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United States Government Accountability Office: GAO: 

Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee 
on Appropriations, House of Representatives: 

December 2011: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

Action Needed to Address NNSA's Program Management and Coordination 
Challenges: 

GAO-12-71: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-12-71, a report to the Subcommittee on Energy and 
Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

GAO has issued numerous reports on the effectiveness of the National 
Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation (DNN) programs. For this report GAO was asked to 
assess (1) the extent of annual DNN uncosted, or unexpended, balances; 
(2) the level of financial support from foreign donor and recipient 
governments to the DNN programs; (3) the effectiveness of DNN program 
performance measures; and (4) the coordination of DNN and other agency 
nonproliferation programs. GAO analyzed NNSA financial data and other 
pertinent documents, and interviewed officials from multiple agencies. 

What GAO Found: 

From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, only about half of the total 
annual funds available to the DNN programs were costed, or expended, 
each year. This resulted in uncosted carryover balances of more than 
$1.5 billion on average from one fiscal year to the next. During this 
time, the total uncosted DNN operating program balances exceeded 
thresholds established by the Department of Energy by hundreds of 
millions of dollars every year. However, much of the annual uncosted 
DNN-wide funding balances were committed for future expenditure, and 
total uncommitted uncosted DNN operating program balances were under 
the thresholds. Nevertheless, three DNN programs had uncommitted 
balances that frequently exceeded thresholds during this time. NNSA 
provides semiannual reports to Congress on DNN uncommitted balances. 
However, these reports do not specify the amounts by which program 
balances exceeded the thresholds or explain why the excess balances 
should not be rescinded, redirected, or used to offset future budget 
requests. 

GAO identified four DNN programs authorized by Congress to receive and 
use contributions from foreign donors, and these authorities expire 
from 2011 through 2015. Three of these programs received approximately 
$47.1 million from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 from seven 
countries. This amount represents about 1 percent of the total funding 
from annual appropriations acts directed to the four programs over the 
same period. Extending these authorities would give NNSA more time to 
obtain foreign contributions. In addition, NNSA has pursued greater 
cost sharing with foreign countries where DNN programs are 
implemented, but the extent of cost sharing is unclear because NNSA 
does not systematically track or maintain such data. 

Some DNN program performance measures do not satisfy key attributes 
that GAO has identified in previous work, namely measures that are 
clear, reliable, and balanced. For example, one program measure— 
securing nuclear material facilities in Russia and the former Soviet 
Union—is unclear, because NNSA counts buildings with security upgrades 
as completed although NNSA may undertake additional upgrades at some 
of these sites. In addition, the results of some DNN programs in 
fiscal year 2010 appear overstated because DNN measured performance 
against different targets in the end of fiscal year performance report 
than the ones presented in the budget request to Congress. Moreover, 
NNSA has dropped one long-standing measure used by the Global 
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program to track reemployment 
of former Soviet weapons scientists rather than improve the measure as 
GAO previously recommended and NNSA agreed to revise. 

Existing strategies and plans for coordinating federal efforts to 
combat nuclear smuggling overseas do not incorporate all of the key 
characteristics of effective national strategies that GAO has 
identified in previous studies. In addition, there are concerns of 
potential fragmentation and overlap among some programs working to 
counter nuclear smuggling overseas, especially those providing 
equipment and training. Furthermore, there is no single recognized 
federal agency responsible for leading and directing efforts to combat 
nuclear smuggling overseas. However, the NSC oversees interagency 
coordination of these efforts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the time frame allowing 
DNN programs to receive and use foreign contributions. GAO recommends 
that NNSA, among other things, (1) justify in its reports to Congress 
why uncommitted DNN program balances over threshold should not be 
rescinded, redirected, or used to offset future budget requests; (2) 
better track foreign cost sharing; and (3) improve performance 
measurement reporting. GAO also recommends that the National Security 
Council (NSC) review U.S. programs working to prevent nuclear 
smuggling overseas to reduce fragmentation and potential overlap. NNSA 
neither agreed nor disagreed with and NSC did not comment on the 
recommendations. NNSA raised concerns with GAO’s analysis of DNN 
financial and performance information. GAO addressed NNSA’s concerns 
as appropriate. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-71]. For more 
information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Some DNN Programs Have Had Difficulty Reducing Uncommitted Uncosted 
Balances: 

Foreign Contributions to DNN Programs Have Been Limited, and Foreign 
Cost-Sharing Data Are Not Systematically Tracked or Maintained by NNSA: 

Some DNN Program Performance Measures Lack Key Attributes and Have Led 
to Overstated Results: 

Limitations in Interagency Strategic Plans Impede Coordination of U.S. 
Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Overseas: 

Conclusions: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Previous GAO Reports Assessing DOE and NNSA Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Programs: 

Appendix III: Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Programs, by 
Program, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Appendix IV: Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Programs, by 
Country, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Appendix V: Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Programs Compared to 
Total Funding from Annual Appropriations Acts, Fiscal Years 2006-2010: 

Foreign Contributions to DNN Programs Compared to Funding from 
Appropriations Acts, Fiscal Years 2006-2010 

Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Program Performance Measures: 

Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010: 

Appendix VIII: U.S. Programs Contributing to Overseas Nuclear 
Smuggling Prevention and Detection: 

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix X: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: DNN Operating Programs and Major Program and Subprogram 
Functions and Activities, by DNN Program Office in Fiscal Year 2010: 

Table 2: DNN-Wide Costed and Uncosted Balances, Including Committed 
and Uncommitted Uncosted Balances from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Table 3: Total DNN Operating Program Uncosted and Uncommitted Uncosted 
Balances Over/Under DOE Threshold from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Table 4: Uncosted Funding Balances Over/Under DOE Threshold, Selected 
DNN Operating Programs from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Table 5: Uncommitted Uncosted Funding Balances Over/Under DOE 
Threshold, Selected DNN Operating Programs from Fiscal Years 2006 
through 2010: 

Table 6: Differences in DNN Program Performance Targets, Fiscal Year 
2010: 

Table 7: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a National Strategy: 

Table 8: Key Attributes of Successful Performance Measures: 

Table 9: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Performance 
Measures, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010, As Presented in Annual 
Budget Requests: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Trends in Total DNN Costed, Committed, and Uncommitted 
Funding Balances from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Figure 2: Total Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Program from 
Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Figure 3: Foreign Contributions to DNN Programs by Country from Fiscal 
Years 2006 through 2010: 

Abbreviations: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

CBSP: Cooperative Border Security Program: 

CPI: Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives: 

CSI: Container Security Initiative: 

CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction program: 

DHS: U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: 

DNN: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

DOD: U.S. Department of Defense: 

DOE: U.S. Department of Energy: 

DTRA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency: 

EWGPP: Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program: 

EXBS: Export Control and Related Border Security program: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

GIPP: Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program: 

GNDA: Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: 

GTRI: Global Threat Reduction Initiative: 

HEU: highly enriched uranium: 

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency: 

ICITAP: International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance 
Program: 

ICP: International Counterproliferation Program: 

INECP: International Nonproliferation Export Control Program: 

INMPC: International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation 
program: 

IPC: interagency policy committee: 

IPP: Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program: 

IWG: interagency working group: 

Justice: U.S. Department of Justice: 

LEU: low-enriched uranium: 

M&O: management and operating: 

MOX: mixed oxide: 

MPC&A: Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program: 

MT: metric tons: 

NDF: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund: 

NGSI: Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 

NIAG: Nuclear Interdiction Action Group: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

NRC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

NSC: U.S. National Security Council: 

NSOI: Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative: 

NTRG: Nuclear Trafficking Response Group: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

OPDAT: Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and 
Training: 

PDCF: Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility: 

PNSP: Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program: 

RCP: Regional Combating WMD Program: 

R&D: research and development: 

SFI: Secure Freight Initiative: 

SLD: Second Line of Defense program: 

State: U.S. Department of State: 

UN: United Nations: 

USG: United States Government: 

WMD: weapons of mass destruction: 

WMD-PPP: WMD Proliferation Prevention Program: 

United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: 

December 14, 2011: 

The Honorable Rodney P. Frelinghuysen: Chairman: 
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development: Committee on 
Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The threat of nuclear proliferation poses one of the most important 
challenges to U.S. and international security. This threat includes 
the possibilities that terrorist organizations could steal nuclear 
weapon-usable materials from poorly secured stockpiles in various 
locations around the world or that other nations could divert nuclear 
material intended for peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear 
weapons.[Footnote 1] As little as 25 kilograms of weapon-grade highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) or 8 kilograms of plutonium could be used to 
make a nuclear weapon. 

To address these and related nuclear proliferation threats, the 
Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) implements more than 20 nonproliferation programs worldwide 
under its Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN).[Footnote 
2] These programs include efforts to secure nuclear warheads; protect, 
consolidate, and dispose of weapon-usable nuclear materials and 
radiological sources;[Footnote 3] reduce the risks of nuclear 
smuggling; research and develop nonproliferation technologies; 
transition weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise and 
infrastructure in partner countries to peaceful purposes; and enhance 
international export controls and International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) nuclear safeguards.[Footnote 4] 

Many DNN programs originated in the early 1990s, following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and have focused principally on 
improving nuclear security in Russia. Increasingly, these programs 
have focused attention on the security of weapon-usable nuclear 
materials in countries beyond Russia and the former Soviet states. DNN 
programs have engaged more than 100 countries and are seeking to 
increase nuclear security work with several countries where there has 
been limited prior cooperation, such as China and India. In addition 
to NNSA, other U.S. government agencies--including the Departments of 
Defense (DOD), State, and Homeland Security (DHS)--support programs 
and activities to reduce proliferation concerns around the world. 

NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation budget has grown significantly over 
the past decade, from approximately $874 million appropriated for DNN 
in fiscal year 2001, to approximately $2.3 billion appropriated for 
DNN in fiscal year 2011. Funding appropriated for DNN activities is 
generally available for obligation[Footnote 5] until expended and is 
known as "no year" funding.[Footnote 6] Typically, NNSA obligates 
funds when it contracts with a management and operating (M&O) 
contractor, such as a DOE national laboratory, to execute certain 
program functions. The obligation is "costed" when goods and services 
are received, and, for practical purposes, DNN considers funds to be 
expended when costed.[Footnote 7] 

Not all DNN obligations are costed during a given fiscal year, and, 
because of the no-year nature of the funding, NNSA carries these 
balances of uncosted obligations over to the next fiscal year. As a 
result, uncosted obligations can accumulate from one fiscal year to 
the next. In addition, uncosted obligations consist of balances that 
are either "committed" or "uncommitted." Generally, uncosted 
obligations are committed when the M&O contractors enter into legally 
enforceable agreements, such as purchase orders or contracts.[Footnote 
8] Uncommitted uncosted obligations are balances that have not yet 
been committed by the contractors and may be available to reduce 
future NNSA budget requests.[Footnote 9] Furthermore, besides domestic 
sources of funding, some DNN programs have been authorized by Congress 
to receive and use contributions from other foreign governments 
interested in supporting nuclear nonproliferation efforts. 

This report responds in part to your request that we conduct a review 
of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation strategies.[Footnote 10] 
Specifically, our objectives were to assess (1) the extent of annual 
DNN uncosted, or unexpended, balances; (2) the level of financial 
contributions from foreign donor and recipient governments to the DNN 
programs; (3) the effectiveness of DNN program performance measures; 
and (4) the effectiveness of interagency strategies and plans for 
coordinating NNSA and other agency nuclear nonproliferation programs, 
especially those working to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling 
overseas. This report focuses on the management and coordination 
challenges facing the DNN programs, but does not evaluate the 
effectiveness of the programs. In previous reports, we have evaluated 
the effectiveness of various individual DNN programs.[Footnote 11] 

To assess the extent of DNN uncosted balances, we obtained and 
analyzed financial data generated from NNSA's official financial 
management system on uncosted and uncommitted DNN funding from fiscal 
years 2006 through 2010. We interviewed knowledgeable NNSA officials 
to assess the reliability of the data from this system, including on 
issues such as data entry, access, quality control procedures, and the 
accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined that the data 
were of sufficient reliability for our purposes. To assess financial 
contributions made by foreign donor governments to the DNN programs, 
we analyzed data in the most recent DOE report to Congress on the 
receipt and utilization of international contributions for 
nonproliferation and threat reduction work. Regarding cost sharing by 
host governments receiving DNN assistance, NNSA officials provided us 
with data estimating the dollar amount of foreign cost sharing for 
relevant programs, and provided us with examples of cost-sharing 
activity. We interviewed NNSA officials on the policies, methods, and 
systems for collecting, estimating, and maintaining foreign cost- 
sharing information. Unless otherwise noted, all dollar figures in 
this report are presented in nominal amounts--that is, they have not 
been adjusted for inflation. To assess the effectiveness of DNN 
performance measures, we evaluated the DNN program performance 
measures presented by NNSA in its annual budget requests to Congress 
from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. Specifically, for each DNN 
program, we: reviewed the performance measures in each budget request 
to assess how the measures changed over time; compared performance 
measures in each budget request against the measures described in DOE 
annual performance reports produced at the end of each fiscal year; 
and evaluated the DNN performance measures against criteria we 
developed previously on the key attributes of effective performance 
measures. To assess the effectiveness of interagency strategies for 
coordinating NNSA and other agency nuclear nonproliferation programs, 
especially those working to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling 
overseas, we reviewed relevant interagency strategies and coordinating 
guidance. We evaluated these strategies against characteristics and 
attributes of effective national strategies for complex interagency 
undertakings that we have developed previously. To assess coordination 
between NNSA and other agencies' nonproliferation programs, we focused 
on 21 programs across five federal agencies that are involved in 
preventing and detecting nuclear smuggling overseas. We submitted a 
standard set of questions to and/or interviewed officials representing 
the 21 programs on a range of issues, including scope of program 
missions and activities, types of interactions with other federal 
programs, and their views on the coordination and integration of 
similar programs across the government. We used the responses to our 
questions and information from our interviews with officials from 
these agencies to evaluate similarities in missions, functions, and 
activities between programs, and obtain official perspectives on the 
effectiveness of coordinating mechanisms and guidance. Additional 
details on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2011 to December 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The President requests funds from Congress each fiscal year for NNSA 
to execute DNN programs. When Congress appropriates funds for DNN, it 
generally recommends that NNSA direct specific amounts of that 
appropriation to each of the programs funded from that appropriation. 
In fiscal year 2010, there were seven operating programs funded from 
NNSA's DNN appropriation managed by six DNN program offices. Table 1 
lists these programs by office and describes major program and 
subprogram functions and activities in fiscal year 2010. Appendix II 
lists some of our prior reports on DNN programs and activities. 

Table 1: DNN Operating Programs and Major Program and Subprogram 
Functions and Activities, by DNN Program Office in Fiscal Year 2010: 

DNN program office: (1) Office of Global Threat Reduction; 

Programs: (1) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI); 

Major program and subprogram functions and activities: GTRI 
subprograms work in the United States and internationally to convert 
research reactors and medical isotope production processes from use of 
HEU, remove and dispose of excess nuclear and radiological materials, 
and protect high-priority nuclear and radiological sources from theft. 

DNN program office: (2) Office of Nonproliferation Research and 
Development (R&D); 

Programs: (2) Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program; 

Major program and subprogram functions and activities: 
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D subprograms support long-term 
basic and applied research, development, and testing of new 
technologies to improve U.S. capabilities to detect and monitor 
nuclear weapons production, proliferation of nuclear weapon-usable 
materials, and nuclear explosions worldwide. 

DNN program office: (3) Office of Nonproliferation and International 
Security; 

Programs: (3) Nonproliferation and International Security program; 

Major program and subprogram functions and activities: 
Nonproliferation and International Security subprograms provide a 
range of policy and technical support to implement and monitor WMD 
reductions; revitalize the safeguards technology and human capital 
base at the U.S. national laboratories to help strengthen the 
international safeguards system; strengthen nuclear material security 
and export control systems; transition WMD expertise and 
infrastructure in partner countries to peaceful purposes; and improve 
international nuclear nonproliferation regimes, agreements, and 
arrangements. 

DNN program office: (4) Office of International Material Protection 
and Cooperation; 

Programs: (4) International Nuclear Materials Protection and 
Cooperation (INMPC) program; 

Major program and subprogram functions and activities: INMPC consists 
of two major subprograms: the nuclear Material Protection, Control, 
and Accounting (MPC&A) program and the Second Line of Defense (SLD) 
program. The MPC&A program works to improve the security of nuclear 
warheads and materials at sites in Russia and at nuclear material 
sites in other countries; consolidate and convert weapon-usable 
nuclear material stocks; and enable Russia and other countries to 
sustain MPC&A upgrades over the long term without continued U.S. 
support.[A] The SLD program seeks to strengthen the capability of 
foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit nuclear 
and radioactive material trafficking. The SLD program is divided into 
an SLD "core" program that installs radiation detection equipment at 
key foreign land borders, airports, and ports, and a Megaports 
Initiative that is designed to enhance radiation screening of cargo 
containers at major foreign seaports. 

DNN program office: (5) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition; 

Programs: (5) U.S. Surplus Materials Disposition program; (6) Russian 
Surplus Materials Disposition program; 

Major program and subprogram functions and activities: The U.S. 
Surplus Materials Disposition program--also referred to as the U.S. 
Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program--supports the 
downblending of HEU that is excess to U.S. defense needs and efforts 
to fabricate 34 metric tons of U.S. excess plutonium into mixed oxide 
fuel, which will be irradiated in commercial reactors. The Russian 
Surplus Materials Disposition program--also referred to as the Russian 
Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program or the Russian plutonium 
disposition program--is planning to assist Russia in modifying 
reactors in that country, which will dispose of an equivalent amount 
of Russian weapon-grade plutonium. 

DNN program office: (6) Office of Nuclear Risk Reduction[B]; 

Programs: (7) Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production 
(EWGPP) program; 

Major program and subprogram functions and activities: The EWGPP 
program has facilitated shutdown of Russia's plutonium production 
reactors by constructing replacement sources of heat and electricity. 
It is expected to complete all programmatic activities in calendar 
year 2011. 

Source: NNSA. 

