecutors, investigators, and judges--is not 
currently included in the quarterly deputy assistant secretary 
meetings on TSCTP. As a result, TSCTP may not be fully leveraging the 
resources and expertise of one of the U.S. government's lead agencies 
for building partner nation law enforcement capacity in support of the 
TSCTP strategy. According to a State official, the quarterly senior-
level meeting has traditionally involved higher-level strategic 
discussions among the three primary TSCTP agencies--State, USAID, and 
DOD--that would not have necessarily benefited from the participation 
of other agencies that play a supporting role in TSCTP. However, after 
we spoke with this official about the potential future participation 
of other agencies in the quarterly meetings, State invited DHS and 
Treasury officials to participate, and TSCTP program managers at State 
have expressed their willingness to invite Justice representatives in 
the future. Justice officials have also expressed an interest in 
participating in these meetings, given their involvement in 
counterterrorism activities in TSCTP countries and their potential 
growing role in assisting State with implementing some TSCTP 
assistance. 

U.S. Agencies Take Steps to Consider Partner Country Needs, Absorptive 
Capacities, and Other Donor Efforts when Selecting TSCTP Activities: 

In selecting TSCTP activities, and consistent with the presidential 
policy directive on security sector assistance, U.S. agencies conduct 
a variety of assessments and meetings to consider partner country 
needs and absorptive capacities.[Footnote 32] They also rely on 
bilateral and multilateral outreach to consider efforts undertaken by 
other donors, although some donor nations are reluctant to share 
information on their activities. 

Agencies Conduct Assessments and Meetings to Identify Partner Country 
Needs and Absorptive Capacities: 

State, USAID, and DOD have all conducted assessments to identify the 
needs and absorptive capacities of TSCTP partner countries.[Footnote 
33] 

* As noted earlier, State has conducted assessments in support of its 
NADR-funded Antiterrorism Assistance program, which include 
discussions of country needs and absorptive capacities. For example, 
regarding partner country needs, one assessment noted that the country 
assessed needed to become more capable in securing and managing land 
and sea ports of entry, while the assessment of another country called 
for strengthened communication and coordination among units that 
jointly patrol the country's borders. With respect to absorptive 
capacity, an assessment of one country found it to be capable of 
absorbing additional training, whereas an assessment of another 
country identified infrastructural, personnel, and technological 
limitations to absorbing training. 

* USAID has conducted country assessments that include consideration 
of partner country needs and absorptive capacities in support of its 
TSCTP activities. For example, its 2009 Niger Counter Extremism 
Assessment notes that it had previously identified Niger's youth as 
the group most at risk for recruitment by violent extremists, and had 
accordingly recommended that TSCTP programming address the need for 
youth to find employment and participate in governance. A 2010 
assessment entitled Strengthening Stability through Development in 
Burkina Faso comments on absorptive capacity, noting that vocational 
training programs must be appropriately tailored so that the local 
economy can absorb the graduates of these programs and provide them 
with sustainable economic opportunities. 

* DOD has developed assessments of country needs and absorptive 
capacities as part of AFRICOM's annual process for selecting 
counterterrorism activities in Africa, including those funded by State 
from the PKO account. Specifically, AFRICOM has created multiyear 
plans for developing the counterterrorism capabilities of several 
TSCTP countries. These plans identify various partner country needs. 
For example, the plan for one country states the need for airborne 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to cover the country's 
long borders and provide operational support. The plan for another 
country notes that enabling it to transport forces to threatened areas 
will necessitate enhancements to aviation assets and the development 
of usable airfields. AFRICOM's plans also comment on absorptive 
capacity, as the plan for each country includes a military estimate of 
the maximum monetary amount of counterterrorism assistance the country 
can absorb per year. We discussed several of these plans during our 
November 2013 meetings with DOD and interagency officials at AFRICOM. 

Some agency and implementing partner officials also reported using 
meetings with host nation officials to identify partner country needs 
and absorptive capacities. For instance, a DOD official in Mauritania 
noted that after DOD responds to the Mauritanian military's requests 
for assistance with detailed proposals of what the United States can 
provide, she meets with Mauritanian military officials again to ensure 
that the detailed proposals are in line with their needs and capacity. 
Using this method, she said, has enabled her to identify opportunities 
for more targeted assistance. For example, meetings with the 
Mauritanian military led her and other DOD colleagues to modify a 
preexisting proposal to provide the Mauritanians with two technically 
sophisticated video cameras costing about $10,000 each and to instead 
purchase $1,100 cameras that were more rugged, easier to use, and 
better suited to the Mauritanians' needs. In another case, she learned 
from her meetings that the Mauritanian military has limited access to 
the Internet, after which she developed a project proposal to instead 
use satellite communications to transmit real-time intelligence to the 
Mauritanian military's national command center. In Niger, USAID and 
implementing partner officials stated that as part of the Peace 
through Development program, they meet regularly with community action 
committees--entities composed of representative members of the 
communities where the program is conducted.[Footnote 34] As USAID and 
implementing partner officials explained, the community action 
committees play a vital role in gauging the needs of the communities 
they represent, proposing activities to address the needs, and using 
firsthand knowledge of their communities to nominate participants for 
the activities who they believe to be at risk of becoming involved in 
violent extremism. A USAID official stated that the committees also 
assist in identifying absorptive capacity, as they help to ensure that 
the skills individuals learn through their participation in Peace 
through Development activities, such as vocational training, are ones 
for which a market exists in their home communities. 

