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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

September 2012: 

Military Readiness: 

Navy Needs to Assess Risks to Its Strategy to Improve Ship Readiness: 

GAO-12-887: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-12-887, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2010, the Navy concluded that decisions it made to increase 
efficiencies of its surface force had adversely affected ship 
readiness and service life. To improve ship readiness the Navy 
developed a new strategy, which includes several initiatives. House 
Report 112-78, accompanying a proposed bill for the Fiscal Year 2012 
National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.1540), directed GAO to review 
the recent Navy initiatives. GAO assessed 1) how the Navy evaluates 
the material readiness of its surface combatant and amphibious warfare 
ships and the extent to which data indicate trends or patterns in the 
material readiness of these ships, and 2) the extent to which the Navy 
has taken steps to improve the readiness of its surface combatant and 
amphibious warfare ships, including implementing its new readiness 
strategy. GAO analyzed Navy policies, material and readiness data from 
January 2008-—two years prior to the release of the Navy’s 2010 report 
on the degradation of surface force readiness—-through March 2012, two 
years after the release of the report, and interviewed headquarters 
and operational officials and ship crews. 

What GAO Found: 

Recent data show variations in the material readiness of different 
types of ships, but do not reveal any clear trends of improvement or 
decline for the period from 2008 to 2012. The Navy uses a variety of 
means to collect, analyze, and track the material readiness of its 
surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships. Three data sources the 
Navy uses to provide information on the material readiness of ships 
are: casualty reports, which reflect equipment malfunctions; Defense 
Readiness Reporting System-Navy (DRRS-N) reports; and Board of 
Inspection and Survey (INSURV) material inspection reports. These data 
sources can be viewed as complementary, together providing data on 
both the current and life cycle material readiness of the surface 
force. INSURV and casualty report data show that the material 
readiness of amphibious warfare ships is lower than that of frigates 
and destroyers. However, there is no clear upward or downward trend in 
material readiness across the entire Navy surface combatant and 
amphibious warfare ships. From 2010 to March 2012, INSURV data 
indicated a slight improvement in the material readiness of the 
surface combatant and amphibious warfare fleet, but over that period 
casualty reports from the ships increased, which would indicate a 
decline in material readiness. DRRS-N data also show differences in 
material readiness between ship types, but the precise differences are 
classified and therefore are not included in this report. 

The Navy has taken steps to improve the readiness of its surface 
combatant and amphibious warfare ships, including a new strategy to 
better integrate maintenance actions, training, and manning, but it 
faces risks to fully implementing its strategy and has not assessed 
these risks or developed alternatives to mitigate them. In March 2012, 
near the end of a year-long pilot, the Navy issued its Surface Force 
Readiness Manual, which calls for integrating and synchronizing 
maintenance, training and manning among multiple organizations. The 
Navy expects this strategy to provide a standard, predictable path for 
ships to achieve and sustain surface force readiness, but certain 
factors, such as high operational tempos and supporting organizations’ 
staffing levels, could delay the entry of some ships into the strategy 
and the execution of the strategy. For example, one supporting 
organization reported needing an additional 680 personnel to fully 
execute the strategy. As of August 2012, the Navy plans to reflect its 
funding needs for 410 personnel in its fiscal year 2014 budget request 
and the remaining 270 in subsequent requests. Also, due to high 
operational tempos the phased implementation of some ships into the 
strategy may be delayed. Furthermore, ships that do not execute the 
strategy’s maintenance periods as planned will have lifecycle 
maintenance actions deferred. GAO has previously reported that risk 
assessment can inform effective program management by helping managers 
make decisions about the allocation of finite resources, and 
alternative courses of action. However, the Navy has not undertaken a 
comprehensive assessment of risks to the implementation of its 
strategy, nor has it developed alternatives to mitigate its risks. GAO 
believes operational tempo, supporting organizations’ staffing levels, 
and other risks may hinder the Navy’s full implementation of its 
surface force readiness strategy. If not addressed, this could lead to 
deferrals of lifecycle maintenance, which have in the past contributed 
to increased maintenance costs, reduced readiness, and shorter service 
lives for some ships. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Navy conduct a comprehensive assessment of the 
risks the new strategy faces and develop alternatives to mitigate 
these risks. DOD partially concurred, but felt that current 
assessments sufficiently identify risks. GAO continues to believe that 
a comprehensive assessment that takes into account the full range of 
risk to the overall strategy is needed. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-887]. For more 
information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or 
pickups@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Data Indicate Differences in Material Readiness Between Ship Types, 
but Do Not Reveal Readiness Trends Due to Limitations in the Data: 

Navy Has Acted to Improve Readiness but Not Assessed Risks to 
Achieving Full Implementation of Its Recent Strategy: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: 
Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: 
Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: 
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables 

Table 1: Classes of Surface Ships Reviewed: 

Table 2: The 27-month Fleet Response Plan for Surface Combatant and 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 

Table 3: Navy’s Material Readiness Data Sources: 

Table 4: INSURV and CASREP Data by Ship Type: January 2008 - March 
2012: 

Table 5: Average INSURV Equipment Operational Capability Scores for 
All Surface Combatant and Amphibious Warfare Ships from January 2008 
through March 2012: 

Table 6: Navy Ships Planned For Early Retirement: 

Table 7: Summary of Regression Model Parameters: 

Figures 

Figure 1: Administrative Chain of Command: 

Figure 2: Average Number of Casualty Reports, per Ship, of Surface 
Combatant and Amphibious Warfare Ships by Quarter from January 2008 
through March 201: 

Figure 3: Notional 27-month Fleet Response Plan Cycle: 

Figure 4: INSURV Process for Determining Overall Material Inspection 
Ratings: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 21, 2012: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

In support of national interests, the Navy maintains a large surface 
force to meet its current missions and long-term obligations, 
including ensuring sea control, projecting power, and providing 
maritime security. The Navy’s plan, which is to grow its current fleet 
of 286 ships to about 300 by 2019, is dependent both on its ability to 
acquire new ships and to maintain current ships for their expected 
service lives. The costs of procuring new ships and maintaining 
current ships can both be significant. For example, the cost of a new 
destroyer is more than $1.6 billion, and in fiscal year 2011, the Navy 
spent an average of $11 million maintaining each of its 62 destroyers. 
In the past, when faced with the high costs of maintaining ships’ 
material conditions and keeping them mission-ready, the Navy elected 
to retire ships early—before they reached their expected service 
lives. For example, in January 2012, the Navy announced plans to 
retire seven cruisers and two amphibious ships early, in 2013 and 
2014. Navy officials later testified that the service would redirect 
the savings from these early retirements to fund the maintenance of 
its remaining ships. 

In 2010, a Navy report found that the material readiness of its 
surface force had declined over the previous ten years and was well 
below the levels necessary to support reliable, sustained operations 
at sea and achieve expected ship service lives. Among other things, 
the report found that the declines in material readiness were 
attributable to reductions in the number of assessments and 
inspections, deferrals of scheduled maintenance, and reductions in the 
length of major repair periods from 15 to 9 weeks. In response, the 
Navy developed several maintenance initiatives and a new readiness 
strategy that it expects will improve the material condition of its 
ships and help them achieve their expected service lives. The strategy 
and initiatives are in various stages of implementation. 

In House Report 112-78, accompanying a bill for the Fiscal Year 2012 
National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540), the House Armed 
Services Committee directed GAO to review the Navy’s initiatives to 
improve the material condition of its surface ship fleet.[Footnote 1] 
This report analyzes 1) how the Navy evaluates the material readiness 
of its surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships and the extent 
to which data indicate trends or patterns in the material readiness of 
these ships, and 2) the extent to which the Navy has taken steps 
intended to improve the readiness of its surface combatant and 
amphibious warfare ships, including efforts to implement its recent 
strategy. 

