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entitled 'The Federal Government's Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: Fall 2012 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

The Federal Government's Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: 

Fall 2012 Update: 

GAO-13-148SP: 

GAO's Long-Term Fiscal Simulations: 

Since 1992, GAO has published long-term fiscal simulations showing 
federal deficits and debt under different sets of policy assumptions. 
GAO developed its long-term model in response to a bipartisan request 
from members of Congress concerned about the long-term effects of 
fiscal policy. GAO's simulations provide context for consideration of 
policy options. They are not intended to suggest particular policy 
choices or to predict the economic impact of any set of choices but to 
help facilitate a dialogue on this important issue. 

GAO regularly updates its simulations as new data become available. 
This update incorporates the most recent projections released by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Social Security and Medicare 
Trustees (Trustees), and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
Office of the Actuary (CMS Actuary). As in the past, GAO shows two 
simulations: 

The Baseline Extended simulation follows CBO's August 2012 baseline, 
which generally reflects current law for the first 10 years. The 
baseline includes the effects from the discretionary spending limits 
and automatic enforcement procedures put in place by the BCA. After 
the first 10 years, this fiscal constraint is maintained; revenue and 
spending other than interest on the debt and large entitlement 
programs (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) are held constant 
as a share of GDP. Over the long term, revenue as a share of GDP is 
higher and discretionary spending lower than historical averages. 

In the Alternative simulation, expiring tax provisions are extended to 
2022, and the alternative minimum tax (AMT) exemption amount is 
indexed to inflation through 2022; revenues are then brought back to 
the historical average as a share of GDP. For the first 10 years, 
discretionary spending reflects the original caps set by the BCA but 
not the lower caps triggered by the automatic enforcement procedures. 
Over the long term, discretionary spending and revenue are held at 
historical averages. 

The Baseline Extended simulation follows the Trustees' 2012 
intermediate projections for Social Security and Medicare and CBO's 
June 2012 long-term projections for Medicaid adjusted to reflect 
excess cost growth consistent with the Trustees' Medicare projections. 
In the Alternative simulation, Medicare spending is based on the CMS 
Actuary's alternative projections that assume reductions in Medicare 
physician rates do not occur as scheduled under current law and that 
certain cost-containment mechanisms intended to slow the growth of 
health care cost are not sustained over the long term. GAO also shows 
the outlook using CBO's long-term projections for Social Security and 
the major health entitlements; the results are consistent with GAO's 
simulations based largely on the Trustees' projections. 

Additional information on the fiscal outlook and federal debt is 
available at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/longterm/]. 

For more information, contact Susan J. Irving at (202) 512-6806 or 
irvings@gao.gov or Thomas J. McCool, at (202) 512-2642 or 
mccoolt@gao.gov. 

GAO's simulations continue to illustrate that the federal government 
is on an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. In both the Baseline 
Extended and Alternative simulations, debt held by the public grows as 
a share of gross domestic product (GDP) over the long term as shown in 
figure 1. While the timing and pace of growth varies depending on the 
assumptions used, neither set of assumptions achieves a sustainable 
path. In the Baseline Extended simulation, which assumes current law, 
including the discretionary spending limits and other spending 
reductions contained in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 and 
expiration of certain tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003, debt as a 
share of GDP declines in the short term before turning up again. In 
the Alternative simulation, in which these laws are assumed to not 
take full effect, federal debt as a share of GDP grows throughout the 
period. Discretionary spending limits alone do not address the 
fundamental imbalance between estimated revenue and spending, which is 
driven largely by the aging of the population and rising health care 
costs. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) slows 
the growth of health care spending and federal debt under the Baseline 
Extended simulation, in which cost-containment mechanisms are assumed 
to be fully implemented and effective. However, some have questioned 
whether these mechanisms can be sustained over the long term; this is 
reflected in GAO's Alternative simulation. 

Figure 1: Debt Held by the Public under Two Fiscal Policy Simulations: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Percentage of GDP: 

Historical high: 109% in 1946. 

