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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
December 2012:
Border Patrol:
Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border
Security Status and Resource Needs:
GAO-13-25:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-13-25, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Border Patrol
has primary responsibility for securing the border between ports of
entry, and reported that with its 18,500 agents it apprehended over
327,000 illegal entrants at the southwest border in fiscal year 2011.
Across Border Patrol’s nine southwest border sectors, most
apprehensions occurred in the Tucson sector in Arizona. GAO was asked
to review how Border Patrol manages resources at the southwest border.
This report examines (1) apprehension and other data Border Patrol
collects to inform changes in border security for the southwest border
and the Tucson sector, in particular; (2) how the Tucson sector
compares with other sectors in scheduling agent deployment and to what
extent data show that deployments have been effective; and (3) the
extent to which Border Patrol has identified mechanisms to assess
resource needs under its new strategic plan. GAO analyzed DHS
documents and data from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, and interviewed
officials in headquarters and five southwest border sectors selected
based on cross-border illegal activity, among other things. Results
cannot be generalized across the southwest border, but provided
insights into Border Patrol operations.
What GAO Found:
In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
reported meeting its goal to secure the border in part, by a decrease
in apprehensions and our data analysis showed that apprehensions
decreased by 68 percent across the southwest border and by 69 percent
in the Tucson sector from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, due in part
to changes in the U.S. economy and achievement of Border Patrol
strategic objectives. These data generally mirrored the decrease in
estimated known illegal entries across locations. Other data are used
by Border Patrol sector management to assess efforts in securing the
border against the threat of illegal migration, drug smuggling, and
terrorism; and Border Patrol may use these data to assess border
security at the national level as the agency transitions to a new
strategic plan. Our analysis of these data indicated that in the
Tucson sector, there was little change in the percentage of estimated
known illegal entrants apprehended by Border Patrol over the past 5
fiscal years, and the percentage of individuals apprehended who
repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined across the southwest
border by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2011. Additionally, the
number of drug seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to
18,898 in fiscal year 2011, and apprehensions of aliens from countries
determined to be at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism
increased from 239 in fiscal year 2006 to 309 in fiscal year 2010, but
decreased to 253 in fiscal year 2011.
The Tucson sector scheduled more agent workdays in fiscal year 2011
for enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other
sectors; however, data limitations preclude comparison of overall
effectiveness in how each sector has deployed resources to secure the
border. In fiscal year 2011 the Tucson sector scheduled 73 percent of
agent workdays for enforcement activities, and of these activities, 71
percent were scheduled for patrolling within 25 miles of the border.
Other sectors scheduled from 44 to 70 percent of agent enforcement
workdays for patrolling the border. Border Patrol sectors assess how
effectively they use resources to secure the border, but differences
in how sectors collect and report the data preclude comparing results.
Border Patrol issued guidance in September 2012 to improve the
consistency of sector data collection and reporting, which may allow
future comparison of performance.
Border Patrol is developing key elements of its 2012-2016 Strategic
Plan needed to define border security and the resources necessary to
achieve it, but has not identified milestones and time frames for
developing and implementing performance goals and measures in
accordance with standard practices in program management. Border
Patrol officials stated that performance goals and measures are in
development for assessing the progress of agency efforts to secure the
border between the ports of entry, and since fiscal year 2011, DHS has
used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border as an interim
goal and measure. However, as GAO previously testified, this interim
measure does not inform program results and therefore limits DHS and
congressional oversight and accountability. Milestones and time frames
could assist Border Patrol in monitoring progress in developing goals
and measures necessary to assess the status of border security and the
extent to which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate
and sufficient. Border Patrol expects to implement other key elements
of its strategic plan over the next 2 fiscal years.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that CBP ensure Border Patrol develops milestones and
time frames for developing border security goals and measures to
assess progress made and resource needs. DHS concurred with these
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-25]. For more
information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or
gamblerr@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Apprehensions Have Decreased across the Southwest Border; However,
Other Data on Illegal Migration, Drug Seizures, and Terrorism Also
Provide Insights into Border Security:
Southwest Border Sectors Scheduled Agents Differently across Border
Zones and Enforcement Activities; Data Limitations Preclude Comparison
of Overall Effectiveness:
Border Patrol Has Not Yet Developed Goals and Measures for Assessing
Efforts and Identifying Resource Needs under the New Strategic Plan:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: General Information about Border Patrol Sectors along the
Southwest Border:
Appendix III: General Information about Border Patrol Stations and
Zones in the Tucson Sector:
Appendix IV: Comparison of Border Patrol's 2004 Strategy and 2012-2016
Strategic Plan:
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known Illegal Entries and
Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 2006
through 2011:
Appendix VI: Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sectors and
Distance from the Border, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011:
Appendix VII: Border Patrol Nonenforcement Activities by Southwest
Border Sector, Fiscal Year 2011:
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data Element
(Apprehensions, Estimated Turn Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by
Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Appendix IX: Identification Sources for Turn Backs and Got Aways by
Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
Appendix X: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Southwest Border Patrol Sectors and Stations Visited by GAO,
by Border Patrol Sector:
Table 2: Description of Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest
Border, Including Border Miles and Size, Terrain, and Stations:
Table 3: Descriptions of Border Patrol Stations and Zones in the
Tucson Sector, including Border Mileage and Size, Terrain, and Number
of Zones by Distance from the Border:
Figures:
Figure 1: Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border:
Figure 2: Border Patrol Stations and Zones in Tucson Sector, as of
April 2012:
Figure 3: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 4: Number and Percentage of Border Patrol Apprehensions by
Distance from the Border in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2010 and
2011:
Figure 5: Recidivism Numbers and Percentages for Border Patrol
Apprehensions across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
Figure 6: Number and Percentage of Seizures of Drugs and Other
Contraband across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
Figure 7: Number and Percentage of Seizures across Southwest Border
Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2011:
Figure 8: Number of Aliens from Special Interest Countries Apprehended
across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011:
Figure 9: Number and Percentage of Aliens from Special Interest
Countries Apprehended across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors by
Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2011:
Figure 10: Border Patrol Agent Workdays Deployed to Border Zones and
Interior Zones across Southwest Border Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
Figure 11: Border Patrol Agent Workdays Scheduled across Enforcement
Activities across Southwest Border Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
Figure 12: Number of Tucson Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 13: Example of Terrain in the Yuma Sector:
Figure 14: Example of Terrain in the Tucson Sector:
Figure 15: Example of Terrain in the El Paso Sector, with the United
States on the Left of the Border Fence and Mexico on the Right:
Figure 16: Example of Terrain in the Rio Grande Valley Sector:
Figure 17: Example of Terrain in the Ajo Station Area of
Responsibility:
Figure 18: Example of Terrain in the Casa Grande Station Area of
Responsibility, with the United States on the Right Side of the Border
Fence and Mexico on the Left:
Figure 19: Example of Terrain in the Tucson Station Area of
Responsibility:
Figure 20: Example of Terrain within the Nogales Station Area of
Responsibility, with the United States on the Left Side of the Border
Fence and Mexico on the Right:
Figure 21: Example of Terrain in the Sonoita Station Area of
Responsibility near the U.S. Border with Mexico:
Figure 22: Example of Terrain in the Naco Station Area of
Responsibility near the U.S. Border with Mexico:
Figure 23: Example of Terrain in the Douglas Station Area of
Responsibility with the United States on the Left Side of the Border
Fence and Mexico on the Right:
Figure 24: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the San Diego Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 25: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the El Centro Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 26: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Yuma Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 27: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 28: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the El Paso Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 29: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Big Bend Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 30: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Del Rio Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 31: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Laredo Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 32: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through
2011:
Figure 33: Number and Percentage of Apprehensions across Southwest
Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2010:
Figure 34: Number and Percentage of Apprehensions across Southwest
Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2011:
Figure 35: Percentage of Border Patrol Agent Nonenforcement Workdays
Scheduled for Nonenforcement Activities across Southwest Border
Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
Figure 36: Number of San Diego Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions,
Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 37: Number of El Centro Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions,
Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 38: Number of Yuma Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 39: Number of Tucson Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 40: Number of El Paso Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 41: Number of Big Bend Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 42: Number of Del Rio Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 43: Number of Laredo Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 44: Number of Rio Grande Valley Sector Border Patrol
Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated
Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figure 45: Source of Data Collection for Turn Back and Got Away Data
across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
Abbreviations:
ASIC: aliens from special interest countries:
BPETS: Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
EID: Enforcement Integrated Database:
IMAT: Integrated Mission Analysis Tool:
OIP: Operational Implementation Plan:
POE: port of entry:
SBI: Secure Border Initiative:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 10, 2012:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ron Barber:
House of Representatives:
In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported spending over $4 billion
to secure the U.S. border with Mexico.[Footnote 1] Border Patrol,
within CBP, is the federal agency with primary responsibility for
securing the national borders between the designated U.S. land border
ports of entry (POE).[Footnote 2] In fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol
reported apprehending over 327,000 illegal entrants and making over
17,150 seizures of drugs along the southwest border, with Border
Patrol's Tucson sector accounting for the greatest percentage of
apprehensions and drug seizures.[Footnote 3] The Tucson sector, which
has primary responsibility for addressing cross-border illegal
activity in Arizona, reported making over 38 percent of apprehensions
and more than 28 percent of all drug seizures reported across Border
Patrol's nine southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2011.
Border Patrol is moving to implement a new strategy for securing the
border. Border Patrol's 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004
Strategy) focused on improving border security by increasing
resources--including personnel, infrastructure, and technology--and
deploying these resources using an approach that provided for several
layers of Border Patrol agents at the immediate border and in other
areas up to 100 miles (referred to as defense in depth).[Footnote 4]
In May 2012 the Border Patrol issued the 2012-2016 Border Patrol
Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan). Citing the buildup in
border resources and the need to use these enhanced capabilities most
effectively, this new strategic plan emphasizes using intelligence
information to inform risk relative to threats of cross-border
terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across locations;
integrating border security operations with other law enforcement
partners to address threats; and developing rapid response
capabilities to deploy the resources appropriate to changes in threat.
You asked us to review the approach used by Border Patrol to deploy
and manage resources along the U.S.-Mexico border in Arizona compared
with approaches used at other southwest border locations. This report
addresses the following questions: (1) What do data show about
apprehensions across the southwest border, and in the Tucson sector in
particular, and what other types of data, if any, does Border Patrol
collect that inform changes in the status of border security? (2) How
does the Tucson sector schedule agent deployment compared with
deployment in other southwest border sectors and to what extent do the
data show these deployments have been effective in securing the
border? (3) To what extent has Border Patrol developed mechanisms to
identify resources needed to secure the border under its new strategic
plan?
In conducting our work, we analyzed agency data related to Border
Patrol performance and cross-border threats, planning documents,
sector operational assessments, reports, guidance, and agency
strategic plans, and held discussions with relevant headquarters and
field officials concerning border strategy, border enforcement
operations, the deployment of resources--personnel, technology, and
infrastructure--and data used to assess the status of border security.
[Footnote 5] We obtained relevant data from DHS and Border Patrol
databases for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We chose this time
period because fiscal year 2006 was the first full year for which data
were available following Border Patrol's implementation of its 2004
Strategy. To assess the reliability of these data, we spoke with
Border Patrol headquarters officials who oversee the maintenance and
analyses of the data and with selected sector and station officials
regarding guidance and processes for collecting and reporting data in
regard to apprehensions of illegal entrants, seizures of drugs and
other contraband, and scheduling the deployment of agents tracked in
Border Patrol databases. We determined that these data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted
visits and observed station and checkpoint operations within five
Border Patrol sectors on the southwest border: San Diego sector,
California; Yuma sector, Arizona; Tucson sector, Arizona; El Paso
sector, Texas; and Rio Grande Valley sector, Texas. We selected these
sectors based on a range of factors, including (1) threat level, (2)
agency priorities for resource deployment, (3) the use of enforcement
strategies deemed successful by Border Patrol in reducing cross-border
illegal activity, and (4) varied terrain and operational conditions.
Among these five sectors, we selected 21 Border Patrol stations to
visit based on factors such as the level of cross-border illegal
activity as defined by Border Patrol data and unique characteristics,
such as terrain. While the results from our visits are not
representative of operations and conditions across the southwest
border, they provided us with an overall understanding of Border
Patrol operations.
To assess trends in apprehensions and other types of data used by
Border Patrol to inform changes in the status of border security
across the southwest border, and Tucson sector in particular, we
obtained relevant data from DHS and Border Patrol databases for fiscal
years 2006 through 2011. We analyzed data on apprehensions, seizures,
apprehensions of repeat offenders (recidivist rates), and
apprehensions of aliens from special interest countries (ASIC) by
sector to obtain an overall view of changes in cross-border illegal
activity.[Footnote 6] For fiscal years 2010 and 2011, we also analyzed
data for apprehensions, seizures, and apprehensions of ASICs by
location, in terms of distance from the border.[Footnote 7] Further,
we analyzed data used by Border Patrol to estimate the number of known
illegal entries by sector.[Footnote 8] Although estimated known
illegal entry data can be compared within a sector over time, these
data cannot be compared or combined across sectors, as discussed later
in this report. We also spoke or corresponded with 13 ranchers who
operated in the Tucson sector at the time of our review to discuss
border security issues. We selected these ranchers based on input from
various entities, including Border Patrol and select organizations
that are knowledgeable about border security issues. While the views
of these individuals are not representative of those of all ranchers
within the Tucson sector, they provided us with insights on ranchers'
perspectives.
To determine how the Tucson sector scheduled agent deployment compared
with deployment in other southwest border sectors and the extent to
which the data showed these deployments had been effective in securing
the border, we analyzed data on Border Patrol's scheduled deployment
of agents, by sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, including
the scheduling of agents near the border and the percentage of
workdays scheduled for enforcement-related activities.[Footnote 9] We
interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials regarding agency
guidance and practices for deploying resources and conducted
interviews with Border Patrol sector and station officials regarding
the processes used and factors considered when determining the
deployment and redeployment of resources. We also analyzed data Border
Patrol uses to calculate overall effectiveness within sectors to
determine if the appropriate mix of assets is being deployed and used
effectively and efficiently.[Footnote 10]
To assess to what extent Border Patrol had developed mechanisms to
identify resources needed to secure the border under its new 2012-2016
Strategic Plan, we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials
from the Planning, Analysis, and Enforcement Systems Branches, and
analyzed relevant documents, such as Border Patrol planning and policy
documents, necessary to gain an understanding of Border Patrol's
processes for developing and implementing key elements of the
strategic plan necessary to inform resource requirements for securing
the border. We compared these processes with standard practices in
program management for documenting the scope of a project, including
the need for milestones or time frames for project completion and
implementation.[Footnote 11] To assess to what extent Border Patrol
sectors and stations had identified the need for additional resources,
we analyzed southwest border sector operational assessments for fiscal
years 2010 and 2012 and interviewed sector and station officials.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to December 2012 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
provides further details on our scope and methodology.
Background:
CBP has divided geographic responsibility for the southwest border
among nine Border Patrol sectors, as shown in figure 1 (see appendix
II for general information about Border Patrol sectors). Each sector
has a varying number of stations, with agents responsible for
patrolling within defined geographic areas. Within these areas, Border
Patrol has reported that its primary mission is to prevent terrorists
and weapons of terrorism from entering the United States and also to
detect, interdict, and apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter
or smuggle any person or contraband across the nation's borders.
Figure 1: Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest Border:
[Refer to PDF for image: Interactive illustrated map]
Mouse over sector names for more information on individual sectors.
Sectors:
San Diego;
El Centro;
Yuma;
Tucson;
El Paso;
Big Bend;
Del Rio;
Laredo;
Rio Grande Valley.
Also depicted:
Sector boundaries;
State lines.
Source: GAO (analysis); MapInfo (map); Border Patrol (data).
[End of figure]
Each Border Patrol sector is further divided into stations. For
example, the Tucson sector has divided geographic responsibility
across eight stations, seven of which have responsibility for miles of
land directly on the U.S.-Mexico border. Within the station areas
Border Patrol refers to "border zones"--those having international
border miles--and "interior zones"--those without international border
miles. According to Border Patrol officials, zones allow sectors to
more effectively analyze border conditions, including terrain, when
planning how to deploy agents. Zone dimensions are largely determined
by geography and topographical features, and zone size can vary
significantly. See figure 2 for Tucson sector station and zone
boundaries (see appendix III for general information about the Tucson
sector stations).
