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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

May 2014: 

Arctic Issues: 

Better Direction and Management of Voluntary Recommendations Could 
Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation: 

GAO-14-435: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-435, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Recent changes in the Arctic from a warming climate, such as decreased 
sea ice coverage making marine areas more accessible, have increased 
global attention to the region's economic opportunities. In 1996, the 
eight Arctic States—-Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the 
Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States—-formed the Arctic 
Council to promote cooperation on various Arctic issues with input 
from indigenous groups. U.S. Arctic policy highlights the importance 
of the Council to pursue U.S. Arctic interests. 

GAO was asked to examine matters related to U.S. Council 
participation. This report examines (1) the Council's organization and 
how it addresses environmental and economic development issues; (2) 
how key U.S. agencies participate in the Council and any challenges; 
and (3) agencies' actions to implement and manage voluntary Council 
recommendations and any challenges. GAO analyzed key documents; 
interviewed federal and other Arctic stakeholders; attended a Council 
meeting; and visited four Alaskan Arctic communities selected for 
their sizes and needs. 

What GAO Found: 

The Arctic Council (Council) is a voluntary intergovernmental forum 
for Arctic States, with involvement of indigenous organizations and 
other stakeholders, to address various environmental and economic 
issues through projects and reports targeting a variety of subjects. 
The eight Arctic States guide the work of the Council through 
consensus decisions and rotate the chairmanship of the Council every 2 
years. The United States will assume the chairmanship in 2015. The 
participants meet in six working groups, four task forces, and various 
expert groups to produce such documents as scientific assessments and 
guidance. For example, the Council has produced assessments of Arctic 
climate change impacts and shipping. As Arctic issues have emerged, 
the Council has expanded and broadened its work to address them. For 
example, since the Council's was established in 1996, the number of 
ongoing projects has increased from about 30 to 80. 

Six key federal agencies hold leadership roles in the Arctic Council 
and other agencies participate through the Council's working groups 
and task forces. The U.S. Department of State (State) leads this 
participation and collaborates with the five other key agencies that 
lead the delegations to Council working groups-—the Environmental 
Protection Agency, National Nuclear Security Agency, National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and 
U.S. Global Change Research Program—-as well as other federal agencies 
with Arctic interests. In collaborating on Council work, the agencies 
face challenges by not having a clear direction or specific resources 
for their work. For example, key agency officials said that the 
agencies do not have a strategy that guides and aligns their Council 
work. Without a clear direction or specific resources for the 
collaborative effort, the agencies face challenges prioritizing the 
work, delivering unified messages to other Arctic States, and 
consistently participating in the Council. GAO previously reported 
that agencies can enhance and sustain collaborative efforts by 
engaging in various practices, such as establishing joint strategies 
and identifying necessary resources. 

Federal agencies have acted on some voluntary recommendations that the 
United States and other Arctic States have adopted through the 
Council. However, State does not review or track progress made on 
these actions and faces challenges implementing the voluntary 
recommendations. Specifically, State informally discusses the 
recommendations with other agencies during monthly meetings but does 
not have a process to review and track progress the agencies have made 
toward implementing them. State officials said that the agency may 
need to more formally assess such progress because, without such a 
process, State does not know the status of recommendation 
implementation and faces challenges planning for and prioritizing 
future actions to address Arctic issues. In addition, the United 
States—-with State as the lead agency—and other Arctic States face 
challenges implementing the Council's broad and numerous 
recommendations. To address these challenges, State officials said 
that the Council needs to more clearly specify and prioritize 
recommendations, but the Council does not have guidelines for doing 
so. Without such guidelines, officials said the recommendations have 
not historically produced actions with measurable outcomes. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that State work with relevant agencies to develop a 
strategy identifying direction for agency Council participation and 
resource needs; develop a process to review and track progress on 
recommendations; and work with other Arctic States to develop 
guidelines for clear and prioritized recommendations. State agreed 
with GAO's recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-435]. For more 
information, contact J. Alfredo Gómez at (202) 512-3841 or 
gomezj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The Arctic Council Is a Voluntary Intergovernmental Forum for Arctic 
States, with the Involvement of Others, to Address Environmental and 
Economic Development Issues: 

Six Key U.S. Agencies Participate in the Council with Leadership Roles 
and Face Challenges by Not Having a Clear Direction or Specific 
Resources for the Work: 

Agencies Have Acted on Some Arctic Council Voluntary Recommendations 
but State Does Not Track Actions and Faces Challenges Implementing 
Them: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Arctic Council Chairmanships: 

Appendix III: Full Text of Figure 1, Changes in September Ice Coverage 
from 2001 to 2013, Compared with the 1979-2000 Median September Ice 
Coverage: 

Appendix IV: U.S. Agencies Participating in Arctic Council Working 
Groups and Task Forces as of January 2014: 

Appendix V: Arctic Policy Group Participants as of December 2013: 

Appendix VI: Full Text of Figure 6, Arctic Alaska Site Visits: 

Appendix VII: Arctic Council Declaration Statements Identified by 
Department of State Officials as Recommendations to Arctic States: 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Changes in September Ice Coverage from 2001 through 2013, 
Compared with the 1979-2000 Median September Ice Coverage: 

Figure 2: Trans-Arctic Sea Routes: 

Figure 3: Permanent Participant Organizations of the Arctic Council: 

Figure 4: Arctic Council Organizational Structure as of April 2014: 

Figure 5: U.S. Agency Leads for Arctic Council Working Groups and Task 
Forces as of March 2014: 

Figure 6: Arctic Alaska Site Visits: 

Figure 7: September Sea Ice Coverage, 2001 through 2013: 

Abbreviations: 

BOEM: Bureau of Ocean Energy Management: 

Council: Arctic Council: 

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 

FWS: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: 

IMO: International Maritime Organization: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

SAO: Senior Arctic Officials: 

UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 

USGCRP: U.S. Global Change Research Program: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 16, 2014: 

Congressional Requesters: 

A warming climate is changing the Arctic environment and bringing 
economic development opportunities to the region.[Footnote 1] For 
example, over the 50-year period ending in 2009, average annual 
temperatures in Alaska have increased by 1.9 degrees Celsius (3.4 
degrees Fahrenheit), more than twice the average global temperature 
rise for this period.[Footnote 2] In addition, the coverage of summer 
sea ice has declined at an average rate of about 14 percent per decade 
since 1979, reaching its lowest point on record in 2012, according to 
the National Snow and Ice Data Center.[Footnote 3] 

As Arctic marine areas become more accessible, the region has 
attracted increasing global attention for its economic opportunities. 
For example, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated in 2008 that the 
Arctic has approximately 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil 
resources.[Footnote 4] In addition, trans-Arctic shipping routes are 
thousands of miles shorter than traditional routes between the 
Atlantic Ocean and Asia, and traffic through the Bering Strait 
increased from 217 vessels in 2008 to 484 vessels in 2012 and 434 
vessels in 2013, according to data from the Coast Guard. However, 
potential increased economic development opportunities bring increased 
concerns about possible pollution risks from oil spills and accidents, 
as well as challenges responding to such incidents in the region. Amid 
these environmental and economic changes, many indigenous people of 
the Arctic struggle to maintain their traditional way of life that 
relies on the ecosystem for subsistence resources.[Footnote 5] 

These complex and interrelated Arctic issues transcend borders and 
increase the importance of cooperation among the Arctic States--
Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark), Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
the Russian Federation (Russia), Sweden, and the United States--as 
they address common challenges and opportunities.[Footnote 6] The 
Arctic States began coordinating officially through the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy adopted in 1991 and formed the 
Arctic Council (Council) in 1996 to promote cooperation, coordination, 
and interaction on Arctic issues, particularly those related to 
environmental protection and sustainable economic development. 
[Footnote 7] The Council's charter expressly omitted matters related 
to military security. The Council's chair rotates among each of the 
eight Arctic States every 2 years. Canada assumed the chair in 2013, 
and the United States will succeed it as chair in 2015. 

U.S. Arctic policy and strategy highlight the importance of working 
with other Arctic States through forums such as the Council to pursue 
U.S. Arctic interests, including protecting the environment, managing 
resources, involving indigenous communities and the state of Alaska, 
and supporting scientific research.[Footnote 8] The U.S. Department of 
State (State) leads the U.S. participation in the Council and 
coordinates the related work of five other key federal agencies with a 
leadership role in the U.S. delegation--the Department of Commerce's 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department 
of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the 
Department of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Global Change 
Research Program (USGCRP)--as well as other federal agencies, such as 
the Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), that 
play various roles in the Council.[Footnote 9] 

We have previously reported on emerging issues and challenges for the 
United States in the Arctic. For example, we have reported on Alaska 
Native villages threatened by flooding and coastal erosion, finding 
that no single federal agency manages and allocates the limited 
assistance available to protect and relocate these villages.[Footnote 
10] In addition, in March 2014, we reported on U.S. Arctic maritime 
infrastructure challenges and the actions taken by federal, state, and 
local stakeholders to plan for future Arctic maritime infrastructure 
investments.[Footnote 11] We have included a list of related products 
at the end of this report. 

You asked us to review matters related to U.S. participation in the 
Council. Our objectives were to examine (1) how the Council is 
organized and how it addresses environmental and economic development 
issues; (2) how U.S. federal agencies with a key leadership role 
participate in the Council and the associated challenges, if any; and 
(3) the actions State and other federal agencies have taken to 
implement and manage voluntary recommendations the United States has 
adopted through the Council and associated challenges, if any. 

To address these objectives, we analyzed documents and reports from 
the Council and reviewed relevant literature from government entities, 
academic sources, and nongovernmental organizations. We also 
interviewed (1) knowledgeable officials from State and other U.S. 
agencies with a lead role in the U.S. delegation to the Council; (2) 
leaders of organizations that represent Alaska Natives in the Council; 
and (3) Arctic stakeholders including state of Alaska officials, 
Alaska Natives, representatives of nongovernmental organizations with 
Arctic interests, and academics that we selected by referral from key 
federal agency officials and based on their experience participating 
in the Council or their knowledge of its work. In addition, we 
attended a Council coordination meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, and 
conducted site visits to the Arctic Alaskan communities of Barrow, 
Kivalina, Kotzebue, and Wainwright. We identified these communities 
through stakeholder referrals and a review of literature and reports 
describing the issues facing Alaskan communities, and selected them to 
include a range of community sizes and needs, as well as their 
accessibility.[Footnote 12] We also analyzed Council documents from 
1998 to 2013 to identify recommendations made by the Council to Arctic 
States. Appendix I provides additional information about our 
objectives, scope, and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

This section discusses the origins of the Council and other 
international forums for addressing Arctic issues, U.S. Arctic policy, 
and key Arctic issues. 

Arctic Council Origins and Other International Forums for Addressing 
Arctic Issues: 

The Ottawa Declaration, signed in 1996 by the eight Arctic States, 
formally established the Council as an intergovernmental forum with 
the involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and others. The eight 
Arctic States are Council members and have exclusive decision-making 
responsibilities. The Ottawa Declaration named three Arctic indigenous 
organizations as "Permanent Participants" and opened such status to 
other Arctic indigenous organizations that met specified criteria, as 
well as observer status for non-governmental and intergovernmental 
organizations that can contribute to the Council's work. The 
chairmanship of the Council rotates among the eight Arctic States. 
Appendix II lists the chairmanships since the Council's inception. 

In addition to the Council, other international treaties, fora, and 
organizations exist that cover specific Arctic issues. For example, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty 
provides a legal framework governing the uses of the oceans and its 
resources. The treaty gives coastal states exclusive sovereign rights 
to explore and use the natural resources, including oil and gas, of 
their continental shelves.[Footnote 13] In addition, it establishes a 
procedure for coastal states that intend to establish the outer limits 
of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, when it extends 
that far. The United States is the only Arctic State that is not a 
party to UNCLOS, but supports and observes it as customary 
international law and practice, as stated in the National Strategy for 
the Arctic Region.[Footnote 14] However, without ratifying UNCLOS, the 
United States cannot make claims or participate in the proceedings to 
establish states' outer limits on their continental shelves. 

Next, through an informal forum, the five Arctic States with coastal 
territory above the Arctic Circle--Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, 
and the United States--adopted the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008. 
[Footnote 15] The declaration stated, in part, that these five states 
remained committed to the legal framework of UNCLOS and saw no need to 
develop a new comprehensive legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean. 
In addition, at a February 2014 meeting, these five states agreed to 
work toward preventing unregulated commercial fishing in the central 
Arctic Ocean and conduct additional scientific research. 