Fiscal year: 2000; 
Baseline extended: 34.72%; 
Alternative: 34.72%. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Baseline extended: 32.46%; 
Alternative: 32.46%. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Baseline extended: 33.58%; 
Alternative: 33.58%. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Baseline extended: 35.64%; 
Alternative: 35.64%. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Baseline extended: 36.76%; 
Alternative: 36.76%. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Baseline extended: 36.9%; 
Alternative: 36.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Baseline extended: 36.51%; 
Alternative: 36.51%. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Baseline extended: 36.25%; 
Alternative: 36.25%. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Baseline extended: 40.32%; 
Alternative: 40.32%. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Baseline extended: 53.52%; 
Alternative: 53.52%. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Baseline extended: 62.8%; 
Alternative: 62.8%. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Baseline extended: 67.72%; 
Alternative: 67.72%. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Baseline extended: 72.8%; 
Alternative: 72.8%. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Baseline extended: 76.1%; 
Alternative: 78.6%. 

Fiscal year: 2014; 
Baseline extended: 76.6%; 
Alternative: 82.4%. 

Fiscal year: 2015; 
Baseline extended: 73.8%; 
Alternative: 82.8%. 

Fiscal year: 2016; 
Baseline extended: 70.8%; 
Alternative: 82.8%. 

Fiscal year: 2017; 
Baseline extended: 67.9%; 
Alternative: 82.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2018; 
Baseline extended: 65.2%; 
Alternative: 83.2%. 

Fiscal year: 2019; 
Baseline extended: 63.2%; 
Alternative: 84.4%. 

Fiscal year: 2020; 
Baseline extended: 61.4%; 
Alternative: 85.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2021; 
Baseline extended: 59.8%; 
Alternative: 87.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2022; 
Baseline extended: 58.5%; 
Alternative: 89.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2023; 
Baseline extended: 57.8%; 
Alternative: 93.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2024; 
Baseline extended: 57.5%; 
Alternative: 97.4%. 

Fiscal year: 2025; 
Baseline extended: 57.8%; 
Alternative: 102.6%. 

Fiscal year: 2026; 
Baseline extended: 58.2%; 
Alternative: 108.4%. 

Fiscal year: 2027; 
Baseline extended: 59%; 
Alternative: 114.5%. 

Fiscal year: 2028; 
Baseline extended: 60%; 
Alternative: 121.2%. 

Fiscal year: 2029; 
Baseline extended: 61.2%; 
Alternative: 128.5%. 

Fiscal year: 2030; 
Baseline extended: 62.6%; 
Alternative: 136.2%. 

Fiscal year: 2031; 
Baseline extended: 64.2%; 
Alternative: 144.4%. 

Fiscal year: 2032; 
Baseline extended: 66%; 
Alternative: 152.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2033; 
Baseline extended: 67.8%; 
Alternative: 161.6%. 

Fiscal year: 2034; 
Baseline extended: 69.8%; 
Alternative: 170.5%. 

Fiscal year: 2035; 
Baseline extended: 71.9%; 
Alternative: 179.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2036; 
Baseline extended: 74.2%; 
Alternative: 189.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2037; 
Baseline extended: 76.6%; 
Alternative: 198.8%. 

Fiscal year: 2038; 
Baseline extended: 79.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2039; 
Baseline extended: 81.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2040; 
Baseline extended: 84.4%. 

Fiscal year: 2041; 
Baseline extended: 87.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2042; 
Baseline extended: 89.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2043; 
Baseline extended: 92.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2044; 
Baseline extended: 95.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2045; 
Baseline extended: 98.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2046; 
Baseline extended: 101.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2047; 
Baseline extended: 105.3%. 

Fiscal year: 2048; 
Baseline extended: 108.6%. 

Fiscal year: 2049; 
Baseline extended: 112.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2050; 
Baseline extended: 115.6%. 

Fiscal year: 2051; 
Baseline extended: 119.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2052; 
Baseline extended: 122.8%. 

Fiscal year: 2053; 
Baseline extended: 126.5%. 

Fiscal year: 2054; 
Baseline extended: 130.2%. 

Fiscal year: 2055; 
Baseline extended: 134%. 

Fiscal year: 2056; 
Baseline extended: 138%. 

Fiscal year: 2057; 
Baseline extended: 142.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2058; 
Baseline extended: 146.2%. 

Fiscal year: 2059; 
Baseline extended: 150.4%. 

Fiscal year: 2060; 
Baseline extended: 154.7%. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Data are from GAO's Fall 2012 simulations based on the Trustees' 
assumptions for Social Security and the Trustees' and the CMS 
Actuary's assumptions for Medicare. 

