This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-13-533 
entitled 'Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on 
NNSA's Options for Meeting Its Plutonium Research Needs' which was 
released on September 11, 2013. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate: 

September 2013: 

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: 

Observations on NNSA's Options for Meeting Its Plutonium Research 
Needs: 

GAO-13-533: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-533, a report to the Armed Services Committee, 
U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Nuclear weapons are an essential part of the nation’s defense 
strategy. NNSA manages the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and 
carries out research to help extend the life of existing weapons. The 
core of a nuclear weapon requires plutonium—-a man-made radioactive 
element—-to create a nuclear explosion. NNSA’s LANL in New Mexico 
houses key plutonium facilities needed for research for nuclear 
weapons life extension programs and other missions. In 2005, NNSA 
approved construction of CMRR to replace the aging facility being 
used. In February 2012, NNSA announced it had decided to defer CMRR 
nuclear facility construction for at least 5 years, creating a 
potential gap in plutonium research capabilities from 2019 to the late-
2020s. NNSA requested LANL to study options to address this gap. The 
study was completed in April 2012. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the 2013 
defense authorization directed GAO to review the study. GAO examined 
(1) the options identified in the study for meeting NNSA’s plutonium 
research needs, including costs and health risks, if any and (2) the 
potential impacts of those options on NNSA’s plutonium research for 
the nuclear weapons stockpile and other plutonium research missions. 

What GAO Found: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Los Alamos 
National Laboratory’s (LANL) April 2012 study (1) identified general 
options for meeting the plutonium research needs of NNSA-—a separately 
organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)-—during the 
several-year gap created by the deferral of the Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) nuclear facility and (2) 
included limited information on costs and health risks. The study 
noted that the level of plutonium research necessary to support the 
nuclear weapons life extension programs is affected by the planned 
schedule of the life extension programs, the number of pits that will 
be needed under the programs, and the number of pits that will need to 
be manufactured versus re-used, all of which have uncertainties. 
According to the April 2012 study, one option for meeting NNSA’s 
plutonium research needs is to relocate analytical chemistry and 
materials characterization capabilities among facilities at LANL, 
which will require upgrades costing roughly $480 million to $820 
million. A second option is to move capabilities to existing 
facilities at other sites. The study concluded that no single site 
could provide all the capabilities that might be needed, but that the 
facilities could be renovated to meet the needs. The study did not 
include costs for relocating capabilities to other sites. A third 
option is a combination of these two. The study also indicated some 
potential health risks to workers from increased plutonium handling if 
samples need to be transported to other sites. As of July 2013, NNSA 
officials stated that an option had not yet been selected for meeting 
plutonium research needs from 2019 through the late-2020s, and no 
decisions have been made on facilities to address longer-term 
plutonium research needs. To address its ongoing, longer-term 
plutonium research needs, NNSA stated it is now considering a modular 
facility. 

The potential impacts of the options identified in LANL’s study on NNSA’
s plutonium research for the nuclear weapons stockpile and other 
plutonium mission areas are uncertain. If NNSA uses space only at 
LANL, rather than relocating some capabilities to facilities at other 
sites, some LANL plutonium research missions could potentially be 
impacted because space may have to be reconfigured to accommodate 
nuclear weapons stockpile mission needs. NNSA has tasked LANL with 
assessing building space to see if it can be repurposed to better 
support plutonium research. In addition, the study noted that one 
potential impact of using facilities at other sites could be delays in 
completing needed analytical chemistry or materials characterization 
due to time needed to transport samples between sites. Using 
facilities at other sites will require time for NNSA to plan for and 
transport materials between LANL and other sites, which could increase 
the total time needed to complete the analyses for weapon pits. The 
study also noted that the shortage of trained staff in analytical 
chemistry could impact the ability to execute the options, which could 
affect NNSA’s ability to meet proposed schedules for the refurbishment 
of nuclear weapons. The study reported that the analytical chemistry 
staff at LANL has been reduced by 60 percent in the span of a few 
years due to retirements and budget cuts. The contractor at LANL 
recommended that NNSA conduct a detailed risk analysis on staffing 
needs to better understand and plan for staffing limitations, 
according to the study. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that NNSA continue efforts to assess how plutonium 
research and capability needs and stockpile requirements have changed, 
if at all since 2008, and develop a plan for both near- and longer-
term needs. NNSA agreed with the recommendation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-533]. For more 
information, contact David Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 
trimbled@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

LANL's Study Identified General Options for Meeting NNSA's Plutonium 
Research Needs and Included Limited Information on Their Costs and 
Risks: 

The Potential Impacts of Options on NNSA's Plutonium Research Missions 
Are Uncertain: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security 
Administration: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Facilities and Sites Considered in LANL's April 2012 Study: 

Abbreviations: 

ARIES: Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System: 

CMR: Chemistry and Metallurgy Research: 

CMRR: Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

LANL: Los Alamos National Laboratory: 

M&O: management and operating: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

PF-4: Plutonium Facility 4: 

[End of section] 

GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 11, 2013: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James M. Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