Agencies Use Bilateral and Multilateral Outreach to Identify Other 
Donor Efforts, but Some Donors Are Reluctant to Share Information: 

U.S. agencies rely on various forms of bilateral and multilateral 
outreach to identify and consider the counterterrorism efforts other 
donors are conducting in TSCTP countries. With respect to bilateral 
outreach, agency officials in all three TSCTP countries we visited 
reported using meetings to coordinate efforts. For example, the 
regional security officer in Algeria stated that through discussions 
with her French counterparts, she had gained an awareness of the types 
of law enforcement training the French were providing to Algeria. 
Similarly, a DOD official in Mauritania cited a briefing she received 
from her Spanish counterparts that provided her insight into the 
security assistance activities Spain is conducting in Mauritania. 
Additionally, the regional security officer in Niger stated that he 
has contacted security officers at several other donor nations' 
embassies in Niger about their capacity-building efforts. 

With respect to multilateral outreach, U.S. and other donor officials 
identified a variety of multilateral efforts that have facilitated 
donor coordination and informed U.S. assistance decisions. For 
instance, several officials named the Global Counterterrorism Forum 
and its Sahel Working Group as key multilateral venues for sharing 
information and insights on the counterterrorism activities of other 
donor nations. In July 2013, for example, State officials noted that a 
recent meeting of the Sahel Working Group had been used to take 
inventory of the participant nations' civilian assistance efforts in 
the Sahel to ensure that U.S. efforts are not duplicative. In 
addition, a European Union civilian mission in Niger has assisted with 
international coordination. For example, through the assistance of 
this mission, the U.S. embassy in Niger was able to coordinate with 
the French on efforts to provide Niger with radios. 

These efforts notwithstanding, officials identified several donor 
nations that typically do not share information on their efforts with 
the United States. For example, the official who chairs the 
counterterrorism working group at the U.S. embassy in Niger stated 
that China does not participate in international donor coordination 
meetings. As a result, he said, neither the United States nor other 
donor countries have visibility into China's activities in Niger. In 
addition, officials at the European Union's civilian mission in Niger 
stated that Turkey and some of the wealthier TSCTP partner countries, 
including Algeria and Morocco, have provided counterterrorism aid to 
Niger but do not customarily share information on such activities with 
other donors. 

Conclusions: 

Terrorist groups in northwest Africa continue to pose a national 
security threat to the United States. To address this threat, U.S. 
agencies have allocated nearly $290 million since 2009 to provide a 
wide range of diplomacy, development, and security assistance to 
partner countries through TSCTP. However, because TSCTP program 
managers at State and USAID do not routinely collect and assess data 
on the status of funds for TSCTP--including unobligated balances, 
unliquidated obligations, and disbursements--they may lack key 
information that could help inform current and future TSCTP program 
management decisions. Further, while State, USAID, and DOD are 
generally consistent with most key practices of interagency 
collaboration in their efforts to implement a whole-of-government 
approach to TSCTP, the Department of Justice has not been fully 
integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts although it has expertise 
in building law enforcement capacity--one of TSCTP's five lines of 
effort. We believe opportunities exist to enhance program management 
and interagency collaboration that would help program managers as well 
as decision makers better plan future TSCTP activities and leverage 
the expertise of all relevant U.S. agencies. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance TSCTP program management and interagency collaboration, we 
make the following two recommendations. 

First, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Administrator 
of USAID ensure that TSCTP program managers take steps to routinely 
collect and assess information that will better enable them to 
efficiently determine and report on the status of funds allocated for 
TSCTP. 

Second, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Administrator of USAID and the Secretary of Defense, take steps to 
ensure that the Department of Justice is better integrated into TSCTP 
coordination efforts. This could include inviting Justice to quarterly 
meetings on TSCTP held at the deputy assistant secretary level. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, DOD, DHS, Justice, 
Treasury, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency for their review and comment. State and 
USAID provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendixes 
V and VI, respectively. State, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency also provided 
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD, DHS, 
Justice, and Treasury did not provide comments. 

State concurred with our recommendations to take steps to routinely 
collect and assess information on the status of funds allocated for 
TSCTP and to better integrate the Department of Justice into TSCTP 
coordination efforts. Specifically, State said it is seeking to 
identify better mechanisms and processes for collecting and 
maintaining financial data on TSCTP activities and will engage Justice 
to explore formalized participation in the TSCTP working group as well 
as higher-level policy coordination mechanisms. USAID also concurred 
with GAO's recommendation to routinely collect and assess information 
on the status of funds allocated for TSCTP and stated that it is 
seeking to identify better processes for collecting and maintaining 
financial data on TSCTP. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, State, USAID, DOD, DHS, Justice, Treasury, the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO 
website at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or j [Hyperlink, johnsoncm@gao.gov] 
ohnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed 
in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To examine the status of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP)-related funding and U.S. agencies' ability to track such 
funding, we reviewed relevant laws and other funding documents and 
asked officials from the Department of State (State) and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide data on 
allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and 
disbursements for TSCTP by country and account for fiscal years 2009 
through 2013. As neither State nor USAID routinely collects or 
maintains these funding elements in a central source, the agencies had 
to gather the data from various databases. The process of gathering 
the data took several months and, according to State and USAID 
officials, was very time-consuming and labor-intensive. To determine 
the reliability of the funding data we received from State and USAID, 
we compared and corroborated information from the sources the agencies 
relied upon, requested information from State and USAID officials 
regarding the processes they use to collect and verify each data 
source, and checked the complete agency data sets for reasonableness 
and completeness. As we note throughout this report, the funding data 
we received from State are current as of November 2013, while the 
funding data we received from USAID are current as of December 2013. 
We did not conduct a financial audit of the funding data and are not 
expressing a financial opinion on them. Based on the checks we 
performed, we determined that the funding data we collected from State 
and USAID were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
engagement. 