Figure 2: Border Patrol Stations and Zones in Tucson Sector, as of
April 2012:
[Refer to PDF for image: Interactive illustrated map]
Depicted:
Zone boundary;
Station boundary;
25 miles from border;
Border zone;
Interior zone.
Stations depicted:
Ajo Station;
Case Grande Station;
Douglas Station;
Naco Station[A];
Tucson Station;
Wilcox Station.
Source: GAO (analysis); MapInfo (map); Border Patrol (data).
Note: In May 2012 Naco Station was renamed the "Brian A. Terry Border
Patrol Station" (Brian A. Terry Memorial Act, Pub. L. No 112-113, 126
Stat. 334 (2012)).
[End of figure]
Border Patrol collects and analyzes various data on the number and
types of entrants who illegally cross the southwest border between the
land border POEs, including collecting estimates on the total number
of identified--or "known"--illegal entries.[Footnote 12] Border Patrol
collects these data composed of the total number of apprehensions,
turn backs, and got aways as an indicator of the potential border
threat across locations.
Border Patrol developed its 2004 Strategy following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, as a framework for the agency's new
priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering the United States and to support its traditional mission of
preventing aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from
crossing U.S. borders illegally. The 2004 Strategy was designed to
facilitate the buildup and deployment of agency and border resources
with a focus on ensuring the agency had the right mix of personnel,
technology, and infrastructure across locations to secure the border.
From fiscal years 2004 through 2011, the number of Border Patrol
agents on the southwest border nearly doubled, from about 9,500 to
about 18,500; and DHS reported that since fiscal year 2006, about $4.4
billion has been invested in southwest border technology and
infrastructure. Through fiscal year 2010, these resources were used to
support DHS's goal to achieve "operational control" of the nation's
borders by reducing cross-border illegal activity. The extent of
operational control--also referred to as effective control--was
defined as the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the
capability to detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal
activity. At the end of fiscal year 2010, Border Patrol reported that
across the nearly 2,000 southwest border miles, resources were in
place to apprehend illegal activity at the immediate border for 129
southwest border miles, or at some distance from the border for an
additional 744 southwest border miles.[Footnote 13] At the beginning
of fiscal year 2011, DHS transitioned from using operational control
as its goal and outcome measure for border security in its Fiscal Year
2010-2012 Annual Performance Report. DHS established an interim
performance measure until a new border control goal and measure could
be developed.
Border Patrol issued its new 2012-2016 Strategic Plan in May 2012,
stating that the buildup of its resource base and the operations
conducted over the past two decades would enable the Border Patrol to
focus on mitigating risk rather than increasing resources to secure
the border. In contrast to the 2004 Strategy, which also recognized
the importance of rapid mobility, the leveraging of partnerships, and
accurate and useful intelligence, the new strategic plan places a
greater emphasis on the integration of partner resources into
operational planning and enforcement efforts, particularly partners
external to DHS. (See appendix IV for strategic goals and objectives
presented in Border Patrol's 2004 Strategy and 2012-2016 Strategic
Plan.)
Apprehensions Have Decreased across the Southwest Border; However,
Other Data on Illegal Migration, Drug Seizures, and Terrorism Also
Provide Insights into Border Security:
Border Patrol apprehensions have decreased in the Tucson sector and
across the southwest border, and DHS has reported data meeting its goal
to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. The
decrease in apprehensions mirrored the decrease in estimated known
illegal entries within each southwest border sector. Border Patrol officials attributed the decrease in apprehensions and estimated known illegal entries within southwest border sectors to multiple factors, including changes in the U.S. economy. While changes in apprehension levels provide useful insight on activity levels, other types of data may also inform changes in the status of border security, including changes in the percentage of estimated known illegal entries who are apprehended and who repeatedly cross the border illegally (recidivist rate), increases in seizures of drugs and other contraband, and increases in apprehensions of aliens from special interest countries (ASIC) that have been determined to be at a potential increased risk of sponsoring terrorism.
Apprehensions Decreased at about the Same Rate as Estimated Known
Illegal Entries in the Tucson Sector and across the Southwest Border:
Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of
apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim
measure for border security as reported in its Annual Performance
Report. In fiscal year 2011, DHS reported data meeting its goal to
secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. These data
show that Border Patrol apprehensions within each southwest Border
Patrol sector decreased from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, generally
mirroring the decrease in estimated known illegal entries within each
sector. In the Tucson sector, our analysis of Border Patrol data
showed that apprehensions decreased by 68 percent from fiscal years
2006 to 2011, compared with a 69 percent decrease in estimated known
illegal entries, as shown in figure 3. (See appendix V for additional
information.)
Figure 3: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 389,326;
Estimated Known Illegal Entries: 627,486.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 378,141;
Estimated Known Illegal Entries: 650,858.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 316,341;
Estimated Known Illegal Entries: 537,452.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 242,016;
Estimated Known Illegal Entries: 411,171.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 212,783;
Estimated Known Illegal Entries: 340,93.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 124,363;
Estimated Known Illegal Entries: 193,278.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Border Patrol officials attributed the decrease in apprehensions and
estimated known illegal entries within southwest border sectors to
multiple factors, including changes in the U.S. economy and successful
achievement of its strategic objectives.[Footnote 14] Border Patrol's
ability to address objectives laid out in the 2004 Strategy was
strengthened by increases in personnel and technology, and
infrastructure enhancements, according to Border Patrol officials. For
example, Tucson sector Border Patrol officials said that the sector
increased manpower over the past 5 years through an increase in Border
Patrol agents that was augmented by National Guard personnel, and that
CBP's Secure Border Initiative (SBI) provided border fencing and other
infrastructure, as well as technology enhancements.[Footnote 15]
Border Patrol officials also attributed decreases in estimated known
illegal entries and apprehensions to the deterrence effect of CBP
consequence programs--programs intended to deter repeated illegal
border crossings by ensuring the most efficient consequence or penalty
for individuals who illegally enter the United States. One such
multiagency initiative, Streamline, is a criminal prosecutions program
targeting aliens who illegally enter the United States through
designated geographic locations.[Footnote 16]
Other Border Patrol Data Provide a Broader Perspective on Changes in
Border Security Related to Illegal Migration, Smuggling of Drugs and
Other Contraband, and Terrorism:
Border Patrol collects other types of data that are used by sector
management to help inform assessment of its efforts to secure the
border against the threats of illegal migration, smuggling of drugs
and other contraband, and terrorism. These data show changes in the
(1) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are
apprehended, (2) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who
are apprehended more than once (repeat offenders), (3) number of
seizures of drugs and other contraband, and (4) number of
apprehensions of persons from countries at an increased risk of
sponsoring terrorism. In addition, apprehension and seizure data can
be analyzed in terms of where they occurred relative to distance from
the border as an indicator of progress in Border Patrol enforcement
efforts. Border Patrol officials at sectors we visited, and our review
of fiscal years 2010 and 2012 sector operational assessments,
indicated that sectors have historically used these types of data to
inform tactical deployment of personnel and technology to address
cross-border threats; however, the agency has not analyzed these data
at the national level to inform strategic decision making, according
to Border Patrol headquarters officials. These officials stated that
greater use of these data in assessing border security at the national
level may occur as the agency transitions to the new strategic plan.
Apprehensions Compared with Estimated Known Illegal Entries:
The 2004 Strategy recognized that factors in addition to apprehensions
can be used to assess changes in Border Patrol's enforcement efforts
to secure the border, including changes in the percentage of estimated
known illegal entrants who are apprehended (apprehensions as a
percentage of estimated known illegal entrants), and changes in the
number and percentage of apprehensions made closer to the border.
[Footnote 17] Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the
percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended is
primarily used to determine the effectiveness of border security
operations at the tactical--or zone--level but can also affect
strategic decision making. The data are also used to inform overall
situational awareness at the border, which directly supports field
planning and redeployment of resources.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data for the Tucson sector showed little
change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who were
apprehended by the Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years.
Specifically, our analysis showed that of the total number of
estimated known aliens who illegally crossed the Tucson sector border
from Mexico each year, Border Patrol apprehended 62 percent in fiscal
year 2006 compared with 64 percent in fiscal year 2011, an increase of
about 2 percentage points. Results varied across other southwest
border sectors, as shown in appendix V.
Over the last fiscal year, however, Border Patrol apprehensions across
the southwest border and in the Tucson sector have occurred closer to
the border. In the Tucson sector, for example, the percentage of
apprehensions occurring more than 20 miles from the border was smaller
in fiscal year 2011 than in fiscal year 2010, while a greater
percentage of apprehensions in fiscal year 2011 occurred more than 5
to 20 miles from the border, as shown in figure 4. There was little
change in the percentage of apprehensions within 1 mile of the border.
Similarly, apprehensions across the southwest border have also moved
closer to the border over time, with the greatest percentage of
apprehensions occurring more than 5 to 20 miles from the border in
fiscal year 2011. (See appendix VI for additional information.)
Figure 4: Number and Percentage of Border Patrol Apprehensions by
Distance from the Border in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2010 and
2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Miles from border: More than 20;
Fiscal year 2010: 60,091 (29%);
Fiscal year 2011: 29,881 (25%).
Miles from border: 5 to 20;
Fiscal year 2010: 49,405 (24%);
Fiscal year 2011: 33,789 (28%).
Miles from border: 1 to 5;
Fiscal year 2010: 56,995 (27%);
Fiscal year 2011: 29,835 (25%).
Miles from border: 0 to 1;
Fiscal year 2010: 43,188 (21%);
Fiscal year 2011: 25,625 (22%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Of the 13 ranchers we spoke or corresponded with in the Tucson sector,
6 said they would like to see Border Patrol enforce closer to the
border to prevent illegal entry and trespass on their properties.
Generally, these ranchers indicated that the level of illegal migrants
coming across their properties had declined, but said the level of
drug smuggling had remained constant. They were most concerned about
safety, but cited considerable property damage and concerns that
illegal trafficking had affected land values and driven up costs in
the ranching industry. Border Patrol officials in the Tucson sector
said that some factors precluding greater border presence included
terrain that was inaccessible or created a tactical disadvantage, the
distance from Border Patrol stations to the border, and access to
ranches and lands that were federally protected and environmentally
sensitive. Border Patrol officials also said they have taken steps to
address factors that prevent closer access to the border, such as
establishing forward operating bases--permanent facilities in remote
locations near the border--and substations closer to the border, and
working with ranchers and the federal government to ensure access to
protected lands.
Repeat Offenders:
The 2004 Strategy stated that changes in the percentage of persons
apprehended who have repeatedly crossed the border illegally (referred
to as the recidivism rate) is a factor that Border Patrol considers in
assessing its ability to deter individuals from attempting to
illegally cross the border. Our analysis of Border Patrol apprehension
data showed that the recidivism rate has declined across the southwest
border by about 6 percentage points from fiscal year 2008 to 2011 in
regard to the number of apprehended aliens who had repeatedly crossed
the border in the prior 3 years.[Footnote 18] Specifically, our
analysis showed that the recidivism rate across the overall southwest
border was about 42 percent in fiscal year 2008 compared with about 36
percent in fiscal year 2011.[Footnote 19] The Tucson sector had the
third highest recidivism rate across the southwest border in fiscal
year 2011, while the highest rate of recidivism occurred in El Centro
sector, as shown in figure 5. According to Border Patrol headquarters
officials, the agency has implemented various initiatives designed to
address recidivism through increased prosecution of individuals
apprehended for crossing the border illegally.[Footnote 20]
Figure 5: Recidivism Numbers and Percentages for Border Patrol
Apprehensions across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
Recidivist: 21,499 (51%);
Nonrecidivist: 20,658 (49%).
Sector: El Centro;
Recidivist: 18,295 (61%);
Nonrecidivist: 11,752 (39%).
Sector: Yuma;
Recidivist: 1,955 (35%);
Nonrecidivist: 3,661 (65%).
Sector: Tuscon;
Recidivist: 41,092 (35%);
Nonrecidivist: 76,305 (65%).
Sector: El Paso;
Recidivist: 2,266 (23%);
Nonrecidivist: 7,741 (77%).
Sector: Big Bend;
Recidivist: 779 (20%);
Nonrecidivist: 3,199 (80%).
Sector: Del Rio;
Recidivist: 3,133 (20%);
Nonrecidivist: 12,827 (80%).
Sector: Laredo;
Recidivist: 9,367 (26%);
Nonrecidivist: 25,983 (74%).
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Recidivist: 15,135 (26%);
Nonrecidivist: 42,102 (74%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Seizures of Drugs and Other Contraband:
The 2004 Strategy identifies the detection, apprehension, and
deterrence of smugglers of drugs, humans, and other contraband as a
primary objective. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that data
regarding seizures of drugs and other contraband are good indicators
of the effectiveness of targeted enforcement operations, and are used
to identify trends in the smuggling threat and as indicators of
overall cross-border illegal activity, in addition to potential gaps
in border coverage, risk, and enforcement operations. However, these
officials stated that these data are not used as a performance measure
for overall border security because while the agency has a mission to
secure the border against the smuggling threat, most smuggling is
related to illegal drugs, and that drug smuggling is the primary
responsibility of other federal agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement
Administration and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland
Security Investigations.[Footnote 21]
Our analysis of Border Patrol data indicated that across southwest
border sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband increased 83
percent over the past 5 fiscal years, with drug seizures accounting
for the vast majority of all contraband seizures. Specifically, the
number of drug and contraband seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal
year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011. Most seizures of drugs and
other contraband occurred in the Tucson sector, with about 28 percent,
or 5,299, of the 18,898 southwest border seizures occurring in the
sector in fiscal year 2011, as shown in figure 6.[Footnote 22]
Figure 6: Number and Percentage of Seizures of Drugs and Other
Contraband across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
Seizures: 1,240 (7%).
Sector: El Centro;
Seizures: 515 (3%).
Sector: Yuma;
Seizures: 2,515 (13%).
Sector: Tuscon;
Seizures: 5,299(28%).
Sector: El Paso;
Seizures: 1,003 (5%).
Sector: Big Bend;
Seizures: 3,170 (17%).
Sector: Del Rio;
Seizures: 635 (3%).
Sector: Laredo;
Seizures: 791 (4%).
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Seizures: 3,730 (20%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Further analysis of these data in the Tucson sector showed that the
percentage of drugs and other contraband seized closer to the border--
5 miles or less--decreased slightly from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal
year 2011. Specifically, the Tucson sector made 42 percent of drug and
other contraband seizures within 5 miles of the border in fiscal year
2010, and 38 percent within 5 miles of the border in fiscal year 2011.
Across other southwest border sectors, the distance from the border
where seizures occurred varied, as shown in figure 7. For example,
about 49 percent of the seizures in the El Centro sector occurred
within 1 mile of the border in fiscal year 2011 compared with less
than 7 percent of seizures within 1 mile of the border in the El Paso
sector. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that variances in
data across sectors reflect geographical and structural differences
among Border Patrol sectors--each sector is characterized by varying
topography, unique ingress and egress routes, land access issues, and
differing technology and infrastructure deployments, all of which
affect how a sector operates and therefore the ability to make
seizures at or near the border.
Figure 7: Number and Percentage of Seizures across Southwest Border
Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
Seizures:
0-1 mile: 36 (3%);
More than 1-5 miles: 62 (5%);
More than 5-20 miles: 729 (59%);
More than 20 miles: 400 (33%).
Sector: El Centro;
Seizures:
0-1 mile: 250 (49%);
More than 1-5 miles: 35 (7%);
More than 5-20 miles: 43 (8%);
More than 20 miles: 185 (36%).
Sector: Yuma;
Seizures:
0-1 mile: 117 (5%);
More than 1-5 miles: 24 (1%);
More than 5-20 miles: 1,727 (70%);
More than 20 miles: 612 (25%).
Sector: Tuscon;
Seizures:
0-1 mile: 892 (17%);
More than 1-5 miles: 1,121 (21%);
More than 5-20 miles: 1,437 (27%);
More than 20 miles: 1,818 (35%).