Nuclear weapons are an essential part of the national defense 
strategy. Plutonium--a man-made radioactive element produced by 
irradiating uranium in nuclear reactors--is vital to the nation's 
nuclear weapons. Plutonium is used in "pits"--the central core of a 
nuclear weapon that is compressed with high explosives to create a 
nuclear explosion. During the Cold War, the United States manufactured 
thousands of pits each year to maintain its stockpile of nuclear 
weapons. With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the nation 
began to shift from designing, testing, and producing new nuclear 
weapons to a strategy of maintaining the existing nuclear weapons 
stockpile through surveillance and life extension programs.[Footnote 
1] Life extension programs are intended to lengthen the lives of 
existing nuclear weapons by 20 to 30 years by repairing or replacing 
nuclear weapons components as needed. 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately 
organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible 
for the management of the nation's nuclear weapons.[Footnote 2] This 
central mission is referred to as the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 
Specifically, under this program, NNSA annually assesses the stockpile 
and (1) determines which components, including the pit, will need 
refurbishment to extend each weapon's life; (2) designs and produces 
the necessary components; (3) installs the components in the weapons; 
and (4) certifies that the changes do not adversely affect the safety 
and reliability of the weapons. NNSA uses science-based activities, 
such as computer simulations and laboratory analyses, to carry out 
this mission. The life extension programs require a coordinated effort 
among NNSA's three national weapons laboratories, four production 
facilities, and one support site--collectively known as the nation's 
Nuclear Security Enterprise. Each of these facilities is managed and 
operated by contractors, called management and operating (M&O) 
contractors. Of these facilities, the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) in New Mexico houses most of the nation's capabilities for 
plutonium research in support of the nuclear weapons mission. In 
addition, LANL's scientists and technicians also perform research on 
plutonium to support other missions, such as conducting research on 
recycling plutonium for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. 

One of the key plutonium facilities at LANL is the Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research facility (CMR). This facility has unique 
capabilities for performing analytical chemistry, material 
characterization, and research and development related to plutonium. 
[Footnote 3] This includes activities that support the manufacturing, 
development, and surveillance of nuclear weapons pits; programs to 
extend the life of nuclear weapons in the stockpile; and nuclear 
weapon dismantlement efforts. Analytical chemistry in particular is 
needed to support the production of pits. The CMR was built in 1952 
and is not sustainable in the long term because of its aging 
infrastructure and because it sits on a seismic fault line, raising 
concerns about the effect of earthquakes on the safety and security of 
plutonium used for research or stored at the facility.[Footnote 4] To 
address these concerns, in 2005 NNSA approved construction of a new 
facility at LANL called the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
Replacement (CMRR) nuclear facility.[Footnote 5] The CMRR nuclear 
facility was to be built to current seismic standards and would 
modernize LANL's plutonium support capabilities, including research. 
NNSA plans to continue operations in the CMR until about 2019, when it 
expected to complete the transfer of operations from the CMR to 
existing facilities, including the planned CMRR. In March 2012, we 
reported that NNSA's selected design for the CMRR nuclear facility, 
which at 22,500 square feet of laboratory space, was too small to meet 
all stockpile and other plutonium-related research needs.[Footnote 6] 

However, it is now unclear when or if the CMRR nuclear facility will 
be built, which may lead to insufficient capabilities to meet LANL's 
plutonium research requirements. In February 2012, NNSA announced that 
it had decided to defer CMRR nuclear facility construction for at 
least 5 years. Since then, NNSA officials have announced that they are 
seeking alternatives to the CMRR nuclear facility that would provide 
the capabilities planned for the CMRR nuclear facility using existing 
infrastructure. NNSA officials have stated they are now reviewing 
concepts that could deliver incremental capability by the mid-2020s. 
One such concept is a modular facility that NNSA officials assert can 
be built in phases and will have the flexibility to support potential 
future changes in mission. The CMRR's estimated costs had increased 6-
fold from an estimated high of $975 million in 2005 to an estimated 
high of $5.8 billion in 2010.[Footnote 7] NNSA officials stated that 
their decision to defer construction of the CMRR nuclear facility was 
intended to free up funds for other higher priority projects, 
including a Uranium Processing Facility in Tennessee. According to 
NNSA officials, with the 5-year delay, the CMRR nuclear facility may 
not be completed until the late-2020s at the earliest, potentially 
creating a gap in the nation's plutonium research capabilities. 
[Footnote 8] In particular, the delay in establishing new plutonium 
research capabilities could affect LANL's ability to manufacture pits 
for nuclear weapons. NNSA has estimated that it needs to be able to 
ramp up its capabilities to manufacture about 30 pits each year by 
2021 to meet expected life extension program requirements. 

In planning to avoid a potential insufficiency in plutonium research 
capabilities beginning in 2019 when the CMR is to cease operations, in 
February 2012, NNSA tasked the M&O contractor operating LANL with 
assessing the potential effects of deferring the construction of the 
CMRR nuclear facility. NNSA asked the M&O contractor to propose 
options for NNSA to maintain continuity in analytical chemistry and 
materials characterization capabilities using existing infrastructure. 
If the CMRR nuclear facility were to be built, it would not become 
operational until at least the late-2020s, assuming a 5-year delay. 
NNSA officials stated that if they built another facility as an 
alternative to the CMRR nuclear facility, it would likely take at 
least through the mid-2020s to plan and construct. On April 16, 2012, 
the contractor completed and issued LANL's study,[Footnote 9] also 
called the 60-day study, which discusses potential capabilities at 
LANL and other sites that could be used to meet NNSA's plutonium 
research needs. In accordance with the tasking letter from NNSA, the 
April 2012 study did not discuss longer-term options, such as the 
construction of the CMRR nuclear facility or other alternatives. 

In light of concerns about maintaining the nation's plutonium research 
capabilities for both its nuclear weapons stockpile and other 
plutonium research missions, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Report, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2013, directed that we review LANL's April 2012 study.[Footnote 
10] This report examines: (1) the options for meeting NNSA's plutonium 
research needs identified in LANL's April 2012 study, including their 
costs and health risks, if any, and (2) the potential impacts of those 
options on NNSA's plutonium research for the nuclear weapons stockpile 
and other plutonium research missions. 