To examine the extent to which U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is 
consistent with key practices of interagency collaboration, we 
collected and reviewed U.S. government strategy documents, agency 
reports, and evaluations to identify and compare agency actions with 
key practices GAO has identified for enhancing interagency 
collaboration.[Footnote 35] We reviewed the National Security 
Strategy, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, State and 
USAID's strategic plans for fiscal years 2007-2012 and 2014-2017, the 
Department of Defense's (DOD) 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 
Guiding Strategy for TSCTP, approved in 2014. In addition, we reviewed 
State's Foreign Operations Performance Reports, Mission Resource 
Requests, Bureau Resource Requests, Integrated Country Strategies, and 
Antiterrorism Assistance assessments. For DOD, we reviewed the 
Northwest Africa Campaign Plan and assessments of the Northwest Africa 
Campaign Plan, among other documents. For USAID, we reviewed the mid-
term and final evaluations of the first phase of the Peace through 
Development program; country assessments for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger; and a report on factors contributing to violent 
extremism. 

To identify whether U.S. agencies considered partner country needs, 
absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP 
activities, we reviewed State and DOD guidance for agency officials 
proposing TSCTP activities. In addition, we reviewed agency 
assessments, to include several State Antiterrorism Assessments; USAID 
assessments for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; and 
the U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) multiyear plans for developing the 
counterterrorism capabilities of TSCTP countries. We also reviewed 
documentation from the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the European 
Union's Common Security and Defence Policy civilian mission in Niger. 

Additionally, we discussed our objectives with State, USAID, and DOD; 
the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury; and 
intelligence community officials in the Washington, D.C., area. At 
State, we interviewed officials from the Bureaus of African Affairs, 
Near Eastern Affairs, Political-Military Affairs, Counterterrorism, 
and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. At USAID, we 
met with officials from the Bureau for Africa and the Bureau for 
Policy, Planning, and Learning. At DOD, we interviewed officials from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. 
Additionally, we met with participants of the 2013 annual TSCTP 
conference that USAID hosted in Washington, D.C., in October 2013, 
including U.S. embassy officials from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal. 

To obtain a more in-depth understanding of TSCTP, we conducted 
fieldwork in November 2013 at AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany, during 
which we met with DOD representatives as well as a State political 
adviser and a USAID adviser. Subsequently, in December 2013, we 
conducted fieldwork in Algiers, Algeria; Nouakchott, Mauritania; and 
Niamey, Niger, to observe TSCTP assistance and meet with U.S. embassy 
and partner country officials implementing TSCTP as well as 
international donors conducting similar counterterrorism activities, 
including officials from the Canadian Embassy and African Union in 
Algeria and officials from the European Union in Algeria and Niger. We 
also interviewed U.S. implementing partners, including officials 
implementing USAID's Peace through Development program in Niger and 
State-funded training and equipping efforts in Mauritania, as well as 
local participants in TSCTP activities, including a community action 
committee in Niamey, Niger. In addition, we visited a U.S.-funded 
military facility in Mauritania and met with Algerian, Mauritanian, 
and Nigerien government officials and Algerian and Mauritanian 
security forces officials. In selecting the countries to visit, we 
considered several criteria, including but not limited to the level of 
funding received by each country for TSCTP activities, geographic 
distribution, the number and duration of TSCTP activities in each 
country, and agency recommendations. 

To identify terrorist events in TSCTP countries between 2009 and 2012, 
we used the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism's Global Terrorism Database. To determine the 
reliability of these data on terrorist events, we reviewed 
documentation outlining the database's scope and methodology, checked 
the data for reasonableness, and interviewed a knowledgeable official 
at the consortium regarding the database. On the basis of these 
checks, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this engagement. Regarding key terrorist groups in 
northwest Africa and their regions of operation, we received and 
incorporated input from officials in State's Bureaus of African 
Affairs, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence and Research on how best 
to depict the geographic presence of groups that State identified as 
primary concerns to U.S. interests. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Examples of Activities Conducted Using Funds Allocated 
for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: 

Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, State, USAID, and DOD conducted a 
variety of activities using TSCTP-dedicated funding. As previously 
noted, State has conducted diplomacy and law enforcement activities, 
while USAID and DOD have focused on development and security 
assistance activities, respectively. 

* State's TSCTP activities include public diplomacy efforts as well as 
law enforcement training and equipping and criminal justice sector 
reform. Through its public diplomacy efforts, State provides messaging 
that is intended to represent an alternative to violent extremist 
propaganda, including support for mainstream media and other forums 
that promote interfaith dialogue and peaceful political participation. 
For example, figure 7 shows an imam training and interfaith dialogue 
workshop in Chad. State's law enforcement training and equipping 
efforts focus on building partner nations' capacity to prevent, 
respond to, investigate, and prosecute acts of terrorism. According to 
State, providing border security training and equipment to secure 
porous land, air, and maritime borders makes up a significant 
component of these activities. 

Figure 7: State TSCTP-Funded Imam Training and Interfaith Dialogue 
Workshop in Chad: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. 

Source: Department of State. GAO-14-518. 