Sector: El Paso;
Seizures:
0-1 mile: 66 (7%);
More than 1-5 miles: 64 (6%);
More than 5-20 miles: 116 (12%);
More than 20 miles: 753 (75%).
Sector: Big Bend;
Seizures:
0-1 mile: 19 (1%);
More than 1-5 miles: 18 (1%);
More than 5-20 miles: 2,936 (93%);
More than 20 miles: 195 (6%).
Sector: Del Rio;
Seizures:
0-1 mile: 179 (28%);
More than 1-5 miles: 106 (17%);
More than 5-20 miles: 212 (33%);
More than 20 miles: 136 (22%).
Sector: Laredo;
Seizures:
0-1 mile: 157 (20%);
More than 1-5 miles: 80 (10%);
More than 5-20 miles: 32 (4%);
More than 20 miles: 522 (66%).
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Seizures:
0-1 mile: 1,091 (29%);
More than 1-5 miles: 344 (9%);
More than 5-20 miles: 857 (23%);
More than 20 miles: 1,423 (38%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Apprehensions of Aliens Posing a Potential Increased Risk for
Terrorism:
The 2004 Strategy identified the detection and prevention of
terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States between
the ports of entry as a primary objective. ASICs are considered to
pose a greater potential risk for terrorism than other aliens, and
Border Patrol headquarters officials said that they collect data on
the number of ASIC apprehensions in accordance with the reporting and
documentation procedures outlined in policy and guidance. However,
Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they did not consider
changes in the number of ASICs apprehended in their assessment of
border security because until recently, they had been primarily
focused on reducing the overall number of illegal entries, and that
terrorism was addressed by multiple agencies besides the Border
Patrol, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the
Department of Justice.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions of ASICs
across the southwest border increased each fiscal year from 239 in
fiscal 2006 to 399 in fiscal year 2010, but dropped to 253 in fiscal
year 2011. The Rio Grande Valley sector had more than half of all ASIC
apprehensions across the southwest border in both fiscal years 2010
and 2011, as shown in figure 8.
Figure 8: Number of Aliens from Special Interest Countries Apprehended
across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
Apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2010: 29;
Fiscal year 2011: 27.
Sector: El Centro;
Apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2010: 20;
Fiscal year 2011: 10.
Sector: Yuma;
Apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2010: 13;
Fiscal year 2011: 7.
Sector: Tuscon;
Apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2010: 19;
Fiscal year 2011: 13.
Sector: El Paso;
Apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2010: 28;
Fiscal year 2011: 22.
Sector: Big Bend;
Apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2010: 19;
Fiscal year 2011: 28.
Sector: Del Rio;
Apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2010: 6;
Fiscal year 2011: 4.
Sector: Laredo;
Apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2010: 15;
Fiscal year 2011: 11.
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2010: 250;
Fiscal year 2011: 131.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Further analysis of these data showed differences in progress to
apprehend ASICs closer to the border in support of Border Patrol's
overall intention to prevent potential terrorist threats from crossing
U.S. borders. For example, Rio Grande Valley sector nearly doubled the
percentage of ASICs apprehended within 1 mile of the border from the
preceding fiscal year, from 26 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 48
percent in fiscal year 2011. In contrast, ASIC apprehensions within 1
mile of the border in Tucson sector decreased from 26 percent in
fiscal 2010 to 8 percent in fiscal year 2011.[Footnote 23] Across the
southwest border, the greatest percentage of ASICs was apprehended
more than 20 miles from the border in fiscal year 2011, as shown in
figure 9. Border Patrol headquarters officials said they are
transitioning to a new methodology to identify the potential terrorist
risk in fiscal year 2013. This new methodology will replace the use of
a country-specific list with a range of other factors to identify
persons posing an increased risk for terrorism when processing
deportable aliens.
Figure 9: Number and Percentage of Aliens from Special Interest
Countries Apprehended across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors by
Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
ASICs:
0-1 mile: 8 (30%);
More than 1-5 miles: 1 (4%);
More than 5-20 miles: 11 (41%);
More than 20 miles: 7 (26%).
Sector: El Centro;
ASICs:
0-1 mile: 2 (20%);
More than 1-5 miles: 0 (0%);
More than 5-20 miles: 2 (20%);
More than 20 miles: 6 (60%).
Sector: Yuma;
ASICs:
0-1 mile: 0 (0%);
More than 1-5 miles: 0 (0%);
More than 5-20 miles: 0 (0%);
More than 20 miles: 7 (100%).
Sector: Tuscon;
ASICs:
0-1 mile: 1 (8%);
More than 1-5 miles: 0 (0%);
More than 5-20 miles: 1 (8%);
More than 20 miles: 11 (85%).
Sector: El Paso;
ASICs:
0-1 mile: 5 (23%);
More than 1-5 miles: 0 (0%);
More than 5-20 miles: 0 (0%);
More than 20 miles: 17 (77%).
Sector: Big Bend;
ASICs:
0-1 mile: 0 (0%);
More than 1-5 miles: 0 (0%);
More than 5-20 miles: 19 (68%);
More than 20 miles: 9 (32%).
Sector: Del Rio;
ASICs:
0-1 mile: 0 (0%);
More than 1-5 miles: 0 (0%);
More than 5-20 miles: 3 (75%);
More than 20 miles: 1 (25%).
Sector: Laredo;
ASICs:
0-1 mile: 0 (0%);
More than 1-5 miles: 2 (18%);
More than 5-20 miles: 2 (18%);
More than 20 miles: 7 (64%).
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
ASICs:
0-1 mile: 63 (48%);
More than 1-5 miles: 25 (19%);
More than 5-20 miles: 4 (3%);
More than 20 miles: 39 (30%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Southwest Border Sectors Scheduled Agents Differently across Border
Zones and Enforcement Activities; Data Limitations Preclude Comparison
of Overall Effectiveness:
The Tucson sector scheduled a higher percentage of agent workdays to
enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other
southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2011.[Footnote 24] However,
until recently sectors have differed in how they collect and report
data that Border Patrol used to assess its overall effectiveness in
using resources to secure the border, precluding comparison across
sectors. In September 2012, Border Patrol issued new guidance on
standardizing data collection and reporting practices that could
increase data reliability and allow comparison across locations.
Factors Affecting Agent Deployment in Border Zones Include Local
Terrain, Infrastructure, and Technology, but Most Sectors Schedule
Agents to Patrol the Border:
Border Patrol's 2004 Strategy provided for increasing resources and
deploying these resources using an approach that provided for several
layers of Border Patrol agents at the immediate border and in other
areas 100 miles or more away from the border (referred to as defense
in depth). According to CBP officials, as resources increased, Border
Patrol sought to move enforcement closer to the border over time to
better position the agency to ensure the arrest of those trying to
enter the country illegally.[Footnote 25] Headquarters and field
officials said station supervisors determine (1) whether to deploy
agents in border zones or interior zones, and (2) the types of
enforcement or nonenforcement activities agents are to perform. Border
Patrol officials from the five sectors we visited stated that they
used similar factors in making deployment decisions, such as
intelligence showing the presence of threat across locations, the
nature of the threat, and environmental factors including terrain and
weather.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed differences across sectors
in the percentage of agent workdays scheduled for border zones and
interior zones in fiscal year 2011. Specifically, our analysis showed
that while Tucson sector scheduled 43 percent of agent workdays to
border zones in fiscal year 2011, agent workdays scheduled for border
zones by other southwest border sectors ranged from 26 percent in the
Yuma sector to 53 percent in the El Centro sector, as shown in figure
10.[Footnote 26] Border Patrol officials attributed the variation in
border zone deployment to differences in geographical factors among
the southwest border sectors--such as varying topography, ingress and
egress routes, and land access issues, and structural factors such as
technology and infrastructure deployments--and stated that these
factors affect how sectors operate and may preclude closer deployment
to the border. Additionally, many southwest border sectors have
interior stations that are responsible for operations at some distance
from the border, such as at interior checkpoints generally located 25
miles or more from the border, which could also affect their
percentage of agent workdays scheduled for border zones.
Figure 10: Border Patrol Agent Workdays Deployed to Border Zones and
Interior Zones across Southwest Border Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
Border zone: 30%;
Interior zone: 70%.
Sector: El Centro;
Border zone: 53%;
Interior zone: 47%.
Sector: Yuma;
Border zone: 26%;
Interior zone: 74%.
Sector: Tuscon;
Border zone: 43%;
Interior zone: 57%.
Sector: El Paso;
Border zone: 40%;
Interior zone: 60%.
Sector: Big Bend;
Border zone: 32%;
Interior zone: 68%.
Sector: Del Rio;
Border zone: 32%;
Interior zone: 68%.
Sector: Laredo;
Border zone: 32%;
Interior zone: 68%.
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Border zone: 36%;
Interior zone: 64%.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Southwest border sectors scheduled most agent workdays for enforcement
activities during fiscal years 2006 to 2011 and the activity related
to patrolling the border accounted for a greater proportion of
enforcement activity workdays than any of the other activities.
Sectors schedule agent workdays across various activities categorized
as enforcement or nonenforcement.[Footnote 27] Across enforcement
activities, our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that all sectors
scheduled more agent workdays for "patrolling the border"--activities
defined to occur within 25 miles of the border--than any other
enforcement activity, as shown in figure 11.[Footnote 28] Border
Patrol duties under this activity include patrolling by vehicle,
horse, and bike; patrolling with canines; performing sign cutting; and
performing special activities such as mobile search and rescue. Other
enforcement activities to which Border Patrol scheduled agent workdays
included conducting checkpoint duties, developing intelligence, and
performing aircraft operations. (See appendix VII for a listing of
nonenforcement activities.)
Figure 11: Border Patrol Agent Workdays Scheduled across Enforcement
Activities across Southwest Border Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
Patrolling the border: 59%;
Traffic check: 9%;
Supervisory duties: 8%;
Other enforcement activities: 23%.
Sector: El Centro;
Patrolling the border: 56%;
Traffic check: 20%;
Supervisory duties: 10%;
Other enforcement activities: 14%.
Sector: Yuma;
Patrolling the border: 44%;
Traffic check: 23%;
Supervisory duties: 16%;
Other enforcement activities: 16%.
Sector: Tuscon;
Patrolling the border: 71%;
Traffic check: 9%;
Supervisory duties: 9%;
Other enforcement activities: 12%.
Sector: El Paso;
Patrolling the border: 67%;
Traffic check: 12%;
Supervisory duties: 10%;
Other enforcement activities: 11%.
Sector: Big Bend;
Patrolling the border: 54%;
Traffic check: 27%;
Supervisory duties: 12%;
Other enforcement activities: 7%.
Sector: Del Rio;
Patrolling the border: 67%;
Traffic check: 10%;
Supervisory duties: 11%;
Other enforcement activities: 12%.
Sector: Laredo;
Patrolling the border: 70%;
Traffic check: 13%;
Supervisory duties: 9%;
Other enforcement activities: 8%.
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Patrolling the border: 54%;
Traffic check: 12%;
Supervisory duties: 12%;
Other enforcement activities: 23%.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Data Limitations Preclude Comparing Effectiveness of Resource
Deployment across Locations:
Border Patrol sectors and stations track changes in their overall
effectiveness as a tool to determine if the appropriate mix and
placement of personnel and assets are being deployed and used
effectively and efficiently, according to officials from Border Patrol
headquarters. Border Patrol calculates an overall effectiveness rate
using a formula in which it adds the number of apprehensions and turn
backs in a specific sector and divides this total by the total
estimated known illegal entries--determined by adding the number of
apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways for the sector.[Footnote 29]
Border Patrol sectors and stations report this overall effectiveness
rate to headquarters. Border Patrol views its border security efforts
as increasing in effectiveness if the number of turn backs as a
percentage of estimated known illegal entries has increased and the
number of got aways as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries
has decreased.
Our analysis of Tucson sector apprehension, turn back, and got away
data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 showed that while Tucson
sector apprehensions remained fairly constant at about 60 percent of
estimated known illegal entries, the percentage of reported turn backs
increased from about 5 percent to about 23 percent, while the
percentage of reported got aways decreased from about 33 percent to
about 13 percent, as shown in figure 12. As a result of these changes
in the mix of turn backs and got aways, Border Patrol data showed that
enforcement effort, or the overall effectiveness rate for Tucson
sector, improved 20 percentage points from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal
year 2011, from 67 percent to 87 percent. (See appendix VIII for
additional information.)
Figure 12: Number of Tucson Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 389,326 (62%);
Estimated turn backs: 30,641 (5%);
Estimated got aways: 207,519 (33%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 378,141 (58%);
Estimated turn backs: 37,790 (6%);
Estimated got aways: 234,927 (36%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 316,341 (59%);
Estimated turn backs: 48,294 (9%);
Estimated got aways: 172,187 (32%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 242,016 (59%);
Estimated turn backs: 51,145 (12%);
Estimated got aways: 118.010 (29%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 212,783 (63%);
Estimated turn backs: 52,424 (15%);
Estimated got aways: 75,723 (22%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 124,363 (64%);
Estimated turn backs: 43,539 (23%);
Estimated got aways: 25,376 (13%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of the
nine sectors on the southwest border improved from fiscal years 2006
through 2011. The exception was the Big Bend sector, which showed a
decrease in the overall effectiveness rate, from 86 percent to 68
percent, during this time period. Border Patrol headquarters officials
said that differences in how sectors define, collect, and report turn
back and got away data used to calculate the overall effectiveness
rate preclude comparing performance results across sectors. Border
Patrol headquarters officials stated that until recently, each Border
Patrol sector decided how it would collect and report turn back and
got away data, and as a result, practices for collecting and reporting
the data varied across sectors and stations based on differences in
agent experience and judgment, resources, and terrain. In terms of
defining and reporting turn back data, for example, Border Patrol
headquarters officials said that a turn back was to be recorded only
if it is perceived to be an "intended entry"--that is, the reporting
agent believed the entrant intended to stay in the United States, but
Border Patrol activities caused the individual to return to Mexico.
[Footnote 30] According to Border Patrol officials, it can be
difficult to tell if an illegal crossing should be recorded as a turn
back, and sectors have different procedures for reporting and
classifying incidents. In terms of collecting data, Border Patrol
officials reported that sectors rely on a different mix of cameras,
sign cutting, credible sources, and visual observation to identify and
report the number of turn backs and got aways.[Footnote 31] (See
appendix IX for additional information.)
According to Border Patrol officials, the ability to obtain accurate
or consistent data using these identification sources depends on
various factors, such as terrain and weather. For example, data on
turn backs and got aways may be understated in areas with rugged
mountains and steep canyons that can hinder detection of illegal
entries. In other cases, data may be overstated--for example, in cases
where the same turn back identified by a camera is also identified by
sign cutting. Double counting may also occur when agents in one zone
record as a got away an individual who is apprehended and then
reported as an apprehension in another zone. As a result of these data
limitations, Border Patrol headquarters officials said that while they
consider turn back and got away data sufficiently reliable to assess
each sector's progress toward border security and to inform sector
decisions regarding resource deployment, they do not consider the data
sufficiently reliable to compare--or externally report--results across
sectors.
Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September 2012
to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the collection
and reporting of turn back and got away data by Border Patrol sectors.
Each sector is to be individually responsible for monitoring adherence
to the guidance. According to Border Patrol officials, it is expected
that once the guidance is implemented, data reliability will improve.
This new guidance may allow for comparison of sector performance and
inform decisions regarding resource deployment for securing the
southwest border.
Border Patrol Has Not Yet Developed Goals and Measures for Assessing
Efforts and Identifying Resource Needs under the New Strategic Plan:
Border Patrol does not yet have performance goals and measures in
place necessary to define border security and determine the resources
necessary to achieve it. Border Patrol officials said that they had
planned to establish such goals and measures by fiscal year 2012, but
these efforts have been delayed, and are contingent on developing and
implementing key elements of its strategic plan. Further, Border
Patrol is in the process of developing a plan for implementing key
elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan that may be used to inform
resource needs across locations, and expects to begin developing a
process for assessing resource needs and informing deployment
decisions across the southwest border once key elements of its
strategic plan have been implemented in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
Border Patrol Has Not Established Milestones and Time Frames for
Developing Performance Goals and Measures:
Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of
developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress
of its efforts to secure the border between POEs and for informing the
identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the
border, but has not identified milestones and time frames for
developing and implementing them. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used
the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an
interim performance goal and measure for border security as reported
in its Annual Performance Report. In February 2011, we testified that
DHS intended to use this indicator as an interim performance goal and
measure until it completed development of new border control
performance goals and measures, which DHS officials expected to be in
place by fiscal year 2012.[Footnote 32] However, as of September 2012,
DHS had not yet issued new performance goals and measures for
assessing border security or identified revised milestones and time
frames for developing and implementing them.