[A] There is a geographic division of labor between MPC&A and GTRI 
program efforts to secure and protect nuclear materials in foreign 
locations. The MPC&A program provides security upgrades to sites in 
foreign countries including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, China, and India. GTRI addresses security at civilian 
research reactors and related facilities utilizing nuclear weapon- 
usable materials in all other countries that are not considered high- 
income. 

[B] In fiscal year 2011, this office ceased to exist, and 
responsibility for administering closeout activities under the EWGPP 
program was transferred to the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition. 

[End of table] 

In April 1996, we reported that DOE did not have a standard, effective 
approach for identifying carryover balances that may be available to 
reduce future budget requests, but instead relied on broad estimates 
of potentially excess balances in individual programs.[Footnote 12] As 
a result, we reported that DOE could not be sure whether the amount of 
carryover balances by its programs was appropriate.[Footnote 13] Based 
on our prior work and recommendations, and congressional interest in 
uncosted balances, DOE developed benchmarks, or "thresholds"--beyond 
which uncosted balances carried over at the end of a fiscal year 
should be given greater scrutiny--to assess the extent to which 
carryover balances are appropriate. These thresholds are typically 
expressed as a percentage of the total funds available to a program to 
cost, or expend, in any given fiscal year, depending on the types of 
activities the program is conducting. The thresholds give NNSA a tool 
for evaluating DNN program performance based on the variance between 
target thresholds and actual uncosted, or unexpended, carryover 
balances. The thresholds for DNN operating programs generally range 
from 14 to 17 percent of the total program funding available to cost 
in a given fiscal year.[Footnote 14] 

These thresholds also provide Congress with a way of overseeing NNSA's 
financial management. In 1992, Congress began requiring DOE to submit 
an annual report on the status of its uncosted obligations.[Footnote 
15] In these reports, DOE evaluates uncosted balances against 
thresholds representing standard costing levels for various types of 
funding, such as operating and capital equipment costs. In 2003, 
Congress required NNSA to provide a semiannual report on DNN 
uncommitted, unobligated, and unexpended balances.[Footnote 16] 

Congress has given specific authority over the past decade to several 
DNN programs to receive and retain contributions from foreign sources 
for program purposes, in addition to funding received from domestic 
sources. We identified four programs that are currently authorized to 
receive and use foreign contributions:[Footnote 17] the Elimination of 
Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) program, the International 
Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program (INMPC) program, 
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), and the Russian 
plutonium disposition program.[Footnote 18] 

Furthermore, other key U.S. government agencies--including DOD, State, 
and DHS--pursue international efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation 
risks. Specifically: 

* DOD administers the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, 
which has provided assistance to (1) facilitate the removal of nuclear 
weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; (2) help Russia and 
Ukraine eliminate strategic delivery systems; (3) secure Russian 
nuclear warheads; (4) destroy the Russian chemical weapons stockpile; 
(5) reduce biological proliferation risks across the former Soviet 
Union; and (6) combat WMD smuggling in the region. The CTR program has 
expanded its geographic scope in recent years, including pursuing 
nuclear security cooperation with India and China in cooperation with 
NNSA. The CTR Policy Office within the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense provides strategic guidance and policy oversight, conducts 
long range planning, and negotiates implementing agreements and 
arrangements for the CTR program. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms Control oversees acquisition, 
implementation, and other management issues for the program. CTR 
program activities are implemented through the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA), which manages all aspects of CTR's 
programming, contracting, and funding.[Footnote 19] DTRA also 
implements international WMD threat reduction activities separate from 
the CTR program. 

* State manages its own nonproliferation programs, provides support to 
NNSA and other U.S. agency nuclear nonproliferation programs working 
overseas, and conducts bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to address 
proliferation threats under the Bureau of International Security and 
Nonproliferation.[Footnote 20] State's nuclear nonproliferation 
programs include efforts to enhance international export controls and 
border security; counter nuclear smuggling; redirect WMD expertise in 
Iraq, Libya, and other countries to peaceful research; and sustain a 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund that provides funding to address 
nonproliferation contingencies and other urgent threat reduction 
efforts. 

* In 2002 Congress established DHS and authorized it to, among other 
things, develop and deploy technologies to detect, prevent, and 
interdict nuclear materials smuggled into the United States. In 2005, 
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within 
DHS to enhance national capabilities to prevent nuclear and 
radiological attacks.[Footnote 21] Part of DNDO's mission is to 
coordinate the development of a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 
(GNDA)--which DNDO describes as a worldwide network of sensors, 
telecommunications, and personnel, with supporting information 
exchanges, programs, and protocols, to detect, analyze, and report on 
nuclear and radiological materials outside of regulatory control. 
[Footnote 22] DNDO also works with other agency programs involved in 
detecting and preventing nuclear smuggling abroad by, among other 
things, developing standards and practices for testing and evaluating 
radiation detection systems and strategies to implement national level 
detection architectures. In addition to DNDO, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) within DHS created the Container Security Initiative 
to identify and screen U.S.-bound maritime cargo containers at foreign 
seaports to prevent and deter terrorist use of maritime containers and 
to request foreign inspection of those containers identified as high 
risk for the possibility they are carrying nuclear or radiological 
weapons or materials. CBP also manages the Secure Freight Initiative-- 
a joint DHS, DOE, and State effort--to deploy non-intrusive imaging 
and radiation detection equipment for the scanning of all U.S.-bound 
maritime cargo containers at foreign seaports. [Footnote 23] 

National Security Council (NSC) staff have the principal role in 
coordinating the implementation of NNSA, DOD, State, and other agency 
nonproliferation programs. NSC oversees the development of general 
policy and establishes guidelines for U.S. nonproliferation programs 
but does not implement programs or control their budgets. 

Some DNN Programs Have Had Difficulty Reducing Uncommitted Uncosted 
Balances: 

From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, only about half of the total 
annual funds available to the DNN programs were costed each year. 
Furthermore, total uncosted DNN operating program balances exceeded 
the thresholds established by DOE by hundreds of millions of dollars 
every year during this time, including some individual DNN programs 
with large uncosted balances over threshold. However, much of the 
annual uncosted DNN-wide funding balances were committed for future 
expenditure, and the total uncommitted uncosted DNN operating program 
balances were under acceptable thresholds. Nevertheless, three 
individual DNN programs had uncommitted balances that frequently 
exceeded thresholds during this time, raising questions about the 
ability of those programs to utilize the funding available to them. 

About Half of DNN Annual Funding Is Uncosted but Most Is Committed for 
Future Expenditure: 

From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, only about half of the total 
annual DNN funding available to cost was costed at the end of each 
fiscal year. As a percentage of the total annual funding available to 
cost, the annual DNN-wide uncosted balances ranged from approximately 
47 percent at the end of fiscal year 2009 to approximately 51 percent 
at the end of fiscal year 2007. In dollar terms, these annual DNN-wide 
uncosted balances have resulted in carryover balances of more than 
$1.5 billion on average from one fiscal year to the next. For 
instance, in fiscal year 2010--the most recent fiscal year in the 
scope of our review--DNN programs costed a total of approximately $1.8 
billion of approximately $3.6 billion available, leaving about $1.8 
billion in uncosted balances at the end of the fiscal year. See table 
2 for more detail on DNN-wide costed and uncosted balances, including 
committed and uncommitted uncosted balances, from fiscal years 2006 
through 2010. 

Table 2: DNN-wide Costed and Uncosted Balances, Including Committed 
and Uncommitted Uncosted Balances from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Dollars in millions: 

Total funds available to cost; 
Fiscal year 2006: $2,689.5; 
Fiscal year 2007: $3,169.1; 
Fiscal year 2008: $3,355.4; 
Fiscal year 2009: $3,103.1; 
Fiscal year 2010: $3,576.0; 
5-year average: $3,178.6. 
Total funds costed; 

Fiscal year 2006: $1,373.6; 
Fiscal year 2007: $1,556.0; 
Fiscal year 2008: $1,758.8; 
Fiscal year 2009: $1,633.2; 
Fiscal year 2010: $1,770.5; 
5-year average: $1,618.4. 
Total funds uncosted; 

Fiscal year 2006: $1,315.9; 
Fiscal year 2007: $1,613.1; 
Fiscal year 2008: $1,596.6; 
Fiscal year 2009: $1,469.8; 
Fiscal year 2010: $1,805.4; 
5-year average: $1,560.2. 
Total uncosted funds committed; 

Fiscal year 2006: $971.2; 
Fiscal year 2007: $1,213.6; 
Fiscal year 2008: $1,206.9; 
Fiscal year 2009: $1,127.4; 
Fiscal year 2010: $1,443.7; 
5-year average: $1,192.6. 
Total funds committed and costed; 

Fiscal year 2006: $2,344.8; 
Fiscal year 2007: $2,769.6; 
Fiscal year 2008: $2,965.7; 
Fiscal year 2009: $2,760.7; 
Fiscal year 2010: $3,214.2; 
5-year average: $2,811.0. 
Total uncosted funds uncommitted; 

Fiscal year 2006: $344.7; 
Fiscal year 2007: $399.5; 
Fiscal year 2008: $389.7; 
Fiscal year 2009: $342.4; 
Fiscal year 2010: $361.8; 
5-year average: $367.6. 
Total uncosted as a percentage of total funds available to cost; 

Fiscal year 2006: 48.9%; 
Fiscal year 2007: 50.9%; 
Fiscal year 2008: 47.6%; 
Fiscal year 2009: 47.4%; 
Fiscal year 2010: 50.5%; 
5-year average: 49.1%. 
Total uncommitted uncosted as a percentage of total funds available to 
cost; 

Fiscal year 2006: 12.8%; 
Fiscal year 2007: 12.6%; 
Fiscal year 2008: 11.6%; 
Fiscal year 2009: 11.0%; 
Fiscal year 2010: 10.1%; 
5-year average: 11.6%. 
Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Notes: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. Amounts may 
not total due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

Furthermore, total uncosted DNN operating program balances exceeded 
DOE thresholds every year by hundreds of millions of dollars during 
this time. For instance, the total uncosted DNN operating program 
balances exceeded the DOE threshold by nearly $800 million in fiscal 
year 2010. See table 3 for more information on the thresholds and 
total DNN operating program uncosted balances compared against these 
thresholds for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. 

Table 3: Total DNN Operating Program Uncosted and Uncommitted Uncosted 
Balances over/under DOE Thresholds, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 
2010: 

Dollars in millions: 

Fiscal Year 2006: 
Total DNN Operating; 
Threshold as percentage of total funds available to cost: 16.4%; 
Threshold as dollars: $363.8; 
Uncosted balances: $1,044.2; 
Uncosted balances over/under threshold: $680.4; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances: $313.7; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances over/under threshold: -$50.2. 

Fiscal Year 2007: 
Total DNN Operating; 
Threshold as percentage of total funds available to cost: 16.0%; 
Threshold as dollars: $412.4; 
Uncosted balances: $1,244.3; 
Uncosted balances over/under threshold: $831.9; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances: $360.7; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances over/under threshold: -$51.7. 

Fiscal Year 2008: 
Total DNN Operating; 
Threshold as percentage of total funds available to cost: 16.0%; 
Threshold as dollars: $456.4; 
Uncosted balances: $1,395.2; 
Uncosted balances over/under threshold: $938.8; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances: $371.7; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances over/under threshold: -$84.6. 

Fiscal Year 2009: 
Total DNN Operating; 
Threshold as percentage of total funds available to cost: 16.0%; 
Threshold as dollars: $462.6; 
Uncosted balances: $1,288.0; 
Uncosted balances over/under threshold: $825.4; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances: $323.2; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances over/under threshold: -$139.3. 

Fiscal Year 2010: 
Total DNN Operating; 
Threshold as percentage of total funds available to cost: 15.3%; 
Threshold as dollars: $430.6; 
Uncosted balances: $1,226.2; 
Uncosted balances over/under threshold: $795.6; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances: $327.3; 
Uncommitted uncosted balances over/under threshold: -$103.3. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Notes: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. Totals 
include balances for some older DNN programs to which Congress 
previously directed funding from DNN appropriations, but do not 
include uncosted and uncommitted uncosted balances associated with 
appropriations identified by NNSA as time-limited funds to DNN 
operating programs. The negative values indicate the amount by which 
balances were under thresholds. The positive values indicate the 
amount by which balances were over thresholds. Amounts may not total 
due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

At the program level, we examined the uncosted balances for the seven 
current DNN operating programs against the DOE thresholds from fiscal 
years 2006 through 2010. In nearly all cases we found that these 
individual programs each had large uncosted balances over DOE 
thresholds at the end of each fiscal year during this time period, 
ranging from approximately $21 million to $490 million. One of these 
programs--the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program--had 
annual uncosted balances below threshold twice during this time. See 
table 4 for more information on the amounts by which individual DNN 
program uncosted balances were over or under DOE threshold during this 
time. 

Table 4: Uncosted Funding Balances over/under DOE Thresholds, Selected 
DNN Operating Programs, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Dollars in millions: 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative; 
Amount of uncosted balances over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $27.1; 
Fiscal year 2007: $71.9; 
Fiscal year 2008: $60.0; 
Fiscal year 2009: $156.6; 
Fiscal year 2010: $104.4. 

Nonproliferation and Verification R&D; 
Amount of uncosted balances over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: -$0.9; 
Fiscal year 2007: -$10.3; 
Fiscal year 2008: $40.4; 
Fiscal year 2009: $48.9; 
Fiscal year 2010: $29.2. 

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production; 
Amount of uncosted balances over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $141.6; 
Fiscal year 2007: $127.1; 
Fiscal year 2008: $188.2; 
Fiscal year 2009: $115.5; 
Fiscal year 2010: $29.8. 

Nonproliferation and International Security; 
Amount of uncosted balances over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $36.8; 
Fiscal year 2007: $38.3; 
Fiscal year 2008: $45.0; 
Fiscal year 2009: $51.3; 
Fiscal year 2010: $53.5. 

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation; 
Amount of uncosted balances over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $317.8; 
Fiscal year 2007: $464.2; 
Fiscal year 2008: $490.2; 
Fiscal year 2009: $411.1; 
Fiscal year 2010: $444.8. 

U.S. Surplus Materials Disposition; 
Amount of uncosted balances over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $64.8; 
Fiscal year 2007: $61.5; 
Fiscal year 2008: $30.8; 
Fiscal year 2009: $21.2; 
Fiscal year 2010: $100.8. 

Russian Surplus Materials Disposition; 
Amount of uncosted balances over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $59.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $62.7; 
Fiscal year 2008: $43.9; 
Fiscal year 2009: $35.0; 
Fiscal year 2010: $33.5. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Notes: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. The negative 
values indicate the amount by which uncosted balances were under DOE 
uncosted thresholds. The positive values indicate the amount by which 
uncosted balances were over thresholds. 

[End of table] 

NNSA has acknowledged that uncosted DNN program funding balances have 
often exceeded the thresholds in reports to Congress. However, NNSA 
has stated that evaluating DNN programs on the basis of their uncosted 
balances alone is unwarranted and that, in addition, balances that are 
uncosted but committed should be considered when reviewing the 
financial status of the programs. NNSA officials told us that 
committed balances represent funds that have been placed on contracts, 
often for long-lead procurements, the work of which must be validated 
by project teams and NNSA headquarters before being costed. According 
to NNSA officials, because committed funding is tied to signed 
contracts, it is not available for other purposes. According to NNSA 
officials, the only way to fully cost funding in a fiscal year is to 
provide full funding at the contract signing, which would limit NNSA's 
ability to govern the execution of DNN projects in foreign countries. 

In addition, NNSA officials told us, and NNSA reports to Congress 
stated, that a significant amount of DNN work is conducted in foreign 
countries, notably Russia. In these countries, business transactions, 
including contract negotiations and subsequent accounting of these 
transactions, do not follow the normal obligation and costing patterns 
for funds costed domestically. For instance, funds are obligated 
upfront to the U.S. contractor handling the negotiations with the 
foreign entity, but costs are not reported until the work has been 
completed, which may take years after work orders are placed. NNSA 
officials told us that this situation can cause a lag between when 
program funds are committed and costed, because project payments are 
not made until after the work is verified as completed in these 
countries. 

We found that much of the annual DNN-wide uncosted balances had been 
committed for future expenditure. For instance, of the $1.8 billion in 
total DNN funding that was uncosted at the end of fiscal year 2010, 
approximately $1.4 billion was committed, leaving a total DNN 
uncommitted uncosted funding balance of approximately $361.8 million. 
This fiscal year 2010 uncommitted uncosted balance was also the 
smallest--as a percentage of total funding available to cost--over the 
5-year period of our review, having decreased from 12.8 percent in 
fiscal year 2006 to 10.1 percent in fiscal year 2010. On average 
during this period, the annual DNN-wide uncommitted uncosted balance 
was approximately $367.6 million, or 11.6 percent of total annual 
funding available to cost. See table 2, above, and figure 1 for more 
information on committed and uncommitted uncosted balances DNN-wide 
from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. 

Figure 1: Trends in Total DNN Costed, Committed, and Uncommitted 
Funding Balances from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

End of FY 2006; 
Total funds uncommitted uncosted: $345 million; 
Total funds uncosted: $1.374 billion; 
Total funds committed and costed: $2.345 billion; 
Total funds available to cost: $2.690 billion. 

End of FY 2007; 
Total funds uncommitted uncosted: $400 million; 
Total funds uncosted: $1.556 billion; 
Total funds committed and costed: $2.770 billion; 
Total funds available to cost: $3.169 billion. 

End of FY 2008; 
Total funds uncommitted uncosted: $390 million; 
Total funds uncosted: $1.759 billion; 
Total funds committed and costed: $2.966 billion; 
Total funds available to cost: $3.355 billion. 

End of FY 2009; 
Total funds uncommitted uncosted: $342 million; 
Total funds uncosted: $1.633 billion; 
Total funds committed and costed: $2.761 billion; 
Total funds available to cost: $3.103 billion. 

End of FY 2010; 
Total funds uncommitted uncosted: $362 million; 
Total funds uncosted: $1.771 billion; 
Total funds committed and costed: $3.214 billion; 
Total funds available to cost: $3.576 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. 

