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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

April 2014: 

Air Force: 

Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Unmanned Aerial System 
Pilots: 

GAO-14-316: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-316, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Since 2008, the Air Force has more than tripled the number of its 
active-duty pilots flying RPAs, which is the term the Air Force uses 
to refer to unmanned aerial systems such as the MQ-1 Predator. Due to 
increases in demand, RPA pilots have had a significant increase in 
workload since 2007. GAO was asked to evaluate the Air Force's 
approach to managing its RPA pilots as well as their quality of life 
and promotion rates. For this review, GAO evaluated the extent to 
which the Air Force (1) has used a strategic human-capital approach to 
manage RPA pilots; (2) has addressed concerns, if any, about the 
working conditions of RPA pilots that may affect their quality of 
life; and (3) analyzes the promotion rates of RPA pilots. 

GAO analyzed personnel planning documents, Air Force studies, and 
officer promotion data. GAO also interviewed unit commanders at 
selected Air Force bases and Headquarters Air Force officials and 
conducted focus groups with RPA pilots. While the results of these 
focus groups are not generalizable, they provide valuable insights. 

What GAO Found: 

The Air Force has managed its remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots 
using some strategic human-capital approaches, such as planning for 
the different levels of experience that it needs in these pilots. 
However, it continues to face challenges. High-performing 
organizations manage human capital to identify the right number of 
personnel and to target the right sources to fill personnel needs. In 
2008, the Air Force determined the optimum number of RPA pilots—-the 
crew ratio-—for some units, but it did not account for all tasks these 
units complete. Air Force officials stated that, as a result, the crew 
ratio is too low, but the Air Force has not updated it. Air Force 
guidance states that low crew ratios diminish combat capability and 
cause flight safety to suffer, but the Air Force has operated below 
its optimum crew ratio and it has not established a minimum crew 
ratio. Further, high work demands on RPA pilots limit the time they 
have available for training and development and negatively affects 
their work-life balance. In addition, the Air Force faces challenges 
recruiting officers into the RPA pilot career and may face challenges 
retaining them in the future. High-performing organizations tailor 
their recruiting and retention strategies to meet their specific 
mission needs, but the Air Force has not tailored its approach to 
recruiting and retaining RPA pilots nor considered the viability of 
using alternative personnel such as enlisted personnel or civilians. 
Without developing an approach to recruiting and retaining RPA pilots 
and evaluating the viability of using alternative personnel 
populations for the RPA pilot career, the Air Force may continue to 
face challenges, further exacerbating existing shortfalls of RPA 
pilots. Moreover, the Air Force has not used direct feedback from RPA 
pilots via existing mechanisms, or otherwise, to develop its approach 
to managing challenges related to recruiting, retention, training, and 
development of RPA pilots. 

The Air Force has taken some actions to address potentially difficult 
working conditions RPA pilots face, but it has not fully analyzed the 
challenge pilots face to balance their warfighting roles with their 
personal lives. RPA pilots operate RPAs from bases in the United 
States and live at home; thus they experience combat alongside their 
personal lives-—known as being deployed-on-station-—which RPA pilots 
stated negatively affects their morale. While the Department of 
Defense has committed to maintaining high morale for servicemembers, 
the Air Force has not fully analyzed the effects on morale related to 
being deployed-on-station, and thus it does not know whether it needs 
to take actions in response. 

The Air Force monitors RPA pilot promotion rates, but has not analyzed 
factors that may relate to their low promotion rates. Statistical 
principles call for researchers to account for potential key factors 
in analysis because when they omit key factors, the relationships 
between other factors may not be accurately estimated. The Air Force 
analyzed promotions across a group of officers, including RPA pilots, 
and found factors that related to promotions in general. However, the 
Air Force has not analyzed the factors related to RPA pilots' 
promotions specifically and, as a result, it does not have the 
information to determine what factors may affect their promotions. 
Consequently, the Air Force may not be targeting actions it is taking 
to raise RPA pilot promotion rates at the appropriate factors, and 
information it has reported to Congress may not be accurate. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Air Force update optimum crew ratios; 
establish a minimum crew ratio; develop a recruiting and retention 
strategy; evaluate using alternative personnel populations to be 
pilots; use feedback from RPA pilots; analyze the effects of being 
deployed-on-station; and analyze the effect that being an RPA pilot 
has on promotions. The Air Force concurred with four recommendations 
and partially concurred with the remaining three recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-316]. For more 
information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or 
farrellb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The Air Force Has Made Efforts to Manage RPA Pilots but Faces 
Challenges to Recruit, Develop, and Retain Pilots and Build Their 
Morale: 

Air Force Has Taken Some Actions to Address the Potentially 
Challenging Working Conditions RPA Pilots Face but Has Not Fully 
Analyzed Being Deployed-on-Station: 

The Air Force Monitors RPA Pilot Promotion Rates but Has Not Analyzed 
Factors Related to Those Rates: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Focus-Group Methodology and Results: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Air Force: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Questions GAO Moderator Asked Air Force Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft (RPA) Pilots during Focus Group Meetings at Beale, Cannon, 
and Creech Air Force Bases: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Current and Planned Operational and Training Locations for 
Air Force Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA): 

Figure 2: Remote-Split Operations of Air Force Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft (RPA): 

Figure 3: Air Force Steps to React to Growth in Demand for Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA): 

Figure 4: Distribution of Permanent and Temporary Air Force Pilots of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA): 

Figure 5: The Rates of Promotion to Major for Pilots of Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air Force Officer Careers, 
2006 to 2012: 

Figure 6: The Rates of Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel for Pilots of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air Force Officer 
Careers, 2006 to 2013: 

Figure 7: The Rates of Promotion Rates to Colonel for Pilots of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air Force Officer 
Careers, 2006 to 2012: 

Figure 8: Results of GAO Analysis of Focus Groups Meetings of RPA 
Pilots: 

Abbreviations: 

AFPC: Air Force Personnel Center: 

CAP: combat air patrol: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOPMA: Defense Officer Personnel Management Act: 

RPA: remotely piloted aircraft: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 10, 2014: 

The Honorable Harry Reid: 
Majority Leader: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) are one of the most in-demand 
capabilities the Air Force provides to battlefield commanders. 
[Footnote 1] Beyond replacing human beings in aircraft that perform 
dangerous roles, RPAs are highly valuable because they possess 
characteristics that many manned aircraft do not. For example, they 
can fly long-duration missions, thereby providing a sustained presence 
over the battlefield. In response to the increased demand, the Air 
Force has significantly increased the number of RPAs it uses for 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and precision strike 
capabilities, according to Air Force documentation. Consequently, the 
Air Force has increased the number of its pilots flying RPAs from 
approximately 400 in 2008 to about 1,350 in 2013. Due to the increased 
demand for their capabilities, these pilots have served at a high pace 
of operations since 2007.[Footnote 2] Most of these pilots are located 
on Air Force bases within the United States and fly the RPAs overseas 
in operational environments. The Air Force uses the term RPA to refer 
to large unmanned aircraft systems, such as the MQ-1 Predator. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) defines an unmanned aerial system as a 
system whose components include the necessary equipment, networks, and 
personnel to control an unmanned aircraft--that is, an aircraft that 
does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight under remote 
control or autonomous programming. 

Our prior work has found that DOD has faced challenges in the 
development and acquisition of unmanned aircraft systems and in the 
integration of these systems into combat operations.[Footnote 3] 
Regarding personnel, we have found that the Air Force and the Army 
identified limitations in their approaches to provide personnel to 
meet unmanned aircraft systems force levels, and they had not fully 
developed plans to supply needed personnel.[Footnote 4] More recently, 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013[Footnote 
5] required the Air Force to report on the education, training, and 
promotion rates of RPA pilots. 

You requested that we evaluate the Air Force's approach to managing 
its RPA pilot workforce as well as the pilots' quality of life and 
their promotion rates. For this review we evaluated the extent to 
which the Air Force (1) has used a strategic human-capital approach to 
manage RPA pilots; (2) has addressed concerns, if any, about the 
working conditions of RPA pilots that may affect their quality of 
life; and (3) has analyzed the promotion rates of RPA pilots. 

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force uses a strategic human-
capital approach to manage RPA pilots, we applied criteria from our 
model of strategic human-capital management that we previously 
reported. The model includes leading practices used by high-performing 
organizations and is intended to help federal organizations use their 
human capital effectively and integrate human-capital considerations 
into daily decision making and planning for the program results they 
wish to accomplish.[Footnote 6] We adapted these criteria by analyzing 
the practices in the model to determine which were relevant to RPA 
pilots and a military career in general. We reviewed our adaptation 
with Air Force officials who agreed that our criteria were relevant to 
the Air Force's management of RPA pilots. To identify the extent to 
which the Air Force used these practices, we interviewed officials 
from offices including the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for 
Manpower, Personnel, and Services and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, as well as RPA 
pilots and their commanders. In addition, we analyzed DOD and Air 
Force guidance and data on personnel levels, incentive pays, and 
attrition rates for RPA pilots. Furthermore, we discussed instances of 
Air Force personnel-management actions that we found to be 
inconsistent with the leading practices we reported on previously with 
the appropriate Air Force officials. 

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force has addressed concerns, 
if any, about the working conditions of RPA pilots that may affect 
their quality of life, we identified and analyzed criteria included in 
DOD's 2009 and 2004 Quadrennial Quality of Life Reviews. These reviews 
include statements that express DOD's commitment to provide 
servicemembers with the best quality of life possible. DOD has broadly 
defined quality of life to include such factors as morale, health and 
wellness, and work-life balance. To understand the working conditions 
of RPA pilots that may affect their quality of life, we analyzed Air 
Force studies that evaluated the stress and mental-health conditions 
of RPA personnel, which included pilots. We also interviewed the 
researchers who conducted these studies to clarify our understanding 
of their methods, findings, and recommendations to alleviate the 
stress of RPA personnel. We analyzed the recommendations included in 
the Air Force studies as well as documentation provided by officials 
from various Air Force offices describing actions the Air Force has 
taken in response to these recommendations. In addition, we 
interviewed officials from the Air Force Medical Support Agency, 
Headquarters Air Force officials, as well as RPA pilots, their 
commanders, and mental-health professionals during site visits to 
Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. In these interviews we 
obtained perspectives on the working conditions of RPA pilots that may 
affect their quality of life and actions taken in response. 

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force analyzes the promotion 
rates of RPA pilots, we applied criteria from our model of strategic 
human-capital management[Footnote 7] regarding using complete data in 
human-capital decisions. We analyzed data from the Air Force Personnel 
Center (AFPC) for active-duty officers promoted to the ranks of major, 
lieutenant colonel, and colonel. We analyzed data from 2006 to the 
most-recently available data, which for promotion to major and colonel 
was 2012 and for promotion to lieutenant colonel was 2013.[Footnote 8] 
In addition, we interviewed officials from AFPC, reviewed 
documentation they provided, and found the data to be reliable for our 
purposes. Furthermore, we analyzed documentation that officials from 
Headquarters Air Force and AFPC provided, including Air Force policy 
that governs the officer promotion process, AFPC's analysis of officer 
promotion rates, and the Air Force's August 2013 report to Congress on 
the promotion rates of RPA pilots.[Footnote 9] Moreover, we evaluated 
documentation of steps the Air Force has taken to raise the promotion 
rates of RPA pilots including instructions the Secretary of the Air 
Force provided to promotion board members and briefings that 
Headquarters Air Force and AFPC prepared for the Secretary of the Air 
Force. 

For all our objectives, we also conducted 10 focus groups during site 
visits to Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. Each group 
generally consisted of six to nine active-duty RPA pilots at ranks 
ranging from second lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. The information 
that we obtained during these focus groups accurately captures the 
opinions provided by the RPA pilots who attended the focus groups at 
the three Air Force Bases we visited. However, these opinions cannot 
be generalized to all RPA pilots at these bases or to all RPA pilots 
in the Air Force. We discuss our scope and methodology in more detail 
in appendix I and our approach to conducting our focus groups in 
appendix II. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to April 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Growth in Use of RPAs and Expanded Missions: 

The Air Force has rapidly expanded its use of RPAs in the last decade 
to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Air Force 
flies three types of RPAs--the MQ-1 (Predator), the MQ-9 (Reaper) and 
the larger RQ-4 (Global Hawk). Beyond the traditional intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to analyze evolving 
battlefield conditions, the MQ-1 and the MQ-9 have been outfitted with 
missiles to strike targets, with equipment to designate targets for 
manned aircraft by laser, and with sensors to locate the positions of 
improvised explosive devices and moving insurgents, among other 
missions. 

The Military Services' Various Approaches to Assigning RPA Personnel: 

All the military services operate RPAs, and each uses different 
approaches to assign personnel to pilot them and operate their 
sensors. For example, the Air Force (the focus of this review) assigns 
officers to fly RPAs and enlisted personnel to operate the RPAs' 
sensors, which provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities. In addition, the Air Force relied solely on manned-
aircraft pilots to fly RPAs until 2010, when it established an RPA 
pilot career field for officers who specialize in flying RPAs and are 
not qualified to fly manned aircraft. Similarly, the Navy assigns 
officers to pilot RPAs, and enlisted personnel to operate RPA sensors. 
However, the Navy has not established a separate career field for 
pilots who specialize in flying RPAs and instead assigns pilots of 
manned aircraft to operate them. By contrast, the Army and Marine 
Corps have opted to assign enlisted personnel to fly RPAs and operate 
their sensors. Further, in both the Army and Marine Corps, there is no 
distinction between the pilot and sensor operator. 

