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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate: 

November 2012: 

Guantánamo Bay Detainees: 

Facilities and Factors for Consideration If Detainees Were Brought to 
the United States: 

GAO-13-31: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-31, a report to the Chairman, Select Committee on 
Intelligence, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Since 2002, the United States has operated military detention 
facilities at its Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to hold 
individuals detained during overseas counterterrorism operations. In 
2009 the President directed the closure of these facilities within 1 
year. Since then, a number of statutes have prohibited the transfer of 
Guantánamo Bay detainees to the United States. GAO was asked to review 
existing U.S. facilities and identify factors to be considered in the 
event that restrictions were lifted and Guantánamo Bay detainees were 
transferred to the United States. This report describes the (1) 
current Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and infrastructure, (2) 
DOD corrections facilities and factors to be considered if these 
facilities were used to hold the detainees, and (3) DOJ facilities 
holding individuals charged with or convicted of terrorism-related 
crimes, and factors to be considered if these facilities were used to 
hold the detainees. 

To conduct its work, GAO reviewed relevant laws and policies on 
detention operations; visited several facilities at Guantánamo Bay and 
DOD and DOJ sites in the United States selected for their range of 
housing configurations; and interviewed officials at both agencies. GAO’
s review is descriptive and did not include an evaluation of whether 
specific U.S. facilities would be suitable for holding Guantánamo Bay 
detainees, nor did GAO address legal factors that are still being 
adjudicated. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In 
commenting on this report, DOJ stated that it has no plans to transfer 
detainees to the United States. This report is an unclassified version 
of a classified report issued in November 2012. 

What GAO Found: 

As of November 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) held 166 
detainees in five separate facilities in conditions ranging from 
communal living to maximum-security segregated cells that limit 
detainee interaction. In addition, DOD maintains facilities and 
infrastructure dedicated to detention support operations. For example, 
DOD operates an extensive information-technology infrastructure, 
conducts operations to support the protection of military personnel, 
and performs other missions at Guantánamo Bay such as securing two 
courthouses used for military commissions. 

Within the United States, DOD operates six corrections facilities that 
are equipped to confine servicemembers for more than 1 year. On 
average, as of August 2012, these facilities were operating at about 
48 percent capacity, but this varies across different facilities and 
housing units. GAO identified from interviews with DOD officials and 
analysis of detention operations documents several factors that would 
need to be considered in the event that the Guantánamo Bay detainees 
were transferred to one of DOD’s U.S. facilities. The following four 
factors, among others such as legal and cost considerations, would 
have to be considered: (1) ensuring compliance with international law 
and U.S. laws and policies; (2) ensuring the continued safety and 
security of DOD personnel and the detainees, as well as the general 
public; (3) collecting intelligence information from the detainees; 
and (4) maintaining current missions and services provided by the 
corrections facilities and associated installations. For example, 
DOD’s current ability to minimize risks to the public is attributable 
to Guantánamo Bay’s remote location and limited access, whereas DOD 
corrections facilities in the United States are generally located on 
active military installations in close proximity to the general 
public. Additionally, DOD officials indicated that locating detention 
operations on an active military installation could present risk to 
the installation’s core operations such as administrative and training 
operations. 

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through its Bureau of Prisons and 
Marshals Service, uses over 2,000 facilities to hold about 280,000 
individuals charged with or convicted of federal crimes. Facilities 
range from low to high security and provide various conditions of 
confinement. GAO identified from interviews with DOJ officials and 
analysis of detention operations documents several factors that would 
need to be considered in the event that the Guantánamo Bay detainees 
were transferred to one of DOJ’s U.S. facilities. The following three 
factors, among others such as legal and cost considerations, would 
have to be considered: (1) formulation of policies and practices for 
housing the detainees; (2) ensuring the safety of facility personnel, 
the detainees, and the general public; and (3) identifying adequate 
space for housing the detainees and maintaining separation of 
detainees from the current inmate population. For example, according 
to DOJ officials, existing facilities would need to be modified or 
current inmates relocated because the Bureau of Prisons and Marshals 
Service would segregate Guantánamo Bay detainees from the inmate 
population for security purposes. Also, as of August 2012, system-wide 
Bureau of Prisons facilities were about 38 percent overcrowded, and 
holding Guantánamo Bay detainees could require triple bunking of 
inmates or expansion of facility capacity in order to maintain 
security for personnel, inmates, and detainees. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-31]. For more 
information, contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 
leporeb@gao.gov or David C. Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or 
maurerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Characteristics of the Current Guantánamo Bay Detention Facilities and 
Infrastructure: 

DOD Corrections Facilities in the United States and Factors to 
Consider If They Were to Hold Detainees: 

DOJ Corrections Facilities in the United States and Factors to 
Consider If They Were to Hold Detainees: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Summary of Key Legislation Affecting the Potential to 
Transfer Guantánamo Bay Detainees to the United States: 

Appendix III: Noninteractive Timeline of Guantánamo Bay Detention 
Operations: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Detainee Detention and Prosecution Status as of November 2012: 

Table 2: Guantánamo Bay Detention Facilities as of November 2012: 

Table 3: Capacity of DOD Level II and III Corrections Facilities as of 
August 2012: 

Table 4: BOP Inmates with a History of or Connection to Terrorism by 
Facility Security Level as of August 2012: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Location of U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba: 

Figure 2: Interactive Timeline of Guantánamo Bay Detention Operations: 

Figure 3: A Segregated Housing Unit in Camp 5: 

Figure 4: Example of a Camp 5 Cell and Detainee Comfort Items: 

Figure 5: Example of a Housing Unit in Camp 6: 

Figure 6: DOD Regional Corrections Facilities and U.S. Disciplinary 
Barracks: 

Figure 7: Sample General-Population Housing Unit, Naval Consolidated 
Brig Chesapeake, Virginia: 

Figure 8: Location of BOP Facilities in the United States: 

Figure 9: Step-Down Housing Unit, "Supermax," U.S. Administrative 
Maximum Facility, Florence, Colorado: 

Figure 10: Outdoor Recreation Area, "Supermax," U.S. Administrative 
Maximum Facility, Florence, Colorado: 

Figure 11: Communications Management Unit Cell, Terre Haute, Indiana: 

Abbreviations: 

ADX: U.S. Penitentiary Florence Administrative-Maximum: 

AUMF: Authorization for Use of Military Force: 

BOP: Bureau of Prisons: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

Marshals Service: U.S. Marshals Service: 

UCMJ: Uniform Code of Military Justice: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

November 14, 2012: 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein: 
Chairman: 
Select Committee on Intelligence: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Madam Chairman: 

Since January 2002 the United States has operated military detention
facilities at its Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to detain
individuals captured during overseas counterterrorism operations. In
January 2009, the President issued an Executive Order directing the
closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention facilities within one year. 
[Footnote 1] Subsequently, in June 2009 the first in a series of 
appropriations and authorization measures limiting or prohibiting the 
use of appropriated funds to transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees to the 
United States was enacted.[Footnote 2 You requested that we review 
existing U.S. federal facilities and identify factors to be considered 
in the event that Guantánamo Bay detention facilities were closed and 
legal restrictions on transfer did not continue, and the 166 detainees 
currently held in these detention facilities were transferred to the 
United States.[Footnote 3 Accordingly, this report describes (1) 
current Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and infrastructure; (2) 
Department of Defense (DOD) corrections facilities in the United 
States, and factors to be considered if they were used to hold 
Guantánamo Bay detainees; and (3) Department of Justice (DOJ) 
corrections facilities in the United States that hold individuals 
charged with or convicted of terrorism-related crimes, and factors to 
be considered if they were used to hold Guantánamo Bay detainees.
[Footnote 4] We are also issuing a classified version of 
this report in November 2012. That version includes an additional
appendix, which provides a discussion of Guantánamo Bay facilities used
for classified operations that would need to be considered if the 
detainees were transferred to facilities in the United States. 

The scope of our work was to provide a descriptive review of the
detention facilities and infrastructure at Guantánamo Bay as well as
existing corrections facilities in the United States. Hence, our 
review did not include an evaluation of whether specific U.S. 
facilities would be suitable for holding Guantánamo Bay detainees, nor 
did we address legal factors that are still being adjudicated such as 
detainee habeas corpus rights,[Footnote 5] and right to counsel. 
[Footnote 6] In addition we are not making recommendations in this 
report. 

To describe the current Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and
infrastructure, we visited the detention and support facilities at the 
U.S. Naval Station Guantánamo Bay. We also reviewed laws and policies
related to DOD’s detention operations, an interagency report on 
detainees’ status, and DOD reports on conditions of detention at 
Guantánamo Bay. In addition, we discussed previous and current 
detention operations with officials from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. Southern Command, Joint Task Force-
Guantánamo, American Correctional Association, and another related 
organization. To describe DOD corrections facilities in the United 
States and factors to consider if they were to hold Guantánamo Bay 
detainees, we reviewed DOD corrections policies and manuals and 
facility capacity data. We also reviewed analyses conducted in 2009 by 
DOD as part of its efforts to determine whether its facilities were 
equipped to conduct detention operations. Because analyses previously 
conducted by DOD to identify facilities in the United States were 
based on the assumption that all detention operations-—including 
intelligence operations and military commission support-—would remain 
the same, we maintained this assumption in our description of factors 
that might be considered in the event that Guantánamo Bay detainees 
were moved to DOD facilities in the United States. We conducted site 
visits and interviewed officials at DOD corrections facilities, which 
are operated by the Army and the Navy. We selected three facilities 
that represent both services’ operating procedures and reflect a range 
of housing configurations, including both segregated and general-
population housing units. There are three different types of 
corrections facilities operated by DOD: (1) Level I facilities, which 
are used for short-term (under 1-year) and pretrial confinement; (2) 
Level II facilities-—consisting of five joint regional corrections 
facilities (two operated under the Army, and three under the Navy)-—
which are used for pretrial confinement and for inmates with sentences 
of 5 years or fewer; and (3) one Level III facility, which holds
inmates with sentences exceeding 5 years and inmates sentenced to
death. Because Level I facilities are not intended for long-term
confinement, we limited the scope of our review to the Level II and 
Level III long-term incarceration facilities. In addition, we 
interviewed officials responsible for management of DOD corrections 
facilities, including officials from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Joint Staff, Army Corrections Command, and Bureau of Naval 
Personnel. 

To describe corrections facilities in the United States that hold 
individuals charged with or convicted of terrorism-related crimes or 
activities, and factors for consideration if Guantánamo Bay detainees 
were transferred to DOJ facilities in the United States, we reviewed 
laws and policies related to Bureau of Prisons (BOP) corrections 
operations, facility capacity data, and information related to the 
number and location of inmates under BOP custody who had a history of 
or connection to terrorism, including those charged with or convicted 
of terrorism-related crimes.[Footnote 7] In addition, we reviewed U.S. 
Marshals Service (Marshals Service) policies related to facility 
capacity data and information related to the number and locations of 
inmates charged with terrorism-related crimes in the custody of the 
Marshals Service.[Footnote 8] Also, we interviewed officials from BOP, 
the Marshals Service, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, as 
well as other relevant DOJ component agencies, and we conducted site 
visits to four facilities selected to reflect diversity in types of 
housing units and security levels. While it is likely that conditions
of confinement and related procedures for the detainees would change if
they were moved into DOJ facilities, it is unclear what changes would
occur. Thus, for the purposes of this report, when discussing factors 
for consideration if the detainees were moved to DOJ facilities, we 
assumed that most conditions and procedures would remain the same. 
Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland 
Security. According to Department of Homeland Security officials, its 
detention facilities are used to detain foreign nationals who are 
awaiting deportation from the United States, not detainees brought to 
the United States for law-of-war detention, pretrial detention, or 
postconviction incarceration; thus we subsequently removed the 
Department of Homeland Security from the scope of our work. For a full 
description of our scope and methodology, see appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to November
2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis 
for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Military Detention: 

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress 
passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which 
authorized the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those ... [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks" against the United States.[Footnote 9] 
Subsequently, many individuals detained during military operations in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere were transferred to the U.S. Naval Station 
at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba--a site designated by the administration for 
long-term military detention operations under the authority of the 
AUMF and in accordance with international law. Approximately 1,800 
servicemembers, civilian employees, and contractors support detention 
operations at Guantánamo Bay. An additional 4,200 individuals support 
other missions at Guantánamo Bay, including logistics and regional 
contingency operations, as it is the only U.S. naval station in the 
U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility.[Footnote 10] The Naval 
Station encompasses 45 square miles on both sides of Guantánamo Bay, 
sharing a 17-mile border with Cuba. (See figure 1.) 

