From the U.S. Government Accountability Office, www.gao.gov Transcript for: Securing U.S. Industrial Radiological Sources Description: Audio interview by GAO staff with David Trimble, Director, Natural Resources and Environment Related GAO Work: GAO-14-293: Nuclear Nonproliferation: Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of U.S. Industrial Radiological Sources Released: June 2014 [ Background Music ] [ Narrator: ] Welcome to GAO's Watchdog Report, your source for news and information from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. It's June 2014. Many industries use radiological materials that, in the wrong hands, could be used to construct a dirty bomb. A team led by David Trimble, a director in GAO's Natural Resources and Environment team, recently looked at what federal agencies are doing to secure industrial sources of radiation. GAO's Sarah Kaczmarek sat down with David to talk about what they found. [ Sarah Kaczmarek: ] Your team went out and visited 33 industrial facilities. Can you talk a little bit about that, and why it's important to secure these facilities? [ David Trimble: ] Sure, the issue of securing industrial facilities that use radiological material really comes down to the threat of a dirty bomb or a radiological dispersal device. Such a device uses conventional explosives to, to disperse radiological materials. One way of thinking about this is if you think back to last year's Boston Marathon bombing, and if you think about that explosion and whether it, if it had had radiological material, the impact on the community would have been much worse. Both the economic and the social and the psychological impact of that bomb would have been much, much more damaging. Regarding the threat across the United States, or the risk in the United States, there's about 1,400 industrial facilities in the U.S. with high-risk radiological sources. During our review, we visited 33 such facilities in 6 states. The majority of these facilities are industrial radiographers who use radiological sources in cameras to test welds on pipes and operate remote, in remote locations across the United States. We also visited large panoramic facilities that sterilize food, research irradiators used in the aerospace industry, well logging companies, and companies that manufacture radiological sources. [ Sarah Kaczmarek: ] What are some of the major challenges to securing industrial radiological sources? [ David Trimble: ] Really the, the challenges we identified come into two categories. The first deals with securing mobile sources from theft. The second involves protecting against insider threats by ensuring that people who have unescorted access to these materials are reliable. Regarding mobile sources, such as radiography cameras, 6 radiography cameras have been stolen from trucks in the United States since the NRC introduced increased controls in 2005, including one of these cameras that was never recovered. It's important to remember when thinking about these radiographers and, and traveling with these cameras is that these guys are out in the middle of nowhere, essentially, remote locations, testing these pipes in the field. So they're, they're pretty isolated. What we found in our audit is the security used on these radiography trucks really varies greatly from company to company. Some are secured with very simple padlocks and chains while other companies are using very sophisticated high security locks and boxes that are bolted to the truck making them much, much more secure. In regard to insider threats, I think what's interesting here is that we found two cases where individuals with extensive criminal records were granted unescorted access to radiological sources. Notably, one case involved an individual with two convictions for making a terroristic threat. Addressing these threats is a challenge for the companies that operate and use these radiological sources because the requirements and guidance issued by the NRC are not as specific or as helpful as they could be. So these companies are sort of doing the best they can with what they're given. [ Sarah Kaczmarek: ] This brings me to the recommendations of the report. What recommendations is GAO making? [ David Trimble: ] We're making several recommendations in this report. Let me highlight a couple that are most germane to our discussion today. The first involves a recommendation to NRC to assess the process for granting unescorted access to sources, radiological sources, to determine why criminal history information, such as the convictions for terroristic threats, was not provided to a licensee. Also, we're asking NRC to consider whether certain criminal convictions or other factors should preclude an employee from gaining unescorted access to radiological material, or trigger a greater role for NRC in the company's decision on whether to grant access to the material. [ Sarah Kaczmarek: ] Finally, what do you see as the bottom line of this report? [ David Trimble: ] The threat from a dirty bomb is obviously very, very serious, and one which NRC, DOE, and DHS take very seriously and are working hard to address. Our hope is that this report spurs the agencies to accelerate efforts to secure vulnerable radiological material in the United States through more robust regulations and enhanced physical security. 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