Finally, all eight Arctic States work through the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency, on issues 
related to the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of 
marine pollution by ships. The IMO expects to complete in 2014 a 
mandatory International Code of safety for ships operating in polar 
waters, which it terms the Polar Code.[Footnote 16] 

U.S. Arctic Policy: 

The United States has articulated its interests in the Arctic since 
the early 1970s. Three key documents that guide current U.S. Arctic 
policy and management recognize the importance of the Council in 
pursuing U.S. Arctic interests but do not expressly guide U.S. 
participation in the Council. First, the Arctic Region Policy issued 
in 2009 specifies U.S. priorities in the Arctic related to national 
security, international governance, international scientific 
cooperation, economic issues, environmental protection, and maritime 
transportation.[Footnote 17] The policy recognized, among other 
things, the establishment and ongoing work of the Council and that the 
United States participates in the Council to promote U.S. interests in 
the region. Second, in May 2013 the administration issued the National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region that articulates U.S. strategic 
priorities in the Arctic and the federal, state, and international 
partners that are involved in the Arctic dialogue.[Footnote 18] The 
strategy states that the United States participates in international 
forums like the Council to promote U.S. interests in the region and 
that the United States will pursue agreements that advance collective 
interests, promote shared Arctic State prosperity, protect the Arctic 
environment, and enhance regional security, among other things. The 
administration released an implementation plan in January 2014 
identifying the methodology, process, and approach for executing the 
strategy and recognizing the importance of international engagement 
for successfully managing the Arctic Region.[Footnote 19] Third, a 
2013 report on Arctic management produced by an interagency group 
recognizes the expert advice the Council provides on a range of 
subjects and recommended that the United States continue to play an 
active role in the Council.[Footnote 20] 

Key Arctic Issues: 

Numerous scientific studies, assessments, and government reports have 
documented the widespread changes occurring in the Arctic and their 
local and global implications. Climate change affects many of these 
issues because warming in the Arctic has exceeded the warming in the 
rest of the world. Scientists have documented the wide-ranging effects 
of such warming on various aspects of the Arctic environment.[Footnote 
21] For example, the coverage of Arctic sea ice has steadily declined 
since 1979, when satellite measurements became available. As shown in 
figure 1, an interactive graphic, sea ice coverage in the years from 
2001 to 2013 had decreased compared to the 1979-2000 average, reaching 
its lowest coverage in 2012 (see appendix III, figure 7, for a 
printable version). 

Figure 1: Changes in September Ice Coverage from 2001 through 2013, 
Compared with the 1979-2000 Median September Ice Coverage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive graphic] 

Interactivity instructions: Roll your mouse over the year to view
recorded ice coverage. See appendix III for a printable version. 

Note: The median ice edge displays the average annual minimum position 
of the ice edge. 

Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to declining sea ice coverage, rising Arctic temperatures 
cause thawing of the permafrost--permanently frozen ground, according 
to the 2009 USGCRP report.[Footnote 22] A 2012 Council report states 
that such thawing can decrease the stability of infrastructure such as 
buildings, roads, pipelines, and airports, and it affects natural 
ecosystems through ground surface collapse and draining of lakes, 
among other things.[Footnote 23] Also, particularly when combined with 
increased wave action from reduced sea ice coverage, the less stable 
ground becomes susceptible to coastal erosion, affecting coastal 
villages and community members. For example, in 2009, we reported that 
at least 12 Alaska Native villages decided to relocate or explore 
relocation options due to imminent threats from coastal erosion. 
Finally, as the permafrost thaws, contaminants frozen in the ice and 
soils can release into the air, water, and land, according to the 2012 
Council report. Various Council reports state that the thawing, along 
with increased human activity in the region, can introduce 
contaminants into the Arctic ecosystem, including persistent organic 
pollutants and mercury.[Footnote 24] 

Climate change also affects the Arctic Ocean's chemistry, increasing 
its acidity as the ocean absorbs the increasing amounts of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere, according to the 2013 interagency Arctic 
management report. This report stated that such ocean acidification 
could have consequences for the entire Arctic marine ecosystem, 
including possible detrimental effects on species of fish important 
for subsistence communities and commercial fisheries.[Footnote 25] 

The environmental changes in the Arctic have affected the region's 
people and ecosystems, but they have also brought about economic 
development opportunities. Specifically, according to a 2014 
Congressional Research Service report, a decrease in sea ice coverage 
leads to a more accessible Arctic, presenting potential opportunities 
to expand economic activities in the region. For example, the 
interagency Arctic management report stated that diminishing Arctic 
sea ice will likely encourage growth of commercial shipping via 
international trans-Arctic sea routes, even though the timing of such 
expansion remains unclear. As shown in figure 2, these routes include 
the Northwest Passage that follows the northern coasts of Alaska and 
Canada, connecting the east coasts of North America and Asia, and the 
Northern Sea Route that follows the northern border of Russia, 
connecting Asia and Europe.[Footnote 26] 

Figure 2: Trans-Arctic Sea Routes: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Map depicts: 

Northern Sea Route; 
Northwest Passage. 

Sources: Office of Naval Intelligence; GAO; and Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

Another economic opportunity arising from a more accessible Arctic 
includes potential development of the region's mineral, oil, and gas 
resources. However, the economic factors and technical challenges of 
operating in the Arctic environment will also affect the growth of 
such development, according to Department of the Interior officials 
and the 2014 Congressional Research Service report. 

A more accessible Arctic presents economic opportunities, but such 
activities can lead to negative impacts. For example, as we previously 
reported, increases in commercial activities could increase the risk 
of ship collisions or oil spills, and potentially increase demand for 
services such as search and rescue and other maritime navigation 
support.[Footnote 27] Furthermore, according to a 2011 Council report, 
increased shipping along with other human activities such as the use 
of diesel vehicles and residential heating can contribute to emissions 
of black carbon--a so called short-lived climate forcer--which can 
warm the climate.[Footnote 28] 

The Arctic Council Is a Voluntary Intergovernmental Forum for Arctic 
States, with the Involvement of Others, to Address Environmental and 
Economic Development Issues: 

The Council is a voluntary intergovernmental forum for the eight 
Arctic States, with the involvement of indigenous organizations and 
other stakeholders, to address environmental and economic development 
issues through various projects and reports.[Footnote 29] Arctic 
States, indigenous organizations, and others serve in various roles 
and cooperate and coordinate through numerous Council meetings to 
discuss and conduct work. The Council conducts a variety of projects 
including scientific assessments, reports, guidance, and regional and 
pan-Arctic initiatives. Arctic States, indigenous organizations, and 
others provide financial and in-kind contributions to carry out these 
projects, and the Council has expanded and broadened its work to 
address emerging issues. 

Arctic States and Others Serve in Various Council Roles: 

Arctic States serve as the members of the Council and make decisions 
by consensus among themselves. The Arctic States set the priorities 
for the Council, make decisions on Council matters, coordinate the 
Council's meetings, perform administrative functions, and finance the 
Council's work on a voluntary basis. Foreign ministers from Arctic 
states typically serve as Arctic Ministers and high-level staff from 
foreign ministries typically serve as Senior Arctic Officials (SAO). 
Staff from various agencies and ministries within Arctic State 
governments serve as members of the six working groups that perform 
the majority of the Council's technical and scientific work. 

Certain Arctic indigenous organizations serve as Permanent 
Participants in the Council. The Ottawa Declaration named three Arctic 
indigenous organizations as Permanent Participants and opened such 
status to other Arctic indigenous organizations that met specified 
criteria.[Footnote 30] Permanent Participants have the opportunity to 
participate in all Council meetings and provide input to reports and 
other projects but the Arctic States make Council decisions by 
consensus.[Footnote 31] Six Permanent Participants currently represent 
indigenous organizations across the Arctic, and four of the six 
Permanent Participant organizations represent Alaska Natives (see 
figure 3). 

Figure 3: Permanent Participant Organizations of the Arctic Council: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Permanent Participants: 

Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC); 
Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC); 
Gwich'in Council International (GCI); 
Saami Council (SC); 
Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON); 
Aleut International Association (AIA). 

Source: Compiled by W.K. Dallman © Norwegian Polar Institute. 

[End of figure] 

The Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat provides some 
assistance to the Permanent Participants.[Footnote 32] This 
Secretariat collects and communicates information about Council 
activities and decisions and disseminates it to the Permanent 
Participants. 

In addition, under the Ottawa Declaration, non-Arctic states; 
intergovernmental, interparliamentary, global and regional 
organizations; and nongovernmental organizations may apply for 
"Observer" status. The Arctic States grant Observer status to these 
parties through consensus. Observer organization representatives may 
attend Council meetings and can actively participate in the Council's 
working groups and projects but Arctic States make Council decisions 
by consensus. As of April 2014, the states had granted 32 
organizations and non-Arctic states Observer status: 12 non-Arctic 
states, 9 intergovernmental organizations, and 11 nongovernment 
organizations. Guest organizations can also attend meetings at the 
discretion of the chair and can contribute to certain Council work. 

The Council has six permanent working groups composed of Arctic State 
representatives that cover a broad range of issues such as emergency 
response, protection of the Arctic marine environment, and the 
conservation of Arctic flora and fauna. In addition to the working 
groups, the Council can establish task forces and expert groups, also 
composed of Arctic State representatives, for a limited period to 
address a specific issue. Figure 4 identifies the Council members, 
Permanent Participants, Observers, working groups, and active task 
forces as of April 2014. 

Figure 4: Arctic Council Organizational Structure as of April 2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: Illustrated Organizational Structure] 

Arctic States (8): 
Canada; 
Denmark; 
Finland; 
Iceland; 
Norway; 
Russia; 
Sweden; 
USA. 

Permanent Participants (6): 
Aleut International Association; 
Arctic Athabaskan Council;
Gwich'in Council International;
Inuit Circumpolar Council;
Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North;
Saami Council. 

Observers (32): 

Countries (12): 
China; 
France; 
Germany; 
India; 
Italy; 
Japan; 
Netherlands; 
Poland; 
Singapore; 
South Korea; 
Spain; 
United Kingdom. 

Nongovernmental organizations (11): 
Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas; 
Arctic Cultural Gateway; 
Association of World Reindeer Herders; 
Circumpolar Conservation Union; 
International Arctic Science Committee; 
International Arctic Social Sciences Association; 
International Union for Circumpolar Health; 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs; 
Northern Forum; 
University of the Arctic; 
World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Programme. 

Intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations (9): 
International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies; 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature; 
Nordic Council of Ministers; 
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation; 
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission; 
Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region; 
United Nations Development Program; 
United Nations Environment Program; 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 

Working groups (6): 
Arctic Contaminants Action Program; 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme; 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna; 
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response; 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment; 
Sustainable Development; 
Working Group. 

Task forces (4): 
Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention; 
Black Carbon and Methane; 
Circumpolar Business Forum; 
Scientific Cooperation. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arctic Council information. 

[End of figure] 

Arctic States and Others Cooperate and Coordinate through Numerous 
Arctic Council Meetings: 

Council participants cooperate and coordinate through numerous 
meetings including: (1) ministerial meetings; (2) meetings of SAOs; 
and (3) working group, task force, and expert group meetings. 

Ministerial meetings. Arctic Ministers meet biennially to set the 
Council agenda for the coming 2 years.[Footnote 33] The foreign 
ministers of the eight Arctic States typically serve as the Arctic 
Ministers.[Footnote 34] According to senior State officials, the U.S. 
Secretary of State serves as the U.S. Arctic Minister during the 2-
year chairmanship and presides over the biennial Council ministerial 
meeting at the chairmanship's conclusion. At the ministerial meetings, 
the Council chair typically proposes the priorities and projects for 
its chairmanship. For example, during the last Council ministerial 
meeting held in Kiruna, Sweden, in May 2013, Canada--which assumed the 
chairmanship in 2013--announced that the Council would focus on 
"Development for the People of the North" during the next 2 years. 
Canada proposed projects focused on responsible resource development, 
safe shipping, and sustainable circumpolar communities, among other 
things. Arctic Ministers may also set Council priorities, direct the 
SAOs and working groups to initiate new projects, establish new task 
forces, change the Council structure, approve new Permanent 
Participant or Observer groups, and endorse Council reports and other 
projects. To document decisions, highlight the accomplishments 
achieved over the past 2 years, and formally announce the priorities 
the Council will address for the next 2 years, the Arctic Ministers 
issue a ministerial declaration at the conclusion of each ministerial 
meeting. 

SAO Meetings. SAOs meet biannually to review and approve ongoing 
Council work. SAOs are government officials selected by the Arctic 
States who manage day-to-day Council activities. Most of the Arctic 
States designate an Arctic Ambassador to serve as their SAO, but the 
United States and Canada do not currently have Arctic 
Ambassadors.[Footnote 35] A senior State official serves as the U.S. 
SAO. During SAO meetings, SAOs review the ongoing work and approve 
reports from the Council working groups, task forces, and expert 
groups to forward to the Arctic Ministers. Arctic States or Permanent 
Participants may also propose new projects at these meetings, and the 
SAOs decide which proposals to submit to the Arctic Ministers for 
approval. 

Working group, task force, and expert group meetings. The Council's 
work takes place in the working groups, task forces, and expert groups 
that the Arctic States chair on a rotating basis. As such, the 
meetings occur in locations that span the eight Arctic States. The 
working groups meet biannually and the task forces and expert groups 
meet at times decided by the participating Arctic States. Each Arctic 
State selects a number of experts from government agencies to comprise 
a national delegation for each of the six working groups. Permanent 
Participants may also serve as members of a Council working group and 
Observers may participate in the work. Working group members carry out 
scientific assessments, draft reports and recommendations, and work on 
other Council projects as directed by the Arctic States. Each working 
group may establish operating guidelines and work plans. Arctic 
Ministers and SAOs review and approve the work plans and any revisions 
made to the operating guidelines for each working group. 

Arctic States and Others Conduct Projects Funded through Voluntary and 
In-Kind Contributions: 

According to federal agency officials, Permanent Participant 
representatives, and other Arctic stakeholders, projects conducted by 
the Council have played a major role in advancing the global 
understanding of environmental and sustainable development issues in 
the Arctic, and enabled Council participants to discuss possible 
actions to address them. These projects include scientific 
assessments, guidelines, recommendations, best practices, and other 
initiatives. Some key Council assessments and guidance include the 
following: 

* The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 2004: The Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment describes ongoing impacts of climate change in the 
Arctic and their consequences such as rising temperatures; loss of sea 
ice; unprecedented melting of the Greenland ice sheet; and many 
impacts on ecosystems, animals, and people.[Footnote 36] This 
assessment was the first comprehensively researched, fully referenced, 
and independently reviewed evaluation of climate change and impacts in 
the Arctic. 