[End of figure] 

* USAID's TSCTP activities include efforts to support youth 
employment, strengthen local governance capacity, and improve access 
to education. USAID's TSCTP activities are primarily conducted through 
the Peace through Development program in Niger, Chad, and Burkina 
Faso, which succeeds a prior Peace through Development program that 
mainly targeted Niger and Chad.[Footnote 36] USAID envisions the 
current Peace through Development program as a 5-year effort that, 
according to USAID officials, includes various "layers" of activities, 
such as support for messages of tolerance and moderation, livelihood 
support, and education, among others. Figure 8 shows one example of 
USAID assistance efforts--a radio studio built in Niger to support 
messaging efforts as part of the Peace through Development program. 

Figure 8: USAID TSCTP-Funded Radio Studio in Niger: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. 

Source: GAO. GAO-14-518. 

[End of figure] 

* DOD's TSCTP activities, funded from State's Peacekeeping Operations 
account, include counterterrorism training and equipping.[Footnote 37] 
Examples of DOD's activities include multicountry training in 
logistics, military intelligence, combat medical skills, and civil-
military operations; bilateral training and equipping of 
counterterrorism and military intelligence units; and providing spare 
parts and maintenance for vehicles. Other Peacekeeping Operations-
funded activities have been implemented directly by State contractors. 
For instance, figure 9 shows radio equipment provided for the 
Mauritanian military's national command center and body armor and 
night vision goggles for Mauritanian special forces. 

Figure 9: State TSCTP-Funded Radio Equipment for Mauritanian Military 
National Command Center and Body Armor and Night Vision Goggles for 
Mauritanian Special Forces: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs] 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. 

Source: GAO. GAO-14-518. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Examples of Accounts and Programs That Support 
Counterterrorism Activities outside of the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership: 

Examples of accounts used by State and USAID to support 
counterterrorism activities outside of TSCTP include the following: 

* Foreign Military Financing--authorizes the President to finance the 
procurement of defense articles and services for foreign countries and 
international organizations. This assistance supports, among other 
things, building and sustaining military counterterrorism capabilities 
globally. In Africa, State created a Regional Africa Counterterrorism 
program specifically to help sustain activities built through 
counterterrorism capacity-building programs in Africa. These funds are 
approved by State and implemented by DOD. 

* International Military Education and Training--authorizes the 
President to furnish military education and training to military and 
related civilian personnel of foreign countries. This assistance 
supports the professionalization of militaries globally through 
training and education activities, primarily in the United States. 
Courses in Africa are not focused on counterterrorism but may include 
counterterrorism topics as part of efforts to professionalize and 
establish relationships with foreign militaries. These funds are State-
approved and DOD-implemented. 

* Peacekeeping Operations--authorizes the President to furnish 
assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for 
peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance 
of the national security interests of the United States. Outside of 
funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, Peacekeeping Operations funds have 
been used to support security sector reform in the region, such as in 
Mali for fiscal year 2014. In fiscal year 2013, Peacekeeping 
Operations funds not dedicated for TSCTP were used to train and equip 
African troops deploying to the African Union mission in Mali, which 
has since transitioned into a United Nations mission. 

* Development Assistance--authorizes the President to provide 
assistance for various purposes, including agricultural development, 
education and human resources development, grant assistance for 
microenterprises, and a development fund for Africa, among other 
purposes. Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, USAID has 
used Development Assistance funds to transfer financial resources to 
developing countries as well as to help countries solve development 
problems. 

* Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs--
authorizes the President to provide antiterrorism assistance, 
nonproliferation and export control assistance, and other assistance 
to foreign countries for various purposes. Outside of funds dedicated 
for TSCTP programs, State has provided Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-funded assistance to 
support additional activities designed to enhance the antiterrorism 
skills of friendly countries by providing training and equipment and 
other programs run by State's Bureau of Counterterrorism, including 
its Counterterrorism Engagement, Counterterrorism Finance, Countering 
Violent Extremism, and Regional Strategic Initiative programs. State 
has provided some funding from this account to the Department of 
Justice to implement activities, such as providing resident legal 
advisers and training in criminal investigative techniques to select 
TSCTP countries. 

* Economic Support Fund--authorizes the President to assist countries 
and organizations in order to promote economic or political stability. 
Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, State has used the 
Economic Support Fund to support its Countering Violent Extremism 
Program and the interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications, while USAID has used it for programs and activities to 
counter violent extremism in the Sahel region. 

* International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement--authorizes the 
President to assist foreign countries and international organizations 
to control narcotics and other controlled substances, or for other 
anticrime purposes. Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, 
State has provided International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 
funds to assist foreign countries and international organizations in 
developing and implementing policies and programs that maintain the 
rule of law and strengthen institutional law enforcement and judicial 
capabilities, including combating transnational crime. State has 
provided some funding from this account to the Department of Justice 
to provide resident and intermittent legal advisers in TSCTP countries. 

Examples of DOD accounts or programs supporting counterterrorism 
activities outside of TSCTP include the following: 

* Section 1206 funds--These funds may be used by DOD to build the 
capacity of a foreign country's military forces and security forces to 
(1) conduct counterterrorist operations and (2) enable foreign 
military forces to participate in or support military and stability 
operations with the U.S. armed forces. Programs funded with this 
assistance must be jointly formulated and implemented by the 
Secretaries of Defense and State, and the law authorizes DOD to 
provide the assistance with the Secretary of State's concurrence. 