RPA Pilots' Current and Future Basing: 

Air Force RPA pilots carry out their missions and pilot RPAs from 
eight active-duty bases in the continental United States including 
Creech, Cannon, and Beale Air Force Bases and from Air National Guard 
bases in six states including North Dakota, New York, and Ohio. In 
addition, RPA pilots are trained at some of the bases where RPAs are 
operated, such as at Beale Air Force Base, as well as at other bases 
where RPAs are not operated, such as at Holloman Air Force Base. The 
Air Force plans to add an Air Force Reserve unit at Hurlburt Field as 
well as Air National Guard RPA bases in Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, New 
York, and Pennsylvania (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Current and Planned Operational and Training Locations for 
Air Force Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Operations only: 
Arizona Air National Guard; 
Cannon Air Force Base; 
Ellsworth Air Force Base; 
Grand Forks Air Force Base; 
Nellis Air Force Base: Active duty and Air Force Reserve; 
North Dakota Air National Guard; 
Ohio Air National Guard; 
Tennessee Air National Guard; 
Texas Air National Guard; 
Whiteman Air Force Base. 

Operations and training: 
Air National Guard - Syracuse; 
Beale Air Force Base: Formal Training Unit; 
California Air National Guard: Formal Training Unit; 
Creech Air Force Base: 
* Formal Training Unit; 
* Active duty and Air Force Reserve. 

Training only: 
Holloman Air Force Base: Formal Training Unit; 
Pueblo, Colorado: Undergraduate RPA Training; 
Randolph Air Force Base; Undergraduate RPA Training. 

Future location: 
Air National Guard - Niagara Falls: Formal Training Unit; 
Arkansas Air National Guard; 
Hurlburt Field: Air Force Reserve; 
Iowa Air National Guard; 
Michigan Air National Guard; 
Pennsylvania Air National Guard. 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force documents; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

Training and Training Costs: 

The initial training that the Air Force provides to its RPA pilots is 
designed specifically for flying RPAs and consists of two major 
components that take about 10 months to complete. The first major 
component is Undergraduate RPA Training and it consists of a basic 
flying skills course in which RPA pilots learn to fly a small manned 
aircraft in Pueblo, Colorado; instrument training in a manned-aircraft 
flight simulator at Randolph Air Force Base in Texas, and an RPA 
fundamentals course that is also at Randolph. In the second major 
component of their initial training, RPA pilots get their first 
opportunity to fly an RPA at a Formal Training Unit, which for most 
active-duty pilots takes place at Holloman Air Force Base in New 
Mexico. During this training, RPA pilots learn basic RPA operations in 
all mission areas including intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance as well as close air support. Following their time in 
Formal Training Units, RPA pilots finish their training by attending a 
2-week joint weapons course in which they learn how to operate with 
the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in a joint operational environment. 

The Air Force spends considerably less to train RPA pilots than it 
does to train manned-aircraft pilots. Specifically, Air Education and 
Training Command officials estimate that the Air Force spends about 
$65,000 to train each RPA pilot to complete Undergraduate RPA 
Training. Conversely, these officials estimate that the Air Force 
spends an average of $557,000[Footnote 10] for each manned-aircraft 
pilot to complete the corresponding portion of manned-aircraft pilot 
training, which is called Undergraduate Pilot Training. 

Remote-Split Operations: 

The Air Force currently flies the bulk of its RPAs using a concept 
known as remote-split operations. With remote-split operations, a 
small number of RPA pilots deploy to operational theaters located 
overseas to launch and recover RPAs from various locations around the 
world while other RPA pilots remotely control the RPA for its mission 
from Air Force bases in the United States (see figure 2). According to 
Air Force officials, remote-split operations help the Air Force reduce 
the personnel and equipment it deploys overseas because the units that 
launch and recover RPAs are staffed with a relatively small number of 
pilots, sensor operators, support personnel, and equipment. In 
addition, remote-split operations provide the Air Force flexibility to 
change the geographic region of the world where an RPA pilot conducts 
a mission without moving the pilot, support personnel, or equipment 
needed to control the RPA. If the Air Force is not able to use one of 
its launch and recovery sites for various reasons such as poor 
weather, the Air Force can continue its RPA operations by launching 
RPAs from a different launch and recovery site. 

Figure 2: Remote-Split Operations of Air Force Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft (RPA): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Most RPA pilots operate RPAs from an Air Force base in the United 
States while the RPAs they control are typically located overseas. 
Satellite relay site; 
Satellite. 

International: 
Remotely piloted aircraft; 
Target. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[End of figure] 

Promotion Process: 

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)[Footnote 11] 
created a system for managing the promotions for the officer corps of 
each of the military services. DOPMA specifies that the secretaries of 
the military departments must establish the maximum number of officers 
in each competitive category that may be recommended for promotion by 
competitive promotion boards. Career categories, also known as 
competitive categories, cluster officers with similar education, 
training, or experience, and these officers compete among themselves 
for promotion opportunities. Under this system, as currently 
implemented in the Air Force, there are several competitive categories 
including one that contains the bulk of Air Force officers called the 
Line of the Air Force, which includes RPA pilots, as well as pilots of 
manned aircraft and other operations-oriented careers.[Footnote 12] 

To consider officers for promotion from among those who are eligible, 
the Air Force assigns groups of senior officers to serve as members of 
a promotion selection board for each competitive category of officer 
in the Air Force. Promotion boards consist of at least five active-
duty officers who are senior in grade to the eligible officers, but no 
officer on the board is below the rank of major. In addition, Air 
Force guidance states that the Air Force attempts to provide a 
balanced perspective on promotion boards, and hence it selects 
officers who mirror, as much as possible, the officers they are 
considering with respect to race, sex, aeronautical rating, career 
field, and command.[Footnote 13] Promotion boards typically convene 
annually at AFPC headquarters to review a variety of records for each 
eligible officer, including performance and training reports as well 
as recommendations from supervisors. Board members assess these 
records using a best-qualified approach and use a variety of methods 
to score the records and resolve differences among the scoring of the 
board members, if necessary. An Air Force officer cannot serve as a 
member of two successive promotion boards considering officers of the 
same competitive category and rank. 

A key feature of DOPMA is its "up-or-out" promotion system. Under this 
system, as currently implemented in the Air Force, promotion to the 
first two ranks in an officer's career is not competitive. 
Specifically, 100 percent of fully qualified Air Force second 
lieutenants and first lieutenants are promoted after serving for 2 
years in their respective ranks and do not meet with a competitive 
promotion board. However, as officers advance through the ranks in 
cohorts that are determined by the year they were commissioned, they 
compete for promotion against other members of their cohort at set 
years or zones of consideration for each rank. For example, Air Force 
officers are generally considered for promotion to major, or the grade 
of O-4, after 10 years. 

Under the DOPMA system, a select group of officers can also be 
considered for promotion 1 or 2 years early, or "below the zone." 
However, because only a limited number of officers below the zone may 
be promoted, officers have their greatest potential for promotion "in 
the zone." If officers in a cohort are not promoted while they are in 
the zone, they can compete for promotion in the following one or in 
some instances two years later, which is known as competing "above the 
zone." However, if these officers are not selected for promotion above 
the zone, they could be involuntarily separated from the Air Force. 

The Air Force Has Made Efforts to Manage RPA Pilots but Faces 
Challenges to Recruit, Develop, and Retain Pilots and Build Their 
Morale: 

The Air Force has taken some steps toward managing RPA pilots using a 
strategic human-capital approach but faces several challenges 
including accurately identifying personnel requirements, limited 
training time for pilots, recruiting and retention difficulties, and 
incorporating feedback from RPA pilots into its operations. 

The Air Force Has Undertaken Some Workforce Planning Efforts but It 
May Not Have Identified Its Personnel Requirements Accurately: 

The Air Force's effort to meet combatant command RPA requirements has 
included some elements of strategic human-capital planning, but 
increasing demand and past experience indicate the Air Force has not 
accurately identified RPA personnel requirements. High-performing 
organizations use strategic human-capital planning to help them 
evaluate the extent to which their human-capital approaches support 
the accomplishment of programmatic goals. Strategic human-capital 
planning involves identifying human-capital needs like the necessary 
"shape," which involves ensuring that agencies have the right numbers 
of staff at the right levels of experience, as well as the necessary 
size of the workforce for accomplishing agency missions while also 
enabling the workforce to accomplish career-development tasks, which 
furthers agency goals and objectives. 

Air Force Steps to Plan for the Shape and Size of the RPA Pilot 
Workforce and React to Increased Combat Air Patrol (CAP) Requirements: 

The Air Force has taken steps to plan for the shape and size of the 
RPA pilot workforce and react to requirements from the Secretary of 
Defense, including adding a cadre of experienced officers to mentor 
officers recruited into a new career the Air Force established for RPA 
pilots. In order to develop a long-term, sustainable career path for 
pilots flying RPAs and demonstrate its commitment to RPA pilots, in 
2010 the Air Force established an RPA pilot career field with a 
separate set of training requirements. These officers are qualified 
only to fly RPAs and are not qualified on Air Force manned aircraft. 

In addition, the Air Force recognized that as new officers were 
recruited into the RPA pilot career field, they would need a group of 
more-senior officers to serve as mentors and leaders. Therefore, in 
2011, the Air Force permanently recategorized around 475 manned-
aircraft pilots who were generally serving at the ranks of major and 
lieutenant colonel to serve as permanent RPA pilots, according to Air 
Force documentation. Air Force officials stated that these more-senior 
pilots would help provide a leadership and experience base for the new 
RPA pilot career field. The officials also stated that additional 
manned-aircraft pilots have been permanently recategorized as RPA 
pilots since 2011, and Air Force documentation shows a total of 545 
recategorized manned-aircraft pilots. 

Furthermore, the Air Force has taken steps to plan for the size of its 
RPA pilot workforce. According to Headquarters Air Force officials, 
the number of RPA combat air patrols (CAP),[Footnote 14] directed by 
the Secretary of Defense and based on the mission needs of the 
combatant commands, is a primary factor in determining RPA pilot 
personnel levels. In 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed the Air 
Force to fund personnel to reach 65 CAPs by fiscal year 2013 and be 
prepared to grow beyond that requirement in future years. To determine 
the number of RPA pilots, the Air Force Manpower Agency conducted a 
personnel requirements study for MQ-1 Predator squadrons in 2008 and 
established the number of RPA crews required to fly one CAP for 24 
hours, referred to as the crew ratio. 

Based on the study, the Air Force concluded that the crew ratio for MQ-
1 Predator squadrons would be 10: 1, which calls for 10 RPA pilots to 
sustain a Predator for 24 hours.[Footnote 15] Air Force officials 
stated that although the 2008 study did not address the personnel 
requirements for MQ-9 Reaper squadrons, the Air Force used the study 
as the basis for establishing a 10: 1 crew ratio for MQ-9 units also 
because MQ-1 and MQ-9 units have similar requirements. In addition to 
this crew ratio, the Air Force used Air Force Instruction 38-201 
[Footnote 16] to calculate the required number of additional pilots it 
needs for support positions such as commanders, and staff positions at 
various organizational levels including headquarters.[Footnote 17] 
Using the crew ratio and the Air Force instruction, the Air Force 
determined that the total number of RPA pilots required to sustain the 
65 CAPs currently required by the Secretary of Defense is between 
1,600 and 1,650 pilots, according to a Headquarters Air Force official. 

Furthermore, the Air Force has taken steps to react to increased CAP 
requirements. Until 2009, the Air Force relied solely on manned-
aircraft pilots serving assignments as RPA pilots to fill personnel 
requirements. In fiscal year 2006, manned-aircraft pilots were 
sustaining 12 CAPs, and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review stated 
that the Predator system alone would grow to 21 CAPs by 2010. However, 
according to Headquarters Air Force officials, by 2007 the demand from 
the combatant commands had already exceeded that benchmark. Air Force 
leadership committed the service to meeting the increased 
requirements, and the Air Force took actions to provide sufficient 
personnel. These actions included lengthening the assignments of 
manned-aircraft pilots in RPA squadrons and then extending those 
assignments indefinitely, mobilizing pilots from the Air National 
Guard and Air Force Reserve, delaying the establishment of the RPA 
weapons school after designating RPA as a formal weapon system, and 
extending the length of deployments to augment staffing levels of RPA 
squadrons. In 2009, the Air Force also began assigning manned-aircraft 
training graduates to RPA assignments as their first assignment after 
completing Undergraduate Pilot Training. In 2010, the Air Force 
established the RPA pilot career field. Figure 3 summarizes the steps 
that the Air Force took to react to increased CAP requirements since 
2007. 