To address our first objective, we analyzed Navy policies and 
procedures for determining surface force material readiness, as well 
as various studies and reports on the Navy’s material readiness 
process. We also interviewed officials from Navy commands that are 
responsible for maintaining, assessing, evaluating, and inspecting the 
material condition of the Navy’s surface ships. In addition, we 
analyzed readiness, maintenance, and inspection data to determine any 
changes in readiness from 2008-—two years prior to the release of the 
Navy’s 2010 report on the degradation of surface force readiness—-
through March 2012, two years after the release of the report. 
Specifically, we analyzed data for the Navy’s guided-missile cruisers 
(CG 47 class), guided-missile destroyers (DDG 51 class), frigates (FFG 
7 class), amphibious assault ships (LHA 1 and LHD 1 classes), 
amphibious transport dock ships (LPD 4 and LPD 17 classes), and dock 
landing ships (LSD 41 and LSD 49 classes). To address our second 
objective, we reviewed relevant Navy instructions on Navy material 
readiness, including the Navy’s Surface Force Readiness Manual, and 
prior GAO work on risk management. We also interviewed Navy training 
and maintenance officials to discuss how the Navy is implementing its 
new readiness strategy. Finally, we met with ship personnel to discuss 
possible challenges in implementing the new readiness strategy and 
efforts. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to September 2012 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We discuss our 
scope and methodology in more detail in appendix I. 

Background: 

The Navy’s fleet includes aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, 
frigates, littoral combat ships, submarines, amphibious warfare, mine 
warfare, combat logistics, and fleet support ships. Our review focused 
on surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships, which constitute 
slightly less than half of the total fleet. Table 1 shows the classes 
of surface ships we reviewed along with their numbers, expected 
service lives, and current average ages. 

Table 1: Classes of Surface Ships Reviewed: 

Ship Class: Surface Combatants; 
Ship Numbers: 107. 

Ship Class: Cruisers (CG 47) 
Ship Numbers: 22; 
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 35; 
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 22. 

Ship Class: Destroyers; 
Ship Numbers: 28;
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 35;
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 16.
* DDG 51(I and II); DDG 51 (IIA): 
Ship Numbers: 34; 
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 40; 
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 7. 

Ship Class: Frigates (FFG 7); 
Ship Numbers: 23; 
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 30; 
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 28. 

Ship Class: Amphibious Warfare Ships; 
Ship Numbers: 28. 

Ship Class: LHA 1; 
Ship Numbers: 1;
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 35;
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 32. 

Ship Class: LPD 4; 
Ship Numbers: 1;
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 35;
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 44. 

Ship Class: LHD 1; 
Ship Numbers: 8;
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 40;
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 15. 

Ship Class: LPD 17;
Ship Numbers: 6;
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 40;
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 4. 

Ship Class: LSD 41; 
Ship Numbers: 8;
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 40;
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 24. 

Ship Class: LSD 49; 
Ship Numbers: 4;
Expected Service Life of Ship Class (years): 40;
Current Average Age of Active Ship Class (years): 16. 

Ship Class: Total: 
Ship Numbers: 135. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

[End of table] 

Figure 1 shows the administrative chain of command for Navy surface 
ships. The U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Fleet Forces Command organize, 
man, train, maintain, and equip Navy forces, develop and submit 
budgets, and develop required and sustainable levels of fleet 
readiness, with U.S. Fleet Forces Command serving as the lead for 
fleet training requirements and policies to generate combat-ready Navy 
forces. The Navy’s surface type commanders—Commander, Naval Surface 
Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic 
have specific responsibilities for the maintenance, training, and 
readiness of their assigned surface ships.[Footnote 2] 

Figure 1: Administrative Chain of Command: 

[Refer to PDF for image: chain of command] 

Top level: 
Chief of Naval Operations: 

Second level, reporting to Chief of Naval Operations: 
Commander, U.S Fleet Forces: 
* Commander, Naval Surface Force; 
- Surface ships located on the East Coast, and in Italy, and Bahrain; 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet: 
* Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet; 
- Surface ships located on the West Coast, and in Hawaii, Japan, and 
Bahrain. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

[End of figure] 

To meet the increased demands for forces following the events of 
September 2001, the Navy established a force generation model—the 
Fleet Response Plan—and in August 2006 the Navy issued a Fleet 
Response Plan instruction.[Footnote 3] The plan seeks to build 
readiness so the Navy can surge a greater number of ships on short 
notice while continuing to meet its forward-presence requirements. As 
depicted in table 2, there are four phases in the Fleet Response Plan 
27-month cycle that applies to surface combatant and amphibious 
warfare ships. The four Fleet Response Plan phases are (1) basic, or 
unit-level training; (2) integrated training; (3) sustainment (which 
includes deployment); and (4) maintenance. 

Table 2: The 27-month Fleet Response Plan for Surface Combatant and 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 

Phase: 
Activities. 

Basic: 
Sea trials, ammunition loading and unloading, unit-level training. 

Integrated: 
Multi-ship training exercises up to the carrier strike group level. 

Sustainment: 
Continued advanced multi-ship training, including carrier strike group 
exercises after deployment. 

Maintenance: 
Includes major maintenance overhauls 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

[End of table] 

In September 2009, the Commanders of U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Fleet 
Forces directed Vice Admiral Balisle, USN-Ret., to convene and lead a 
Fleet Review Panel to assess surface force readiness. The Panel issued 
its report in February 2010. It stated that Navy decisions made to 
increase efficiencies throughout the fleet had adversely affected 
surface ship current readiness and life cycle material readiness. 
[Footnote 4] Reducing preventative maintenance requirements and the 
simultaneous cuts to shore infrastructure were two examples of the 
detrimental efficiencies cited in the report. The report also stated 
that if the surface force stayed on the present course, surface ships 
would not reach their expected service lives. For instance, it 
projected that destroyers would achieve 25-27 years of service life 
instead of the 35-40 years expected. The report concluded that each 
decision to improve efficiency may well have been an appropriate 
attempt to meet Navy priorities at the time, but there was limited 
evidence to identify any changes that were made with surface force 
readiness as the top priority—-efficiency was sought over 
effectiveness. The Fleet Review Panel made several maintenance, 
crewing, and training recommendations that it stated should be 
addressed not in isolation but as a circle of readiness. According to 
the report, it will take a multi-faceted, systematic solution to stop 
the decline in readiness, and begin recovery. 

We have previously reported on the Navy’s initiatives to achieve 
greater efficiencies and reduce costs. In June 2010, we issued a 
report regarding the training and crew sizes of cruisers and 
destroyers. In it we found that changes in training and reductions in 
crew sizes had contributed to declining material conditions on 
cruisers and destroyers. We recommended that the Navy reevaluate its 
ship workload requirements and develop additional metrics to measure 
the effectiveness of Navy training. DOD agreed with these 
recommendations.[Footnote 5] Also, in July 2011 we reported[Footnote 
6] on the training and manning information presented in the Navy’s 
February 2011[Footnote 7] report to Congress regarding ship readiness. 
The Navy’s report included information on ships’ ability to perform 
required maintenance tasks, pass inspection, and any projected effects 
on the lifespan of individual ships. We concluded that the Navy’s 
report did not provide discussion of data limitations or caveats to 
any of the information it presented, including its conclusions and 
recommendations. However, we found that the Navy did outline specific 
actions that it was taking or planned to take to address the declines 
in readiness due to manning and crew changes. 

In January 2011, the commanders of U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. 
Pacific Fleet jointly instructed their type commanders to develop a 
pilot program to “establish a sequenced, integrated, and building 
block approach” to achieve required readiness levels. This pilot 
program began in March 2011, and in March 2012, near the end of the 
pilot, the Navy issued its Surface Force Readiness Manual, which 
details a new strategy for optimizing surface force readiness 
throughout the Fleet Response Plan.[Footnote 8] The strategy calls for 
integrating and synchronizing maintenance, training, and resources 
among multiple organizations such as Afloat Training Groups and 
Regional Maintenance Centers. 