* Various Title X programs--DOD's primary source of funding to support 
activities conducted by the armed forces, including its 
counternarcotics program, Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, and 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. 

* Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara--DOD's mission-oriented 
regional program that supports personnel activities related to 
implementation of TSCTP and other related DOD counterterrorism efforts. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Status of Funds Allocated for Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership Activities: 

Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, State and USAID allocated about 
$288 million for TSCTP activities. Tables 4 through 10 show the status 
of funding for TSCTP activities between fiscal years 2009 and 2013 and 
the total by account. Specifically, the table for each account shows 
allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and 
disbursements. 

Table 4: Status of Peacekeeping Operations Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 
2013: 

Allocated; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $15,000,000; 
2010: $21,000,000; 
2011: $19,939,000; 
2012: $20,001,000; 
2013: $16,100,000; 
Total: $92,040,000. 

Unobligated balance; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Unliquidated obligations; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $4,310,000; 
2010: $4,612,000; 
2011: $5,667,000; 
2012: $4,456,000; 
2013: $15,739,000; 
Total: $34,784,000. 

Disbursed; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $10,690,000; 
2010: $16,388,000; 
2011: $14,272,000; 
2012: $15,545,000; 
2013: $361,000; 
Total: $57,256,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. GAO-14-518. 

[End of table] 

Table 5: Status of Development Assistance Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of December 
2013: 

Allocated; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $10,700,000; 
2010: $27,450,000; 
2011: $22,750,000; 
2012: $12,825,000; 
2013: $12,689,000; 
Total: $86,414,000. 

Unobligated balance; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: $1,907,000[A]; 
Total: $1,907,000. 

Unliquidated obligations; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $6,699,000; 
2011: $20,198,000; 
2012: $11,284,000; 
2013: $10,782,000; 
Total: $48,963,000. 

Disbursed; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $10,700,000; 
2010: $20,751,000; 
$2011: $2,552,000; 
2012: $1,541,000; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: $35,544,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. GAO-14-518. 

[A] The unobligated balance in fiscal year 2013 reflects funds that 
remain available for obligation until September 30, 2014 and that 
USAID is in the process of obligating. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: Status of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 
Related Programs Antiterrorism Assistance Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 
2013: 

Allocated; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $6,950,000; 
2010: $14,124,000; 
2011: $9,403,000; 
2012: $12,071,000; 
2013: $9,947,000; 
Total: $52,495,000. 

Unobligated balance; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $2,108,000[A]; 
2010: $3,259,000[A]; 
2011: $827,000[A]; 
2012: $545,000[A]; 
2013: $9,947,000[B]; 
Total: $16,686,000. 

Unliquidated obligations; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $93,000; 
2010: $646,000; 
2011: $1,602,000; 
2012: $5,913,000; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: $8,254,000. 

Disbursed; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $4,749,000; 
2010: $10,219,000; 
2011: $6,974,000; 
2012: $5,613,000; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: $27,555,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. GAO-14-518. 

[A] The unobligated balances from fiscal years 2009 through 2012, 
totaling about $6.7 million, are funds that, according to State 
officials, were not obligated or were deobligated and may no longer be 
available to incur new obligations. Once the period of availability 
for obligation has expired, unobligated balances remain available for 
an additional 5 fiscal years for recording and adjusting obligations 
properly chargeable to the appropriations period of availability. For 
example, these funds may remain available for contract modifications 
properly within the scope of the original contract. 

[B] The unobligated balance in fiscal year 2013 reflects funds that 
remain available for obligation until September 30, 2014 and that 
State is in the process of obligating. 

[End of table] 

Table 7: Status of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 
Related Programs Counterterrorism Finance Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 
2013: 

Allocated; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $1,500,000; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: $1,500,000. 

Unobligated balance; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Unliquidated obligations; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $1,244,000; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: $1,244,000. 

Disbursed; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $256,000; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: $256,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. GAO-14-518. 

[End of table] 

Table 8: Status of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 
Related Programs Terrorist Interdiction Program Funding for TSCTP 
Activities, by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 
2013: 

Allocated; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $530,000; 
2011: $500,000; 
2012: $850,000; 
2013: $1,636,000; 
Total: $3,516,000. 

Dollars in thousands: Unobligated balance; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: $1,636[A]; 
Total: $1,636,000. 

Dollars in thousands: Unliquidated obligations; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Dollars in thousands: Disbursed; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $530,000; 
2011: $500,000; 
2012: $850,000; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: $1,880,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. GAO-14-518. 

[A] The unobligated balance in fiscal year 2013 reflects funds that 
remain available for obligation until September 30, 2014 and that State 
is in the process of planning how to obligate. 

[End of table] 

Table 9: Status of Economic Support Fund Funding for TSCTP Activities, 
by Fiscal Year Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 1, 2013: 

Allocated; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $4,000,000; 
2010: $11,000,000; 
2011: $3,500,000; 
2012: $5,500,000; 
2013: $5,305,000; 
Total: $29,305,000. 

Unobligated balance; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $4,000[A]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: $31,000[A]; 
2013: $5,206,000[B]; 
Total: $5,241,000. 

Unliquidated obligations; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $160,000; 
2010: $4,675,000; 
2011: $1,209,000; 
2012: $4,703,000; 
2013: $99,000; 
Total: $10,846,000. 

Disbursed; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $3,840,000; 
2010: $6,321,000; 
2011: $2,291,000; 
2012: $766,000; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: $13,218,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. GAO-14-518. 