[End of figure] 

Moreover, the total uncommitted uncosted DNN operating program 
balances were below threshold at the end of every fiscal year during 
the 5-year period we reviewed, from $50.2 million below threshold at 
the end of fiscal year 2006 to approximately $103.3 million below 
threshold at the end of fiscal year 2010. (See table 3, above, for 
more information on total uncommitted uncosted DNN operating program 
balances compared to DOE uncosted thresholds for fiscal years 2006 
through 2010.) 

Uncommitted Uncosted Balances of Four DNN Programs Were Under Annual 
Thresholds, but Balances of Three Programs Frequently Exceeded Them: 

Four of the seven DNN operating programs we reviewed--GTRI, 
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D, EWGPP, and the International 
Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation programs--had uncommitted 
uncosted balances below threshold for 4 or all 5 of the fiscal years 
from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. However, the other three DNN 
operating programs--Nonproliferation and International Security, U.S. 
Surplus Materials Disposition, and Russian Surplus Materials 
Disposition--had uncommitted uncosted balances that exceeded DOE 
thresholds at the end of 4 or all 5 of the fiscal years. In our view, 
this raises questions about whether these programs are effectively 
utilizing their funding, and whether uncommitted uncosted carryover 
balances could be directed to other NNSA programs or be used to reduce 
future DNN budget requests. See table 5 for more information on the 
amounts by which individual DNN program uncommitted uncosted balances 
were over or under DOE thresholds during this time. 

Table 5: Uncommitted Uncosted Funding Balances over/under DOE 
Thresholds, Selected DNN Operating Programs, from Fiscal Years 2006 
through 2010: 

Dollars in millions: 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative; 
Amount of uncommitted uncosted funding over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $2.3; 
Fiscal year 2007: -$5.9; 
Fiscal year 2008: -$18.0; 
Fiscal year 2009: -$30.6; 
Fiscal year 2010: -$41.7. 

Nonproliferation and Verification R&D; 
Amount of uncommitted uncosted funding over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: -$47.5; 
Fiscal year 2007: -$42.0; 
Fiscal year 2008: -$11.8; 
Fiscal year 2009: -$5.4; 
Fiscal year 2010: -$18.5. 

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production; 
Amount of uncommitted uncosted funding over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: -$48.1; 
Fiscal year 2007: -$70.9; 
Fiscal year 2008: -$61.5; 
Fiscal year 2009: -$57.7; 
Fiscal year 2010: -$29.4. 

Nonproliferation and International Security; 
Amount of uncommitted uncosted funding over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $1.5; 
Fiscal year 2007: $15.1; 
Fiscal year 2008: $25.1; 
Fiscal year 2009: $28.4; 
Fiscal year 2010: $21.5. 

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation; 
Amount of uncommitted uncosted funding over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: -$14.5; 
Fiscal year 2007: $5.4; 
Fiscal year 2008: -$17.5; 
Fiscal year 2009: -$74.7; 
Fiscal year 2010: -$65.0. 

U.S. Surplus Materials Disposition; 

Amount of uncommitted uncosted funding over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $7.7; 
Fiscal year 2007: $5.8; 
Fiscal year 2008: -$2.9; 
Fiscal year 2009: $3.3; 
Fiscal year 2010: $16.0. 

Russian Surplus Materials Disposition; 
Amount of uncommitted uncosted funding over or under threshold: 
Fiscal year 2006: $33.9; 
Fiscal year 2007: $34.3; 
Fiscal year 2008: $21.1; 
Fiscal year 2009: $19.0; 
Fiscal year 2010: $16.7. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Notes: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. The negative 
values indicate the amount by which uncommitted uncosted balances were 
under DOE uncosted thresholds. The positive values indicate the amount 
by which uncommitted uncosted balances were over thresholds. 

[End of table] 

Specifically, the uncommitted uncosted balances for the U.S. Surplus 
Materials Disposition program exceeded the DOE thresholds for 4 of the 
5 fiscal years in our review. In addition, the uncommitted uncosted 
balances for the Nonproliferation and International Security and 
Russian Surplus Materials Disposition programs exceeded thresholds in 
all 5 fiscal years. On average, the Nonproliferation and International 
Security program's uncommitted uncosted balance exceeded its threshold 
by approximately $18.3 million each year. The uncommitted uncosted 
balances for the Russian disposition program exceeded threshold on 
average by approximately $25 million per year. 

NNSA provides semiannual reports to Congress on DNN uncommitted, 
unobligated, and unexpended balances. These reports include 
information on the extent to which DNN program uncosted obligations 
consist either of committed or uncommitted funds. For instance, in the 
most recent end-of-year report we reviewed--for fiscal year 2010--NNSA 
identifies uncommitted funding by DNN program in dollar amounts and as 
a percentage of its uncosted obligated funding. The report also 
includes brief explanations for the uncommitted balances by program at 
the end of the fiscal year. However, this report does not identify the 
amount of uncommitted funding in excess of the DOE thresholds by 
program, or why such excess balances should not be rescinded, 
redirected to other NNSA programs, or used to offset future DNN budget 
requests. This makes it difficult to evaluate whether such balances 
are appropriate on a program-by-program basis. 

In general, NNSA officials told us that uncertainties associated with 
the congressional appropriations process explain in part why DNN 
uncommitted uncosted balances often exceed DOE thresholds. 
Specifically, the DNN programs have usually operated under a series of 
continuing resolutions for the first few months of the fiscal year 
until the regular DNN appropriation for that fiscal year is approved 
by Congress. Under continuing resolutions, DNN operates on a 
conservative basis, limiting commitment and costing of program funds, 
due to uncertainty concerning when the regular appropriation will be 
approved by Congress. According to NNSA officials, when the annual DNN 
appropriation is delayed months into the fiscal year, the programs 
face difficulty in fully committing and costing available funds before 
the end of the fiscal year because of the shorter period in which to 
execute the regular appropriation. 

In addition, NNSA officials provided us with the following 
explanations for why the three programs frequently had uncommitted 
uncosted balances exceeding DOE thresholds from fiscal years 2006 
through 2010. 

Nonproliferation and International Security: 

NNSA officials provided several explanations for the Nonproliferation 
and International Security program's frequent over threshold 
uncommitted uncosted balances during this period. First, they noted 
that several program activities occur at the beginning of each fiscal 
year as required under certain international agreements, and funds 
must be available at the beginning of the fiscal year to enable these 
activities to be conducted. According to these officials, because DNN 
in most years operates under a continuing resolution at the beginning 
of a fiscal year, the program is forced to carry over balances above 
the threshold to ensure adequate funding for these activities. Second, 
the officials said that export control and other training courses 
supported by the program often occur early in the fiscal year to meet 
schedules of international partners. Full funding is needed to execute 
those training courses, which requires holding money from the previous 
fiscal year in reserve to ensure that they can be executed. Third, 
NNSA officials noted that some program activities are conducted at the 
discretion of foreign partners and, because the program cannot control 
events overseas, this may lead to delays in previously agreed-to 
activities. 

In response to these explanations, we asked NNSA officials to address 
three concerns: (1) reasons why Nonproliferation and International 
Security program funding would not at least be sufficiently committed 
to contracts or subcontracts to be under threshold at the end of a 
fiscal year; (2) why the program's overseas activities could lead to 
uncommitted balances, when other DNN programs with larger work scope 
overseas are able to maintain uncommitted balances under threshold; 
and (3) whether the program has sought to increase the threshold or 
defer time frames for some activities from earlier to later in the 
fiscal year. 

With respect to the first two concerns, accounting definitions and the 
unique nature of Nonproliferation and International Security program 
work limit the program in recording uncosted program funding as 
committed, according to NNSA officials. Specifically, they told us 
that the program relies on technical expertise of DOE's national 
laboratories to accomplish the majority of its mission. According to 
these officials, under NNSA's accounting definition of committed 
funds, DNN program funding that is contracted to a national laboratory 
for personnel expenses associated with laboratory technical experts is 
never counted as committed before being costed. Such funding goes from 
uncosted to costed as actual costs are incurred. NNSA officials 
representing the Nonproliferation and International Security program 
explained that the majority of other DNN programs--including those 
implementing a more extensive range of overseas activities--execute 
their programs by contracting with the private sector or through 
subcontracts via the national laboratories. In those cases, commitment 
of DNN funding is tracked, which allows those programs to have 
comparatively smaller uncommitted balances at the end of a fiscal year. 

Regarding the third concern, NNSA officials said that they believed 
the threshold for the Nonproliferation and International Security 
program is inadequate, given the circumstances described above, but 
that NNSA has not decided whether to pursue a formal exception or 
threshold increase. Regarding the possibility of delaying some program 
activities to later in the fiscal year, the officials told us that in 
some cases the program must defer to the host country on the timing of 
activities. 

Russian Surplus Materials Disposition: 

NNSA officials told us that the uncommitted uncosted balances in this 
program over this period are due largely to the lack of a milestone 
plan from Russia indicating how it would propose using $400 million 
pledged by the United States to support the Russian materials 
disposition effort under the terms of the U.S.-Russia Plutonium 
Management and Disposition Agreement. According to NNSA officials, 
once the Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy submits this 
plan, the program will be able to commit and cost funds that are 
currently uncommitted and uncosted. The United States and Russia have 
been negotiating the milestone plan since a new protocol to the 
agreement was signed in April 2010. NNSA officials said that they 
expect to receive the milestone plan from Russia in fiscal year 2012 
and begin committing and costing program funds at that time. 

U.S. Surplus Materials Disposition: 

The uncommitted balances that we identified as being over threshold 
for this program pertain to operating funding for the overall effort 
to dispose of surplus U.S. plutonium. This mission also includes 
construction of three facilities in the United States, which DNN 
budgets separately from operating funds. In general, NNSA officials 
noted that when there has been a change in a construction project, 
such as a reduction in the construction budget or change in work 
scope, expenses for some activities that were originally planned to be 
incurred in one quarter can be deferred to another, or from one fiscal 
year to the next, resulting in uncommitted uncosted carryover. 
Therefore, according to NNSA, programmatic or budgetary changes 
related to the construction of a facility can have a domino effect, 
resulting in the accumulation of uncommitted uncosted balances for 
operating funding associated with the project since some of the 
operating funds are tied to facility construction time lines and 
milestones. 

Foreign Contributions to DNN Programs Have Been Limited, and Foreign 
Cost-Sharing Data Are Not Systematically Tracked or Maintained by NNSA: 

Three of the four DNN programs we identified that have been authorized 
by Congress to receive and use contributions from foreign donor 
governments were provided a total of approximately $47.1 million from 
fiscal years 2006 through 2010, by seven different countries, equaling 
about 1 percent of the total funding from annual appropriations acts 
directed to these programs over the same period. In addition to 
contributions made directly to DNN programs by foreign donor 
governments, NNSA has pursued greater cost sharing on the part of 
governments in foreign countries where DNN programs are implemented. 
Cost sharing includes financial and nonfinancial contributions such as 
in-kind assistance. However, the extent of such cost sharing is 
unclear because there is no systematic effort by NNSA to track and 
maintain this data. 

Foreign Governments Contributed Approximately $47.1 Million to Three 
DNN Programs, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, three of four DNN programs 
authorized by Congress to receive and use foreign contributions--the 
EGWPP program, INMPC program, and GTRI--received a total of 
approximately $47.1 million, donated by seven countries. These 
countries were Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
South Korea, and the United Kingdom.[Footnote 24] Most of these 
contributions were made to the EWGPP program, which received a total 
of approximately $18.3 million, or about 39 percent of the total funds 
contributed. The INMPC program received approximately $11.2 million 
(or about 24 percent of the total foreign contributions), while GTRI 
received approximately $17.6 million (or about 37 percent of the total 
foreign contributions). A fourth program authorized by Congress--the 
Russian plutonium disposition program--received no foreign financial 
contributions from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. See figure 2 and 
appendix III for more information on the foreign contributions by 
recipient DNN program from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. 

Figure 2: Total Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Program from 
Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production: $18,324.2; 
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation: $11,206.5; 
Global Threat Reduction Initiative: $17,602.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. 

[End of figure] 

NNSA has put these foreign contributions, varying from $140,000 to 
over $10 million, toward a variety of program uses, including (1) 
assisting the overall U.S. effort to facilitate the shutdown of 
Russia's three remaining plutonium production reactors under the EWGPP 
program, (2) supporting physical security upgrades at a nuclear 
material site in Russia and providing radiation detection equipment on 
borders in the former Soviet Union under the INMPC program, and (3) 
promoting GTRI efforts to remove and secure radiological sources in 
countries in the former Soviet Union. Each authorized DNN program must 
use the foreign contributions within 5 years of receiving them or 
return them to the contributing nations, and none of these programs is 
permanently authorized to accept contributions. EWGPP is authorized to 
accept contributions through December 31, 2011; for GTRI, the 
expiration date is December 31, 2013; and for INMPC and the Russian 
plutonium disposition program, the expiration date is December 31, 
2015. The GTRI, INMPC, and Russian plutonium disposition programs all 
anticipate conducting program activities beyond the time frames under 
which they are currently authorized to accept foreign contributions. 
For instance, the GTRI program is planning to continue its efforts to 
convert or verify the shutdown of 200 research reactors utilizing HEU 
until 2022. 

State officials told us that State's efforts resulted in a significant 
share of the $47.1 million in foreign donations provided to the DNN 
programs. Specifically, they said that its Nuclear Smuggling Outreach 
Initiative (NSOI) has facilitated approximately $17.6 million in 
foreign contributions to the SLD and GTRI programs through July 2011. 
However, data provided by State did not specify dates of the foreign 
donations, and we did not determine what percentage of the $47.1 
million in foreign contributions DOE reported receiving from fiscal 
years 2006 through 2010 was the result of NSOI program efforts. 

The United Kingdom and Canada accounted for approximately 88 percent 
of the total foreign contributions during this time, with the United 
Kingdom providing approximately $25.3 million (or about 54 percent of 
the total contributions), and Canada providing approximately $16.1 
million (or about 34 percent of the total contributions). See figure 3 
and appendix IV for more information on the foreign contributions to 
DNN programs by country. 

Figure 3: Foreign Contributions to DNN Programs by Country from Fiscal 
Years 2006 through 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Norway: $837.6; 
Finland: $936.8; 
Netherlands: $1,190.2; 
New Zealand: $1,192.2; 
South Korea: $1,550.0; 
Canada: $16,118.1; 
United Kingdom: $25,308.2. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. 

[End of figure] 

According to NNSA and State officials, some countries have made 
contributions to DNN programs to fulfill their national commitments 
made under the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons 
and Materials of Mass Destruction.[Footnote 25] Some foreign 
governments that have made financial commitments to promoting nuclear 
nonproliferation and security in the context of the Global Partnership 
do not have well-established nonproliferation programs or the capacity 
to undertake nonproliferation activities in other countries. As a 
result, some countries have chosen to fulfill some of their Global 
Partnership pledges by contributing funding to the DNN programs. In 
May 2011, the G-8 leaders agreed to extend the Global Partnership 
beyond the original 2012 expiration date, which may allow for 
additional foreign donations to the DNN programs in the future. 

Contributions made by foreign nations remain small, however, compared 
to the total funding from annual appropriations acts directed to the 
four DNN programs we identified that were authorized to receive 
foreign contributions. Altogether, the foreign contributions represent 
approximately 1.1 percent of approximately $4.4 billion in total 
funding from annual appropriations acts directed to these programs 
from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. The foreign contributions to the 
EWGPP program have been most significant, representing about 2.5 
percent of the total program funding from annual appropriations acts 
directed to this program over this period. For more information 
comparing the foreign contributions to the four DNN programs with 
total funding from annual appropriations acts directed to these 
programs, see appendix V. 

According to NNSA officials, foreign contributions have been important 
in augmenting and accelerating DNN programs. However, for at least one 
program, we have concerns about how effectively NNSA took the 
availability of foreign contributions into consideration as potential 
offsets into future program budget requests to Congress. Specifically, 
in the fiscal year 2006 budget request, NNSA stated that foreign 
contributions to the EWGPP program were critical to the program's 
success in facilitating the shutdown of the last remaining plutonium 
production reactor in the Russian city of Zheleznogorsk. However, at 
the end of fiscal year 2010, the EWGPP program had accumulated an 
unobligated funding balance of approximately $75.9 million. In fiscal 
year 2011, $45 million was rescinded from NNSA's unobligated balances, 
approximately $41.1 million of which was allocated to the EWGPP 
program. These circumstances raise questions about whether the foreign 
contributions were essential to the EWGPP program, and the extent to 
which NNSA factored the contributions as offsets into its future 
budget requests to Congress. 

NNSA officials told us that the agency could not anticipate the timing 
or amounts of foreign contributions when preparing budget requests to 
Congress. Furthermore, they noted that foreign contributions were 
applied immediately to the EWGPP project in Zheleznogorsk and that 
they were helpful in allowing the program to be completed within a 
reasonable schedule and below total project cost. 

DNN Programs Are Not Systematically Tracking or Maintaining Data on 
Cost Sharing by Foreign Countries: 

In addition to allowing the DNN programs to accept contributions from 
foreign donor governments, Congress has encouraged the pursuit of 
greater cost sharing by foreign countries where some DNN and other 
agency nonproliferation programs are implemented. Cost sharing 
includes financial and nonfinancial contributions such as in-kind 
assistance. We have also recommended greater foreign cost sharing for 
some DNN programs in prior reports. In addition, as we reported in 
December 2010, the President's 4-year initiative to secure all 
vulnerable nuclear material around the world is predicated on other 
countries providing assistance and engaging in cost sharing with the 
United States to implement cooperative nuclear security programs. 
[Footnote 26] According to NNSA officials, NNSA is increasing its 
cost- sharing efforts with other countries for DNN programs as a 
"force multiplier" to address high-priority international nuclear 
security and nonproliferation objectives and the programs are pursuing 
cost sharing as part of their project management practices. NNSA 
officials identified three main DNN programs conducting work overseas 
where cost sharing may be applicable: the International Nuclear 
Materials Protection and Cooperation (INMPC) program (including both 
the MPC&A and SLD subprograms), the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI), and the Nonproliferation and International Security program's 
Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP). 