Figure 3: Air Force Steps to React to Growth in Demand for Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA): 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph and associated information] 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 1. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 3. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 4. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 6. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 8. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 10. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 15; 
* Directs RPA units to surge to meet its 21 CAP requirement early with 
the goal of reaching it by fiscal year 2009; 
* Extends assignments of manned-aircraft pilots in RPA units and 
mobilizes manned-aircraft pilots from the Air National Guard and Air 
Force Reserve. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 28; 
* Directs RPA units to surge three times to meet an increased demand 
from combatant commanders; 
* Freezes assignments of manned-aircraft pilots serving in RPA units 
and delays establishment of an RPA weapons school. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 36; 
* Continues to freeze assignments of manned-aircraft pilots to serve 
in RPA units indefinitely; 
* Begins assigning recent manned-aircraft pilot training graduates to 
RPA units. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 44; 
* Directs RPA units to surge to support 7 CAPs earlier than planned to 
meet an increased demand from combatant commanders; 
* Establishes the RPA pilot career field. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 50; 
* Directs RPA units to surge to support 4 CAPs earlier than planned to 
meet an increased demand from combatant commanders; 
* Mobilizes additional pilots from the Air National Guard and the Air 
Force Reserve; reduces capacity of Formal Training Units and weapons 
school; 
* Permanently recategorizes 477 manned aircraft pilots as RPA pilots. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 57; 
* Holds at 57 CAPs to begin a reconstitution period to restaff the 
Formal Training Units, restart the weapons school, and increase the 
RPA unit crew ratios. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Combat Air Patrols (CAP): 65; 
* Begins reassigning manned aircraft pilot training graduates out of 
RPA units to their manned weapons systems; 
* Ends formal reconstitution period and continues growth toward 65 CAP 
requirement. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and Air Force documents. 

[End of figure] 

Using these steps, the Air Force has made progress towards meeting the 
CAP requirements, but at personnel levels that were below 
requirements. In addition, the Air Force reduced the capacity of its 
RPA training unit because instructors were pulled to fly in RPA units. 
In fiscal year 2012, the Air Force began a reconstitution period 
intended to staff the training units, restart the weapons school, and 
increase the overall number of RPA pilots to increase the crew ratios 
of RPA units. As of December 2013, there were 1,366 RPA pilots, or 
around 85 percent of the total of 1,600 pilots determined by the Air 
Force as necessary to sustain RPA operations and training for 65 CAPs. 
In addition, the Air Force anticipates increasing the number of RPA 
pilot staff positions across the Air Force from 111 as of December 
2013 to 300 by fiscal year 2023 to serve at various Air Force 
commands, including at Headquarters Air Force and Air Combat Command. 

Air Force Has Not Accurately Identified Optimum Personnel Requirements 
and Has Not Established a Minimum Personnel Requirement: 

The Air Force has not accurately identified optimum personnel 
requirements, or crew ratio, for the number of RPA pilots it requires. 
We have reported that high-performing organizations use complete and 
current data to inform their strategic human-capital planning and 
remain open to reevaluating workforce planning efforts.[Footnote 18] 
In the 2008 study that the Air Force Manpower Agency conducted to 
determine the appropriate crew ratios for MQ-1 Predator squadrons, the 
Air Force did not account for all of the flying and administrative 
tasks that are required in these squadrons. While the study accounted 
for some important tasks that RPA pilots perform in MQ-1 squadrons 
such as performing operational missions, it did not account for other 
important tasks such as those required to launch and recover RPAs. In 
addition, the study did not account for some important administrative 
tasks such as conducting flight-safety evaluations and providing a 
commander's support staff. The study acknowledged that due to its 
reporting time frames, it did not capture the personnel requirements 
of a variety of tasks. 

Headquarters Air Force personnel acknowledged the study's limitations 
and said that because the study omitted critical and important tasks 
from its analysis, the resulting crew ratio that it recommended 
probably did not provide enough pilots to perform the work in an MQ-1 
squadron. These officials stated that, because of the study's 
omissions, the 10: 1 crew ratio for MQ-1 squadrons established in an 
Air Force instruction that was based on this study should probably be 
increased.[Footnote 19] Similarly, some RPA unit commanders and RPA 
pilots in some of our focus groups also said that the crew ratio is 
too low.[Footnote 20] However, to-date the Air Force has not updated 
the crew ratio for RPA squadrons. Headquarters Air Force officials 
stated that updating the crew ratio has not been a top priority. At 
the same time, these officials noted that more recently they have 
discussed the need to update the crew ratio and expressed optimism 
that it would become a priority in the future, though no concrete 
plans exist to initiate an update to the requirement.[Footnote 21] 

Furthermore, an Air Force instruction states that a crew ratio 
establishes the number of personnel required to support a unit mission 
and that if a ratio is too low, combat capability is diminished and 
flight safety suffers.[Footnote 22] Such risks can arise when crew-
ratio requirements are set too low, as well as when units operate at 
crew ratios that are too far below optimum crew ratios. However, Air 
Force documentation shows that crew ratios in RPA units have 
fluctuated between 7: 1 and 8.5: 1, and at times have dropped to 6: 1, 
according to Air Force officials. This indicates that the RPA pilot 
workload is performed by fewer pilots working more hours to accomplish 
the mission than if the Air Force ensured that its RPA units operated 
at the required crew ratios. The Air Force has operated at these 
levels to provide a higher number of CAPs. 

According to Headquarters Air Force officials, in the past the Air 
Force has attempted to deny requests made by combatant commanders for 
Air Force RPA capabilities because they push crew ratios too low. 
These officials stated that when the Air Force denies a request it 
provides justification, which include concerns about crew ratios, to 
the Joint Staff, which is responsible for resolving differences 
between combatant commanders' requests for capabilities and the 
services that provide them. However, Air Force officials stated that 
the Joint Staff has overridden some of the Air Force denials in order 
to accomplish missions, despite the possibility that crew ratios would 
decrease. Without establishing a minimum crew ratio for RPA units, the 
Air Force does not have the information it needs to determine when 
those units are operating at crew ratio levels that expose the Air 
Force to unacceptable levels of risk to accomplishing its mission and 
ensuring safety. 

A High Pace of Operations and Work Demands Limit Time for Training and 
Development: 

As a result of inaccurate crew ratios for Air Force RPA squadrons and 
a lack of a minimum crew ratio, the RPA pilot workforce has sustained 
a high pace of operations, which limits its time for training and 
development. The Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-
2047 states that it is imperative to provide the necessary training 
and opportunities for advancement that will create a cadre of future 
Air Force leaders.[Footnote 23] However, unit commanders in each of 
the three locations we visited and some RPA pilots stated that the 
high pace of operations and demand for RPA capabilities limited their 
units' time to train for the various mission sets that RPA units are 
required to perform.[Footnote 24] One unit commander stated that 
battlefield commanders that his unit supports have pointed out that 
his RPA pilots need training, and pilots in some focus groups noted 
that limited training opportunities prevent RPA units from excelling 
at their missions and becoming experts in their field. In addition, 
pilots in all 10 focus groups indicated that they are limited in their 
ability to pursue developmental opportunities.[Footnote 25] 

Furthermore, DOD has noted that the prevalence and use of unmanned 
systems, including RPAs, will continue to grow at a dramatic pace. As 
discussed above, the Secretary of Defense has stated specifically that 
the requirement for 65 CAPs represents a temporary plateau in progress 
toward an increased enduring requirement. Also, as the national 
security environment changes, RPA pilots will be expected to conduct a 
broader range of missions across different conditions and 
environments, including antiaccess and area-denial environments where 
the freedom to operate RPAs is contested.[Footnote 26] By not creating 
an environment where RPA pilots can receive the training and 
development opportunities they need to perform their functions 
effectively, the Air Force may be hindering its ability to perform its 
mission even if it is able to operate at the optimum crew ratio that 
is set in the Air Force instruction. 

The Air Force Faces Challenges Recruiting RPA Pilots and May Face 
Challenges Retaining Them in the Future: 

The Air Force has used a dual strategy to meet its increasing need for 
RPA pilots: using manned-aircraft pilots and recruiting RPA pilots, 
the career field established in 2010 for officers trained to only fly 
RPAs. However, the Air Force has faced challenges in recruiting RPA 
pilots since it began this career field. High-performing organizations 
tailor their recruitment and retention strategies to meet their 
specific mission needs.[Footnote 27] The Air Force intends to build a 
cadre of dedicated RPA pilots, and projects that RPA pilots will make 
up 90 percent of the RPA pilot workforce by fiscal year 2022. However, 
the Air Force has not been able to achieve its recruiting goals for 
RPA pilots in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. In fiscal year 2013, the Air 
Force recruited 110 new RPA pilots, missing its goal of 179 pilots by 
around 39 percent. Consequently, while the Air Force has made progress 
in increasing the total number of RPA pilots and staffed its RPA units 
at about 85 percent of current requirements as of December 2013, 
around 42 percent of those pilots are manned-aircraft pilots and 
manned-aircraft pilot training graduates. Both of these groups are 
temporary RPA pilots who serve only one assignment in an RPA squadron. 
While the length of these assignments can be extended, these pilots 
will likely not stay in the RPA squadrons permanently (see figure 4). 

Figure 4: Distribution of Permanent and Temporary Air Force Pilots of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA): 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Permanent pilots: 58%: 
Recategorized manned-aircraft pilots: 40% (545); 
Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots: 18% (249); 
Temporary pilots: 42%: 
Manned-aircraft pilots: 26% (352); 
Manned-aircraft training graduates: 16% (220). 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data. 

[End of figure] 

Headquarters Air Force officials believe the Air Force has missed its 
recruiting goals in 2012 and 2013 for RPA pilots because potential 
recruits have a limited understanding of the RPA mission and there is 
a lack of recruiting officials with RPA experience to advise potential 
recruits. The Air Force may face challenges recruiting officers to 
serve as RPA pilots because of a negative perception that some in the 
Air Force associate with flying RPAs. Headquarters Air Force 
officials, RPA pilots in some of our focus groups, and one unit 
commander stated that some in the Air Force view flying RPAs 
negatively, resulting in a stigma. According to these officials one 
reason some view flying an RPA negatively is because flying an RPA 
does not require pilots to operate an aircraft while on board an 
aircraft in-flight. In addition, officials stated that overcoming this 
stigma may be difficult because publicizing the work that RPA pilots 
do is often not feasible due to the classified nature of RPA missions. 
Nonetheless, Headquarters Air Force officials stated that the Air 
Force projects it will meet its recruiting goals for the RPA pilot 
career field for fiscal year 2014 on the basis of commitments made by 
cadets participating in the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps. 

We have reported that high-performing organizations make use of 
targeted investments such as recruiting bonuses as part of their 
strategies to recruit high-quality personnel with the critical skills. 
However, Headquarters Air Force officials reported that the Air Force 
is not currently exercising its option to offer a recruiting bonus as 
an incentive to volunteer for the RPA pilot career field. Officials 
from the Headquarters Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense stated that such pay incentives are rarely used to recruit 
officers in the Air Force. Headquarters Air Force officials also 
stated that due to the current constrained budget environment in which 
DOD and the federal government are operating, the Air Force would 
first prefer to exhaust the use of all nonmonetary options for 
improving recruiting before offering bonuses. As a result, the Air 
Force may have to continue to rely on manned-aircraft pilots to meet 
RPA pilot personnel needs. This approach may not be cost-effective 
because the Air Force spends an average of $557,000 per pilot on 
traditional Undergraduate Pilot Training, compared to an average of 
$65,000 for Undergraduate RPA Training, according to Air Education and 
Training Command officials. Without a more-tailored approach to 
recruiting RPA pilots that increases the appeal of the new career to 
potential recruits, the Air Force risks perpetuating personnel 
shortages and may need to continue relying on manned-aircraft pilots 
to fill its personnel requirements. 

Moreover, the Air Force uses officers as RPA pilots, but it has not 
evaluated whether using alternative personnel populations such as 
enlisted or civilian personnel as RPA pilots is a viable option. A 
report by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence urged 
the Air Force to study the other military services' experiences with 
using enlisted personnel as RPA operators and evaluate whether this 
approach would degrade mission performance.[Footnote 28] Headquarters 
Air Force officials stated that prior to 2010, they decided to assign 
officers to serve as RPA pilots because they thought officers were 
more appropriate since RPAs fly in complex airspace, and, in some 
cases, fire missiles at adversaries. Headquarters Air Force officials 
also stated that they have, at times, considered the use of enlisted 
or civilian personnel but have not initiated formal efforts to 
evaluate whether using such populations would negatively affect the 
ability of the Air Force to carry out its missions. However, without 
an evaluation of the viability of using other sources of personnel, 
the Air Force may lack valuable information on whether additional 
options exist for meeting personnel requirements. 

With regard to pilot retention, the Air Force has taken some steps but 
does not have a retention strategy for RPA pilots, though indications 
suggest that it could face challenges retaining them in the future. 
Specifically, according to Headquarters Air Force officials, the Air 
Force has offered assignment incentive payments to RPA pilots since 
the career field was established in 2010. In addition, the officials 
stated that manned-aircraft pilots serving assignments in RPA 
squadrons receive skill-based aviator career incentive pay and can 
receive aviator retention pay by extending their service commitment in 
the Air Force. Despite these incentive payments, pilots in 7 of 10 
focus groups we conducted indicated that retention of RPA pilots is or 
will be a challenge. In addition, pilots in some focus groups stated 
that they are considering their options for leaving active-duty 
service in the Air Force to go to the Air National Guard, or Air Force 
Reserve, or the private sector. Unit commanders in one location we 
visited, pilots in some of our focus groups, and other Air Force 
officials stated that they were concerned about the future retention 
rates of RPA pilots. 