We previously testified that the interim goal and measure of number of
apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs provides
information on activity levels, but it does not inform program results
or resource identification and allocation decisions, and therefore
until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and Congress could
experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability.[Footnote 33]
Further, studies commissioned by CBP have documented that the number
of apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because
agency officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-
border illegal activity.[Footnote 34]
According to Border Patrol officials, establishing milestones and time
frames for the development of performance goals and measures is
contingent on the development of key elements of the 2012-2016
Strategic Plan, such as a risk assessment tool, and the agency's time
frames for implementing these key elements--targeted for fiscal years
2013 and 2014--are subject to change. Specifically, under the 2012-
2016 Strategic Plan, the Border Patrol plans to continuously evaluate
border security--and resource needs--by comparing changes in risk
levels against available resources across border locations. Border
Patrol officials stated the agency is in the process of identifying
performance goals and measures that can be linked to these new risk
assessment tools that will show progress and status in securing the
border between POEs, and determine needed resources, but has not
established milestones and time frames for developing and implementing
goals and measures because the agency's time frames for implementing
key elements of the plan are subject to change.[Footnote 35] Standard
practices in program management call for documenting the scope of a
project as well as milestones and time frames for timely completion
and implementation to ensure results are achieved.[Footnote 36] These
standard practices also call for project planning--such as identifying
time frames--to be performed in the early phases of a program and
recognize that plans may need to be adjusted along the way in response
to unexpected circumstances. Time frames for implementing key elements
of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan can change; however, milestones and
time frames for the development of performance goals and measures
could help ensure that goals and measures are completed in a timely
manner. Moreover, milestones and time frames could better position CBP
to monitor progress in developing and implementing goals and measures,
which would provide DHS and Congress with information on the results
of CBP efforts to secure the border between POEs and the extent to
which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and
sufficient.
Border Patrol Is in the Process of Implementing Key Elements of the
Strategic Plan and a Process for Assessing Resource Needs:
Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they were in the
process of developing a plan for implementing key elements of the 2012-
2016 Strategic Plan that may be used to inform resource needs across
locations, and expect to begin developing a process for assessing
resource needs and informing deployment decisions across the southwest
border once those key elements have been implemented. Border Patrol
officials said that they planned to develop and implement key elements
of the new strategic plan in fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
Implementation of the New Strategic Plan:
According to Border Patrol officials, the Border Patrol 2012-2016
Strategic Plan identifies several key elements that are to inform
agency resource needs and deployment decisions. Border Patrol
officials reported in September 2012 that they were in the process of
developing an implementation plan that is to lay out how key elements
of the new strategic plan are to be implemented. Border Patrol
officials reported that, in general, key elements of the strategic
plan are to be developed and implemented during fiscal years 2013 and
2014. According to agency officials, key strategic plan elements to be
addressed by the implementation plan that are to inform agency
resource needs and deployment decisions include (1) a process for
identifying risk that is to inform resource decisions, (2) the
enhancement of mobile response capabilities to redeploy resources to
address the shifts in threat, and (3) an approach to integrate partner
resources and contributions to enhance Border Patrol capabilities
("whole-of-government" approach).[Footnote 37] Border Patrol officials
told us that these elements are interdependent and must be developed,
refined, and disseminated to the field to strengthen the effectiveness
of the new strategic plan. According to these officials, delays in the
development of one element would likely affect the development of
others. For example, delays in implementing the new risk assessment
tools could affect sectors' ability to identify appropriate responses
to changing levels of risk.
* Risk assessment tools. In September 2012, Border Patrol officials
said they were in the process of developing two tools that are to be
used in the field to identify and manage risk under the agency's new
risk management approach. The first tool for assessing risk is the
Operational Implementation Plan (OIP), a qualitative process that
prioritizes sector evaluations of border security threats and
identifies potential responses. Border Patrol is developing a second
tool--a quantitative model called the Integrated Mission Analysis Tool
(IMAT)--that is to, among other things, assess risk and capability by
predicting and identifying the need for various courses of action,
such as the rapid response of resources to the highest risks. Actions
are to be assessed based on a comparison of agency capability with
risk. In contrast to the OIP, the IMAT is to be completed at the zone
level by stations; consolidated station outputs may then be used by
sectors to inform the OIP process. The IMAT is to use data from
various sources to develop a "Border Assessment of Threat" of known or
potential threats by zone and compare that assessment with a point-in-
time operational assessment of each sector's capability to determine
to what extent current capability--including resources--matches the
perceived risk.[Footnote 38] On the basis of the outcome, the station
can then choose from various predetermined courses of action to
address the perceived level of risk, such as reallocating resources or
leveraging external--law enforcement partner--resources.[Footnote 39]
Once the IMAT is fully implemented, Border Patrol plans for the
resulting outputs to be used to reassess and inform OIP decision
making; information from both systems is to be used to inform resource
needs and deployment decisions after the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan has
been implemented.
According to Border Patrol officials, both the OIP and the IMAT are to
identify risk and potential responses at the sector level. However,
these tools will not allow Border Patrol to assess and prioritize
risks and response options across sectors.[Footnote 40] Moreover,
agency officials said that when the IMAT is fully deployed, in fiscal
year 2014, it will not have the capacity to differentiate among
threats related to terrorists and their weapons, drugs and other
illegal contraband, and illegal migration (such as recidivism, in
which individuals repeatedly cross the border illegally). Border
Patrol officials said the agency plans to explore mechanisms for
developing these capabilities--assessing risk across sectors and
differentiating threat--once OIP and IMAT have been developed and
implemented in fiscal year 2014. According to Border Patrol
headquarters officials, as of August 2012, the agency was in the
process of pilot testing the OIP and the IMAT in the field and
expected to begin to initially implement the OIP and populate the IMAT
through a web-based program that will record baseline data on threat
and operational conditions throughout fiscal year 2013.
* Rapid deployment of resources. A second key element of the 2012-2016
Strategic Plan is to increase mobility and rapid deployment of
personnel and resources to quickly counter and interdict threats based
on shifts in smuggling routes and tactical intelligence. As we
testified in May 2012, CBP reported expanding the training and
response capabilities of the Border Patrol's specialized response
teams to support domestic and international intelligence-driven and
antiterrorism efforts as well as other special operations.[Footnote
41] Additionally, Border Patrol officials stated that in fiscal year
2011, Border Patrol allocated 500 agent positions to provide a
national group of organized, trained, and equipped Border Patrol
agents who are capable of rapid movement to regional and national
incidents in support of high-priority CBP missions. However, we
testified in May 2012 that Border Patrol officials had not fully
assessed to what extent the redeployment of existing resources would
be sufficient to meet security needs, or when additional resources
would need to be requested.[Footnote 42] In September 2012, Border
Patrol officials said they had not yet developed a process for
assessing the need for, or implementation of, rapid deployment of
existing resources to mitigate changing risk levels along the border,
but expected to do so after programs and processes--key elements--
identified in the strategic plan have been more fully developed. In
the interim, deployment decisions--such as the redeployment of agents
and mobile technology to border areas identified as having greater, or
unacceptable, levels of risk--are to be made at the sector level.
* Integrated partner resources. A third key element of the 2012-2016
Strategic Plan is the capability of Border Patrol and federal, state,
local, and international partners working together to quickly and
appropriately respond to changing threats through the timely and
effective use of personnel and other resources.[Footnote 43] According
to the new strategic plan, this "whole of government" approach will be
achieved through various efforts, including the expansion of
operational integration (the combining of best practices, capabilities
and strategies among partners) and jointly planned targeted operations
(the leveraging of combined partner assets to address risks), the
development and fusion of intelligence, and the creation of integrated
partnerships (the sharing of resources, plans, and operations among
partners). In December 2010, we recommended that CBP develop policy
and guidance necessary to identify, assess, and integrate available
partner resources in its operational assessments and resource planning
documents.[Footnote 44] CBP concurred with this recommendation, but as
of June 2012, Border Patrol had not yet required partner resources to
be incorporated into operational assessments or into documents that
inform the resource planning process.[Footnote 45] Border Patrol
headquarters officials said that the agency has yet to finalize
interim milestones for integrating partner resources into Border
Patrol operational assessments and resource planning documents because
it is still in the process of determining how partner resources are to
be integrated; however, Border Patrol plans to have a process in place
for that purpose in fiscal year 2014.
Process for Assessing Resource Needs:
According to Border Patrol officials, since the beginning of fiscal
year 2011, as the agency began transitioning from the 2004 resource-
based strategy to the 2012-2016 risk-based strategic plan, the Border
Patrol has been using an interim process for assessing the need for
additional personnel, infrastructure, and technology in agency
sectors. Border Patrol officials said that resource needs using this
interim process are intended to maintain the current status of border
security, and will be used until key elements of the strategic plan--
such as the OIP and the IMAT--that are necessary to develop a new
process have been implemented in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Under
this interim process, Border Patrol has maintained, with some
exceptions, personnel and resource levels established in fiscal year
2010, the last year in which operational control was used as a
performance goal and measure for border security.[Footnote 46]
According to Border Patrol officials, under the new risk management
approach, the need for additional resources will be determined in
terms of unacceptable levels of risk caused by illegal activity across
border locations. Moreover, in considering ways to mitigate elevated
risk levels, Border Patrol will look to mechanisms other than resource
enhancement for expanding capacity, such as the rapid redeployment of
resources from locations with lower risk levels and the leveraging of
partner resources (i.e., a "whole of government" approach). Border
Patrol officials said that use of the new risk assessment tools--the
OIP and the IMAT--in making decisions for resource requests will be
made at the sector level. Until a new process for identifying resource
needs has been developed, sectors will continue to use annual
operational assessments to reflect specific objectives and measures
for accomplishing annual sector priorities, as well as identifying
minimum budgetary requirements necessary to maintain the current
status of border security in each sector.
Border Patrol headquarters officials said that the resource levels
established at the end of fiscal year 2012 are to serve as a baseline
against which future needs are assessed, and that the personnel and
infrastructure in place across the southwest border by the end of
fiscal year 2012 should be sufficient to support the agency's
transition to a risk-based strategy for securing the border. Key
elements--such as the OIP and the IMAT--of the strategic plan are
necessary to evaluate the need for resources; until these elements are
in place, Border Patrol sectors are to continue to request resources
they have identified as necessary to maintain the current status of
border security. However, our review of Border Patrol's fiscal year
2012 operational assessments showed that sectors have continued to
show concerns about resource availability. For example, all nine
southwest border sectors reported a need for new or replacement
technology to detect and track illegal activity, six southwest border
sectors reported a need for additional infrastructure (such as all-
weather roads), and eight southwest border sectors reported a need for
additional agents to maintain or attain an acceptable level of border
security.[Footnote 47] Border Patrol officials stated that at the time
these operational assessments were developed--in fiscal year 2011--the
agency had yet to transition to the new risk-management approach under
the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan and sectors were continuing to assess
resource needs according to the 2004 resource-based model.[Footnote
48] According to these officials, Border Patrol has determined that
for fiscal year 2013 resource levels for most of the southwest border
will remain constant, with the exception of the Tucson and Rio Grande
Valley sectors, because of budget constraints. Border Patrol officials
stated that the agency recognizes the need to develop a new process
for assessing resource needs under the new risk management focus of
the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan and that this process will be different
from the prior system, which focused on increasing resources and
activities at the border rather than using existing resources to
manage risk. As Border Patrol is in the initial stages of developing
and implementing the key elements of its 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, it
is too early to assess how Border Patrol will identify the level of
resources needed to secure the border under the new plan.
Conclusions:
Securing the nation's borders against the evolving threat of terrorism
and transnational crime is essential to the protection of the nation.
Recognizing the importance of establishing secure national borders,
DHS has dramatically increased resources and activities at the
southwest border over the past several years to deter illegal border
crossings and secure the border.
With increased levels of resources and activities now in place, Border
Patrol intends to transition from a resource-based approach to
securing the nation's borders to a risk management approach that seeks
to leverage existing resources to manage risk. Given the nation's
ongoing need to identify and balance competing demands for limited
resources, linking necessary resource levels to desired outcomes is
critical to informed decision making. Accordingly, milestones and time
frames--established as soon as possible--for the development of
performance goals that define the levels of security--or risk--to be
achieved at the border could help ensure that goals are developed in a
timely manner. The establishment of such goals could help guide future
border investment and resources decisions. Similarly, milestones and
time frames for developing and implementing performance measures under
the new strategic plan that are linked to the Border Patrol's goal for
securing the border could better ensure accountability and oversight
of the agency's programs by better positioning it to show progress in
completing its efforts. Once established, border security performance
goals and measures would also support Border Patrol's efforts to
assess whether the key elements--programs and processes--of its new
strategic plan have brought the agency closer to its strategic goal of
securing the border.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To support the implementation of Border Patrol's 2012-2016 Strategic
Plan and identify the resources needed to achieve the nation's
strategic goal for securing the border, we recommend that the
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection ensure that the Chief of
the Office of Border Patrol establish milestones and time frames for
developing:
* a performance goal, or goals, for border security between the POEs
that defines how border security is to be measured and:
* a performance measure, or measures--linked to a performance goal or
goals--for assessing progress made in securing the border between POEs
and informing resource identification and allocation efforts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS
provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix X,
and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS
concurred with our recommendations for the agency to establish
milestones and time frames for developing performance goals and
measures for border security between the POEs, and stated that it
plans to establish such milestones and time frames by November 30,
2013. Establishing these milestones and time frames would meet the
intent of our recommendations, but doing so as soon as possible, as we
reported, would better position CBP to monitor progress in developing
and implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and
Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the
border between POEs and the extent to which existing resources and
capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Further, DHS indicated
that Border Patrol cannot unilaterally develop a performance goal for
border security and define how it is to be measured, but can develop
performance goals that will likely become key components of an
overarching goal for border security. Since our recommendations were
directed at Border Patrol establishing milestones and time frames for
developing such goals and measures focused on border security between
the POEs, we believe that DHS's proposed actions for Border Patrol in
this area would meet the intent of our recommendations, as Border
Patrol has primary responsibility for securing the border between
POEs. Such actions would help provide oversight and accountability for
border security between the POEs, support the implementation of Border
Patrol's 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, and help identify the resources
needed to achieve the goal for securing the border.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional
committees, as appropriate. The report will also be available at no
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix XI.
Signed by:
Rebecca Gambler:
Acting Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The report addresses the following three questions:
* What do data show about apprehensions across the southwest border,
and in the Tucson sector in particular, and what other types of data,
if any, does Border Patrol collect that inform changes in the status
of border security?
* How does the Tucson sector schedule agent deployment compared with
deployment in other southwest border sectors and to what extent do the
data show these deployments have been effective in securing the border?
* To what extent has Border Patrol developed mechanisms to identify
resources needed to secure the border under its new strategic plan?
In conducting our work, we gathered information and interviewed
officials from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Office of Border Patrol.
Specifically, we analyzed agency data related to Border Patrol
performance and cross-border threats; policy, planning, and budget
documents; sector operational assessments; border security reports;
operations manuals; and strategic plans provided by Border Patrol.
[Footnote 49] We interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials
regarding data collection and analysis procedures, strategic planning,
operational assessments, and border security programs and activities.