To examine the options for meeting NNSA's plutonium research needs 
identified in LANL's April 2012 study, including costs and risks to 
health, we reviewed the April 2012 study as well as pertinent budget, 
planning, and analytical documents from NNSA and LANL. We interviewed 
NNSA officials and the M&O contractor to discuss the options and to 
better understand other facilities that could be used to meet 
plutonium research needs. We interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) 
officials to gain a better understanding of nuclear weapons stockpile 
requirements and DOD's input into the options identified in LANL's 
April 2012 study. We reviewed pertinent documents from the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, a statutorily-created body that 
reviews safety issues for certain NNSA and DOE facilities, and we 
interviewed board officials to discuss potential safety issues with 
LANL's plutonium facilities. To examine the potential impact of the 
options identified in LANL's April 2012 study on NNSA's plutonium 
research for the nuclear weapons stockpile and other mission areas, we 
reviewed pertinent documents from NNSA and LANL. We interviewed NNSA 
officials and the M&O contractor to discuss the impacts, if any, of 
using the facilities identified in LANL's April 2012 study. We also 
interviewed former DOE officials and former LANL contractor officials 
to understand the history of the CMRR and reviewed documents and 
interviewed representatives from the JASON Program Office to gather 
other perspectives on NNSA and its plutonium science mission.[Footnote 
11] Appendix I describes our objectives, scope, and methodology. We 
conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 2013 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

This background section discusses activities related to managing the 
stockpile and conducting plutonium related research, plutonium related 
research at LANL, and development of the CMRR. 

Activities Related to Managing the Stockpile and Conducting Plutonium-
Related Research: 

Two key activities related to the management of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile are determining the size and composition of the stockpile 
and the schedule for life extension programs. The DOD and DOE each 
play an important role in nuclear weapons stockpile management, 
including participation in the Nuclear Weapons Council, which serves 
as the focal point for interagency activities to maintain the U.S. 
nuclear weapons stockpile. The council is a joint DOD and DOE 
organization responsible for facilitating cooperation and 
coordination, reaching consensus, and establishing priorities between 
the two departments as they manage the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. 
The Secretaries of Defense and Energy, with input from the Nuclear 
Weapons Council, recommend a multiyear plan to the President on the 
size and composition of the stockpile, which if approved by the 
President, becomes the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Based on this 
plan, the Nuclear Weapons Council approves the schedule for nuclear 
weapons' life extension activities. Because of limited production 
capacity, NNSA has conducted these life extension programs 
consecutively, rather than concurrently. Although their durations have 
varied, life extension programs can take nearly a decade or more from 
the start of the planning phases until refurbished weapons are 
delivered to DOD for reintroduction into the stockpile. 

Plutonium research facilities and capabilities are needed to fulfill 
NNSA's nuclear weapons stockpile plutonium research mission as well as 
its other plutonium research missions. Although the rate of 
deterioration for some components of nuclear weapons is relatively 
well-known, scientists are still learning about the effects of aging 
on pits, particularly on the plutonium housed inside. Scientists must 
perform research to determine if existing pits can be reused or if new 
pits need to be manufactured to extend the life of nuclear 
weapons.[Footnote 12] When manufacturing new pits, scientists perform 
about 20 different types of analyses to characterize and assess the 
chemical and material properties of plutonium. Analytical chemistry 
and materials characterization analyses are also used to assess 
plutonium's structural attributes, such as the metal's microscopic 
grain size and texture, to identify any potential defects. 

Plutonium Related Research at LANL: 

While LANL houses most of the capabilities for plutonium research 
related to maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, it also 
has a broader plutonium-related research mission. For example, LANL 
conducts basic and applied research in the chemistry of plutonium and 
other radiological materials for the study of nuclear materials, 
including nuclear materials separation, processing, and recovery. As 
part of this capability, LANL has demonstrated the conversion of 
weapons-grade excess plutonium to mixed oxide fuel for electric power 
generation in commercial nuclear reactors.[Footnote 13] This core 
plutonium research capability also contributes to LANL's role in 
understanding and minimizing the risks of proliferation and terrorism. 
Specifically, LANL conducts research to support safeguards in nuclear 
processing and storage facilities; arms control, denuclearization, and 
nuclear test treaty verification; and detection of nuclear materials 
in transit. 

Currently, three main facilities at LANL are used for plutonium-
related research: 

* CMR--The CMR became operational in 1952 and has unique capabilities 
for performing analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and 
research and development related to plutonium. NNSA plans to transfer 
operations out of CMR in about 2019. 

* Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4)--PF-4 began operations in 1978 and is 
the nation's only fully operational plutonium facility supporting pit 
manufacturing and the research of plutonium, including chemical and 
metallurgical processes to purify and convert plutonium into other 
chemical compounds. Space in PF-4 is also used to support the 
manufacture of plutonium heat sources and electric generators in 
spacecraft as well as the research into improved methods for 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The facility is capable of 
handling and storing plutonium and other special nuclear materials, 
although much of its storage space is already filled. 

* Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building--The radiological 
laboratory, consisting of office-space, training areas, utilities, and 
laboratory space for research, was built to complement the proposed 
CMRR nuclear facility. According to NNSA officials, operations began 
in the radiological laboratory in 2013. The laboratory has the 
capacity to handle small plutonium samples for use in analytical 
chemistry research to support plutonium programs in PF-4. 

History of the Proposed CMRR Nuclear Facility: 

DOE's and NNSA's plans for replacing the CMR have changed over the 
past several decades. In 1983, DOE first decided that the CMR was 
outdated and began making plans to replace it. Over the next nearly 2 
decades, several large replacement projects were proposed, but none 
progressed beyond conceptual stages. In developing a major 
construction project, like the CMRR, DOE and NNSA follow specific DOE 
orders, regulations, and guidance, which, as a whole, are intended to 
ensure that broadly stated mission needs can be transformed into well-
defined requirements, ultimately resulting in operationally effective, 
suitable, and affordable facilities.[Footnote 14] NNSA has taken a 
number of steps to develop the CMRR nuclear facility or some facility 
to replace the CMR, but its plans have continued to change over time. 
Specifically: 

* In 2002, NNSA developed an initial design for the CMRR nuclear 
facility with 40,500 square feet of laboratory space to meet mission 
needs and to ensure ample contingency for program changes. 