Figure 1: Location of U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map of Cuba] 

Source: DOD. Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

According to DOD officials, the installation's remote location enables 
DOD to limit aircraft flights and control maritime access points, and 
consequently provides an additional layer of security for the 
detention operations. DOD considers most of the individuals held in 
custody at Guantánamo Bay to be "unprivileged enemy belligerents" 
under U.S. and international law.[Footnote 11] Those detainees are 
afforded certain legal rights and protections under both international 
law and U.S. law. For example, Executive Order 13492 states that 
custody at Guantánamo Bay shall conform with Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, which, among other things, prohibits "outrages 
upon personal dignity" and "the passing of sentences and the carrying 
out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."[Footnote 12] In 
addition, various U.S. laws, including the Detainee Treatment Act 
[Footnote 13] and the Military Commissions Act,[Footnote 14] govern 
aspects of detainee treatment and trial. The President's January 2009 
order for the closure of Guantánamo Bay detention facilities directed 
the Secretary of Defense to undertake a review of the conditions of 
detention at Guantánamo Bay, and this review, known as the "Walsh 
Report," reported that the conditions of confinement at Guantánamo Bay 
conformed with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.[Footnote 
15] According to DOD, the purpose of military detention is to remove 
enemy armed forces from the battlefield, as opposed to criminal 
incarceration, which is a punitive measure for individuals convicted 
of violating domestic law. 

Under the authority of the AUMF, DOD has since January 2002 detained a 
total of 779 detainees at Guantánamo Bay. The detainee population 
peaked at approximately 680 in June 2003, and the last detainee to 
arrive was transferred to Guantánamo Bay in March 2008. The U.S. 
government, through an interagency task force, has ongoing efforts to 
transfer detainees from Guantánamo Bay to other countries and, since 
January 2002, has transferred more than 600 detainees, either to their 
home country or to a third country.[Footnote 16] In addition, in 2009, 
one detainee was transferred to the United States for trial and, in 
2010, was convicted in a U.S. civilian court. He is currently serving 
a life sentence in a BOP facility in Florence, Colorado. 

As of November 2012, 166 detainees were being held in military 
detention at Guantánamo Bay. Also, as of November 2012, 3 of these 
detainees had been convicted of crimes by military commissions at 
Guantánamo Bay.[Footnote 17] Additionally, 7 detainees--including the 
5 individuals accused of planning the September 11 attacks--have 
charges pending and face potential trial by military commissions. 
[Footnote 18] According to DOD officials, the U.S. government, through 
an interagency task force, is currently negotiating with other 
countries to transfer more than one-third of the remaining 156 
detainees.[Footnote 19] Table 1 reflects the current detention and 
prosecution status of all detainees held at Guantánamo Bay as of 
November 2012. 

Table 1: Detainee Detention and Prosecution Status as of November 2012: 

Status: Currently in Transfer Negotiations; 
Description of status: Detainees for whom the U.S. Department of State 
is in current or planned negotiations with the detainees' home or 
third country for transfer. These detainees are not currently facing 
prosecution; 
Number of detainees: 56. 

Status: Continued Detention under the AUMF; 
Description of status: Detainees who have been determined to require 
continued detention to protect against a significant threat to the 
security of the United States. These detainees are not currently 
facing prosecution; 
Number of detainees: 46. 

Status: Conditional Detention; 
Description of status: Detainees from Yemen who will not be 
transferred until one of the following is satisfied (1) the security 
situation improves in Yemen, (2) appropriate rehabilitation programs 
become available, or (3) appropriate third-country resettlement 
options become available.[A] These detainees are not currently facing 
prosecution; 
Number of detainees: 30. 

Status: Possible Prosecution Pending; 
Description of status: Detainees whose cases are under review in 
accordance with a joint DOD-DOJ protocol to determine if a case is 
feasible for prosecution and, if so, the appropriate forum and venue 
for that prosecution[B]; 
Number of detainees: 24. 

Status: Currently Facing Prosecution; 
Description of status: Detainees with military commission charges 
pending; 
Number of detainees: 7. 

Status: Convicted; 
Description of status: Detainees convicted through a military 
commission process at Guantánamo Bay; 
Number of detainees: 3. 

Status: Total; 
Number of detainees: 166. 

Sources: DOD, DOJ, and Guantánamo Review Task Force. 

[A] Not all detainees from Yemen are in Conditional Detention status. 
These conditions were specified in the final report of the Guantánamo 
Review Task Force, issued pursuant to Executive Order 13492. 
Guantánamo Review Task Force, Final Report (Jan. 22, 2010). They do 
not necessarily reflect subsequent legal restrictions on transfers, 
such as those described in footnote 19. Additionally, while all 
detainees facing conditional detention are from Yemen, they do not 
represent all detainees from Yemen currently held at Guantánamo Bay. 

[B] DOD and DOJ, Determination of Guantánamo Cases referred for 
Prosecution (undated). 

[End of table] 

Roles of the Federal Agencies in Detention and Incarceration: 

Executive Order 13492, signed by the President on January 22, 2009, 
directed the closure of the detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay 
within a year and stated that any individuals who remained in 
detention at Guantánamo Bay at the time of the closure of its 
facilities "shall be returned to their home country, released, 
transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United 
States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and the 
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." 
Following the issuance of this Executive Order, an interagency working 
group including officials from DOD, DOJ, and the Department of 
Homeland Security began to identify existing facilities in the United 
States that could be used for continued military detention if the 
decision was made to transfer detainees to the United States.[Footnote 
20] Each of these departments operates confinement facilities in the 
United States, consistent with its missions and legal authorities. 

* DOD operates a system of corrections facilities in the United States 
that are used for pretrial detention and incarceration of members of 
the U.S. armed forces who are charged with or convicted of violations 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).[Footnote 21] 

* DOJ, through BOP, operates a system of corrections facilities in the 
United States that are used for pretrial detention and incarceration 
of individuals convicted of violating federal laws. BOP's mission is 
to confine federal inmates in the controlled, safe, secure, humane, 
and cost-efficient environments of prisons and community-based 
facilities, and to provide work and other self-improvement 
opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens. 
DOJ's Marshals Service is the enforcement arm of the federal court 
system and its mission includes responsibility for the custody of 
pretrial federal inmates until they are acquitted or convicted, and 
delivered to the designated BOP facility. 

* The Department of Homeland Security operates a system of detention 
facilities to detain noncitizens who may be subject to removal from 
the United States under U.S. immigration laws. 

According to DOD attorneys, DOD, under the AUMF, has legal authority 
to maintain custody of the detainees currently at Guantánamo Bay. A 
DOJ official from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General stated 
that DOJ would likely need additional authorities to detain law-of-war 
detainees for continued detention at BOP facilities, but indicated 
that he was unaware of any analysis of the issue because DOJ is not 
evaluating transferring detainees to the United States in light of 
transfer restrictions. With respect to the three detainees who have 
been convicted of crimes by military commissions, the Military 
Commissions Act provides that, "under such regulations as the 
Secretary of Defense may prescribe, a sentence of confinement adjudged 
by a military commission…may be carried into execution by confinement …
in any penal or correctional institution under the control of the 
United States."[Footnote 22] However, while this statute indicates 
that the three convicted detainees serving sentences at Guantánamo Bay 
could potentially be confined in DOJ or other U.S. controlled 
facilities, BOP officials said that BOP would need additional 
statutory authority in the federal criminal code to take custody of 
individuals convicted by military commission, like the authority it 
currently has to confine persons convicted by courts-martial.[Footnote 
23] In addition to the above-mentioned legal authorities, since the 
signing of Executive Order 13492 in January 2009, a number of statutes 
have limited or prohibited the use of federal funds to transfer or 
assist in the transfer of Guantánamo Bay detainees to U.S. facilities. 
See appendix II for a summary of key statutes. Prior to the enactment 
of these statutes, in June 2009, one Guantánamo Bay detainee was 
formally charged with crimes by DOJ and subsequently transferred to 
the United States. This detainee was transferred by DOD into the 
custody of the Marshals Service to stand trial in the United States. 
In November 2010 he was convicted by a federal court, and is currently 
serving a life sentence in a BOP facility in Colorado. 

History of Detention Facilities and Standards of Confinement at 
Guantánamo Bay: 

Over time, DOD's detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay have evolved 
as the department has constructed new facilities and closed older ones 
in response to changes in the size of the detainee population. The 
original facilities--known as Camp X-Ray--were open for 92 days (in 
2002). They were preexisting migrant-detention facilities comprised of 
chain-link enclosures on concrete slabs. Subsequent facilities, called 
Camps 1, 2, 3, and 4, were built in response to increases in the 
detainee population and the need to segregate different groups of 
detainees; for example, individuals who were compliant with facility 
rules were separated from those who were noncompliant. These early 
facilities were generally covered, open-air, single-cell structures 
with steel mesh walls. DOD subsequently constructed the indoor, 
climate-controlled facilities that are currently in use. As shown 
under the Facilities tab in figure 2, a total of 10 different 
detention facilities have been used to hold Guantánamo Bay detainees 
(see appendix III for the noninteractive version of this figure). Of 
these, 5 are currently in use: Camp Echo, Camp Iguana, and Camps 5, 6, 
and 7. 

Figure 5: Interactive Timeline of Guantánamo Bay Detention Operations: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive timeline] 

Interactivity instructions: Click on the event type to view more 
information. See appendix III for the non-interactive, printer-
friendly version. 

Source: DOD, DOJ, and GAO analysis of select executive and legislative 
actions. 

[End of figure] 

In September 2006, DOD revised DOD Directive 2310.01E, its policy 
regarding standards for detainee treatment.[Footnote 24] The standards 
outlined in the directive ensure that military detainees are treated 
humanely and in conformity with "the laws of the United States, the 
law[s] of war, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and all 
applicable policies, directives, or other issuances ..." According to 
DOD officials, as long as Guantánamo Bay detainees maintain their 
legal status as military detainees held under the authority of AUMF 
and remain in DOD custody, DOD's detention directive and all related 
laws and standards would continue to be applicable to the Guantánamo 
Bay detainees if they were transferred to the United States. 

Characteristics of the Current Guantánamo Bay Detention Facilities and 
Infrastructure: 

DOD currently conducts extensive detention operations at Guantánamo 
Bay, operating multiple facilities that hold detainees and support 
other detainee-related missions, such as medical services. In 
addition, DOD maintains facilities and infrastructure dedicated to 
detention support operations.[Footnote 25] For example, DOD operates 
an extensive information-technology infrastructure to support force 
protection and other missions, and maintains and secures legal 
facilities. 

Overview of Current Detention Facilities at Guantánamo Bay: 

As of November 2012, DOD held 166 detainees in five detention 
facilities on its Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. According to 
DOD officials, all facilities currently in use were designed on the 
basis of facilities in the United States that meet American 
Correctional Association standards.[Footnote 26] The facilities differ 
in configuration and detainee population, and DOD generally places 
detainees in facilities according to a detainee's compliance with 
facility rules.[Footnote 27] See table 2 for a description of each 
detention facility. DOD also provides medical, dental, and behavioral 
health services in some of the detention facilities and in separate 
dedicated facilities. 

Table 2: Guantánamo Bay Detention Facilities as of November 2012: 

Facility name: Camp 5; 
Description of facility: Four housing units containing single-
occupancy cells for noncompliant detainees and prisoners; 
One shared housing unit; 
Nonsegregated population: 1-20; 
Segregated population: 10-30. 

Facility name: Camp 6; 
Description of facility: Eight shared housing units; 
Nonsegregated population: 110-130; 
Segregated population: 0. 

Facility name: Camp 7; 
Description of facility: Segregated single-cell facility, used for 
high-value detainees; 
Nonsegregated population: 0; 
Segregated population: 10-20. 

Facility name: Camp Echo; 
Description of facility: Single-occupant structures, with shared 
recreation area; 
Nonsegregated population: 5-10; 
Segregated population: 0. 

Facility name: Camp Iguana; 
Description of facility: Communal structures shared by detainees who 
have been designated for release; 
Nonsegregated population: 1-5; 
Segregated population: 0. 

Source: GAO representation of DOD data. 

Note: Populations of Camps 5, 6, Echo, and Iguana are presented as 
ranges because specific numbers of detainees in these camps can change 
over time as detainees are released or moved between facilities. The 
specific number of detainees in Camp 7 can be found in the classified 
version of this report. 

[End of table] 

Camp 5: 

Camp 5 is the second-most populous detention facility at Guantánamo 
Bay--approximately one-fourth of detainees reside there at any given 
time. It is a maximum-security facility consisting of 100 indoor 
climate-controlled cells divided among four individual cell blocks, 
each with two tiers, and 24 open-air cells. Most of the cell blocks in 
Camp 5 are operated as segregated housing. One block currently serves 
as shared housing. DOD holds three types of detainees in Camp 5: 

(1) Most of the detainees in Camp 5 are held in segregated cells on a 
temporary basis to encourage compliance with facility rules. Once 
these detainees have begun complying with facility rules, they are 
transferred to one of the other camps having more shared living spaces. 

(2) One cell block of Camp 5 houses compliant detainees with similar 
lifestyle habits in shared housing. DOD finished converting this block 
to shared housing in May 2012 in order to decrease the number of 
detainees in another facility. Detainees in the shared housing block 
can access each other's cells and recreate together, but are separated 
from the other groups of detainees in Camp 5. 

(3) Detainees who have been convicted by military commission at 
Guantánamo Bay and are serving their sentences there are also held in 
Camp 5. These convicted individuals are confined to a cell block tier 
segregated from all other detainees. 