* The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 2009: The Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment is the first comprehensive analysis of current and 
potential future Arctic shipping activity.[Footnote 37] It provides 17 
recommendations, which are still being implemented, related to 
enhancing Arctic marine safety, protecting Arctic people and the 
environment, and building Arctic marine infrastructure. 

* Community Based Monitoring Handbook, 2010: Federal officials 
described this Handbook as the best manual available for researchers 
to use when interacting with local communities in the Arctic.[Footnote 
38] In particular, they said that the handbook's positive examples of 
engaging with indigenous communities helped guide many researchers 
that may have had limited previous contact with indigenous communities. 

In addition to assessments and guidance, the Council has undertaken 
regional and pan-Arctic initiatives that produced concrete 
deliverables and, in some cases, led to measurable outcomes. For 
example, the Arctic Contaminants Action Program project on obsolete 
pesticides began in 2001 to reduce environmental releases of outdated 
pesticides found in 11 Northern territories of Russia. Through this 
project, working group members report they have inventoried, 
repackaged, and stored nearly 7,000 tons of outdated pesticides. 
[Footnote 39] In another example, the Arctic Maritime and Aviation 
Transportation Infrastructure Initiative carried out by the 
Sustainable Development Working Group developed a Web-based searchable 
map of Arctic infrastructure to better identify capacity and 
capability needs for future infrastructure development.[Footnote 40] 

The Council does not have a central source of funding for projects, 
and all funding is voluntary. Specifically, each working group relies 
on its own mechanisms to fund projects. State officials said that 
Arctic States provide nearly all funding and in-kind contributions. 
The officials also said that Permanent Participants sometimes provide 
small amounts of funding, but their contributions to the Council's 
work are almost entirely in-kind. Financial support from Observers 
cannot exceed that of the Arctic States, unless the SAOs decide 
otherwise by consensus. In addition, some working groups seek 
supplemental financing from international financial institutions to 
carry out some projects. According to some Council stakeholders, 
working groups may compete for project funding because different 
working groups might simultaneously have several applications for 
financing under review at the same international financial institution 
without any coordination. This arrangement places responsibility for 
the prioritization of projects in the hands of these external 
institutions rather than with the Council itself. Some federal agency 
officials also said that the voluntary funding structure makes the 
working groups and their projects vulnerable to political forces 
because Arctic States fund projects that reflect their own priorities. 
Further, federal officials said that these projects may not always 
reflect Council priorities and that the projects undertaken may not 
always be the most important or the most strategic. 

The Arctic Council Has Expanded and Broadened Its Work to Address 
Emerging Issues: 

As the opportunities and challenges facing the Arctic have grown in 
volume and complexity, the Council has increased its workload and 
created new task forces to address emerging issues. According to 
federal officials, when the Council was established in 1996, it had 
about 30 ongoing projects. Over the years, that number has increased, 
and State officials now estimate that the Council has about 80 ongoing 
projects. In addition, the Council has created a number of task forces 
to supplement the work of the working groups. The first task force was 
initiated at the 2009 Norwegian Ministerial meeting to negotiate a 
search and rescue agreement that was delivered at the 2011 Danish 
Ministerial meeting. The Council currently has a total of four task 
forces to address emerging issues during the 2013 to 2015 Canadian 
chairmanship. Some federal officials said that task forces address 
specific cross-cutting issues that require high-level discussion from 
decision makers. Two task forces, one during the Danish chairmanship 
from 2009 to 2011 and one during the Swedish chairmanship from 2011 to 
2013, resulted in two multilateral agreements among the eight Arctic 
States. However, according to federal officials, the expanded use of 
task forces sometimes pulls experts away from the core working groups. 
Further, one official said that if these task forces respond to new 
priority issues, the Council may want to revisit the structure and 
scope of the existing working groups and incorporate the emerging 
issues into the mandate of the working groups. 

The Canadian chairmanship has further broadened the Council's work to 
address emerging issues. For example, Canada's plan for its 
chairmanship includes facilitating the creation of a business forum to 
foster sustainable economic development in the Arctic and provide 
opportunities for businesses to engage with the Council.[Footnote 41] 
Some stakeholders said that, prior to this initiative, the Council did 
not have mechanisms to involve industry and businesses, but some 
industry and business experts participate on a meeting-or project-
specific basis. According to an Arctic stakeholder, business and 
industry have an interest in Council activities because the 
discussions and decisions made at the Council can directly affect 
their work. Moreover, stakeholders said that industry and business 
representatives provide valuable knowledge, expertise, and equipment 
for oil spill and other emergency prevention, preparedness, and 
response. 

As the Council's workload has expanded, the Council has facilitated 
and integrated its operations. For example, to enhance administrative 
support and continuity of its operations, the Council established a 
small, voluntarily funded administrative Secretariat in Tromsø, 
Norway, in January 2013. Prior to this development, the Arctic State 
holding the chairmanship performed the Secretariat functions. The 
Secretariat, which had a staff of seven at the time of our review, 
maintains and updates the Council's website; provides a repository for 
information; and facilitates information sharing among the Council 
working groups, task forces, and expert groups. Federal officials said 
that the Secretariat will enhance the institutional memory of the 
Council, increase information sharing, help organize activities across 
the working groups, and make the work of the Council more manageable 
and transparent. Some Arctic stakeholders said that the Secretariat 
will also help strengthen relationships with other organizations by 
providing up-to-date information regarding the Council's projects. 

In addition, federal officials said that the Council has adopted 
measures aimed at increasing communication and cooperation among the 
various Council working groups. For example, the Council encourages 
representatives from working groups to attend one another's meetings. 
Federal officials said that in early years of the Council, the Council 
working groups operated independently with little interaction. 
According to some Arctic stakeholders, this limited communication led 
to some competition for projects among the Council working groups. In 
addition, the Council issued a strategy in 2012 to improve internal 
communication, facilitate cooperation, and avoid overlap in Council 
work. Among other things, the strategy recommends that working groups 
prepare 2-page summaries following all meetings and distribute the 
summaries to the SAOs, Secretariat, working groups, and chairmanship 
to quickly inform them of meeting outcomes. 

Six Key U.S. Agencies Participate in the Council with Leadership Roles 
and Face Challenges by Not Having a Clear Direction or Specific 
Resources for the Work: 

Six federal agencies with leadership roles participate in the Council 
mainly by heading U.S. delegations to working groups and face 
challenges in doing so. Other federal agencies participate in Council 
working groups and lead U.S. participation in some task forces. 
Numerous agencies with Arctic interests collaborate through an 
informal interagency group to conduct Council work but face challenges 
because of not having a clear direction and specific resources for 
their participation in the Council. Finally, some mechanisms exist to 
consider Alaska's and Alaska Natives' interests in federal agencies' 
Council work, but agencies face additional challenges considering 
these interests. 

Six Key Agencies Hold Leadership Roles in the Council, and Other 
Agencies Participate Through Working Groups and Task Forces: 

Six key agencies hold leadership roles as head of the U.S. delegations 
to the Council's working groups, and other agencies lead the U.S. 
efforts on Council task forces (see figure 5). 

Figure 5: U.S. Agency Leads for Arctic Council Working Groups and Task 
Forces as of March 2014: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Working groups: 

* Arctic Contaminants Action Program: Environmental Protection Agency; 
* Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme: U.S. Global Change 
Research Program; 
* Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna: U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service; 
* Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response: National Nuclear 
Security Administration; 
* Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment: National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration; 
* Sustainable Development Working Group: Department of State. 

Task forces (4): 
* Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention: Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement; 
* Black Carbon and Methane: Department of State; 
* Circumpolar Business Forum: U.S. Coast Guard; 
* Scientific Cooperation: National Science Foundation. 

Source: Department of State. 

[End of figure] 

As one of the six key agencies, State leads federal agency efforts and 
participates in the Council in several capacities. For example, in 
addition to the Secretary of State's role as the U.S. Arctic Minister, 
State leads the U.S. chairmanship of the Council, which first occurred 
from 1998 to 2000 and will occur again in 2015.[Footnote 42] A State 
official also serves as the U.S. SAO and leads U.S. participation in 
the Sustainable Development Working Group. State officials said they 
consult with federal agencies to select U.S. heads of delegation and 
U.S. representatives to the Council's working groups and task forces. 
For example, State asked USGCRP to head the U.S. delegation to the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme working group and EPA to co-
chair a task force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers with Norway and 
Sweden that produced a report on black carbon, among other products. 
[Footnote 43] Some of these agencies provide varying amounts of 
funding to the working groups and task forces in which they 
participate.[Footnote 44] 

In addition to agencies with leadership roles, at least 15 agencies 
with Arctic interests participate in the Council's working groups and 
task forces (see appendix IV for a list of agencies participating in 
working groups and task forces as of January 2014). For example, a 
BOEM official participates in the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme working group's effort to produce a three-volume oil and gas 
assessment, which discusses the potential effects of oil and gas 
activities in the Arctic. Furthermore, Coast Guard officials said they 
formerly served as the head of the U.S. delegations for the Task 
Forces on Search and Rescue and on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response, and authored various chapters of the Arctic 
Marine Shipping Assessment. 

Most officials we interviewed from key agencies said their 
participation in the Council enhances their ability to leverage 
resources, fulfill their missions, learn best practices, or further 
develop relations with other Arctic States. For example, an FWS 
official said the work of the Council enables the agency to leverage 
resources to accomplish Council projects that align with its mission, 
and provides access to other Arctic States with common interests. In 
addition, a NOAA official said the Council helps the agency build 
partnerships that have provided opportunities crucial for conducting 
its work, such as obtaining access to other countries' exclusive 
economic zones to conduct scientific research.[Footnote 45] A Coast 
Guard official said the participation in the Council facilitated 
valuable interactions with international partners to sponsor research, 
identify best practices, and support development of shipping standards 
at the IMO and other standards bodies. Coast Guard officials also said 
working through the Council particularly enhanced bi-lateral relations 
with Russian and Canadian officials, supporting related initiatives 
outside the Council such as updating joint contingency plans between 
the United States and Canada to manage a cross-border oil spill, among 
other things. 

Agencies Collaborate on Arctic Council Work and Face Challenges by Not 
Having a Clear Direction or Specific Resources for the Work: 

Within the United States, federal agency officials who participate in 
the Council collaborate primarily through the Arctic Policy Group, an 
informal interagency group led by State but is not part of the Council 
itself. According to State officials, this group discusses Council 
issues and shares Arctic-related information, among other 
things.[Footnote 46] State convenes the group monthly and uses it to 
circulate information and identify agency officials to work on Council 
projects. According to a National Security Decision Memorandum and 
State officials, the Arctic Policy Group oversees implementation of 
U.S. Arctic policy but does not make policy decisions. As of December 
2013, this group consisted of officials from at least 39 federal 
agencies and the state of Alaska Governor's and Lieutenant Governor's 
offices (see appendix V for a list of agencies participating in the 
group). In addition to the Arctic Policy Group, EPA officials said the 
six U.S. heads of delegation collaborate through informal meetings, 
which generally occur quarterly and involve discussion of current 
Council work and priorities. 

Several agency officials we spoke with said that the Arctic Policy 
Group helps them collaborate on Council work, but some officials said 
agencies face challenges participating on the Council. First, some key 
agency officials and Arctic stakeholders said collaborating agencies 
face a key challenge by not having a clear direction to guide and 
align their Council work. Specifically, some agency officials and 
these stakeholders said that the six agencies have not developed a 
strategy that guides agency collaboration for Council participation 
and aligns the agencies' work. For example, a USGCRP official said, 
aside from State's overall role as the lead U.S. agency, other federal 
agencies have limited ability to influence one another and have no 
strategy to guide their Council work. The U.S. government and various 
agencies have Arctic strategies, but these documents do not articulate 
an overall approach for agencies to follow in Council participation. 
State officials said these strategies do not guide agency 
participation in Council activities instead, they reflect work 
conducted in the Council. 

In the absence of clear direction that helps align collaborating 
agencies' Council work, some stakeholders said the United States faces 
challenges prioritizing the work and delivering unified messages to 
other Arctic States. For example, an NNSA official said that U.S. 
agencies do not have a strategy applied across the agencies, but 
agency officials discuss and agree upon projects within the Arctic 
Policy Group as they arise. In addition, one stakeholder who 
participated in the Council said different agencies have delivered 
inconsistent messages when providing comments on various working group 
reports. The stakeholder said at times agency officials provide 
comments on reports but do not do so in an official capacity. The 
stakeholder also said that establishing Council priorities could unify 
U.S. agencies' voices. 

In addition to not having a clear direction for Council participation, 
officials from most of the six key agencies said they face challenges 
sustaining their collaborative Council efforts because they do not 
have specific resources for their Council work. In particular, agency 
officials said federal funding and staff time for Council activities 
come from general program budgets, which creates challenges when 
Council work must compete with other agency priorities for funding. 
For example, NOAA officials said their agency focuses mainly on 
domestic issues, which limits funding for international activities 
such as Council work even though this work relates to NOAA's mission. 
State officials also said the United States does not have specific 
funding for Council work because it had not formerly prioritized 
Council participation. In addition, agency officials said they do not 
identify their in-kind time spent on Council activities, primarily 
because of challenges differentiating Council tasks from their other 
duties. 