* In 2004, NNSA evaluated three different possible laboratory space 
sizes for the CMRR nuclear facility--22,500, 31,500, and 40,500 square 
feet--and selected the smallest option, reporting that cost was the 
primary driver of the decision.[Footnote 15] 

* In 2006, an independent business case analysis validated the need 
for the CMRR nuclear facility, but it concluded that an additional 
9,000 square feet of laboratory space could allow for contingency in 
the event of changing requirements. 

* In 2008, as part of a complex-wide review, NNSA issued a study that 
revalidated the need for the CMRR nuclear facility based on program 
requirements, the capabilities within the facility, and its size of 
22,500 square feet. 

* In 2010, NNSA estimated that the CMRR nuclear facility would cost 
from $3.7 to $5.8 billion--a nearly 6-fold increase from the initial 
estimate--and that construction would be complete by 2020--a 3-to 7-
year delay. 

* In February 2012, NNSA announced that construction of the CMRR 
nuclear facility would be delayed for at least 5 years. 

* In March 2012, we reported that the CMRR nuclear facility design may 
not meet all plutonium-related research needs and recommended that 
NNSA conduct a comprehensive assessment of needed plutonium-related 
research.[Footnote 16],[Footnote 17] 

* In March 2013, the NNSA Administrator directed the agency to conduct 
an analysis to compare the planned CMRR nuclear facility with other 
options--including a modular facility concept that could be built in 
phases to meet additional capacity needs or new mission requirements--
and to enlist the assistance of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office in carrying 
out this analysis. According to NNSA officials, the results are 
expected in October 2013. 

LANL's Study Identified General Options for Meeting NNSA's Plutonium 
Research Needs and Included Limited Information on Their Costs and 
Risks: 

LANL's April 2012 study identified general options for meeting NNSA's 
plutonium research needs. The study included limited information on 
the potential costs and health risks associated with those options. 

Options Identified for Meeting NNSA's Plutonium Research Needs: 

LANL's April 2012 study identified general options for meeting NNSA's 
plutonium research needs. Specifically, the April 2012 study outlined 
three options for analytical chemistry and materials characterization 
capabilities to support current and future pit production requirements 
and other plutonium research needs. These options include relocating 
analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities among 
facilities at LANL, moving some capabilities to facilities at other 
sites, or some combination of the two. Contractor representatives at 
LANL noted that the April 2012 study was intended primarily to 
identify options that needed to be addressed quickly to support 
decisions for the fiscal year 2014 budget cycle, and that additional 
information and analysis would be required to develop a plan to meet 
NNSA's ongoing--and much longer-term--plutonium research needs. 

The April 2012 study stated that the level of plutonium research 
necessary to support nuclear weapons life extension programs would be 
affected by the planned schedule of the life extension programs, the 
number of pits that will be needed under the programs, and the number 
of pits that will need to be manufactured versus reused, all of which 
have uncertainties. The Nuclear Weapons Council is still evaluating 
specifications for nuclear weapons and their corresponding life 
extension program schedules, and it may take another year or two 
before final decisions are made, according to NNSA officials. Since 
the schedule has not been finalized, the number of pits that will be 
needed is uncertain as well. The number of pits that need to be 
manufactured is an important consideration because the analytical 
chemistry capacity needed is largely proportional to the pit 
manufacturing capacity needed. Roughly speaking, the more pits that 
must be manufactured, the more analytical chemistry is required. On 
the other hand, according to the April 2012 study, reusing pits is 
less resource intensive because it requires less analytical chemistry. 
For planning purposes, NNSA is studying the possibility of 
manufacturing about 30 pits per year and the potential reuse of up to 
about 90 pits per year by 2021. According to NNSA officials, initial 
studies indicate it is likely that pits can be reused, but further 
detailed studies regarding pit specifications will need to be 
completed before NNSA can be certain which pits, if any, can be 
reused. According to the April 2012 study, several independent, but 
key factors must be considered when making decisions about options to 
meet future analytical chemistry requirements. For example, any option 
should have the ability to increase the capacity of analytical 
chemistry to support increased pit manufacturing rates, should it be 
required. Also, the disposal of byproduct radiological material needs 
to be taken under consideration. 

One option for meeting NNSA's plutonium research needs identified in 
the April 2012 study was relocating analytical chemistry and materials 
characterization capabilities to other facilities at LANL. The study 
noted that LANL had demonstrated it could provide the analytical 
chemistry support for manufacturing 10 pits per year but that 
manufacturing the 30 pits per year that are estimated would be needed 
by 2021 would require more analytical chemistry capacity than LANL can 
currently provide. The April 2012 study noted that any option for 
increasing the analytical chemistry capability to support the 
manufacture of more than 10 pits per year should involve more 
effective use of the radiological laboratory at LANL. According to 
NNSA officials and representatives of the M&O contractor at LANL, the 
radiological laboratory was designed to handle about 6 grams of 
weapons-grade plutonium at a single time, which, without additional 
capabilities, is not sufficient to support the manufacture of 30 pits 
per year. The April 2012 study suggested that the radiological 
laboratory could be outfitted with additional equipment that would 
allow for additional capability and capacity. The study also suggested 
that the amount of plutonium that can be handled in the radiological 
laboratory could be increased to enhance the analytical chemistry 
capability at LANL. The study stated that the amount of plutonium 
could be increased to 26 grams using revised material limits for 
radiological facilities--the current limit for the radiological 
laboratory under DOE's hazard categorization standard--or 1,750 grams 
by attempting to increase the hazard categorization level.[Footnote 
18] The 26-gram level still requires additional analytical chemistry 
and materials characterization capabilities in other facilities to 
support the manufacture of 30 pits per year. The 1,750-gram level was 
considered not practical, considering the regulatory and cost 
challenges. To more effectively use space for analysis, the study also 
suggested that space in PF-4 could be reconfigured to prepare 
radiological samples that would then be analyzed in the radiological 
laboratory. Since the April 2012 study, an NNSA official has stated 
that, with the upgrade of the radiological laboratory to handle 26 
grams of plutonium, and with repurposing available space in PF-4, NNSA 
now believes that LANL can support the manufacture of 30 pits per 
year, but the official stated that many uncertainties related to these 
possible improvements still exist. 