Headquarters Air Force officials stated that the Air Force's strategy 
for meeting personnel requirements has focused on recruiting and that 
they have not observed indications of a concern with the retention of 
RPA pilots. However, the Air Force has not evaluated the potential 
effect of the difficult working conditions, such as long working hours 
and frequently rotating shifts that we discuss in more detail later in 
this report, that RPA pilots face and how those conditions may affect 
the Air Force's ability to retain RPA pilots, despite the situation 
that many of these pilots will begin to reach the end of their service 
commitments in fiscal year 2017. In a 2011 memorandum to the Air 
Force, the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to provide 
sufficient incentives to retain high-quality RPA personnel. Although 
the Air Force has made retention payments available to RPA pilots, 
these efforts may not be enough or appropriate to overcome the 
challenges the Air Force may face to retain RPA pilots. 

The Air Force Has Mechanisms to Collect Feedback from RPA Pilots but 
Has Not Used That Feedback to Manage Its Human-Capital Strategy for 
RPA Pilots: 

While the Air Force has mechanisms in place to collect feedback from 
RPA pilots, it has not used this feedback to develop its strategic 
human-capital approach to managing RPA pilots, such as by 
incorporating their feedback into tailoring a recruiting and retention 
strategy or by taking actions related to training and development. 
High-performing organizations involve their employees in their 
strategic human-capital approaches and planning in order to improve 
motivation and morale by seeking employee feedback on a periodic 
basis, and using that input to adjust their human-capital approaches. 

The Air Force has mechanisms in place that it has used to collect 
feedback from RPA pilots. For example, the Air Force solicits feedback 
from RPA units as well as all other Air Force units during an annual 
Unit Climate Assessment that gauges discrimination, harassment, and 
morale issues at the unit level. While this effort is not specific to 
the RPA units, it does include assessments of RPA units. Unit 
commanders can use the results of their Unit Climate Assessments to 
address challenges at the local unit level. However, Headquarters Air 
Force officials responsible for managing RPA pilots have not obtained 
information from these assessments to identify whether they include 
potentially valuable information about any concerns related to 
establishing the RPA pilot career field. Headquarters Air Force 
officials stated that the Air Force created this career field more 
quickly and under greater operational demand than any career field in 
recent Air Force history. However, these officials also stated that 
using feedback from the Unit Climate Assessments to address issues at 
a headquarters level that would affect RPA pilots could undermine unit 
commanders. They also noted that officials at the headquarters level 
might lack the proper context for understanding the assessment results. 

The Air Force also collected feedback from RPA pilots in studies the 
Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine published in 2011 and 2013 to 
assess the level of and reasons for stress in personnel assigned to 
RPA units, which included surveys and interviews of RPA pilots. In 
response to these studies, the Air Force took actions designed to 
address stress in personnel assigned to RPA units. For instance, the 
studies recommended that the Air Force assign an operational 
psychologist to each RPA unit, and, in response, local flight 
surgeons, clinical providers, and aerospace physiologists have created 
teams to help address stress concerns at the base level. While 
researchers from the Air Force's medical research community conducted 
these studies, they included findings related to personnel shortages 
that are germane to the Air Force personnel and operations 
communities. However, Headquarters Air Force officials from the 
personnel and operations communities stated that, prior to our review, 
they were unaware of the studies and their findings. 

RPA pilots in our focus groups also noted information that suggests 
that incorporating pilot feedback from existing mechanisms could help 
improve communication and address issues pilots are facing. For 
example, pilots in some of our focus groups stated that they did not 
know what the career path for an RPA pilot is or what steps they 
should take to advance. Further, in some of our focus groups, manned-
aircraft pilots who are serving assignments as RPA pilots expressed 
uncertainty regarding whether they will be able to return to their 
manned platforms and what effect, if any, their RPA assignment will 
have on their careers. Pilots in some focus groups also reported that 
senior leadership had not communicated to them about this uncertainty, 
and one pilot specifically noted that the lack of communication 
negatively affects morale. Without using existing mechanisms to obtain 
feedback from RPA pilots directly, Headquarters Air Force may be 
missing an opportunity to obtain information that can help it address 
recruiting, retention, training, and development challenges related to 
RPA pilots. 

Air Force Has Taken Some Actions to Address the Potentially 
Challenging Working Conditions RPA Pilots Face but Has Not Fully 
Analyzed Being Deployed-on-Station: 

Air Force RPA Pilots Find Their Work Rewarding but Report Multiple 
Challenging Working Conditions, Some of Which the Air Force Has Taken 
Actions to Address: 

RPA pilots find their mission rewarding, but they reported that they 
face multiple, challenging working conditions. RPA pilots in 8 of the 
10 focus groups we conducted reported that they found it rewarding to 
be able to contribute to combat operations every day through the RPA 
mission. For instance, one pilot stated that the mission is the reason 
that he had decided to become a permanent RPA pilot and that it was 
rewarding to contribute to overseas contingency operations, which he 
would not be able to do in any other job. Similarly, the Air Force 
School of Aerospace Medicine published studies in 2011 and 2013 that 
evaluated the psychological condition of RPA personnel and found that 
RPA pilots held positive perceptions of the effect and contributions 
of their work. However, RPA pilots also stated that they face multiple 
challenging working conditions including: long hours, working shifts 
that frequently rotate, and remaining in assignments beyond typical 
lengths.[Footnote 29] RPA pilots in all of our focus groups reported 
that these challenging conditions negatively affected their morale and 
caused them stress. Similarly, the Air Force School of Aerospace 
Medicine studies found that RPA personnel reported sources of stress 
that were consistent with the challenges we identified. These 
challenges include the following: 

* RPA pilots in 8 of our 10 focus groups stated, and Air Force studies 
we reviewed show, that RPA pilots work long hours. RPA pilots in 7 of 
our focus groups described factors that contribute to their long hours 
including performing administrative duties and attending briefings, in 
addition to flying shifts. The Air Force studies also found that 
working long hours was one of the top five reasons for stress among 
personnel in RPA squadrons. In the studies, over 57 percent of 
respondents reported that they worked more than 50 hours per week. In 
addition, the studies found that over 40 percent of respondents 
reported that performing administrative duties added hours to their 
work week and was the third-highest reason for stress among active-
duty RPA personnel. 

* RPA pilots also reported that it was challenging to work on shifts 
that rotate. RPA pilots in 7 of the 10 focus groups we conducted 
stated that constantly rotating shifts caused sleep problems for them 
because they must continuously adjust their sleep schedule to 
accommodate new shifts.[Footnote 30] In addition, pilots noted that 
continuously rotating to new shifts disrupted their ability to spend 
time with their family and friends. Officials told us that it was 
ideal for pilots working evening or night shifts to maintain a 
consistent sleep pattern on their off-duty days even though those 
sleep patterns would require that pilots sleep while their family and 
friends were awake. However, some RPA pilots reported that they 
typically adjusted their sleep schedules dramatically on their off-
duty days so they could spend time with their families and that these 
changes to their sleep schedules resulted in significant fatigue both 
at home and when they returned to work. Similarly, over half of the 
respondents to the surveys included in the Air Force studies we 
reviewed reported that shift work caused a moderate to large amount of 
their stress. 

* RPA pilots in 5 of our focus groups reported that being assigned to 
continue flying RPAs for periods extending beyond the typical Air 
Force assignment was difficult. In all of the focus groups we 
conducted with RPA pilots, those who plan to return to flying manned 
aircraft stated that they have been required to stay in their 
assignments for periods that are longer than a typical Air Force 
assignment. Air Force officials stated that there is no requirement 
for officers to move to a new assignment after a specified period. 
However, pilots in our focus groups and Air Force headquarters 
officials said that officer assignments typically last 3 to 4 years. 
Air Force documentation shows that some of these pilots have been in 
their RPA assignments for over 6 years. Moreover, the Air Force 
studies also found that one of the most common stressors that RPA 
personnel cited was the lack of clarity regarding when they would 
return to their careers in manned aircraft. Specifically, the 2011 
study states that the Air Force informed RPA pilots who previously 
flew manned aircraft that their RPA assignments were temporary and 
after 3 to 4 years they could return to their manned-aircraft career. 
[Footnote 31] The study goes on to state that due to the increasing 
demand for RPAs and the long-standing surge in RPA operations, many 
pilots have been unable to return to their manned-aircraft careers 
and, until recently, the Air Force kept them in these assignments 
indefinitely. 

The Air Force has taken some actions to address some of the 
challenging working conditions that RPA pilots face. The Air Force 
studies included over 10 recommendations to address the sources of 
stress that RPA personnel reported. For example, the studies 
recommended that the Air Force assign an operational psychologist to 
each RPA unit to help commanders optimize work-rest schedules and 
shift cycles, and identify pilots who are reaching elevated levels of 
fatigue or stress. In response, the Air Force has assigned mental-
health providers that are dedicated to RPA squadrons at Beale, Cannon, 
and Creech Air Force Bases. However, the studies also recommended that 
the Air Force increase staffing in RPA squadrons to reduce the number 
of hours that RPA personnel work and to help establish better shift 
schedules. Air Force researchers stated that increasing staffing 
levels, or crew ratios, in RPA squadrons would be the most-effective 
means to reduce RPA pilot stress, but as discussed above, the Air 
Force has operated its RPA squadrons below the optimum crew ratios. 

Air Force Has Not Fully Analyzed Challenges That RPA Pilots Face 
Related to Being Deployed-on-Station: 

RPA pilots also face challenges related to being deployed-on-station 
as they balance their warfighting responsibilities with their personal 
lives. Because pilots are able to operate RPAs from Air Force bases in 
the United States and are thus able to live at home--what is known as 
being deployed-on-station--their dual role juxtaposes stress related 
to supporting combat operations with the strains that can occur in 
their personal lives. While these pilots face this challenging working 
condition that may affect their quality of life, DOD's Quadrennial 
Quality of Life Reviews have emphasized DOD's continued commitment to 
provide servicemembers with the best quality of life possible. 
[Footnote 32] 

Being deployed-on-station is a new concept in warfighting, and a 2011 
report[Footnote 33] prepared for the Air Force Medical Support Agency 
describes five conditions that personnel who are deployed-on-station 
can experience. The report notes that these personnel (1) experience a 
justifiable risk of being the target of hostile adversary attacks 
because they are combatants and their bank accounts, reputations, or 
physical safety could be targeted; (2) operate in contact with and 
sometimes kill adversaries, although operations they conduct are out 
of direct risk from combat; (3) must act with urgency to sometimes 
kill adversaries and take other time-pressured actions to help ensure 
combatants they support do not lose their lives; (4) work on a wartime 
rhythm that includes 24/7 operations 365 days a year; and (5) are 
required to conceal information from friends and family about their 
work because their missions are often classified. A Headquarters Air 
Force official described being deployed-on-station as a status between 
deployed-in-theater and not deployed and emphasized that personnel who 
are deployed-on-station are not directly engaged in combat, which is a 
significant component of being deployed. The official also 
acknowledged that being deployed-on-station can be more challenging 
than assignments with more-limited connections to the battlefield. 

RPA pilots in each of the 10 focus groups we conducted reported that 
being deployed-on-station negatively affected their quality of life, 
as it was challenging for them to balance their warfighting 
responsibilities with their personal lives for extended periods of 
time. RPA pilots in some of our focus groups, as well as commanders of 
RPA squadrons, noted that they would prefer to deploy-in-theater for 6 
months with a clear end point and be separated from their family and 
friends rather than be deployed-on-station for 3 or more years. One 
commander stated that he preferred being deployed-in-theater and 
knowing when his deployment would end. In contrast, he stated that in 
an RPA squadron, it was difficult to juggle his warfighting role with 
the typical challenges of home life for multiple years. Likewise, the 
Air Force studies found that being deployed-on-station was one of the 
most commonly cited stressors that RPA personnel reported.[Footnote 
34] In addition, RPA pilots in 6 of our 10 focus groups reported that 
they are expected to do more work than their counterparts who are 
deployed-in-theater. For example, RPA pilots in some of our focus 
groups who had previously deployed-in-theater stated that they are 
expected to complete administrative tasks that are not required of 
them when they are deployed-in-theater. 

Headquarters Air Force officials as well as pilots in some of our 
focus groups stated that the Air Force provides support to personnel 
who are deployed-in-theater that it does not provide for personnel who 
are deployed-on-station. Moreover, the Air Force has surveyed RPA 
personnel and other deployed-on-station personnel to study their 
stress and mental health, but it has not fully analyzed the effects of 
being deployed-on-station. Specifically, it has not fully analyzed 
whether being deployed-on-station has negative effects on quality of 
life that are not attributable to the stressors that are related to 
low unit-staffing levels that we discussed above such as rotating 
shifts and long assignments. As a result, the Air Force does not have 
the information it needs to determine whether being deployed-on-
station has a negative effect on the quality of life of RPA pilots 
that is not attributed to the other factors and what steps might be 
needed to reduce those effects. 