Some agency officials said that without specified resources for their 
Council work, they face challenges implementing agreed-upon actions 
and committing to Council activities. For example, EPA officials said 
the absence of funding specific to Council projects limits their 
ability to participate. In particular, EPA officials said Council 
ministers approved projects on mercury contamination, but these 
projects had not occurred at the time of our review because of limited 
funding from Arctic States, including the United States. In another 
case, according to a FWS official, the FWS official who leads the U.S. 
delegation for the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working 
group was not able to attend in-person two working group meetings in 
2012 and 2013, although FWS officials attended these meetings in 
previous years.[Footnote 47] Some stakeholders said inconsistent U.S. 
participation concerns other Arctic States, which may cause some loss 
of U.S. influence in the Council. Furthermore, State officials said 
the absence of specified funding for Council work makes it challenging 
to manage the increased workload. For example, State officials said 
the agency had two full-time employees dedicated to Council work, as 
of February 2014. Various agency officials and stakeholders said that 
State does not have enough staff necessary to carry out the agency's 
increasing Council responsibilities. State officials said they hoped 
to identify additional funding for staff dedicated to Council work and 
were developing a plan at the time of our review to identify their 
anticipated staff needs for the U.S. chairmanship in 2015. 

State officials said that developing a Council strategy, in 
collaboration with other agencies that participate in Council 
activities, which outlines a clear direction for participation and 
identifies resources might help sustain the collaborative effort to 
address these challenges and support the United States' role as chair 
in 2015. We previously reported on key practices for enhancing and 
sustaining collaboration among federal agencies.[Footnote 48] These 
practices include collaborating agencies (1) establishing mutually 
reinforcing or joint strategies to help align activities and resources 
for the collaborative effort and (2) identifying and addressing needs 
by leveraging resources, which entails, among other things, 
identifying human and financial resources needed to initiate or 
sustain a collaborative effort. Without engaging in these practices, 
the collaborating agencies that hold leadership roles may continue to 
face challenges prioritizing the work, delivering unified messages, 
and consistently participating in the Council. 

Agencies Consider Alaska's and Alaska Natives' Interests in Their 
Arctic Council Work, but Challenges Exist with These Efforts: 

Key federal agency officials we spoke with said they consider the 
state of Alaska and Alaska Natives' interests though various 
mechanisms, including the Council and the Alaska Arctic Council ad hoc 
working group, but they said challenges exist in doing so. In 
addition, key documents articulate the federal government's intent to 
consider the interests of Arctic stakeholders. For example, the 2013 
National Strategy for the Arctic Region includes fostering 
partnerships with the state of Alaska and consulting and coordinating 
with Alaska Natives and a 2013 interagency report to the President 
prioritizes partnering with them to implement the national 
strategy.[Footnote 49] However, officials from the state of Alaska and 
some Alaska Natives we spoke with had concerns about the extent to 
which federal agencies and their Permanent Participant representatives 
view them as partners and consider their interests since the United 
States is an Arctic nation because of Alaska. 

Regarding the state of Alaska, federal agency officials that we 
interviewed mainly consider its interests in their Council work 
through the Arctic Policy Group, direct interactions on the U.S. 
delegation to the Council, and the Alaska Arctic Council ad hoc 
working group consisting of interested parties in Alaska. Most of the 
key federal agency and state of Alaska officials we interviewed said 
the Arctic Policy Group is the primary mechanism for considering the 
state of Alaska's interests. An Alaska official cited the Arctic 
Policy Group as a helpful way to incorporate input from the Alaska 
region. For example, in February 2012, an Alaska state official 
presented the Arctic Policy Group with a state legislative-led task 
force's efforts to identify opportunities for addressing the economic 
and environmental effects of diminishing sea ice on Alaska, according 
to State officials.[Footnote 50] 

In addition, state of Alaska officials said they work directly with 
federal agencies by participating in Council working groups and 
projects. For example, regarding the upcoming U.S. chairmanship of the 
Council, Alaska officials sent State a list of four priority themes 
the state of Alaska would like considered when the United States 
assumes the chair in 2015, such as creating jobs and economic 
opportunities for Arctic residents and ensuring safe, secure, and 
reliable shipping.[Footnote 51] In addition, state of Alaska officials 
said they participated on the Council's Task Force on Arctic Marine 
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response and the Arctic Maritime and 
Aviation Transportation Infrastructure Initiative.[Footnote 52] 
Finally, Alaska officials said they also host a bimonthly Alaska 
Arctic Council ad hoc working group teleconference, which involves 
coordination with State officials, Alaska-based Permanent 
Participants, the Alaska Congressional Delegation, and others to 
facilitate communication on Council issues. 

Alaska state officials we spoke with said they faced three main 
challenges while working with the federal agencies to have them 
consider the state's interests in the agencies' Council work. First, 
Alaska officials said the state's Arctic priorities sometimes differ 
from those of the federal agencies, making it challenging for the 
state to have its perspectives incorporated into agencies' Council 
work. For example, Alaska officials said they tried to have their 
interests reflected in a report by the Council's Ecosystem Based 
Management expert group, but could not do so because the U.S. 
delegation working on the report had different priorities than the 
state of Alaska. Second, state of Alaska officials said State does not 
provide enough information on the process used to make policy 
decisions regarding the Council. Without this information, Alaska 
state officials said it is difficult to know which federal agency they 
should contact to provide their input and when to do so. In 
particular, Alaska officials said that federal agencies leading U.S. 
participation in Council working groups have a considerable amount of 
autonomy to direct participation and ability to affect project 
outcomes, which may not align with Alaska's priorities.[Footnote 53] 
Third, Alaska officials said the state had limited resources to engage 
with the federal agencies and participate in Council projects. Because 
of limited information on the process used for federal decision making 
regarding the Council and resources for Alaska's participation, Alaska 
state officials said they could not participate as fully as desired to 
ensure that the Council addresses their interests. Overall, an Alaska 
state official said that increasing collaboration between the state 
and federal government would help address some of these challenges. 

With respect to incorporating the perspectives of Alaska Natives, some 
federal agency officials leading U.S. participation in the Council 
said they consider Alaska Natives' interests through engagement with 
the four Permanent Participant groups that represent Alaska Natives. 
For example, State officials said they primarily consult with 
Permanent Participant representatives prior to SAO meetings on an as-
needed basis to discuss items on upcoming meeting agendas. Officials 
from other agencies said they work with the Permanent Participant 
representatives during Council meetings. For example, a USGCRP 
official said he engages with the Inuit Circumpolar Council through 
the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme working group.[Footnote 
54] In addition, a Permanent Participant representative said his group 
regularly talks with the U.S. head of delegation to the Conservation 
of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group, an FWS official based in 
Alaska. However, this Permanent Participant representative said he 
interacts less frequently with federal officials located outside of 
Alaska, such as the U.S. head of delegation to the Sustainable 
Development Working Group, a State official based in Washington, D.C. 

Various agencies and Alaska-based Permanent Participant 
representatives we spoke with said Permanent Participants' limited 
financial resources and number of staff for Council participation 
created challenges when considering Alaska Native interests in 
agencies' Council work. One Permanent Participant representative said 
over the years, increases in the number of Council activities, 
projects, and task forces in turn increased the burden on the 
Permanent Participants, particularly for travel to meetings. To help 
address these issues, State provides annual travel funding to the four 
Alaska-based Permanent Participant groups.[Footnote 55] Without State 
funding, the groups would have a more difficult time maintaining their 
Council participation, according to a Permanent Participant 
representative. In addition to travel challenges, the increasing 
number of Council projects challenges Permanent Participants' capacity 
to keep up with the workload. For example, a former Permanent 
Participant representative said that effective involvement requires 
participation in activities taking place between SAO meetings, such as 
spending time reviewing draft documents. This can pose challenges for 
some Permanent Participants because of a limited number of staff. 
Specifically, some of the Alaska-based Permanent Participant groups 
have no permanent staff, and others have only two to three staff. 

Our site visits to Alaska Native villages reinforced some of these 
challenges. Alaska Natives we interviewed from Barrow, Kivalina, 
Kotzebue, and Wainwright said some of their primary environmental and 
economic interests included the following: 

* ensuring sustainable economic development; 

* preventing pollution from oil spills and other hazardous materials; 

* reducing the effects of increased shipping traffic on the wildlife 
they hunt and rely on for food, such as whale, caribou, walrus, seal, 
and salmon; 

* addressing the adverse effects of climate change, such as sea ice 
retreat and coastal erosion; 

* reducing the effects of rising fuel prices; and: 

* preparing for increased visitors from cruise ships and any related 
incidents. 

One community leader said oil and gas development would provide jobs 
and address infrastructure gaps, but he would like this development 
conducted responsibly. Other community leaders said the changes in the 
climate, such as declining sea ice, make it more difficult for Alaska 
Natives to hunt the animals they primarily rely on for food and 
require some villages to construct sea walls or relocate due to rising 
seas and coastal erosion.[Footnote 56] See figure 6, an interactive 
graphic, for information on each site visit location (see appendix VI 
for the full text of this graphic). 

Figure 6: Arctic Alaska Site Visits: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive graphic] 

Instructions: Move your cursor over any of the photos below to read 
information about the associated site. For a noninteractive version of 
this information, see appendix VI. 

Sources: Department of the Interior; GAO (analysis and photos); U.S. 
Census Bureau; Cities of Barrow and Kotzebue; Government of Canada; 
Maniilaq Association; Map Resources (map); NANA Regional 
Corporation; North Slope and Northwest Arctic Boroughs; State of 
Alaska. 

[End of figure] 

Regarding representation of Alaska Native interests by the Permanent 
Participant groups, some Alaska Native community leaders we 
interviewed said they coordinate with their representative, and others 
expressed concern that their Permanent Participant group did not 
adequately represent them. For example, some Alaska Native community 
leaders said their Permanent Participant representative visited and 
worked with their community in various capacities, such as on a 
Council food security project. However, another Alaska Native 
community leader said the Permanent Participants represented too broad 
of a population, and he would like to have a Permanent Participant 
representative from his borough--a unit of government similar to a 
county. This community leader also said a Permanent Participant 
representative had never visited the community. Other Alaska Native 
community leaders we spoke with said they were not aware of the 
Council or how it represented their interests. 

Agencies Have Acted on Some Arctic Council Voluntary Recommendations 
but State Does Not Track Actions and Faces Challenges Implementing 
Them: 

Federal agencies have taken various actions on some voluntary 
recommendations that the United States and other Arctic States have 
adopted through the Council, but State does not have a process to 
review and track progress made on these actions and faces challenges 
implementing them. The United States endorses actions to address 
Arctic issues by adopting voluntary recommendations approved in 
nonbinding ministerial declarations and, more recently, signing two 
formal multilateral agreements that address specific high-priority 
issues.[Footnote 57] State relies on other agencies to act on the 
recommendations, but the agency does not review or track their overall 
implementation. According to State officials and other stakeholders, 
the recommendations provide a mechanism to strengthen the Council's 
ability to address Arctic issues, but the United States--with State as 
the lead agency--and other Arctic States face challenges implementing 
them. 

The United States Endorses Actions to Address Arctic Issues through 
Voluntary Recommendations and Formal Agreements and Has Taken Some 
Related Actions: 

The United States and other Arctic States adopt voluntary 
recommendations that the Council makes in nonbinding biennial 
ministerial declarations, which Arctic States negotiate and approve by 
consensus. We analyzed the eight Council declarations issued from 1998 
to 2013 and consulted with State officials to identify statements in 
the declarations that State considers as recommendations to Arctic 
States. In total, State officials identified 39 recommendations in the 
declarations that spanned many Arctic issues addressed in the Council 
including the marine environment, biodiversity, climate change, 
environmental protection, emergency prevention, and human health and 
development (see appendix VII for the list of recommendations that 
State officials identified). In general, the recommendations either 
identified broad actions associated with various Arctic issues or 
endorsed numerous recommendations made in reports and assessments 
produced by working groups and task forces.[Footnote 58] 

State relies on other agencies to act on the recommendations, and 
agencies have taken some actions in response. For example, several 
U.S. agencies have actively contributed to a monitoring initiative 
endorsed in the 2006 Salekhard Declaration.[Footnote 59] Specifically, 
the declaration encouraged the Arctic States to contribute to the 
Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program, an international network 
of scientists, governments, indigenous organizations, and conservation 
groups working to integrate efforts to monitor the Arctic's living 
resources. In response, U.S. agencies have contributed to the program 
through the Bureau of Land Management co-chairing the effort with the 
North Slope Science Initiative, an intergovernmental effort to improve 
collection and dissemination of ecosystem information in the U.S. 
Arctic, and the Arctic Research Centre in Denmark.[Footnote 60] 

Other actions recommended by the Council were already under way in the 
United States. For example, in 2009, the Council recommended that the 
Arctic States apply guidelines developed by the Council for offshore 
oil and gas development.[Footnote 61] According to a BOEM official, 
these guidelines reflected some practices already used in the United 
States, such as conducting environmental studies to establish baseline 
information for a region included in an oil and gas lease sale. In 
another example, the Council declarations in 2011 and 2013 encouraged 
Arctic States to implement recommendations in Council reports on short-
lived climate forcers, including black carbon.[Footnote 62] According 
to State officials, the United States has already implemented some 
actions aimed at reducing black carbon pollution. These actions 
include developing standards under the Clean Air Act to reduce 
emissions of particulate matter, of which black carbon is a component, 
as well as implementing voluntary EPA programs to retrofit diesel 
vehicles, the largest source of black carbon emissions. 