According to NNSA officials, these three programs have all made 
efforts to develop cost-sharing relationships with international 
partners, and some have established goals or requirements with respect 
to foreign cost matching. The GIPP program, for instance, has set a 
goal of 25 percent cost sharing for projects taking place in Russia 
and seeks cost sharing on projects in all other former Soviet 
countries on a case-by-case basis. According to NNSA officials, while 
the GTRI program does not specify a minimum cost-sharing threshold, 
for some types of projects the program has established specific cost 
sharing requirements for foreign partners, especially high-income 
countries. For instance, for HEU reactor conversions in high-income 
countries, GTRI will provide technical support, while the country 
where the reactor is located is expected to pay for the large expenses 
associated with the conversion, such as purchasing low-enriched 
uranium replacement fuel. NNSA officials stated that INMPC has not 
formulated specific cost-sharing requirements, but where possible the 
program has included cost-sharing arrangements in specific MPC&A 
program contracts, agreements, and transition plans. For SLD Core 
program and Megaports Initiative projects, NNSA officials indicated 
that in general there is a cost sharing division of labor in which the 
programs provide radiation detection equipment, training, and other 
support, while the partner country assumes responsibility for all 
construction costs and, in some cases, equipment installation and 
personnel costs. 

These three programs have adopted different approaches and 
methodologies for how they collect data on or estimate cost sharing. 
Under the GIPP program, for example, project agreements are completed 
between the recipient foreign institute and one of several non- 
governmental entities--the International Science and Technology 
Center, Science and Technology Center Ukraine, and the Civilian 
Research and Development Foundation--that manage and transmit funding 
to project participants. According to NNSA officials, these agreements 
include a detailed breakdown of foreign cost sharing in conjunction 
with the breakdown of tasks under the agreement. GTRI has developed a 
methodology combining actual known costs and independent estimates 
performed by project managers to estimate cost sharing. In some 
countries, where the INMPC program can obtain cost information from 
foreign counterparts, it uses those data to develop cost-sharing 
estimates. In cases where foreign cost information is less 
transparent, the program identifies the amount of work scope completed 
by the foreign partner and then it estimates the likely cost of that 
activity if the U.S. side were to have completed those tasks. 

None of these programs are yet systematically tracking and maintaining 
this information that would allow for reporting of foreign cost 
sharing DNN-wide. For instance, INMPC officials told us that while 
projects with foreign partners are evaluated to ensure that work is 
completed, foreign cost sharing-amounts are generally collected on an 
ad hoc basis, and the program does not systematically assess or report 
cost-sharing data. GTRI officials stated that the program is 
developing a process to estimate cost sharing in every foreign GTRI 
project, which will be integrated into GTRI's project management 
information system, but did not indicate when these changes would be 
incorporated into the system. GIPP officials stated that while project 
agreements with foreign institutes include detailed cost sharing 
amounts, program officials were unaware of an NNSA system where such 
data could be entered, recorded, and used for reporting. As a result, 
NNSA is currently unable to provide comprehensive information to 
Congress--in the annual budget requests or in other reports--on the 
extent to which DNN efforts in foreign countries are being supported 
by financial or in-kind assistance from the host governments. 

Notwithstanding these limitations, DNN program officials were able to 
provide us with some estimates and examples of foreign cost sharing. 
The GTRI program estimated a total of over $225 million in foreign 
cost sharing across all of its activity areas from fiscal years 2005 
through 2010. The Nonproliferation and International Security program 
estimated approximately $1.8 million in foreign cost sharing for the 
GIPP program in fiscal year 2008, based on the responses to a 
questionnaire by institutes in the former Soviet Union involved in the 
program. For fiscal years 2008 and 2009, INMPC estimated a total of 
$60.8 million in foreign cost sharing under the SLD program. 

In addition, NNSA officials provided a range of examples--particularly 
for the INMPC and GTRI programs--where they believe some foreign cost 
sharing has occurred. For instance, according to NNSA officials: 

* In Russia, NNSA and the Russian Customs Service have equipped 383 
international border crossing sites with radiation detection equipment 
through cooperation under the SLD Core program. NNSA and the Russian 
Customs Service divided responsibility by splitting the number of 
sites between both parties, with 124 sites funded solely by NNSA, 123 
funded solely by Russia, and 136 sites that were jointly funded. NNSA 
estimates that the total expenditure by the Russian Customs Service in 
equipping sites for which it was responsible is at least $71 million. 
The joint U.S.-Russian effort to equip these sites was completed in 
September 2011. 

* According to information provided by NNSA, some of the Russian sites 
involved in the MPC&A program have used their own funding to support 
security improvements at their facilities, including paying for 
procurement and installation of certain security equipment. For 
example, according to information provided by NNSA, one Russian 
nuclear material site agreed to contribute $190,000 toward replacing: 

equipment at two entry control points, while another site agreed to 
pay for increasing the "clear zone" around the external perimeter of 
the site, which NNSA estimated would cost $473,000. 

* For HEU reactor conversions in high income countries, the GTRI 
program maintains a policy of providing technical support while the 
country in which the reactor is located pays for the large expenses 
associated with the conversion, such as purchasing low-enriched 
uranium replacement fuel.[Footnote 27] According to NNSA officials, 
non-high-income countries also share in some conversion costs. In 
cases where HEU reactors are shut down, both high-income and non-high- 
income countries have paid for all reactor shutdown costs. From fiscal 
years 2005 through 2010, 11 countries paid for some or all the costs 
of reactor conversions and shutdowns. GTRI officials estimated that 
the value of this foreign support from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 
was approximately $128.5 million. 

Nevertheless, DNN programs are unable to audit cost sharing by foreign 
partners to validate these estimates, and NNSA officials stressed the 
difficulty in obtaining information from foreign governments that 
would allow DNN programs to validate cost sharing amounts. INMPC and 
GTRI officials told us that their programs can verify that foreign 
partners have completed their tasks in accordance with project 
agreements, but that the agreements with foreign countries do not 
include rights to audit the costs or financial contributions incurred 
by foreign counterparts. GIPP officials told us that under the terms 
of the project agreements with foreign institutes, all tasks are 
subject to routine audit and monitoring. However, these officials said 
that they doubted that these audits could include a review of 
individual institute or host government financial records. 

Some DNN Program Performance Measures Lack Key Attributes and Have Led 
to Overstated Results: 

Some DNN program performance measures do not satisfy key attributes of 
effective measures that we have identified in previous work, including 
clarity, reliability, and balance. In addition, some of NNSA's 
performance measures for its nuclear nonproliferation programs changed 
from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, making it difficult to evaluate 
progress over this period. Furthermore, for fiscal year 2010, some DNN 
program accomplishments appear overstated because NNSA used different 
performance targets in its end of year fiscal performance report from 
the ones presented in the budget request to Congress. Moreover, rather 
than updating a critical performance measure for the GIPP program--as 
we recommended and as NNSA officials reported previously they would 
do--NNSA has dropped this measure altogether. 

Some DNN Performance Measures Lack Key Attributes of Successful 
Measures: 

Some DNN program performance measures we reviewed did not have key 
attributes of successful performance measures that we have identified 
in our previous work. We have reported that agencies successfully 
measure performance when they use measures that satisfy four general 
characteristics--(1) they demonstrate results, (2) are limited to the 
vital few, (3) cover multiple program priorities, and (4) provide 
useful information for decision making.[Footnote 28] To assess whether 
program performance measures satisfy these general characteristics, we 
developed nine key specific attributes of successful measures, 
including whether the measures are clear, measurable, reliable, 
objective, and balanced.[Footnote 29] 

We identified clarity concerns in the performance measures for two DNN 
programs. Several of the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D 
program's performance measures assess progress using unspecified 
criteria and milestones from a classified R&D requirements document. 
Because these performance measures are linked to an unstated secondary 
set of criteria, it is difficult for a third party, unfamiliar with 
the classified requirements, to interpret the measure and discern 
whether the criteria are appropriate, sufficient, and up-to-date for 
tracking progress. In addition, for the MPC&A program, NNSA measures 
progress by the cumulative number of buildings with weapon-usable 
nuclear materials in Russia and the former Soviet states with 
completed MPC&A upgrades.[Footnote 30] However, we found this measure 
to be unclear and potentially misleading because, among other reasons, 
it does not provide information about the quantities of materials 
being secured by the program and the total number of buildings 
completed is not adjusted to account for any new upgrade work that may 
be pursued at those locations. 

We also identified reliability concerns in the performance measures 
for two DNN programs. For the disposition of HEU that the United 
States has declared surplus to defense needs, the U.S. Surplus Fissile 
Materials Disposition program has an endpoint goal of downblending 217 
metric tons of HEU by 2050.[Footnote 31] The program has set annual 
performance targets and is measuring annual progress toward this goal. 
However, NNSA officials told us that the 2050 date for completing the 
blend-down of this surplus HEU was an arbitrary placeholder because 
they could not predict at what rate nuclear weapons would be 
dismantled and the corresponding rate at which additional HEU will be 
available for dispositioning. NNSA officials told us that this work 
could be completed sooner, depending on the rate at which HEU is made 
available to the program from defense needs. In addition, for the 
Megaports Initiative, NNSA developed a performance measure to track 
the number of megaports sites where there is host-country cost sharing 
and the estimated dollar amount of such cost sharing. However, we 
found this measure to be unreliable because, as noted above, NNSA is 
unable to validate foreign cost-sharing estimates. NNSA officials told 
us that this measure was difficult to quantify. 

Furthermore, we question whether the performance measures are 
sufficiently balanced for two DNN efforts--ensuring the long-term 
sustainability of MPC&A upgrades in Russia and other countries of the 
former Soviet Union, and the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative 
(NGSI), a multiyear program to develop the policies, concepts, 
technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to strengthen 
and sustain the international safeguards system over the next 25 
years. Performance in achieving sustainability of MPC&A upgrades in 
Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union is measured by 
the cumulative number of MPC&A regulations in the development phase in 
those countries, while NGSI performance is measured by the number of 
safeguards systems deployed and used in other countries to address 
specific safeguards deficiencies. We question whether measuring 
performance in a single area of activity provides a sufficient basis 
for gauging the progress that each effort is making overall toward 
multiple, diverse objectives. However, NNSA officials told us that DNN 
programs are allowed only a limited number of representative published 
performance metrics by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
Officials representing both programs told us that both programs 
maintain a broader set of internal-use measures that are not provided 
to Congress or the public which the programs use to track and assess 
progress made under both efforts. 

For more information on the key attributes of successful performance 
measures we have identified in our previous work, and for further 
details on our findings of clarity, reliability, and balance 
limitations in the DNN measures, see appendix VI. 

The Number and Descriptions of DNN Performance Measures Changed from 
Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

We examined the performance measures NNSA provided to Congress in its 
annual budget requests from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 for the DNN 
programs, and found that the number and nature of DNN program 
performance measures changed during this period, making it difficult 
to evaluate DNN program performance consistently over time. For 
instance, in its fiscal year 2006 congressional budget request, NNSA 
included 32 measures to track the performance of its nonproliferation 
programs, but in its fiscal year 2010 budget request NNSA included 26 
measures. Based on our review of the performance measures presented in 
NNSA's annual budget requests, we identified several ways in which DNN 
performance measures changed over the period we reviewed, including: 

* Some performance measures used in earlier years were no longer 
relevant by fiscal year 2010 because work was reported by NNSA as 
being completed or because anticipated work was never initiated. 

* Some DNN performance measures during this time were dropped, or new 
measures--that had not been used in prior years to assess program 
performance--were established. 

* Some program performance measures were consolidated into a smaller 
number, while some single performance measures were disaggregated in 
to several new measures. 

* The descriptions of some program measures also changed over this 
time, which resulted in program progress being measured in new or 
different ways. 

NNSA officials told us they believed that the DNN performance measures 
should not be static and should be adjusted to reflect changes in 
circumstances, such as program reorganizations, and in response to 
external recommendations. For instance, NNSA officials told us that a 
Nonproliferation and International Security program performance 
measure tracking the number of foreign nationals trained on 
nonproliferation issues was eliminated after the program undertook a 
review of its program performance measurements in 2009 at the request 
of OMB and determined that the measure did not adequately capture the 
value of the training delivered. 

Furthermore, after each fiscal year, in annual performance reports, 
DOE assesses performance made by the DNN programs meeting annual 
targets under each measure. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, we 
found over 30 instances in which DNN program performance measures 
identified in the congressional budget request for a fiscal year 
differed from the measures assessed in the DOE annual performance 
reports for that fiscal year. In some cases, we determined that these 
differences were relatively minor and involved wording or terminology 
changes, while in others the differences were more significant. In 
other cases, measures included in the budget requests for some 
programs were missing and not updated with a new measure in the 
performance reports. As a result, some of the measures NNSA identified 
to Congress for assessing DNN program performance during a fiscal year 
were not those against which actual progress was assessed at the end 
of the fiscal year. 

NNSA officials stated that for any given fiscal year there can be 
differences between the performance measures presented in the budget 
requests to Congress and evaluated in the DOE end of fiscal year 
performance reports. However, these officials noted that performance 
measures identified in a budget request can be developed 9 months 
prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, with the final performance 
report issued several months after the end of the fiscal year, or a 
period of 24 months which may pass from the time the performance 
measures are developed until performance is evaluated. NNSA officials 
noted that during this time, DNN programs can be reorganized, be re- 
evaluated, or experience other changes that result in differences 
between the measures in the budget request and the final performance 
reports. However, the end of fiscal year performance reports we 
reviewed did not include explanations in those instances where the 
performance measure changed from the measure proposed in the budget 
request for that fiscal year. 

For more information on and examples of the changes in DNN performance 
measures and for a listing of the measures by DNN program office and 
year, from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, see appendix VII. 

Some DNN Program Accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2010 Appear 
Overstated Because of Inconsistent Performance Measure Targets: 

In DOE's Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report, released in April 
2011, DNN programs were assessed as to whether they had exceeded, met, 
or did not meet their performance targets for that fiscal year. DOE 
reported that it had met or exceeded the annual performance targets 
for 20 out of 26 DNN program performance measures. However, we found 
that the annual targets for several performance measures in the fiscal 
year 2010 performance report differed from the targets presented for 
those measures in the fiscal year 2010 congressional budget request. 
Because some annual targets were lower in the end of fiscal year 
performance report for several programs than the annual targets 
proposed in the congressional budget request, the achievements by some 
programs under those performance measures appear to be overstated. See 
table 6 for more information on the differences between targets in 
both documents for DNN program performance measures in fiscal year 
2010. 

Table 6: Differences in DNN Program Performance Targets, Fiscal Year 
2010: 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative: 

Performance measure by program: Cumulative number of HEU reactors 
converted or verified as shutdown prior to conversion; 
Result as reported in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report: 
72 reactors; 
Target in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report (DOE 
assessment based on results): 71 reactors (target exceeded); 
Target in fiscal year 2010 budget request (GAO assessment based on 
results): 73 reactors (target not met). 

Performance measure by program: Cumulative number of kilograms of 
vulnerable nuclear material (HEU and plutonium) removed or disposed; 
Result as reported in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report: 
2,853 kilograms; 
Target in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report (DOE 
assessment based on results): 2,767 kilograms (target exceeded); 
Target in fiscal year 2010 budget request (GAO assessment based on 
results): 2,913 kilograms (target not met). 

Performance measure by program: Cumulative number of buildings with 
high priority nuclear and radiological materials secured; 
Result as reported in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report: 
971 buildings; 
Target in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report (DOE 
assessment based on results): 855 buildings (target exceeded); 
Target in fiscal year 2010 budget request (GAO assessment based on 
results): 818 buildings (target exceeded). 

Performance measure by program: Cumulative number of excess domestic 
radiological sources removed or disposed; 
Result as reported in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report: 
26,172 sources; 
Target in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report (DOE 
assessment based on results): 25,214 sources (target exceeded); 
Target in fiscal year 2010 budget request (GAO assessment based on 
results): 24,500 sources (target exceeded). 

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation Program: 

Performance measure by program: Cumulative number of buildings 
containing weapons-usable material with completed MPC&A upgrades; 
Result as reported in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report: 
213 buildings; 
Target in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report (DOE 
assessment based on results): 213 buildings (target met); 
Target in fiscal year 2010 budget request (GAO assessment based on 
results): 218 buildings (target not met). 

Performance measure by program: Cumulative number of SLD sites with 
nuclear detection equipment installed and cumulative number of 
Megaports completed; 
Result as reported in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report: 
399 SLD sites and 34 Megaports; 
Target in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report (DOE 
assessment based on results): 404 SLD sites and 41 Megaports (not met 
for both); 
Target in fiscal year 2010 budget request (GAO assessment based on 
results): 369 SLD sites and 43 Megaports (exceeded for SLD sites, but 
not met for Megaports). 

U.S. Surplus Materials Disposition Program: 

Performance measure by program: Cumulative percentage of the design, 
construction, and cold start-up activities completed for the Waste 
Solidification Building; 
Result as reported in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report: 
47 percent; 
Target in DOE Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report (DOE 
assessment based on results): 45 percent (target exceeded); 
Target in fiscal year 2010 budget request (GAO assessment based on 
results): 55 percent (target not met). 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

[End of table] 

Specifically, we identified annual targets under four performance 
measures for three programs--the GTRI, INMPC, and U.S. Surplus 
Materials Disposition programs--that DOE reported as meeting or 
exceeding in its Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Performance Report, but which 
appear to be unmet when the reported program results are compared 
against the targets specified in the fiscal year 2010 budget request. 
For example, in the fiscal year 2010 budget request, NNSA proposed 
converting or verifying as shutdown 73 HEU reactors as a target for 
that year. In the end of fiscal year 2010 performance report, however, 
the annual target for this performance measure was changed to 71 
reactors, which DOE reported as exceeding based on 72 reactors having 
been converted or verified as shut down. When the actual results are 
compared against the annual goal stated in the congressional budget 
request, however, the target should have been reported as not met, 
rather than exceeded. 