Data Indicate Differences in Material Readiness Between Ship Types, 
but Do Not Reveal Readiness Trends Due to Limitations in the Data: 

For the period from 2008 to 2012, available data show variations in 
material readiness between different types of ships—such as material 
readiness differences between amphibious warfare ships and surface 
combatants—but data limitations prevent us from making any conclusions 
concerning improvements or declines in the overall readiness of the 
surface combatant and amphibious warfare fleet during the period. 
Through a variety of means and systems, the Navy collects, analyzes, 
and tracks data that show the material condition of its surface ships—
in terms of both their current and life cycle readiness. Three of the 
data sources the Navy uses to provide information on the material 
condition of ships are casualty reports;[Footnote 9] Defense Readiness 
Reporting System – Navy (DRRS-N) reports; and Board of Inspection and 
Survey (INSURV) material inspection reports. None of these individual 
data sources are designed to provide a complete picture of the overall 
material condition of the surface force. However, the data sources can 
be viewed as complementary and, when taken together, provide data on 
both the current and life cycle material readiness of the surface 
force. For example, some casualty report data must be updated every 72 
hours and provides information on individual pieces of equipment that 
are currently degraded or out of commission. DRRS-N data is normally 
reported monthly and focuses on current readiness by presenting 
information on broader capability and resource areas, such as ship 
command, control, and communications, rather than individual 
equipment. INSURV data is collected less frequently—ships undergo 
INSURV inspections about once every 5 years—but the data is extensive, 
and includes inspection results for structural components, individual 
pieces of equipment, and broad systems, as well as assessments of a 
ship’s warfighting capabilities. The INSURV data is used to make 
lifecycle decisions on whether to retain or decommission Navy ships. 
Casualty reports, DRRS-N data, and INSURV reports are all classified 
when they identify warfighting capabilities of individual ships. 
However, when casualty reports and INSURV information is consolidated 
and summarized above the individual ship level it is unclassified. 
Even summary DRRS-N data is classified, and therefore actual DRRS-N 
data is not included in this unclassified report. Table 3 provides 
additional details on each of the data sources. 

Table 3: Navy’s Material Readiness Data Sources: 

Data Source: Data Owner; 
INSURV: Navy Board of Inspection and Survey; 
DRRS-N: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; 
Casualty Reports: United States Fleet Forces Command and United States 
Pacific Fleet. 

Data Source: Purpose and Types of Data Collected; 
INSURV: Determines fitness of Navy ships for further service; assesses 
material condition to include equipment operating capability and 
demonstrational testing;
DRRS-N: Measures current readiness in terms of capabilities, training, 
and resources (people, equipment, supplies, and ordnance); 
Casualty Reports: Provides a measure of the material condition of a 
ship, in terms of deficiencies. 

Data Source: Limitations; 
INSURV: Inspections may be delayed due to deployment, 
maintenance requirements, or other factors such as coordination of 
schedules; 
DRRS-N: Focus on ability to meet current mission requirements may not 
reflect elements of material condition requiring action in the long 
term, such as corrosion; 
Casualty Reports: Casualty report data has not been consistently 
reported and can vary among ships due to differences in leadership 
philosophy, crew experience and training, and the number of 
independent assessments. 

Data Source: Frequency of Reports; 
INSURV: Generally, every 48 to 60 months; 
DRRS-N: Monthly/Within 24 hours of a significant change; 
Casualty Reports: As often as every 72 hours. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

Legend: INSURV = Board of Inspection and Survey and DRRS-N = Defense 
Readiness Reporting System–Navy. 

[End of table] 

INSURV and casualty report data from January 2008 through March 2012 
consistently show differences in material readiness between different 
types of ships. As illustrated in Table 4, there are differences 
between frigates, destroyers, cruisers, and amphibious warfare ships 
in their overall INSURV ratings-—which reflect ship abilities to carry 
out their primary missions; their INSURV Equipment Operational 
Capability scores—-which reflect the material condition of 19 
different functional areas; and their average numbers of casualty 
reports—-which reflect material deficiencies in mission essential 
equipment. The differences within the average Equipment Operational 
Capability and casualty reports were found to be statistically 
significant. See additional details regarding the statistical 
significance of average Equipment Operational Capability scores and 
the average number of casualty reports in Appendix I. 

Table 4: INSURV and CASREP Data by Ship Type: January 2008-March 2012: 

January 2008 to March 2012: 

INSURV Overall Rating: 

Number of ships inspected: 
Frigates: 20; 
Destroyers: 38; 
Cruisers: 18; 
Amphibious Ships: 18. 

‘Unsatisfactory’: 
Frigates: 5%; 
Destroyers: 3%; 
Cruisers: 22%; 
Amphibious Ships: 6%. 

‘Degraded’: 
Frigates: 5%; 
Destroyers: 14%; 
Cruisers: 11%; 
Amphibious Ships: 28%. 

‘Satisfactory’: 
Frigates: 90%; 
Destroyers: 84%; 
Cruisers: 67%; 
Amphibious Ships: 67%. 

INSURV Average EOC Scores: 
Frigates: 0.806; 
Destroyers: 0.829; 
Cruisers: 0.786; 
Amphibious Ships: 0.746. 

Average Number of Casualty Reports per Ship: 
Frigates: 11.8; 
Destroyers: 14.5; 
Cruisers: 18.0; 
Amphibious Ships: 22.3. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

Notes: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

INSURV overall ratings are assigned based on the ship’s ability to 
materially carry out its missions. A rating of ‘satisfactory’ 
indicates an ability to carry out all missions, ‘degraded’ indicates 
an inability to carry out one mission; a rating of ‘unsatisfactory’ 
indicates an inability to carry out more than one mission. 

INSURV assigns Equipment Operational Capability scores to different 
functional areas of inspected ships’ systems. The scores range from 0 
to 1 with 1 being the best score. The average Equipment Operational 
Capability scores shown in table 4 are based on GAO analysis of INSURV 
scores for all 19 functional areas (18 areas in the case of amphibious 
ships). Differences in Equipment Operational Capability scores between 
ship types are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level. Differences in Average Number of Casualty Reports per Ship 
between ship types are statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level. Differences in INSURV Overall Ratings were not 
assessed statistically. See additional statistical details in Appendix 
I. 

[End of table] 

For example, the data in table 4 shows that, for the time period 
covered, the material condition of amphibious ships is generally lower 
than that of frigates and destroyers. For example, a lower percentage 
of amphibious warfare ships received overall “satisfactory” ratings in 
INSURV inspections than destroyers and frigates; likewise, amphibious 
ships had lower average INSURV Equipment Operational Capability scores 
than those two types of ships. Amphibious warfare ships also have on 
average more casualty reports per ship than destroyers and frigates. 
According to Navy officials, some of these differences may result from 
differences in the size, complexity, and age of the various types of 
ships. Likewise, cruisers have a lower material condition than that of 
destroyers. The data show that 22 percent of cruisers were rated “
unsatisfactory” compared to 3 percent of destroyers, and the average 
cruiser Equipment Operational Capability score of 0.786 was also lower 
than the destroyer score of 0.829. Finally, the average of 18 casualty 
reports per cruiser was about 24 percent higher than the 14.5 casualty 
reports per destroyer. DRRS-N data also show that there are readiness 
differences between the Navy’s different types of ships but the 
precise differences are classified and therefore are not included in 
this report. 

Material readiness data show some clear differences between types of 
ships as shown in table 4. However, when we considered the surface 
combatant and amphibious warfare ships in aggregate, we were unable to 
make any conclusions concerning trends in the overall readiness of 
these ships. One readiness measure-—casualty reports-—indicates that 
the material readiness of these ships has declined but other readiness 
measures show both upward and downward movement. Because of the 
relatively small number of INSURV inspections conducted each year, it 
is not possible to draw a conclusion about trends in the material 
readiness of surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships from 
January 2008 to March 2012 based on INSURV data. 

Casualty report data from January 2008 to March 2012 show that there 
is a significant upward trend in the average daily number of casualty 
reports per ship for both surface combatants and amphibious warfare 
ships, which would indicate declining material readiness. 
Specifically, the average daily numbers of casualty reports per ship 
have been increasing at an estimated rate of about 2 and 3 per year, 
respectively. Furthermore, for both ship types, there is not a 
statistically significant difference in the trend when comparing the 
periods before February 2010-—when the Fleet Review Panel’s findings 
were published-—and after February 2010. According to Navy officials, 
increases in casualty reports could be reflective of the greater 
numbers of material inspections and evaluations than in the past, 
which is likely to identify more material deficiencies and generate 
more casualty reports. Figure 2 shows the increases in casualty 
reports over time. 