In addition to voluntary recommendations adopted through the Council, 
starting in 2011, the United States signed multilateral agreements 
with the other Arctic States on search and rescue and oil spill 
preparedness and response that were developed by Council task forces. 
[Footnote 63] In the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (Arctic Search and Rescue 
Agreement), the Arctic States committed to search and rescue actions, 
such as: 

* promoting the establishment, operation, and maintenance of an 
adequate and effective search and rescue capability within an area 
specified in the agreement; 

* ensuring that assistance is provided to anyone in distress 
regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or 
circumstances in which that person is found; 

* exchanging information that may serve to improve the effectiveness 
of search and rescue operations; and: 

* meeting with the other parties on a regular basis to consider and 
resolve issues regarding practical cooperation.[Footnote 64] 

In the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (Arctic Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response Agreement), Arctic States committed to oil 
spill preparedness and response actions, such as: 

* maintaining a system for responding promptly and effectively to oil 
pollution incidents; 

* establishing, as appropriate, a minimum level of prepositioned oil 
spill combating equipment; 

* establishing, as appropriate, a program of exercises for oil 
pollution response organizations and training of relevant personnel; 

* establishing, as appropriate, plans and communications capabilities 
for responding to an oil pollution incident; 

* promoting cooperation and coordination by endeavoring to carry out 
joint exercises and training; and: 

* developing and maintaining, with the other parties to the agreement, 
a set of operational guidelines to assist in the agreement's 
implementation but these guidelines will not be legally binding. 
[Footnote 65] 

The Coast Guard acts as the lead agency for implementing the two 
agreements and has taken or planned various actions in response. These 
actions include the following: 

* Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement. According to Coast Guard 
officials, the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement solidified 
partnerships with neighboring countries and formalized an existing 
understanding but did not formally commit the United States to 
allocate additional resources to search and rescue in the Arctic. 
Since the agreement was signed, the United States has organized some 
high-level meetings and committed to joint training exercises. Even 
while meeting the intent of the agreement, the absence of a permanent 
physical presence in the region limits the U.S. government's ability 
to respond to vessels or persons in distress in the Arctic, according 
to Coast Guard and State officials. 

* Arctic Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement. The Coast 
Guard has not dedicated any additional resources to implement this 
agreement but plans to participate in the first exercise under the 
agreement in 2014 with the other Arctic States, according to Coast 
Guard officials. An oil and gas industry stakeholder said that the 
Coast Guard could face challenges implementing the agreement in the 
event of an oil spill incident because the government does not own 
adequate equipment to respond to an emergency. This stakeholder said 
that oil and shipping companies own approximately 90 percent of the 
emergency response equipment in the Arctic. However, Coast Guard 
officials said the agency plays an oversight role in maritime incident 
response and that industry must provide any response resources. 

State Does Not Track Agencies' Progress Toward Implementing 
Recommendations: 

State does not review or track agencies' overall progress toward 
implementing the recommendations the United States has adopted through 
the Council. According to State officials, agencies discuss the 
implementation of recommendations informally during monthly 
interagency Arctic Policy Group meetings, but State does not formally 
follow up with the agencies to identify their progress toward 
implementation. Several senior agency officials said that 
historically, the United States has not made a concerted effort to 
follow up on recommendations because the Council had not been a high 
priority for State. However, the officials said that State has 
increased the priority of the Council recommendations as the United 
States prepares to assume the Council chair in 2015. 

Senior State officials said that they may need to more formally focus 
on follow-up and provide an overall assessment of progress made by 
agencies toward implementing recommendations. According to the 
officials, developing a process for U.S. agencies to review and track 
implementation progress would increase accountability across the 
government, enhance coordination across agencies, and avoid overlap. 
However, the officials also said that they would have to weigh the 
benefits of such a process against the resources it would require for 
maintenance. 

Without such a process to review and track progress toward 
implementing Council recommendations, State officials said that State 
and other key agencies do not know the status of the recommendations 
and could face challenges planning for and prioritizing actions to 
address Arctic issues. Specifically, State officials said that the 
agencies use the same resources to implement recommendations as they 
do for their other Council work, so adopting new actions reduces the 
resources available to take on the increasing workload of the Council 
working groups, task forces, and other efforts. The officials said 
they need to know the capacity of agencies to implement new 
recommendations as State prepares for the Council chairmanship through 
steps such as developing new project proposals and determining 
priorities. 

Broad and Numerous Recommendations Create Implementation Challenges: 

Some federal officials and stakeholders directly involved in Council 
work said that the United States--with State as the lead agency--and 
other Arctic States at times face challenges implementing the broad 
recommendations made in the declarations and the numerous 
recommendations made in the working group and task force reports. 
First, according to the officials, the ministerial declarations do not 
always clearly specify measurable actions that the Council recommends 
Arctic States take. For example, the broad recommendations included 
such statements as, the Arctic States "encourage actions to reduce the 
risks of radioactivity in the Arctic" and "urge implementation of 
early actions where possible on methane and other relevant short-lived 
climate forcers" in the 2000 and 2009 declarations, respectively. 
[Footnote 66] 

In addition to the broad declaration recommendations, our analysis 
found and State officials said the working group and task force 
recommendations endorsed by the declaration statements are too 
numerous for Arctic States to fully implement. State officials said 
that a complete list of these recommendations does not exist, but our 
analysis identified several instances in which working group and task 
force reports and assessments had from 10 to 20 recommendations 
directed to the Arctic States.[Footnote 67] For example, a 2004 
Council climate change report included 16 recommendations related to 
climate change, and a 2009 Council report on Arctic pollutants made 18 
related recommendations.[Footnote 68] In this context, State officials 
said that the working groups produced too many recommendations to the 
Arctic States without specifying priorities, making it difficult for 
the States to implement all of them or focus on priority issues. 

According to senior State officials, the Council does not have 
guidelines for developing clear and prioritized recommendations for 
the Arctic States. The officials said that not having such guidelines 
has contributed to the Council adopting broad and numerous 
recommendations, resulting in implementation challenges. State 
officials said that Arctic States intend for their governments to 
implement the recommendations, but act on them voluntarily and must 
balance recommendation implementation with competing needs and 
resources for the increasing volume of Council work.[Footnote 69] 
Recognizing some of these challenges, the Council has started to take 
a more strategic approach to adopting recommendations than it had in 
the past, placing a greater focus on outcomes, according to some 
federal officials and stakeholders. Starting in 2006 the Council began 
developing a more formal process for reviewing and negotiating 
recommendations. However, challenges implementing the broad and 
numerous recommendations remain and State officials said that a need 
exists for the Council to more clearly specify actions with measurable 
outcomes and prioritize the Council recommendations to better ensure 
their implementation. 

State officials and stakeholders said that the Council has produced 
valuable work but, partially due to these implementation challenges, 
the recommendations have not historically produced actions leading to 
measurable outcomes in addressing Arctic issues within the Council's 
purview. The officials said that the recommendations, if implemented, 
provide a means to strengthen the Council's ability to address Arctic 
issues, which represents a goal of the Council and the United States. 
Specifically, Council declarations have underscored the importance of 
such strengthening, and U.S. Arctic policy states that the United 
States seeks to strengthen institutions for cooperation among the 
eight Arctic States, such as the Council. When the United States 
assumes the chairmanship in 2015, it will have an opportunity to guide 
and more effectively advance the Council's efforts to address Arctic 
issues. For example, according to the 2013 National Arctic Strategy 
Implementation Plan, the United States will lead the development of 
the 2015 ministerial declaration that will include recommendations 
related to priorities for the U.S. chairmanship. 

Conclusions: 

The Arctic region's rapid changes alter the environment, provide 
economic opportunities, and affect the people living there. With these 
changes and an increase in global attention on the region, the 
Council's work will likely continue to expand. The federal government 
has increased its focus on Arctic issues, and U.S. participation in 
the Council provides a forum to address some of these issues, 
collaborate domestically and internationally, and leverage resources. 
State leads U.S. participation in the Council and relies heavily on 
the work of other federal agencies for most of the U.S. contributions 
to the Council. However, State has not established a joint strategy 
for U.S. participation that outlines a clear direction or specifies 
necessary resources. Without a joint strategy, key collaborating 
agencies may continue to face challenges prioritizing the work, 
delivering unified messages, and consistently participating in the 
Council. In addition, the U.S. chairmanship will span two presidential 
administrations, making it particularly important to plan for 
continuity. 

Furthermore, as Arctic issues have emerged and become a priority for 
the United States, State has increased its attention on the voluntary 
recommendations the United States has adopted through the Council and 
identified a need to more formally follow up on and assess progress 
toward implementing them. Because State does not have a process to 
review and track progress made by U.S. agencies to implement 
recommendations, State faces challenges planning for and prioritizing 
future areas of action on Arctic issues within the Council's purview. 
This will become increasingly important when the United States chairs 
the Council starting in 2015, providing State with valuable 
opportunities to shape future Council priorities. 

Finally, State has recognized the importance of strengthening the 
Council's ability to make progress toward addressing Arctic issues 
through implementing recommendations and identified the need to more 
clearly specify actions with measurable outcomes and prioritize 
recommended actions. Specifically, State officials said the Council 
does not have guidelines for adopting clear and prioritized 
recommendations. Having no such guidelines has led to the Council 
adopting broad and numerous recommendations that the Arctic States 
face challenges implementing. As a result, State officials said that 
the Council has produced valuable work, but the recommendations have 
not historically produced actions leading to measurable results in 
addressing Arctic issues. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help clarify the direction of future U.S. participation and 
position the United States for a successful Arctic Council 
chairmanship, assess the status of recommendations adopted through the 
Council, and strengthen the Council's ability to address Arctic issues 
within its purview, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the 
following three actions: 

* As a part of its responsibilities in assuming the Council chair in 
2015 and in collaboration with other relevant agencies, develop a 
joint strategy for U.S. participation in the Council that outlines a 
clear direction for the agencies and identifies resources needed to 
sustain collaborative efforts and consistent participation in the 
Council. 

* Develop a process to review and track U.S. progress in implementing 
existing and any future recommendations. 

* Work with other Arctic States to develop guidelines for producing 
clear recommendations with measurable actions and prioritizing the 
recommendations. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided EPA, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Interior, 
State, and USGCRP with a draft of this report for review and comment. 
In written comments, reproduced in appendix VIII, State generally 
agreed with our recommendations. State also noted that the Council 
recommendations we discuss in the report are expressly voluntary and 
should be differentiated from more formal commitments made through the 
international agreements. We modified the text to make this 
distinction. EPA, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Interior, and 
USGCRP provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Administrator of the EPA, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Energy, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary 
of State, Executive Director of USGCRP, the appropriate congressional 
committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202)512-3841 or gomezj@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. Appendix IX lists the GAO staff 
who made key contributions to the report. 

Signed by: 

J. Alfredo Gómez: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Lisa Murkowski: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John Garamendi: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Timothy H. Bishop: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Water Resources and the Environment: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Rick Larsen: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

We were asked to review matters related to U.S. participation in the 
Arctic Council (Council). This report examines (1) how the Council is 
organized and how it addresses environmental and economic development 
issues; (2) how U.S. federal agencies with a key leadership role 
participate in the Council and the associated challenges, if any; and 
(3) the actions the Department of State (State) and other federal 
agencies have taken to implement and manage voluntary recommendations 
the United States has adopted through the Council and associated 
challenges, if any. 

To choose from the many federal agencies involved in Council work and 
to scope our work, we selected agencies that hold key leadership 
roles. We chose State because it leads U.S. participation in the 
Council and agencies that head the U.S. delegations to the six Council 
working groups. These agencies are the U.S. Global Change Research 
Program, the Department of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the 
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. 

To provide information to answer all three of our objectives, we 
interviewed the following: 

1. knowledgeable officials from the key federal agencies with a 
leadership role in the Council; 

2. leaders of Permanent Participant organizations that represent 
Alaska Natives in the Council, including the Aleut International 
Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council 
International, and Inuit Circumpolar Council; and: 

3. key Arctic stakeholders. 

To select key Arctic stakeholders, we first identified a potential 
list of over 100 contacts by conducting research, as well as 
collecting referrals through a snowballed process, starting with key 
agency officials and stakeholders known to have direct involvement in 
the Council. Our list included contacts who represented diverse 
perspectives such as federal agencies, Alaska state agencies, 
nongovernmental organizations, groups representing Alaska Natives, 
science and policy research organizations, industry groups, and 
academic institutions. We ranked each contact from highest to lowest 
priority based on whether they: (1) had significant involvement in the 
Council - the six key agencies, Alaska-based Permanent Participants, 
and the state of Alaska; (2) were referred to us based on their 
experience working with the Council in the past; (3) worked with the 
Council as identified by Council documents or individual biographical 
research, but were not referred to us; and (4) represented an 
organization that applied for Council Observer status, or was in the 
process of doing so during our review. Once we organized our 
stakeholder list based on these rankings, we categorized the list by 
topic areas to acquire a balance of perspectives. These topic areas 
included environmental groups, federal agencies, health and human 
development groups, indigenous groups, industry, local or state 
agencies, policy groups, and science and research groups. Finally, we 
narrowed our list of stakeholders to those who were the highest 
priority based on our rankings, could offer a diverse perspectives, 
and had availability while ensuring alignment with GAO's allotted 
staff resources and time. Because of our scope and resources, we did 
not interview all stakeholders. Findings from our report based on 
stakeholder perspectives are not generalizable. 