NNSA officials told us they believed that some flexibility and 
variation in program performance targets during a fiscal year should 
be allowed, given the uncertain circumstances under which the DNN 
programs operate, especially the uncertainty regarding when 
congressional appropriations will be provided and how much of the 
requested funding DNN will receive. NNSA officials told us that DNN is 
permitted to adjust its annual performance measures for its programs 
within 30 days of the final appropriation to take into account 
differences between requested and actual funding provided by Congress. 
GTRI officials told us that a congressional funding cut for the 
program's gap nuclear material removal effort and a redirection of 
reactor conversion funding in fiscal year 2010 explain why GTRI 
changed its targets and why it did not meet the targets for these two 
efforts as presented in the budget request for that year. However, the 
2010 fiscal year performance report did not include explanations in 
those instances where the performance target changed from the target 
proposed in the budget request for that fiscal year. 

Some DNN Performance Measures Have Not Been Updated Based on Prior GAO 
Recommendations: 

For the GIPP program, NNSA has dropped--instead of improving--a long- 
standing performance measure to gauge the success of the program in 
reemploying former Soviet weapons scientists in civilian jobs. In 
1999, we reported that a major purpose of DOE's Initiatives for 
Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program was to identify commercial 
opportunities through IPP projects that would attract commercial 
investment and lead to self-sustaining business ventures and long-term 
employment opportunities for WMD scientists in the former Soviet 
Union.[Footnote 32] However, we found that the program had not 
achieved its nonproliferation goal of long-term employment through the 
commercialization of IPP projects. In our December 2007 report on the 
IPP program,[Footnote 33] we reported that the measures DOE used to 
set program goals and gauge progress were outdated, and that 
performance achievements under the program's "flagship" 
commercialization goal were overstated. We recommended, among other 
things, that NNSA develop more reliable data on the commercialization 
results of IPP projects, such as the number of jobs created. 

NNSA agreed with this recommendation, and in 2008 it reported that it 
would revise the program performance measure and include in its budget 
documents a new measure that better reflects program accomplishments. 
However, NNSA has not implemented this action. Neither the fiscal year 
2009 nor fiscal year 2010 NNSA budget request included any new 
commercialization-related measure. In the fiscal year 2010 budget 
request, the previous measure to assess program progress in this area 
was dropped, leaving only one program performance measure: the 
cumulative percentage of non-U.S. government (private sector and 
foreign government) project funding contributions obtained relative to 
cumulative U.S. government GIPP funding contributions.[Footnote 34] In 
2009 and 2010, NNSA officials told us that they were still considering 
new GIPP performance measures. However, neither the fiscal year 2011 
nor fiscal year 2012 budget request included a new GIPP 
commercialization performance measure. 

In September 2011, contrary to the long-standing commercialization 
goal of the program, NNSA reported to us that commercialization would 
no longer be a leading program objective, but a secondary program 
benefit, and as such would no longer be a published program 
performance measure. Thus, the non-U.S. government cost-sharing 
measure noted above is the only current GIPP performance measure. NNSA 
officials stated that the GIPP program was directed by OMB to retain 
this cost-sharing measure, but NNSA officials told us in 2009 and 2010 
that they did not believe this was a good performance measure for the 
program. 

Limitations in Interagency Strategic Plans Impede Coordination of U.S. 
Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Overseas: 

None of the existing strategies and plans for coordinating federal 
efforts to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling and illicit nuclear 
transfers overseas incorporates all of the desirable characteristics 
of national strategies that we have identified in previous work. We 
also identified potential fragmentation and overlap among some 
programs working in this area, especially those providing equipment 
and training in foreign countries to counter nuclear smuggling. 
Furthermore, there is no single recognized agency responsible for 
leading and directing federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. 

Key Attributes Missing from U.S. Government Strategies to Counter 
Nuclear Smuggling Overseas: 

None of the existing strategies and plans for coordinating federal 
efforts to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling and illicit transfers 
overseas incorporates all of the desirable characteristics of national 
strategies that we have identified in previous work. We have 
previously reported that complex interagency and intergovernmental 
efforts--such as programs to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling 
overseas--can benefit from development of a national strategy. 
[Footnote 35] We have also previously identified a set of desirable 
characteristics in national strategies that can enhance their 
usefulness in resource and policy decisions and to better assure 
accountability.[Footnote 36] These elements include (1) purpose, 
scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; 
(3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance 
measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) 
organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) 
integration and implementation.[Footnote 37] See table 7 for a summary 
of the six characteristics. 

Table 7: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a National Strategy: 

Desirable characteristic: Purpose, scope, and methodology; 

Description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its 
coverage, and the process by which it was developed. 

Desirable characteristic: Problem definition and risk assessment; 
Description: Addresses the particular national problems and threats 
the strategy is directed towards. 

Desirable characteristic: Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, 
and performance measures; 
Description: Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps 
to achieve those results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and 
performance measures to gauge results. 

Desirable characteristic: Resources, investments, and risk management; 
Description: Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and 
types of resources and investments needed, and where resources and 
investments should be targeted based on balancing risk reduction with 
costs. 

Desirable characteristic: Organizational roles, responsibilities, and 
coordination; 
Description: Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what 
their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for them to 
coordinate their efforts. 

Desirable characteristic: Integration and implementation; 
Description: Addresses how a national strategy relates to other 
strategies' goals, objectives, and activities, and to subordinate 
levels of government and their plans to implement the strategy. 

Source: GAO data. 

[End of table] 

We found that existing interagency strategies to coordinate efforts 
governmentwide against the overseas nuclear smuggling threat lacked 
some of these desirable attributes. We reviewed several interagency 
strategy documents that provide guidelines or direction for 
coordination of federal programs to counter nuclear smuggling 
overseas. These include (1) the 2010 "Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture (GNDA) Strategic Plan" developed jointly by DHS, DOD, 
DOE, State, the Department of Justice, the intelligence community, and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); (2) a 2006 "Strategic Plan 
For Interagency Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection 
Assistance Overseas," produced by State; and (3) a 2005 "International 
Nuclear and Radiological Border Security Efforts: Implementation 
Guidelines" issued by the NSC. We found that each of these documents 
incorporates some of the desirable elements of effective national 
strategies, but that they each lacked key components or had other 
limitations. Specifically: 

* 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan. One of DHS's responsibilities, through 
DNDO, is to coordinate development of the GNDA. In June 2010, we 
reported that DNDO had not developed a strategic plan for the global 
architecture despite our prior recommendations that it do so.[Footnote 
38] In December 2010, DNDO released the jointly developed strategic 
plan which establishes a broad vision for the GNDA, identifies cross- 
cutting issues, defines several objectives, and assigns mission roles 
and responsibilities to the various federal agencies that contribute 
to the global architecture.[Footnote 39] In July 2011, we reported 
that the new strategic plan addressed some of the key components that 
we previously recommended should be included, such as identifying 
roles and responsibilities for meeting the GNDA's strategic 
objectives.[Footnote 40] However, we reported that the GNDA strategic 
plan does not identify the financial resources--a desirable 
characteristic of a national strategy--needed to achieve the strategic 
plan's objectives. In addition, we raised concerns about the ability 
to measure results under the plan, because it did not identify the 
monitoring mechanisms that could be used to determine programmatic 
progress and identify needed improvements. DHS officials responded 
that they will address these missing elements in an implementation 
plan, which they plan to issue before the end of 2011. 

In addition, the GNDA strategic plan should not be considered a 
comprehensive strategy for coordinating the governmentwide response to 
the overseas nuclear smuggling threat for other reasons. For instance, 
the focus of the GNDA is on detecting, analyzing, and reporting on the 
illicit trafficking and unauthorized use of nuclear and radiological 
materials. However, some U.S. programs involved in countering the 
nuclear smuggling threat overseas are not considered part of the 
global architecture. For instance, neither NNSA's International 
Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), DOD's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Program, nor DTRA's Regional 
Combating WMD Program are included in the list of programs 
contributing to the GNDA in the 2011 annual report on the global 
architecture, even though these programs are involved in capacity- 
building and other activities overseas to counter nuclear and related 
WMD trafficking. 

* Strategic Plan for Interagency Coordination of U.S. Nuclear 
Detection Assistance Overseas. In May 2002, we found that efforts to 
combat nuclear smuggling overseas needed strengthened planning to link 
U.S. programs through common goals and objectives, strategies and time 
frames for providing assistance to other countries, and performance 
measures for evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.[Footnote 
41] State subsequently developed a "Strategic Plan For Interagency 
Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance 
Overseas." In March 2006, we found that this plan lacked several key 
components, including a lack of specific performance measures, overall 
program cost estimates, and projected time frames for program 
completion.[Footnote 42] We concluded that without these elements, 
State would not have a way of effectively measuring performance toward 
the plan's goals nor would it have a way of determining the level of 
resources and the amount of time that would be required to achieve 
those goals. We recommended that the Secretary of State, working with 
the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the NNSA Administrator, 
strengthen this strategic plan to include specific performance 
measures. We also recommended that they prepare overall cost estimates 
and projected time frames for completion of U.S. radiation detection 
equipment assistance efforts, in order to determine the amount and 
timing of U.S. government resources required to achieve interagency 
goals and objectives. 

In our current review, we found that the updated version of the 
strategic plan issued by State in December 2006 incorporated some but 
not all of our prior recommendations. The plan does include specific 
performance measures, but it does not include overall cost estimates 
or projected time frames for programmatic work. In addition, the 2006 
strategic plan does not include some programs such as State's Nuclear 
Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI), or other recently established 
programs such as NNSA's Cooperative Border Security Program (CBSP), 
[Footnote 43] or DTRA's Regional Combating WMD Program. In addition, 
State officials said that the 2006 strategic plan is only intended to 
address programs providing counter-smuggling assistance to foreign 
countries, and not the full range of programs contributing to the 
detection and prevention of nuclear smuggling abroad, such as those 
conducting R&D on technologies to detect illicit nuclear trafficking. 
As of July 2011, this interagency strategic plan had not been updated. 
State officials told us that State's Export Control and Related Border 
Security (EXBS) program does not intend to update the plan because 
State's Office of Export Control Cooperation no longer plays a 
coordinating role in the provision of radiation detection assistance 
since the creation of DNDO and State's Office of WMD Terrorism. 

* International Nuclear and Radiological Border Security Guidelines. 
In 2005, we found that there was no governmentwide coordination 
guidance for programs to improve foreign capabilities to detect and 
prevent WMD smuggling across borders. We recommended that NSC lead a 
process to develop clear guidance for these programs that identifies 
U.S. government goals and objectives, designates roles and 
responsibilities, and establishes procedures to resolve policy and 
program disputes.[Footnote 44] NSC officials told us that they did not 
know if the recommendation had been acted on or implemented by the 
previous administration. However, NNSA officials provided us with a 
document--"International Nuclear and Radiological Border Security 
Efforts: Implementation Guidelines"--issued by NSC in 2005. This 
document describes the U.S. government strategy and guidelines for 
implementation and interagency coordination of U.S. efforts to detect 
nuclear and radiological material movement across international 
borders, provides general descriptions of relevant program roles and 
responsibilities, and includes guidance for an interagency 
coordination mechanism led by State. However, it does not contain all 
the elements we have identified previously for an effective strategic 
plan. For instance, it does not establish priorities, identify 
measures to track progress, or define the resources needed to 
effectively implement the strategy. 

Concerns about Potential Fragmentation and Overlap among Some U.S. 
Programs: 

We reviewed 21 U.S. government programs and offices that we identified 
as playing a role in preventing and detecting smuggling of nuclear 
materials and illicit trafficking of related technologies overseas. 
The programs we reviewed are implemented by five different agencies-- 
NNSA, DOD, State, DHS, and Justice--and encompass a broad range of 
activities to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, and technology 
are not illegally transferred or smuggled from overseas locations. 
These include programs that (1) conduct R&D on radiation detection 
technologies; (2) deploy radiation detection equipment along foreign 
borders and points of transit; (3) train and equip foreign customs and 
border security officials to identify and interdict illicit nuclear 
materials or technology transfers; (4) assist foreign governments in 
the development of export control systems; (5) enhance foreign 
antismuggling law enforcement and prosecutorial capabilities; and (6) 
analyze potential foreign nuclear smuggling cases and incidents. See 
appendix VIII for a list and descriptions of the programs and offices 
we reviewed. 

We identified potential fragmentation and overlapping functions among 
some of these programs.[Footnote 45] For example, we identified six 
programs providing training to improve the capabilities of foreign 
border security and customs officials to prevent smuggling and illicit 
nuclear shipments, including NNSA's INECP, CBSP, and SLD programs; 
State's EXBS program; DOD's Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation 
Prevention Program (WMD-PPP);[Footnote 46] and DTRA's International 
Counterproliferation (ICP) Program. Similarly, we identified four 
programs that are involved in providing equipment to foreign 
governments to enhance the ability of their customs and border 
security organizations to detect nuclear material smuggling, including 
EXBS, WMD-PPP, ICP, and the SLD program. 

Agency officials representing these programs told us that not all of 
them have the same focus, that some concentrate on specialized niches, 
and that many are complementary. For instance, in the area of training 
foreign border security and customs officials, NNSA officials told us 
that SLD is focused on training in the use and long-term sustainment 
of the radiation detection equipment provided by the program, whereas 
INECP concentrates on training foreign customs and border guard 
personnel at official points of entry to detect illicit WMD-related 
commodity transfers and assisting border security officials to detect 
illicit trafficking of WMD-related items in "green border" areas 
between official points of entry.[Footnote 47] DOD officials told us 
that ICP also conducts training to counter smuggling of dual-use 
commodities, but that this training is focused on investigations, 
which is not part of the INECP training program. Regarding the 
provision of equipment, NNSA, State, and DOD officials noted that SLD 
tends to provide larger equipment, such as radiation portal monitors 
and cargo scanning equipment, while EXBS and ICP provide smaller-scale 
equipment, such as handheld radiation detection pagers, hazardous 
materials kits, and investigative suits to foreign customs and border 
security organizations. Similarly, DOD officials also stated that much 
of the equipment the WMD-PPP program provides--such as coastal radars 
and large communications networks--cannot be provided by other 
programs for budgetary or other reasons. DOD and NNSA officials also 
pointed out geographic distinctions between SLD and WMD-PPP, noting 
that SLD focuses on equipping official border crossings, while WMD-PPP 
provides equipment for green border areas and "blue borders," or the 
maritime border areas between ports of entry. 

Furthermore, some officials told us that their programs play a 
complementary role by addressing priorities and gaps that other 
programs have not. For instance, State officials told us that the NSOI 
program helps equip some of the highest-priority sites identified by 
NNSA's SLD program. According to State officials, the SLD program is 
unable to address some high-priority sites because of limited 
resources. In country after country, according to State officials, 
NSOI found that SLD and other programs lacked sufficient resources to 
address all of their priorities. In cases where the SLD program 
notified NSOI of additional priority sites needing attention, NSOI 
identified and facilitated financial contributions from foreign donors 
who paid for equipping the locations that SLD was unable to address. 

No Federal Agency Has Lead Responsibility for U.S. Efforts to Prevent 
and Detect Nuclear Smuggling Overseas: 

No single federal agency has lead responsibility to direct federal 
efforts to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling overseas. In the past, 
we have reported that interagency undertakings can benefit from the 
leadership of a single entity with sufficient time, responsibility, 
authority, and resources needed to ensure that federal programs are 
based upon a coherent strategy, are well coordinated, and that gaps 
and duplication in capabilities are avoided.[Footnote 48] Some of the 
agency officials we interviewed expressed concerns about the absence 
of a lead agency, recognized across the government, serving as the 
focal point for federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. 
For instance, one DOD official told us that the absence of a 
recognized lead agency, empowered to set priorities and provide 
direction to relevant programs across the federal government, is an 
obstacle to a more effective approach to combating nuclear smuggling 
abroad. Another DOD official stated to us that even with interagency 
communication and coordinated working groups, without a lead agency 
having the authority to assign and direct roles and responsibilities 
in this area, ultimately the individual programs will take direction 
from their agency leadership or Congress. 

For efforts to detect nuclear material smuggling into or movement 
within the United States, a 2005 presidential directive gave DNDO 
responsibility for developing the GNDA and managing the domestic 
portion of the global architecture. However, this directive divided 
responsibility for the international portion of the global 
architecture among State, DOD, and DOE.[Footnote 49] The 2010 
strategic plan for the GNDA takes a step toward clarifying lead 
agencies responsible for different elements of the global 
architecture, including efforts overseas. Specifically, for the 
exterior layer of the GNDA--the portion focused on enhancing 
international capabilities for detecting nuclear and radiological 
materials abroad--the strategic plan identifies four performance 
goals, designating lead and supporting agency roles for each. Lead 
responsibility rests with State, DOE, and/or Justice, depending on the 
performance goal. For example, State is identified as lead agency for 
establishing and maintaining engagement with foreign governments to 
provide detection assistance and facilitate information sharing, while 
DOE has the lead in improving international detection capabilities by 
providing equipment, training, and sustainability support. DOE and 
Justice share the lead for enhancing international detection 
capabilities by developing and/or participating in international 
programs and efforts. 

However, it is unclear whether these more defined roles give authority 
to these lead agencies to provide direction and guidance across 
multiple agencies and programs. For instance, State and DOD officials 
told us that neither State nor any other federal agency has the 
authority to direct the activities or coordinate implementation of 
programs administered by other agencies involved in preventing or 
detecting nuclear smuggling overseas. Indeed, notwithstanding its 
designation of lead agencies, the GNDA strategic plan notes that 
nothing in it shall be construed as limiting any authorities or 
responsibilities of the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, State, and 
Homeland Security, as well as the Attorney General, under any statute, 
regulation, Executive Order, or Presidential Directive. 

State Is Taking Steps to Enhance One of the Principal Interagency 
Coordinating Mechanisms: 

The NSC has established mechanisms to coordinate efforts in this area, 
including a Countering Nuclear Threats Interagency Policy Committee 
(IPC), and a sub-IPC for international nuclear and radiological border 
security efforts.[Footnote 50] NSC officials declined our request to 
discuss various aspects of the IPC structure and how it coordinates 
U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. However, some 
officials from other agencies expressed doubts about the value of the 
NSC's coordinating role. Notably, DOD officials told us that they 
believed the NSC has played a negligible role in coordination of 
programs to counter nuclear smuggling. 