Figure 2: Average Number of Casualty Reports, per Ship, of Surface 
Combatant and Amphibious Warfare Ships by Quarter from January 2008 
through March 2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2008, 1Q; 
Surface Combatants: 10.2; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 16.8. 

Year: 2008, 2Q; 
Surface Combatants: 11.1; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 16.7. 

Year: 2008, 3Q; 
Surface Combatants: 11.1; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 18.7. 

Year: 2008, 4Q; 
Surface Combatants: 11.3; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 19.1. 

Year: 2009, 1Q; 
Surface Combatants: 11.5; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 19.2. 

Year: 2009, 2Q; 
Surface Combatants: 12.2; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 19.2. 

Year: 2009, 3Q; 
Surface Combatants: 13.4; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 19.3. 

Year: 2009, 4Q; 
Surface Combatants: 14; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 22.6. 

Year: 2010, 1Q; 
Surface Combatants: 13.5; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 23.7. 

Year: 2010, 2Q; 
Surface Combatants: 14.2; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 24.2. 

Year: 2010, 3Q; 
Surface Combatants: 15.9; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 26. 

Year: 2010, 4Q; 
Surface Combatants: 16.9; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 27.6. 

Year: 2011, 1Q; 
Surface Combatants: 18.4; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 22.6. 

Year: 2011, 2Q; 
Surface Combatants: 18.3; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 21.8. 

Year: 2011, 3Q; 
Surface Combatants: 18.2; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 24.4. 

Year: 2011, 4Q; 
Surface Combatants: 19.2; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 28.2. 

Year: 2012, 1Q; 
Surface Combatants: 17; 
Amphibious Warfare Ships: 29. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Table 5 shows the summary data for all the INSURV inspections of 
surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships that were conducted 
from January 2008 through March 2012.[Footnote 10] Throughout the 
period, the data fluctuate in both an upward and downward direction. 
For example, the proportion of surface combatant and amphibious 
warfare ships rated ‘satisfactory’ fell 11 percent from 83 percent in 
2008 to 72 percent in 2010, and then increased to 77 percent in 2011. 
Average Equipment Operational Capability scores also fluctuated 
throughout the period— increasing in 2011 and declining in 2009, 2010, 
and 2012. As previously noted, because of the relatively small number 
of INSURV inspections conducted each year, it is not possible to draw 
a conclusion about trends in the material readiness of surface 
combatant and amphibious warfare ships between 2008 and 2012 based on 
INSURV data. 

Table 5: Average INSURV Equipment Operational Capability Scores for 
All Surface Combatant and Amphibious Warfare Ships from January 2008 
through March 2012: 

INSURV by Calendar Year: 2008; 
Total Number and Percent of Surface Combatant and Amphibious Warfare 
Ships: 
Inspected: 29; 
‘Satisfactory’: 24 (83%); 
‘Degraded’: 3 (10%); 
‘Unsatisfactory’: 2 (7%); 
Average Equipment Operational Capability Scores for Surface Combatant 
and Amphibious Warfare Ships: 0.796. 

INSURV by Calendar Year: 2009; 
Total Number and Percent of Surface Combatant and Amphibious Warfare 
Ships: 
Inspected: 23; 
‘Satisfactory’: 19 (83%); 
‘Degraded’: 2 (9%); 
‘Unsatisfactory’: 2 (9%); 
Average Equipment Operational Capability Scores for Surface Combatant 
and Amphibious Warfare Ships: 0.795. 

INSURV by Calendar Year: 2010; 
Total Number and Percent of Surface Combatant and Amphibious Warfare 
Ships: 
Inspected: 25; 
‘Satisfactory’: 18 (72%); 
‘Degraded’: 5 (20%); 
‘Unsatisfactory’: 2 (8%); 
Average Equipment Operational Capability Scores for Surface Combatant 
and Amphibious Warfare Ships: 0.785. 

INSURV by Calendar Year: 2011; 
Total Number and Percent of Surface Combatant and Amphibious Warfare 
Ships: 
Inspected: 13[A];
‘Satisfactory’: 10 (77%); 
‘Degraded’: 2 (15%); 
‘Unsatisfactory’: 1 (8%); 
Average Equipment Operational Capability Scores for Surface Combatant 
and Amphibious Warfare Ships: 0.842. 

INSURV by Calendar Year: 2012[B]; 
Total Number and Percent of Surface Combatant and Amphibious Warfare 
Ships: 
Inspected: 4; 
‘Satisfactory’: 3 (75%); 
‘Degraded’: 1 (25%); 
‘Unsatisfactory’: 0 (0%); 
Average Equipment Operational Capability Scores for Surface Combatant 
and Amphibious Warfare Ships: 0.836. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

[A] Because the Board of Inspection and Survey conducts INSURV 
inspections of all Navy ships, the number of INSURV inspections of 
surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships can vary widely from 
year to year. 

[B] Data for 2012 goes through March 2012. 

[End of table] 

The casualty report and INSURV data that we analyzed are consistent 
with the findings of the Navy’s Fleet Review Panel, which found that 
the material readiness of the Navy’s ships had been declining prior to 
2010. Our analysis showed a statistically significant increase in 
casualty reports between 2008 and 2010 which would indicate a 
declining material condition. Although the statistical significance of 
the INSURV data from 2008 to 2010 could not be confirmed due to the 
small number of ships that were inspected during this time period, 
that data showed declines in both the percentage of satisfactory 
inspections and average Equipment Operational Capability scores. 

The Navy has taken steps intended to improve the readiness of its 
surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships. However, it faces 
risks to achieving full implementation of its recent strategy and has 
not assessed these risks or developed alternative implementation 
approaches to mitigate risks. 

Navy Has Acted to Improve Readiness but Not Assessed Risks to Achieving 
Full Implementation of Its Recent Strategy: 

Navy Steps to Improve Surface Force Readiness: 

The Navy has taken several steps to help remedy problems it has 
identified in regard to maintaining the readiness of its surface 
combatant and amphibious warfare ships. In the past, material 
assessments, maintenance, and training were carried out separately by 
numerous organizations, such as the Regional Maintenance Centers and 
Afloat Training Groups. According to the Navy, this sometimes resulted 
in overlapping responsibilities and duplicative efforts. Further, the 
Navy has deferred maintenance due to high operational requirements. 
The Navy recognizes that deferring maintenance can affect readiness 
and increase the costs of later repairs. For example, maintenance 
officials told us that Navy studies have found that deferring 
maintenance on ballast tanks to the next major maintenance period will 
increase costs by approximately 2.6 times, and a systematic deferral 
of maintenance may cause a situation where it becomes cost prohibitive 
to keep a ship in service. This can lead to early retirements prior to 
ships reaching their expected service lives. 

In the past few years the Navy has taken a more systematic and 
integrated approach to address its maintenance requirements and 
mitigate maintenance problems. For example, in November 2010 it 
established the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program, 
which provides life cycle management of maintenance requirements, 
including deferrals, for surface ships and monitors life cycle repair 
work. Also, in December 2010 the Navy established Navy Regional 
Maintenance Center headquarters, and began increasing the personnel 
levels at its intermediate maintenance facilities in June 2011. More 
recently, in March 2012, the Navy set forth a new strategy in its 
Surface Force Readiness Manual.[Footnote 11] This strategy is designed 
to integrate material assessments, evaluations, and inspections with 
maintenance actions and training and ensure that surface ships are (1) 
ready to perform their current mission requirements and (2) able to 
reach their expected service lives.[Footnote 12] The manual addresses 
the need for the organizations involved in supporting ship readiness 
to take an integrated, systematic approach to eliminate redundancy, 
build training proficiency to deploy at peak readiness, and reduce 
costs associated with late identified work. 