The Air Force Monitors RPA Pilot Promotion Rates but Has Not Analyzed 
Factors Related to Those Rates: 

The Air Force Monitors RPA Pilot Promotion Rates and Has Found That 
They Are Lower Than in Other Career Fields: 

AFPC monitors the promotion rates of RPA pilots and has found that 
they were promoted below the average rate for active-duty line 
officers on 20 of 24 officer promotion boards since 2006. We reached 
the same conclusion based on our review of data for these promotion 
boards. We also found that RPA pilots were promoted below the average 
rate of manned-aircraft pilots[Footnote 35] on 21 of 24 boards. 
Furthermore, we compared the promotion rates of RPA pilots to those of 
other career fields and found that RPA pilots were promoted at the 
lowest rate of any career field on 9 of the 24 boards and were 
promoted in the lowest 5 percent of the career fields that competed on 
5 additional boards.[Footnote 36] Conversely, RPA pilots were promoted 
in the top 50 percent of the career fields that competed on only 3 
boards of the 24 boards. More specifically, RPA pilots competing for 
promotion to each rank that we analyzed faced challenges. RPA pilots 
competing for promotion to major were promoted in the top 50 percent 
on just one of the seven promotion boards since 2006. RPA pilots 
competing for promotion to lieutenant colonel were promoted at the 
lowest or next-to-lowest rate compared to the other career fields that 
competed on 7 of the 9 boards since 2006. Likewise, RPA pilots 
competing for promotion to the rank of colonel had the lowest 
promotion rate of any career field that competed on 4 of the 8 colonel 
boards since 2006. Figures 5, 6, and 7 display the results of our 
analyses. 

Figure 5: The Rates of Promotion to Major for Pilots of Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air Force Officer Careers, 
2006 to 2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: plotted point graph] 

Promotion rate is indicated for each year as a range, from lowest to 
highest rate, with RPA shown. 

Year: 2006; 
RPA: slightly above 50th percentile. 

Year: 2007; 
RPA: RPA is the lowest rate. 

Year: 2008; 
RPA: below 50th percentile. 

Year: 2009; 
RPA: below 50th percentile. 

Year: 2010; 
RPA: below 50th percentile. 

Year: 2011; 
RPA: below 50th percentile. 

Year: 2012. 
RPA: at 50th percentile. 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data. 

Note: The Air Force did not hold a promotion board for Line of the Air 
Force majors in 2013. At least 10 eligible officers from between 29 
and 33 careers competed, in the zone, for promotion to the rank of 
major in the Line of the Air Force competitive category between 2006 
and 2012. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 6: The Rates of Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel for Pilots of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air Force Officer 
Careers, 2006 to 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: plotted point graph] 

Promotion rate is indicated for each year as a range, from lowest to 
highest rate, with RPA shown. 

Year: 2006a; 
RPA: RPA is the lowest rate. 

Year: 2006b; 
RPA: below 50th percentile. 

Year: 2007; 
RPA: RPA is the lowest rate. 

Year: 2008; 
RPA: slightly above 50th percentile. 

Year: 2009; 
RPA: RPA is the lowest rate. 

Year: 2010; 
RPA: below 50th percentile. 

Year: 2011; 
RPA: RPA is the lowest rate. 

Year: 2012. 
RPA: below 50th percentile. 

Year: 2013. 
RPA: at 50th percentile. 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data. 

Note: The Air Force held two promotion boards in 2006 for Line of the 
Air Force lieutenant colonels. Fewer than 10 RPA pilots were eligible 
for the 2006a, 2007, and 2008 promotion boards. At least 10 eligible 
officers from between 26 and 30 careers competed, in-the-zone, for 
promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Line of the Air 
Force competitive category between 2006 and 2013. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 7: The Rates of Promotion Rates to Colonel for Pilots of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Compared to Other Air Force Officer 
Careers, 2006 to 2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: plotted point graph] 

Promotion rate is indicated for each year as a range, from lowest to 
highest rate, with RPA shown. 

Year: 2006; 
RPA: RPA is the lowest rate. 

Year: 2007; 
RPA: slightly below 50th percentile. 

Year: 2008; 
RPA: at 50th percentile. 

Year: 2009a; 
RPA: RPA is the lowest rate. 

Year: 2009b; 
RPA: RPA is the lowest rate. 

Year: 2010; 
RPA: RPA is the lowest rate. 

Year: 2011; 
RPA: below 50th percentile. 

Year: 2012. 
RPA: above 50th percentile. 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data. 

[End of figure] 

Note: The Air Force held two promotion boards for Line of the Air 
Force colonels in 2009. Also, the Air Force held a promotion board for 
Line of the Air Force colonels in November 2013, but the results were 
not available as of February 2014. Fewer than 10 RPA pilots were 
eligible for the 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a, and 2009b promotion boards. 
At least 10 eligible officers from between 22 and 26 careers competed, 
in-the-zone, for promotion to the rank of colonel in the Line of the 
Air Force competitive category between 2006 and 2012. 

Air Force Has Not Analyzed Factors Related to Lower RPA Pilot 
Promotion Rates: 

While AFPC has monitored the promotion rates of RPA pilots, it has not 
analyzed the factors related to lower promotion rates for these 
pilots. It is a common statistical practice when analyzing how 
selected factors are related to a given outcome to account for other 
key factors that could also be related to the outcome. Although AFPC 
analyzed the promotions of officers in the Line of the Air Force 
competitive category, which includes RPA pilots, and identified 
factors related to promotion outcomes for officers in this category, 
it has not incorporated a key factor--the career field effect of being 
an RPA pilot--into its analysis. 

AFPC analyzed promotion data of officers in the competitive category 
that includes RPA pilots called Line of the Air Force and found 
multiple factors related to promotion outcomes. Specifically, AFPC 
analyzed these data using logistic regression, which is a statistical 
method that enables AFPC to analyze the relationships among multiple 
factors. Using this method, AFPC identified a number of factors that 
are positively and negatively related to promotions. For example, AFPC 
found that one of the two factors with the most-substantial positive 
relationship to promotions was for an officer to have completed a 
professional military education program by attending an Air Force 
school in-residence, rather than completing the same professional 
military education program by correspondence. The other factor with 
the most-substantial positive relationship was for an officer to have 
completed an advanced academic degree. By contrast, AFPC found that 
officers who have unfavorable information, such as performance-related 
reprimands, in their personnel files are promoted at lower rates, in 
general, than officers who do not. 

AFPC did not include the career field effect of being an RPA pilot as 
a factor in its analysis. As a result, AFPC does not know whether or 
how being an RPA pilot is related to promotions for these pilots. AFPC 
has analyzed other careers and found that most careers are not related 
to promotion rates. AFPC officials stated that they had not analyzed 
this effect because most of the officers currently serving as RPA 
pilots are temporary RPA pilots and AFPC does not typically analyze a 
career field effect of temporary assignments. 

In addition, AFPC assumed that the factors that were substantially 
related to promotions for the Line of the Air Force category were also 
substantially related to promotions for the RPA pilot subgroup, but 
did not confirm that its assumption was warranted. AFPC officials 
stated that when they analyzed the records of RPA pilots, they focused 
on the factors identified in the analysis of Line of the Air Force 
officers, including completing professional military education in-
residence and advanced degrees. They found that RPA pilots generally 
completed professional military education in-residence and advanced 
degrees at lower rates compared to the average rates for officers who 
had been promoted since 2006. However, by not including the career 
field effect of being an RPA pilot into its analysis, the Air Force 
cannot determine whether these factors have the same relationship with 
RPA pilot promotions as they do on officer promotions in the broader 
Line of the Air Force category. 

Air Force Reported Reasons for Low RPA Pilot Promotions Rates to 
Congress and Took Actions in Response without a Comprehensive 
Understanding: 

The Air Force reported reasons for low RPA pilot promotions rates to 
Congress and took actions to raise those rates without a comprehensive 
understanding of the factors related to the promotion rates of these 
pilots. Specifically, the Air Force attributed low RPA pilot promotion 
rates to three factors: (1) RPA pilots completed professional military 
education at lower rates than average; (2) RPA pilots completed 
advanced degrees at lower rates than average; and (3) the process the 
Air Force used to select RPA pilots. As discussed above, the AFPC's 
approach to identify the first two factors assumed that their 
relationships with promotion rates for RPA pilots as a subgroup would 
be the same as those with the Line of the Air Force as a whole, but 
this assumption was not confirmed through analysis. Regarding the 
third factor, Air Force documentation states "lower quality pilots are 
generally sent to RPA squadrons."[Footnote 37] 

Headquarters Air Force officials and two commanders of manned-aircraft 
squadrons explained that commanders select pilots from their squadrons 
to assign to RPA squadrons and in general most commanders assign less-
skilled pilots and less-competent officers to these squadrons. 
Headquarters officials also stated that less-skilled and less-
competent officers generally had fewer of the factors AFPC identified 
that positively influence promotions in their records than their 
peers. Air Force officials also explained that because the bulk of RPA 
pilots who have competed for promotion since 2006 were assigned using 
this process, they believe these are the reasons that RPA pilots have 
been promoted at lower rates than their peers. However, the Air Force 
has not incorporated variables into its analysis to account for RPA 
pilots or the process to assign them to determine whether they are 
related to promotions of RPA pilots. Consequently, the Air Force 
report to Congress may not be accurate because the Air Force does not 
have comprehensive analysis to demonstrate that these factors are 
actually related to RPA pilot promotions. 

Recently, the Air Force has taken actions to raise promotion rates of 
RPA pilots. First, to communicate to promotion boards that promoting 
RPA pilots was important, the Secretary of the Air Force has issued 
instructions since 2008 to each officer promotion board, directing 
them to consider the strategic effect made by RPA pilots when 
evaluating their records for promotion. In the instructions, the 
Secretary directs board members to consider that RPA pilots' records 
may not show the same career progression as their peers because of 
operational requirements they have had to meet to satisfy the needs of 
the Air Force. Second, the Air Force intervened on behalf of RPA 
pilots to enhance their opportunities to achieve one of the two most 
important factors that AFPC identified in its analysis of all Line of 
the Air Force officers by reserving 46 in-residence seats in Air Force 
professional military education schools in 2012 for RPA pilots who 
were competing to be promoted to major. Moreover, the Air Force stated 
in its August 2013 report to Congress that its long-term plan to raise 
promotion rates is to attract "quality" recruits to the RPA pilot 
career field and to establish a sustainable pace of operations that 
will enable these pilots time to complete in-residence professional 
military education and advanced academic degrees. However, because it 
has not fully analyzed the career field effects of being an RPA pilot, 
it is unclear whether the Air Force is targeting these corrective 
actions at the right factors. Consequently, the Air Force's actions 
may have limited effect on improving the promotion rates for RPA 
pilots. 

Conclusions: 

The Air Force has demonstrated a commitment in recent years to the use 
of RPAs, believing that the capabilities they provide are worth the 
service's investment in both platforms and personnel. As the RPA pilot 
career field evolves, it will be important that Air Force senior 
leadership demonstrates a commitment to a human-capital management 
approach that addresses a number of outstanding challenges. For 
instance, without updating its optimum crew ratio for RPA units, the 
Air Force may have RPA pilot shortfalls even after its current 
requirement is met, which could exacerbate existing strains on this 
workforce. In addition, by not establishing a minimum crew ratio below 
which RPA units cannot operate, the Air Force does not know when it is 
operating at unacceptable levels of risk to mission and safety. 
Further, without developing a strategy tailored to address specific 
challenges of recruiting and retaining RPA pilots, current pilot 
shortfalls may persist even longer than expected. Finally, without 
evaluating the viability of using alternative personnel populations, 
such as enlisted or civilian personnel, the Air Force may not meet and 
sustain required RPA pilot staffing levels. 

Moreover, without incorporating feedback from RPA pilots using 
existing feedback mechanisms, the Air Force may be missing 
opportunities to manage its human-capital strategies effectively for 
these pilots. Also, RPA pilots face a number of challenging working 
conditions that can affect their quality of life including those 
associated with being deployed-on-station. However, without analyzing 
whether being deployed-on-station has long-term negative effects, the 
Air Force does not have the information it needs to determine whether 
it should take any action in response. Finally, while the Air Force 
has taken action to improve the chances for RPA pilots to be promoted, 
senior Air Force leaders cannot be assured that the actions are the 
appropriate ones because the Air Force has not analyzed the effect 
that being an RPA pilot itself may have on those chances. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Air Force to take the following seven actions: 

* update crew ratios for RPA units to help ensure that the Air Force 
establishes a more-accurate understanding of the required number of 
RPA pilots needed in its units, 

* establish a minimum crew ratio in Air Force policy below which RPA 
units cannot operate without running unacceptable levels of risk to 
accomplishing the mission and ensuring safety, 

* develop a recruiting and retention strategy that is a tailored to 
the specific needs and challenges of RPA pilots to help ensure that 
the Air Force can meet and retain required staffing levels to meet its 
mission, 

* evaluate the viability of using alternative personnel populations 
including enlisted or civilian personnel as RPA pilots to identify 
whether such populations could help the Air Force meet and sustain 
required RPA pilot staffing levels, 

* incorporate feedback from RPA pilots by using existing mechanisms or 
by collecting direct feedback from RPA pilots, 

* analyze the effects of being deployed-on-station to determine 
whether there are resulting negative effects on the quality of life of 
RPA pilots and take responsive actions as appropriate, and: 

* include the career field effect of being an RPA pilot into AFPC's 
analysis to determine whether and how being an RPA pilot is related to 
promotions and determine whether the factors AFPC identified in its 
analysis of Line of the Air Force officers are also related to RPA 
pilot promotions. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. The 
Deputy Director of Force Management Policy, Headquarters Air Force 
provided written comments in response to our report. In its written 
comments, the Air Force concurred with four of our seven 
recommendations and partially concurred with the remaining three 
recommendations. The Air Force's written comments are reprinted in 
their entirety in appendix III. The Air Force also provided technical 
comments that we have incorporated into this report where applicable. 