Figure 3: A Segregated Housing Unit in Camp 5: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to housing units, Camp 5 contains one media room on each 
tier--consisting of a television for use by one detainee at a time--
and three outdoor recreation areas. These secured outdoor recreation 
areas have exercise equipment but are not large enough for detainees 
to play games such as soccer. They are designed such that no more than 
two detainees can be present in the same area at a given time, though 
detainees may speak with those in adjacent recreation areas. All 
detainees assigned to segregated housing units in Camp 5 have access 
to at least 2 hours of recreation per day with one other detainee; 
those who have begun complying with facility rules have access to at 
least 4 hours of recreation per day. All detainees in Camp 5 also have 
access to books and magazines, and compliant detainees may obtain a 
greater number of books as well as additional clothing choices. 
Detainees in the shared housing unit are provided other privileges as 
well, such as the ability to move freely within the tier. Camp 5 also 
contains a medical treatment room and a dental chair. 

Figure 4: Example of a Camp 5 Cell and Detainee Comfort Items: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: DOD. 

Note: All detainees receive basic comfort supplies, such as soap, 
toothpaste, clothing, and religious items. Compliant detainees receive 
additional clothing and footwear choices and other incentives. 

[End of figure] 

Camp 6: 

Camp 6 is the most-populous detention facility at Guantánamo Bay--
about two-thirds of detainees are held there. It is a medium-security 
detention camp designed after the layout of a U.S. county jail, and it 
consists of eight indoor climate-controlled, two-story housing units 
that each contain 22 individual cells and one large common area. 
Within each housing unit, two cells are reserved for use as a shared 
pantry and library. DOD generally assigns detainees to specific 
housing units according to cultural and lifestyle preferences. For 
example, detainees of the same nationality or detainees who have 
similar television-viewing preferences may share a housing unit. 

Figure 5: Example of a Housing Unit in Camp 6: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

Detainees in Camp 6 are allowed access to one adjacent housing unit as 
well as their own unit. Adjacent housing units are connected by a 
secured, shared outdoor recreation yard with exercise equipment and an 
area for the detainees to play sports such as basketball or soccer. 
Except for DOD inspection times, during which detainees are confined 
to their cells, detainees can move freely for 20 hours per day in the 
recreation yard and the adjacent housing unit; they are confined to 
their assigned housing unit the remaining 4 hours per day. Camp 6 also 
includes medical and dental treatment rooms and staff to provide 
routine medical care and medication dispensation. 

Camp 7, Camp Echo, and Camp Iguana: 

DOD operates three additional facilities to house certain small groups 
of detainees: Camp 7, Camp Echo, and Camp Iguana. Camp 7 holds "high-
value" detainees, such as those accused of planning the September 11 
attacks. These individuals are held in climate-controlled segregated 
housing units that limit their ability to communicate with each other. 
Detainees in Camp 7 have access to up to 4 hours of recreation per day 
in secured recreation areas containing exercise equipment; two 
detainees may have outdoor recreation at the same time in separate but 
adjacent recreation areas. In addition, Camp 7 contains a medical 
treatment room and a dental chair. The other two facilities--Camp Echo 
and Camp Iguana--house compliant detainees in shared settings. 
Detainees whose personal security would be at risk if they were housed 
in Camp 6 are assigned to Camp Echo, and detainees who have been 
designated for release from Guantánamo Bay are assigned to Camp 
Iguana.[Footnote 28] These camps are isolated from each other and from 
the other camps. Camp Echo consists of 10 wooden hut-like structures, 
with each detainee's housing unit containing a sleeping cell and a 
personal living area. Detainees assigned to Camp Echo may recreate 
together up to 20 hours per day. DOD uses unoccupied structures at the 
Camp Echo facility to support other detention-related operations, such 
as detainee-attorney meetings. Camp Iguana is a communal space that 
consists of multiple wooden hut-like structures within a secured 
fenced area. The detainees can move freely within the fenced area at 
all times, and they use the structures for a variety of purposes, 
including sleeping, cooking, laundry, and recreation. Although 
detainees in Camps Echo and Iguana are afforded more privileges than 
other detainees, they must continue to comply with facility rules or 
they may be temporarily placed in Camp 5 to encourage compliance. 

Medical, Dental, and Behavioral Health Facilities: 

In addition to detention facilities, DOD operates several facilities 
that provide medical, dental, and behavioral health care to detainees. 
In addition to medical treatment rooms at Camps 5, 6, and 7, DOD 
operates a hospital dedicated to detainee care. The detainee hospital 
is primarily an in-patient facility with secured cells, but it does 
provide some outpatient care such as radiology, surgery, dental, and 
other medical services. If necessary, the detainee hospital can 
leverage the resources of the Naval Station hospital, which is located 
elsewhere on the base. For example, medical staff can perform minor 
surgery at the detainee hospital, but major surgery is performed at 
the Naval Station hospital. In addition, DOD will bring specialists to 
Guantánamo Bay to treat detainees if required. Camps 6 and 7 also have 
dental facilities. Furthermore, DOD operates a 12-bed behavioral 
health unit in a separate facility, which provides care to detainees 
with mental health issues. Overall, there are about 100 people who 
provide medical, dental, or behavioral health care to the detainees, 
including specialized medical linguists. 

Detention Support Operations: 

In addition to the facilities it uses to house and provide services to 
detainees, DOD maintains facilities and infrastructure dedicated to 
detention support operations. These operations include (1) physical 
security and protection for detainees and U.S. military personnel, (2) 
intelligence collection and analysis, (3) maintenance and security of 
military commission courtrooms and other legal support. In addition, 
DOD provides administrative offices, housing, dining, medical, and 
other necessary support facilities for the approximately 1,800 
detention-operations staff members at Guantánamo Bay. On average, the 
cost to operate Guantánamo Bay detention facilities and support 
operations is about $114 million per year, not including the cost of 
military personnel or approximately 120 contract linguist staff. 
[Footnote 29] Some of this funding is dedicated to fixed costs, such 
as the information-technology infrastructure, and would not change 
proportionately to changes in detainee population. 

Maintaining Physical Security and Protection of Detainees and U.S. 
Military Personnel: 

Several facilities at Guantánamo Bay are used to support DOD's 
operations to maintain physical security and protection of the 
detainees and U.S. military personnel. For example, in one facility, 
DOD screens and translates--in up to 13 languages--approximately 400 
pieces of incoming and outgoing detainee mail each month; according to 
officials, this figure can increase to more than 1,000 when officials 
from the International Committee of the Red Cross visit. All 
operations at Guantánamo Bay utilize an extensive information-
technology infrastructure, comprising several networks, over 2,000 
computers, and 190 servers. For example, electronic records of all 
detention camp activities are stored in a computer database. Moreover, 
DOD policy requires the preservation of all evidence, documents, and 
recorded information of every detainee now or ever held at Guantánamo 
Bay.[Footnote 30] Therefore, DOD maintains facilities to store and 
preserve a variety of information including (1) all electronic data 
collected, (2) physical evidence obtained at the time of a detainee's 
capture, and (3) records of contraband or makeshift weapons seized 
over the course of detention operations. 

Intelligence Collection and Analysis: 

DOD also operates some facilities at Guantánamo Bay exclusively for 
the collection of intelligence--through voluntary interviews of 
detainees--and analysis of this information by linguistic and 
technical support staff.[Footnote 31] According to DOD, it collects 
this intelligence to provide support to military commissions, Periodic 
Review Boards,[Footnote 32] the intelligence community, and law-
enforcement agencies. According to a 2009 DOD report, given the length 
of time that most detainees have spent at Guantánamo Bay, the primary 
focus of the voluntary detainee interviews is to gather information to 
help ensure the safety and security of the detention facilities and 
personnel. 

Military Commissions and Other Legal Support: 

DOD maintains and secures two courthouses and several office 
facilities used in the military-commission process at Guantánamo Bay. 
In 2008, DOD completed construction of a courtroom complex designed 
specifically to hold commissions for the five detainees accused of 
organizing the September 11 attacks. It includes five detainee holding 
cells and nine areas, including the courtroom and office spaces, in 
which highly classified information may be discussed. Because the 
facility was designed to allow the discussion of highly classified 
information, DOD must secure it 24 hours per day. In addition, DOD 
operates a separate facility that it converted into a courtroom in 
2005. This facility utilizes some of the same technology as the other 
courtroom but is smaller and is cleared for discussion of classified 
information at a lower level. The facility includes a holding cell for 
detainees and rooms for detainees to meet with legal counsel. DOD 
utilizes advanced videoconferencing and court-reporting technology in 
both courtrooms and it can broadcast proceedings to an observation 
area adjacent to the larger courtroom, the media facility at 
Guantánamo Bay, and remote viewing locations in the United States. 

In addition to the courtrooms, there are several administrative 
facilities dedicated to legal services and upcoming detainee Periodic 
Review Boards. One facility will enable the use of secure video 
teleconferencing during upcoming detainee reviews, and the 
intelligence collection and analysis staff will provide support to 
assessments of the potential threat posed by each detainee. In 
addition, DOD maintains a legal office staffed with approximately 10 
attorneys to facilitate detainee-attorney meetings, of which there 
were 132 between November 2011 and April 2012. This office also 
contributes support to the military commission process. 

DOD Corrections Facilities in the United States and Factors to 
Consider If They Were to Hold Detainees: 

DOD operates six facilities in the continental United States for 
confining servicemembers for more than 1 year. Each facility utilizes 
both general-population and segregated housing units and is equipped 
to manage inmates at all security levels. On average, as of August 
2012, these six facilities were 48 percent occupied. In the event that 
the Guantánamo Bay detainees were transferred to one of these 
facilities, and all detention operations were to remain the same as 
they were at Guantánamo Bay, we identified from interviews with DOD 
officials and analysis of detention operations documents several 
factors that would need to be considered, such as ensuring compliance 
with international law and U.S. laws and policies, and ensuring the 
safety and security of detainees, DOD personnel, as well as the 
general public, before the facilities could be used for this purpose. 
[Footnote 33] 

DOD Corrections Facilities in the United States: 

DOD operates a system of corrections facilities in the continental 
United States that it uses to confine members of the uniformed 
services charged with or convicted of violations of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (UCMJ). Six of these facilities, operated by the 
Army and the Navy, are equipped to confine individuals for more than 1 
year.[Footnote 34] Five of the six are joint regional correctional 
facilities--two Army-operated regional correctional facilities and 
three Naval consolidated brigs--that are used for pre-and post-trial 
confinement for inmates with sentences of 5 years or fewer. The sixth 
is the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a 
facility operated by the Army, which holds inmates with sentences 
exceeding 5 years as well as inmates sentenced to death. Five of these 
six DOD corrections facilities are accredited by the American 
Correctional Association, which reaccredits facilities every 3 years 
to ensure they meet specific national standards related to facility 
administration and management, physical plant and institutional 
operations, institutional services, and inmate programs.[Footnote 35] 
In fiscal year 2011, the cost to operate these facilities ranged from 
approximately $1.6 million to $14 million.[Footnote 36] See figure 6 
for the names and locations of the six facilities. 

Figure 6: DOD Regional Corrections Facilities and U.S. Disciplinary 
Barracks: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Northwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility: 
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; 
Maximum capacity: 219. 

Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility; 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 
Maximum capacity: 512. 

Naval Consolidated Brig Chesapeake; 
Naval Support Activity Northwest Annex, Virginia; 
Maximum capacity: 395. 

Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar; 
Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California; 
Maximum capacity: 599. 

U.S. Disciplinary Barracks;     
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 
Maximum capacity: 515. 

Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston; 
Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina; 
Maximum capacity: 439. 

Source: DOD; Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

Each of these facilities comprises both general-population and 
segregated housing units. Most inmates are housed in general-
population housing units. These units are similar in design to the 
shared housing units in Camp 6 at Guantánamo Bay; they generally 
include an open space with shared tables, chairs, televisions, 
telephones, and showers, as well as individual cells containing single 
or double bunked beds, a toilet, and a sink. Each DOD facility has 
multiple general-population housing units, and while capacity of these 
units varies, typically general-population units can be configured to 
hold up to 80 inmates; Navy officials indicated that when possible 
they prefer to maintain capacity at 40 inmates. Depending on the 
facilities' operating procedures and individual inmates' compliance 
with facility rules, the amount of time inmates in general-population 
housing units are required to spend in their cells varies, as does 
their access to the shared living space. See figure 7 for a 
photographic example of a general-population housing unit. 

Figure 7: Sample General-Population Housing Unit, Naval Consolidated 
Brig Chesapeake, Virginia: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

Unlike general-population housing units, segregated housing units 
prevent inmate interaction, and they do not have a shared living 
space. Inmates in segregated units are individually bunked and 
confined to their cells for the majority of their time. Similar to the 
segregated housing units in Camp 5 at Guantánamo Bay, these cells are 
used primarily as a temporary administrative or disciplinary measure 
for inmates who are noncompliant with facility rules, who may be a 
danger to themselves or others, or who may be at risk of harm from 
other inmates. Segregated housing units can also be used as long-term 
housing for inmates who have been classified as needing maximum 
security. 