According to the Surface Force Readiness Manual, readiness is based 
upon a foundation of solid material condition that supports effective 
training. In line with this integrated maintenance and training 
approach, the new strategy tailors the 27-month Fleet Response Plan by 
adding a fifth phase that is not included in the Fleet Response Plan, 
the shakedown phase. This phase allows time between the end of the 
maintenance phase and the beginning of the basic phase to conduct a 
material assessment of the ship to determine if equipment conditions 
are able to support training. In addition, the new strategy shifts the 
cycle’s starting point from the basic phase to the sustainment phase 
to support the deliberate planning required to satisfactorily execute 
the maintenance phase and integrate maintenance and training for 
effective readiness. Under the new strategy, multiple assessments, 
which previously certified ship readiness all throughout the Fleet 
Response Plan cycle, will now be consolidated into seven readiness 
evaluations at designated points within the cycle. Because each 
evaluation may have several components, one organization will be 
designated as the lead and will be responsible for coordinating the 
evaluation with the ship and other assessment teams, thereby 
minimizing duplication and gaining efficiencies through 
synchronization. Figure 3 shows the readiness evaluations that occur 
within each phase of the strategy’s notional 27-month cycle. 

Figure 3: Notional 27-month Fleet Response Plan Cycle: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Sustainment: Deployment; 
Months 12 through 22: 
READ-E 1: month 16; 
READ-E 2: month 20; 
READ-E 3: month 22. 

Maintenance: 
Months 23 through 26; 
READ-E 4: month 26-27 

Shakedown: 
Month 27; 
READ-E 5: month 26-27. 

Basic: 
Months 1 through 6; 
READ-E 6: month 4. 

Integrated/Advanced:     
Months 7 through 11; 
READ-E 7: month 8. 
   
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

[End of figure] 

As previously noted, development of the Navy’s new strategy began with 
a pilot program. The pilot was conducted on ships from both the East 
and West coasts beginning in March 2011. Initial implementation of the 
new strategy began in March 2012 and is currently staggered, with ships’
 schedules being modified to support the strategy’s integration of 
training, manning, and maintenance efforts.[Footnote 13] Ships that 
were not involved in the pilot program will begin implementing the 
strategy when they complete the maintenance phase of the Fleet 
Response Plan cycle. The Navy plans to fully implement the new 
strategy in fiscal year 2015 (i.e. to have all surface ships operating 
under the strategy and resources needed to conduct the strategy’s 
required tasks in place). While the Surface Force Readiness Manual 
states that providing a standard, predictable path to readiness is one 
of the tenets of the Navy’s new strategy, it also acknowledges that 
circumstances may arise that will require a deviation from the 
notional 27-month cycle. 

Navy Has Not Assessed Risks to Implementing its Strategy as Planned or 
Developed Alternatives: 

Certain factors could affect the Navy’s ability to fully implement its 
strategy, but the Navy has not assessed the risks to implementation or 
developed alternatives. As we have previously reported,[Footnote 14] 
risk assessment can provide a foundation for effective program 
management. Risk management is a strategic process to help program 
managers make decisions about assessing risk, allocating finite 
resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty. To 
carry out a comprehensive risk assessment, program managers need to 
identify program risks from both external and internal sources, 
estimate the significance of these risks, and decide what steps should 
be taken to best manage them. Although such an assessment would not 
assure that program risks are completely eliminated, it would provide 
reasonable assurance that such risks are being minimized. 

As the Navy implements its new surface force readiness strategy one 
risk we identified involves the tempo of operations. While the 
strategy acknowledges circumstances may arise that require a deviation 
from the 27-month Fleet Response Plan cycle, it also states that 
predictability is necessary in order to synchronize the maintenance, 
training, and operational requirements. However, the tempo of 
operations is currently higher than planned for in the Fleet Response 
Plan. According to Navy officials, this makes execution of the 
strategy challenging. High operational tempos pose challenges because 
they could delay the entry of some ships into the strategy as well as 
the movement of ships through the strategy. For example, some ships 
that have been operating at increased tempos, such as the Navy’s 
ballistic missile defense cruisers and destroyers, have not followed 
the Navy’s planned 27-month cycle. Navy officials told us that 
requirements for ballistic missile defense ships are very high leading 
to quick turnarounds between deployments. They said, in some cases, 
ships may not have time for the maintenance or full basic and 
integrated/advanced training phases. The manual notes that ships 
without an extended maintenance period between deployments will remain 
in the sustainment phase. According to Navy guidance, the maintenance 
phase is critical to the success of the Fleet Response Plan since this 
is the optimal period in which lifecycle maintenance activities— major 
shipyard or depot-level repairs, upgrades, and modernization 
installations—occur. Thus, ships with a high operational tempo that do 
not enter the maintenance phase as planned will have lifecycle 
maintenance activities deferred, which could lead to increased future 
costs. Further, ships that do not enter the maintenance phase may be 
delayed entering into the strategy. This delay would be another risk 
to the implementation of the Navy’s new readiness strategy and ships’ 
lifecycle readiness. 

In addition, the Navy’s plan to decrease the number of surface 
combatant and amphibious warfare ships through early retirements is 
likely to increase operational tempos even further for many ships that 
remain in the fleet. DOD’s fiscal year 2013 budget request proposes 
the early retirement of seven Aegis cruisers and two amphibious ships 
in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. When fewer ships are available to meet 
a given requirement, ships must deploy more frequently. Table 6 shows 
the ships that the Navy plans to retire early, their ages at 
retirement, and their homeports. 

Table 6: Navy Ships Planned For Early Retirement: 

Hull Number: CG 63; 
Name: Cowpens; 
Year to be Retired: FY 13; 
Age at Retirement (years): 22; 
Homeport: Yokosuka, Japan. 

Hull Number: CG 68; 
Name: Anzio; 
Year to be Retired: FY 13; 
Age at Retirement (years): 21; 
Homeport: Norfolk, Virginia. 

Hull Number: CG 69; 
Name: Vicksburg; 
Year to be Retired: FY 13; 
Age at Retirement (years): 21; 
Homeport: Mayport, Florida. 

Hull Number: CG 73; 
Name: Port Royal; 
Year to be Retired: FY 13; 
Age at Retirement (years): 19; 
Homeport: Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 

Hull Number: CG 64; 
Name: Gettysburg; 
Year to be Retired: FY 14; 
Age at Retirement (years): 23; 
Homeport: Mayport, Florida. 

Hull Number: CG 65; 
Name: Chosin; 
Year to be Retired: FY 14; 
Age at Retirement (years): 23; 
Homeport: Pearl Harbor, HI 

Hull Number: CG 66; 
Name: Hue City; 
Year to be Retired: FY 14; 
Age at Retirement (years): 23; 
Homeport: Mayport, Florida. 

Hull Number: LSD 41; 
Name: Whidbey Island; 
Year to be Retired: FY 14; 
Age at Retirement (years): 29; 
Homeport: Norfolk, Virginia. 

Hull Number: LSD 46; 
Name: Tortuga; 
Year to be Retired: FY 14; 
Age at Retirement (years): 24; 
Homeport: Sasebo, Japan. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

Legend: FY = Fiscal Year 

[End of table] 

Also, recent changes in national priorities,[Footnote 15] which call 
for an increased focus on the Asia-Pacific region that places a 
renewed emphasis on air and naval forces, make it unlikely that 
operational tempos will decline. At the same time, DOD will still 
maintain its defense commitments to Europe and other allies and 
partners. 

In addition to the risks posed by high operational tempos, several 
supporting organizations currently have staffing levels that are below 
the levels needed to fulfill their roles in the new integrated 
readiness strategy. For example, Navy Afloat Training Group officials 
have identified the staffing levels required to fully support the 
strategy, and reported that they need an additional 680 personnel to 
fully execute the new strategy. As of August 2012, the Navy plans to 
reflect its funding needs for 410 of the 680 personnel in its fiscal 
year 2014 budget request and for the remaining 270 in subsequent 
requests. Under the new strategy, the Afloat Training Groups provide 
subject matter experts to conduct both material, and individual and 
team training. Previously the Afloat Training Groups used a “Train the 
Trainer” methodology, which did not require the same number of 
trainers because ships’ crews included their own system experts to 
train the crew and the Afloat Training Groups just trained the ships’ 
trainers. Afloat Training Group Pacific officials told us that there 
are times when the training events that can be offered—-to ships 
currently under the strategy and/or ships that have not yet 
implemented the strategy-—are limited because of their staffing level 
gaps. Current staffing allows executing all portions of the Basic 
Phase in select mission areas only. Other mission areas are expected 
to gain full training capability as staffing improves over the next 
several years. Until then, the Afloat Training Group officials plan to 
schedule training events within the limited capability mission areas 
based on a prioritized hierarchy. 