In concurring with our first three recommendations, the Air Force 
stated that it: 

* has an effort underway to update crew ratios for RPA units and 
expects to have this effort completed by February 2015; 

* a minimum crew ratio would indicate when the Air Force receives a 
request for forces that would pose risks to the mission and safety and 
it expects to respond to our recommendation by February 2015; and: 

* will develop a recruiting and retention strategy that is tailored to 
the specific needs and challenges of RPA pilots and expects to have 
this done by October 2015. 

In concurring with our fifth recommendation, to incorporate feedback 
from RPA pilots by using existing mechanisms or by collecting direct 
feedback from RPA pilots, the Air Force stated that if it determines 
that it is appropriate to collect such feedback, it will do so using a 
survey. We continue to believe that collecting this feedback could be 
a useful tool for the Air Force to develop a tailored recruiting and 
retention strategy and to inform actions it may take related to 
training and developing RPA pilots. 

The Air Force partially concurred with our fourth recommendation that 
it evaluate the viability of using alternative personnel populations 
as RPA pilots and determine if such populations could help the Air 
Force meet and sustain required RPA pilot staffing levels. The Air 
Force stated that it considered assigning enlisted personnel as RPA 
pilots, but it decided that the responsibilities of piloting an RPA 
were commensurate with the rank of officers instead. At the same time, 
the Air Force stated that it has initiated a review of some of its 
missions and the ranks needed to execute those missions and that it 
may consider using enlisted airmen in this review. 

In our report, we acknowledge that the Air Force had previously 
considered using enlisted personnel as RPA pilots and that the Air 
Force decided instead to use officers. However, it is not clear what 
steps the Air Force took in its previous considerations. We think it 
is a positive step that the Air Force has initiated a review of Air 
Force missions and rank requirements to execute those missions. 
Considering the significant role that RPAs play in the Air Force 
mission, we believe the Air Force should include RPA pilots in its 
review to evaluate whether enlisted personnel as well as civilians may 
provide a means for the Air Force to address shortfalls in the 
staffing levels of RPA pilots. 

In addition, the Air Force partially concurred with our sixth 
recommendation that it analyze the effects of being deployed-on-
station to determine if there are resulting negative effects on RPA 
pilots' quality of life and take responsive actions as appropriate. In 
response to our recommendation, the Air Force stated that it had 
studied the effects that being deployed-on-station has on RPA pilots 
and that many of the stressors it identified in these studies were 
related to low unit staffing levels. In addition, the Air Force asked 
us to focus our recommendation on an evaluation of these studies. 

We acknowledge in our report that the Air Force evaluated the 
psychological condition of RPA personnel who are deployed-on-station 
in studies it published in 2011 and 2013. We also acknowledge that the 
primary recommendation these studies make is to increase staffing 
levels in RPA units to alleviate the stress of RPA personnel. As we 
discussed in our report, RPA units have been understaffed and thus 
increasing staffing levels may be appropriate. However, our finding is 
focused on whether being deployed-on-station has negative effects on 
quality of life that are not attributable to the stressors that are 
related to low unit-staffing levels. We think that a more complete 
understanding of the effects of being deployed-on-station that are not 
attributable to low staffing levels will help the Air Force determine 
if responsive actions are needed that go beyond increasing staffing 
levels. Further, the 2011 report prepared for the Air Force Medical 
Support Agency that focuses more directly on the concept of being 
deployed-on-station is a constructive source of input for the Air 
Force to understand any negative effects of being deployed-on-station. 
However, it is not clear that an evaluation of this report and the 
2011 and 2013 studies will provide the Air Force with a complete 
understanding of this new deployment concept's consequences for its 
personnel. 

Finally, the Air Force partially concurred with our seventh 
recommendation that it include the career field effect of being an RPA 
pilot into AFPC's promotion analysis to determine if being an RPA 
pilot is related to promotions and determine if other factors that 
AFPC identified in its analysis of Line of the Air Force officers are 
also related to RPA pilot promotions. The Air Force stated that the 
RPA career field is a subsection of the Line of the Air Force and 
therefore factors related to promotions identified in analysis of the 
Line of the Air Force are directly related to RPA pilot promotions. In 
our report, we acknowledge that the Air Force identified factors 
related to promotion outcomes for officers in the Line of the Air 
Force competitive category. However, as we discussed in the report, 
not including the career field effect of being an RPA pilot as a 
factor in its analysis has several consequences. First, AFPC does not 
know whether or how being an RPA pilot is related to promotions for 
these pilots. Second, the Air Force cannot determine whether the 
factors that it found that are related to promotions for the Line of 
the Air Force competitive category have the same relationship with RPA 
pilot promotions. Third, the information the Air Force included in a 
report to Congress in August 2013 on education, training, and 
promotion rates of RPA pilots may not be accurate. Finally, it is 
unclear whether the Air Force is targeting actions to increase RPA 
promotion rates at the right factors and thus its actions may have 
limited effect. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air 
Force. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO 
website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3604 or FarrellB@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To understand the context of each of the issues in our review, we 
analyzed various Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force documents. 
This documentation included a report[Footnote 38] to Congress by the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics on the future of unmanned aerial systems and a 
report[Footnote 39] by the Air Force Audit Agency on the Air Force's 
personnel management of pilots flying RPAs. We also reviewed reports 
that we previously issued that address topics related to our review 
including a 2010 report on DOD planning, training, and doctrine for 
unmanned aircraft systems.[Footnote 40] 

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force uses a strategic human-
capital approach to manage remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots, we 
used a model of human-capital management GAO had previously developed 
[Footnote 41] that specifies leading practices that high-performing 
organizations exhibit in their strategic human-capital management. The 
Model for Strategic Human Capital Management is intended to help 
federal organizations use their human capital effectively and 
integrate human-capital considerations into daily decision making and 
planning for the program results they wish to accomplish. It 
identifies concepts and leading practices that are organized into 
strategic human-capital management cornerstones including strategic 
human-capital planning; acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; 
and creating results-oriented cultures. 

To adapt the criteria to the context of this review, we reviewed the 
model to identify specific practices that organizations can use to 
make progress associated with each of the four strategic human-capital 
management cornerstones. We then analyzed each practice to determine 
whether it was appropriate and relevant to both the RPA pilot 
workforce and the military context overall. After identifying the list 
of practices, we discussed our adaptation with Air Force officials, 
who agreed they were appropriate and relevant and provided points of 
contact for obtaining information on each practice. 

We interviewed officials from Headquarters Air Force offices including 
the Officer of Manpower, Personnel, and Services Policy and the Office 
of Operations, Plans, and Requirements Policy to gather their 
perspectives and information on practices across all four 
cornerstones. From these offices, we obtained and analyzed 
documentation, including strategic DOD and Air Force guidance and data 
on personnel levels, recruiting, incentive pays, and attrition rates 
for remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots. In addition, we 
interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy on the Air Force's 
use of incentives to recruit and retain RPA pilots. We collected 
perspectives from RPA pilots and RPA unit commanders on the Air 
Force's strategic human-capital planning practices, including the 
effects of those practices on their training, professional 
development, quality of life, and retention, as well as any efforts 
the Air Force has made to solicit feedback from and communicate about 
key issues with RPA pilots. We also interviewed knowledgeable 
officials from the Air Force Personnel Center on practices related to 
results-oriented cultures. 

Furthermore, we compared the perspectives and documentation we 
collected to the GAO criteria and held discussions with Air Force 
officials to discuss instances in which the Air Force's management 
actions were not consistent with these criteria. We discussed 
challenges raised by the RPA pilots and unit commanders with whom we 
spoke, including any efforts in place to address the challenges. 

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force has addressed concerns, 
if any, about the working conditions of RPA pilots that may affect 
their quality of life, we identified and analyzed criteria included in 
DOD's 2009 and 2004 Quadrennial Quality of Life Reviews in which DOD 
expresses its commitment to provide servicemembers with the best 
quality of life possible through support and development of responses 
to emerging servicemember needs. DOD has broadly defined quality of 
life to include such factors as morale, health and wellness, and work-
life balance. To understand these reviews and the commitments, we 
obtained information from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Military Community & Family Policy, which is 
responsible for conducting the department's Quadrennial Quality of 
Life Reviews. To understand challenges in the working conditions that 
RPA pilots may face we analyzed studies that the Air Force conducted 
to assess the stress and mental-health condition of RPA personnel, 
including RPA pilots. 

In particular, we reviewed and analyzed two studies conducted by the 
Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine published in 2011 and 2013, 
which identified the sources of stress of RPA personnel.[Footnote 42] 
The studies' results were based on self-administered surveys of Air 
Force RPA personnel, including pilots, from squadrons in Air Combat 
Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, the Air National Guard, 
and the Air Force Reserve. The surveys were administered in 2011 and 
2012 with response rates from RPA squadrons that ranged from 24 to 98 
percent. The surveys included questions related to exhaustion, 
distress, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 

We also interviewed the researchers who conducted these studies to 
clarify our understanding of their methods, findings, and 
recommendations to alleviate the stress of RPA personnel. In addition, 
we analyzed a report prepared for the Air Force Medical Support Agency 
that describes the defining characteristics of being deployed-on-
station and examines the challenges that personnel who are deployed-on-
station face.[Footnote 43] To obtain a firsthand account of the 
challenging working conditions that RPA pilots face, we conducted 
focus groups with pilots at Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. 
We also interviewed leadership officials at these bases to obtain 
their perspective on the challenges that RPA pilots in their units 
face. Moreover, we interviewed mental-health professionals at each of 
the bases we visited to obtain their perspectives on the working 
conditions of RPA pilots and any effects on their quality of life. 

To evaluate actions the Air Force has taken to address the challenging 
working conditions RPA pilots face, we analyzed the recommendations 
that were included in the studies conducted by the Air Force School of 
Aerospace Medicine and the report prepared for the Air Force Medical 
Support Agency. We also obtained and analyzed documentation provided 
by the Air Force Medical Support Agency that describes actions the Air 
Force has taken in response to these recommendations and we 
interviewed officials from this agency to further understand these 
actions. Furthermore, we interviewed and obtained information from 
officials in the Air Force Office of Manpower, Personnel and Services 
Policy and the Office of Operations, Plans and Requirements Policy to 
determine any actions the Air Force has taken to alleviate the 
challenging working conditions that RPA pilots face. We also obtained 
information from commanders and mental-health professionals at each of 
the bases we visited to understand actions they have taken to address 
the challenging working conditions that RPA pilots face and that 
affect their quality of life. 

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force analyzes the promotion 
rates of RPA pilots, we applied criteria from common statistical 
practices, which indicate that when analyzing relationships between 
selected factors and a given outcome researchers should account for 
other key factors that could also explain that relationship. To 
understand the context of Air Force officer promotions, we reviewed 
relevant laws and Air Force guidance including the Defense Officer 
Personnel Management Act[Footnote 44] and Air Force Instruction 36-
2501.[Footnote 45] To identify the promotion rates of Air Force RPA 
pilots and how their promotion rates compared to officers in other 
careers in the Air Force, we analyzed promotion-rate data for officers 
in the Line of the Air Force competitive category who were promoted 
"in-the-zone" to the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. 
We analyzed data from 2006 to the most-recently available data, which 
for promotion to major and colonel was 2012 and for promotion to 
lieutenant colonel was 2013. 

We focused on Line of the Air Force officers, because RPA pilots are 
included in this category. We focused on officers promoted in-the-zone 
because this zone is the point in an officer's career when his or her 
opportunity for promotion is the highest. We focused on rates of 
promotion to the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel 
because the promotion rates from second lieutenant to first lieutenant 
and from first lieutenant to captain are nearly 100 percent, and hence 
the first competitive promotion opportunity for an Air Force officer 
occurs as he or she becomes eligible for promotion to the rank of 
major. In addition, we did not evaluate promotion rates above colonel 
because no RPA pilots have been promoted to the general officer ranks 
in the Air Force yet. 