These six DOD facilities are required to manage inmates at all 
security levels. When sentenced to a facility, inmates are assessed 
and assigned a security custody classification.[Footnote 37] These 
classifications range from individuals who require limited supervision 
and maintain jobs outside of the facility to the most-maximum-security 
inmates who present the highest risk of violence. An inmate's security 
classification is the basis upon which he or she is assigned to a 
housing unit--for example, medium-custody inmates are housed with 
other medium-custody inmates. DOD policy allows for an inmate 
classification to be reviewed and for inmates to be reclassified, if 
appropriate; thus housing-unit security designations can change over 
time. An inmate's classification can also change as needed based on 
compliance with facility rules. These six facilities have the ability 
to secure inmates requiring additional controls such as protective 
custody or restricted communications; for example, the Midwest Joint 
Regional Correctional Facility at Ft. Leavenworth has eight 
specialized soundproof cells within its segregated housing unit that 
can be used for individuals charged with high-profile crimes in order 
to limit their communications with other inmates. 

These six facilities also have space and infrastructure dedicated to 
facility support operations and inmate programs, including 
administrative offices and staff rooms; rooms used to facilitate legal 
and general visits; and on-site medical, dental, and behavioral health 
facilities, although inmates requiring advanced care are transported 
to separate military or civilian medical facilities. In addition, 
these facilities include classrooms for educational, treatment, and 
other group programs; space for religious services; dining areas; 
shops for work programs (for example, wood and textile shops); and 
indoor and outdoor recreation spaces. An inmate's freedom of movement 
around a facility is also based on his or her security custody 
classification; for example, inmates requiring minimum security may 
move throughout the facility unescorted on an as-needed basis, whereas 
inmates classified as needing maximum security require restraints and 
two escorts when moving throughout a facility. 

Factors to Consider if the Guantánamo Bay Detainees Were to Be Held in 
DOD Corrections Facilities in the United States: 

On the basis of our interviews with DOD officials and analyses of 
detention operation documents, we identified several factors that 
would have to be considered in the event that the Guantánamo Bay 
detainees were transferred to existing DOD facilities within the 
United States. According to DOD's 2009 plan and DOD officials we 
interviewed, if detainees were transferred to DOD facilities in the 
United States, DOD would plan on providing all of the same detention 
and support operations in U.S. facilities that are currently 
maintained at Guantánamo Bay. While there is available capacity to 
house the 166 Guantánamo Bay detainees across the six DOD facilities 
included in our scope if detention operations remained the same (see 
table 3), the following four factors, among others such as legal and 
cost considerations, would also have to be considered: (1) ensuring 
compliance with international law and U.S. laws and policies; (2) 
ensuring the continued safety and security of DOD personnel and the 
detainees, as well as the general public; (3) conducting intelligence 
operations; and (4) maintaining current missions and services provided 
by the corrections facilities and associated installations. 

Table 3: Capacity of DOD Level II and III Corrections Facilities as of 
August 2012: 

Naval Consolidated Brig Chesapeake, VA[A]; 
Maximum capacity: 395; 
Current inmates: 78; 
Available capacity: 317; 
Percent occupied: 20%. 

Naval Consolidated Brig Charleston, SC; 
Maximum capacity: 439; 
Current inmates: 102; 
Available capacity: 337; 
Percent occupied: 23%. 

Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar, CA; 
Maximum capacity: 599; 
Current inmates: 310; 
Available capacity: 289; 
Percent occupied: 52%. 

Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Ft. Leavenworth, KS; 
Maximum capacity: 512; 
Current inmates: 215; 
Available capacity: 297; 
Percent occupied: 42%. 

Northwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Joint Base Lewis-
McChord, WA; 
Maximum capacity: 219; 
Current inmates: 123; 
Available capacity: 96; 
Percent occupied: 56%. 

United States Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth, KS[B]; 
Maximum capacity: 515; 
Current inmates: 449; 
Available capacity: 66; 
Percent occupied: 87%. 

Total; 
Maximum capacity: 2,679; 
Current inmates: 1,277; 
Available capacity: 1,402; 
Percent occupied: 48%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] The Naval Consolidated Brig in Chesapeake, Virginia, opened in 
July 2011 as a result of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission process. While it was built as a Level II facility, at the 
time of our review it was being used as a Level I facility. Level I 
facilities are for inmates serving sentences up to 1 year, while Level 
II facilities are for inmates serving sentences of 5 years or fewer. 

[B] In 1994, the Army entered into a memorandum of agreement with the 
BOP to provide space in BOP facilities for 500 UCMJ inmates. According 
to DOD officials, as of April 2012 there were about 300 UCMJ inmates 
being held in BOP facilities. 

[End of table] 

First, U.S. law prohibits the confinement of members of the armed 
forces in "immediate association" with foreign nationals.[Footnote 38] 
To comply with this law, DOD would need to relocate UCMJ inmates if 
detainees were to be moved to existing facilities. Since this 
provision in the law does not define "immediate association," UCMJ 
inmates could potentially be relocated among multiple facilities, or 
within a specific facility, according to DOD officials. Additionally, 
according to DOD officials, for operational and policy reasons DOD 
prohibits the commingling of unprivileged enemy belligerents with 
those convicted of crimes, as seen in its holding of three detainees 
under AUMF authority in the United States. For example, DOD held one 
former Guantánamo Bay detainee at the former Naval Brig Norfolk--which 
is now closed--and subsequently transferred him to Naval Consolidated 
Brig Charleston. DOD officials told us that although this individual 
was a U.S. citizen, because he was taken into custody under AUMF 
authority he was therefore segregated from all UCMJ inmates until his 
transfer to another country.[Footnote 39] According to officials, DOD 
did not relocate inmates to another facility, but instead segregated 
this detainee from all UCMJ inmates at all times. DOD would also have 
to ensure that it maintained separation of detainees and UCMJ inmates 
while still conforming to international and U.S. standards for access 
to medical care and recreation. According to DOD officials, provision 
of on-site medical care for detainees might present a challenge. All 
DOD corrections facilities provide medical services on site, although, 
they are limited in what they are equipped to provide. As a result, 
UCMJ inmates requiring more-complex medical treatments are transported 
to clinics or hospitals, but that might be challenging were Guantánamo 
Bay detainees to be treated in this way in the United States. 

While UCMJ inmates have in the past been colocated in the same 
facilities with a few AUMF detainees, the current configuration of 
these six facilities may not easily accommodate the 166 currently held 
at Guantánamo Bay. In particular this is because DOD's policies for 
separating different categories of inmates and detainees may present 
capacity limitations. DOD policies require that within the same 
facility UCMJ inmates of different gender and security custody 
classifications maintain separate hygiene and sleeping areas, 
including additional segregation for those inmates requiring 
additional controls.[Footnote 40] DOD's Guantánamo Bay standard 
operating procedures also call for segregating different categories of 
detainees from each other. According to DOD, the practice of 
segregating different categories of Guantánamo Bay detainees from each 
other would also be maintained if detainees were transferred to DOD 
facilities in the United States. Currently at Guantánamo Bay the 
following three categories of detainees are confined separately from 
one another, and from all other detainees: (1) detainees designated 
for release, (2) "high-value" detainees, and (3) detainees who have 
been convicted by military commissions. 

Second, according to DOD officials, if detainees were moved to its 
U.S. facilities, DOD would need to continue to ensure the safety and 
security of DOD personnel and the detainees, as well as ensure the 
safety and security of the general public located in close proximity 
to these facilities. According to DOD, maintaining the safety and 
security of its personnel and the detainees is a key mission area at 
Guantánamo Bay. For example, as we observed during our visit to 
Guantánamo Bay, DOD takes several precautions to safeguard its 
personnel's identities from the detainees in an effort to prevent any 
harm from coming to personnel or their families, and to minimize any 
attempt by the detainees to compromise DOD's detention operations. In 
DOD corrections facilities, however, personnel and inmates typically 
interact regularly throughout the course of the day. Additionally, in 
order to conform with international law and DOD policies, detainees 
are to be treated humanely and protected from public curiosity (for 
example, pictures of detainees' faces are not disseminated publicly). 
According to DOD's 2009 analysis, four of the six facilities in our 
review--the two Ft. Leavenworth facilities and the Miramar and 
Charleston brigs--are in public view and this could present a 
disadvantage. For example, the general public might be able to view 
detainees utilizing the outdoor recreation areas, or detainee privacy 
and personnel anonymity may be compromised when transporting detainees 
off-site for medical care. 

Moving the detainees to DOD's U.S. facilities would also necessitate 
the development of operations to ensure the safety of the general 
public. According to DOD officials, the physical location of the 
detainees could become a target for individuals and groups intent on 
harming the detainees, or harming the U.S. military personnel involved 
in detention operations--which could result in unintended harm to the 
general public. DOD's current ability to minimize risks to the public 
is attributable to Guantánamo Bay's remote location and limited 
access, whereas DOD's corrections facilities in the United States are 
generally located on active military installations in close proximity 
to the general public. Further, because the only access to Naval 
Station Guantánamo Bay is by military approved flights (including both 
military flights and commercial flights contracted by DOD) or ships, 
all visitors are cleared in advance of their arrival. If detainees 
were colocated with UCMJ inmates, according to DOD corrections 
officials, DOD may not be able to maintain similar control over 
facility access, specifically because UCMJ inmates are permitted 
visits from family and friends, and access to U.S. military 
installations is not as restricted as access to the installation at 
Guantánamo Bay. DOD may also need to consider increased risk when 
transporting detainees outside of the facility. 

Third, if DOD were to continue to conduct intelligence operations 
similar to those conducted at Guantánamo Bay, according to DOD 
officials, this could require facilities and infrastructure that may 
not be readily available at existing U.S. DOD facilities. For example, 
DOD would require secure facilities equipped with recording equipment 
for conducting detainee interviews, as well as secure workspaces for 
intelligence personnel, documents, and equipment. According to DOD 
officials, its intelligence costs might increase if the detainees were 
moved from Guantánamo Bay to the United States. That is because most 
intelligence information collected at Guantánamo Bay from the 
detainees is used to ensure the protection of U.S. military personnel, 
and relocating the detainees to a U.S. facility, with more exposure 
than Guantánamo Bay, may increase the need for greater protective 
measures resulting in additional costs to implement such measures. 

Fourth, inmates at U.S. DOD facilities provide services to DOD, and 
these and other operations performed on the installation would be 
affected by moving Guantánamo Bay detainees to an existing DOD 
facility. According to DOD, if DOD were to move all UCMJ inmates from 
a facility it might also have to relocate work programs such as 
graphic arts, woodworking, as well as textile repair and embroidery 
for all Army uniforms and related gear. According to DOD, in fiscal 
year 2011 provision of these services by inmates at the U.S. 
Disciplinary Barracks resulted in almost $15 million in offset 
savings. Additionally, according to DOD, locating detention operations 
on an active military installation could present risk to the 
installation's enduring base operations such as administrative and 
training operations. For example, Ft. Leavenworth is home to the Joint 
Center for International Security Force Assistance, and it hosts 
international officials. According to DOD officials, the objection of 
several foreign nations to the Guantánamo Bay detention operations 
could affect these international exchanges. 

DOJ Corrections Facilities in the United States and Factors to 
Consider If They Were to Hold Detainees: 

DOJ, through BOP and the Marshals Service, uses over 2,000 federal, 
state, local, and private facilities to hold about 280,000 individuals 
charged with or convicted of violating federal laws.[Footnote 41] 
Under current U.S. law, DOJ does not consider itself to have authority 
to maintain custody of DOD detainees under the AUMF. According to DOJ 
officials, DOJ does not have plans to transfer any Guantánamo Bay 
detainees to its facilities in the United States, and such transfer is 
prohibited by law. BOP and Marshals Service officials also stated 
that, although no active consideration has been given to the unique 
issues that would arise in connection with transferring Guantánamo Bay 
detainees to the United States, on the basis of their experience they 
could safely and securely house and transport the detainees if 
requested to do so and if given the necessary resources, planning lead 
time, and authorities. However, several factors would need to be 
considered, such as maintaining separation of detainees from the 
current inmate population; ensuring the safety and security of 
facility personnel and the detainees; and formulating new policies and 
practices for housing the detainees in DOJ facilities in the United 
States.[Footnote 42] 

DOJ Corrections Facilities in the United States: 

BOP has 117 corrections facilities in the United States, where as of 
July 2012 it held over 177,000 federal inmates.[Footnote 43] Many of 
these facilities consist of both general-population and segregated 
housing units. BOP confines inmates at all security levels--including 
those inmates convicted of federal crimes related to terrorism or who 
otherwise have a history of or connection to terrorism.[Footnote 44] 
BOP holds inmates in facilities that range from minimum to high 
security, some of which are called administrative facilities and have 
special purposes (e.g., the detention of pretrial offenders, or the 
treatment of inmates with serious or chronic medical problems). 
[Footnote 45] Currently, BOP has only one high-security maximum-
custody facility--its Administrative-Maximum (ADX) facility in 
Florence, Colorado--to contain the most dangerous, violent, or escape-
prone inmates. BOP facility security levels are based on the extent of 
physical security and supervision provided in the facility. BOP 
reports that, in fiscal year 2011, system-wide on average, the per 
inmate costs to house inmates ranges from $73.57 per day in a low-
security prison to $94.87 per day at a high-security prison. The 
Marshals Service is responsible for the custody of about 63,000 
individuals, who are held across 22 BOP facilities, and in about 1,800 
state, local, and private facilities.[Footnote 46] According to 
Marshals Service officials, the security levels of the BOP, state, 
local, and private facilities it uses vary from low security to high 
security and administrative facilities. In addition, a facility's age, 
configuration, and capacity may determine the housing units the 
facility is able to provide. For example, some facilities provide 
dormitory-style housing while others may provide segregated housing 
units. 