Further, Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program officials 
told us they are also short of staff. They said they need 241 staff to 
perform their requirements, but currently have 183 staff. They stated 
that while current budget plans include funding to reach the 241 
staffing level in 2013, it will be reduced below the 241 requirement 
in 2014. 

As with the Afloat Training Groups and Surface Maintenance Engineering 
Planning Program, officials at the Navy Regional Maintenance Center 
headquarters told us they currently lack the staff needed to fully 
execute the ship readiness assessments called for in the new strategy. 
Ship readiness assessments evaluate both long-term lifecycle 
maintenance requirements (e.g. preservation to prevent structural 
corrosion) and maintenance to support current mission requirements 
(e.g. preventative and corrective maintenance for the Aegis Weapons 
System). According to the officials, ship readiness assessments allow 
them to deliberately plan the work to be done during major maintenance 
periods and prioritize their maintenance funds. The goal is for ships 
to receive all the prescribed ship readiness assessments in fiscal 
year 2013. However, Navy officials stated that they are evaluating the 
impact of recent readiness assessment revisions on changes in the 
Regional Maintenance Center’s funding and personnel requirements. 

The Navy has not undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the impact 
of high operational tempos, staffing shortages, or any other risks it 
may face in implementing its new readiness strategy, nor has it 
developed alternatives to mitigate any of these risks. The Navy does 
recognize in its strategy that circumstances may arise that require 
ships to deviate from the 27-month Fleet Response Plan cycle and has 
considered the adjustments to training that would need to take place 
in such a case. However, the strategy does not discuss, nor identify 
plans to mitigate, maintenance challenges that could arise from delays 
in full implementation. We believe the risks we identified may delay 
full implementation, which could lead to continued deferrals of 
lifecycle maintenance, increasing costs and impacting the Navy’s 
ability to achieve expected service lives for its ships. 

Conclusions: 

Today’s fleet of surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships 
provides core capabilities that enable the Navy to fulfill its 
missions. In order to keep this fleet materially and operationally 
ready to meet current missions and sustain the force for future 
requirements, the Navy must maximize the effective use of its 
resources and ensure that its ships achieve their expected service 
lives. Full implementation of its new strategy, however, may be 
delayed if the Navy does not account for the risks it faces and devise 
plans to mitigate against those risks. Navy organizations have taken 
individual steps to increase their staffing levels, but the Navy has 
yet to consider alternatives if the integration of assessment, 
maintenance, and training under the strategy is delayed. Without an 
understanding of risks to full implementation and plans to mitigate 
against them, the Navy is likely to continue to face the challenges it 
has encountered in the past, including the increased costs that arise 
from deferring maintenance and the early retirement of ships. This 
could impact the Navy’s ability to meet its long-term commitments. 
Further, ongoing maintenance deferrals—and early retirements that 
increase the pace of operations for the remaining surface force—could 
potentially impact the Navy’s ability to meet current missions. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance the Navy’s ability to implement its strategy to improve 
surface force material readiness, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following two 
actions: 

* Develop a comprehensive assessment of the risks the Navy faces in 
implementing its Surface Force Readiness Manual strategy, and 
alternatives to mitigate risks. Specifically, a comprehensive risk 
assessment should include an assessment of risks such as high 
operational tempos and availability of personnel. 

* Use the results of this assessment to make any necessary adjustments 
to its implementation plan. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with our recommendations. Overall, DOD stated it agrees that risk 
assessment is an important component of program management, but does 
not agree that a comprehensive assessment of the risks associated with 
implementation of the Navy’s Surface Force Readiness strategy is 
either necessary or desirable. It also stated that existing assessment 
processes are sufficient to enable adjustments to implementation of 
the strategy. DOD also noted several specific points. For example, 
according to DOD, a number of factors impact surface ship readiness 
and some of those factors, such as budgetary decisions, emergent 
operational requirements, and unexpected major ship repair events are 
outside of the Navy’s direct control. DOD further stated that the 
strategy, and the organizations that support the strategy, determine 
and prioritize the full readiness requirement through reviews of ship 
material condition and assess the risk of any gaps between 
requirements and execution, as real world events unfold. DOD also 
noted that the Surface Ship Readiness strategy has a direct input into 
the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
process. It stated that its position is that execution of the strategy 
and PPBE process adequately identify and mitigate risks. DOD further 
believes that a separate one-time comprehensive assessment of risks, 
over and above established tracking mechanisms, is an unnecessary 
strain on scarce resources. Moreover, DOD stated that the Navy now has 
the technical resources available, using a disciplined process, to 
inform risk-based decisions that optimize the balance between current 
operational readiness and future readiness tied to expected service 
life through the standup of its Surface Maintenance Engineering 
Planning Program and Commander Navy Regional Maintenance Centers. 
Specifically, DOD noted documenting and managing the maintenance 
requirement is now a fully integrated process. According to DOD, the 
Navy’s Surface Type Commanders identify and adjudicate risks to 
service life and this approach is consistent with fundamental process 
discipline and risk management executed by the submarine and carrier 
enterprises. Finally, according to DOD, the Navy is continually 
assessing progress in achieving the strategy and has the requisite 
tools in place to identify changes in force readiness levels that may 
result from resource constraints, and will adjust the process as 
necessary to ensure readiness stays on track. 

As described in our report, we recognize that the Navy has taken a 
more systematic and integrated approach to address its maintenance 
requirements and mitigate problems, and specifically cite the Surface 
Readiness strategy, and actions such as standing up Surface 
Maintenance Engineering Planning Program and Commander Navy Regional 
Maintenance Centers. We also recognize that the Navy conducts various 
assessments of ship readiness and considers resource needs associated 
with implementing the strategy as part of the budget process. However, 
we do not agree that any of the current assessments or analyses offer 
the type of risk assessment that our report recommends. For example, 
the PPBE process does not address the specific risk that high 
operational tempos pose to implementation of the strategy nor does it 
present alternatives for mitigating this risk. Also, despite the 
ongoing efforts by Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program 
and Commander Navy Regional Maintenance Centers officials to document 
and manage the maintenance requirement of the surface force in an 
integrated process, both organizations are currently under staffed. 
The challenges identified in our report, including high operational 
tempos and current organizational staffing levels, have hindered the 
Navy’s ability to achieve the desired predictability in ships’ 
operations and maintenance schedules, as called for in its strategy. 
Given factors such as the Navy’s plan to decrease the number of ships 
as well as changes in national priorities that place a renewed 
emphasis on naval forces in the Asia Pacific region, these challenges 
we identified are unlikely to diminish in the near future, and there 
could be additional risks to the strategy’s implementation. Without an 
understanding of the full range of risks to implementing its strategy 
and plans to mitigate them, the Navy is likely to continue to face the 
challenges it has encountered in the past, including increased costs 
that arise from deferring maintenance and the early retirement of 
ships. Therefore, we continue to believe that a comprehensive risk 
assessment is needed. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the navy, and 
other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 51209619. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Sharon Pickup: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess how the Navy evaluates the material readiness of its surface 
combatant and amphibious warfare ships and the extent to which data 
indicate trends or patterns in the material readiness of these ships, 
we interviewed officials from the Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet, Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, as 
well as visiting a number of ships, to include the USS Leyte Gulf (CG 
55), USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), USS San Antonio (LPD 17), and USS 
Higgins (DDG-76). We obtained and analyzed Navy policies and 
procedures for determining surface force readiness, as well as various 
studies and reports on the Navy’s material readiness process. We 
obtained and analyzed material readiness data from the Navy’s Board of 
Inspection and Survey (INSURV) as well as the United States Fleet 
Forces Command (USFF). We also met with Navy officials from the Board 
of Inspection and Survey and the United States Fleet Forces Command to 
complement our data analysis, and observed the INSURV material 
inspection of the USS Cole (DDG 67). 