We obtained relevant data from DHS and Border Patrol databases for
fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We chose this time period because
fiscal year 2006 was the first full year for which data were available
following Border Patrol's implementation of its 2004 National Border
Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). To assess the reliability of these
data, we spoke with Border Patrol headquarters officials who oversee
the maintenance and analyses of the data and with select sector and
station officials regarding guidance and processes for collecting and
reporting data in regard to apprehensions of illegal entrants,
seizures of drugs and other contraband, and scheduling the deployment
of agents tracked in a Border Patrol database. We determined that
these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted visits to five of the nine Border Patrol sectors on the
southwest border--San Diego sector, California; Yuma sector, Arizona;
Tucson sector, Arizona; El Paso sector, Texas; and Rio Grande Valley
sector, Texas. We selected these sectors based on differences in (1)
the level of threat as defined by Border Patrol data, (2) agency
priorities for resource deployment, (3) the level of operational
control achieved in fiscal year 2010, (4) the use of enforcement
strategies deemed successful by the Border Patrol in reducing cross-
border illegal activity, and (5) varied terrain.[Footnote 50] Within
these sectors we selected 21 Border Patrol stations to visit based on
factors such as the level of cross-border illegal activity as defined
by Border Patrol data and unique characteristics such as terrain and
topography. We visited both "border stations"--those having
international border miles--and "interior stations"--those without
international border miles. Because Border Patrol officials identified
the Tucson sector as the highest-priority sector for resource
deployment in fiscal year 2011 and it had the highest level of cross-
border illegal activity, we conducted site visits to each of the eight
stations. (See table 1 for the Border Patrol sectors and stations we
visited and the location of each station relative to the border.)
While we cannot generalize the conditions we found at these Border
Patrol sectors and stations to all southwest border locations, they
provided us with an overall understanding of the range of operating
conditions across the southwest border, as well as differences in how
sectors and stations assess border security and deploy resources.
Table 1: Southwest Border Patrol Sectors and Stations Visited by GAO,
by Border Patrol Sector:
Sector: San Diego;
Stations:
* Chula Vista (border station);
* Brown Field (border station);
* San Clemente (interior station).
Sector: Yuma;
Stations:
* Yuma (border station);
* Wellton (border station).
Sector: Tucson;
Stations:
* Ajo (border station);
* Casa Grande (border station);
* Tucson (border station);
* Nogales (border station);
* Sonoita (border station);
* Naco (border station)[A];
* Douglas (border station);
* Willcox (interior station).
Sector: El Paso;
Stations:
* Lordsburg (border station);
* El Paso (border station);
* Fabens (border station);
* Fort Hancock (border station).
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Stations:
* Rio Grande City (border station);
* McAllen (border station);
* Harlingen (border station);
* Brownsville (border station).
Source: GAO.
[A] In May 2012 the Naco station was renamed the Brian A. Terry Border
Patrol Station (Brian A. Terry Memorial Act, Pub. L. No 112-113, 126
Stat. 334 (2012)).
[End of table]
In each location we observed conditions, including the use of
personnel, technology, and infrastructure, and conducted
semistructured interviews with Border Patrol sector and station
officials.
To assess trends in apprehensions,[Footnote 51] seizures, and other
types of data Border Patrol uses to inform changes in the status of
border security across the southwest border and in the Tucson sector,
we obtained Border Patrol data for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 from
DHS and Border Patrol databases--apprehensions and seizure data from
the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID) and estimated cross-border
illegal activity data from the Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking
System (BPETS).[Footnote 52] Because of the complexity and amount of
the data sets we requested, Border Patrol queried apprehension and
seizure data in two groups, with different run dates.[Footnote 53] We
analyzed Border Patrol apprehension and seizure data by sector for
each fiscal year to obtain an overall view of cross-border illegal
activity over time and the types of threats in each sector. In
addition, we analyzed apprehension data to identify the number of
repeat offenders (recidivism rate) and aliens from special interest
countries (ASIC) apprehended across years by sector, as indicators of
the extent to which deportable aliens with increased levels of
associated risk were apprehended.[Footnote 54] For fiscal years 2010
and 2011, we also analyzed data showing the location of apprehensions,
seizures, and apprehensions of ASICs relative to their distance from
the border.[Footnote 55]
We also analyzed data Border Patrol uses to assess estimated known
illegal entries (cross-border illegal activity) within each sector.
[Footnote 56] Although estimated known illegal entry data can be
compared within a sector over time, these data cannot be compared or
combined across sectors as discussed in this report. Because of the
complexity and amount of data we requested, Border Patrol provided
these data in two queries, with different run dates.[Footnote 57] We
also interviewed relevant Border Patrol headquarters and field
officials regarding the maintenance of these data, and how the agency
analyzes the data to inform the status of border security. In
addition, we spoke or corresponded with 13 ranchers who operated in
the Tucson sector at the time of our review to discuss border security
issues. We selected these ranchers based on input from various
entities, including Border Patrol and select organizations that are
knowledgeable about border security issues. Because this selection of
ranchers was a nonprobability sample, the results from our discussions
cannot be generalized to other ranchers; however, what we learned from
the ranchers we contacted provided a useful perspective on the issues
addressed in this report.
To determine how the Tucson sector scheduled agent deployment compared
with other southwest border sectors and to what extent the data showed
these deployments had been effective in securing the border, we
analyzed Border Patrol BPETS data regarding the scheduled deployment
of agents, by sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We also
analyzed to what extent agents were scheduled for deployment in
"border zones"--those having international border miles--and "interior
zones"--those without international border miles.[Footnote 58] Because
of the complexity and amount of the data sets we requested, Border
Patrol queried deployment data in two groups, with different run
dates.[Footnote 59]
We also interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials in the
Planning, Analysis, and Enforcement Systems Branches regarding agency
guidance and practices for allocating and deploying resources--
personnel, technology, and infrastructure. In addition, we conducted
semistructured interviews with Border Patrol sector and station
officials regarding the processes used and factors considered when
determining the deployment and redeployment of resources. Further, we
analyzed data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 that Border Patrol
uses to calculate overall effectiveness within sectors and to
determine if the appropriate mix of assets is being deployed and used
effectively and efficiently.[Footnote 60] We also interviewed Border
Patrol headquarters and station officials regarding agency practices
for collecting and recording these data and how those practices may
vary across sectors. As previously discussed, because of potential
inconsistencies in how the data are collected, these data cannot be
compared across sectors but can be compared within a sector over time
as discussed in more detail in this report. In addition, we reviewed
Border Patrol guidance issued in September 2012 regarding the
collection and reporting of effectiveness data.
To assess to what extent Border Patrol has identified mechanisms for
assessing resource needs under the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic
Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan), we analyzed key elements of the
strategic plan defined by Border Patrol. To gain a better
understanding of Border Patrol's plans for developing and implementing
key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, including processes for
identifying resource needs and the extent to which officials have
identified interim milestones and time frames, we interviewed Border
Patrol headquarters officials from the Planning and Analysis Branches,
and analyzed relevant documents, such as Border Patrol planning and
policy documents. We also reviewed standard practices in program
management for documenting the scope of a project, including
milestones or time frames for project completion and
implementation.[Footnote 61] To assess to what extent Border Patrol
sectors and stations had identified the need for additional resources,
we interviewed sector and station officials and analyzed southwest
border sector operational assessments for fiscal years 2010 and 2012.
We analyzed operational assessments for fiscal year 2010 because that
was the last fiscal year in which DHS used operational control as a
performance goal and measure, and for fiscal year 2012 because it was
the most current fiscal year available at the time we conducted our
analysis.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to December 2012 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: General Information about Border Patrol Sectors along the
Southwest Border:
Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 1. Table 2
describes, for each of the nine sectors on the southwest border, the
(1) number of border miles and size, in square miles; (2) type of
terrain; and (3) number and type (border or interior) of stations.
Figures 13 through 16 illustrate the types of terrain that can be
found in four of the nine sectors.
Table 2: Description of Border Patrol Sectors along the Southwest
Border, Including Border Miles and Size, Terrain, and Stations:
Sector: San Diego;
Border miles and size: About 60 land border miles and 114 coastal
miles; approximately 56,830 square miles;
Terrain: The San Diego sector contains one of the most densely
populated areas in the United States with more than 7 million people
and includes the sixth largest city (San Diego) in the nation. Sector
terrain includes beaches, estuaries, coastal plains, steep canyons and
ravines, high desert, mountains over 6,000 feet in elevation, and
sparsely populated remote and rural wilderness areas. The sector also
includes environmentally sensitive and protected areas;
Stations: Eight Border Patrol stations (six border and two interior).
Sector: El Centro;
Border miles and size: About 70 land border miles; approximately
107,750 square miles;
Terrain: The El Centro sector contains many different environments
from mountains on the west side to sand dunes on the east side of the
sector. Terrain is largely composed of rugged mountains, agricultural
areas, and low-lying desert areas. In addition, the geography of the
sector also Includes a designated wilderness area and several military
reservations, as well as large areas of desert that have been
designated as critical habitat for threatened species;
Stations: Four Border Patrol stations (two border and two interior).
Sector: Yuma;
Border miles and size: About 126 land border miles; approximately
181,670 square miles;
Terrain: The Yuma sector contains sandy desert terrain, mountains, and
river valleys, as shown in figure 13. There are sand dunes and several
mountain ranges with elevations over 4,000 feet. In addition, large
portions of the Yuma sector fall within federal land and military
reservations. The federal land and military ranges are highly
sensitive areas, because of environmental issues and range safety
concerns. During the monsoon season in late summer and early fall,
rains and flash flooding normally occur;
Stations: Three Border Patrol stations (two border and one interior).
Sector: Tucson;
Border miles and size: About 260 land border miles; approximately
90,500 square miles;
Terrain: The Tucson sector contains many different environments,
including mountain ranges and valleys, as shown in figure 14. Two
major metropolitan areas exist within the sector's geography--Tucson
and Phoenix. There are also several protected areas (federal lands)
within the sector totaling approximately 12,080 square miles;
some of these public lands are adjacent to the border (approximately
178 miles). The sector also contains two American Indian reservations,
with one that includes 63 miles of border with Mexico;
Stations: Eight Border Patrol stations (seven border and one interior);
one substation.
Sector: El Paso;
Border miles and size: About 268 border miles (land and river border);
approximately 125,000 square miles;
Terrain: The El Paso sector contains various types of terrain,
including mountains and arid desert--with canyons, rocky hills, and
mountains--rivers and deep, swift-moving irrigation canals and an
urban metropolitan area, as shown in figure 15. The sector covers
border miles in both New Mexico and Texas. The El Paso sector has
responsibility for 88 miles of river border and 180 miles of land
border. The washes and playas (dry lakebeds) in the sector are
susceptible to flash flooding during the July-October monsoon season;
Stations: Eleven Border Patrol Stations (seven border and four
interior).
Sector: Big Bend;
Border miles and size: About 510 land border miles; approximately
165,150 square miles;
Terrain: The Big Bend sector contains terrain that varies from dry
sandy desert to cedar-and oak-covered hills and also includes remote
and rugged mountainous terrain, ranging from elevations of 2,800 to
8,000 feet above sea level. The sector also contains a border river
area, which includes areas of thick vegetation. The Big Bend sector
contains the most border miles of all the Border Patrol sectors on the
southwest border;
Stations: Ten Border Patrol stations (seven border and three interior);
two substations (one border and one interior).
Sector: Del Rio;
Border miles and size: About 210 border miles (river border);
approximately 59,540 square miles;
Terrain: The Del Rio sector contains terrain that varies from rugged
canyons and steep hills to rolling hills and flatland. The Rio Grande
cuts through deep canyons within the sector and the Rio Grande, which
establishes the international boundary, is oriented predominantly
north to south. The greater part of the Del Rio sector is sparsely
populated and consists of mostly farms and ranches;
Stations: Nine Border Patrol stations (five border and four interior);
one interior substation.
Sector: Laredo;
Border miles and size: About 171 border miles (river border);
approximately 88,460 square miles;
Terrain: The Laredo sector contains terrain that varies from rolling
to steep hills, generally covered with brush. Elevations range from
400 feet at the international border to 900 feet in the northern part
of the sector. Several deep arroyos, washouts, and creeks provide
drainage into the Rio Grande, which runs along the international
border. The area in the northern part of the sector--including the
Dallas/Fort Worth area--is mostly an urban environment containing over
5 million inhabitants;
Stations: Nine Border Patrol stations (four border and five interior).
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Border miles and size: About 316 border miles (river and coastal
border); approximately 18,580 square miles;
Terrain: The Rio Grande Valley sector contains terrain that varies
from a mixture of rural farmland and ranchland to densely populated
metropolitan areas, as shown in figure 16. The sector includes a large
coastal shoreline, a large population base, and a well-established
infrastructure on both sides of its international border. The Rio
Grande Valley sector's easternmost boundary is composed entirely of
Gulf of Mexico shoreline;
Stations: Nine Border Patrol stations (seven border and two interior).
Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol operational assessments.
[End of table]
Figure 13: Example of Terrain in the Yuma Sector:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 14: Example of Terrain in the Tucson Sector:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 15: Example of Terrain in the El Paso Sector, with the United
States on the Left of the Border Fence and Mexico on the Right:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 16: Example of Terrain in the Rio Grande Valley Sector:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: General Information about Border Patrol Stations and
Zones in the Tucson Sector:
Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 2. Table 3
describes, for each of the eight stations in the Tucson sector, the
(1) number of border miles and size, in square miles; (2) type of
terrain; and (3) number and type (border or interior) of zones, and
their distance from the border. Figures 17 through 23 illustrate the
types of terrain that can be found in seven of the eight stations in
the Tucson sector.
Table 3: Descriptions of Border Patrol Stations and Zones in the
Tucson Sector, including Border Mileage and Size, Terrain, and Number
of Zones by Distance from the Border:
Station: Ajo;
Border miles and size: About 68 border miles; approximately 9,240
square miles;
Terrain: The Ajo station contains a vast desert with mountainous
terrain with varying amounts of undergrowth, as shown in figure 17.
The Ajo station terrain also includes environmentally sensitive and
protected lands. Portions of the station area of responsibility also
include an American Indian reservation;
Zones by distance from the border: Nine border zones; 0 to 68 miles
from the border; Three interior zones; 24 to 159 miles from the border.
Station: Casa Grande;
Border miles and size: About 40 border miles; approximately 41,500
square miles;
Terrain: The Casa Grande station contains terrain that varies from
rocky terrain and mountainous regions to flat desert, as shown in
figure 18. There are only a few small villages or ranches on both
sides of the border. The majority of the Casa Grande station area of
responsibility also includes an American Indian reservation;
Zones by distance from the border: Six border zones; 0 to 37 miles
from the border; Five interior zones; 17 to 392 miles from the border.
Station: Tucson;
Border miles and size: About 24 border miles; approximately 3,790
square miles;
Terrain: The Tucson station contains terrain that varies from open
valleys to rugged mountains and is covered with various forms of
desert shrubs, as shown in figure 19. The majority of the station area
of responsibility also contains federal lands and portions of an
American Indian reservation. A major metropolitan area exists within
the station's geography--Tucson;
Zones by distance from the border: Three border zones; 0 to 42 miles
from the border; Four interior zones; 25 to 81 miles from the border.
Station: Nogales;
Border miles and size: About 30 border miles; approximately 1,800
square miles;
Terrain: The Nogales station contains terrain that varies from high
desert terrain with rugged mountains to rolling hills with numerous
deep canyons, as shown in figure 20. The station area of
responsibility also includes small rural communities and individual
ranch houses with a significant portion of the station's area of
responsibility on federal lands;
Zones by distance from the border: Four border zones; 0 to 28 miles
from the border; One interior zone; 11 to 29 miles from the border.
Station: Sonoita;
Border miles and size: About 27 border miles; approximately 665 square
miles;
Terrain: The Sonoita station contains terrain that varies from
mountain ranges to hilly terrain, including a grassland valley with
many arroyos and creeks, as shown in figure 21. The station's area of
responsibility includes federal lands and the majority of the land in
the Sonoita area of responsibility is under federal or private
ownership;
Zones by distance from the border: Four border zones; 0 to 37 miles
from the border; No interior zones.
Station: Naco[A];
Border miles and size: About 33 border miles;
approximately 1,175 square miles;
Terrain: The Naco station contains terrain that varies from deep
desert washes that form an extensive drainage network during monsoon
season, to rugged mountains that consist of heavy brush and steep,
rocky canyons, and a mixture of sparse vegetation and desert
grasslands, as shown in figure 22. The elevation within the station
area of responsibility ranges from 3,600 feet to 9,466 feet;
Zones by distance from the border: Five border zones; 0 to 12 miles
from the border; Three interior zones; 3 to 37 miles from the border.