[A] The unobligated balances in fiscal years 2010 and 2012, totaling 
about $35,000, are funds that, according to State officials, were not 
obligated or were deobligated and may no longer be available to incur 
new obligations. Once the period of availability for obligation has 
expired, unobligated balances remain available for an additional 5 
fiscal years for recording and adjusting obligations properly 
chargeable to the appropriations period of availability. For example, 
these funds may remain available for contract modifications properly 
within the scope of the original contract. 

[B] The unobligated balance in fiscal year 2013 reflects funds that 
remain available for obligation until September 30, 2014 and that 
State and USAID are in the process of obligating. 

[End of table] 

Table 10: Status of International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement Funding for TSCTP Activities, by Fiscal Year 
Appropriations (2009-2013), as of November 2013: 

Allocated; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $3,000,000; 
2010: $4,192,000; 
2011: $3,530,000; 
2012: $4,360,000; 
2013: $7,344,000; 
Total: $22,426,000. 

Unobligated balance; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $68,000[A]; 
2011: $2,000[A]; 
2012: $187,000[A]; 
2013: $3,962,000[B]; 
Total: $4,219,000. 

Unliquidated obligations; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $2,475,000; 
2010: $2,532,000; 
2011: $2,709,000; 
2012: $4,032,000; 
2013: $3,382,000; 
Total: $15,130,000. 

Disbursed; 
Fiscal years: 
2009: $525,000; 
2010: $1,592,000; 
2011: $819,000; 
2012: $141,000; 
2013: [Empty]; 
Total: $3,077,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. GAO-14-518. 

[A] The unobligated balances from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, 
totaling about $81,000, are funds that, according to State officials, 
were not obligated or were deobligated and may no longer be available 
to incur new obligations. Once the period of availability for 
obligation has expired, unobligated balances remain available for an 
additional 5 fiscal years for recording and adjusting obligations 
properly chargeable to the appropriations period of availability. For 
example, these funds may remain available for contract modifications 
properly within the scope of the original contract. 

[B] The unobligated balance in fiscal year 2013 reflects funds that 
remain available for obligation until September 30, 2014 and that 
State is in the process of obligating. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Comptroller: 
P.O. Box 150008: 
Charleston, SC 20415-5008: 

June 6, 2014: 

Dr. Loren Yager: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Dr. Yager: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Combating 
Terrorism: Enhanced Program Management Would Strengthen Northwest 
Africa Partnership" GAO Job Code 320983. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for incorporation
with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Peter Quaranto, Counterterrorism Officer, Bureau of African Affairs
at (202) 736-4435. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Christopher H. Flaggs, Acting: 

Enclosure: as stated. 

cc: GAO - Charles Michael Johnson; 
AF - Linda Thomas-Greenfield; 
State/OIG - Norman Brown. 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Combating Terrorism: Enhanced Program Management Would Strengthen 
Northwest Africa Partnership (GAO-14-518, GAO Code 320983): 

Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to 
comment on the draft report, "Combating Terrorism· Enhanced Program
Management Would Strengthen Northwest Africa Partnership." The 
Department deeply appreciates the professionalism of the GAO team over 
the course of this yearlong project, and the thoughtfulness and 
cordiality they demonstrated in carrying out their duties. 

The Department of State is committed to working with other U.S. agencies
and international partners to build the capacity and resilience of 
governments and civil society to contain, degrade, and ultimately 
defeat al-Qa'ida, its affiliates, Boko Haram and other violent 
extremist organizations in Northwest Africa. We view the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) as a valuable tool in this 
regard. TSCTP provides dedicated, flexible funding that enables multi-
year planning. TSCTP also promotes and enables a regional approach to 
countering terrorism, which is critical given the agile and diffuse 
terrorist threats in the region. 

We appreciate that the GAO report highlights the multiple steps we have
taken to strengthen TSCTP and implement key practices of interagency
collaboration. These include (1) agreeing on an updated joint, 
interagency strategy to guide TSCTP activities; (2) institutionalizing 
the interagency TSCTP Working Group, which holds monthly meetings 
and/or teleconferences; (3) setting up an email listserv to enable 
better information-sharing among TSCTP implementing agencies and 
stakeholders; (4) establishing an annual strategic planning process
involving U.S. embassies to validate TSCTP's priorities and evaluate 
its overall progress; and (5) standing up a Deputy Assistant Secretary-
level committee to provide strategic direction for TSCTP and broader 
efforts in the Sahel-Maghreb region. As noted in GAO's report, we have 
also continued to organize an annual TSCTP conference to promote 
coordination among agencies and between Washington and the field. 
Finally, we have also taken steps to improve coordination with 
international partners, including through the Global Counterterrorism 
Forum's Sahel Region Working Group. 

The GAO report's first recommendation is that the Department of State 
and USAID take steps to routinely collect and assess information that 
will better enable us to efficiently determine and report on the 
status of funds allocated for TSCTP. The report notes that respective 
implementing units track and analyze such data, but it is not 
consistently and comprehensively collected by the overall TSCTP 
managers in State's Bureaus of African Affairs and Near Eastern 
Affairs. We agree with GAO that this is an area for improvement. The 
number of interagency implementing units and U.S. embassies involved, 
each with their own reporting chains and requirements - as well as 
staff limitations - poses considerable challenges in this regard, but 
we are seeking to identify better mechanisms and processes for 
collecting and maintaining financial data on TSCTP activities. 