As of August 2012, BOP and the Marshals Service had custody of at 
least 377 inmates charged with or convicted of crimes related to 
terrorism, or who otherwise had a history of or connection to 
terrorism. BOP had 373 of these inmates housed in 98 of its 
facilities, and the Marshals Service had the remaining 4 inmates 
housed in 3 different facilities--2 inmates were in a BOP facility, 1 
was in a privately contracted detention facility, and 1 was in a 
county facility.[Footnote 47] See figure 8 for the locations of all 
BOP facilities, including the 98 facilities holding individuals with a 
history of or connection to terrorism; and see table 4 for the number 
of BOP inmates with a history of or connection to terrorism by 
facility security level. 

Figure 8: Location of BOP Facilities in the United States: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Map depicts the location of the following: 

Bureau of Prisons facility; 
Bureau of Prisons facility holding individuals with a history of 
connection to terrorism. 

Source: BOP, GAO, and Map Resources (map). 

Note: This map excludes BOP minimum-security facilities. 

[End of figure] 

Table 4: BOP Inmates with a History of or Connection to Terrorism by 
Facility Security Level as of August 2012: 

BOP facility security level: Minimum; 
Number of individuals with a history of or connection to terrorism[A]: 
0; 
Number of facilities that hold individuals with a history of or 
connection to terrorism: 0. 

BOP facility security level: Low; 
Number of individuals with a history of or connection to terrorism[A]: 
70; 
Number of facilities that hold individuals with a history of or 
connection to terrorism: 28. 

BOP facility security level: Medium; 
Number of individuals with a history of or connection to terrorism[A]: 
123; 
Number of facilities that hold individuals with a history of or 
connection to terrorism: 38. 

BOP facility security level: High; 
Number of individuals with a history of or connection to terrorism[A]: 
42; 
Number of facilities that hold individuals with a history of or 
connection to terrorism: 16. 

BOP facility security level: Administrative[B]; 
Number of individuals with a history of or connection to terrorism[A]: 
138; 
Number of facilities that hold individuals with a history of or 
connection to terrorism: 16. 

BOP facility security level: Total; 
Number of individuals with a history of or connection to terrorism[A]: 
373; 
Number of facilities that hold individuals with a history of or 
connection to terrorism: 98. 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data. 

[A] BOP identified these inmates by including offenders who have been 
charged with or convicted of either a terrorism offense, such as 
receiving terrorist training, or an offense with a documented 
connection to terrorism, such as using the proceeds of criminal 
activity to support a terrorist group. In addition, regardless of the 
nature of the offense, BOP included inmates who are engaged in, or are 
under investigation for engaging in, radicalization and recruitment 
activities. 

[B] Administrative facilities are institutions with different security 
levels, including maximum security. They also have special purposes, 
such as the detention of pretrial offenders, or the treatment of 
inmates with serious or chronic medical problems. 

[End of table] 

According to DOJ officials, although BOP and the Marshals Service have 
the correctional expertise to safely and securely house detainees with 
a history of or nexus to terrorism, DOJ has not made preparations for 
housing Guantánamo Bay detainees, nor does it have plans to do so. 

DOJ Security Classification Policies: 

BOP has security policies that govern where inmates, including those 
with a history of or connection to terrorism, are sent for their terms 
of incarceration. While the Marshals Service does not assign specific 
security levels to individual inmates, Marshals Service officials told 
us they consider all inmates under their custody as "high-risk" for 
the purposes of prisoner handling and transportation.[Footnote 48] 
According to BOP, the first step to determine which security level is 
appropriate for the inmate is "scoring" the inmate. This is done by 
taking into consideration information about the inmate from several 
sources, including the sentencing court, the Marshals Service, and 
other federal agencies. BOP also considers other factors such as the 
inmate's membership in a specific disruptive group, the inmate's 
history of violence, and inmate programming. On the basis of this 
information, BOP assigns a score to each inmate. Generally, an inmate 
who receives a higher classification score will be placed in a higher-
security facility. In addition to scoring, BOP also considers other 
factors such as the inmate's medical needs, the level of overcrowding 
at a facility, and whether an inmate may need to be separated from 
others, before assigning the inmate to a facility. 

The Marshals Service generally defers to the facility holding the 
inmate to conduct a risk assessment on the basis of information 
provided to facility officials by the Marshals Service and other law-
enforcement agencies, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and courts to 
determine the inmate's appropriate custody classification level. The 
Marshals Service can also recommend that high-profile inmates, such as 
some recognized as terrorists, be held in isolation. While in Marshals 
Service custody, the one Guantánamo Bay detainee who was transferred 
to the United States in 2009 was placed in a segregated housing unit 
in a BOP facility in New York City. In another case, involving a 
terrorist suspect associated with the September 11 attacks, the 
Marshals Service made a special agreement with the local facility 
where the suspect was being held to provide increased security. For 
example, Marshals Service officials stated that they arranged for 24/7 
monitoring of this individual, a private cell, and an additional cell 
for use by his legal team to conduct meetings.[Footnote 49] 

DOJ may also apply additional security procedures for an individual on 
the basis of security concerns that are not reflected in the 
classification process; these exceptions are called special 
administrative measures. Special administrative measures, which must 
be authorized by the Attorney General, primarily limit an inmate's 
communications with other inmates and the outside world (e.g., 
separation from other inmates, limited telephone privileges, and 
visitation rights).[Footnote 50] These measures may affect the BOP 
facility or housing unit where the inmate is placed. The Attorney 
General may authorize special administrative measures when there is 
the presence of substantial risk that an inmate's communications or 
contact with others could result in death or serious bodily injury to 
persons, or substantial damage to property. Generally, pretrial 
inmates subject to the provisions for special administrative measures 
would be held at facilities that are located within the Judicial 
District in which they have proceedings. Postconviction inmates 
subject to the provisions for special administrative measures would 
generally be held at ADX due to the requirements of the order that 
dictates specific controls on their housing and communications. 

DOJ Conditions of Confinement: 

Conditions of confinement for inmates in BOP facilities can vary on 
the basis of the facility's security level, inmate behavior, and other 
factors. BOP policies state that all facilities, security level 
notwithstanding, must provide the same basic conditions of 
confinement, such as clean housing units; nutritionally adequate meals 
that meet dietary requirements (such as vegetarian or religious diet); 
access to educational, occupational, and leisure time programming; 
access to work opportunities; and basic medical and mental health 
care.[Footnote 51] All BOP facilities are to provide inmates with 
access to a chaplain and basic religious items according to their 
religious beliefs. Most inmates in general-population housing units, 
regardless of security level, are allowed outside of their cells 
approximately 16 to 17 hours per day. Generally during this time, 
inmates may move freely within the housing unit and may move to other 
areas of the facility (such as the dining or work areas) through 
controlled or supervised movements throughout the day. In low-security 
facilities, inmates live in dormitories and are not confined to a 
cell. Typically, general-population inmates at all security levels 
consume their meals in a common dining area, such as a dining hall. 
Inmates in general-population units also have mail, visitation, and 
telephone privileges that are subject to monitoring.[Footnote 52] In 
addition, BOP requires all its facilities to be accredited by the 
American Correctional Association. 

BOP also operates specialized housing units that allow it to separate 
inmates from the general population. This specialized housing includes 
its ADX facility, its Communications Management Units, as well as 
other units.[Footnote 53] For example, BOP's most-dangerous inmates 
are placed in ADX because they are perceived as a risk to the 
institutional security of other corrections facilities. Some of the 
373 terrorism-related individuals in BOP facilities are confined in 
cells alone approximately 23 hours a day at ADX. According to BOP 
officials, as of February 2012, ADX held 41 of the 373 BOP inmates 
charged with or convicted of federal crimes related to terrorism. ADX 
has multiple housing units that provide a range of conditions of 
confinement on the basis of the inmate's security needs, including the 
following: 

* Control Unit: The control unit is ADX's most-restrictive unit and 
houses BOP's most-disruptive inmates, who are allowed 7 hours of out-
of-cell recreation in individual recreation areas per week. Control 
unit inmates are also allowed one 15-minute phone call and up to five 
noncontact visits per month. 

* Special Security Unit: Generally inmates that have special 
administrative measures are held in the Special Security Unit. These 
inmates are subject to restrictive conditions specific to their 
special administrative measures that can include limited physical 
contact with other inmates; as well as limited communications, 
visitation, and phone calls. In addition, all inmate telephone calls 
and visits are contemporaneously recorded and monitored by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and written social correspondence is 
monitored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well. Special 
Security Unit inmates are allowed a minimum of two 15-minute phone 
calls and up to five visits per month. 

* General-Population and Step-Down Units: According to BOP officials, 
the majority of inmates at ADX are held either in general-population 
units or in the step-down unit. The step-down unit is a four-phase 
program in which inmates may progress from more-restrictive to less-
restrictive phases over a minimum of 36 months on the basis of good 
conduct. For example, inmates in the step-down unit may interact with 
other inmates during their recreation hours and receive more telephone 
time as they progress through the phases. Both general-population and 
step-down unit inmates are allowed a minimum of two 15-minute phone 
calls and up to five visits per month. 

According to BOP officials, all inmates at ADX are generally kept 
segregated from each other; they consume all their meals inside their 
cells, except for those in phases three and four of the step-down 
unit, in which inmates may share their meals with a small group of 
other inmates. Like all BOP facilities, ADX can provide a religiously 
observant diet. A full-time chaplain provides for inmates' religious 
needs, but BOP officials explained that group prayers are not allowed 
at ADX. BOP provides most educational, religious, and recreational 
programs to ADX inmates in their cells through staff visits or by 
closed circuit television or radios located inside the inmates' cells. 
See figures 9 and 10 for examples of a segregated housing unit and 
recreation areas. 

Figure 9: Step-Down Housing Unit, "Supermax," U.S. Administrative 
Maximum Facility, Florence, Colorado: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: BOP. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Outdoor Recreation Area, "Supermax," U.S. Administrative 
Maximum Facility, Florence, Colorado: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: BOP. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to ADX, some individuals with a history of or connection 
to terrorism are held in Communications Management Units, which are 
administrative units located within two medium-security BOP 
facilities, where they are allowed to interact with the other inmates 
in the unit for up to 15 hours a day.[Footnote 54] As of February 
2012, of the 373 inmates with a history of or connection to terrorism, 
44 were held in these units. In 2006 and 2008, BOP established these 
units to confine inmates who require increased monitoring of all 
communications between inmates and with persons outside the prison. 
[Footnote 55] Communications Management Units require 100 percent live 
monitoring of inmates' telephone calls and social visits, and review 
of all incoming and outgoing social mail.[Footnote 56] Inmates are 
allowed two 15-minute telephone calls per week and 8 hours of visiting 
time per month, although no physical contact is allowed during visits. 
All telephone calls and social visits are live monitored and recorded, 
and they must occur in English only, unless the call is previously 
scheduled for and conducted through simultaneous translation 
monitoring. Other than increased communications monitoring, BOP 
officials stated that conditions of confinement in these units are the 
same as conditions of confinement for inmates in other medium-security 
general-population housing units, including access to medical and 
mental health services; meals meeting inmate dietary requirements 
served in a common dining area; access to recreation in a common area 
daily up to 15 hours per day; religious service opportunities; and 
access to leisure and law library services, table games, television in 
the common areas, and some aerobic exercise equipment. See figure 11 
for a photographic example of a Communications Management Unit cell. 

Figure 11: Communications Management Unit Cell, Terre Haute, Indiana: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: BOP. 

[End of figure] 

Marshals Service policy requires that the facilities it uses to detain 
inmates meet minimum conditions of confinement, including 24-hour 
staff supervision; three adequate meals per day; availability of 
adequate emergency medical coverage 24 hours a day; adequate security, 
sanitation, and hygiene services; and access to prescription drugs. In 
addition, Marshals Service policy states Marshals should seek to 
develop intergovernmental agreements with facilities that can provide 
special prisoner services, such as mental health care. 

Factors to Consider if the Guantánamo Bay Detainees Were to Be Held in 
DOJ Corrections Facilities in the United States: 

As previously stated, DOJ does not consider itself to have authority 
to maintain custody of DOD detainees under the AUMF and has no plans 
to house Guantánamo Bay detainees at its U.S. facilities; and BOP and 
the Marshals Service would need additional statutory authority to take 
custody of Guantánamo Bay detainees. If prohibitions against 
transferring the Guantánamo Bay detainees to the United States were 
eliminated, and BOP and the Marshals Service were authorized to 
conduct military detention under the AUMF in U.S. facilities, our 
interviews with DOJ officials and analysis of detention-operation 
documentation identified several factors--among others such as 
funding, personnel resources, and planning time--that would need to be 
considered. These factors include (1) formulation of policies and 
practices for housing the detainees; (2) ensuring the safety of 
facility personnel, the detainees, and the general public; (3) 
identifying adequate space for housing the detainees and maintaining 
separation of detainees from the current inmate population. 