In addition, to identify how the Council is organized and addresses 
environmental and economic development issues, we attended a Council 
Senior Arctic Officials meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, in March 2013, 
and we analyzed Council documents, academic publications, and the 
Council's website. We also reviewed Arctic State publications, peer-
reviewed academic literature, and nongovernmental organization reports 
published from 2008 to 2013. We determined these sources were 
sufficiently sound for our purpose. Furthermore, we focused on Arctic 
environmental and economic issues because the Council's mission 
outlines these as issues to address. We did not assess the 
effectiveness of the Council. 

In addition to conducting interviews with key U.S. federal agency 
officials to determine how they participate in the Council and 
identify any associated challenges, we reviewed relevant agency and 
Council documents. We also conducted site visits to the Arctic Alaskan 
communities of Barrow, Kivalina, Kotzebue, and Wainwright. We met with 
community leaders to learn their perspectives on environmental and 
economic issues facing their community and how, if at all, key federal 
agencies considered their interests in their Council work. We selected 
these four communities based on the following factors: (1) stakeholder 
referrals, (2) location above the Arctic Circle, (3) representation of 
a range of community sizes and perspectives, and (4) accessibility in 
order to accommodate GAO's allotted staff and financial resources. 
Findings from these site visits cannot be generalized to those we did 
not include in our nonprobability sample. In addition to these four 
locations, we visited Anchorage, Alaska, where we interviewed 
knowledgeable Alaska state officials, key Arctic stakeholders, and two 
Permanent Participant group representatives to help inform our 
objectives. 

Finally, to identify and assess the actions that State and other 
federal agencies take to implement and manage voluntary 
recommendations the United States has adopted through the Council, we 
first analyzed Council ministerial declarations from 1998 to 2013 to 
develop a list of statements that directed actions to Arctic States. 
To create the list, two analysts independently identified these 
statements, compared results, and resolved any differences. We then 
asked State officials to review our list and identify which statements 
they viewed as Council recommendations to Arctic States. We also 
analyzed Council reports endorsed in the recommendations and the two 
multilateral agreements negotiated through the Council. Finally, we 
selected examples of actions agencies took to implement Council 
recommendations and multilateral agreements. 

This report will contribute to a multilateral audit of the Council led 
by the Supreme Audit Institutions of Norway and Russia, also with 
participation by Denmark, and Sweden.[Footnote 70] The Supreme Audit 
Institutions of Canada, Finland, and Iceland observed the multilateral 
audit. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Arctic Council Chairmanships: 

Arctic state: Canada; 
Chairmanship years: 1996-1998; 
Location of ministerial meeting: Iqaluit, Canada. 

Arctic state: United States of America; 
Chairmanship years: 1998-2000; 
Location of ministerial meeting: Barrow, Alaska. 

Arctic state: Finland; 
Chairmanship years: 2000-2002; 
Location of ministerial meeting: Inari, Finland. 

Arctic state: Iceland; 
Chairmanship years: 2002-2004; 
Location of ministerial meeting: Reykjavik, Iceland. 

Arctic state: Russia; 
Chairmanship years: 2004-2006; 
Location of ministerial meeting: Salekhard, Russia. 

Arctic state: Norway; 
Chairmanship years: 2006-2009; 
Location of ministerial meeting: Tromsø, Norway. 

Arctic state: Denmark; 
Chairmanship years: 2009-2011; 
Location of ministerial meeting: Nuuk, Greenland. 

Arctic state: Sweden; 
Chairmanship years: 2011-2013; 
Location of ministerial meeting: Kiruna, Sweden. 

Arctic state: Canada; 
Chairmanship years: 2013-2015; 
Location of ministerial meeting: To be determined. 

Source: Arctic Council. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Full Text of Figure 1, 

Changes in September Ice Coverage from 2001 to 2013, Compared with the 
1979-2000 Median September Ice Coverage: 

Figure 7 shows changes in September sea ice coverage, by year from 
2001 through 2013 (see interactive figure 1). 

Figure 7: September Sea Ice Coverage, 2001 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 13 illustrated maps] 

2001: 
Total coverage: 6.8 million square kilometers. 

2002: 
Total coverage: 6.0 million square kilometers. 

2003: 
Total coverage: 6.1 million square kilometers. 

2004: 
Total coverage: 6.0 million square kilometers. 

2005: 
Total coverage: 5.6 million square kilometers. 

2006: 
Total coverage: 5.9 million square kilometers. 

2007: 
Total coverage: 4.3 million square kilometers. 

2008: 
Total coverage: 4.7 million square kilometers. 

2009: 
Total coverage: 5.4 million square kilometers. 

2010: 
Total coverage: 4.9 million square kilometers. 

2011: 
Total coverage: 4.6 million square kilometers. 

2012: 
Total coverage: 3.6 million square kilometers; Lowest recorded 
September ice coverage. 

2013: 
Total coverage: 5.3 million square kilometers. 

Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: U.S. Agencies Participating in Arctic Council Working 
Groups and Task Forces as of January 2014: 

Arctic Council working groups: 

Arctic Contaminants Action Program:
Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.
Department of State.
Environmental Protection Agency. 

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program: 
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Department of Energy.
Department of Health and Human, Services Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention.
Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey.
Environmental Protection Agency.
Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology 
Policy.
Executive Office of the President, U.S. Global Change Research Program.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
National Science Foundation.
United States Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service. 

Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna: 
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management/North Slope 
Science Initiative.
Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology 
Policy.
Marine Mammal Commission.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
National Science Foundation. 

Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response: 
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration.
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention.
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement.
Environmental Protection Agency. 

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment: 
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Department of Defense, U.S. Navy.
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.
Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
Department of State.
Environmental Protection Agency.
Marine Mammal Commission. 

Sustainable Development Working Group: 
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Department of Energy.
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Global Affairs.
Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.
Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey.
Department of State.
Environmental Protection Agency.
National Science Foundation.
U.S. Arctic Research Commission. 

Arctic Council task forces: 

Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane: 
Environmental Protection Agency.
Department of State. 

Task Force on Science Cooperation: 
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Research.
Department of Energy.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.
Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service.
Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey.
Department of State.
Environmental Protection Agency.
Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology 
Policy.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
National Science Foundation.
U.S. Arctic Research Commission. 

Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention: 
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Department of Energy.
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement.
Department of State.
Environmental Protection Agency. 

Task Force to Create a Circumpolar Business Forum: 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard.
Department of State.
U.S. Arctic Research Commission. 

Source: Department of State. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Arctic Policy Group Participants as of December 2013: 

Executive Office of the President: 
National Ocean Council.
National Security Council.
Office of Science and Technology Policy.
U.S. Global Change Research Program. 

Federal agencies: 

Department of Commerce; 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 

Department of Defense; 
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson.
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
U.S. Air Force.
U.S. European Command.
U.S. Navy.
U.S. Northern Command. 

Department of Energy; 
National Nuclear Security Administration.
Office of International Affairs.
Office of Science.
National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Department of Health and Human Services; 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
National Institutes of Health.
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. 

Department of Homeland Security; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency.
U.S. Coast Guard. 

Department of the Interior; 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Bureau of Land Management - North Slope Science Initiative.
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement.
National Park Service.
Office of the Secretary.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
U.S. Geological Survey. 

Department of Justice; 

Department of State; 

Department of Transportation; 
Federal Aviation Administration.
Maritime Administration. 

Other federal entities: 
Environmental Protection Agency.
Marine Mammal Commission.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
National Science Foundation.
Office of the Federal Coordinator for Alaska Natural Gas 
Transportation Projects.
Smithsonian Institution.
U.S. Arctic Research Commission. 

State of Alaska; 
Office of the Governor.
Office of the Lieutenant Governor. 

Source: Department of State. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Full Text of Figure 6, Arctic Alaska Site Visits: 

Barrow: 

Name: Barrow (traditionally known as Ukpeagvik): 

Population: 4,212, of which approximately 61 percent are American 
Indian and Alaska Native, which includes Iñupiat Eskimos. 

Location: Located on the Chukchi Sea coast, Barrow is the northernmost 
community in the United States. 

Brief background: During the 1940s and 1950s, the military played an 
influential role in the Barrow area and constructed a Distant Early 
Warning line - a system of radar stations established to detect 
incoming Soviet bombers during the cold war and provide early warning 
of incursions into North American airspace. Exploration in the 
National Petroleum Reserve, which is a 22.8-million acre area with oil 
on Alaska's North Slope, brought new people to the region, and 
construction of the Prudhoe Bay oilfields and Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
have each contributed to its development. Since that time, tax 
revenues from the North Slope oil fields fund services in the area. 
Barrow has become the economic, transportation, and administrative 
center for Alaska's North Slope region. 

Main industries providing employment: According to 2008 to 2012 data, 
out of 1,969 employed, 23 percent were in educational services, health 
care, and social assistance; 22 percent were in public administration; 
and 13 percent were in retail trade. 

Alaska Native concerns on various Arctic issues: Some community 
leaders said they were concerned about the affects of increased Arctic 
activities and change in the climate on their access to subsistence 
resources, as well as limited plans and regulations to guide oil 
exploration and response to spills. 

Kivalina: 

Name: Kivalina (traditionally known as Kivaliniq): 

Population: 374, of which approximately 96 percent are American Indian 
and Alaska Native, which includes Iñupiat Eskimos. 

Location: Kivalina is at the tip of an 8-mile barrier reef located 
between the Chukchi Sea and Kivalina River. It is 80 air miles 
northwest of Kotzebue and approximately 50 miles from the Red Dog Mine. 

Brief background: The first recorded history of Kivalina occurred in 
1847 when a Russian naval officer mistook a seasonal hunting camp at 
the north end of Kivalina Lagoon as a permanent settlement. Kivalina 
was located at its current location in 1905 when the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs built a school on the southern tip of the island. This 
compelled people who lived in the original Kivalina to migrate to the 
Kivalina created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 

Main industries providing employment: According to 2008 to 2012 data, 
out of 132 employed, 24 percent were in educational services, health 
care, and social assistance; 23 percent were in retail trade; and 17 
percent were in public administration. 

Alaska Native concerns on various Arctic issues: Community leaders 
said severe coastal erosion has significantly affected Kivalina. The 
village intends to relocate to a new site 2.5 miles away. In addition, 
homes do not have full plumbing, and there is only one public space 
with three showers available. 

Kotzebue: 

Name: Kotzebue (traditionally known as Kikiktagruk): 

Population: 3,201, of which approximately 74 percent are American 
Indian and Alaska Native, which includes Iñupiat Eskimos. 

Location: Kotzebue lies on the Baldwin Peninsula in Kotzebue Sound 
where the Noatak, Kobuk, and Selawik rivers end. 

Brief background: The Iñupiat have occupied the area for at least 600 
years. The site was a trading location for local natives for hundreds 
of years. Expansion of economic activities, such as oil and mineral 
exploration, and services to support these activities contributed to 
Kotzebue's development. Kotzebue is the service and transportation 
center for all villages in Alaska's northwest region. 

Main industries providing employment: According to 2008 to 2012 data, 
out of 1,326 employed, 38 percent were in educational services, health 
care and social assistance; 13 percent were in transportation, 
warehousing, and utilities; and 11 percent were in public 
administration. 

Alaska Native concerns on various Arctic issues: Community leaders 
said they have seen changes in sea ice, which affects the community's 
traditional subsistence lifestyle. As a result, many have turned to 
participating in the cash based economy, although there is strong 
desire to return to their traditional lifestyle. 

Wainwright: 

Name: Wainwright (traditionally known as Olgoonik): 

Population: 556, of which approximately 92 percent are American Indian 
and Alaska Native, which includes Iñupiat Eskimos. 

Location: Wainwright sits on a wave-eroded coastal bluff of a narrow 
peninsula, which separates Wainwright Inlet from the Chukchi Sea. 
Wainwright is about 70 miles southwest of Barrow. 

Brief background: The region around Wainwright was traditionally well 
populated, though the present village was not established until 1904 - 
when the Alaska Native Service built a school and instituted medical 
and other services. Wainwright is the third largest village in 
Alaska's North Slope region. 

Main industries providing employment: According to 2008 to 2012 data, 
out of 233 employed, 25 percent were in educational services, health 
care, and social assistance; 15 percent were in construction; and 13 
percent were in transportation, warehousing, and utilities. 

Alaska Native concerns on various Arctic issues: Community leaders 
said they were concerned about the effects of climate change in their 
community and were in the process of constructing a seawall to protect 
a bluff from wave erosion. Leaders also said they would like to 
increase responsible oil and gas exploration to help support the 
community's lifestyle. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Arctic Council Declaration Statements Identified by 
Department of State Officials as Recommendations to Arctic States: 

Year: 1998; 
Declaration: Iqaluit; 
No. 1. 
Declaration statement: Reaffirm our commitment from the Alta 
Declaration to take the findings and recommendations from the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme Report, Arctic Pollution Issues: A 
State of the Arctic Environment Report, into consideration in our 
policies and programmes, to increase our efforts to limit and reduce 
emissions of contaminants into the environment and to promote 
international cooperation and make a determined effort to secure 
support for international actions in order to address the serious 
pollution risks reported by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme. 

Year: 2000; 
Declaration: Barrow; 
No. 2. 
Declaration statement: Endorse and adopt the Arctic Council Plan to 
Eliminate Pollution in the Arctic. 