[End of figure] 

Significant actions to change the long-term fiscal path must be taken 
and the design of these actions should take into account concerns 
about the near-term impact on economic growth. In the near term, for 
example, the Baseline Extended simulation reflects a number of fiscal 
policy changes contained in current law that are projected to sharply 
reduce spending and raise revenue from their current levels beginning 
in 2013. CBO, the Federal Reserve Board Chairman, and others project 
that such drastic fiscal tightening--commonly referred to as the 
"fiscal cliff"--could disrupt economic growth. In the Alternative 
simulation, historical trends and past policy preferences are assumed 
to continue; revenue is lower and spending is higher than in the 
Baseline Extended simulation. While CBO projects that continuation of 
such polices would prevent disruptions to the economy in the very near 
term, it would lead to higher debt over the long term. 

In both GAO simulations spending for the major health and retirement 
programs will increase in coming decades, putting greater pressure on 
the rest of the federal budget. For the first few decades this 
spending is driven largely by the aging of the population. The oldest 
members of the baby-boom generation are already eligible for Social 
Security retirement benefits and for Medicare, and, as shown in figure 
2, the number of baby boomers turning 65 is projected to grow in 
coming years from an average of about 7,600 per day in 2011 to more 
than 11,000 per day in 2029. 

Figure 2: Daily Average Number of People Turning 65 Each Year: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Baby boomers turning 65: 

Year: 2000: 5,500. 

Year: 2001: 5,500. 

Year: 2002: 5,500. 

Year: 2003: 5,800. 

Year: 2004: 5,800. 

Year: 2005: 6,000. 

Year: 2006: 6,200. 

Year: 2007: 6,700. 

Year: 2008: 7,200. 

Year: 2009: 7,200. 

Year: 2010: 7,200. 

Year: 2011: 7,600. 

Year: 2012: 9,100. 

Year: 2013: 9,200. 

Year: 2014: 9,100. 

Year: 2015: 9,400. 

Year: 2016: 9,400. 

Year: 2017: 9,700. 

Year: 2018: 10,000. 

Year: 2019: 10,200. 

Year: 2020: 10,700. 

Year: 2021: 10,700. 

Year: 2022: 11,000. 

Year: 2023: 11,200. 

Year: 2024: 11,200. 

Year: 2025: 11,600. 

Year: 2026: 11,400. 

Year: 2027: 11,400. 

Year: 2028: 11,300. 

Year: 2029: 11,400. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data. 

Note: Data are from the U.S. Census Bureau's National Population 
Projections. For this analysis, we used data from the low net 
international migration series. 

[End of figure] 

Health care spending has been growing faster than the overall economy 
and is expected to continue growing as more members of the baby-boom 
generation become eligible for federal health programs and the cost of 
caring for each enrollee increases. If PPACA is implemented as 
currently written and is effective, it would have a major effect on 
slowing the rate of growth in federal health care spending as shown in 
our Baseline Extended simulation. In this simulation, spending on 
Medicare and Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 
and exchange subsidies grows from 5 percent of GDP in 2010 to over 7 
percent by 2030. If, however, the cost containment measures are not 
sustained over the long term--a concern expressed by the Trustees, the 
CMS Actuary, the CBO, and others--spending on federal health care 
programs grows much more rapidly. Spending on Medicare and Medicaid, 
CHIP, and exchange subsidies under the Alternative simulation grows to 
over 8 percent of GDP by 2030. 

Figures 3 and 4 below show revenue and the composition of spending in 
the Baseline Extended and Alternative scenarios moving forward. In the 
Baseline Extended simulation, not only is health care spending growth 
slower, but revenue as a share of the economy is higher and 
discretionary spending lower than at any point in the last 50 years. 
Even in this simulation, revenue covers little more than spending on 
Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, exchange subsidies, and 
interest in 2040 (see figure 3).There is little room for "all other 
spending," which includes not only national defense, homeland 
security, veteran's health care, and investment in highways and mass 
transit, but also smaller entitlement programs such as farm price 
supports and student loans. 