We limited our data analysis to the period from January 2008 to March 
2012 in order to cover a period of approximately two years prior to, 
and two years following, publication of the Fleet Review Panel of 
Surface Force Readiness report. Specifically, we analyzed data for the 
Navy’s guided-missile cruisers (CG 47 class), guided-missile 
destroyers (DDG 51 class), frigates (FFG 7 class), amphibious assault 
ships (LHA 1 and LHD 1 classes), amphibious transport dock ships (LPD 
4 and LPD 17 classes), and dock landing ships (LSD 41 and LSD 49 
classes). 

We analyzed data from three of the primary data sources the Navy uses 
to provide information on the material condition of ships: casualty 
reports; Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) material inspection 
reports; and the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Navy (DRRS-N) 
reports. None of these individual data sources are designed to provide 
a complete picture of the overall material condition of the surface 
force. 

From the Board of Inspection and Survey we met with INSURV officials 
and observed an INSURV inspection onboard the USS Cole (DDG 67) 
conducted on December 12, 2011 and December 14, 2011. We obtained all 
INSURV initial material inspection reports dating from 2008 through 
2012 for cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and amphibious warfare ships. 
We then extracted relevant data from those reports, including INSURV’s 
overall assessment of the material condition of these surface ships 
(satisfactory, degraded, unsatisfactory), Equipment Operational 
Capability scores for the different functional areas of ships systems 
(on a 0.00 to 1.00 scale), and dates when these ships were inspected. 
Although INSURV provides an overall assessment, we included Equipment 
Operational Capability scores to provide additional insight into the 
material condition of a ship’s systems. Overall assessments focus on a 
ship’s material readiness to perform primary missions. As such, while 
multiple individual systems may be in an unsatisfactory condition 
(Equipment Operational Capability scores below 0.80 are considered “
degraded,” while those below 0.60 are considered “unsatisfactory”), 
the ship may receive an overall rating of “satisfactory” due to its 
material readiness to meet its primary missions. Figure 4 below shows 
the process for determining INSURV ratings, with that segment for 
determining Equipment Operational Capability scores highlighted. 

Figure 4: INSURV Process for Determining Overall Material Inspection 
Ratings: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Assess ship subsystems and configuration items;   
Assess ship INSURV demonstrations; 
Assess material readiness of systems/functional areas (EOC scores); 
Assess material readiness to perform primary missions; 
Determine overall INSURV rating. 

EOC: Equipment Operational Capability. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

[End of figure] 

We analyzed both INSURV overall ratings and Equipment Operational 
Capability scores to identify differences in material readiness 
between types of ships. To determine if there were statistically 
significant differences in the Equipment Operational Capability scores 
among four types of ships (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and 
amphibious ships), we took the average of the various Equipment 
Operational Capability scores for each ship and conducted a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). In addition, we conducted post-hoc 
multiple comparison means tests to determine which ship types, if any, 
differed. Based on the results of this analysis, we concluded that 
there were statistically significant differences in the average 
Equipment Operational Capability score between the four ship types (p-
value < 0.0001). Specifically, the average for amphibious ships was 
significantly lower, at the 95 percent confidence level, than the 
average scores for cruisers, destroyers, and frigates and the average 
for cruisers was significantly lower than the average for destroyers. 

In presenting our results, we standardized relevant data where 
necessary in order to present a consistent picture. For example, in 
2010, the Board of Inspection and Survey moved from rating those ships 
with the worst material condition as “unfit for sustained combat 
operations” to rating them as “unsatisfactory.” We have treated both 
these ratings as “unsatisfactory” in this report. 

We obtained casualty report data for the same set of ships from the 
United States Fleet Forces Command office responsible for the Navy’s 
Maintenance Figure of Merit program. Casualty report data provided 
average daily numbers of casualty reports per ship for cruisers, 
destroyers, frigates, and amphibious warfare ships. We then used these 
daily averages to identify differences between ship types and to 
calculate and analyze changes in these daily averages from month to 
month and quarter to quarter. 

We assessed the reliability of casualty report data presented in this 
report. Specifically, the Navy provided information based on data 
reliability assessment questions we provided, which included 
information on an overview of the data, data collection processes and 
procedures, data quality controls, and overall perceptions of data 
quality. We received documentation about how the systems are 
structured and written procedures in place to ensure that the 
appropriate material readiness information is collected and properly 
categorized. Additionally, we interviewed the Navy officials to obtain 
further clarification on data reliability and to discuss how the data 
were collected and reported into the system. After assessing the data, 
we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of assessing the material condition of Navy surface combatant 
and amphibious warfare ships, and we discuss our findings in the 
report. 

To determine if there were statistically significant differences in 
the daily averages among the four types of ships (cruisers, 
destroyers, frigates, and amphibious warfare ships), we conducted a 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), followed by post-hoc multiple 
comparison means tests to determine which ship types, if any, 
differed. Based on the results of this analysis we concluded that 
there were statistically significant differences in the daily averages 
between the four ship types (p-value < 0.0001), and specifically, the 
daily average for amphibious warfare ships was significantly higher, 
at the 95 percent confidence level, than the daily average for 
cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. 

Next we analyzed the changes in the daily averages to determine if 
there was an increasing, decreasing, or stationary trend from month to 
month. We did this separately for surface combatant ships (cruisers, 
destroyers, and frigates) and amphibious warfare ships. To estimate 
the trends, we conducted a time-series regression analysis to account 
for the correlation in the average daily scores from month to month. 
We then tested the estimated trends for significant changes after 
February 2010 — when the Fleet Review Panel’s findings were 
published – using the Chow test for structural changes in the 
estimated parameters. We fit a time-series regression model with 
autoregressive errors (AR lag of 1) to monthly data for both surface 
combatants and amphibious ships to account for the autocorrelation 
between monthly observations. The total R-squared, a measure that 
reflects how well the model predicts the data, was 0.9641 for the 
surface combatant ships model and 0.9086 for the amphibious warfare 
ships model which indicate both models fit the data well. A summary of 
the model parameters is given in the table below. 

Table 7: Summary of Regression Model Parameters: 

Model: Surface Combatants; 
Model: Total R-Squared: 0.9641; 
Model: Regression R-Squared: 0.6063; 
Parameter: Intercept; 
Estimate: 9.8221; 
p-value: <0.0001; 
Parameter: Month (trend); 
Estimate: 0.1770; 
p-value: <0.0001. 

Model: Amphibious Ships; 
Model: Total R-Squared: 0.9086; 
Model: Regression R-Squared: 0.4013; 
Parameter: Intercept; 
Estimate: 16.1106; 
p-value: <0.0001; 
Parameter: Month (trend); 
Estimate: 0.2438; 
p-value: <0.0001. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

[End of table] 

We observed statistically significant positive trends in the daily 
average for both models. Specifically, the estimated trend for the 
daily average number of casualty reports per ship increased at a rate 
of about 2 per year (0.1770 * 12 months) for surface combatant ships 
and about 3 per year (0.2438 * 12 months) for amphibious warfare 
ships. In addition, neither of the tests for significant structural 
changes in the model parameters after February 2010 were significant 
at the 95 percent confidence level. Based on this, we concluded that 
there is not enough evidence to suggest there were significant changes 
in the estimated trends after February 2010 for either ship type. 

We analyzed data from the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy 
(DRRS-N), which contains data that is normally reported monthly and 
focuses on current readiness by presenting information on broader 
capability and resource areas. We obtained classified DRRS-N readiness 
data for all surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships from 
January 2008 through March 2012. DRRS-N data showed upward and 
downward movements between 2008 and 2012, but we did not evaluate the 
statistical significance of these movements. 