The GAO report's second recommendation is that the Department of State
take steps to ensure that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is better 
integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts. We agree with GAO that DOJ 
is a key agency for building law enforcement capacity and has an 
important role to play within TSCTP and related counterterrorism 
efforts. DOJ officers participate in TSCTP working groups at several 
U.S. embassies and support implementation of specific projects. We 
will engage DOJ to explore formalized participation in the TSCTP Working
Group as well as higher-level policy coordination mechanisms. 

Again, the Department of State expresses our sincere thanks to the GAO 
for its thoughtful assessments and engagement throughout this process. 
Please be assured that the Department takes the GAO's findings very 
seriously and will continue to work to strengthen TSCTP and all other 
tools that can advance our counterterrorism efforts in North and West 
Africa. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

June 10, 2014: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Govenm1ent Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

I am pleased to provide USAID's formal response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled "Combating 
Terrorism: Enhanced Program Management Would Strengthen Northwest 
Africa Partnership" (GAO-14-518). 

This letter, together with the enclosed USAID comments, is provided 
for incorporation as an appendix to the final report. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit 
review. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Angeliques M. Crumbly: 
Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 

Enclosure: a/s. 

USAID Comments on GAO Draft Report: No. GAO-14-518: 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Secretary of State and the 
Administrator of USAID ensure that TSCTP program managers take steps 
to routinely collect and assess information on the status of funds for 
TSCTP. 

USAID Response: We acknowledge the challenges in tracking funds for a 
regional crosscutting program across multiple operating units, and 
note that USAID's management of TSCTP funds is in accordance with 
federal standards and internal control procedures. We are seeking to
identify better processes for collecting and maintaining financial 
data on TSCTP activities. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Godwin Agbara (Assistant 
Director), Aniruddha Dasgupta, Kendal Robinson, Ashley Alley, Martin 
de Alteriis, Karen Deans, and Etana Finkler made key contributions to 
this report. Cynthia Taylor and Sarah Veale provided technical 
assistance. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Combating Terrorism: State Department Can Improve Management of East 
Africa Program. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-502] 
Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2014. 

Afghanistan: Oversight and Accountability of U.S. Assistance. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-680T] Washington, D.C.: 
June 10, 2014. 

Countering Overseas Threats: DOD and State Need to Address Gaps in 
Monitoring of Security Equipment Transferred to Lebanon. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-161]. Washington, D.C.: February 
26, 2014. 

Central America: U.S. Agencies Considered Various Factors in Funding 
Security Activities, but Need to Assess Progress in Achieving 
Interagency Objectives. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-
771]. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2013. 

Combating Terrorism: DHS Should Take Action to Better Ensure Resources 
Abroad Align with Priorities. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-681]. Washington, D.C.: September 
25, 2013. 

Building Partner Capacity: DOD is Meeting Most Targets for Colombia's 
Regional Helicopter Training Center but Should Track Graduates. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-674]. Washington, D.C.: 
July 24, 2013. 

Status of Funding, Equipment, and Training for the Caribbean Basin 
Security Initiative. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-367R]. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 
2013. 

U.S. Assistance to Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of 
Emergency Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-310]. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 
2013. 

Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage 
Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-335T]. Washington, 
D.C.: February 14, 2013. 

Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-218SP]. Washington, D.C.: February 
11, 2013. 

Security Force Assistance: DOD's Consideration of Unintended 
Consequences, Perverse Incentives, and Moral Hazards. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-241R]. Washington, D.C.: January 8, 
2013. 

Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in 
Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-824]. Washington, D.C.: 
July 10, 2012. 

Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for 
Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-614]. Washington, D.C.: 
May 15, 2012. 

Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information 
Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-534]. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012. 

Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. Efforts to 
Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-432R]. Washington, D.C.: February 
29, 2012. 

Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign 
Partners' Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-637]. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2011. 

Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on 
Terrorist Safe Havens. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-561]. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 
2011. 

Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development 
Assistance in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to 
Be Improved. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-289]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010. 

Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering 
Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on 
Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-883]. Washington, D.C.: September 
24, 2009. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area with 
Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-263SP]. Washington, D.C.: February 
23, 2009. 

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2008. 

Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International 
Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-351]. Washington, D.C.: February 
19, 2008. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] We previously reported on TSCTP funding and implementation in 
2008. See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance 
Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 31, 2008). 

[2] We reported separately on similar issues in our report on the U.S. 
Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism. See GAO, 
Combating Terrorism: State Department Can Improve Management of East 
Africa Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-502] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2014). 

[3] The Global Counterterrorism Forum was created in 2011 and, in 
addition to the United States, consists of 28 member countries and the 
European Union. The goal of the forum is to facilitate global 
cooperation in identifying and addressing critical civilian 
counterterrorism needs around the world. 

[4] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[5] Coups, human rights violations, and government abuses of power in 
partner countries, among other factors, can affect U.S. ability to 
provide assistance to such countries, including through TSCTP. 

[6] While DOD does not directly fund TSCTP activities, its Operation 
Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara program provides operational support for 
U.S. military personnel who conduct efforts to build partner nation 
counterterrorism capacity and synchronize security cooperation 
activities across the region, including those undertaken through 
TSCTP. DOD obligated approximately $205 million for Operation Enduring 
Freedom-Trans-Sahara between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. 

[7] Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006, as amended, established this program, also known as the 
Global Train and Equip Program, which is used to build the capacity of 
foreign military forces and foreign security forces to conduct 
counterterrorism operations, and to enable foreign military forces to 
participate in or support military and stability operations in which 
the U.S. armed forces are a participant. Through this program, DOD may 
provide foreign military forces with equipment, supplies, training, 
and small-scale military construction activities. Programs funded with 
this assistance must be jointly formulated and implemented by the 
Secretaries of Defense and State, and the law authorizes DOD to 
provide the assistance with the Secretary of State's concurrence. 