Figure 3: Potential Fiscal Outcomes: Revenues and Composition of 
Spending in the Baseline Extended Simulation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar and line graph] 

Percentage of GDP: 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Net interest: 1.4%; 
Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies: 4.9%; 
Social Security: 5.1%; 
All other spending: 12.8%; 
Revenue: 14.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2020; 
Net interest: 2.3%; 
Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies: 5.3%; 
Social Security: 6.1%; 
All other spending: 8.1%; 
Revenue: 20.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2030; 
Net interest: 3.1%; 
Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies: 6.2%; 
Social Security: 7.7%; 
All other spending: 8%; 
Revenue: 21%. 

Fiscal year: 2040; 
Net interest: 4.1%; 
Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies: 6.3%; 
Social Security: 8.8%; 
All other spending: 8%; 
Revenue: 21%. 

Source: GAO. 

Notes: Data are from GAO's Fall 2012 simulations based on the 
Trustees' assumptions for Social Security and Medicare. 

[End of figure] 

As figure 4 shows, if the federal government continues on the current 
path, as assumed in the Alternative simulation, and borrows from the 
public to finance the growing imbalance between revenue and spending, 
by 2040 more than half of all federal revenue will go to net interest 
payments. Overall, our simulations illustrate the difficult trade-offs 
that policymakers will have to consider in order to put the federal 
government on a more sustainable path. 

Figure 4: Potential Fiscal Outcomes: Revenues and Composition of 
Spending in the Alternative Simulation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar and line graph] 

Percentage of GDP: 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Net interest: 1.4%; 
Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies: 4.9%; 
Social Security: 5.1%; 
All other spending: 12.8%; 
Revenue: 14.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2020; 
Net interest: 3%; 
Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies: 5.3%; 
Social Security: 6.3%; 
All other spending: 8.7%; 
Revenue: 18.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2030; 
Net interest: 6.4%; 
Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies: 6.2%; 
Social Security: 8.2%; 
All other spending: 9.6%; 
Revenue: 17.9%. 

Fiscal year: 2040; 
Net interest: 10.9%; 
Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies: 6.3%; 
Social Security: 9.7%; 
All other spending: 9.9%; 
Revenue: 17.9%. 

Source: GAO. 

Notes: Data are from GAO's Fall 2012 simulations based on the 
Trustees' assumptions for Social Security and the CMS Actuary's 
assumptions for Medicare. 

[End of figure] 

Balancing Near-Term and Long-Term Considerations: 

One measure of the challenge over the long term is the "fiscal gap." 
The fiscal gap represents the difference, or gap, between revenue and 
noninterest spending over a certain period, such as 75 years, that 
would need to be closed in order to achieve a specified debt level at 
the end of the period. From the fiscal gap, one can calculate the size 
of action needed--in terms of tax increases, spending reductions, or, 
more likely, some combination of the two--to close the gap. 

For example, to keep debt held by the public as a share of GDP in 2086 
from exceeding its level at the beginning of 2012 (roughly 68 percent 
of GDP) in our Alternative simulation, the fiscal gap is 8.3 percent 
of GDP (see table 1). This means that revenue would have to increase 
by 46 percent or noninterest spending would have to be reduced by 
about 32 percent (or some combination of the two) on average over the 
75-year period. Even more significant changes would be needed to 
reduce debt to lower levels. 

Table 1: Federal Fiscal Gap under Our Simulations: 

Scenario: Baseline Extended; 
Fiscal gap 2012-2086 (percentage of GDP): 2.1%; 
Average percentage change required to close gap: 
If action is taken today: 
Solely through increases in revenue: 10.0%; 
Solely through decreases in noninterest spending: 9.4%; 
If action is delayed until 2022: 
Solely through increases in revenue: 11.8%; 
Solely through decreases in noninterest spending: 0.9%. 

Scenario: Alternative; 
Fiscal gap 2012-2086 (percentage of GDP): 8.3%; 
Average percentage change required to close gap: 
If action is taken today: 
Solely through increases in revenue: 46.0%; 
Solely through decreases in noninterest spending: 32.3%; 
If action is delayed until 2022: 
Solely through increases in revenue: 54.7%; 
Solely through decreases in noninterest spending: 37.2%. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Data are from GAO's Fall 2012 simulations based on the Trustees' 
assumptions for Social Security and the Trustees' and CMS Actuary's 
assumptions for Medicare. 