Coordinating groups have been established beneath the IPC structure to 
facilitate greater interagency cooperation at a working level to 
address the nuclear smuggling threat in foreign countries. One of the 
principal coordinating mechanisms for U.S. export control and related 
border security assistance activities overseas is an interagency 
working group (IWG) specified in the 2005 NSC guidelines for 
international nuclear and radiological border security, which is 
chaired by State's EXBS program. This IWG meets on a regular basis and 
officials at DOD, NNSA, and State told us the meetings are well 
attended and are useful for exchanging information--such as sharing 
calendars and information on planned program activities--and building 
relationships between program managers. 

Agency officials identified some limitations with this mechanism and 
its ability to facilitate a more cohesive national response to this 
threat. For example, NNSA and DOD officials told us that the 
coordination meetings are hampered by the participation of many 
individuals and are oriented toward high-level discussion, making in- 
depth discussion of specific issues affecting program implementation 
difficult in these settings. State officials said that they believed 
they have addressed these limitations, by chairing executive level and 
regional sub-IWG meetings. According to State officials, quarterly 
executive level meetings involving senior level participation at the 
deputy assistant secretary level, allow for high-level discussion of 
agency programmatic goals and funding priorities. The regional sub-IWG 
meetings are conducted at the action-officer level, held approximately 
two to three times per year, and provide for more focused attention on 
nonproliferation capacity building in specific countries or regions, 
according to State officials. 

NNSA and DOD officials told us that while the IWG is useful for 
information exchange, it is not a mechanism designed or suitable for 
conducting more fundamental interagency strategic planning or for 
developing guidance and priorities for individual agency programs. For 
instance, some DOD officials noted that the working group does not 
seek to establish or enforce program missions or evaluate individual 
program priorities, plans, and strategies to avoid potential 
redundancies or duplication of efforts. A State official with the EXBS 
program told us that the working group is not designed to be anything 
more than a forum for exchanging information between programs, and 
that it does not have the mandate to direct the scope and activities 
of individual agency programs. Nevertheless, State officials told us 
that they have recently proposed using the EXBS IWG as a means of 
developing common interagency strategies and approaches toward other 
countries and to encourage individual programs to engage or disengage 
in particular regions, countries, and functional areas. 

Conclusions: 

The missions, goals, and activities of many DNN programs--as well as 
many nuclear nonproliferation efforts pursued by other agencies-- 
remain critical to addressing one of the most serious risks to U.S. 
national security. Proliferation of nuclear weapons could have a 
profound impact on international stability and endanger vital U.S. 
interests. If terrorists were to acquire and use a nuclear weapon, the 
results could have far-reaching and long-lasting social, financial, 
and health impacts that are difficult to contemplate. Recognizing the 
importance of the DNN efforts, Congress has provided NNSA with 
significant amounts of funding over the past decade. Nevertheless, the 
serious fiscal realities now confronting the nation mean the financial 
resources available to DNN--and numerous other federal government 
programs and functions--are likely to be constrained for the 
foreseeable future. For these reasons, it is imperative that DNN 
programs are implemented and pursued in the most effective and 
efficient ways possible. 

It is essential that NNSA make the most efficient possible use of its 
funding. Regarding the execution of DNN budgets, we acknowledge the 
challenging circumstances under which many of the DNN programs 
operate--including appropriations provided months into the fiscal 
year, delays that may come in executing agreements with foreign 
governments, and difficulties in implementing activities through 
subcontractors overseas--which, as we found, can lead to large 
uncosted and, in some cases, large uncommitted annual balances. 
However, NNSA must maintain strong financial oversight to ensure that 
funding directed to these programs is having the greatest possible 
impact and that resources Congress is making available to DNN are not 
being underutilized. For DNN programs having difficulty committing 
funding on a timely basis, it is appropriate for NNSA to justify as 
part of its current semiannual reporting to Congress on DNN 
uncommitted, unobligated, and unexpended balances why uncommitted DNN 
program funding balances--especially those exceeding acceptable 
thresholds--should not be rescinded, redirected to other NNSA 
programs, or used to offset future DNN budget requests. 

Furthermore, contributions from other countries to DNN programs can 
help accelerate these efforts and reduce the financial burden on the 
United States. However, the foreign contributions made to the three 
DNN programs in recent fiscal years have remained relatively small 
compared with the funding directed to these programs from annual 
appropriations. The recent extension of the mandate of the G-8 Global 
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction beyond the original 2012 expiration date provides NNSA 
with an opportunity to seek out additional foreign contributions to 
DNN programs and provides a reason for extending the time frames 
authorizing certain DNN programs to receive and use such contributions. 

In addition to the contributions provided directly to DNN programs by 
foreign donor governments, cost sharing by foreign governments in 
countries where DNN programs are being implemented is another way to 
leverage NNSA's resources. However, none of the main DNN programs 
conducting work overseas is systematically tracking and maintaining 
information on foreign cost sharing that would allow for reporting of 
such data DNN-wide. Such information could provide a tangible measure 
of foreign governments' commitment to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 
objectives, such as the President's initiative to secure all 
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years, and enable 
Congress to better understand the levels of foreign financial burden 
sharing relative to the funding appropriated to DNN. 

NNSA also faces difficulties in consistently and effectively measuring 
the results of some DNN programs because it uses performance measures 
that changed over time, performance targets that differed in the end 
of fiscal year performance report and in the budget request to 
Congress for at least one fiscal year, and measures with limitations-- 
specifically for the MPC&A, NGSI, Nonproliferation and Verification 
R&D, and U.S. HEU disposition programs--concerning clarity, 
reliability, or balance. As a result, Congress and the public may not 
have a sufficient basis to judge, or may be receiving misleading 
information about, the results of some DNN programs, their goals and 
scope of work, and the limitations and challenges they face in 
implementing their efforts. Furthermore, NNSA's decision to eliminate 
the commercialization measure for the GIPP program raises questions 
about the fundamental underlying goals of the program. From its 
inception in the mid-1990s, commercialization was a central goal of 
the GIPP program. Eliminating this measure and relying only on cost 
sharing as a performance indicator, in our view, raises serious 
questions about the ability of the program to achieve this long- 
standing goal and provides little information on the program's 
nonproliferation impact and results. 

Finally, effective coordination of federal government efforts to 
prevent and detect nuclear smuggling overseas is limited by 
shortcomings in strategic plans, potential fragmentation and overlap 
among some programs, and divided responsibilities among several 
agencies. Furthermore, it is apparent that no single agency or program 
has the authority to undertake and implement a strategic re-evaluation 
and restructuring across the government to address these concerns. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

To allow DNN programs to receive and use additional foreign 
contributions in the future, thereby offsetting some future DNN 
appropriations requests, Congress may wish to consider extending the 
time frames under which current DNN programs are authorized in current 
law to receive and use such contributions. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Administrator of NNSA take the following seven 
actions: 

* To provide further information to Congress on DNN program budget 
execution, in the end of fiscal year semiannual reports on DNN 
uncommitted program funding balances (1) identify uncommitted balances 
over acceptable carryover thresholds on a program-by-program basis, 
and (2) justify why such balances should not be considered for 
rescission, redirection to other NNSA programs, or to offset future 
DNN budget requests. 

* To clarify how other countries are sharing in the burden of 
implementing DNN programs, develop ways to better track and maintain 
information on foreign cost sharing for DNN projects overseas. To 
allow Congress to understand the scope of foreign country cost 
sharing, NNSA should include in the annual DNN budget requests to 
Congress information explaining actual or estimated amounts of cost 
sharing during the prior fiscal year by foreign governments in 
countries where DNN program activities have been implemented. 

* To provide Congress with consistent information on DNN program 
results over time, develop and maintain to the extent practicable a 
consistent set of DNN program performance measures and ensure that, 
for each fiscal year, the targets for measuring annual program 
performance as proposed in the budget requests to Congress are the 
same as those used to assess progress in the end of fiscal year 
performance reports. In those cases where circumstances warrant a 
change in performance measures or targets--especially during the 
course of a fiscal year--the end of fiscal year performance reports 
should explain why the measures or targets were changed. 

* To provide Congress with better information on the status and 
progress of DNN program performance, address clarity, reliability, and 
balance issues in the performance measures for specific programs as 
follows: 

- Develop clearer measures, especially for the Nonproliferation and 
Verification R&D program and MPC&A programs, so the requirements and 
scope of program efforts can be more easily understood. For the MPC&A 
program in particular, reconsider the practice under its performance 
measure of counting buildings and facilities as having "completed" 
MPC&A upgrades, where there is additional or ongoing security work 
under way or planned. 

- Clarify the long-term goal under the performance measure for the 
U.S. HEU disposition program to reflect that the overall amount of 
material for dispositioning and the rate at which it will be 
downblended is conditional upon decisions regarding the U.S. nuclear 
weapons stockpile and the pace of warhead dismantlement. 

- Develop broader, more encompassing, or a more balanced set of public 
measures to gauge progress by the Next Generation Safeguards 
Initiative and in the sustainability of MPC&A upgrades provided to 
foreign countries. 

- Provide an updated and more reliable measure to assess the 
nonproliferation impact of the GIPP program, as NNSA previously stated 
it would. 

We are making the following two recommendations to the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs: 

* To streamline and eliminate potential for fragmentation and overlap 
among U.S. government programs involved in preventing and detecting 
smuggling of nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies overseas, 
undertake--or direct and delegate an appropriate agency or agencies to 
undertake--a comprehensive review of the structure, scope, and 
composition of agencies and programs across the federal government 
involved in such efforts. Such a review should assess several issues, 
including: (1) the level of overlap and duplication among agencies and 
programs, especially in the provision of nuclear detection equipment 
and in training provided to foreign border security, customs, and law 
enforcement officials; (2) potential for consolidation of these 
functions to fewer programs and agencies; (3) the feasibility, costs, 
and benefits of establishing a special coordinator to preside over the 
allocation of U.S. counter-nuclear- smuggling assistance to foreign 
nations and be responsible for directing the interagency process of 
development, funding, and implementation of all U.S. government 
programs related to combating nuclear smuggling overseas; 
and (4) any U.S. laws that would need to be amended by Congress in 
order to facilitate consolidation, elimination, or other changes to 
existing programs. 

* Following this review, to ensure remaining programs are being 
coordinated and implemented effectively, issue new guidance that 
incorporates the elements of effective strategic plans, including 
clearly delineating the roles and missions of relevant programs, 
specific priorities and objectives, performance measures and targets, 
overall program cost estimates, and projected time frames for program 
completion. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Administrator of NNSA, the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (NSC), the 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, and the Attorney General for their review and comment. DHS 
and NNSA provided written comments on the draft report, which are 
presented in appendixes IX and X, respectively. State, DOD, and NSC 
did not provide written comments but provided technical comments which 
we incorporated as appropriate. Justice did not provide comments. In 
its comments, DHS provided additional information about the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office's role in initiatives related to nuclear 
forensics and on the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic 
Plan and Joint Annual Interagency Review, as well as technical 
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

In its comments, NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with our 
recommendations. However, concerning our findings, NNSA stated that 
the draft report distorts the facts and reinforces misperceptions 
about DNN's financial, procurement, and performance management. NNSA 
stated that the report leaves the false impression that DNN has unused 
funds and does not make effective program management a priority. 
Specifically, NNSA commented on three points of the report--the 
discussion of (1) uncosted and uncommitted carryover funding, (2) DNN 
tracking of cost-sharing data, and (3) performance measures for 
several DNN programs. NNSA also provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

Uncosted and uncommitted carryover funding. NNSA commented that: the 
DOE threshold for DNN programs only applies to uncommitted uncosted 
balances, not uncosted balances; we "buried" information on DNN 
uncommitted balances in the draft report; and that our finding that 
uncommitted uncosted carryover funding of several DNN programs raises 
questions as to whether such balances could be directed to other NNSA 
programs or be used to reduce future DNN budget requests, is "untrue 
and has dangerous implications in the current budget environment." 

NNSA's assertion that the DOE threshold applies only to uncommitted 
uncosted balances and not uncosted balances is not consistent with 
DOE's annual reports to Congress on the status of its uncosted 
obligations, in which DNN uncosted balances are evaluated against the 
threshold. For example, DOE stated in its report on uncosted balances 
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 that total DNN uncosted balances 
exceeded the overall DNN threshold level by a net amount of $827.9 
million in fiscal year 2009. In addition, the financial statements we 
obtained from NNSA that served as the basis for our analysis compared 
the uncosted balances of each DNN program against a corresponding 
threshold for each program. We also note that NNSA is presenting this 
information in its comment letter for the first time. In August 2011, 
NNSA officials indicated that they did not want us to discuss uncosted 
DNN funding balances in any way due to their concerns that our report 
would be misunderstood by Congress and, in turn, jeopardize future DNN 
appropriations. However, prior to our receipt of these comments, NNSA 
officials had not provided any indication that we should not have 
analyzed the uncosted data in this manner. In response to NNSA's 
technical comments, we modified the presentation of our analysis of 
uncosted and uncommitted DNN funding balances against the thresholds. 

Furthermore, contrary to NNSA's statement in its comments, the 
information on DNN uncommitted carryover is not "buried" in the 
report. Rather, it is presented in a logical sequence following the 
discussion of DNN's overall and program-specific uncosted funding 
balances and the discussion of the reasons why NNSA believes it is 
important to consider DNN funding that is uncosted but committed. In 
our view, including information on the annual levels of DNN costed and 
uncosted funding is relevant information because it depicts the level 
at which DNN work is being completed and expenditures are being made. 
At the same time, we recognize that information on committed and 
uncommitted balances can be useful in understanding DNN program 
commitments that have been incurred but which may not be payable for 
years to come, and therefore provides a longer-term picture of current 
DNN program operations. We believe both sets of financial data present 
complementary information, provide fuller context to Congress on the 
execution of DNN budgets, and can be used together to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of DNN's financial position today and over time. 

We continue to believe that it is appropriate to consider whether DNN 
uncommitted uncosted funding balances--especially the uncommitted 
balances of programs that have routinely exceeded the DOE thresholds-- 
could be rescinded, directed to other NNSA programs, or used to reduce 
future DNN budget requests. NNSA's comment that rescission of "amounts 
committed to signed contracts" would create significant delays and 
result in possible contract-related penalties. However, we reiterate 
that our finding pertains to consideration of uncommitted, not 
committed, funding which is not yet contracted. In addition, 
concerning NNSA's reference to "dangerous implications in the current 
budget environment," we believe that current U.S. fiscal environment 
means that all federal programs must be held accountable to executing--
whether costing or committing--their budgets efficiently and on a 
timely basis. 

DNN tracking of cost sharing data. NNSA commented that our draft 
report does not mention the inherent difficulties associated with 
assessing cost sharing with foreign partners at sensitive sites. In 
the report, we note the limitations in NNSA's ability to audit foreign 
cost sharing. We also explained the efforts NNSA has made to develop 
cost sharing relationships with international partners and the 
different approaches and methodologies DNN programs have adopted to 
collect data on or estimate cost sharing. However, none of the DNN 
programs we reviewed are systematically tracking and maintaining these 
data to allow for reporting of foreign cost sharing DNN-wide. We 
understand, however, the challenges involved in obtaining such 
information and have added further language to the report which 
reflects NNSA's comment. 

On a related matter, NNSA commented that when it asked us what type of 
methodology might be used as a satisfactory way to calculate foreign 
cost-sharing data, we responded that we could not provide any 
prescriptive advice on how to approach the issue. It is important to 
note that the discussion of this issue was one among many issues 
discussed with NNSA during the exit meeting and throughout our review. 
Furthermore, we point out that our recommendation to NNSA is not that 
it audit or validate foreign cost-sharing data but that it improve its 
internal processes for tracking and maintaining such information and 
that it provide information on actual or estimated amounts of cost 
sharing in annual DNN budget requests to Congress. 

Performance metrics for DNN programs. NNSA made several statements in 
its written comments concerning our findings on the performance 
measures of several DNN programs, including the nuclear Material 
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative 
(NGSI), and the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) 
program. 

Regarding the MPC&A program performance measures, NNSA commented that 
the program does not track the amount of material secured because 
estimates of inventories are highly uncertain and the specifics are 
considered sensitive or classified by foreign governments. NNSA also 
commented that having to reclassify buildings previously deemed as 
complete if a new MPC&A upgrade project is initiated would require the 
metric baseline to change frequently and make it an unusable measure. 
We acknowledged in our draft report the difficulties NNSA faces in 
obtaining information from foreign governments on the amounts of 
material being secured by the program. For this reason, we did not 
recommend that NNSA develop a new performance measure that attempts to 
capture and report on such information. With respect to our finding 
that the MPC&A program is not adjusting the total number of buildings 
with completed MPC&A upgrades to account for any new upgrade work that 
may be pursued, NNSA stated that the metric baseline would change 
frequently if it were required to adjust the total number of completed 
buildings when new upgrade work is undertaken. We continue to believe 
it is misleading and could create a false sense of security to 
classify a building as having "completed" MPC&A upgrades when 
additional upgrade work is ongoing at that location. Furthermore, 
while we did not specify the frequency by which NNSA should update 
MPC&A program performance data we believe that NNSA should, at a 
minimum, provide accurate data on this matter in the DOE end of fiscal 
year performance reports and in the DNN budget requests to Congress. 

Regarding the GTRI performance measure, NNSA commented that we implied 
that the GTRI program had an ulterior motive to change the program's 
reactor conversion measure. Our characterization of the performance 
metric is accurate: the measure changed during the time frame of our 
review. NNSA explained the change in the measure, but the broader 
point made in the report concerns the changing nature of DNN program 
performance measures and the difficulty this poses in evaluating 
program performance consistently over time. 