To determine the extent to which the Navy has taken steps intended to 
improve the readiness of its surface combatant and amphibious warfare 
ships including efforts to implement its recent strategy, we reviewed 
relevant Navy instructions on Navy material readiness, including the 
strategy—the Surface Force Readiness Manual—to identify the policies 
and procedures required by the Navy to ensure its surface ships are 
ready to perform their current mission requirements and reach their 
expected service lives. We also reviewed prior GAO work on risk 
management and collected and analyzed data on the resources needed to 
implement the strategy, and interviewed relevant officials. 

To gain a better understanding of how the Navy’s independent 
maintenance, training, and manning initiatives will be integrated into 
the new strategy, we collected data on the staffing resources needed 
to implement the strategy and met with officials from the Commander 
Navy Regional Maintenance Center, the Surface Maintenance Engineering 
Planning Program, and the Afloat Training Group Pacific. We focused 
primarily on the Navy’s maintenance initiatives because we have 
previously reported on its training and manning initiatives.[Footnote 
16] 

In addition, we met with personnel on board four Navy ships to obtain 
their views on the impact of the Navy’s maintenance initiatives, such 
as readiness assessments and material inspections, on the readiness of 
these ships. Specifically, we visited the USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55), USS 
Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), USS San Antonio (LPD 17), and USS Higgins (DDG 
76). We also discussed initial implementation of the new strategy with 
personnel on board the USS Higgins. 

We also met with officials from the Commander Naval Surface Force, 
U.S. Pacific Fleet who are responsible for administering the strategy 
for surface ships on the West coast and in Hawaii and Japan to discuss 
timeframes for transitioning ships into the strategy, challenges 
implementing the strategy, and plans to address any risks that may 
occur during the strategy’s implementation. Additionally, we obtained 
written responses to our questions from these officials and from 
officials at the Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet 
who administer the strategy for surface ships on the East coast. 

Finally, we reviewed prior GAO work on risk assessment as well as Navy 
testimony on the readiness of its ships and aircraft and Department of 
Defense strategic guidance on the key military missions the department 
will prepare for and budget priorities for fiscal years 2013-2017. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to September 2012, 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office of The Under Secretary of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20S01-3000: 

September 5, 2012: 

Ms. Sharon L. Pickup: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441: 
G Street NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Pickup: 

This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-l2887, "Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Assess Risks to 
Its Strategy To Improve Ship Readiness," dated August 1, 2012 (GAO 
Code 351621). The Department's comments on the two specific 
recommendations are enclosed. 

The Department partially concurs with both recommendations. In 
response to recommendation l, the Navy feels that the annual Planning. 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process adequately 
identifies risks and that a one-time comprehensive assessment of risk 
above the annual PPBE related assessments may strain scarce resources. 
In response to recommendation 2, the Navy agrees that results of these 
annual assessments are also sufficient to enable adjustments to the 
implementation of the strategy. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. Technical comments were provided separately. For further 
questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Jack Evans, 
Director, Naval Warfare, 703-614-3170. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Strategic and Tactical Systems: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

GAO Draft Report Dated August 1, 2012: 
GAO-12-887 (GAO Code 351621): 

"Navy Needs To Assess Risks To Its Strategy To Improve Ship Readiness" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive assessment of the 
risks the Navy faces in implementing its Surface Force Readiness 
Manual strategy, and alternatives to mitigate risks. Specifically a 
comprehensive risk assessment should include an assessment of risks 
such as high operational tempos and availability of personnel. 

DoD Response: Partially Concur. The Department agrees that risk 
assessment is an important component of program management but does 
not agree that a comprehensive assessment of the risks associated with 
implementation of the Navy's Surface Force Readiness strategy is 
either necessary or desirable. 

A tremendous number of factors impact Surface Ship readiness. Some of 
those factors, such as budgetary decisions, emergent operational 
requirements, and unexpected major ship repair events, such as fire, 
flooding, or collisions, are outside of the Navy's direct control. 
However, the Navy's Surface Ship readiness strategy, and the 
organizations that support that strategy, determine and prioritize the 
full readiness requirement through in-depth review of each ship's 
material condition and assess the risk of any gaps between that 
requirement and execution, as real world events unfold. 

The Surface Ship readiness strategy has a direct input into the annual 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. The 
Department's position is that execution of the Surface Ship readiness 
strategy and the PPBE process adequately identify and mitigate risks 
to the Surface Force. A separate one-time comprehensive assessment of 
risks, over and above established tracking mechanisms is an 
unnecessary strain on scarce resources. 

With the stand-up of Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program 
(SURFMEPP) and Commander Navy Regional Maintenance Centers (CNRMC), 
the surface Navy now has the technical resources available, using a 
disciplined process, to inform risk-based decisions that optimize the 
balance between current operational readiness and future readiness 
tied to expected service life. Documenting and managing the 
maintenance requirement is now a fully integrated process at SURFMEPP 
and CNRMC. Risks to service life are identified and adjudicated with 
each Surface Type Commander. This approach is consistent with 
fundamental process discipline and risk management executed by the 
submarine and carrier enterprises. 

Navy leadership has managed the risks associated with the generation and
implementation of the Surface Force Readiness Strategy. Navy is 
continually assessing our progress in achieving that strategy, and we 
have the requisite tools in place to identify changes in Force 
readiness levels that may result from resource constraints, and will 
adjust/modify our process as necessary to ensure Force readiness stays 
on track. 

For reference purposes this recommendation will be identified as item 
GAO-12-887-01. 

Recommendation 2: GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Secretary of the Navy to use the results of this assessment to 
make any necessary adjustments to its implementation plan. 

DoD Response: Partially Concur. The Department believes that the 
existing assessment processes are sufficient to enable the Navy to 
make necessary adjustments to the implementation of the strategy.
For reference purposes, this recommendation will be identified as GAO-
12-887-02. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this 
report were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Jim Ashley, Mary Jo 
Lacasse, David Rodriguez, Michael Silver, Amie Steele, Nicole Volchko, 
Erik Wilkins-McKee, Nicole Willems, and Ed Yuen. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

1. H.R. Rep. No-112-78, at 110 (2011). 

2. The Navy also has two air type commanders responsible for aircraft 
and aircraft carriers assigned to their geographic areas of 
responsibility and two submarine type commanders. 

3. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3000.15, Fleet 
Response Plan (FRP) (Aug. 31, 2006). 

4. Fleet Review Panel, Final Report, Fleet Review Panel of Surface 
Force Readiness (Feb. 26, 2010). For the purposes of this report, we 
are defining current readiness as ships’ abilities to meet near term 
operational requirements and life cycle material readiness as ships’ 
abilities to achieve their expected service lives. 

5. GAO, Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and 
Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-592] (Washington, D.C.: June 2010). 

6. GAO, Military Readiness: Navy’s Report to Congress on the Impact of 
Training and Crew Size on Surface Force Material Readiness, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-746R] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2011). 

7. Department of the Navy, Report to Congress: Impact of Training and 
Crew Size on Surface Force Material Readiness (Washington, D.C.: 
February 2011). 

8. Commander, Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet/Commander, Naval 
Surface Force Atlantic Instruction 3502.3. Surface Force Readiness 
Manual (Mar. 9, 2012). 

9. Casualty reports reflect equipment malfunctions that impact a ship’
s ability to support required mission areas and suggest a deficiency 
in mission essential equipment. We drew casualty report data from the 
Maintenance Figure of Merit program. 

10. The data includes all first inspection data but does not include 
data from any re-inspections that were conducted following an “
unsatisfactory” inspection. 

11. Commander, Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet/Commander, Naval 
Surface Force Atlantic Instruction 3502.3, Surface Force Readiness 
Manual (Mar. 9, 2012). 

12. The Surface Force Readiness Manual applies to most surface ships 
in the fleet. However, aircraft carriers and littoral combat ships are 
governed by separate instructions. 

13. Currently, no ships have applied the strategy throughout an entire 
27-month Fleet Response Plan cycle. 

14. GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

15. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 
Priorities For 21st Century Defense (Jan. 3, 2012). 

16. Footnote numbers start over at “1” in appendices. GAO, Military 
Readiness: Navy’s Report to Congress on the Impact of Training and 
Crew Size on Surface Force Material Readiness, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-746R] (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 
2011) and Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and 
Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-592] (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 
2010). 

[End of section] 

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