[End of table] 

When considering action to address the longer-term fiscal challenge, 
it is important to recognize the current state of the economy. With 
this in mind, policy changes could be designed to phase in over time 
allowing for the economy to fully recover and for people to adjust to 
the changes. However, the longer action is delayed the greater the 
risk that the eventual changes will be disruptive and destabilizing. 
Table 1 illustrates how much greater fiscal policy changes would have 
to be if no actions were taken for the next decade. Under our 
Alternative simulation, waiting 10 years would increase the fiscal gap 
to nearly 10 percent of GDP--meaning a revenue increase of more than 
54 percent or a noninterest spending cut of about 37 percent or some 
combination of the two would be required to bring debt held by the 
public back to its level in 2012 by 2086. 

Concluding Observations: 

Addressing the long-term fiscal challenge will likely require 
difficult choices affecting both revenue and spending. In addition, 
the need to act soon to develop a plan for addressing the long-term 
fiscal imbalance must be balanced with concerns about the near-term 
impact of policy decisions. Action now would allow for the greatest 
range of options to address the fiscal imbalance and strengthen the 
economy for the long term. Many of the long-term drivers highlighted 
in past updates, including health care cost growth and the aging 
population, have already begun to affect the federal budget. These are 
challenges for which there are no quick or easy solutions. 

Changes since the Last Update: 

This update incorporates CBO's August 2012 baseline projections that 
follow current law at the time.[Footnote 1] This includes updated 
projections for Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange spending consistent with 
the Supreme Court's recent decision about PPACA. As a result of the 
decision, CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
decreased their estimates of federal spending for Medicaid and 
increased their estimates of federal spending on health insurance 
exchange subsidies. CBO and JCT's projections reflect an assessment of 
the probabilities of different outcomes. CBO notes, however, that what 
states decide to do regarding the Medicaid expansion under PPACA is 
highly uncertain and depends in part on how flexible executive branch 
agencies will be regarding the choices that states have. 

Consistent with our past practice, spending on Medicaid, CHIP, and 
exchange subsidies in our simulations follows CBO's baseline 
projections for the first 10 years. After that, growth in spending for 
these programs is based on CBO's long-term projections adjusted to 
reflect excess cost growth consistent with the 2012 Medicare Trustees' 
intermediate projections. Overall, the net effect of the changes in 
spending on Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies in the 10-year 
baseline do not significantly change the results of our simulations 
because the reduced costs of covering fewer individuals in state 
Medicaid programs is partially offset by increased costs of the 
exchange subsidies. 

Beginning with this update, we also revised our method for developing 
an excess cost growth rate for Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies 
consistent with the Trustees intermediate projections. In prior 
updates, our excess cost growth assumption, while based on growth for 
the U.S. health sector as a whole, was affected by productivity 
adjustments and other cost containment mechanisms for Medicare. For 
this update, we removed the effects of productivity adjustments and 
other cost containment mechanisms for Medicare from our estimates of 
excess cost growth for Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies. Excess 
cost growth for these programs is now 0.8 percent in the Baseline 
Extended simulation, or 0.2 percentage points higher than it was in 
our previous update, and tracks more closely with private insurance. 
This is in the same range as CBO's long-term projections for excess 
cost growth for Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies. Unlike our 
prior update where excess cost growth for Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange 
subsidies differed in the Baseline Extended and Alternative 
simulations depending on assumptions about Medicare spending, the same 
rate is used in both simulations for this update. 

Key Assumptions in Our Federal Simulations: 

Table 2 lists the key assumptions incorporated in the Baseline 
Extended and Alternative simulations based on the Trustees' 
assumptions for Social Security and the Trustees' and CMS Actuary's 
assumptions for Medicare. 

Table 2: Key Budget Assumptions for Baseline Extended and Alternative 
Simulations Based on the Social Security and Medicare Trustees' 
Projections: 

Model inputs: Revenue; 
Baseline Extended simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline that assumes 
tax cuts will expire as scheduled under current law and that an 
increasing share of taxpayers will be subject to higher tax rates 
through 2022; thereafter remains constant at 21.4 percent of GDP 
(CBO's projection in 2022); 
Alternative simulation: CBO's estimates that assume expiring tax 
provisions other than the temporary Social Security payroll tax 
reduction are extended through 2022, and the 2011 alternative minimum 
tax (AMT) exemption amount is indexed to inflation for years 2012 to 
2022; thereafter is phased into the 40-year historical average of 17.9 
percent of GDP. 