In addition to more effective use of the radiological laboratory and 
PF-4 at LANL, the April 2012 study stated that facilities at other 
sites were available to provide for basic analytical chemistry. The 
LANL M&O contractor sent a survey to seven sites to gather information 
about additional capabilities available. The study concluded that no 
site can provide all the capabilities needed, but sites indicated that 
they could take steps to obtain additional capabilities such as 
renovating an existing facility or upgrading equipment. The April 2012 
study noted that finding facilities with the capability to perform 
materials characterization, however, is more difficult than for 
analytical chemistry because most materials characterization analyses 
require larger amounts of plutonium. While multiple sites in the 
nation's nuclear security enterprise have fairly broad analytical 
chemistry capabilities, materials characterization capabilities are 
mainly available at LANL and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 
California. The April 2012 study also discussed moving some special 
nuclear material for staging at the Device Assembly Facility in Nevada 
to free up space in PF-4. Storage space in PF-4 for radioactive 
materials is already largely utilized and additional space is needed 
to store special nuclear material produced during plutonium-related 
research and pit manufacturing.[Footnote 19] The study recommended 
that a base analytical capability could be established at the 
radiological laboratory and at PF-4 and as program requirements--
including pit requirements--become more clear, additional options, 
such as using capabilities at other sites, could be explored. LANL 
officials told us that they are continuing to evaluate information 
about which facilities might be able to provide analytical chemistry 
and materials characterization. Figure 1 shows the facilities and 
sites that LANL considered in its April 2012 study. 

Figure 1: Facilities and Sites Considered in LANL's April 2012 Study: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility (CMR): 
* Analytical chemistry; 
* Materials characterization; 
* Storage. 

Planned closure of CMR leaves gaps in capability. 

Proposed Chemistry Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) nuclear 
facility: 
* Analytical chemistry; 
* Materials characterization; 
* Storage. 

Deferral of CMRR leaves gaps in capability: 

Sites with potential capabilities to address gap (see map): 
* Analytical chemistry; 
* Materials characterization; 
* Storage. 

Sites: 

Analytical chemistry research: 
* Hanford Analytical Services, Washington; 
* Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Washington; 
* Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho; 
* New Brunswick Laboratory, Illinois; 
* Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee; 
* Savannah River National Laboratory, South Carolina; 
* Los Alamos National Laboratory: Radiological Laboratory
Utility Office Building, New Mexico. 

Materials characterization research: 
* Los Alamos National Laboratory: Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4), New 
Mexico. 

Analytical chemistry and materials characterization research: 
* Los Alamos National Laboratory: Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research facility (CMR), New Mexico. 

Special nuclear materials storage: 
* Nevada National Security Site. 

Sources: Copyright © Corel Corp., all rights reserved (map); GAO 
analysis based on LANL data. 

[End of figure] 

As of July 2013, NNSA officials told us that they had not selected any 
options for meeting the plutonium research needs from 2019 through the 
late-2020s, although they were exploring improved work processes in 
analytical chemistry that could potentially enable LANL to support the 
manufacture of 30 pits per year. In addition, NNSA officials said that 
they had not made any decisions on facilities to address longer-term 
research needs, such as the phased, modular facility NNSA officials 
are considering. NNSA officials said planning must begin soon on some 
longer-term plutonium research facility if it were to be constructed 
and operational by the late-2020s. 

Costs of the Options Are Uncertain: 

The April 2012 study provided limited information on general options 
for meeting NNSA's plutonium research needs and, given the time frames 
in which it was produced, was not expected to provide a meaningful 
assessment of the costs associated with any of the options. 
Specifically, the study reported that the cost of moving capabilities 
among facilities at LANL ranged from $480 million to $820 million. The 
study characterized these cost estimates as high-level and a rough 
order of magnitude and noted that the estimates should be viewed as 
preliminary and preconceptual that would not be useful for program 
definition or scoping. The April 2012 study did not include any 
estimated costs for the option of relocating some plutonium research 
capabilities to facilities at other sites, such as any actions that 
would be potentially necessary to conduct the needed research at those 
facilities, including capital improvements to develop analytical 
chemistry or materials characterization capabilities, or any 
operational costs related to the start-up or transportation. The 
information in the April 2012 study was not sufficient for a 
meaningful assessment of the costs associated with any of the options 
for meeting NNSA's plutonium research needs identified in the study. 

Some Potential Health Risks of the Options Have Been Identified: 

The April 2012 study also included some discussion of risks to 
workers. Although risks to workers and the public exist at PF-4 due to 
seismic hazards, some additional risks could be posed by the option to 
use facilities at other sites. Specifically, the study reported that 
using facilities at other sites for analytical chemistry research 
increases the handling and shipping of small samples of plutonium, 
thereby increasing the risk of contamination to workers. The study did 
not, however, quantify what the risk to workers might be. The April 
2012 study also did not assess any risks to the public posed by 
transporting plutonium or other radiological materials. An NNSA 
official told us that transportation accidents or unintentional 
releases could pose risks to the public but that these risks generally 
are low given DOE's history of successful shipments, existing 
transportation protocols, and the planned use of robust shipping 
containers. 