To identify the percentile of RPA pilot promotion rates compared to 
other line officer career fields, we analyzed data on the range of 
promotion rates of active-duty officers from the careers that competed 
in the promotion zone on each promotion board to the ranks of major, 
lieutenant colonel, and colonel from 2006 to 2013. For this analysis, 
the promotion rate of RPA pilots includes the rate for permanent RPA 
pilots (i.e., RPA pilots and recategorized RPA pilots) as well as 
temporary RPA pilots (i.e., manned-aircraft pilots serving assignments 
in RPA squadrons and manned-aircraft pilot training graduates). For 
this analysis all of the listed career fields are mutually exclusive. 
That is, if a temporary RPA pilot was identified as an RPA pilot in 
this analysis, the pilot was not included in the data to calculate 
promotion rates for other careers such as the manned-aircraft career 
fields. For each promotion board, officers from between 22 and 33 
careers competed for promotion. This analysis excludes career fields 
where fewer than 10 officers were eligible for promotion, because the 
rate of promotion in these cases is highly sensitive to the outcomes 
of single individuals. However, we included the results from 8 boards 
in which fewer than 10 RPA pilots competed for promotion to provide a 
more-comprehensive account of RPA pilot promotions. The promotion rate 
that we calculate for these instances should be considered cautiously 
since the outcome of one or two individuals could have a large effect 
on the overall rate. Fewer than 10 RPA pilots were eligible for 
promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel for the first 2006 board 
as well as the 2007 and 2008 boards. In addition, fewer than 10 RPA 
pilots were eligible for promotion to the rank of colonel for the 
2006, 2007, 2008, and both of the 2009 promotion boards. We obtained 
these data from the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), and to 
understand the methods AFPC used to collect, store, and maintain these 
data, we interviewed officials from AFPC and reviewed documentation 
they provided, and we found the data to be reliable for our purposes. 

To evaluate steps the Air Force took to analyze the promotion rates of 
RPA pilots and the reasons that these rates have been lower than 
average, we interviewed Air Force officials in headquarters personnel 
offices as well as AFPC offices. In addition, we evaluated 
documentation of AFPC's analysis of officer promotions rates including 
the results of AFPC's logistic regression identifying the factors that 
are related to officer promotion. We also reviewed the August 2013 
report[Footnote 46] that the Air Force provided to Congress on the 
promotion rates of RPA pilots in which the Air Force identifies 
reasons for lower promotion rates of RPA pilots. To identify actions 
the Air Force took to respond to low RPA pilot promotion rates, we 
evaluated relevant documentation including instructions the Secretary 
of the Air Force has provided to promotion board members since 2008 in 
which the Secretary communicates the importance of promoting RPA 
pilots. We also reviewed briefings that Air Force headquarters offices 
as well as AFPC prepared for the Secretary of the Air Force on 
additional steps the Air Force took to address low RPA pilot promotion 
rates. We also analyzed the Air Force's August 2013 report to Congress 
and additional documentation that the Air Force provided about its 
plans to raise promotion rates of RPA pilots. 

As we noted earlier, to obtain the perspectives of RPA pilots related 
to each of our three objectives we conducted 10 focus groups that each 
consisted of between six and nine active-duty RPA pilots during site 
visits to Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. To conduct these 
focus groups we randomly selected RPA pilots to participate, asked 
them a structured set of questions during meetings that lasted about 
90 minutes, and took detailed notes. We then evaluated these notes 
using content analysis to develop our findings. We discuss the methods 
we used to select our participants, develop questions, conduct the 
focus-group meetings, and analyze the information we obtained in the 
focus groups, and the results of our analysis, in more detail in 
appendix II. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to April 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Focus-Group Methodology and Results: 

To obtain the perspectives of pilots of remotely piloted aircraft 
(RPA) related to each of our three objectives, we conducted 10 focus 
group meetings with active-duty RPA pilots during site visits to 
Beale, Cannon, and Creech Air Force Bases. We decided to visit the 
three bases we selected because more RPA pilots are stationed at these 
bases than other Air Force bases. We specifically included Beale Air 
Force base because we wanted to obtain the perspectives of the RPA 
pilots who fly the RQ-4 (Global Hawk) who are stationed there. In 
addition, we selected Cannon Air Force Base because we wanted to 
obtain the perspectives of RPA pilots assigned to the Air Force 
Special Operations Command. 

To select specific RPA pilots to participate in our focus groups, we 
obtained documentation that included lists of the RPA pilots stationed 
at each base as well as the amount of time each had served flying 
RPAs, and their ranks. To obtain a variety of perspectives, we 
randomly selected pilots with various amounts of experience flying 
RPAs and we included pilots of various ranks in our groups. These 
groups typically consisted of six to nine participants. 

To conduct the focus groups, a GAO moderator followed a protocol that 
included prompts, instructions to the participants, and a set of three 
questions, each with several follow-up questions. We pretested this 
protocol at Beale Air Force base and used it at the remaining two 
bases. We used the same set of questions from this protocol for each 
of the 10 focus groups we conducted. These questions are reprinted 
below. During each focus group, the GAO moderator asked questions 
related to the topics of our review to participants who, in turn, 
provided their perspectives on the topics. During the focus-group 
meetings, three GAO team members took separate sets of detailed notes 
to document the participants' comments. See table 2 for the complete 
list of questions and follow-up questions that we asked during our 
focus groups. 

Table 1: Questions GAO Moderator Asked Air Force Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft (RPA) Pilots during Focus Group Meetings at Beale, Cannon, 
and Creech Air Force Bases: 

Promotion: 

1. As an RPA pilot, what has been your perception of your chances of 
promotion? 
a. What factors do you think contribute to different promotions rates 
of RPA pilots? Has it been possible to attend professional military 
education in residence? 
b. As an RPA pilot, have you experienced challenges pursuing any other 
career-development activities, like completing an advanced academic 
degree? 
c. For pilots who previously flew manned aircraft, how does your 
ability to pursue career-development activities compare with the 
ability to do so as a pilot of the manned aircraft? 
d. What effects do perceptions of differences in promotion rates have 
on squadron morale? 

Quality of Life: 

2. How would you say being an RPA pilot has impacted your quality of 
life? 
a. For pilots who previously flew manned aircraft, how does the level 
of stress as an RPA pilot compare to your level of stress as a pilot 
of the manned aircraft? 
b. What aspects of being an RPA pilot do you think increase or 
decrease stress levels? 
c. What about manning shortages in your squadron? 
d. (If Yes) What effects do manning shortages have on your level of 
stress? 
e. (If Yes) What effects do manning shortages have on squadron morale? 
f. If being an RPA pilot has increased or decreased your levels of 
stress, what has the impact been? 
g. As an RPA pilot, are you aware of any options that the leadership 
has made available to reduce stress? 
h. What are the positive and negative aspects of conducting warfare 
operations away from the kinetic battlefield? 

Other Personnel Challenges: 

3. Do you face any other challenges in your work, such as training 
issues, that we have not addressed today? 
a. What about training exercises and the tempo of operations? 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Following our focus-group meetings, we consolidated our separate sets 
of detailed notes for each focus group to create a compiled final 
record of the participant comments from each focus group. To do this, 
a GAO analyst reviewed the set of detailed notes and compiled them in 
a final record for each focus group. A key rule of this compilation 
was that if one analyst recorded a comment, but another did not, we 
included the material in the final record. To ensure that our compiled 
final record of each focus group was accurate, a second analyst then 
reviewed at least 25 percent of each of the final records. In 
instances where an analyst identified some discrepancies between the 
detailed notes and the final record, the reviewing analyst corrected 
the discrepancy and reviewed a higher percentage of the notes for that 
focus group. 

Next, we used content analysis to analyze the final records of each 
focus group to identify themes that participants expressed across all 
or most of the groups. To do this, three GAO analysts first met to 
discuss and agree on a preliminary set of themes. We then analyzed an 
initial set of the records and counted instances that we observed 
these initial themes. We then reconvened as a group to discuss and 
agree on additional themes to add to our analysis and to consolidate 
and delete others. We then analyzed our records and made coding 
decisions. Following the initial analysis by one analyst, a second 
analyst independently reviewed all of the coding decisions that the 
first analyst made for each of the records. Where there were 
discrepancies, the analysts reviewed one another's coding and 
rationale for their coding decisions and reached a consensus on which 
codes should be used. See figure 8 for the complete results of our 
analysis. 

When describing the results of our analysis of our focus groups in 
this report, we use the term "some," as in "pilots in some focus 
groups," to report topics that were discussed by RPA pilots in two to 
four of our focus groups. The information we present from our focus 
groups accurately captures the opinions provided by the RPA pilots who 
attended the 10 focus groups at the three Air Force Bases we visited. 
However these opinions cannot be generalized to all of the RPA pilots 
at the three Air Force Bases we visited or to all RPA pilots in the 
Air Force. The results of our analyses of the opinions of RPA pilots 
we obtained during our focus groups are not generalizable because the 
Air Force Bases we selected are not necessarily representative of all 
of the Air Force Bases that contain RPA squadrons and the RPA pilots 
included in our focus groups are not necessarily representative of all 
of the RPA pilots in the Air Force. 

Figure 8: Results of GAO Analysis of Focus Groups Meetings of RPA 
Pilots: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Being an RPA pilot does not negatively impact promotion: 
Number of focus groups reported: 10. 

Promotion is difficult to achieve as an RPA pilot: 
Number of focus groups reported: 10. 

RPA pilots face challenging working conditions: 
Number of focus groups reported: 10. 

RPA pilots have low morale: 
Number of focus groups reported: 10. 

RPA pilots are limited in pursuing developmental opportunities: 
Number of focus groups reported: 10. 

Other: 
Number of focus groups reported: 10. 

Working conditions are improving for RPA pilots: 
Number of focus groups reported: 9. 

Working conditions of RPA pilots put stress on family and social lives: 
Number of focus groups reported: 9. 

Being an RPA pilot has limited or no impact on morale: 
Number of focus groups reported: 9. 

Quality and quantity of RPA training is insufficient: 
Number of focus groups reported: 9. 

RPA pilots face uncertainty in their careers: 
Number of focus groups reported: 9. 

RPA units have manning shortages: 
Number of focus groups reported: 8. 

The RPA career field lacks a fully developed career path: 
Number of focus groups reported: 8. 

Rates of promotion for RPA pilots are getting better: 
Number of focus groups reported: 7. 

RPA pilots and RPA leadership lack experience: 
Number of focus groups reported: 7. 

Retaining RPA pilots is or is likely to be a problem: 
Number of focus groups reported: 7. 

RPA field offers more and/or unique experience/on the job training: 
Number of focus groups reported: 7. 

RPA leadership is good or improving: 
Number of focus groups reported: 7. 

RPA pilots experience a lack of feedback and communication: 
Number of focus groups reported: 6. 

Flying an RPA has different conditions than flying a manned aircraft: 
Number of focus groups reported: 6. 

RPA pilots were or are lower quality performers: 
Number of focus groups reported: 5. 

RPA flying instruction is not a problem or has improved: 
Number of focus groups reported: 5. 

Broader Air Force lacks knowledge of RPA mission: 
Number of focus groups reported: 5. 

Air Force has taken steps to address stress: 
Number of focus groups reported: 4. 

There was a negative perception of RPA pilots but it is improving: 
Number of focus groups reported: 4. 

There is a negative perception of RPA pilots: 
Number of focus groups reported: 4. 

Ability to take developmental opportunities is improving for RPA 
pilots: 
Number of focus groups reported: 4. 

RPA units are manned adequately: 
Number of focus groups reported: 2. 

There is not a negative perception of RPA pilots: 
Number of focus groups reported: 0. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of the Air Force: 

Department of The Air Force: 
Headquarters United States Air Force: 
Washington, DC: 

April 2, 2014: 

Ms. Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Farrell: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report GAO-14-316, "Air Force: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management 
of Unmanned Aerial System Pilots," dated March 6, 2014 (GAO Code 
351792). 

The Department is providing official written comments for inclusion in 
the report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

John T. Parks, SES: 
Deputy Director, Force Management Policy: 

Attachment: DoD Comments to the GAO Recommendations. 

GAO Draft Report Dated March 6, 2014: 
GAO-14-316 (GAO Code 351792): 

"Air Force: Actions Needed To Strengthen Management Of Unmanned Aerial 
System Pilots" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to update crew ratios for RPA 
units to help ensure that the Air Force establishes a more accurate 
understanding of the required number of RPA pilots needed in its
units. 

DoD Response: Concur. This is already in progress. The United States 
Air Force directed the Air Force Personnel Command/Manpower 
Directorate to conduct an updated manpower study, and continues to 
analyze the RPA crew ratio. Having the correct ratio of crew members
to missions flown will greatly facilitate the growth and development 
of the RP A career field. Once the RPA enterprise reaches program of 
record strength in people and equipment, there will be capacity for 
continuation training for current and future missions. ECD: 1 Feb 15. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a minimum crew 
ratio in Air Force policy below which RPA cannot operate without 
running unacceptable levels of risk to accomplishing the mission
and ensuring safety. 