Model inputs: Social Security spending; 
Baseline Extended simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022; 
thereafter phases into the 2012 Social Security Trustees' intermediate 
projections; 
Alternative simulation: Same as Baseline Extended. 

Model inputs: Medicare spending; 
Baseline Extended simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022 
that assumes cuts in physician payment rates will occur as scheduled 
under current law[A] at the time and that the implementation of the 
Budget Control Act's automatic enforcement procedures reduces 
spending;[B] thereafter phases into the 2012 Medicare Trustees' 
intermediate projections in which cost containment mechanisms reduce 
excess cost growth to 0.2 percentage points on average between 2023 
and 2086[C]; 
Alternative simulation: Based on CMS Actuary's alternative scenario 
that assumes physician payment rates grow by 1 percent annually 
through 2022[A] and then gradually transition to a long-term growth 
rate equal to the per capita increase in overall health spending; 
spending reductions under the BCA do not occur,b and policies that 
would restrain spending growth are applied fully through 2019 but 
begin to phase out thereafter; excess cost growth averages 0.8 
percentage points between 2023 and 2086[C]. 

Model inputs: Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and 
exchange subsidies spending; 
Baseline Extended simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022; 
thereafter growth in spending for these programs is consistent with 
CBO's June 2012 long-term assumptions for the number and age 
composition of enrollees and the 2012 Medicare Trustees' intermediate 
assumptions for excess cost growth; excess cost growth averages 0.8 
percentage points between 2023 and 2086[C]; 
Alternative simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022; 
thereafter growth in spending for these programs is consistent with 
CBO's June 2012 long-term assumptions for the number and age 
composition of enrollees and CBO's alternative assumption that a 
policy that would slow the growth of per-participant subsidies for 
health insurance coverage is not in effect and eligibility thresholds 
are modified to maintain the share of the population eligible for 
subsidies; as in Baseline Extended, excess cost growth averages 0.8 
percentage points between 2023 and 2086[C]. 

Model inputs: Other mandatory spending; 
Baseline Extended simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022, 
which incorporates the reductions in spending scheduled to occur under 
the Budget Control Act's automatic enforcement procedures;[B] 
thereafter remains constant as a share of GDP at 2.4 percent of GDP 
(implied by CBO's projection in 2022); 
Alternative simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline adjusted for 
extension of certain tax credits and to exclude the effects of the 
Budget Control Act's automatic enforcement procedures through 2022;[B] 
thereafter is phased back to 2.4 percent of GDP (same as Baseline 
Extended) by 2025. 

Model inputs: Discretionary spending; 
Baseline Extended simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022, 
which reflects the original caps set by the Budget Control Act, as 
well as the lower caps triggered by the automatic enforcement 
procedures;[B] thereafter remains constant at 5.6 percent of GDP 
(CBO's projection in 2022); 
Alternative simulation: Follows the original caps set by the Budget 
Control Act but not the lower caps triggered by the automatic 
enforcement procedures;[B] after 2022 it gradually phases up to 7.5 
percent of GDP (the 20-year historical average). 

Source: GAO. 

Notes: CBO's projections are from An Update to the Budget and Economic 
Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022 (August 2012) and CBO's The 2012 
Long-Term Budget Outlook (June 2012). Trustees projections are from 
The 2012 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age 
and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds 
and The 2012 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal 
Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust 
Funds, which were both issued on April 23, 2012. Projections from the 
CMS Actuary are based on Projected Medicare Expenditures under 
Illustrative Scenarios with Alternative Payment Updates to Medicare 
Providers (May 18, 2012). We assume that Social Security and Medicare 
benefits are paid in full regardless of the amounts available in the 
trust funds. 

[A] Physician payment rates are scheduled to be reduced by roughly 27 
percent at the start of 2013. Since 2003, Congress has taken a series 
of legislative actions to override scheduled reductions in physician 
payment rates that would otherwise occur under law. Physician fee 
updates set by Congress have averaged 0.9 percent per year over this 
period. 

[B] The Budget Control Act established limits on discretionary budget 
authority for 2012 through 2021. It also specified additional limits 
on discretionary spending and automatic reductions in mandatory 
spending, including Medicare, that begin to take effect in January 
2013 and are intended to reduce projected deficits by an additional 
$1.2 trillion. 

[C] Excess cost growth refers to the annual growth rate of health care 
spending per enrollee in excess of the annual growth rate of potential 
GDP, adjusted for demographic characteristics. 