No. 3. 
Declaration statement: Encourage actions to reduce the risks of 
radioactivity to the Arctic. 

Year: 2002; 
Declaration: Inari; 
No. 4. 
Declaration statement: Acknowledge the recommendations arising from 
the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna report Arctic Flora and 
Fauna, Status and Conservation as a strategy for future biodiversity 
conservation work of the Arctic Council. 

No. 5. 
Declaration statement: The Ministers took note of recommendations 
generated by projects on timberline forests, sustainable reindeer 
husbandry, and sacred sites and encourage further dialogue among 
stakeholders on this basis. 

No. 6. 
Declaration statement: Welcome with appreciation Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme's "Arctic Pollution 2002" Report and take the 
recommendations into consideration in our policies and programmes to 
reduce pollution affecting the Arctic. 

Year: 2004; 
Declaration: Reykjavik; 
No. 7. 
Declaration statement: Encourage Member States to take effective 
measures to adapt to and manage the environmental, economic and social 
impacts of climate change and ultraviolet radiation, inter alia 
through enhancing the access of Arctic residents to information, 
decision makers and institutional capacity building. 

No. 8. 
Declaration statement: Encourage relevant national and international 
research bodies and sponsors to take into account the Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment science recommendations in the planning, 
development, and implementation of their programmes. 

Year: 2004; 
Declaration: Reykjavik; 
No. 9. 
Declaration statement: Endorse the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan and 
encourage its implementation through the working groups and other 
mechanisms and in cooperation with regional and global bodies. 

No. 10. 
Declaration statement: Encourage Member States and others to 
disseminate the Arctic Waters Oil Transfer Guidelines widely. 

No. 11. 
Declaration statement: Direct Member States and the relevant working 
groups of the Arctic Council to consider appropriate follow-up actions 
[to the Arctic Human Development Report]. 

Year: 2006; 
Declaration: Salekhard; 
No. 12. 
Declaration statement: Reconfirm [Arctic States'] commitments to the 
Reykjavik Declaration and to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
policy document, adopted at the Arctic Council meeting in 2004, and 
that the Member States will continue their active efforts to implement 
the recommendations on mitigation, adaptation, research, monitoring 
and outreach. 

No. 13. 
Declaration statement: Urge Member States and other entities to 
strengthen monitoring and research efforts needed to comprehensively 
address Arctic change and to promote the establishment of a 
circumpolar Arctic observing network of monitoring stations with 
coordinated data handling and information exchange for scientific 
data, statistics, and traditional knowledge as a lasting legacy of the 
International Polar Year (and as the evolving Arctic component of the 
Global Earth Observing System of Systems). 

No. 14. 
Declaration statement: Encourage research and practical actions, as 
well as exchange of expertise and best practices among the Member 
States to increase stability of the Arctic infrastructure in changing 
climatic conditions. 

No. 15. 
Declaration statement: Urge all the Member countries to maintain and 
extend long-term monitoring of change in all parts of the Arctic. 

Year: 2006; 
Declaration: Salekhard; 
No. 16. 
Declaration statement: Encourage the Arctic Council Member States to 
implement the Assessment Report on Acidifying Pollutants, Arctic Haze, 
and Acidification in the Arctic recommendations addressing 
acidification and Arctic haze effects, as appropriate, recognizing 
that the effects are regional in nature. 

No. 17. 
Declaration statement: Endorse long-term monitoring of Arctic 
biodiversity to provide policymakers with the information needed to 
accurately assess the impacts from global environmental change and 
increased human activities related to regional development and 
economic growth. 

No. 18. 
Declaration statement: Encourage countries to contribute actively to 
Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program and expect the program to 
provide valuable data for increased knowledge and improved management 
of biodiversity in the Arctic. 

No. Year2009: 19. 
Declaration statement: Year2009: Encourage the Arctic Council Member 
States to focus on the following areas and initiate new projects in 
order to improve the capacity to respond to emergencies in the Arctic: 
* exchange of information, training and experience; 
* public information; 
* technical development and support, and; 
* coordination of response. 

Year: 2009; 
Declaration: Tromsø; 
No. 20. 
Declaration statement: Urge implementation of early actions where 
possible on methane and other short-lived climate forcers. 

No. 21. 
Declaration statement: Urge the Arctic Council members to strengthen 
their work on adaptation to climate change, including by pursuing 
community-level actions and continue to share information on best 
practices. 

No. 22. 
Declaration statement: Encourage collaboration with the Methane to 
Markets Partnership and other relevant international bodies taking 
action to reduce methane and other short-lived forcers. 

No. 23. 
Declaration statement: Encourage the continuation of this work [the 
Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks] with emphasis on improving 
sustained long-term observation. 

No. 24. 
Declaration statement: Approve the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
2009 Report including its recommendations on enhancing Arctic marine 
safety, protecting Arctic people and environment and building Arctic 
marine infrastructure. 

No. 25. 
Declaration statement: Urge all States to apply the Arctic Council 
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines throughout the Arctic as minimum 
standards in national regulations. 

No. 26. 
Declaration statement: Encourage the continued implementation of the 
Arctic Council Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities. 

No. 27. 
Declaration statement: Approve the findings and recommendations of the 
assessment of Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic: Effects and 
Potential Effects. 

No. 28. 
Declaration statement: Decide to strengthen cooperation on prevention 
of, and response to, accidental spills of oil and hazardous substances 
in the Arctic. 

No. 29. 
Declaration statement: Urge Member States to apply the precautionary 
approach and polluter-pays principle as reflected in Principles 15 and 
16 of the Rio Declaration, respectively, and conduct risk and 
environmental impact assessments for the exploration, development, 
transport and storage of oil, and enact and/or enforce appropriate 
laws and controls. 

Year: 2011; 
Declaration: Nuuk; 
No. 30. 
Declaration statement: Encourage Arctic States to implement, as 
appropriate in their national circumstances, relevant recommendations 
[from the Arctic Council Report on Short-Lived Climate Forcers] for 
reducing emissions of black carbon. 

Year: 2013; 
Declaration: Kiruna; 
No. 31. 
Declaration statement: Welcome the report on short-lived climate 
forcers and support its recommendations including that national black 
carbon emission inventories for the Arctic should continue to be 
developed and reported as a matter of priority. 

No. 32. 
Declaration statement: Announce the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine 
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic and encourage 
future national, bi-national, and multinational contingency plans, 
training and exercises, to develop effective response measures. 

Year: 2013; 
Declaration: Kiruna; 
No. 33. 
Declaration statement: Welcome the Recommended Practices in Prevention 
of Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Project reports and recommendations to 
Ministers, and encourage Arctic States to pursue further work in the 
recommended areas. 

No. 34. 
Declaration statement: Welcome the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, the 
first Arctic-wide comprehensive assessment of status and emerging 
trends in Arctic biodiversity, approve its recommendations, and 
encourage Arctic States to follow up on its recommendations. 

No. 35. 
Declaration statement: Encourage Arctic States to take decisive action 
to help sustain Arctic biodiversity and implement internationally 
agreed biodiversity objectives, to cooperate on adaptive management 
strategies for vulnerable species and ecosystems, and to continue 
existing Arctic biodiversity research and monitoring efforts through 
the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program. 

No. 36. 
Declaration statement: Welcome the Arctic Ocean Acidification 
assessment, approve its recommendation and request the Arctic States 
to continue to take action on mitigation and adaptation and to monitor 
and assess the state of the Arctic Ocean acidification. 

No. 37. 
Declaration statement: Welcome the Arctic Ocean Review report, 
undertaken to provide guidance to Arctic States on strengthening 
governance in the Arctic through a cooperative, coordinated, and 
integrated approach to the management of the Arctic marine 
environment, approve its recommendations and request appropriate 
follow-up action, and report on progress at subsequent ministerial 
meetings. 

No. 38. 
Declaration statement: Encourage Arctic States to continue monitoring 
and assessment activities and enhance their efforts to meet the 
objectives of the Stockholm Convention. 

No. 39. 
Declaration statement: Welcome the report on Ecosystem Based 
Management, approve the definition, principles and recommendations, 
encourage Arctic States to implement recommendations both within and 
across boundaries. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State information. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Comptroller: 
P.O. Box 150008: 
Charleston, SC 29415-5008: 

May 5, 2014: 

Dr. Loren Yager: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Dr. Yager: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Arctic Issues: Better Direction and Management of Commitments Could 
Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation" GAO Job Code 361458. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Julia Gourley, Senior Arctic Official, Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs at (202) 647-3264. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Christopher H. Flaggs, Acting: 

Enclosure: as stated. 

cc: GAO — J. Alfredo Gomez: 
OES — Judith G.Garber, Acting: 
State/OIG — Norman Brown: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

ARCTIC ISSUES: Better Direction and Management of Commitments Could
Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation (GAO-14-435, GAO Code 
361548): 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report entitled 
"Arctic Issues: Better Direction and Management of Commitments Could 
Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation." 

The Arctic Council was created in 1996 as a "high-level 
intergovernmental forum of the eight Arctic States and the Arctic 
indigenous peoples to provide a means for promoting cooperation, 
coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the 
involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic 
inhabitants on common Arctic issues." It is not a regulatory body and 
has no mandate to require actions of its member states. Throughout 
this report (and particularly pages 31-37), the term "commitments" is 
used in a manner that encompasses many recommendations that are not in 
fact commitments of the eight Arctic States. For example, the vast 
majority of the recommendations of Arctic Council's Working Groups 
endorsed in various manners by the Council are expressly voluntary, 
inviting Arctic States to consider taking a certain course of action 
"as appropriate" or consistent with national circumstances. Many of 
these recommendations are aspirational in nature. The report treats 
these recommendations as though they were commitments undertaken by 
the Arctic States, and does not adequately differentiate between such 
voluntary recommendations and commitments made in legally binding 
international agreements. We would suggest that the word "commitments" 
be replaced with "recommendations" to more accurately reflect the 
nature of the Council's work, except in those cases where the Arctic 
States have actually undertaken a commitment (e.g., in the two 
international agreements addressed in the report). 

Nevertheless, the benefit of the Arctic Council producing 
recommendations to the member states is that they highlight important 
issues — in some cases issues that have received little public 
attention so that the general public is made aware of developments in 
the region that they otherwise may not have known about.
Observers and other stakeholders in the Arctic region are important 
sources of public outreach and education about the rapid changes 
taking place in the Arctic, and Arctic Council reports, assessments 
and other project documents are often the only sources — or at least 
the most current and accurate sources — of information they can use in 
their own efforts to build support for positive change in the region. 

The Department of State generally supports the three proposed 
recommendations for Executive Branch action. Two of the three proposed 
recommendations entail action to be taken by the U.S. government with 
the goal of strengthening United States participation in the Arctic 
Council. The third recommendation is intended to strengthen the 
Council itself. 

Regarding the two U.S. government-specific recommendations, we believe 
that an Arctic Council strategy could provide benefits to the 
Executive Branch by formalizing United States participation in the 
Council and giving it higher priority within each agency. We would 
consider such a strategy to be complementary to the National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region and other Executive Branch Arctic strategies, 
and would develop it on that basis. This report suggests that such a 
strategy be completed prior to the beginning of the U.S. chairmanship 
of the Council in April 2015, and although we agree that is an 
important goal, it may not be possible to complete by then. 

We also agree that a tracking system to review progress in 
implementing Arctic Council recommendations would be useful, although 
the staff time and resources that would be required to maintain such a 
system may render it a lower priority than the other two 
recommendations. 

Finally, we agree that the Arctic Council would benefit from having 
guidelines for producing clear, prioritized recommendations with 
measurable actions. This would be compatible with one of our 
overarching goals: to strengthen the Council and leave it in a 
stronger position than when we took the chair. We will give this 
serious consideration as we develop our chairmanship program. 

We appreciate GAO's work in this area and its useful insights into and 
recommendations for the U.S. government's participation in the Arctic 
Council. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

J. Alfredo Gómez, (202) 512-3841 or gomezj@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Michael Hix (Assistant 
Director), Cheryl Arvidson, Keesha Egebrecht, Cindy Gilbert, Jessica 
Hilbrich, Anne Hobson, Dan Royer, Jeanette Soares, Emily Suarez-
Harris, and Kiki Theodoropoulos made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Maritime Infrastructure: Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity in 
the U.S. Arctic Over the Next Decade. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-299]. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 
2014. 

Managing for Result: Implementation Approaches Used to Enhance 
Collaboration in Interagency Groups.[hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-220]. Washington, D.C.: February 
14, 2014. 

Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements 
in Its 2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near-and Long-
term Needs. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-180]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2012. 

Managing for Results, Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 
Collaborative Mechanisms. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022]. Washington, D.C.: September 
27, 2012. 

Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but 
More Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-870]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 15, 2010. 

National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen 
Interagency Collaborations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-822T]. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 
2010. 

Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating 
Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-551]. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 
2009. 

Result-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and 
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 
2005. 

Alaska Native Villages: Most Are Affected by Flooding and Erosion, but 
Few Qualify for Federal Assistance. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-142]. Washington, D.C.: December 
12, 2003. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] In general, the Arctic is the polar region located at the 
northernmost part of the Earth. Arctic stakeholders define the Arctic 
geographical area in different ways. For example, the Arctic Research 
and Policy Act of 1984 defines the Arctic as all U.S. and foreign 
territory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and 
west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim 
Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean 
and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian Chain. 
Pub. L. No. 98-373, 98 Stat. 1242,1248 (1984), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
4111. The Arctic Circle is the line of latitude located at 66× 33' 44" 
North of the equator. Other definitions of the Arctic use markers such 
as the southernmost extent of winter sea ice for oceanic boundaries, 
or the northern-most tree line for terrestrial boundaries. 