The Potential Impacts of Options on NNSA's Plutonium Research Missions 
Are Uncertain: 

The potential impacts of the options on NNSA's plutonium research for 
the nuclear weapons stockpile and other plutonium mission areas are 
uncertain but could include reduced space to accommodate other 
plutonium research missions if NNSA relies only on facilities at LANL 
for nuclear weapons stockpile research, delays in completing needed 
analytical chemistry and materials characterization analyses if 
facilities at other sites were to be used, and challenges in meeting 
stockpile refurbishment schedules due to shortages in certain staff. 

Relying on LANL to Accommodate Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Mission Could 
Potentially Reduce Space for Other Plutonium Research Missions: 

If NNSA uses space only at LANL, rather than moving some capabilities 
to facilities at other sites, some LANL plutonium research missions 
could potentially be impacted because space may have to be 
reconfigured to accommodate nuclear weapons stockpile mission needs. 
Currently, the bulk of the plutonium research activities for missions 
other than the nuclear weapons stockpile take place in PF-4. If NNSA 
decides to rely only on space at LANL, then PF-4 at LANL might have to 
absorb the additional plutonium research for the nuclear stockpile 
mission, which, in turn, could reduce the space available for other 
NNSA plutonium research missions. This impact, if it occurs, would not 
take place for several more years because, according to agency 
officials, NNSA plans to continue using the CMR until about 2019. The 
April 2012 study stated that the required number of activities in PF-4 
would likely be too great to be supported in the facility but noted 
further that it was a rough guess given that no formal PF-4 space 
analysis has been performed. Following the study, NNSA tasked the M&O 
contractor for LANL with assessing the space inside PF-4 to see if it 
could be repurposed to better support plutonium research for the 
nuclear weapons program and other mission areas. 

Moving Capabilities to Facilities at Other Sites Could Result in 
Delays: 

According to the April 2012 study, one potential impact of using 
facilities at other sites could be delays in completing needed 
analytical chemistry or materials characterization due to the time 
needed for transportation of samples between sites. Using facilities 
at other sites will require time for NNSA to plan for and then 
transport materials from LANL to facilities at other sites. This in 
turn could increase the total time needed to complete the analyses for 
weapon pits. Plans for transporting plutonium or other radioactive 
materials from LANL to facilities at other sites could also spur 
public opposition that may cause schedule delays or create other 
impediments to efficiently conduct analytical chemistry or materials 
characterization at other facilities in the nuclear security 
enterprise. 

Shortage of Trained Staff Could Impact Ability to Meet Nuclear Weapons 
Missions: 

The April 2012 study stated that the shortage of trained staff in 
analytical chemistry could impact the ability to execute the options, 
which in turn could affect NNSA's ability to meet proposed schedules 
for the refurbishment of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the study 
noted that the number of analytical chemistry researchers has 
decreased by 60 percent from 2005 to 2012 due to retirements and 
budget cuts. According to the April 2012 study, any of the options, 
including relocating capability and capacity to an augmented 
radiological laboratory, reconfiguring capabilities in PF-4, or 
transferring capabilities to facilities at other sites, will strain 
existing staff resources and will require hiring additional staff. 
Staff shortages could adversely impact the ability of NNSA and LANL to 
meet proposed schedules for its nuclear weapons work. LANL's M&O 
contractor representatives told us that it takes years of on-the-job 
training to develop core competencies for nuclear weapons work--about 
10 years for scientists and about 3 to 4 years for technicians. NNSA 
and LANL officials told us that recruiting additional staff for 
plutonium-related research necessarily takes years of advance 
planning, but that the uncertainty of where the new capabilities will 
be located or what the level of capacity is needed has complicated 
planning efforts. The contractor at LANL recommended that NNSA conduct 
a detailed risk analysis on staffing needs to better understand and 
plan for staffing limitations, according to the April 2012 study. 

Conclusions: 

NNSA's mission to ensure the safety and security of nuclear weapons is 
a critical, complex, and costly one. Key plutonium research facilities 
and capabilities are needed to assess the condition of existing 
nuclear weapons, implement life extension programs, and ensure that 
the nation's nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable. Although NNSA 
has taken nearly a decade and spent millions of dollars designing a 
replacement for LANL's aging CMR facility--an initiative that was 
approved in 2005 and revalidated in 2008--the construction of the CMRR 
nuclear facility has been delayed for at least 5 years. With the 
current CMR facility slated to transfer operations to some as yet 
undecided facility or facilities by 2019, this deferral may lead to 
insufficient plutonium research capabilities beginning in 2019. The 
timing of this potential gap in capabilities is critical given the 
number of pits NNSA is expecting to have to manufacture by 2021 to 
support the life extension programs of our nuclear stockpile. The 
options identified in LANL's April 2012 study were intended to help 
meet NNSA's plutonium research needs, but NNSA has not clarified how 
these needs may have changed, if at all, since NNSA's validation of 
its requirements for the CMRR nuclear facility in 2008--requirements 
we reported might not fully account for all of NNSA's plutonium 
research needs. NNSA has also not selected one of the study's options, 
or developed a plan for meeting these needs. Many aspects of the 
options identified in its April 2012 study, including which facilities 
will be used, what upgrades or changes to facilities will be needed, 
and the costs of carrying out the options are still uncertain as are 
the potential impacts of the various options being considered. NNSA is 
assessing possible concepts to meet NNSA's longer-term plutonium 
research needs, including one that would call for constructing a 
facility at LANL in phases, as additional capacity is needed. A change 
in approach from constructing the CMRR nuclear facility, however, 
raises a number of questions. These include whether NNSA will make 
costly investments in short-term facilities that may ultimately not 
address its longer-term plutonium research needs. It is imperative 
that NNSA make prudent investments that right-size the solution with 
the actual and anticipated needs or it may continue to spend 
significant sums of money with little to show for it. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To ensure that NNSA's investments in plutonium research facilities and 
capabilities result in an operationally effective and affordable 
solution, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy continue efforts 
to assess how plutonium research and other capability needs and 
stockpile requirements have changed, if at all, since the needs were 
revalidated in 2008, and develop a plan to appropriately meet the 
nation's near-term and longer-term plutonium needs. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided DOE and NNSA with a draft of this report for review and 
comment. In its written response on behalf of DOE, NNSA stated that it 
agreed in principle with our recommendation. NNSA suggested changing 
the recommendation by broadening it to also reflect other plutonium 
activities or capabilities. We have modified the recommendation to 
incorporate NNSA's suggested changes. In addition, NNSA noted that it 
has begun an evaluation of options for the plutonium strategy to 
inform the fiscal year 2015 budget request. Staff from LANL and DOD's 
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office will be involved in this 
evaluation. NNSA added that it believes that the results of this 
effort will be responsive to our recommendation. Although we discussed 
this effort in our report, it is still underway and we have not 
evaluated whether it will fully respond to our recommendation. 