DoD Response: Concur. Currently the Air Force deploy-to-dwell redline 
is 1:2. RPA units are deployed-on-station providing no quantitative 
metric when a deploy-to-dwell redline is crossed. Establishing a 
minimum crew ratio would provide clear service redlines for use when
the Air Force receives a request for forces. This would not negate the 
continued ability of the Secretary of Defense to manage risk depending 
on the situation. ECD: 1 Feb 15. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a recruiting and 
retention strategy that is tailored to the specific needs and 
challenges of RPA pilots to help ensure that the Air Force can meet 
and retain required staffing levels to meet its mission. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Air Force's competitive advantage begins 
with its ability to recruit, develop, and retain innovative warriors. 
This year, Headquarters Air Force/AI has continued to develop and 
mature its accessions process to help recruiting. Additionally, 
retention methods like the Air Force's annual Aviation Retention Pay 
program must be utilized for the 18X specialty-coded RPA pilots in 
future years.
ECD: 1 Oct 2015. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to evaluate the viability of 
using alternative personnel populations including enlisted or civilian 
personnel as RPA pilots to identify whether such populations could
help the Air Force meet and sustain required RPA pilot staffing levels. 

DoD Response: Partially Concur. During the establishment of the RPA 
community, the Air Force, on multiple occasions, examined the use of 
enlisted RPA operators and repeatedly decided an officer is necessary 
to ensure rank is commensurate with responsibility. Most recently on 
26 Nov 13, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force concluded that the use 
of alternative personnel populations was not necessary based on an 
Headquarters Air Force/AI game plan to fix accessions which is now 
proving successful. The Air Force has, however, initiated a holistic
review of Air Force missions and rank requirements to execute those 
missions. This review may eventually include an examination of the use 
of enlisted Airmen in rated positions. ECD: 31 December 2014. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to incorporate feedback from RPA 
pilots by using existing mechanisms or by collecting direct feedback 
from RPA pilots. 

DoD Response: Concur The Air Force thrives in large part due to the 
innovation, imagination, and dedication of its incredible Airmen. The 
Air Force uses standardized feedback mechanisms across all units 
through the Air Force Unit Climate Assessment and other similar
surveys. Consideration should be given to assess whether this is 
appropriate to collect feedback from RPA pilots and at the appropriate 
levels desired and, if so, the Air Force will analyze and incorporate 
feedback from a validated survey and feedback process. ECD:1 Mar 15. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to analyze the effects of being 
deployed-on-station to determine if there are resulting negative 
effects on the quality of life of RPA pilots and take responsive
actions as appropriate. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. DoD requests the GAO change the 
recommendation to read: "The GAO recommends that the Secretary of 
Defense directs the Secretary of the Air Force to evaluate the studies 
done on the effects of being deployed-on-station on RPA pilots and
take responsive actions as appropriate to mitigate the negative 
effects on the quality of life of RPA pilots." The Air Force has ample 
data showing the analyzed effects of RPA pilots being deployed-on-
station over the last nine years. The stressors have been identified 
and discussed at length and many stressors could likely be addressed 
with personnel solutions (increased crew ratios, as mentioned). If the 
GAO has continued concern over quality of life for RPAs GAO should 
recommend a review of all the Air Force studies, evaluate the 
recommendations and take additional actions as appropriate. ECD: 31 
Dec 14. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to include the career field 
effect of being an RPA pilot into Air Force Personnel Center's 
analysis to determine if and how being an RPA pilot is related to 
promotions and determine if the factors Air Force Personnel Center 
identified in its analysis of Line of the Air Force officers are also 
related to RPA pilot promotions. 

DoD Response: Partially concur To further build RPA career field 
leadership and enhance retention, it is important to understand 
promotion dynamics within the RPA force. Continued tracking and 
analysis of the promotion rates of RPA pilots is currently underway. For
promotions, the RPA career field is a subsection of the Line of the 
Air Force. Therefore, factors related to promotions identified in 
analysis of the Line of the Air Force are directly related to RPA 
pilot promotions. ECD: 1 Mar 15. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or FarrellB@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Lori Atkinson (Assistant 
Director), Steve Boyles, Ron La Due Lake, Kelly Liptan, James P. 
Klein, Steven R. Putansu, Michael Willems, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and 
Amie Steele made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 (May, 
18 2009). 

[2] Pace of operations refers to the number of aircraft flying hours 
and it increases with the intensity and number of operations. In 
fiscal year 2013, the Air Force flew its Predator and Reaper systems 
for over 300,000 hours, combined. 

[3] See, for example, GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies 
Possible for DOD's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Systems, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-578] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007); Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance 
Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-836] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2007); Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed 
to Improve Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support 
Warfighter Needs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-175] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2008); and Defense Acquisitions: 
Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies 
among Unmanned Aircraft Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-520] (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 
2009). 

[4] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a 
Results-Oriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing 
Inventories, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-331] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010). 

[5] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 
No. 112-239, § 527 (2013). 

[6] GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 
2002). See also applications of this model in evaluations of DOD 
personnel management in GAO, Defense Space Activities: Management 
Actions Are Needed to Better Identify, Track, and Train Air Force 
Space Personnel, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-908] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006) and Defense Management: Actions 
Needed to Ensure National Guard and Reserve Headquarters Are Sized to 
be Efficient, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-71] 
(Washington D.C.: Nov. 12, 2013). 

[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP]. 

[8] We evaluated promotion rates of officers in the Line of the Air 
Force competitive category, which includes RPA pilots. In addition, we 
focused our analysis on officers who were promoted in the zone. We 
discuss competitive categories and officer promotion timing in more 
detail in the background section of this report. 

[9] Air Force, Report on Education and Training and Promotion Rates 
for Air Force Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (August 2013). 

[10] This cost is an average of the $679,552 that the Air Force spends 
to train fighter or bomber pilots during Undergraduate Pilot Training 
and the $434,418 that it spends for cargo or tanker pilots during the 
same training. Air Education and Training Command officials stated 
that fuel costs were the primary reason for the differences between 
the cost to train fighter and bomber pilots versus cargo and tanker 
pilots. 

[11] See 10 U.S.C. § 611, et seq. 

[12] Additional competitive categories in the Air Force include the 
judge advocate and chaplain competitive categories as well as several 
competitive categories for a variety of medical career fields. 

[13] Air Force Pamphlet 36-2506, You and Your Promotions--The Air 
Force Officer Promotion Program (Sept. 1, 1997). 

[14] The term CAP refers to a near-continuous 24-hour flight presence 
of an RPA. This includes time en route to and from the target area. 
Based on the distance to the target, more than one CAP may be required 
for 24-hour continuous coverage of a geographic point. A CAP requires 
around four RPAs--three in-theater and one at a U.S. Air Force base 
for training purposes. 

[15] The Air Force conducted the personnel requirements study in 
response to concerns that the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
expressed that a preliminary crew ratio the Air Force established in 
Air Force policy of 10: 1 was too high. The Air Force based the 
preliminary crew ratio on commanders' experiences operating RPA 
squadrons, and although the study recommended a crew ratio of 9: 1, 
the Air Force decided to retain the 10: 1 crew ratio in guidance. 

[16] Air Force Instruction 38-201, Management of Manpower Requirements 
and Authorizations (May 14, 2013). 

[17] As of December 2013, the Air Force had 175 RPA training-position 
billets and 111 RPA staff billets across the Air Force major commands, 
including Air Combat Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, 
and Headquarters Air Force, among others. 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP]. 

[19] Air Force Instruction 65-503, Authorized Aircrew Composition-
Active Forces, table A36-1 (Feb. 1, 2012). 

[20] We use the term "some," as in "pilots in some focus groups," to 
report topics that were discussed by RPA pilots in two to four of our 
focus groups. 

[21] The crew ratio for units that operate the RQ-4 Global Hawk RPA is 
set at 15: 1 in Air Force policy. However, it is not clear that this 
crew ratio is appropriate because the Air Force's manpower study 
focused on the personnel requirements for MQ-1 squadrons and did not 
evaluate RQ-4 squadrons. 

[22] Air Force Instruction 65-503, table A36-1 (Feb. 1, 2012). 

[23] Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 (May 
18, 2009). 

[24] For example, one RPA unit had to spend about 95 percent of its 
work hours in fiscal year 2013 flying combat-operations missions and 
the remaining 5 percent flying training missions, logging around 
19,600 hours flying combat missions, compared to about 940 hours of 
training missions. 

[25] Development opportunities can include changes in base assignments 
or assignments within the squadron, wing, or staff levels, as well as 
completing professional military education in-residence or via 
correspondence, which is a primary component of an officer's 
professional development. 

[26] DOD defines operational access as the ability to project military 
force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to 
accomplish the mission. Antiaccess refers to those actions and 
capabilities designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an 
operational area. Area denial refers to those actions and capabilities 
designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom 
of action within the operational area. 

[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP]. 

[28] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Performance 
Audit of Department of Defense Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (April 2012). 

[29] Often during our focus groups when a participant described a 
challenging working condition associated with being an RPA pilot, 
another participant raised a counterpoint to that challenge. For 
example, during one focus group, one participant described the 
challenge of working long hours in an RPA squadron, and another 
participant stated that all squadrons in the Air Force require pilots 
to work long hours. One or more participants raised counterpoints to 
most of the challenging working conditions that RPA pilots described. 

[30] RPA pilots fly CAPs 24 hours a day and thus RPA pilots may be 
needed to fly on day, evening, and night shifts. Whereas civilian 
workers typically work the same, fixed shift for extended periods, 
military servicemembers, such as RPA pilots, tend to work on shifts 
that rotate. RPA pilots fly shifts that rotate from days, to evenings, 
to nights. Some squadrons rotate their pilots' shifts quickly, such as 
weekly, and other squadrons rotate shifts slowly, up to several 
months. Research has shown that shift work negatively affects employee 
sleep as well as family and social lives, which can adversely 
influence performance, physical health, and safety. See, for example, 
J. Barton et al., "The Standard Shiftwork Index: a battery of 
questionnaires for assessing shiftwork-related problems," Work Stress, 
vol. 9, no. 1 (1995): 4-30. 

[31] Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Psychological Health 
Screening of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Operators and Supporting 
Units (April 2011). 

[32] For example, see Department of Defense, Report of the 2ND 
Quadrennial Quality of Life Review (January 2009). 

[33] Air Force Medical Support Agency, On Telewarfare and Military 
Medicine: A White Paper/State of the Art Report On AFMS Support to the 
Emerging Paradigm of Employed-in-Place Operations (September 2011). 

[34] Conversely, some pilots in our focus groups did not identify 
being deployed-on-station as a challenging working condition and some 
stated that they preferred it. 

[35] We compared the average promotion rate of RPA pilots to the 
average promotion rates of fighter, bomber, and mobility pilots 
combined. 

[36] To identify the percentile of RPA pilot promotion rates compared 
to other Line of the Air Force officer career fields that competed on 
the promotion boards in the scope of our review, we analyzed the 
promotion rates of the active-duty officers from all of the careers 
from the Line of the Air Force competitive category who competed on 
each promotion board since 2006. For this analysis, the number of 
careers that competed on these promotion boards ranged from 22 to 33. 
We excluded career fields if fewer than 10 officers competed for 
promotion from a given year, because the rate of promotion in these 
cases is highly sensitive to the outcomes of single officers. However, 
we included the results from 8 promotion boards in which fewer than 10 
RPA pilots competed for promotion to provide a more-comprehensive 
account of RPA pilot promotions. The promotion rate that we calculate 
for instances when fewer than 10 RPA pilots competed for promotion 
should be considered cautiously since the outcome of one or two 
officers could have a large effect on the overall rate for RPA pilots 
for those instances. The boards that included fewer than 10 RPA pilots 
who competed for promotion are indicated in the notes to figures 5, 6, 
and 7. 

[37] Air Force documentation notes that one indicator of the trend to 
assign "lower quality pilots" to RPA squadrons is that pilots selected 
for RPA assignments tended to perform at lower levels on flight-safety 
evaluations than pilots retained in manned-aircraft squadrons. 

[38] Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Department of Defense 
Report to Congress on Future Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training, 
Operations, and Sustainability (April 2012). 

[39] Air Force, Air Force Audit Agency, Unmanned Aerial System Pilot 
Force Management (Dec. 17, 2008). 

[40] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a 
Results-Oriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing 
Inventories, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-331] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010). 

[41] GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 
2002); Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to 
Better Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Space Personnel, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-908] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 21, 2006); and Defense Management: Actions Needed to Ensure 
National Guard and Reserve Headquarters Are Sized to be Efficient, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-71] (Washington D.C.: 
Nov. 12, 2013). 

[42] Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Facets of Occupational 
Burnout Among U.S. Air Force Active Duty and National Guard/Reserve MQ-
1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper Operators (June 2011) and 2012 Occupational 
Health Stress Screenings within USAF RPA Predator/Reaper Units (Feb. 
26, 2013). 

[43] Air Force Medical Support Agency, Telewarfare and Military 
Medicine: White Paper/State of the Art Report on AFMS Support to the 
Emerging Paradigm of Employed-in-Place Operations (Sept. 30, 2011). 

[44] See 10 U.S.C. § 611, et seq. 

[45] Air Force Instruction 36-2501, Officer Promotions and Selective 
Continuation (Aug. 17, 2009). 

[46] Air Force, Report on Education and Training and Promotion Rates 
for Air Force Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (August 2013). 

[End of section] 

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