First, according to DOJ officials, new operational policies and 
practices would need to be formulated for housing the detainees in BOP 
facilities in the United States or in other types of facilities used 
by the Marshals Service for detention purposes. BOP and the Marshals 
Service established existing policies and practices pursuant to 
federal criminal statutes specifically authorizing them to take 
custody of individuals charged with or convicted of violating a 
federal law.[Footnote 57] In addition, BOP follows American 
Correctional Association standards for care and treatment of inmates 
convicted or charged under U.S. law. According to DOJ officials, these 
existing policies and practices would not be sufficient if DOJ 
received new authority to conduct law-of-war detention. New policies 
and practices that would be needed include standards governing (1) the 
holding of detainees who have not been charged with or convicted of 
violating U.S. law, (2) where and how each category of detainee would 
be housed, (3) religious and cultural accommodations, (4) visitation 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and (5) intelligence 
gathering and use. 

Second, according to BOP and Marshals Service officials, additional 
procedures and infrastructure would be required governing where and 
how each category of detainee would be held, including their 
accommodations. According to Marshals Service officials, they may have 
to adopt additional measures to transport detainees to and from BOP 
facilities, which could have implications on detainee and public 
safety. For example, Marshals Service officials explained that when it 
had a high-profile prisoner associated with the September 11 attacks 
in its custody, it used extra security vehicles and additional staff 
to help ensure safety and security during transport. 

Third, according to BOP officials, given its current facility capacity 
rates, finding capacity in its facilities for the Guantánamo Bay 
detainee population may present challenges. Overall, according to BOP, 
as of August 2012, its facilities system wide were 38 percent 
overcrowded, and crowding is a relatively higher concern at facilities 
with higher security levels, where, according to BOP officials, 
Guantánamo Bay detainees would likely be held. Despite current 
overcrowding, BOP officials said that if they had custody of the 
detainees, with adequate resources, they could accommodate the 
detainees.[Footnote 58] 

Finally, BOP officials we interviewed said that if they were to add 
166 detainees to their facilities, keeping them completely separated 
from the existing inmate population would have an effect on BOP's 
operations in the facility or facilities where the detainees were 
placed. For example, if BOP needed to confine detainees to single 
cells, existing inmates would have to be moved to create space for the 
detainees, which could require that BOP triple bunk some of the 
current inmate population. According to BOP officials, increasing the 
number of inmates per cell can affect BOP's ability to ensure the 
safety and security of its personnel, inmates, and institutions. 
Another challenge BOP would face in maintaining separation of 
detainees and inmates would be in the provision of inmate-provided 
services including food preparation, commissary operations, and 
laundry, educational, and religious services. According to BOP 
officials, if detainees were to have access to these services, BOP 
would require additional personnel to ensure separation between the 
detainees and the inmates. For example, while most general-population 
inmates go to a shared dining hall for their meals--which can be 
served and prepared by other inmates--to avoid interaction with 
inmates, detainees would likely not be able to eat meals in shared 
dining halls, or in dining facilities where other inmates work. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DOJ, and the Department of 
Homeland Security for comment. The Department of Homeland Security 
declined to provide comments, and DOD provided technical comments that 
were incorporated as appropriate. DOJ provided technical comments as 
well as a letter making additional written comments, which are 
reproduced in appendix IV and were incorporated as appropriate. 

In its letter, DOJ stated that, generally speaking, BOP and the 
Marshals Service have the correctional expertise to safely and 
securely house detainees with a nexus to terrorism. However, DOJ 
reiterated that current law prohibits the transfer of detainees to the 
United States; DOJ has not made preparations for housing Guantánamo 
Bay detainees, and does not have plans to do so. DOJ also stated that, 
given these factors, any discussion of housing detainees in the United 
States is hypothetical and raises legal, policy, and resource issues 
that descriptions of current policies and practices contained in this 
report cannot fully address. We agree that given the legal 
restrictions on transferring detainees to the United States and DOJ's 
stated policy that it does not plan to transfer detainees to the 
United States, our assessment of factors to be considered if DOD or 
DOJ facilities were used to hold detainees is hypothetical. Our report 
provides a descriptive discussion of several factors that would need 
to be considered should the current legal restrictions be discontinued 
and detainees were transferred to the United States, but does not 
purport to provide a comprehensive list of all factors. Our report 
also clearly states the current legal restrictions and policy 
decisions against transferring detainees to the United States, and 
makes no recommendations on the legal and policy issues surrounding 
Guantánamo Bay detainees and whether they should be transferred to the 
United States. 

DOJ also recommended that we delete Table 4 showing the number of BOP 
inmates with a history of or connection to terrorism by facility 
security level. We believe the table accurately demonstrates a point 
DOJ makes in its comment letter; namely that BOP and the Marshals 
Service have the correctional expertise to safely and securely house 
detainees with a history of or connection to terrorism. In response to 
DOJ's comment, we added language clarifying that, while DOJ has this 
expertise, DOJ has not made preparations or plans to house Guantánamo 
detainees. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. we will send copies to appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or LeporeB@gao.gov, or David 
C. Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Brian J. Lepore: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management Team: 

Signed by: 

David C. Maurer: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Team: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

The scope of our work was to provide a descriptive review of the 
detention facilities and infrastructure at Guantánamo Bay, existing 
military and civilian corrections facilities in the United States, and 
an overview of factors that might need to be considered if Guantánamo 
Bay detainees were moved to facilities in the United States. Hence, 
our review did not include an evaluation of whether specific U.S. 
facilities would be suitable for holding Guantánamo Bay detainees. Our 
description of what factors would need to be considered does not 
include legal issues related to the Guantánamo Bay detainees that are 
currently being adjudicated, such as habeas corpus, and right to 
counsel. We limited our review to corrections facilities in the United 
States operated by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP) and federal, state, local, and private facilities used 
by the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service). Additionally, we 
interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security who 
told us that its detention facilities are used to detain foreign 
nationals who are awaiting deportation from the United States, not 
detainees brought to the United States for law-of-war detention, 
pretrial detention, or postconviction incarceration. Thus we 
subsequently removed the Department of Homeland Security from the 
scope of our work. 

To describe the history and current status of Guantánamo Bay detention 
operations, facilities, and infrastructure, we reviewed relevant 
international law and U.S. laws and policies relating to DOD's 
detention operations, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and relevant sections of Title 10 of the U.S. 
Code. We also reviewed executive orders pertaining to Guantánamo Bay 
detention operations, an interagency report on detainees' status, and 
DOD reports on conditions of detention at Guantánamo Bay. We conducted 
a site visit to the detention and support facilities at the U.S. Naval 
Station Guantánamo Bay, where we interviewed officials and observed 
operations at Camps 5, 6, Echo, and Iguana, and toured former camps. 
Members of the team also received a detailed briefing on Camp 7 and 
reviewed photographs of the facility. We met with officials and toured 
the detention-support facilities including the courtroom complex, 
media-support facility, detainee hospital, behavioral health center, 
kitchen facility, intelligence operations-support facilities, 
information-technology facilities, visitor lodging, and staff housing. 
We also met with officials responsible for providing legal and 
International Committee of the Red Cross support. In addition, we 
interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Joint Staff, U.S. Southern Command, Joint Task Force-Guantánamo, 
Congressional Research Service, and American Correctional Association. 
In order to determine the average cost to operate Guantánamo Bay 
detention facilities and support operations, we obtained data from 
U.S. Southern Command on funding that the U.S. Army and U.S. Southern 
Command provide for detention operations at Guantánamo Bay. We met 
with officials to clarify funding sources and totals, as well as the 
cost categories not included in these data, and analyzed the data to 
determine average funding among fiscal years 2008 through 2012. We 
conducted a data-reliability analysis of these data by asking detailed 
questions of U.S. Southern Command regarding the origins and means of 
collection of these data, and determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To describe DOD corrections facilities in the United States and 
factors to consider in the event that they were to hold Guantánamo Bay 
detainees, we focused the scope of our review on DOD's Level II and 
Level III facilities. DOD has two Level II regional corrections 
facilities and three Level II consolidated brigs used for pretrial 
confinement and for inmates with sentences ranging from 1 to 5 years, 
and one Level III facility used for inmates with sentences from 5 
years to life, and inmates sentenced to death. We excluded DOD's Level 
I facilities, because they are not intended for confinement of 
individuals for more than 1 year. We reviewed relevant laws such as 
the Detainee Treatment Act, the Military Commissions Act, and the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice; and DOD documents that govern its 
corrections operations and facilities, such as DOD directives on the 
administration of military corrections facilities and Army and Navy 
corrections manuals and regulations. In order to determine overall 
capacity levels in DOD Level II and Level III corrections facilities, 
we obtained and analyzed facility capacity data from the Army and the 
Navy. We conducted a data-reliability analysis of these data by 
obtaining information from DOD officials on how the data are collected 
and used, and what internal controls the data are subject to. We 
determined that they were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In 
addition, we conducted site visits to the Naval Consolidated Brig 
Chesapeake, Virginia (Level II); the Midwest Joint Regional 
Correctional Facility, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (Level II); and the 
United States Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (Level 
III). We interviewed officials and observed operations at these 
facilities. We selected these facilities because they represent both 
Level II and Level III facility operations; both Army and Navy 
operating procedures; and because they reflect a range of housing 
configurations--including both segregated and general-population 
housing units. In addition, we interviewed officials responsible for 
the management of DOD corrections facilities, including officials from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Army Corrections 
Command, and Bureau of Naval Personnel. 

To identify factors for consideration if the Guantánamo Bay detainees 
were transferred to DOD facilities in the United States, we reviewed 
analyses from 2009 conducted by DOD to determine whether its 
facilities were equipped to conduct Guantánamo Bay detainee 
operations. We also interviewed an official that worked on these 
analyses to identify what factors and facilities may have changed 
since 2009. Because these analyses were based on the assumption that 
all detention operations--including intelligence operations and 
military commission support--would remain the same, we maintained this 
assumption in our description of factors requiring consideration in 
the event that Guantánamo Bay detainees were moved to DOD facilities 
in the United States. Therefore, using this assumption as our 
framework, we identified challenges DOD might face in conforming to 
all relevant U.S. laws and policies, international laws, as well as 
DOD corrections policies and operating procedures if Guantánamo Bay 
detainees were transferred to DOD facilities. We also identified 
operational challenges that DOD might face in moving its detention 
operations as they currently exist to the United States. Factors we 
describe in this section provide a summary of several key issues DOD 
may need to consider, and is not intended to be an all-inclusive list. 
Additionally, we are issuing a classified version of this report. That 
version includes an additional appendix that provides a discussion of 
Guantánamo Bay facilities used for classified operations that would 
need to be considered if the detainees were transferred to facilities 
in the United States. 

To describe Department of Justice (DOJ) corrections facilities in the 
United States we reviewed relevant laws and policies, such as federal 
laws and regulations governing detention pending trial in federal 
court, imprisonment of federal offenders, and BOP management and 
operations; BOP and Marshals Service policies, such as the BOP 
policies on inmate classification and management and a Marshals 
Service directive on prisoner detention and housing. We also 
interviewed officials from BOP, the Marshals Service, and the Office 
of the Deputy Attorney General. We conducted site visits to and 
interviewed officials at four BOP facilities including: U.S. 
Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas; U.S. Penitentiary, Lewisburg, 
Pennsylvania; Federal Correctional Complex, Florence, Colorado; and 
Federal Correctional Complex, Allenwood, Pennsylvania. We selected 
these facilities because they provide examples of various types of 
housing units and security levels, including segregated and general-
population housing units. In order to determine overall capacity 
levels in DOJ facilities, we obtained and analyzed facility capacity 
data from BOP and the Marshals Service. To assess the reliability of 
the BOP and Marshals Service data on facility capacity, we reviewed 
agency documentation, received a demonstration of BOP's facility 
database, and interviewed BOP and Marshals Service officials. We 
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To describe the number and locations of inmates in BOP and Marshals 
Service custody charged with or convicted of terrorism-related crimes, 
we obtained inmate data from both agencies. Both BOP and the Marshals 
Service determined the criteria for inmates identified as charged with 
or convicted of terrorism-related crimes. BOP identified these inmates 
by including offenders who have been charged with or convicted of 
either a terrorism offense, such as receiving terrorist training, or 
an offense with a documented connection to terrorism, such as using 
the proceeds of criminal activity to support a terrorist group. In 
addition, regardless of the nature of the offense, BOP included 
inmates who are engaged in, or are under investigation for engaging 
in, radicalization and recruitment activities. BOP described the group 
of inmates for which they provided data as inmates with a history of 
or nexus (connection) to terrorism. While the Marshals Service does 
not classify individuals in its custody as having terrorism-related 
charges, it used other sources, including media reports and the nature 
of the pending charges, to identify individuals in its custody who 
might be considered to have such charges. To describe factors that 
would need to be considered if Guantánamo Bay detainees were 
transferred to DOJ facilities in the United States, we assumed that 
operations or conditions of confinement at facilities used by BOP or 
the Marshals Service may be the same as those as currently at 
Guantánamo Bay. While it is likely that conditions of confinement and 
related procedures for the detainees would change if they were moved 
into DOJ facilities, it is unclear what changes would occur. Thus, for 
the purposes of this report, when discussing factors for consideration 
if the detainees were moved to DOJ facilities, we assumed that most 
conditions and procedures would remain the same. Therefore, using this 
assumption as our framework, we identified challenges DOJ might face 
in conforming to relevant U.S. laws and policies, as well as DOJ 
corrections policies and operating procedures if Guantánamo Bay 
detainees were transferred to DOJ facilities. We also identified 
operational challenges that DOJ might face in providing the same scope 
and level of detention operations at its facilities in the United 
States as DOD provides at Guantánamo Bay. Factors we describe in this 
section provide a summary of several key issues DOJ may need to 
consider, and is not intended to be an all-inclusive list. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to November 2012 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Summary of Key Legislation Affecting the Potential to 
Transfer Guantánamo Bay Detainees to the United States: 

In addition to legal issues pertaining to the authority of civilian 
agencies to conduct military detention operations, since Executive 
Order 13492 was signed in January 2009, a number of statutes have 
limited or prohibited the transfer of Guantánamo Bay detainees to U.S. 
facilities. 