Station: Douglas;
Border miles and size: About 41 border miles;
approximately 1,385 square miles;
Terrain: The Douglas station contains terrain that includes rugged,
steep, rocky, high-elevation desert terrain and low-lying valleys of
moderate vegetation, as shown in figure 23. A large mountain range
splits the Douglas station area of responsibility in half. The station
area of responsibility also includes the city of Douglas and rural
areas where houses and ranches are present;
Zones by distance from the border: Six border zones; 0 to 29 miles
from the border; Six interior zones; 3 to 37 miles from the border.
Station: Willcox;
Border miles and size: No border miles;
approximately 33,600 square miles;
Terrain: The Willcox station contains terrain that varies from valleys
to flat low-lying desert, to rugged and steep mountain ranges. The
Willcox station area of responsibility is bordered on either side by
mountain ranges;
Zones by distance from the border: No border zones; Four interior
zones; 37 to 392 miles from the border.
Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol operational assessments and data.
[A] In May 2012 Naco Station was renamed the "Brian A. Terry Border
Patrol Station" (Brian A. Terry Memorial Act, Pub. L. No 112-113, 126
Stat. 334 (2012)).
[End of table]
Figure 17: Example of Terrain in the Ajo Station Area of
Responsibility:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 18: Example of Terrain in the Casa Grande Station Area of
Responsibility, with the United States on the Right Side of the Border
Fence and Mexico on the Left:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 19: Example of Terrain in the Tucson Station Area of
Responsibility:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 20: Example of Terrain within the Nogales Station Area of
Responsibility, with the United States on the Left Side of the Border
Fence and Mexico on the Right:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 21: Example of Terrain in the Sonoita Station Area of
Responsibility near the U.S. Border with Mexico:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 22: Example of Terrain in the Naco Station Area of
Responsibility near the U.S. Border with Mexico:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 23: Example of Terrain in the Douglas Station Area of
Responsibility with the United States on the Left Side of the Border
Fence and Mexico on the Right:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comparison of Border Patrol's 2004 Strategy and 2012-2016
Strategic Plan:
2004 National Border Patrol Strategy:
Strategic goal 1: Establish and maintain operational control of
national borders;
Objectives:
* Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and
their weapons;
* Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement with focus on
priority areas identified by threat analysis;
* Detect, apprehend, deter smugglers;
* Leverage smart border technology as force multiplier;
* Reduce crime in border communities and improve quality of life and
economic vitality through personnel deployment and community outreach;
Strategic goal 2: Not applicable.
2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan:
Strategic goal 1: Secure America's borders;
Objectives:
* Prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States between the ports of entry (POE) through improved and focused
intelligence-driven operations, and operational integration, planning,
and execution with law enforcement partners;
* Manage risk through the introduction and expansion of sophisticated
tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as increased mobile response;
* Disrupt and degrade transnational criminal organizations by
targeting enforcement efforts against highest-priority threats and
expanding programs that reduce smuggling and smuggling-related crimes;
* Expand CBP's situational awareness at and between POEs and employ a
"whole of government" approach;
* Increase community engagement by participating in community programs
and engaging the public;
Strategic goal 2: Strengthen the Border Patrol;
Objectives:
* Strengthen investment in people and capabilities through improved
education, training, and support of personnel;
* Reinforce employee support initiatives and programs that continue
Border Patrol traditions;
* Address threats to organizational integrity and remain vigilant in
training and promoting anticorruption initiatives;
* Improve organizational processes, systems, and doctrine by
standardizing reporting and planning processes;
* Introduce improved tools to collect and analyze data to develop
outcome measures;
* Enhance efficiency by improving planning, resource allocation, and
acquisition processes.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Border Patrol documents.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Border Patrol Estimated Known Illegal Entries and
Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Years 2006
through 2011:
Border Patrol collects and analyzes various data on the number and
types of entrants who illegally cross the southwest border between the
land border ports of entry, including estimates on the total number of
identified--or "known"--illegal entries. Border Patrol's estimate of
known illegal entries includes the number of illegal entrants who were
apprehended as well as estimates of the number of entrants who
illegally crossed the border but were not apprehended (individuals who
either crossed back to Mexico--turn backs--or continued traveling to
the U.S. interior and who Border Patrol ceased pursuing--got aways).
These data are collectively referred to as known illegal entries
because Border Patrol officials have what they deem to be a reasonable
indication that the cross-border activity occurred.[Footnote 62]
Border Patrol uses the estimated known illegal entry data to inform
tactical decision making within each of the nine southwest border
sectors.
Border Patrol apprehensions and estimated known illegal entries
decreased significantly across all nine southwest border sectors from
fiscal years 2006 through 2011, as shown in figures 24 through 32.
Apprehensions decreased by 46 percent or more across all the southwest
border sectors. Over this same time period, the number of estimated
known illegal entries also decreased by 28 percent or more across all
southwest border sectors. Apprehensions as a percentage of estimated
known illegal entries increased for six sectors over this time period.
Figure 24: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the San Diego Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 140,459;
Estimated illegal entries: 267,347.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 151,501;
Estimated illegal entries: 264,693.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 161,931;
Estimated illegal entries: 252,011.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 118,415;
Estimated illegal entries: 171,143.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 68,263;
Estimated illegal entries: 95,255.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 42,389;
Estimated illegal entries: 55,934.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 25: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the El Centro Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 57,408;
Estimated illegal entries: 98,298.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 56,098;
Estimated illegal entries: 95,088.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 41,223;
Estimated illegal entries: 62,037.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 33,515;
Estimated illegal entries: 48,834.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 32,623;
Estimated illegal entries: 44,431.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 30,172;
Estimated illegal entries: 38,186.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 26: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Yuma Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 120,356;
Estimated illegal entries: 211,184.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 36,780;
Estimated illegal entries: 54,241.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 7,711;
Estimated illegal entries: 12,025.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 5,631;
Estimated illegal entries: 8,570.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 5,961;
Estimated illegal entries: 8,012.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 4,861;
Estimated illegal entries: 6,537.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 27: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 389,326;
Estimated illegal entries: 627,486.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 378,141;
Estimated illegal entries: 650,858.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 316,341;
Estimated illegal entries: 537,452.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 242,016;
Estimated illegal entries: 411,171.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 212,783;
Estimated illegal entries: 340,930.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 124,363;
Estimated illegal entries: 193,278.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 28: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the El Paso Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 122,029;
Estimated illegal entries: 359,061.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 75,022;
Estimated illegal entries: 194,636.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 29,916;
Estimated illegal entries: 89,819.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 14,662;
Estimated illegal entries: 49,074.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 12,002;
Estimated illegal entries: 36,290.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 9,994;
Estimated illegal entries: 27,823.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 29: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Big Bend Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 7,505;
Estimated illegal entries: 8,997.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 5,533;
Estimated illegal entries: 6,416.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 5,393;
Estimated illegal entries: 6,783.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 6,345;
Estimated illegal entries: 8,881.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 5,270;
Estimated illegal entries: 7,588.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 4,027;
Estimated illegal entries: 6,466.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 30: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Del Rio Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 42,598;
Estimated illegal entries: 73,415.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 22,903;
Estimated illegal entries: 41,234.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 20,714;
Estimated illegal entries: 34,145.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 17,046;
Estimated illegal entries: 24,507.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 14,941;
Estimated illegal entries: 21,605.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 16,661;
Estimated illegal entries: 23,837.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 31: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Laredo Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 74,759;
Estimated illegal entries: 119,426.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 56,673;
Estimated illegal entries: 112,036.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 43,619;
Estimated illegal entries: 81,017.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 40,412;
Estimated illegal entries: 82,987.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 34,030;
Estimated illegal entries: 63,354.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 35,201;
Estimated illegal entries: 58,883.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 32: Border Patrol Apprehensions and Estimated Known Illegal
Entries in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through
2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 110,032;
Estimated illegal entries: 226,435.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 73,340;
Estimated illegal entries: 173,126.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 75,470;
Estimated illegal entries: 168,693.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 61,092;
Estimated illegal entries: 136,823.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 60,591;
Estimated illegal entries: 134,226.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 59,450;
Estimated illegal entries: 122,627.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sectors and
Distance from the Border, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011:
Border Patrol's 2004 Strategy recognized that both apprehensions and
apprehending individuals closer to the border affect border security.
Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions across
the southwest border decreased by 69 percent from fiscal year 2006 to
fiscal year 2011. Across the southwest border, from fiscal year 2010
to 2011, apprehensions within 5 miles of the border increased
slightly, from 54 percent to 55 percent of total apprehensions.
Apprehensions that occurred more than 20 miles from the border
decreased slightly from fiscal year 2010 to 2011, from 28 percent to
26 percent across the southwest border. See figures 33 and 34 for
apprehensions by southwest Border Patrol sector and distances from the
border, for fiscal years 2010 and 2011.
Figure 33: Number and Percentage of Apprehensions across Southwest
Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 34,045 (51%);
More than 1-5 miles: 18,032 (27%);
More than 5-20 miles: 8,119 (12%);
More than 20 miles: 7,033 (10%).
Sector: El Centro;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 15,983 (51%);
More than 1-5 miles: 8,244 (26%);
More than 5-20 miles: 3,438 (11%);
More than 20 miles: 3,785 (12%).
Sector: Yuma;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 1,709 (25%);
More than 1-5 miles: 724 (12%);
More than 5-20 miles: 1,018 (15%);
More than 20 miles: 3,189 (48%).
Sector: Tuscon;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 43,188 (21%);
More than 1-5 miles: 56,955 (27%);
More than 5-20 miles: 49,405 (23%);
More than 20 miles: 60,091 (29%).
Sector: El Paso;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 5,019 (42%);
More than 1-5 miles: 1,718 (14%);
More than 5-20 miles: 1,314 (12%);
More than 20 miles: 3,851 (32%).
Sector: Big Bend;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 100 (2%);
More than 1-5 miles: 108 (2%);
More than 5-20 miles: 2,001 (38%);
More than 20 miles: 2,992 (58%).
Sector: Del Rio;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 1,908 (14%);
More than 1-5 miles: 1,614 (12%);
More than 5-20 miles: 3,977 (28%);
More than 20 miles: 6,501 (46%).
Sector: Laredo;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 10,324 (30%);
More than 1-5 miles: 4,570 (13%);
More than 5-20 miles: 3,245 (9%);
More than 20 miles: 16,637 (48%).
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 22,836 (38%);
More than 1-5 miles: 10,619 (18%);
More than 5-20 miles: 4,509 (8%);
More than 20 miles: 20,897 (36%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 34: Number and Percentage of Apprehensions across Southwest
Border Patrol Sectors by Distance from the Border, Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 22,253 (53%);
More than 1-5 miles: 9,605 (23%);
More than 5-20 miles: 5,020 (12%);
More than 20 miles: 5,089 (12%).
Sector: El Centro;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 15,633 (52%);
More than 1-5 miles: 8,470 (29%);
More than 5-20 miles: 3,350 (11%);
More than 20 miles: 2,535 (8%).
Sector: Yuma;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 1,222 (22%);
More than 1-5 miles: 528 (9%);
More than 5-20 miles: 873 (16%);
More than 20 miles: 2,972 (53%).
Sector: Tuscon;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 25,625 (22%);
More than 1-5 miles: 29,835 (27%);
More than 5-20 miles: 33,789 (28%);
More than 20 miles: 29,881 (25%).
Sector: El Paso;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 4,176 (42%);
More than 1-5 miles: 1,3332 (13%);
More than 5-20 miles: 1,409 (14%);
More than 20 miles: 3,158 (31%).
Sector: Big Bend;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 114 (3%);
More than 1-5 miles: 171 (4%);
More than 5-20 miles: 1,483 (37%);
More than 20 miles: 2,237 (56%).
Sector: Del Rio;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 1,796 (11%);
More than 1-5 miles: 2,186 (14%);
More than 5-20 miles: 5,539 (35%);
More than 20 miles: 6,504 (40%).
Sector: Laredo;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 11,521 (32%);
More than 1-5 miles: 4,659 (13%);
More than 5-20 miles: 5,295 (15%);
More than 20 miles: 14,410 (40%).
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Apprehensions:
0-1 mile: 27,639 (46%);
More than 1-5 miles: 11,811 (20%);
More than 5-20 miles: 4,013 (7%);
More than 20 miles: 15,874 (27%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Border Patrol Nonenforcement Activities by Southwest
Border Sector, Fiscal Year 2011:
Border Patrol schedules the deployment of agents to various
activities, which are categorized as either enforcement or
nonenforcement.[Footnote 63] In fiscal year 2011 the percentage of
agent workdays scheduled for nonenforcement activities varied by
southwest border sector, from 19 percent for the Big Bend sector to 34
percent for the Yuma sector. The percentage of nonenforcement agent
workdays scheduled to individual activities in fiscal year 2011 varied
across sectors, as shown in figure 35, with "administration"
accounting for a greater proportion of agent workdays than any other
nonenforcement activities across all southwest border sectors. Border
Patrol officials stated that examples of administrative activities
include remote-video surveillance, public and congressional affairs
duties, asset forfeiture duties, and employee support duties. Agent
workdays scheduled to administration ranged from about 39 percent of
all nonenforcement agent workdays in the Rio Grande Valley sector to
almost 65 percent in the Laredo sector. Within the Tucson sector-our
focus sector-training, intelligence support, and agent nonenforcement
duties (defined to include duties such as brush removal; facility,
fence, and vehicle maintenance; and video surveillance system
operations) each accounted for a greater proportion of agent workdays
than any other nonenforcement activity after administration. The
percentage of agent workdays scheduled to these activities in other
sectors varied, as shown in figure 35. "Other nonenforcement
activities" includes duties such as litigation, camera operations, and
public relations.
Figure 35: Percentage of Border Patrol Agent Nonenforcement Workdays
Scheduled for Nonenforcement Activities across Southwest Border
Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Sector: San Diego;
Administrative duties: 50%;
Agent nonenforcement duties: 16%;
Training: 5%;
Intelligence support: 18%;
Other nonenforcement activities: 12%.
Sector: El Centro;
Administrative duties: 47%;
Agent nonenforcement duties: 26%;
Training: 6%;
Intelligence support: 11%;
Other nonenforcement activities: 11%.
Sector: Yuma;
Administrative duties: 51%;
Agent nonenforcement duties: 8%;
Training: 6%;
Intelligence support: 14%;
Other nonenforcement activities: 22%.
Sector: Tuscon;
Administrative duties: 41%;
Agent nonenforcement duties: 21%;
Training: 10%;
Intelligence support: 8%;
Other nonenforcement activities: 20%.
Sector: El Paso;
Administrative duties: 51%;
Agent nonenforcement duties: 12%;
Training: 11%;
Intelligence support: 11%;
Other nonenforcement activities: 15%.
Sector: Big Bend;
Administrative duties: 50%;
Agent nonenforcement duties: 14%;
Training: 4%;
Intelligence support: 15%;
Other nonenforcement activities: 17%.
Sector: Del Rio;
Administrative duties: 58%;
Agent nonenforcement duties: 11%;
Training: 6%;
Intelligence support: 7%;
Other nonenforcement activities: 18%.
Sector: Laredo;
Administrative duties: 65%;
Agent nonenforcement duties: 3%;
Training: 3%;
Intelligence support: 6%;
Other nonenforcement activities: 24%.
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Administrative duties: 39%;
Agent nonenforcement duties: 12%;
Training: 8%;
Intelligence support: 17%;
Other nonenforcement activities: 25%.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Estimated Illegal Entries by Data Element
(Apprehensions, Estimated Turn Backs, and Estimated Got Aways) by
Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
Figures 36 through 44 show the number of apprehensions, turn backs,
and got aways as percentages of total estimated known illegal entries
for each southwest border sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.