[End of table] 

Table 3 shows the key economic assumptions that underlie all of our 
simulations. GDP is held constant across simulations and does not 
respond to changes in fiscal policy. Also, the implied interest rate 
on federal debt held by the public in our simulations is held constant 
over the long term even when deficits climb. With large budget 
deficits, there could be a rise in the rate of interest and a more 
rapid increase in federal interest payments than our simulations 
display. 

Table 3: Key Economic Assumptions Underlying All of Our Long-Term 
Federal Simulations: 

Model inputs: Real GDP growth; 
All simulations: CBO August 2012 baseline through 2022; thereafter 
averages 2.1 percent based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2012 
Social Security and Medicare Trustees Reports. 

Model inputs: Inflation (percentage change in GDP price index); 
All simulations: CBO August 2012 baseline through 2022; 2 percent 
thereafter (CBO's projection in 2022). 

Model inputs: Interest rate (on debt held by the public); 
All simulations: Rate implied by CBO's August 2012 baseline net 
interest payment projections through 2022; phasing to 5.2 percent in 
2025 and then constant thereafter (based on CBO's June 2012 long-term 
projection). 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

A more detailed description of the federal model and key assumptions 
can be found at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/longterm/fed/aboutlongterm.html]. 

The simulation results depend largely on what is assumed about growth 
in large entitlement programs. As in previous updates, we also show 
the Baseline Extended simulation using both Trustees and CBO estimates 
for long-term spending on Social Security and major health entitlement 
programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and others). In addition, we show the 
Alternative simulation using different assumptions about certain 
health care cost-containment provisions based on CBO and CMS Actuary 
alternative projections. As figure 5 shows, the results are not 
materially different. The outlook under either set of assumptions is 
unsustainable. 

Figure 5: Debt Held by the Public under Fiscal Policy Simulations with 
Different Assumptions for Major Entitlement Programs: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Fiscal year: 2000; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 35%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 35%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 35%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 35%. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 32%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 32%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 32%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 32%. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 34%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 34%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 34%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 34%. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 36%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 36%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 36%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 36%. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 37%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 37%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 37%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 37%. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 37%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 37%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 37%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 37%. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 37%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 37%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 37%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 37%. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 36%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 36%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 36%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 36%. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 40%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 40%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 40%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 40%. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 54%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 54%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 54%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 54%. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 62%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 62%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 62%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 62%. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 68%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 68%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 68%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 68%. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 73%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 73%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 73%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 73%. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 76%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 79%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 76%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 79%. 

Fiscal year: 2014; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 77%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 82%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 77%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 82%. 

Fiscal year: 2015; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 74%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 83%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 74%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 83%. 

Fiscal year: 2016; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 71%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 83%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 71%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 83%. 

Fiscal year: 2017; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 68%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 83%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 68%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 83%. 

Fiscal year: 2018; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 65%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 83%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 65%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 83%. 

Fiscal year: 2019; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 63%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 84%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 63%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 84%. 

Fiscal year: 2020; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 61%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 86%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 61%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 86%. 

Fiscal year: 2021; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 60%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 88%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 60%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 88%. 

Fiscal year: 2022; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 58%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 90%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 58%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 90%. 

Fiscal year: 2023; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 58%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 93%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 58%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 93%. 

Fiscal year: 2024; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 57%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 97%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 57%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 97%. 

Fiscal year: 2025; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 58%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 102%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 57%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 102%. 

Fiscal year: 2026; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 58%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 108%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 58%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 107%. 

Fiscal year: 2027; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 59%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 114%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 58%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 113%. 

Fiscal year: 2028; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 60%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 121%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 58%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 120%. 

Fiscal year: 2029; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 61%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 128%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 59%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 126%. 

Fiscal year: 2030; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 63%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 136%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 60%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 134%. 

Fiscal year: 2031; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 64%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 144%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 61%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 142%. 

Fiscal year: 2032; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 66%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 153%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 63%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 150%. 

Fiscal year: 2033; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 68%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 161%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 64%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 158%. 

Fiscal year: 2034; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 70%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 170%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 66%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 167%. 

Fiscal year: 2035; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 72%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 180%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 68%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 176%. 

Fiscal year: 2036; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 74%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 189%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 70%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 185%. 