Legislation: Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009; 
Pub. L. No. 111-32 (2009); 
Date enacted: June 24, 2009; 
Effect on transfer of detainees: Prohibits the use of federal funds to 
transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees into the United States, except for 
prosecution or detention during legal proceedings, and requires the 
President to report this transfer to Congress 45 days in advance and 
provide detailed plans regarding potential risks and mitigation 
strategies. 

Legislation: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010; 
Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009); 
Date enacted: October 28, 2009; 
Effect on transfer of detainees: During the specified period, 
prohibits the use of funds made available to Department of Defense 
(DOD) to release detainees into the United States, and limits the 
authority of DOD to transfer detainees to the United States until 
after the President submits a comprehensive plan including, for 
example, potential risks, costs, and mitigation strategies for each 
detainee to be transferred. 

Legislation: Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010; 
Pub. L. No. 111-117 (2009); 
Date enacted: December 16, 2009; 
Effect on transfer of detainees: Prohibits the use of federal funds to 
transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees into the United States, except for 
prosecution or detention during legal proceedings, and requires the 
President to report this transfer to Congress 45 days in advance and 
provide detailed plans regarding potential risks and mitigation 
strategies. 

Legislation: Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2011; 
Pub. L. No. 111-383 (2011); 
Date enacted: January 7, 2011; 
Effect on transfer of detainees: Prohibits the use of funds authorized 
for fiscal year 2011 to transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees to the 
United States. Prohibits the use of funds to construct or modify 
facilities in the United States for the purpose of detaining or 
imprisoning detainees under DOD control. 

Legislation: Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2011; 
Pub. L. No. 112-10 (2011); 
Date enacted: April 15, 2011; 
Effect on transfer of detainees: Prohibits the use of federal funds to 
transfer or assist in the transfer of Guantánamo Bay detainees into 
the United States, unless the detainee is a U.S. citizen or a member 
of the U.S. Armed Forces. 

Legislation: Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2012 and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012; 
Pub. L. No. 112-55 (2011) and Pub. L. No. 112-74 (2011); 
Date enacted: November 18, 2011 and December 23, 2011; 
Effect on transfer of detainees: Both laws prohibit the use of federal 
funds to transfer or assist in the transfer of Guantánamo Bay 
detainees into the United States, unless the detainee is a U.S. 
citizen or a member of the U.S. Armed Forces. 

Legislation: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012; 
Pub. L. No. 112-81(2011); 
Date enacted: December 31, 2011; 
Effect on transfer of detainees: Prohibits the use of funds authorized 
for fiscal year 2012 to transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees to the 
United States. Prohibits the use of funds to construct or modify 
facilities in the United States for the purpose of detaining or 
imprisoning detainees under DOD control. 

Source: GAO analysis of relevant laws. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Noninteractive Timeline of Guantánamo Bay Detention 
Operations: 

[A] Facilities; 
[B] Detainees; 
[C] Key Executive Actions. 
[D] Key Legislation. 

2001: 

January: 
Detainees begin arriving at Guantanamo Bay[B]; 

November: 
Start of military detention overseas[C]: 
* Start of overseas military detention operations. 

December: 
Selection of Guantanamo Bay as a detention site[C]: 
* President selected Naval Station Guantanamo Bay as site of long-term 
military detention operations. 

2002: 

January: 
Camp X-Ray opens[A]; 

April: 
Camp X-Ray closes[A]; 
Camp 1 opens[A]; 

September 18: 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force[D]. 

October: 
Camps 2 and 3 open[A]; 

2003: 

February: 
Camp 4 opens[A]; 

June: 
Guantanamo Bay reaches peak population, approximately 680[B]; 

2004: 

April: 
Camp 5 opens[A]; 

October: 
Camp Echo opens[A]; 

2005: 

December 30: 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005[D]. 

2006: 

September: 
Camp 7 opens[A]; 

October 17: 
Military Commissions Act of 2006[D]. 

2008: 

March: 
Last detainee transferred to Guantanamo Bay[B]; 

August: 
Camp Iguana opens[A]; 

2009: 

January: 
Population of 242[B]; 

January 22: 
Executive Order 13492[C]: 
* Directed (1) the closure of detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay 
by January 22, 2010, (2) an interagency review of the disposition 
options for all detainees, and (3) a review of conditions of 
confinement at Guantanamo Bay detention facilities. 

February: 
Report on conditions of confinement at Guantanamo Bay issued[C]: 
* As directed by Executive Order 13492, a DOD team led by Admiral 
Patrick Walsh reviewed conditions of confinement, based on 27 
categories, at Guantanamo Bay detention facilities. The team 
determined that conditions conformed with Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, and made recommendations to further enhance 
conditions. 

June: 
One detainee transferred to Department of Justice for prosecution[B]; 

June 24: 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009[D]. 

October 28: 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010[D]: 
* Includes the Military Commissions Act of 2009. 

December 16: 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010[D]. 

2010: 

January 22: 
Guantanamo Review Task Force Report[C]: 
* As directed by Executive Order 13492, an interagency task force 
determined disposition categories (referred for prosecution, detention 
until hostilities cease, conditional detention, and cleared for 
transfer) for all detainees. 

March: 
Camps 2 and 3 close[A]; 

2011: 

January 7: 
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011[D]. 

January: 
Camp 4 closes for repair[A]; 

February: 
Camp 1 closes[A]; 

March 7, 2011: 
Executive Order 13567[C]: 
* Directed the creation of Periodic Review Boards and establishment of 
a process to review continued detention at Guantanamo Bay. 

April 15: 
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2011[D]. 

November 18: 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012[D]. 

December 23: 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012[D]. 

December 31: 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012[D]. 

2012: 

September: 
Population of 166[B]. 

Source: DOD, DOJ, and GAO analysis of select executive and legislative 
actions. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

Note: Page numbers in the draft may differ from those in this report. 

U.S. Department of Justice: 
Washington, D.C. 20530: 

November 6, 2012: 

David C. Maurer: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Team: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Maurer: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Government 
Accountability Office's draft Report to the Chair of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Guantanamo Bay Detainees: Facilities and 
Factors for Consideration if Detainees Were Brought to the United 
States. On January 12, 2012, the GAO first informed the Department of 
Justice of the engagement, which GAO initiated after receiving a 
request from Senator Feinstein. In providing comments on the draft 
report, the Department made clear that it has no plans to house any 
Guantanamo detainees in U.S. facilities. 

As the draft report indicates, following standard procedures, GAO 
teams requested to speak to various Department offices, along with 
other agencies, to obtain technical assistance and information 
relevant to GAO's report. The Department provided such assistance, 
which has consisted of describing existing practice regarding the 
housing of criminal detainees, resource issues, and a description of 
certain legal authorities relevant to the report. The Department was 
not asked to provide, and did not provide, its views on policy issues 
that would arise if serious consideration were given to transferring 
Guantanamo detainees to the United States — issues that the report 
does not address. 

The Department appreciates GAO's effort to incorporate into the report 
many of the detailed comments the Department provided on September 19, 
2012, and the separate technical comments that have been provided by 
the Bureau of Prisons and United States Marshals Service. To the 
extent that GAO declined to incorporate some of the comments contained 
in the September 19 letter, the Department respectfully incorporates 
them here. Specifically, the Department continues to recommend the 
deletion of Table 4 on page 34 of the draft report, regarding the 
types of facilities used to house inmates with a nexus to terrorism, 
because the information is open to significant misinterpretation and 
its relevance to the detainees at issue in this report is unclear. 
Also, on page 31 we recommend changing the third sentence to reflect 
accurately the Department's position, as follows: "According to DOJ 
officials, DOJ does not have plans to transfer any Guantanamo Bay 
detainees to its facilities in the United States, and such transfer is 
prohibited by law." 

In addition, the Department reiterates the broader points made in the 
September 19 comments. As the draft report states, current law 
prohibits the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the United States. 
Importantly, because current law bars the transfer of the detainees to 
the United States, and such transfers are not being considered, the 
Department's comments in response to GAO's hypothetical questions 
about housing such detainees in the United States did not address all 
of the issues that the Department would likely identify if such 
transfers were seriously considered. Accordingly, although the Bureau 
of Prisons and United States Marshals Service assisted GAO in 
obtaining an accurate account of current policies relating to U.S. 
facilities, procedures, and the prison population, any decision by 
Congress and the Executive Branch to transfer Guantanamo detainees to 
the United States would raise legal, policy, and resource issues that 
descriptions of current policies and practices cannot fully address. 
Any information provided by the Department bearing on how such a 
decision would implicate Department resources or authorities is 
necessarily tentative because the Department has not had occasion to 
evaluate those issues in detail. 

The only conclusion supportable by the information provided by the 
Department is that, generally speaking, the Bureau of Prisons and 
Marshals Service have the correctional expertise to safely and 
securely house detainees with a nexus to terrorism. However, the 
Department has not made preparations for housing Guantanamo detainees, 
does not have plans for doing so, has not recently explored the issues 
that would need to be considered, and would require adequate lead time 
and considerable resources to house Guantanamo detainees. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Lee J. Lofthus: 
Assistant Attorney General for Administration: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or LeporeB@gao.gov: 

David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contacts named above, Alissa Czyz (Assistant 
Director), Edward J. George, Jr. (Assistant Director), Carla Brown, 
Jennifer Bryant, Frances Cook, Michele Fejfar, Gregory Marchand, Tida 
Reveley, Kelly Rubin, Jennifer Spence, Amie Steele, Cheryl Weissman, 
and Yee Wong made significant contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Exec. Order No. 13492, Review and Disposition of Individuals 
Detained At the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention 
Facilities, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 

[2] Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103 (2009). See appendix II for 
descriptions of subsequent statutes. 

[3] For purposes of this report, we use the word "detainees" to 
collectively refer to the individuals currently housed at Guantánamo 
Bay. As discussed later in the report, the status of these individuals 
varies. 

[4] In providing information addressing these objectives, DOJ and DOD 
officials stated that the two agencies do not have plans to transfer 
any Guantánamo Bay detainees to their facilities in the United States 
and that such transfer is currently prohibited by law. 

[5] The constitutional privilege to seek a writ of habeas corpus 
allows a detained person to challenge the legality of his or her 
detention. In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Supreme 
Court found that the detainees at Guantánamo Bay have the habeas 
corpus privilege, and a number of habeas cases are ongoing in the 
federal courts. 

[6] Litigation is ongoing regarding the extent of detainee access to 
counsel, and other issues. 

[7] BOP identified these inmates by including offenders who have been 
charged with or convicted of either a terrorism offense, such as 
receiving terrorist training, or an offense with a documented 
connection to terrorism, such as using the proceeds of criminal 
activity to support a terrorist group. In addition, regardless of the 
nature of the offense, BOP included inmates who are engaged in, or are 
under investigation for engaging in, radicalization and recruitment 
activities. BOP referred to this entire category of inmates as inmates 
with a history of or nexus (connection) to terrorism. 

[8] Among other missions, the Marshals Service is responsible for 
housing and transporting all federal prisoners from the time they 
enter federal custody until the time they are acquitted or convicted 
and delivered to their designated facility. While the Marshals Service 
does not classify individuals in their custody as having terrorism-
related charges, they used other sources, including media reports and 
the nature of the pending charges, to identify individuals in their 
custody who might be considered to have such charges. 

[9] Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001). 

[10] U.S. Southern Command operates in Central America, the Caribbean, 
and South America and is one of the six geographic combatant commands 
included within DOD. 

[11] Section 948a of title 10, U.S. Code, defines an "unprivileged 
enemy belligerent" as "an individual (other than a privileged 
belligerent) who (A) has engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners; (B) has purposefully and materially 
supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners; or (C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged 
offense under this chapter." 