[8] The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
is responsible for coordinating TSCTP activities funded through INCLE. 
The Bureau of Counterterrorism coordinates TSCTP activities funded 
through NADR. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs coordinates 
TSCTP activities funded through PKO. 

[9] If an agency is not present in a country, it may not be 
represented on that country team. For example, USAID is not present in 
Algeria, so USAID is not part of the country team at that embassy. 

[10] USAID's Bureau for the Middle East coordinates TSCTP activities 
in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and the Bureau for Africa 
coordinates activities in Burkina Faso, Chad, Cameroon, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. 

[11] Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of 
African Affairs oversees DOD's TSCTP activities, provides policy and 
guidance to AFRICOM, and interfaces with other U.S. agencies in TSCTP 
implementation. 

[12] State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 4 FAM 013, and GAO, Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 1, 1999). 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[14] As we note throughout this report, the funding data we received 
from State are current as of November 2013, while the funding data we 
received from USAID are current as of December 2013. 

[15] The remaining approximately $28 million consists of about $10.5 
million in fiscal year 2013 funding that State and USAID are in the 
process of allocating and obligating to country-specific and regional 
programs and about $17.6 million in program management costs. 

[16] As noted earlier, the remaining approximately $28 million 
allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013 consists of 
about $10.5 million in fiscal year 2013 funding that State and USAID 
are in the process of allocating and obligating to country-specific 
and regional programs and about $17.6 million in program management 
costs. 

[17] State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 4 FAM 013. 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[20] Annual appropriations laws routinely include a provision stating 
that if NADR, INCLE, and ESF funds are initially obligated within the 
period of availability, they may be deobligated and remain available 
for obligation for an additional 4 years. For the most recent 
provision, see Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 7011, Jan. 17, 2014. 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[22] We did not evaluate the eighth key practice of interagency 
collaboration--that agencies reinforce individual accountability for 
collaborative efforts through performance management systems--because 
it is outside the scope of our review. 

[23] For example, one such quarterly meeting led to the recommendation 
to invite Cameroon to become a member of TSCTP. Subsequently, Cameroon 
became a member of TSCTP in January 2014. 

[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[26] USAID's recommendation to consider effects of project suspension 
was made after a military coup in Niger resulted in the suspension of 
a USAID activity, which adversely affected progress toward program 
goals, as demonstrated by both quantitative and qualitative data. 
Adverse effects noted in the evaluation included a reduction of trust 
in the United States as a result of the activity's suspension. See Mid-
Term Evaluation of USAID's Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb.1, 2011). 

[27] The annual Foreign Operations Performance Report is submitted to 
Congress as part of the congressional budget justification process. 
The Mission Resource Request is the first step in the State and USAID 
budget formulation process, where each U.S. mission, under chief of 
mission authority, annually justifies the resources required to 
achieve its foreign policy and management objectives. State and USAID 
bureaus evaluate the Mission Resource Requests to inform the Bureau 
Resource Requests, which are included in State's annual presidential 
budget request submission to the Office of Management and Budget. 

[28] Theater campaign plans, such as the Northwest Africa Campaign 
Plan, encompass the activities of a geographic combatant command--in 
this case, AFRICOM--and translate national or theater strategy into 
operational concepts and those concepts into unified action. 

[29] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. 
No. 113-66, § 1206(a), Dec. 26, 2013. This provision requires the 
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to 
develop a strategic framework for U.S. counterterrorism assistance and 
cooperation in the Sahel and Maghreb regions, including for TSCTP 
programs, and to report on that strategic framework to Congress. 

[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[31] We recently reported on effective approaches to enhancing 
interagency collaboration through mechanisms such as interagency 
working groups. See GAO, Managing for Results: Implementation 
Approaches Used to Enhance Collaboration in Interagency Groups, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-220] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 14, 2014). 

[32] Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance, 
issued April 5, 2013, calls for assessments that identify partner 
country needs, highlights absorptive capacity as necessary to 
sustaining U.S. investments, and notes the importance of coordination 
with other donors. 

[33] Officials in several countries noted the challenges of providing 
TSCTP assistance to partner countries because of the limited capacity 
of some members to absorb assistance. For example, one implementing 
partner official noted that in order for some partner country 
officials to be able to operate the radio equipment provided (similar 
to that pictured in fig. 9 later in this report), U.S. officials first 
had to teach them how to type on the computer. 

[34] For instance, a community action committee that we met with in 
Niamey included, among others, youth and religious leaders, a tribal 
elder, a representative of a women's group, and a radio station media 
specialist. Its president was a former mayor of the district of Niamey 
represented by the committee. USAID and implementing partner officials 
stated that they established community action committees as part of 
the second Peace through Development program and that each committee 
is intended to represent the community as a whole. 

[35] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[36] The $31.8 million first phase of the program, from 2008 to 2011, 
was designed to cover Mauritania, but USAID suspended its country 
program there following Mauritania's August 2008 coup.According to 
State and USAID officials, Mauritania was also invited to participate 
in the $62 million second phase of the program, from 2011 to 2016, but 
opted out because of its preference for bilateral assistance over 
participation in a multicountry program. 

[37] As noted earlier in this report, DOD does not directly fund TSCTP 
but implements some TSCTP assistance funded from State's Peacekeeping 
Operations account. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
"E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO's 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]