NNSA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the 
report as appropriate. In particular, NNSA expressed concern that our 
use of the term plutonium research capabilities could be misleading to 
some readers. NNSA added that the principle role of the CMR, as well 
as its planned replacement, is to provide analytical chemistry and 
materials characterization capabilities to support plutonium 
manufacturing operations in other facilities at LANL. For consistency 
with our previous reports on this topic, we have continued to use the 
term plutonium research capabilities but have added language to the 
report to clarify our use of this term. 

NNSA's written comments are reproduced in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, and 
other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

David C. Trimble: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To examine the Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) April 2012 
study for meeting the National Nuclear Security Administration's 
(NNSA) plutonium research needs, including costs and risks to health, 
if any, we reviewed LANL's April 2012 study and pertinent budget, 
planning, and analytical documents from NNSA and LANL. For example, we 
reviewed various technical documents on plans for research and 
production of pits. We interviewed senior NNSA officials at NNSA's 
Washington, D.C. headquarters and interviewed several LANL program 
managers at LANL to better understand NNSA's plutonium research needs 
and to the extent to which they analyzed cost estimates, and to 
determine what decisions still need to be made related to capacity 
requirements that may affect costs in the future. Separately, we 
interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) program officials to gain a 
better understanding of nuclear weapons stockpile requirements and 
DOD's input into the options and related costs. To examine the risks 
the options pose to public health and safety, we reviewed numerous 
pertinent documents from NNSA, LANL, and the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board, focusing on issues related to seismic risks 
at LANL. In addition, we interviewed Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board officials to discuss the potential risks to public health and 
safety, if any, posed by the options. 

To examine the potential impact of options in LANL's April 2012 study 
on NNSA's plutonium research for the nuclear weapons stockpile and 
other mission areas, we reviewed pertinent analytical documents from 
NNSA and LANL related to NNSA's options for maintaining its 
capabilities for plutonium-related analytical chemistry, materials 
characterization, and storage, following the deferral of Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) nuclear facility. We also 
interviewed several NNSA and LANL program officials to better 
understand various facilities' capabilities that might be used as part 
of the options and to identify major impacts, if any, of using these 
facilities. We also interviewed former Department of Energy (DOE) 
officials and former contractor officials to understand the history of 
the CMRR and reviewed documents and interviewed representatives from 
the JASON Program Office to gather other perspectives on NNSA and its 
plutonium science mission. We also reviewed documents and interviewed 
representatives from several nongovernmental organizations, including 
the Los Alamos Study Group, the Union of Concerned Scientists, Nuclear 
Watch of New Mexico, and Project on Government Oversight, to identify 
challenges to using facilities across the nuclear security enterprise 
and to gain their perspective on NNSA's plan. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 
2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security 
Administration: 

Department of Energy: 
National Nuclear Security Administration: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

August 23, 2013: 

Mr. David Trimble: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20458: 

Dear Mr. Trimble: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the Government Accountability 
Offices (GAO) draft report titled "Modernizing The Nuclear Security 
Enterprise: Observations on NNSA's Options for Meeting Its Plutonium 
Needs, GA0-13-533." I understand the GAO began this review in response 
to a request made by the Committee on Armed Services, and was asked to 
examine: (1) the options identified in a 2012 Los Alamos National 
Laboratory study for meeting NNSA's plutonium needs, including costs 
and health risks, if any; and (2) the potential impacts of those 
options on NNSA's plutonium capabilities for the nuclear weapons 
stockpile and other plutonium research milestones. The report 
identified one recommendation for executive action. 

NNSA agrees in principle with the recommendation. The enclosure to 
this letter provides detailed response to that recommendation, 
including the actions NNSA is taking to address the underlying 
findings, and suggested language change for the recommendation to 
reflect NNSA's current status and the breadth of analysis activities. 
In addition, we have provided technical and general comments to 
further enhance the clarity and factual accuracy of the report. If you 
have any questions regarding this response, please contact
Dean Childs, Director, Office of Audit Coordination and Internal 
Affairs, at (301) 903-1341. 

Sincerely, 

Cynthia A. Lersten: 
Associate Administrator For Management and Budget: 

Enclosure: 

National Nuclear Security Administrations Comments on the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report titled "Modernizing The 
Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on NNSA's Options for 
Meeting Its Plutonium Research Needs, GAO-13-533" 

The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Energy: 

Recommendation: Assess how plutonium research needs and stockpile 
requirements have changed, if at all, since the needs were revalidated 
in 2008, and develop a plan to appropriately meet the Nation's near-
term and longer-term plutonium needs." 

Management Response: Concur in Principle. 

NNSA agrees that an assessment of both near and long-term plutonium 
needs is necessary. However, NNSA does not agree with the 
characterization/limitation of NNSA plutonium activities as solely 
"research," as they involve manufacturing, support and other 
capabilities. Classifying them as research activities limits the 
breadth of the analysis. In addition, in March 2013, the NNSA 
initiated a business case analysis with staff from Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) and the Department of Defense Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (CAPE) office to evaluate options for the plutonium 
strategy to inform NNSA's Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request. This effort 
is ongoing as of the date of this memorandum and NNSA believes the 
results of this effort will be responsive to the GAO recommendation. 