Figure 36: Number of San Diego Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions,
Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 140,459 (53%);
Estimated turn backs: 74,672 (27%);
Estimated got aways: 52,216 (20%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 151,051 (57%);
Estimated turn backs: 53,596 (20%);
Estimated got aways: 59,596 (23%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 161,931 (64%);
Estimated turn backs: 44,665 (18%);
Estimated got aways: 45,415 (28%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 118,415 (69%);
Estimated turn backs: 30,088 (18%);
Estimated got aways: 22,640 (13%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 68,263 (72%);
Estimated turn backs: 17,203 (18%);
Estimated got aways: 9,789 (10%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 42,389 (76%);
Estimated turn backs: 8,992 (16%);
Estimated got aways: 4,553 (8%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 37: Number of El Centro Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions,
Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 57,408 (58%);
Estimated turn backs: 23,945 (24%);
Estimated got aways: 16,945 (18%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 56,098 (59%);
Estimated turn backs: 24,494 (26%);
Estimated got aways: 14,496 (15%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 41,223 (67%);
Estimated turn backs: 19,592 (17%);
Estimated got aways: 10,222 (16%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 33,515 (69%);
Estimated turn backs: 9,307 (19%);
Estimated got aways: 6,012 (12%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 32,623 (74%);
Estimated turn backs: 6,808 (15%);
Estimated got aways: 5,000 (11%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 30,172 (79%);
Estimated turn backs: 4,402 (12%);
Estimated got aways: 3,612 (9%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 38: Number of Yuma Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 120,356 (57%);
Estimated turn backs: 14,400 (7%);
Estimated got aways: 76,428 (36%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 36,780 (68%);
Estimated turn backs: 5,901 (11%);
Estimated got aways: 11,560 (21%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 7,711 (64%);
Estimated turn backs: 2,823 (23%);
Estimated got aways: 1,491 (13%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 5,631 (66%);
Estimated turn backs: 2,232 (26%);
Estimated got aways: 707 (8%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 5,961 (74%);
Estimated turn backs: 1,635 (20%);
Estimated got aways: 416 (6%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 4,861 (74%);
Estimated turn backs: 1,267 (19%);
Estimated got aways: 409 (7%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 39: Number of Tucson Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 389,326 (62%);
Estimated turn backs: 30,641 (5%);
Estimated got aways: 207,519 (34%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 378,141 (58%);
Estimated turn backs: 37,790 (6%);
Estimated got aways: 234,927 (36%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 316,341 (59%);
Estimated turn backs: 48,294 (9%);
Estimated got aways: 172,187 (32%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 242,016 (59%);
Estimated turn backs: 51,145 (12%);
Estimated got aways: 118,010 (29%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 212,783 (63%);
Estimated turn backs: 52,424 (15%);
Estimated got aways: 75,723 (22%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 124,363 (65%);
Estimated turn backs: 43,539 (13%);
Estimated got aways: 25,376 (23%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 40: Number of El Paso Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 122,029 (34%);
Estimated turn backs: 139,841 (39%);
Estimated got aways: 97,191 (27%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 75,022 (39%);
Estimated turn backs: 93,931 (48%);
Estimated got aways: 25,683 (13%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 29,916 (34%);
Estimated turn backs: 53,328 (59%);
Estimated got aways: 6,575 (7%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 14,662 (30%);
Estimated turn backs: 31,656 (64%);
Estimated got aways: 2,756 (6%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 12,002 (33%);
Estimated turn backs: 22,733 (63%);
Estimated got aways: 1,555 (4%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 9,994 (36%);
Estimated turn backs: 16,819 (60%);
Estimated got aways: 1,010 (4%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 41: Number of Big Bend Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 7,505 (83%);
Estimated turn backs: 239 (3%);
Estimated got aways: 1,253 (14%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 5,533 (86%);
Estimated turn backs: 86 (2%);
Estimated got aways: 797 (12%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 5,393 (79%);
Estimated turn backs: 124 (2%);
Estimated got aways: 1,266 (19%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 6,345 (71%);
Estimated turn backs: 178 (2%);
Estimated got aways: 2,358 (27%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 5,270 (69%);
Estimated turn backs: 270 (4%);
Estimated got aways: 2,048 (27%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 4,027 (62%);
Estimated turn backs: 368 (6%);
Estimated got aways: 2,071 (32%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 42: Number of Del Rio Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 42,598 (58%);
Estimated turn backs: 3,629 (5%);
Estimated got aways: 27,188 (37%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 22,903 (56%);
Estimated turn backs: 5,401 (13%);
Estimated got aways: 12,930 (31%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 20,714 (60%);
Estimated turn backs: 3,959 (12%);
Estimated got aways: 9,472 (28%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 17,046 (70%);
Estimated turn backs: 2,998 (12%);
Estimated got aways: 4,463 (18%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 14,941 (69%);
Estimated turn backs: 3,623 (17%);
Estimated got aways: 3,041 (14%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 16,661 (69%);
Estimated turn backs: 3,948 (17%);
Estimated got aways: 3,228 (14%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 43: Number of Laredo Sector Border Patrol Apprehensions, Turn
Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated Known Illegal
Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 74,759 (62%);
Estimated turn backs: 9,129 (8%);
Estimated got aways: 35,538 (30%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 56,673 (51%);
Estimated turn backs: 15,559 (14%);
Estimated got aways: 39,804 (35%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 43,619 (54%);
Estimated turn backs: 19,350 (24%);
Estimated got aways: 18,048 (22%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 40,412 (49%);
Estimated turn backs: 29,147 (35%);
Estimated got aways: 13,428 (16%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 34,030 (54%);
Estimated turn backs: 20,934 (33%);
Estimated got aways: 8,390 (13%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 35,201 (60%);
Estimated turn backs: 14,233 (24%);
Estimated got aways: 9,449 (16%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 44: Number of Rio Grande Valley Sector Border Patrol
Apprehensions, Turn Backs, and Got Aways as a Percentage of Estimated
Known Illegal Entries, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Apprehensions: 110,032 (49%);
Estimated turn backs: 15,494 (6%);
Estimated got aways: 100,909 (45%).
Fiscal year: 2007;
Apprehensions: 73,340 (42%);
Estimated turn backs: 17,728 (10%);
Estimated got aways: 82,058 (48%).
Fiscal year: 2008;
Apprehensions: 75,470 (45%);
Estimated turn backs: 21,041 (12%);
Estimated got aways: 72,182 (43%).
Fiscal year: 2009;
Apprehensions: 61,092 (45%);
Estimated turn backs: 21,811 (16%);
Estimated got aways: 53,920 (39%).
Fiscal year: 2010;
Apprehensions: 60,591 (45%);
Estimated turn backs: 24,370 (18%);
Estimated got aways: 49,265 (27%).
Fiscal year: 2011;
Apprehensions: 59,450 (45%);
Estimated turn backs: 27,418 (22%);
Estimated got aways: 35,79 (30%).
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Identification Sources for Turn Backs and Got Aways by
Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
Border Patrol sectors rely on a different mix of cameras, sign
cutting, credible source, and visual observation to identify and
report the number of turn backs and got aways used to determine the
number of estimated known illegal entries across locations. Figure 45
shows the breakdown by source of data that sectors used to estimate
got aways and turn backs in fiscal year 2011.
Figure 45: Source of Data Collection for Turn Back and Got Away Data
across Southwest Border Patrol Sectors, Fiscal Year 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Got aways:
Sector: San Diego;
Visual: 884;
Sign cut: 3,380;
Camera: 188;
Credible source: 101.
Sector: El Centro;
Visual: 160;
Sign cut: 2,923;
Camera: 180;
Credible source: 349.
Sector: Yuma;
Visual: 10;
Sign cut: 390;
Camera: 9;
Credible source: 0.
Sector: Tucson;
Visual: 3,052;
Sign cut: 20,636;
Camera: 1,574;
Credible source: 114.
Sector: El Paso;
Visual: 184;
Sign cut: 765;
Camera: 9;
Credible source: 52.
Sector: Big Bend;
Visual: 112;
Sign cut: 1,862;
Camera: 0;
Credible source: 97.
Sector: Del Rio;
Visual: 233;
Sign cut: 2,952;
Camera: 26;
Credible source: 17.
Sector: Laredo;
Visual: 2,093;
Sign cut: 6,798;
Camera: 384;
Credible source: 174.
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Visual: 3,929;
Sign cut: 31,274;
Camera: 269;
Credible source: 287.
Turn backs:
Sector: San Diego;
Visual: 5,803;
Sign cut: 1,440;
Camera: 1,670;
Credible source: 79.
Sector: El Centro;
Visual: 551;
Sign cut: 149;
Camera: 3,668;
Credible source: 34.
Sector: Yuma;
Visual: 91;
Sign cut: 1,055;
Camera: 121;
Credible source: 0.
Sector: Tucson;
Visual: 10,082;
Sign cut: 20,958;
Camera: 11,995;
Credible source: 504.
Sector: El Paso;
Visual: 15,100;
Sign cut: 1,319;
Camera: 384;
Credible source: 16.
Sector: Big Bend;
Visual: 105;
Sign cut: 261;
Camera: 0;
Credible source: 2.
Sector: Del Rio;
Visual: 1,287;
Sign cut: 1,848;
Camera: 798;
Credible source: 15.
Sector: Laredo;
Visual: 11,390;
Sign cut: 640;
Camera: 2,124;
Credible source: 79.
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Visual: 24,388;
Sign cut: 1,422;
Camera: 1,587;
Credible source: 21.
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix X: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
November 27,2012:
Rebecca Gambler:
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: Draft Report GAO-13-25, "Border Patrol: Key Elements of New
Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform to Inform Border Security
Status and Resource Needs"
Dear Ms. Gambler:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland. Security (DHS) appreciates
the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning
and conducting its review and issuing this report.
As the draft report acknowledges, securing our borders against the
evolving threat of terrorism and transnational crime is essential to
the protection of the Nation. The Department is pleased that the
report recognizes the importance of establishing secure national
borders and that DHS has dramatically increased resources and
activities at the southwest border over the past several years to
deter illegal crossings and secure the border. We also appreciate
GAO's positive recognition that U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) is in the
process of implementing key elements of the 2012-2016 Border Patrol
Strategic Plan and a process for assessing resource needs.
The draft report contains two recommendations with which the
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommends that Commissioner of
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CEP) ensure that the Chief of the
Office of Border Patrol establish milestones for developing:
Recommendation 1: A performance goal, or goals, for border security
between the POEs that defines how border security is to be measured.
Response: Concur. DHS fully appreciates the importance and need of
having measurable goals to assess progress in the area of border
security. USBP will develop goals and performance measures, as per its
2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan, that indicate the level of
security of the border between ports of entry (POEs). Estimated
Completion Date (ECD): November 30, 2013.
Recommendation 2: A performance measure, or measures — linked to a
performance goal or goals — for assessing progress made in securing
the border between POEs and informing resource identification and
allocation efforts.
Response: Concur. While the Chief, USBP, cannot unilaterally develop a
performance goal for border security and define how it is to be
measured, USBP can address the development of performance goals that
will likely become key components of an overarching goal for border
security. Subsequent to the release earlier this year of the 2012-2016
Border Patrol Strategic Plan, USBP has been working towards its full
implementation by first establishing tools and processes for managing
risk. As these tools and processes mature, USBP will use them to help
inform performance measures for assessing progress in USBP
contributions to securing borders between the POEs. USBP will align
these measures to its goals and objectives, as well as to overarching
CBP and DHS goals and objectives.
USBP has already begun the process of developing performance measures
that are linked to the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan and
demonstrate progress towards securing the border. In Fiscal Year (FY)
2012, USBP began using internal measures to monitor improvements
resulting from creation of the Consequence Delivery System (CDS), an
analytical process for systematically applying consequences to
apprehended illegal aliens. In FY 2012, USBP increased the percentage
of apprehensions that resulted in the use of more effective and
efficient consequences from 59 percent in FY 2011 to 78 percent in FY
2012. USBP also developed two outcome measures to track progress:
"Percentage of people apprehended multiple times," which fell from 20
percent in FY 2011 to 17 percent in FY 2012, and "Average number of
apprehensions for persons with multiple apprehensions," which fell
from 2.54 percent in FY 2011 to 2.40 percent by the end of FY 2012.
USBP plans to begin reporting these measures publicly in FY 2013 as
part of the Government Performance and Results Act performance measure
set. In FY 2012, CBP stood up the Integrated CDS Program Management
Office, consisting of personnel from USBP and the Office of Field
Operations. The office is organized to align with each Southwest
Border corridor and field office, as well as representatives in each
field location. This organizational structure allows for operational
differences within each geographic location and the facilitation of
CDS management. The collection and dissemination of integrated CDS-
related data and analysis will further enhance our ability to report
on and improve border security. Ultimately, rigorous analysis of CDS
Program outputs, coupled with application of other evolving USBP tools
and processes, will help inform resource identification and
allocation. ECD: November 30, 2013.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jim H. Crumpacker:
Director:
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Lacinda Ayers (Assistant
Director); Joshua S. Akery; Frances A. Cook; Barbara A. Guffy; Eric D.
Hauswirth; Stanley J. Kostyla; Brian J. Lipman; John W. Mingus, Jr.;
Jessica S. Orr; Susan A. Sachs; and Jerome T. Sandau made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] This figure represents the estimated percentage of net costs
applied to the southwest border for CBP's Border Security and Control
Between the Ports of Entry and Border Security Fencing,
Infrastructure, and Technology programs.
[2] Ports of entry are officially designated places that provide for
the arrival at, or departure from, the United States.
[3] CBP has divided geographic responsibility for border security
operations along the southwest border among nine sectors, each of
which has a headquarters with management personnel; these sectors are
further divided geographically into varying numbers of stations, with
agents assigned to patrol defined geographic areas. Border Patrol's
Yuma sector is also responsible for patrolling portions of Arizona and
California; however, the majority of enforcement statistics for
Arizona are reported by the Tucson sector, which reported apprehending
over 124,000 illegal entries and making over 4,800 seizures of drugs
in fiscal year 2011.
[4] Border Patrol operates under several statutes and regulations that
set forth the powers of immigration and customs officers. For example,
Border Patrol agents have the authority, without a warrant, to enter
private lands (but not dwellings) within 25 miles of the border to
prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States and to
search a railway car, aircraft, or vehicle for aliens within 100 miles
of the border. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2); for
additional authorities, including those not specifically limited by
distance from the border, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1357; 19 U.S.C. §§
482, 1581, 1589a, 1595(b); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1.
[5] Border Patrol sectors biannually develop operational assessments
that identify and justify requests for additional resources to
maintain or increase security in their areas of responsibility. These
assessments are part of Border Patrol's Operational Requirements Based
Budget Process, a standardized national planning process that links
sector-and station-level planning, operations, and budgets.
[6] For the purposes of this report, apprehensions data include only
individuals arrested and identified as deportable aliens, in keeping
with Border Patrol's definition. The data do not include individuals
arrested for illegally crossing the border but determined to be
nondeportable. Special interest countries are countries determined to
represent a potential terrorist threat to the United States. While
people from these countries may not have ties to terrorist activities,
Border Patrol agents detain aliens from special interest countries if
they are in the United States illegally and report these encounters to
the local sector intelligence agent and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force, among others, for further
questioning and screening. Apprehension and seizure data for fiscal
years 2006 through 2009 were queried (i.e., obtained from relevant
databases) as of April 2012, and data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011
were queried as of March 2012. Border Patrol officials stated that any
differences in our apprehension and seizure numbers and those of
Border Patrol are due to variances in when the data were reported--
i.e., Border Patrol reports apprehension and other data on an "end-of-
year" basis, and therefore agency data do not reflect adjustments or
corrections made after that reporting date.
[7] Fiscal year 2010 was the first full year Border Patrol mandated
that the latitude and longitude of each apprehension and seizure be
recorded.
[8] Border Patrol defines estimated illegal entries as the total
number of deportable aliens who were apprehended, in addition to the
number of entrants who illegally crossed the border but were not
apprehended either because they crossed back to Mexico--"turn backs"--
or continued traveling to the U.S. interior and Border Patrol was no
longer actively pursuing them--"got aways." We defined these illegal
entries as estimated "known" illegal entries to clarify that the
estimates do not include illegal entrants for which Border Patrol does
not have reasonable indications of cross-border illegal activity. Turn
back and got away data for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 were queried
as of April 2012.
[9] Border Patrol has a database to track the scheduling of agent
deployment in the field, which is to be updated to reflect the most
recent deployment changes. Scheduled deployment data for fiscal year
2011 were queried as of March 2012, and data for fiscal years 2006
through 2010 were queried as of April 2012.