Fiscal year: 2037; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 77%; 
Alternative: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 199%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 72%; 
Alternative: CBO Social Security and alternative health: 194%. 

Fiscal year: 2038; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 79%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 75%. 

Fiscal year: 2039; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 82%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 77%. 

Fiscal year: 2040; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 84%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 80%. 

Fiscal year: 2041; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 87%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 82%. 

Fiscal year: 2042; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 90%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 85%. 

Fiscal year: 2043; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 93%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 88%. 

Fiscal year: 2044; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 96%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 91%. 

Fiscal year: 2045; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 99%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 94%. 

Fiscal year: 2046; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 102%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 98%. 

Fiscal year: 2047; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 105%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 102%. 

Fiscal year: 2048; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 109%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 105%. 

Fiscal year: 2049; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 112%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 109%. 

Fiscal year: 2050; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 116%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 114%. 

Fiscal year: 2051; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 119%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 118%. 

Fiscal year: 2052; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 123%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 122%. 

Fiscal year: 2053; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 126%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 127%. 

Fiscal year: 2054; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 130%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 132%. 

Fiscal year: 2055; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 134%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 137%. 

Fiscal year: 2056; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 138%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 142%. 

Fiscal year: 2057; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 142%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 148%. 

Fiscal year: 2058; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 146%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 153%. 

Fiscal year: 2059; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 150%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 159%. 

Fiscal year: 2060; 
Baseline: Trustees intermediate Social Security and Medicare: 155%; 
Baseline: CBO Social Security and baseline health: 165%. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Table 4 shows the CBO assumptions incorporated into the simulations 
that were used in the comparison shown in figure 5. 

Table 4: Key Budget Assumptions Underlying Our Simulations Using CBO's 
Spending Projections for Major Entitlement Programs: 

Model inputs: Social Security spending; 
Baseline Extended simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022; 
thereafter based on CBO's June 2012 long-term projections for Social 
Security; 
Alternative simulation: Same as Baseline Extended. 

Model inputs: Medicare spending; 
CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022; 
thereafter based on CBO's June 2012 long-term projections under its 
extended-baseline scenario that assumes policies that would restrain; 
spending growth are not in effect after 2029 and excess cost growth 
averages 1.2 percentage points per year over the long term[A]; 
Alternative simulation: Based on CBO's projections under its 
alternative fiscal scenario that assumes physician payment rates are 
maintained at 2012 levels through 2022; spending reductions under the 
BCA do not occur; policies to restrain growth are not in effect after 
2022; and excess cost growth averages 1.3 percentage points per year 
over the long term[A]. 

Model inputs: Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and 
exchange subsidies spending; 
Baseline Extended simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022; 
thereafter based on CBO's June 2012 long-term projections under its 
extended-baseline scenario which follows current law and assumes that 
excess cost growth for Medicaid and CHIP averages 0.7 percentage 
points per year over the long term[A]; 
Alternative simulation: CBO's August 2012 baseline through 2022; 
thereafter CBO's June 2012 projections under its alternative fiscal 
scenario in which a policy that would slow the growth of per-
participant subsidies for health insurance coverage is assumed not to 
be in effect; eligibility thresholds are assumed to be modified to 
maintain the share of the population eligible for subsidies; and 
excess cost growth for Medicaid and CHIP is assumed to average 0.7 
percentage points per year over the long term[A]. 

Source: GAO. 

Notes: CBO's projections are from An Update to the Budget and Economic 
Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022 (August 2012) and CBO's The 2012 
Long-Term Budget Outlook (June 2012). CBO assumes that full benefits 
are paid regardless of the amounts available in the trust funds. 

[A] Excess cost growth refers to the annual growth rate of health care 
spending per enrollee in excess of the annual growth rate of potential 
GDP, adjusted for demographic characteristics. 

[End of table] 

This product is part of a body of work on federal debt and the long-
term fiscal challenge. Related products can be found at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/longterm/index.html]. 

We conducted our work from September 2012 to December 2012 in 
accordance with all sections of GAO's Quality Assurance Framework that 
are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan 
and perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate 
evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations 
in our work. We believe that the information and data obtained, and 
the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings 
and conclusions in this product. 

[End of section] 

Footnote: 

[1] The CBO report is available at [hyperlink, http://www.cbo.gov]. 

[End of section] 

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