To more accurately reflect the broader set of plutonium activities and 
acknowledge the current status of NNSA's assessment efforts, we 
propose the following revised language for the recommendation: "...we 
recommend that the NNSA Administrator continue efforts to assess how 
plutonium capability needs and stockpile requirements have changed, if 
at all, since the needs were revalidated in 2008, and develop a plan 
to appropriately meet the nation's near-term and longer-term plutonium 
needs." 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Janet E. Frisch (Assistant 
Director); John Delicath; Mehrzad Nadji; Timothy Persons; Cheryl 
Peterson; Steven Putansu; Danny Royer; Robert Sánchez; Kiki 
Theodoropoulos; and Rajneesh Verma made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The number of nuclear weapons in the nation's stockpile has been 
decreasing since the end of the Cold War. The Department of Defense 
reported that in 1990, the nation had 21,392 nuclear weapons and by 
2009 the number decreased to 5,113. In addition, under the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, the United States agreed to further 
future reductions in the stockpile. 

[2] NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999). It is a separate, 
semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy, with 
responsibility for the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and 
naval reactors programs. 

[3] For the purposes of this report, we are using the term plutonium 
research to include research and development, analytical chemistry, 
materials characterization, and other support capabilities for 
plutonium manufacturing operations. 

[4] LANL first assessed the currently known seismic risks in the late 
1990s. At the time, DOE decided to continue operations at CMR using a 
safety analysis designed for nuclear facilities with limited 
operational lives. In order to keep operating under this safety 
analysis, LANL developed a strategy for minimizing risks at CMR, which 
included, among other things, closing several wings considered most at 
risk, improving safety controls, and reducing the amount of plutonium 
in the facility. DOE, then NNSA, has continued to operate CMR under 
this interim safety basis since 1998, but NNSA has committed to 
transferring all plutonium operations out of CMR by 2019 and then 
begin decommissioning activities. 

[5] The CMRR included both a radiological laboratory, which could 
manage only small amounts of plutonium, and a nuclear facility, where 
the bulk of plutonium-related research was to be performed. This 
report focuses primarily on the nuclear facility. 

[6] GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: New Plutonium 
Research Facility at Los Alamos May Not Meet All Mission Needs, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-337] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 26, 2012). 

[7] Nominal dollars. 

[8] We reported in March 2012 that the CMRR nuclear facility had 
initially been planned to be completed between 2013 and 2017, but that 
it was delayed until 2020 due to cost increases, reflecting a 3-to 7-
year delay. See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-337]. 
With the 5-year deferral, assuming no further delays, NNSA officials 
stated that the CMRR nuclear facility could be completed in 
approximately 2029, but some critics of NNSA we spoke to stated that, 
based on NNSA's prior project management experience, the CMRR nuclear 
facility likely could not have been built within NNSA's stated time 
frames and that further delays could be expected. 

[9] Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos Initial Response for 
Maintaining Capabilities with Deferral of the CMRR Nuclear Facility 
Project, (Los Alamos, N.M.: Apr. 16, 2012). 

[10] Senate Report 112-173 for the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2013 directed GAO to report by January 31, 2013. Sen. 
Rep. No. 112-173 at 282 (2012). The Senate Report directed us to 
review NNSA's proposed plutonium strategy, the options for which were 
initially outlined in the April 2012 study. On January 31, 2013, we 
reported our preliminary findings to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. 

[11] JASON is a scientific advisory group that provides consulting 
services to the U.S. government on matters of defense science and 
technology. 

[12] NNSA is studying the potential for reusing existing pits. 
Different studies have produced varying results on the life time of 
pits, and NNSA officials are not certain whether or for how long pits 
can be safely reused. NNSA and LANL officials told us, however, that 
although there are some generic analyses on pit reuse that can be done 
now, specific analyses must be tied to the weapon system being 
refurbished because each weapon has unique system requirements. 

[13] The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System, or ARIES, 
demonstrated the technology for extracting plutonium from used pits 
and converting it into a plutonium oxide. The intent of making the 
plutonium oxide is to blend it with other materials to make a mixed 
oxide fuel that can be used as fuel for commercial nuclear power 
reactors. The technology was to be used at the planned Mixed Oxide 
Fuel Fabrication Facility, the future of which is uncertain because 
the President's fiscal year 2014 budget request proposes decreasing 
funding for the facility while NNSA assesses other plutonium 
disposition strategies. The mixed oxide fuel produced by ARIES was to 
have been eventually produced by the planned Plutonium Disposition and 
Conversion Facility, but NNSA terminated that facility because of 
budget conflicts. 

[14] See DOE, DOE Order 413.3B: Program and Project Management for the 
Acquisition of Capital Assets (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2010). 

[15] NNSA based its initial plans for the CMRR nuclear facility on the 
22,500 square feet design and, in 2005, projected that the facility 
would cost from $745 million to $975 million and would be completed 
from 2013 to 2017. 

[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-337]. 

[17] By October 2012, NNSA had spent about $450 million designing the 
CMRR nuclear facility and $360 million designing, constructing, and 
equipping the radiological laboratory. 

[18] See DOE Standard: Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis 
Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety 
Analysis Reports, DOE-STD-1027-92 (Washington, D.C.: September 1997) 
and NNSA Supplemental Guidance: Guidance on Using Release Fraction and 
Modern Dosimetric Information Consistently with DOE STD 1027.92, 
Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance 
with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, Change Notice 
No. 1, NA-1 SD G 1027 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2011). 

[19] Special nuclear material comes from plutonium research and 
development programs and is not suitable for direct use in pit 
manufacturing. 

[End of section] 

GAO’s Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO’s website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
“E-mail Updates.” 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]