[12] "Common Article 3" refers to Article 3 of each of the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (including, for example, the Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316). 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), the Supreme Court held 
that Common Article 3 applies to the armed conflict between the United 
States and al Qaeda. 

[13] Two substantially similar versions of the Detainee Treatment Act 
of 2005 were enacted, as title X of Pub. L. No. 109-148 (2005) and 
title XIV of Pub. L. No. 109-163 (2006). 

[14] The Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, was 
later amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, enacted as part 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-84, div. A, title XVIII (2009) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 
948a, et seq.). 

[15] DOD, Review of Department Compliance with President's Executive 
Order on Detainee Conditions of Confinement (Washington, D.C.: 
February 2009). 

[16] One hundred twenty-one of the detainees who have left Guantánamo 
Bay have been sent to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to participate in 
programs to reeducate them and integrate them back into society. For 
additional information on Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation program, see 
GAO, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering 
Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on 
Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-883] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 
2009). For a video of GAO interviews with a former Guantánamo Bay 
detainee, see http://www.gao.gov/media/video/GAO-09-883]. 

[17] As of November 2012, in addition to the three convicted detainees 
at Guantánamo Bay, four other detainees had been convicted by military 
commissions and subsequently transferred to other countries. In 
October 2012, one of the convicted detainees who had been transferred 
to another country had his conviction overturned by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Of the three remaining at Guantánamo 
Bay, one has an appeal pending with the D.C. Circuit. 

[18] Six of those with charges pending have been referred to a 
commission for trial, while one has had charges sworn by prosecutors 
but has not yet been referred to a commission for trial. 

[19] These potential transfers are subject to legal limitations, 
including potential certification requirements and prohibitions on 
transfers to certain countries. See, for example, section 1028 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-81 (2011). 

[20] These efforts ceased after restrictions, beginning in June 2009, 
were imposed on the transfer of detainees to the United States. 

[21] The UCMJ is a collection of statutes that govern the military 
justice system, and is codified in Title 10 of the United States Code. 
UCMJ includes punitive articles that define specific offenses similar 
to those found in civilian criminal law (e.g., murder, rape, wrongful 
use of controlled substances, larceny, and drunk driving) as well as 
other offenses that specifically affect good order and discipline in 
the military (e.g., absence without leave, disrespect toward superior 
commissioned officer, or dereliction of duty). 

[22] 10 U.S.C. § 949u. 

[23] 18 U.S.C. § 4083 ("Persons convicted of offenses against the 
United States or by courts-martial punishable by imprisonment for more 
than one year may be confined in any United States penitentiary."). 
BOP officials noted that under this statute and article 58 of the UCMJ 
(10 U.S.C. § 858), which provides that "a sentence of confinement 
adjudged by a court-martial or other military tribunal … may be 
carried into execution by confinement … in any penal or correctional 
institution under the control of the United States … .", as well as a 
memorandum of understanding with DOD, BOP houses convicted military 
uniformed service personnel, who have been formally discharged from 
their respective service. 

[24] Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E, Department of Defense 
Detainee Program (Sept. 5, 2006). This directive states that all 
detainees, regardless of status, will at a minimum receive treatment 
consistent with Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
This includes prohibitions on violence, taking of hostages, 
humiliating or degrading treatment, and the sentencing and carrying 
out of executions without a court judgment; provision of care for the 
wounded and sick; and provision of services by an impartial 
humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. 

[25] A discussion of facilities used for classified operations can be 
found in the classified version of this report. 

[26] The American Correctional Association's Commission on 
Accreditation provides all accreditations for BOP institutions. The 
American Correctional Association's standards provide guidance to all 
correctional organizations on correctional issues such as programming, 
officer staffing, and officer safety, as well as physical standards 
such as inmate housing, environmental conditions, and exercise and 
recreation areas. However, the Guantánamo Bay detention facilities 
themselves have not been evaluated or accredited by the American 
Correctional Association. 

[27] An exception to this practice is the small group of detainees 
deemed to be "high-value," who are housed separately from each other 
and from the other facilities at Guantánamo Bay regardless of 
compliance with facility rules. 

[28] As of November 2012, DOD has designated three detainees for 
release, but the detainees have so far refused offers from third 
countries willing to receive them. 

[29] This figure reflects the fiscal years 2008 through 2012 budget 
data for operation of the five detention facilities currently in use; 
intelligence and security programs; and the support provided to Naval 
Station Guantánamo Bay for hosting detention operations. 

[30] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 5761, Preservation 
of Detainee Records (Feb. 29, 2008). 

[31] DOD is required by law to record all detainee interviews. 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-84, § 1080, 123 Stat. 2190, 2479-81 (2009). 

[32] In March 2011, the President directed DOD to coordinate a process 
of periodic review of continued law-of-war detention for detainees. 
Exec. Order 13567, Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force, 76 Fed. Reg. 13277 (Mar. 7, 2011). Section 1023 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-81 (2011), directed DOD to issue procedures for the review boards, 
and DOD did so in May 2012. Directive-Type Memorandum 12-005, 
Implementing Guidelines for Periodic Review of Detainees Held at 
Guantánamo Bay per Executive Order 13567 (May 9, 2012). According to 
DOD officials, an interagency task force has begun reviewing detainee 
files. Review boards will ultimately conduct hearings--at which 
detainees may participate--and make determinations about whether DOD 
should continue to detain that individual. 

[33] A discussion of Guantánamo Bay facilities used for classified 
operations and related factors that would need to be considered if the 
detainees were transferred to facilities in the United States can be 
found in the classified version of this report. 

[34] The facilities are operated by the Army and the Navy, but 
individuals from any branch of the military can be confined in any 
facility. DOD also operates facilities that it uses primarily for 
inmates with sentences of less than 1 year. For the purposes of our 
review, we did not consider these facilities in our scope. 

[35] At the time of our review, the Naval Consolidated Brig in 
Chesapeake, Virginia, which opened in August 2011 and had not yet been 
accredited, was in the accreditation process. 

[36] This figure includes facility operations and civilian personnel 
costs for fiscal year 2011 for the Northwest Joint Regional 
Correctional Facility, Naval Consolidated Brig Miramar, Naval 
Consolidated Brig Charleston, the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional 
Facility, and U.S. Disciplinary Barracks. Because Naval Consolidated 
Brig Chesapeake was opened in 2011, historic cost data were not 
available at the time of this review. 

[37] Army standards require that this classification be based on 
several factors including, at a minimum, the individual prisoner's 
offense, attitude, aptitude, intelligence, personality, adaptation to 
incarceration, record of performance prior to incarceration, and 
potential for further military service. 

[38] 10 U.S.C. § 812. "No member of the armed forces may be placed in 
confinement in immediate association with enemy prisoners or other 
foreign nationals not members of the armed forces." All of the 
Guantánamo Bay detainees are foreign nationals. 

[39] This individual was born in the United States, and subsequent to 
his detention he gave up his citizenship and was transferred to Saudi 
Arabia. In addition to the former Guantánamo Bay detainee, DOD held 
two other individuals in its U.S. facilities under AUMF authority. 
Neither of these individuals was ever detained at Guantánamo Bay, and 
according to DOD officials, in both cases they were fully segregated 
from UCMJ inmates until they were charged with federal crimes and 
transferred to DOJ custody. 

[40] Housing for all female inmates in the DOD prison system is 
located in the Naval Consolidated Brig in Chesapeake, Virginia--which 
houses females with sentences not exceeding 5 years--and the Naval 
Consolidated Brig in Miramar, California--which houses females with 
sentences over 5 years. 

[41] In fiscal year 2012, BOP had a budget of about $6.6 billion for 
salaries and expenses and a staff of about 36,700, which includes 
administrative, program, and support staff responsible for all of 
BOP's activities nationwide. In fiscal year 2012, the Marshals Service 
had a budget of $1.2 billion and a staff of about 5,500 employees, 
including U.S. marshals, deputy U.S. marshals, criminal investigators, 
detention enforcement officers, and administrative staff. 

[42] A discussion of facilities used for classified operations and 
related factors that would need to be considered if the detainees were 
transferred to facilities in the United States can be found in the 
classified version of this report. 

[43] One of these facilities is located in Puerto Rico. As of July 
2012, BOP also held about 40,800, or about 19 percent, of federal 
prisoners, in 15 privately managed low-and minimum-security level 
prisons, in 185 residential reentry centers (also known as halfway 
houses), and in home detention. According to DOJ, inmates with a 
history of or connection to terrorism have been referred to 
residential reentry centers. However, as of July 2012, BOP did not 
hold inmates with a history of or connection to terrorism in minimum 
security facilities. 

[44] There are a range of federal statutes that DOJ uses to prosecute 
terrorism-related offenses, some of which specifically address 
terrorist activities, such as terrorist attacks against mass 
transportation systems or receiving military-type training from a 
foreign terrorist organization, and others that address general 
criminal activities that could be in support of either a terrorist 
organization or other criminal networks, such as money laundering, 
immigration fraud, or drug trafficking. 

[45] BOP also has seven stand-alone minimum-security facilities. 
However, BOP does not hold individuals charged with or convicted of 
terrorist-related crimes or activities in minimum-security facilities. 

[46] Generally, the Marshals Service holds more than 80 percent of its 
inmates in state, local, and private facilities. The remaining 20 
percent are held in 22 BOP facilities that have allocated bed space 
for the Marshals Service. Through Intergovernmental Service 
Agreements, the Marshals Service contracts with approximately 1,800 
state and local governments for the provision of suitable quarters and 
the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of the prisoners in Marshals 
Service custody. 

[47] BOP identified these inmates by including offenders who have been 
charged with or convicted of either a terrorism offense, such as 
receiving terrorist training, or an offense with a documented 
connection to terrorism, such as using the proceeds of criminal 
activity to support a terrorist group. In addition, regardless of the 
nature of the offense, BOP included inmates who are engaged in, or are 
under investigation for engaging in, radicalization and recruitment 
activities. The Marshals Service does not classify individuals in 
their custody as having terrorism-related charges. Instead, they used 
other sources, including media reports and the nature of the pending 
charges, to identify individuals in their custody who might be 
considered to have such charges. 

[48] According to Marshals Service officials, the Marshals Service 
assigns inmates under its custody to a facility on a case-by-case 
basis, primarily based on the facility's proximity to where the 
individual is indicted, the security measures the facility can 
provide, the quality of facility management, the availability of in-
facility medical care, and available capacity. When possible, the 
Marshals Service prefers to use BOP facilities because they do not 
charge for bed space and, because the facilities are DOJ facilities, 
the Marshals Service has greater control over the detention of the 
inmate as compared with state or local facilities. 

[49] According to Marshals Service officials, the Marshals Service 
must pay for these and other supplemental security measures such as 
additional car escorts and staff to and from the trial location for 
high-profile inmates in its custody. 

[50] 28 C.F.R. § 501.3. Special administrative measures may be imposed 
for a period of up to 120 days, or, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, up to 1 year and may be renewed. The BOP Director may renew 
special restrictions within the special administrative measures if the 
Attorney General or a federal law-enforcement or intelligence agency 
provides written notification of continued substantial risk related to 
the inmate's communications or contacts with other persons. 

[51] BOP detention centers and metropolitan corrections centers are 
not required to offer the full range of programming activities to 
inmates. 

[52] According to BOP, all inmate telephone calls are recorded and 
randomly monitored, except for attorney-inmate telephone calls. 
Inmates may have limited physical contact with visitors, which may be 
restricted by facility staff to prevent the introduction of contraband 
and ensure the orderly operation of the facility. 

[53] For the purposes of this report, we limited our scope to the ADX 
facility and Communications Management Units. 

[54] According to BOP policy, inmates in the Communications Management 
Unit at the Terre Haute Federal Correctional Institution (Terre Haute, 
Indiana) are ordinarily housed in double-bunk cells. Inmates in the 
Communications Management Unit at Marion U.S. Penitentiary (Marion, 
Illinois) are ordinarily housed in single-bunk cells. 

[55] In 2006, BOP established the Terre Haute Communications 
Management Unit, and in 2008, the Marion Communications Management 
Unit. 

[56] Legal and special mail (e.g., attorney, federal courts) can be 
sealed and delivered to unit management. 

[57] See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(i), 3621(a)-(b), 4001, 4042(a)(2), 4068. 
Pursuant to statute, DOJ also has authority to take custody of certain 
persons convicted by courts-martial, offenders in the District of 
Columbia, and state offenders pursuant to a contract for 
reimbursement. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4083, 5003; Balanced Budget Act of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 11201(a)-(b), 111 Stat. 251, 734. 

[58] BOP expects to activate four newly constructed prisons by 2014, 
adding about 5,568 beds. In addition, BOP is budgeting for additional 
contracted bed space--1,000 beds in 2013 and 1,500 the next year, but 
the addition of these contracted beds is subject to future 
appropriations. For additional information on BOP capacity, see: GAO, 
Bureau of Prisons: Growing Inmate Crowding Negatively Affects Inmates, 
Staff, and Infrastructure, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-743] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 
2012). 

[End of section] 

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