Regarding the NGSI performance measure, NNSA stated that we had 
incorrectly claimed that the measure was not sufficiently balanced, 
and that we did not include the full text of the measure, leaving out 
the word "deployed." We stand by our statement for the following 
reasons. We believe the NGSI is a significant, multifaceted 
undertaking whose scope of goals and activities is not adequately 
captured by the single current published performance measure. The 
overarching goal of NGSI is to develop the policies, concepts, 
technologies, expertise, and infrastructure needed to strengthen and 
sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new 
challenges over the next 25 years. In our view, this is a much 
broader, long-term strategic goal that transcends questions of whether 
safeguards systems have been deployed and used in other countries to 
address specific safeguards deficiencies. We recognize the 
difficulties facing NNSA posed by the limited number of published DNN 
performance measures allowed by OMB. However, we believe NGSI will 
remain an important, wide-ranging DNN program for years to come, which 
calls for a wider, more balanced set of public measures to allow 
Congress to track the program's performance rather than a single 
measure assessing progress in one dimension of program output. In 
response to NNSA's comment, we added language to the report concerning 
the word deployed as it relates to the program's performance measure. 

Regarding the GIPP program, NNSA commented that we criticized the lack 
of a commercialization metric. NNSA stated that commercialization is 
no longer a leading program metric, but a secondary benefit. We 
believe that our observation regarding this metric is fair and 
reasonable. Commercialization had been a long-standing measure used by 
the program to track reemployment of former Soviet weapons scientists 
and, as we reported in 2007, was considered the "flagship" of the 
program. We explain in our report that NNSA determined that 
commercialization would no longer be a leading program objective and 
would no longer be a published program performance measure. However, 
as we noted in the report, we had previously recommended that NNSA 
improve the measure by developing more reliable data on the 
commercialization results of GIPP projects, not eliminate the measure. 
Eliminating the measure leaves the impression that the program has 
failed to meet a key program objective and raises other questions 
about GIPP's continued value as a nonproliferation program. In that 
regard, we do not believe that the single current public performance 
measure for the GIPP program--the cumulative percentage of non-U.S. 
government project funding contributions obtained relative to 
cumulative U.S. government GIPP funding--provides Congress with 
sufficient information on the program's nonproliferation results. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator of NNSA, the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the 
Secretary of Energy, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and interested 
congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix XI. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The objectives of our review of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration's (NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) 
programs were to assess (1) the extent of annual DNN uncosted, or 
unexpended, balances; 
(2) the level of financial contributions from foreign donor and 
recipient governments to the DNN programs; (3) the effectiveness of 
DNN program performance measures; and (4) the effectiveness of 
interagency strategies and plans for coordinating NNSA and other 
agency nuclear nonproliferation programs, especially those working to 
prevent and detect nuclear smuggling overseas. 

To assess DNN uncosted balances, we obtained and analyzed financial 
data generated from the Standard Accounting and Reporting System, the 
Department of Energy's (DOE) and NNSA's official financial management 
system. We analyzed data on uncosted and uncommitted DNN funding from 
fiscal years 2006 through 2010. We selected this time frame as the 
most recent five year period of available end of fiscal year financial 
data. This included data on end of fiscal year funding costed by the 
programs; uncosted balances; uncosted funding committed; and 
thresholds developed by the Department of Energy (DOE) to assess the 
appropriateness of uncosted carryover balances. We used this data to 
analyze uncosted and uncommitted uncosted balances at the end of each 
fiscal year, compare uncosted and uncommitted uncosted balances 
against the thresholds, and assess individual DNN programs whose 
annual uncommitted uncosted balances frequently exceeded acceptable 
thresholds. 

We conducted a reliability assessment of the system that generated 
this data and interviewed knowledgeable officials from NNSA's Office 
of Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation on the reliability 
of the data, including issues such as data entry, access, quality 
control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data. In 
several instances, we found minor discrepancies in the financial data 
provided to us by NNSA, but were able to reconcile and obtain 
satisfactory explanations for the differences from NNSA officials. 
Specifically, the scope of our analysis of DNN-wide uncosted and 
uncommitted uncosted balances included funding for several small DNN 
program elements that involve shared or transferred funding between 
DNN and other agency programs. NNSA does not consider these amounts in 
its semiannual reports to Congress on DNN program uncosted and 
committed funding. According to NNSA, this resulted in minor 
differences in the data in our report and in NNSA's reports to 
Congress. We also reviewed external auditor reports of DOE's 
consolidated financial statements to identify any potential material 
weaknesses that could affect the reliability of the data. We did not 
identify any material weaknesses in those reports that would raise 
questions about the reliability of the data during the timeframe of 
our review. We determined that, overall, the data provided to us were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. 

To assess the financial contributions to the DNN programs made by 
foreign donor governments, we analyzed data provided in the most 
recent DOE report to Congress on the receipt and utilization of 
international contributions for nonproliferation and threat reduction 
work. We analyzed these contributions to the four programs authorized 
by Congress to receive such contributions over the most recent 5-year 
period of available data--fiscal years 2006 through 2010--to align 
with the timeframe of our analysis of DNN program uncosted balances. 
We analyzed the contribution data by DNN programs receiving the 
funding and the countries providing the contributions. In addition, 
using DOE financial data, we compared the foreign contributions to 
each program against the amount of funding from annual appropriations 
acts allocated to each program. Regarding cost sharing by host 
governments in countries where DNN activities are implemented, NNSA 
officials provided us with data estimating the dollar amount of 
foreign cost sharing for relevant programs, and provided us with 
examples of cost-sharing activity. We interviewed NNSA officials on 
the policies, methods, and systems for collecting, estimating, and 
maintaining foreign cost-sharing information. NNSA did not have 
documentation to support the validity or reliability of these 
estimates. We included the cost-sharing estimates to illustrate that 
DNN programs are attempting to measure the level of financial 
assistance by recipient governments, but we noted that these figures 
were not audited and that the NNSA faces difficulties in developing 
valid and reliable foreign cost-sharing estimates. We did not adjust 
any dollar figures in this report for inflation. 

To assess the effectiveness of DNN performance measures, we evaluated 
the DNN program performance measures presented by NNSA in its annual 
budget requests to Congress from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. For 
each DNN program, we assessed the description of each program 
performance measure in each fiscal year to assess how the measures 
have changed over time. To further analyze consistency in these 
measures, for each fiscal year we compared the description of each 
performance measure in the budget requests against the measures 
described in the DOE annual performance reports produced at the end of 
each fiscal year. For fiscal year 2010, we also compared the annual 
performance targets for the DNN programs as proposed in the budget 
request with the targets and actual accomplishments reported in the 
performance report for fiscal year 2010. Furthermore, we evaluated the 
DNN performance measures against criteria we have developed in 
previous reports which identify key characteristics and attributes of 
effective performance measures. We interviewed NNSA officials on some 
of the DNN performance measures, including measures used by the 
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D, Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative, Material Protection, Control, and Accounting, and Global 
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention programs. 

To assess the effectiveness of interagency strategies and plans for 
coordinating NNSA and other agency nuclear nonproliferation programs, 
especially those working to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling 
overseas, we reviewed relevant interagency strategies and coordinating 
guidance. These documents included the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture Strategic Plan 2010 produced jointly by the Departments 
of Homeland Security (DHS), Defense, State, and Justice, DOE, the 
intelligence community, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a 2006 
strategic plan produced by the Department of State for interagency 
coordination of U.S. government nuclear detection assistance overseas, 
and 2005 implementation guidelines issued by the National Security 
Council for international nuclear and radiological border security 
efforts. We evaluated these strategies against characteristics and 
attributes of effective national strategies for complex interagency 
undertakings that we developed previously. We also reviewed findings 
and recommendations in our prior reports on programs involved in 
combating nuclear smuggling and evaluated whether current strategic 
plans and coordinating guidance have addressed relevant findings or 
recommendations in these reports. To assess coordination between NNSA 
and other agency nonproliferation programs, we focused on those 
programs across the federal government that play a role in preventing 
and detecting nuclear smuggling overseas. By reviewing agency 
documentation--such as descriptions of programs in NNSA, State, DHS, 
and Department of Defense budget requests and in the "Joint Annual 
Interagency Review of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture" 
produced by the interagency partners responsible for the GNDA 
Strategic Plan, as coordinated by DNDO--and interviewing agency 
officials, we identified 21 programs across five federal government 
agencies that are involved in preventing and detecting smuggling or 
illicit transfers of nuclear materials and related sensitive 
technologies overseas for further evaluation. These included programs 
that (1) conduct R&D on radiation detection technologies; (2) deploy 
radiation detection equipment along foreign borders and points of 
transit; (3) train and equip foreign customs and border security 
officials; (4) assist foreign governments in the development of export 
control systems; (5) enhance foreign antismuggling law enforcement and 
prosecutorial capabilities; and (6) analyze potential foreign nuclear 
smuggling cases and incidents. These programs we selected do not 
represent the total universe of federal programs involved in this 
area, nor does our list represent a statistically representative 
sample of the total U.S. government effort in this area. To conduct 
our assessment of coordination in this area, we submitted a standard 
set or questions to and/or interviewed officials representing the 21 
programs we identified on a range of issues pertaining to their 
programs, including scope of program missions and activities, types of 
interactions with other federal programs, and their views on the 
coordination and integration of similar programs across agencies. We 
used the responses to our questions and information from our 
interviews with officials from these agencies to evaluate similarities 
in missions, functions, and activities between programs, and obtain 
official perspectives on the effectiveness of coordinating mechanisms 
and guidance. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2011 to December 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence, to provide a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Previous GAO Reports Assessing DOE and NNSA Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Programs: 

For over a decade, we have evaluated the implementation and execution 
of Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) nuclear nonproliferation programs. The following 
is a list of selected products on these programs. 

For more information on the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, see: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: National Nuclear Security Administration Has 
Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global Research Reactor 
Program, but Action Is Needed to Address Remaining Concerns. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-949. Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 17, 2009. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological Threat 
Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the 
Highest Priority Radiological Sources. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-282. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 
2007. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce 
the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-807. Washington, D.C.: 
July 30, 2004: 

For more information on the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D 
program, see: 

Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful Technologies, 
but Project Management Can Be Strengthened. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-904. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 
2002. 

For information on NNSA's WMD scientist redirection programs, see: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist Weapons Scientists 
in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-189. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 
2007. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists 
in Russia's Nuclear Cities Face Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-429. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE's Efforts to Reduce the 
Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-99-54. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 
1999. 

For information on the nuclear Material Protection, Control, and 
Accounting program, see: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better 
Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials 
Worldwide. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-227. 
Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2010. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at 
Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded 
Security Upgrades Is Uncertain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-404. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2007. 

For information on the Second Line of Defense Core Program and 
Megaports Initiative, see: 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination 
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection 
Equipment to Other Countries. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 
2006. 

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 
Seaports. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-375. 
Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005. 

For more information on the U.S. plutonium disposition effort, see: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Address Uncertainties with and 
Strengthen Independent Safety Oversight of Its Plutonium Disposition 
Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-378. 
Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 2010. 

For more information on the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium 
Production program, see: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort to Close Russia's Plutonium 
Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-662. Washington, D.C.: 
June 4, 2004. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Programs, by 
Program, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Dollars in thousands: 

Program: International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation: 

Country contributing: Canada; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; Fiscal 
year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $4,418.8; Fiscal year 
2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; Fiscal year 2009 
total foreign contributions received: $4,067.1; Fiscal year 2010 total 
foreign contributions received: $0.0; Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: 
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation: $8,485.9. 

Country contributing: Finland; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; Fiscal 
year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; Fiscal year 2008 
total foreign contributions received: $0.0; Fiscal year 2009 total 
foreign contributions received: $0.0; Fiscal year 2010 total foreign 
contributions received: $308.8; Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: 
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation: $308.8. 

Country contributing: New Zealand; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $497.2; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $387.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $884.2. 

Country contributing: Norway; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $837.6; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $837.6. 

Country contributing: South Korea; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $300.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $550.0. 

Country contributing: United Kingdom; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $140.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $140.0. 

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $4,916.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $5,591.7; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $698.8; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $11,206.5. 

Program: Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production: 

Country contributing: Finland; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $628.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $628.0. 

Country contributing: Netherlands; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $1,190.2; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $1,190.2. 

Country contributing: New Zealand; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $308.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $308.0. 

Country contributing: South Korea; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $750.0. 

Country contributing: United Kingdom; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $10,300.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $5,148.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $15,448.0. 

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $12,676.2; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $5,398.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $18,324.2. 

Program: Global Threat Reduction Initiative: 

Country contributing: Canada; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $1,738.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $1,975.4; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $3,918.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $7,632.2. 

Country contributing: South Korea; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $250.0. 

Country contributing: United Kingdom; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $3,998.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $5,722.2; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $9,720.2. 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $1,738.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $6,223.4; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $9,640.2; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $17,602.4. 

Program: Total; 
Fiscal year 2006 total foreign contributions received: $12,676.2; 
Fiscal year 2007 total foreign contributions received: $12,052.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 total foreign contributions received: $6,473.4; 
Fiscal year 2009 total foreign contributions received: $15,231.9; 
Fiscal year 2010 total foreign contributions received: $698.8; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation: $47,133.1. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Foreign Contributions Received by DNN Programs, by 
Country, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010: 

Dollars in thousands: 

Donating Country: Canada; 

DNN program receiving contribution: INMPC; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $4,418.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $4,067.1; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $8,485.9. 

DNN program receiving contribution: GTRI; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $1,738.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $1,975.4; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $3,918.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $7,632.2. 

DNN program receiving contribution: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $6,157.6; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $1,975.4; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $7,985.1; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $16,118.1. 

Donating Country: Finland; 

DNN program receiving contribution: INMPC; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $308.8; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $308.8. 

DNN program receiving contribution: EWGPP; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $628.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $628.0. 

DNN program receiving contribution: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $628.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $308.8; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $936.8. 

Donating Country: Netherlands; 

DNN program receiving contribution: EWGPP; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $1,190.2; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $1,190.2. 

DNN program receiving contribution: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $1,190.2; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $1,190.2. 

Donating Country: New Zealand; 

DNN program receiving contribution: INMPC; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $497.2; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $387.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $884.2. 

DNN program receiving contribution: EWGPP; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $308.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $308.0. 

DNN program receiving contribution: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $308.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $497.2; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $387.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $1,192.2. 

Donating Country: Norway; 

DNN program receiving contribution: INMPC; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $837.6; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $837.6. 

DNN program receiving contribution: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $837.6; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $837.6. 

Donating Country: South Korea; 

DNN program receiving contribution: INMPC; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $300.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $550.0. 

DNN program receiving contribution: EWGPP; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $750.0. 

DNN program receiving contribution: GTRI; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $250.0. 

DNN program receiving contribution: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $500.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $300.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $250.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $1,550.0. 

Donating Country: United Kingdom; 

DNN program receiving contribution: INMPC; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $140.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $140.0. 

DNN program receiving contribution: EWGPP; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $10,300.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $5,148.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $15,448.0. 

DNN program receiving contribution: GTRI; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $3,998.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $5,722.2; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $9,720.2. 

DNN program receiving contribution: Subtotal; 
Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $10,300.0; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $5,148.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $3,998.0; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $5,722.2; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $140.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $25,308.2. 

Donating Country: Total; 

Fiscal year 2006 foreign contributions received: $12,676.2; 
Fiscal year 2007 foreign contributions received: $12,052.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 foreign contributions received: $6,473.4; 
Fiscal year 2009 foreign contributions received: $15,231.9; 
Fiscal year 2010 foreign contributions received: $698.8; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $47,133.1. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Foreign Contributions to DNN Programs Compared to Funding 
from Appropriations Acts, Fiscal Years 2006-2010: 

Dollars in thousands: 

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation. 

Total funding from annual appropriations acts directed to the 
program[A]; 
Fiscal year 2006: $422,730; 
Fiscal year 2007: $592,730; 
Fiscal year 2008: $624,482; 
Fiscal year 2009: $452,232; 
Fiscal year 2010: $572,050; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $2,664,224. 

Foreign contributions; 
Fiscal year 2006: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $4,916.0; 
Fiscal year 2008: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009: $5,591.7; 
Fiscal year 2010: $698.8; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $11,206.5. 

Foreign contributions as a percentage of total funding directed to 
program from appropriations; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0.0%; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0.8%; 
Fiscal year 2008: 0.0%; 
Fiscal year 2009: 1.2%; 
Fiscal year 2010: 0.1%; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: 0.4%. 

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production: 

Total funding from annual appropriations acts directed to the 
program[A]; 
Fiscal year 2006: $174,423; 
Fiscal year 2007: $225,754; 
Fiscal year 2008: $179,941; 
Fiscal year 2009: $141,299; 
Fiscal year 2010: $24,507; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $745,924. 

Foreign contributions; 
Fiscal year 2006: $12,676.2; 
Fiscal year 2007: $5,398.0; 
Fiscal year 2008: $250.0; 
Fiscal year 2009: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $18,324.2. 

Foreign contributions as a percentage of total funding directed to 
program from appropriations; 
Fiscal year 2006: 7.3%; 
Fiscal year 2007: 2.4%; 
Fiscal year 2008: 0.1%; 
Fiscal year 2009: 0.0%; 
Fiscal year 2010: 0.0%; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: 2.5%. 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative: 

Total funding from annual appropriations acts directed to the 
program[A]; 
Fiscal year 2006: $96,995; 
Fiscal year 2007: $129,495; 
Fiscal year 2008: $193,225; 
Fiscal year 2009: $393,208; 
Fiscal year 2010: $333,500; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $1,146,423. 

Foreign contributions; 
Fiscal year 2006: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $1,738.8; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6,223.4; 
Fiscal year 2009: $9,640.2; 
Fiscal year 2010: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $17,602.4. 

Foreign contributions as a percentage of total funding directed to 
program from appropriations; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0.0%; 
Fiscal year 2007: 1.3%; 
Fiscal year 2008: 3.2%; 
Fiscal year 2009: 2.5%; 
Fiscal year 2010: 0.0%; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: 1.5%. 

Russian Plutonium Disposition Program: 

Total funding from annual appropriations acts directed to the 
program[A]; 
Fiscal year 2006: $33,427; 
Fiscal year 2007: $0; 
Fiscal year 2008: -$207,000; 
Fiscal year 2009: -$27; 
Fiscal year 2010: $1,000; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: -$172,600. 

Foreign contributions; 
Fiscal year 2006: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2009: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2010: $0.0; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $0.0. 