[2] Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo, and Thomas C. Peterson, eds., 
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States (Cambridge 
University Press: 2009). 

[3] The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration established 
the National Snow and Ice Data Center in 1976 to support research into 
the cryosphere--places on earth where water is frozen into ice or 
snow. For more information, see [hyperlink, http://www.nsidc.org]. 

[4] U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049: Circum-Arctic 
Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the 
Arctic Circle. [hyperlink, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/]. 

[5] A 2013 interagency report on Arctic Management states that a 
subsistence way of life relies upon natural resources for food, 
shelter, clothing, transportation, and the maintenance of cultural 
traditions. J.P. Clement, J.L. Bengston, and B.P. Kelly, Interagency 
Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and 
Permitting in Alaska (D.J. Hayes, Chair), Managing for the Future in a 
Rapidly Changing Arctic: A report to the President (Washington, D.C.: 
March 2013). 

[6] The Arctic States all have territory north of the Arctic Circle. 
The Kingdom of Denmark includes Greenland and the Faroe Islands. 

[7] Through the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, the Arctic 
States agreed to, among other things, cooperate in scientific 
research, assess potential environmental impacts of development 
activities, and to hold regular meetings to assess the progress made 
and to coordinate future action. 

[8] The White House, 2009 National Security Presidential Directive-66/ 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25), 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2009); the White House, National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2013). 

[9] These six agencies with a leadership role head the U.S. 
delegations to the Council's ongoing work. 

[10] GAO, Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on 
Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-551] (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 
2009). 

[11] GAO, Maritime Infrastructure: Key Issues Related to Commercial 
Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next Decade, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-299] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 
2014). 

[12] The findings from our interviews with these communities cannot be 
generalized to those we did not include but provide examples of 
communities' interaction with federal agencies to address Arctic 
issues. 

[13] The continental shelf is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas that extend either (1) beyond the state's territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin or (2) to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not 
extend up to that distance. 

[14] White House, National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Washington, 
D.C.: May 10, 2013). 

[15] Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat Declaration (Ilulissat, 
Greenland: May 27-29, 2008). 

[16] The Polar Code will cover the full range of design, construction, 
equipment, operational, training, search and rescue and environmental 
protection matters relevant to ships operating in the Arctic and 
Antarctic. 

[17] White House, Arctic Region Policy, National Security Presidential 
Directive/NSPD-66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-25 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9, 2009). 

[18] White House, National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Washington, 
D.C.: May 10, 2013). 

[19] White House, Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for 
the Arctic Region (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2014). 

[20] J.P. Clement, J.L. Bengston, and B.P. Kelly, Interagency Working 
Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in 
Alaska (D.J. Hayes, Chair), Managing for the Future in a Rapidly 
Changing Arctic. A report to the President (Washington, D.C.: March 
2013). 

[21] C.J. Markon, S.F. Trainor, and F.S. Chapin III, eds., The United 
States National Climate Assessment--Alaska Technical Chapter, U.S. 
Geological Survey Circular 1379 (2012). 

[22] Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo, and Thomas C. Peterson, eds., 
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States (Cambridge 
University Press: 2009). 

[23] Arctic Council Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic 
Climate Issues 2011: Changes in Arctic Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost 
(Oslo, Norway: 2012). 

[24] Arctic Council Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic 
Pollution 2009 (Oslo: 2009); Arctic Council Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme, AMAP Assessment 2011: Mercury in the Arctic 
(Oslo: 2011). Persistent organic pollutants and mercury are toxic 
chemicals that can accumulate in the environment and contaminate food 
sources. 

[25] We have ongoing work related to effects of ocean acidification 
and related federal actions. 

[26] For more information regarding Arctic shipping, refer to 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-299]. 

[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-299]. 

[28] Arctic Council Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers, 
Progress Report and Recommendations for Ministers (2011). Black 
carbon, which is soot, can warm the climate by darkening the snow and 
ice and absorbing sunlight, which leads to further warming and 
melting. Other short-lived climate forcers include ozone and methane, 
among other things. 

[29] Throughout this report, we use the term indigenous to describe 
the communities of people that have historically resided in the 
Arctic. We use the term Alaska Natives to refer to the indigenous 
people who reside in Alaska. 

[30] Specifically, the Council opens Permanent Participant status to 
other Arctic organizations of indigenous people with majority Arctic 
indigenous constituency that represent either an Arctic indigenous 
group in more than one Arctic state or represent multiple indigenous 
groups in one Arctic state. The declaration further states that the 
number of Permanent Participant groups at any time should be less than 
the number of Arctic Council member states. 

[31] The six Permanent Participant Groups to the Arctic Council 
include: the Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan 
Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, 
Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council. 
Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in 
Council International, and Inuit Circumpolar Council represent Alaska 
Natives. 

[32] For more information regarding the Arctic Council Indigenous 
Peoples' Secretariat, visit its website: [hyperlink, 
http://www.arcticpeoples.org/]. 

[33] Arctic States permit Permanent Participants and Observers to 
attend the biennial ministerial meetings. 

[34] Other ministers may serve as the Arctic Minister for an Arctic 
State. For example, Canada's Environment Minister leads the 2013-2015 
Canadian chairmanship of the Arctic Council. 

[35] In February 2014, State announced that it will name a special 
high-level representative to the Council tasked with advancing U.S. 
Arctic interests in preparation for the U.S. chairmanship of the 
Council beginning in May 2015. 

[36] Arctic Council, Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment (Cambridge, United Kingdom: October 15, 2004). 

[37] Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report 
(Tromsø, Norway: April, 2009). 

[38] Victoria Gofman, Community-Based Monitoring Handbook: Lessons 
from the Arctic and Beyond, Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, 
CBMP Report No.21 (Akureyri, Iceland: August, 2010). 

[39] For additional information regarding the Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program's project on obsolete pesticides, see: [hyperlink, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/acap-home/acap-sgs/obsolete-
pesticides]. 

[40] For additional information regarding the Arctic Maritime and 
Aviation Transportation Infrastructure Initiative, see: [hyperlink, 
http://www.arcticinfrastructure.org]. 

[41] On March 26, 2014, the Arctic Council issued a statement 
announcing that SAOs agreed to move forward with the creation of the 
forum now referred to as the Arctic Economic Council. According to the 
statement, the Arctic Economic Council will be able to put forward 
proposals and reports to help inform the work of the Arctic Council. 

[42] Prior to 2011, the United States Ministerial Representative was a 
lower-level State official. For example, the Deputy Secretary of State 
attended the 2009 ministerial meeting and the Under Secretary of State 
for Democracy and Global Affairs attended the 2006 ministerial meeting. 

[43] The task force was established in the Tromsø Declaration at the 
Sixth Arctic Council's biennial ministerial meeting in April 2009 and, 
according to EPA officials, concluded its work in May 2013. 

[44] For example, according to a NOAA official, the agency annually 
provides $20,000 to the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
working group and FWS officials said the agency contributes $30,000 
annually to the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna working group. 

[45] Under UNCLOS, coastal states have the right to regulate and 
authorize marine scientific research in their exclusive economic zone 
and on their continental shelf in accordance with the treaty. A 
coastal state's exclusive economic zone is the area beyond and 
adjacent to the territorial sea and extends no more than 200 nautical 
miles from the territorial sea baseline. 

[46] In1971, President Nixon directed in National Security Decision 
Memorandum 144 that an Interagency Arctic Policy Group be established, 
chaired by State. 

[47] According to an FWS official, the FWS delegation lead 
participated in the meetings by phone. 

[48] GAO, Results Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration Among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). Other key practices we identified that can enhance and sustain 
interagency collaboration are to define and articulate a common 
outcome; agree on roles and responsibilities; establish compatible 
policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency 
boundaries; develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the 
results; reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts; 
and reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts. 
Additional discussion on interagency collaboration mechanisms can be 
found in GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for 
Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 
2012) and GAO, Managing for Results: Implementation Approaches Used to 
Enhance Collaboration in Interagency Groups, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-220] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.14, 
2014). 

[49] The White House, National Strategy for the Arctic Region 
(Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2013); J.P. Clement, J.L. Bengston, and 
B.P. Kelly, Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic 
Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska (D.J. Hayes, Chair), 
Managing for the Future in a Rapidly Changing Arctic: A report to the 
President (Washington, D.C.: March 2013). 

[50] In 2010, the Alaska State Legislature established the Alaska 
Northern Waters Task Force to identify opportunities to increase the 
state's engagement on issues associated with diminishing sea ice and 
associated economic and environmental affects. The task force included 
state legislators, leaders from Alaskan communities, and 
representatives of key state and federal agencies. The task force 
produced a report in January 2012, which included findings and 
recommendations. 

[51] Alaska officials said additional priorities include preventing 
suicides and developing safe and sustainable sanitation facilities for 
smaller, isolated Arctic communities. In addition, in early 2014, both 
houses of the Alaska State Legislature approved a resolution urging 
State to consider Alaska's priorities when it chairs the Council and 
work in partnership with state officials to appoint a Council chair. 

[52] According to the Institute of the North, a nongovernmental 
organization that aims to inform public policy and engage citizens, 
the Arctic Maritime and Aviation Transportation Infrastructure 
Initiative seeks to evaluate northern infrastructure ports, airports, 
and response capability by inventorying maritime and aviation assets 
in the Arctic. A multinational steering committee composed of 
government, academic, and private sector entities leads the initiative. 

[53] At the time of our review, the Alaska Arctic Policy Commission 
was finalizing a report to outline the state of Alaska's overarching 
Arctic priorities. Alaska Arctic Policy Commission, Preliminary Report 
to the Alaska State Legislature (Anchorage and Bethel, Alaska: 
submitted Jan. 30, 2014). 

[54] This working group addresses the environmental consequences and 
biological effects in the Arctic resulting from climate change, among 
other issues. 

[55] For example, in 2012, an Aleut International Association 
representative said State provided $75,000 and, in 2013, it provided 
$55,000. Not all Permanent Participants use this funding. For example, 
Gwich'in Council International has not used this funding in recent 
years mainly because of limited number of staff, according to a 
Permanent Participant representative. 

[56] We reported in 2009 that coastal erosion from rising temperatures 
and thawing permafrost has posed imminent threats to 31 Alaska 
villages, many of which have decided to relocate or explore relocation 
options [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-551]. 

[57] In addition to the recommendations made to the Arctic States, the 
Council makes recommendations to Council bodies, such as the working 
groups, and other stakeholders, such as the scientific community. This 
report focuses on the recommendations the Council makes to the Arctic 
States. 

[58] Through the analysis, we identified 21 Ministerial Declaration 
statements that endorsed Arctic Council work products. 

[59] Arctic Council, Salekhard Declaration: On the Occasion of the 
Tenth Anniversary of the Arctic Council, the Fifth Arctic Council 
Ministerial Meeting (Salekhard, Russia: Oct. 26, 2006). 

[60] FWS leads the U.S. efforts to implement the Circumpolar 
Biodiversity Monitoring Program, with participation from NOAA and 
other agencies. 

[61] Arctic Council, Tromsø Declaration: On the Occasion of the Sixth 
Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council (Tromsø, Norway: Apr. 29, 
2009); Arctic Council Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
Working Group, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (Akureyri, 
Iceland: Apr. 29, 2009). 

[62] Arctic Council, Nuuk Declaration: On the Occasion of the Seventh 
Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council (Nuuk, Greenland: May 12, 
2011); Arctic Council Secretariat, Kiruna Declaration: On the Occasion 
of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council (Kiruna, 
Sweden: May 15, 2013); Arctic Council Task Force on Short-Lived 
Climate Forcers, An Assessment of Emissions and Mitigation Options for 
Black Carbon for the Arctic Council (April 2011); Arctic Council Task 
Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers, Recommendations to Reduce Black 
Carbon and Methane Emissions to Slow Arctic Climate Change (May 2013). 

[63] According to State officials, the United States signed the Arctic 
Search and Rescue Agreement as an executive agreement, which does not 
require Senate ratification to enter into force for the United States. 
The officials also said that the United States signed the Arctic 
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement but has not 
consented to be bound by it. 

[64] Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic (Nuuk, Greenland: May 12, 2011). 

[65] Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic (Kiruna, Sweden: May 15, 2013). 

[66] Arctic Council, Barrow Declaration: On the Occasion of the Second 
Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council (Barrow, AK USA: Oct. 13, 
2000); Arctic Council, Tromsø Declaration (2009). 

[67] According to State officials, the Council has initiated some 
efforts under the Canadian chairmanship to begin inventorying and 
monitoring existing recommendations at the Council level. In addition, 
some Council working groups have development mechanisms to follow up 
on recommendations made in specific reports. 

[68] Arctic Council, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy Document 
(Reykjavik, Iceland: November, 2004); Arctic Council, Regional 
Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment from Land-Based Activities (Akureyri, Iceland: Apr. 29, 
2009). 

[69] According to EPA officials, the Arctic States have varying 
abilities to implement the Council's recommendations, so the Council 
includes the phrase "as appropriate in their national circumstances" 
in the language of some recommendations to Arctic States. 

[70] A Supreme Audit Institution is the national audit office of a 
country. GAO is the Supreme Audit Institution of the United States. 

[End of section] 

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