[10] Border Patrol's formula for calculating overall effectiveness
adds the number of apprehensions and turns backs in a specific sector
and divides this total by the total number of estimated known illegal
entries.
[11] For example, see the Project Management Institute, The Standard
for Program Management © (Newtown Square, Penn., 2006).
[12] Indications of illegal crossings are obtained through various
sources such as direct agent observation, referrals from credible
sources (such as residents), camera monitoring, and detection of
physical evidence left on the environment from animal or human
crossings.
[13] Border Patrol reported that for nearly two-thirds of the
remaining 1,120 southwest border miles, resources were in place to
achieve a high probability to detect illegal activity, but the ability
to respond may be compromised by insufficient resources or
inaccessible terrain; while for the remaining border miles,
insufficient resources or infrastructure inhibited detection or
apprehension of illegal activity.
[14] Specifically, objectives to (1) deter illegal entries through
improved enforcement--defined as increasing the certainty of
apprehensions through the proper mix of assets and implementing
prosecution strategies that establish a deterrent effect in targeted
locations--and (2) leverage "smart border" technology to multiply the
effect of enforcement personnel. Border Patrol defines "smart border"
technology to include camera systems for day/night/infrared
operations, sensors, aerial platforms, and other systems.
[15] The number of Border Patrol agents in Tucson sector increased
from nearly 2,600 in fiscal year 2006 to about 4,200 in fiscal year
2011, augmented by 9,000 National Guard personnel deployed
periodically from June 2006 through July 2008 under Operation Jump
Start. Under SBI, CBP expended approximately $850 million on
technology in Arizona such as wide-area and mobile surveillance
systems, to augment Tucson sector operations. Other infrastructure as
of March 2012 included installation of 352 miles of pedestrian fencing
and 299 miles of vehicle fencing along the southwest border, for a
combined total of 651 miles of fencing.
[16] Federal entities participating in Streamline are CBP, the U.S.
Attorneys' Office, the U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and the Department of Justice Executive Office of
Immigration Review.
[17] In February 2011 we testified that "number of apprehensions" is
an output measure and as such is a useful indicator of activity levels
but does not necessarily reflect an improvement in enforcement
effectiveness. See GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on
Border Control Measures for the Southwest Border, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,
2011).
[18] We used a rolling 3-fiscal year time period to determine the
percentage of apprehensions of deportable aliens in a given year who
had previously been apprehended for illegally crossing the border in
any of the previous 3 years, at any southwest border location. We used
four rolling 3-fiscal year time periods because our analysis covered a
5-year period and required comparable time periods to assess
recidivism in each fiscal year. Using a single time period would
result in a bias given that some apprehensions in earlier years would
be incorrectly classified as nonrecidivist.
[19] Changes in the recidivism rate could be due to factors other than
the deterrent effect of Border Patrol's enforcement activities, such
as changes in the U.S. economy.
[20] Border Patrol's 2012-2016 Strategic Plan emphasizes the
importance of the application of appropriate consequences to illegal
entrants. As previously discussed, Border Patrol has developed a new
Consequence Delivery System that guides management and agents in
evaluating each individual apprehended and identifying the ideal
consequence to break the smuggling cycle. Consequences delivered under
the system include administrative, criminal prosecution, and
programmatic elements that are designed to stem the flow of illegal
activity.
[21] According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, increasing and
sustaining certainty of arrest is critical to the success of Border
Patrol's 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, as it places emphasis on applying
capabilities against the greatest risk. By managing risk, the agency
can better respond to transnational criminal organizations and their
efforts. A key objective is to increase and sustain certainty of
arrest of illegal border crossers regardless of their intent or cargo.
[22] Drugs accounted for the vast majority of all contraband seizures.
Although drug seizures increased 81 percent from fiscal years 2006
through 2011, the percentage of all contraband seizures that were drug
seizures compared with the percentage of all contraband seizures
remained nearly constant, averaging about 93 percent over this time
period.
[23] Most--85 percent--of Tucson sector ASIC apprehensions occurred
more than 20 miles from the border.
[24] Although the Border Patrol deployment database uses the term
"manday" when referring to the scheduled deployment of agents, for the
purposes of this report we use the term "agent workday." Both refer to
the measure of staff hours equal to those of an agent who works a
shift of 8 hours per day. Border Patrol has a database to track the
scheduling of agent deployment in the field, which is to be updated to
reflect the most recent deployment changes. Deployment figures
referred to in this report therefore may be for scheduled, not actual,
agent deployment.
[25] According to Border Patrol officials, enforcement includes
efforts of Border Patrol agents to deter cross-border illegal
activity, apprehend aliens who illegally cross the border, and seize
drugs and other contraband.
[26] For the Tucson sector specifically, our analysis of Border Patrol
data showed that there had been a slight increase in the percentage of
agent workdays scheduled for border zones compared to interior zones
in the last 5 fiscal years. Specifically, our analysis showed that 43
percent of Tucson sector agent workdays were scheduled for deployment
in border zones in fiscal year 2011 compared with 39 percent in fiscal
year 2006.
[27] The percentage of total agent workdays scheduled for deployment
across enforcement activities compared to nonenforcement activities in
fiscal year 2011 ranged from a low of 66 percent in the Yuma sector to
a high of 81 percent in the Big Bend sector. The Tucson sector
scheduled 73 percent of agent workdays across enforcement activities
in fiscal year 2011.
[28] Data on the extent to which these activities occurred at the
immediate border were not available.
[29] Border Patrol officials stated that only entrants who can be
traced back to a cross-border entry point in a border zone are to be
reported as got aways. These officials also noted that while the
agency strives to minimize variance in the collection of these data by
using standard terminology and consistent collection and reporting
methods, in many cases the determination of a turn back or got away
depends on agent judgment. Patrol agents-in-charge are responsible for
ensuring that Border Patrol agents are aware of the integrity of data
collection at their respective stations and field commanders must
ensure the accurate counting of got away data for reconciling possible
inconsistencies in data between operational boundaries.
[30] Officials said that sometimes illegal entrants can be "drop offs"
or "decoys" to lure agents away from a specific area so others can
cross, such as smugglers returning to Mexico to pick up another load,
or an individual crossing the border to steal an item and take it back
to Mexico.
[31] "Camera" indicates that one of the remote cameras caught sight of
an individual; "sign cut" indicates that an agent encountered foot
prints that led him/her to believe that an unauthorized crossing took
place; "credible source" indicates a report by a non-Border Patrol
witness, who could be a local law enforcement agent, a citizen, or a
ground sensor; "visual" indicates an agent actually witnessed an
unauthorized crossing.
[32] See GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border
Control Measures for the Southwest Border, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-374T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,
2011).
[33] See GAO, Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in
Implementation and Assessment Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-688T] (Washington, D.C.: May 8,
2012).
[34] For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the
Effect of the Arizona Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct.
18, 2005).
[35] Border Patrol officials stated that DHS and Border Patrol have
established a performance goal--linked to relevant measures--
addressing border security that, as of October 2012, was being used as
an internal management indicator. However, a DHS official said it has
not been decided whether this goal and the associated measures will be
publicly reported or used as an overall performance goal and measures
for border security.
[36] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program
Management© (Newtown Square, Penn., 2006).
[37] Other key elements of the new strategic plan that might inform
resource decision making are "Change Detection Capability" (a tactical
strategy to evaluate low-threat areas for changes in threat levels and
increase situational awareness), "Leverage Technology" (the process
whereby Border Patrol manages requirements for existing and emerging
technology based on mission and capability gaps), and "Targeted
Enforcement" (the use of intelligence and analysis to focus deployment
of capabilities to prevent and disrupt terrorist and transnational
threats). According to Border Patrol officials, these elements are to
be developed through the application of multiple processes, such as
the agency's new risk model and its overall process for assessing
resource needs.
[38] According to Border Patrol officials, the IMAT is to be developed
by surveying stations to assess capabilities and assets. Once it is
implemented, the field surveys are to be updated once every quarter,
or as needed, with threat intelligence and other data to assess risk
levels. CBP components and law enforcement partners are to be
identified in "partnership" assessments, and their resources and
capabilities are to be considered but not specifically assessed.
[39] For example, if risk is greater than sector capability, Border
Patrol could choose to deploy urgent solutions or develop new
capabilities based on the nature of the risk.
[40] According to Border Patrol officials, the IMAT can aggregate
risks and capabilities at the station, sector, and agency levels, but
zones, stations, and sectors must be adjacent to one another to allow
comparison.
[41] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-688T].
[42] Our review of Border Patrol operational assessments showed that
Border Patrol reported difficulty maintaining border control in areas
from which resources had been redeployed. Border Patrol stations
within six of the nine southwest border sectors reported that agent
deployment to other stations have affected their own deployment and
enforcement activities. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-688T].
[43] Border Patrol officials stated that he 2012-2016 Strategic Plan
is predicated on Border Patrol and federal, state, local, tribal, and
international partners working together to use a risk-based approach
to secure the border, and therefore an assessment of capability is to
include the leveraging of all partner resources, including CBP
component resources.
[44] GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of
Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 17, 2010).
[45] According to Border Patrol officials, CBP components and law
enforcement partners are identified in "partnership assessments";
partner resources and capabilities are taken into account, but not
specifically assessed.
[46] According to Border Patrol officials, in fiscal year 2011, some
sectors received additional resources that were allocated in prior
years as part of Border Patrol's plans to attain operational control
at the southwest border. Of these, Tucson sector was the largest
recipient, receiving an additional 500 agent positions and additional
technology and border infrastructure. Border Patrol officials said
that beginning in fiscal year 2010, Tucson sector was designated as a
high-priority area, with an emphasis on reducing the high levels of
estimated known illegal entries, apprehensions, and seizures.
[47] For example, one southwest border station reported a need for
fixed and movable technology to secure the remote and rugged terrain,
reporting that without this technology, rapid response was often
impossible.
[48] According to Border Patrol officials, under the operational
control performance goal and measure, sector operational assessments
were used to identify resources needed in the following fiscal year to
attain operational control at the border.
[49] According to Border Patrol officials, Border Patrol sectors
biannually develop operational assessments that identify and justify
requests for additional resources to maintain or increase security in
their areas of responsibility. These assessments are part of Border
Patrol's Operational Requirements Based Budget Process, a standardized
national planning process that links sector-and station-level
planning, operations, and budgets. These assessments are developed by
Border Patrol sectors; CBP has divided geographic responsibility for
the southwest border--between land ports of entry (POE)--among nine
Border Patrol sectors. Each sector has a headquarters staffed with
management personnel and each includes a varying number of stations,
with agents responsible for patrolling within defined geographic areas.
[50] From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, DHS used operational control
as its performance goal and outcome measure for assessing security of
the border between the ports of entry. The extent of operational
control--also referred to as effective control--was defined as the
number of border miles where Border Patrol had the capability to
detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. We
analyzed the operational control status for each of the southwest
border sectors as of the end of fiscal year 2010, the last year for
which DHS used operational control as a measure of border security.
[51] Although Border Patrol arrests both deportable aliens and
nondeportable individuals whom they encounter during patrol
activities, for the purposes of this report we define "apprehensions"
to include only deportable aliens, in keeping with Border Patrol's
definition. According to the Immigration and Nationalization Act,
deportable aliens include those who are inadmissible to the United
States or present in violation of U.S. law, who have failed to
maintain their status or violated the terms of their admission, or who
have committed certain criminal offenses or engaged in terrorist
activities, among others. (See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 for a complete list of
the classes of deportable aliens.) In some cases, Border Patrol
apprehends a deportable alien but turns the individual over to another
agency prior to initiating a removal. Aliens with lawful immigration
status and U.S. citizens would be considered nondeportable.
[52] The EID is a DHS-shared common database repository for several
DHS law enforcement and homeland security applications. Data on
apprehensions and seizures are held in the EID; data on scheduled
deployment of agents are held in BPETS.
[53] Fiscal years 2010 and 2011 apprehension and seizure data were
queried as of March 2012; data for fiscal years 2006 through 2009 data
were queried as of April 2012. Border Patrol officials stated that any
differences in our apprehension and seizure numbers and those of
Border Patrol are due to variances in when the data were "queried," or
reported--i.e., Border Patrol reports apprehension and other data on
an "end-of-year" basis, and therefore agency data do not reflect
adjustments or corrections made after that reporting date.
[54] Our measurement of recidivism, using a rolling 3-fiscal year time
period, is the percentage of apprehensions of deportable individuals
in a given year who had previously been apprehended for illegally
crossing the border in any of the previous 3 years, at any southwest
border location. In contrast, Border Patrol calculates recidivism by
dividing the total number of recidivists (individuals who have two or
more apprehensions during a specified time period) by the total number
of unique subjects (individuals who may account for one or multiple
apprehensions, but are counted only once within a specified time
period and location). We used four rolling 3-fiscal year time periods
rather than Border Patrol's methodology because our analysis covered a
5-year period and required comparable time periods to assess
recidivism in each fiscal year. Using a single time period would
result in a bias given that some apprehensions in earlier years would
be incorrectly classified as nonrecidivist.
[55] Border Patrol began mandating the collection of longitude and
latitude coordinates for all apprehensions and seizures in May 2009,
therefore fiscal year 2010 was the first full year for which these
data were available. We used these data to determine how far away from
the border apprehensions and seizures occurred within each southwest
border sector in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. To perform these
analyses, we compared Border Patrol data on the longitude and latitude
of apprehensions and seizures with agency mapping data, which allowed
us to determine distance from the border. Although we determined that
the latitude and longitude coordinates for some apprehensions and
seizures were invalid--e.g., they were identified as occurring outside
U.S. national boundaries--the numbers were not significant and we
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of this report. Location data that were determined to be invalid were
not included in our analysis.
[56] Border Patrol's estimate includes the number of deportable aliens
who were apprehended as well as the number of individuals who
illegally crossed the border but were not apprehended (individuals who
either crossed back to Mexico--"turn backs"--or continued traveling to
the U.S. interior and Border Patrol was no longer actively pursuing
them-- "got aways"). Border Patrol refers to these data as "estimated
illegal entries"--it does not identify the data as "known" entries
because the agency does not estimate illegal entries for which it does
not have reasonable support ("unknown" entries). However, to clarify
that these estimates are based on what Border Patrol deems to be
reasonable indications of cross-border illegal activity, we refer to
them as "estimated known illegal entries."
[57] Apprehensions, turn back, and got away data for fiscal years 2006-
2010 were queried on April 9, 2012. These data for fiscal year 2011
were queried on April 20, 2012.
[58] Border Patrol stations are geographically divided into border and
interior zones.
[59] Border Patrol has a database to track the scheduling of agent
deployment in the field, which is to be updated to reflect the most
recent deployment changes. Scheduled deployment data for fiscal year
2011 were queried as of March 2012, and data for fiscal years 2006
through 2010 were queried as of April 2012.
[60] Border Patrol's formula for calculating overall effectiveness
adds the number of apprehensions and turns backs in a specific sector
and divides this total by the total number of estimated known illegal
entries, determined by adding total apprehensions, turns backs, and
got aways for the sector.
[61] For example, The Project Management Institute, The Standard for
Program Management© (Newtown Square, Penn., 2006).
[62] Indications of illegal crossings are obtained through various
sources such as direct agent observation, referrals from credible
sources (such as residents), camera monitoring, and detection of
physical evidence left on the environment from animal or human
crossings. Border Patrol's estimate of known illegal entries does not
include estimates of illegal entries for which Border Patrol does not
have reasonable support (collectively referred to as "unknown"), such
as the number of illegal entries conducted through illicit cross-
border tunnels. In such instances, no reasonable indication of an
illegal crossing is identified.
[63] Border Patrol has a database to track the scheduling of agent
deployment in the field, which is to be updated to reflect the most
recent deployment changes. Deployment figures referred to in this
report therefore may be for scheduled, not actual, agent deployment.
Agents are assigned to activities in 8-hour shifts, referred to as
agent workdays in this report. According to Border Patrol officials,
agent activities are categorized as enforcement-or nonenforcement-
related based on the subject matter expertise of headquarters
officials.
[End of section]
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