Foreign contributions as a percentage of total funding directed to 
program from appropriations; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0.0%; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0.0%; 
Fiscal year 2008: 0.0%; 
Fiscal year 2009: 0.0%; 
Fiscal year 2010: 0.0%; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: 0.0%. 

Total: 

Total funding from annual appropriations acts directed to all four 
programs[A]; 
Fiscal year 2006: $727,575; 
Fiscal year 2007: $947,979; 
Fiscal year 2008: $790,648; 
Fiscal year 2009: $986,712; 
Fiscal year 2010: $931,057; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $4,383,971. 

Total foreign contributions to all four programs; Fiscal year 2006: 
$12,676.2; 
Fiscal year 2007: $12,052.8; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6,473.4; 
Fiscal year 2009: $15,231.9; 
Fiscal year 2010: $698.8; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: $47,133.1. 

Total foreign contributions as a percentage of total funding directed 
to programs from appropriations, all four programs; Fiscal year 2006: 
1.7%; 
Fiscal year 2007: 1.3%; 
Fiscal year 2008: 0.8%; 
Fiscal year 2009: 1.5%; 
Fiscal year 2010: 0.1%; 
Total, fiscal years 2006-2010: 1.1%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

Note: All data and calculations are in nominal dollars. 

[A] Amounts are adjusted new obligational authority to account for 
changes to original DNN annual appropriations, including across the 
board rescissions, rescission of prior year unobligated balances, 
transfers to other NNSA accounts, supplemental appropriations, and 
other structural changes affecting the funds available to the programs 
to obligate and cost. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Limitations in Key Attributes of Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Program Performance Measures: 

We have found that agencies successfully measure performance when they 
use measures that satisfy four general characteristics--(1) they 
demonstrate results, (2) are limited to the vital few, (3) cover 
multiple program priorities, and (4) provide useful information for 
decision making.[Footnote 51] To assess whether program performance 
measures satisfy these general characteristics, we developed nine key 
specific attributes of successful measures, including whether the 
measures are clear, measurable, reliable, objective, and 
balanced.[Footnote 52] For more information on the attributes of 
successful performance measures, see table 8.[Footnote 53] 

Table 8: Key Attributes of Successful Performance Measures: 

Attribute: Linkage; 
Definition: Measure is aligned with division and agencywide goals and 
mission and clearly communicated throughout the organization; 
Potentially adverse consequences of not meeting attribute: Behaviors 
and incentives created by measures do not support achieving division 
or agencywide goals or mission. 

Attribute: Clarity; 
Definition: Measure is clearly stated and the name and definition are 
consistent with the methodology used to calculate it; Potentially 
adverse consequences of not meeting attribute: Data could be confusing 
and misleading to users. 

Attribute: Measurable target; 
Definition: Measure has a numerical goal; Potentially adverse 
consequences of not meeting attribute: Cannot tell whether performance 
is meeting expectations. 

Attribute: Objectivity; 
Definition: Measure is reasonably free from significant bias or 
manipulation; 
Potentially adverse consequences of not meeting attribute: Performance 
assessments may be systematically over-or understated. 

Attribute: Reliability; 
Definition: Measure produces the same result under similar conditions; 
Potentially adverse consequences of not meeting attribute: Reported 
performance data are inconsistent and add uncertainty. 

Attribute: Core program activities; Definition: Measures cover the 
activities that an entity is expected to perform to support the intent 
of the program; Potentially adverse consequences of not meeting 
attribute: Not enough information available in core program areas to 
managers and stakeholders. 

Attribute: Limited overlap; 
Definition: Measure should provide new information beyond that 
provided by other measures; 
Potentially adverse consequences of not meeting attribute: Manager may 
have to sort through redundant, costly information that does not add 
value. 

Attribute: Balance; 
Definition: Balance exists when a suite of measures ensures that an 
organization's various priorities are covered; Potentially adverse 
consequences of not meeting attribute: Lack of balance could create 
skewed incentives when measures over-emphasize some goals. 

Attribute: Governmentwide priorities; Definition: Each measure should 
cover a priority such as quality, timeliness, and cost of service; 
Potentially adverse consequences of not meeting attribute: A program's 
overall success is at risk if all priorities are not addressed. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Some National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation (DNN) program performance measures we reviewed did 
not have key attributes of successful performance measures, including 
some DNN performance measures that were potentially unclear, of 
questionable reliability, or lacking sufficient balance. 

DNN Performance Measures Having Potential Clarity Limitations: 

We identified clarity concerns in the performance measures for the 
following two DNN programs: 

* The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (R&D) 
program measures the cumulative progress in demonstrating the next 
generation of technologies and methods to detect uranium-235 
production, plutonium production, and special nuclear material 
movement. For each of these measures, progress is judged against 
unspecified "baseline criteria" and milestones published in an "FY 
2006 R&D Requirements Document." NNSA officials told us that the R&D 
requirements document is classified. Nevertheless, because these 
measures link performance to a secondary set of criteria that are not 
clearly expressed, it is difficult for a third party who may be 
unfamiliar with the classified requirements to interpret the measure 
and discern whether the criteria provide an appropriate, sufficient, 
and up-to-date basis for tracking program progress. 

* For the nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) 
program, NNSA measures progress by the cumulative number of buildings 
with weapon-usable nuclear materials in Russia and the former Soviet 
states with completed MPC&A upgrades.[Footnote 54] Through fiscal year 
2009, the program also gauged progress on the cumulative number of 
Russian nuclear warhead sites with completed MPC&A upgrades, but no 
longer uses this measure because, according to NNSA, all 73 warhead 
sites in the scope of work received completed MPC&A upgrades as of 
December 2008. We identified several concerns with both of these 
measures. 

- First, one of the measures focuses on the number of buildings with 
nuclear material having completed MPC&A upgrades, rather than the 
amounts of materials secured. This measure is less than optimal 
because it does not provide information about the quantities of 
materials being secured by the program. NNSA officials agreed that 
this performance measure is less than ideal to track material security 
progress in Russia, but they told us that the Russian government's 
unwillingness to divulge the amount of material located in each 
building under the program's scope prevented the program from 
developing a more refined measure. 

- Second, in our 2007 report on the MPC&A program, we reported that 
DOE's measure for reporting progress on the number of buildings 
"secured" by the MPC&A program was a potentially misleading indicator 
of security at those facilities, because a building was considered 
secure after only "rapid" rather than "comprehensive" security 
upgrades had been put in place.[Footnote 55] NNSA subsequently revised 
its performance measure to track the number of buildings with 
completed MPC&A upgrades. According to NNSA officials, the program 
periodically conducts reviews of completed sites to assess levels of 
residual risk and other issues. In some cases, additional upgrades may 
be pursued if warranted by the new information. In those cases, 
however, the MPC&A program is not adjusting the total number of 
buildings completed to account for any new upgrade work that may be 
pursued. In the view of NNSA officials, subtracting the number of 
buildings that will receive MPC&A equipment retrofits or additional 
upgrades from the total number of "completed" buildings would be 
impractical, and that to redevelop the measure to only include 
completed buildings where there is no MPC&A work taking place would be 
potentially confusing to external reviewers familiar with the program. 

- Third, the completed MPC&A upgrades measure may also be misleading 
and create a false sense of security to the extent decision makers 
interpret this to mean that a nuclear material or warhead site is 
secure and further U.S. assistance is no longer required. However, as 
we reported in our December 2010 report, the MPC&A program has a 
significant effort under way to establish practices and procedures to 
ensure that security improvements at Russian nuclear material and 
warhead storage sites will be effectively sustained over time by 
Russia without U.S. assistance. This effort faces a number of 
challenges and may require continued U.S. support to 2018. NNSA 
officials told us they believed that nuclear security is a dynamic, 
ongoing process that has to keep up with an evolving threat, and may 
never be finished. 

- Fourth, the MPC&A performance measure for nuclear material security 
in Russia may produce a false sense of security because it does not 
acknowledge that there are several significant sites in Russia 
believed to have large amounts of nuclear weapon-usable materials 
where the program is not planning to pursue MPC&A upgrades. As we 
noted in our December 2010 report, the Russian government has refused 
to include in the scope of MPC&A cooperation with NNSA three major 
facilities in Russia responsible for production of nuclear weapons 
material. NNSA has not been provided access to and is not anticipating 
conducting future MPC&A work at those locations. 

DNN Performance Measures Having Potential Reliability Limitations: 

We identified reliability concerns in the performance measures for the 
following two DNN programs: 

* For the disposition of surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium (HEU), 
under the U.S. Surplus Materials Disposition program, NNSA's 
performance measure tracks progress in the cumulative amount of 
surplus HEU down-blended or shipped for down-blending to LEU each 
year.[Footnote 56] The measure has an endpoint target of down-blending 
217 metric tons of HEU that the United States has declared surplus to 
defense needs by 2050. The program has set annual performance targets 
and is measuring annual progress toward this goal. Through fiscal year 
2010, the program had completed down-blending a cumulative total of 
133 metric tons. However, we identified potential reliability concerns 
with this measure. NNSA officials told us that the 2050 date was an 
arbitrary placeholder because they could not predict at what rate 
nuclear weapons would be dismantled and the corresponding rate at 
which additional HEU will be available for dispositioning. The program 
has adopted a conservative time frame for tracking performance in this 
mission area due to this uncertainty, even though NNSA officials told 
us that this work could be completed sooner, depending on the rate at 
which HEU is made available to the program from nuclear weapons needs. 

* For the Megaports Initiative, NNSA developed a performance measure 
to track the number of megaports sites where there is host-country 
cost sharing and the estimated dollar amount of such cost sharing. 
However, NNSA does not systematically track and verify foreign cost 
sharing for the Megaports Initiative or other DNN programs. An NNSA 
official told us that the Megaports Initiative cost-sharing values are 
estimates and are not validated or audited. For these reasons, the 
cost-sharing measure for the Megaports Initiative is unreliable. NNSA 
officials told us that this measure was difficult to quantify, and 
told us that it would be eliminated for fiscal year 2012 as a result 
of a DOE "performance measures streamlining initiative." 

DNN Performance Measures Having Potential Balance Limitations: 

We identified concerns as to whether performance measures for two DNN 
programs are sufficiently balanced: 

* NNSA has developed one performance measure--the cumulative number of 
MPC&A regulations in the development phase in Russia and other 
countries of the former Soviet Union--to track the long-term 
sustainability of MPC&A upgrades that NNSA has provided to these 
countries. According to NNSA officials, the MPC&A program's 
sustainability work is very important to ensure that Russia can 
effectively assume long-term responsibility for maintaining the U.S.- 
provided systems. Regulations are important in this regard because 
they establish legal requirements for MPC&A activities for relevant 
ministries, agencies, services, operating organizations, and 
facilities in foreign countries. By working with other countries, such 
as Russia, to develop their MPC&A regulations, NNSA aims to create 
incentives for effective MPC&A procedures and sanctions for 
noncompliance in order to foster a strong MPC&A culture and sustain 
U.S.-funded security upgrades. 

However, we have some concerns with the performance measure NNSA uses 
to gauge progress in the MPC&A sustainability. First, while 
development of regulations is an important component of effective and 
sustainable MPC&A systems, according to NNSA officials, the extent to 
which and how effectively these regulations are implemented by the 
facilities responsible for handling and managing nuclear materials is 
unclear. Second, the measure implies that the rate at which MPC&A 
regulations are developed in Russia alone provides a sufficient basis 
for judging whether Russia and other host countries are adequately 
prepared and equipped to sustain MPC&A systems on their own 
independent of U.S. support. However, as we reported in December 2010, 
transitioning responsibility to Russia for sustaining MPC&A 
improvements over the long term has been a complex process, pursued at 
both the national and site levels in Russia through multiple project 
areas, including but not limited to development of MPC&A regulations. 
[Footnote 57] 

* In 2008 NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative 
(NGSI), a multiyear program to develop the policies, concepts, 
technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to strengthen 
and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet 
new challenges over the next 25 years. According to NNSA officials, 
NGSI is considered an important, high-priority undertaking intended to 
address a range of emerging challenges to the international safeguards 
system. Specifically, NGSI is addressing multiple objectives under 
five long-term safeguards goals, including (1) supporting U.S. 
safeguards policy development and conducting outreach bilaterally and 
multilaterally to strengthen the international safeguards system; (2) 
developing advanced safeguards concepts, approaches, and assessment 
methodologies; (3) developing safeguards technologies and methods to 
optimize effectiveness of safeguards implementation; (4) revitalizing 
the international safeguards human capital base; and (5) developing 
national safeguards infrastructure in countries that have nuclear 
power programs or plans for nuclear power. 

NNSA has used one performance measure to track safeguards-related 
assistance to other countries under NGSI: the number of safeguards 
systems deployed and used in other countries to address specific 
safeguards deficiencies. However, NNSA does not have a broader set of 
public performance measures to monitor and provide information to 
Congress on progress toward the longer-term safeguards-related goals 
of NGSI, such as progress in addressing human capital issues 
associated with the international safeguards system. 

In both of these cases, we question whether measuring performance in a 
single area of activity provides a sufficient basis for gauging the 
progress that each effort is making overall toward multiple, diverse 
objectives. However, NNSA officials told us that DNN programs are 
allowed only a limited number of representative published performance 
metrics by the Office of Management and Budget. Officials representing 
both programs told us that these efforts have been allotted only one 
performance measure each. These officials noted that the programs 
maintain a broader set of internal-use measures that are not provided 
to Congress or the public which the programs use to track and assess 
progress made under both efforts. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: DNN Performance Measures, Fiscal Years 2006 to 2010: 

We examined the performance measures the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) provided to Congress in its annual budget 
requests from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 for its Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation (DNN) programs, and found that the number and nature 
of some DNN program performance measures changed over this period 
making it difficult to evaluate program performance consistently over 
time. For instance, in its fiscal year 2006 congressional budget 
request, NNSA included 32 measures to track the performance of its 
nonproliferation programs, but in its fiscal year 2010 budget request 
NNSA included 26 measures. For descriptions of the DNN program 
performance measures, by nonproliferation program office and year, 
from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, see table 9. 

Based on our review of the performance measures presented in NNSA's 
annual budget requests, we identified several ways in which DNN 
performance measures changed over the period we reviewed, including: 

* Some performance measures NNSA used in earlier years were no longer 
relevant by fiscal year 2010 because work was reported by NNSA as 
being completed--such as efforts by the nuclear Material Protection, 
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to secure nuclear warheads in 
Russia, or work by the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium 
Production (EWGPP) program to facilitate the shutdown of plutonium 
production reactors in Russia. In other cases, performance measures 
developed in earlier years became irrelevant because, according to 
NNSA officials, anticipated work was never initiated, such as 
assisting Russia in constructing a mixed oxide fuel fabrication 
facility for plutonium disposition. 

* Some measures used by NNSA during this time were dropped, while some 
new measures were established. For example, from fiscal years 2006 
through 2009, the Nonproliferation and International Security program 
had a performance measure tracking the number of international and 
domestic experts trained in nuclear nonproliferation issues. In fiscal 
year 2010, this measure was dropped. Conversely, in fiscal year 2010 
NNSA established two new measures to gauge progress by the 
Nonproliferation and International Security program in assisting 
countries with export controls and nuclear safeguards, which had not 
been used in prior years to assess program performance. 

* Some program performance measures used by NNSA in earlier years were 
consolidated into new performance measures, while some single measures 
were divided into several new measures. For example, in fiscal year 
2006, the Nonproliferation and International Security program 
maintained three separate measures to track performance in U.S. 
monitoring of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) downblending. In 
fiscal year 2007, these three measures were consolidated into a single 
measure--the cumulative metric tons of Russian weapons-usable HEU that 
U.S. experts have confirmed as permanently eliminated from the Russian 
stockpile under the HEU Purchase Agreement.[Footnote 58] In fiscal 
year 2010 this single measure was augmented with the addition of 
another--the annual number of special monitoring visits to Russian 
downblending facilities to confirm the elimination of Russian HEU 
under the agreement. In fiscal year 2006, the Nonproliferation and 
Verification R&D program used a single measure--the annual number of 
advanced radiation and remote sensing technologies developed--to 
assess progress in the program's proliferation detection mission. 
However, in subsequent years, this performance measure was divided 
into three separate measures to track detection technology development 
in three specific areas: detection of uranium-235 production, 
detection of plutonium production, and detection of special nuclear 
material movement. 

* The descriptions of some program measures also changed over this 
time, which resulted in program progress being measured in new or 
different ways. For example, the GTRI program changed its measure from 
tracking the cumulative number of HEU-fueled research and test 
reactors converted to low-enriched uranium (LEU) during fiscal years 
2006-2008, to the cumulative number of HEU reactors converted or shut 
down in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. In addition, the International 
Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation (INMPC) program stopped 
monitoring the cumulative percentage of weapon-usable material being 
secured after fiscal year 2006, switched to measuring the cumulative 
number of buildings with weapon-usable material secured in fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008, and then switched to evaluating the cumulative 
number of buildings containing weapon-usable material with completed 
MPC&A upgrades in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. 

NNSA officials told us they believed that the DNN performance measures 
should not be static and should be adjusted to reflect changes in 
circumstances, such as program reorganizations, and in response to 
external recommendations. For instance, NNSA officials told us that 
the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security undertook a 
review of its program performance measurements in 2009 at the request 
of the Office of Management of Budget (OMB). Based on the OMB 
recommendations the Nonproliferation and International Security 
program eliminated the performance measure for tracking the number of 
foreign nationals trained on nonproliferation issues, since that 
measure did not adequately capture the value of the training delivered. 

Furthermore, after each fiscal year, in annual performance reports, 
the Department of Energy (DOE) assesses performance made by the DNN 
programs meeting annual targets under each measure. From fiscal year 
2006 through 2009, we found over 30 instances in which DNN program 
performance measures identified in the congressional budget request 
for a fiscal year were different from the measures assessed in the DOE 
annual performance reports for that fiscal year. In some cases, we 
determined that these differences were relatively minor and involved 
wording or terminology changes. In other instances, we found the 
differences were more significant. For instance, the fiscal year 2007 
budget request included two measures for the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative's (GTRI) recovery of nuclear materials in foreign 
locations: the cumulative kilograms of HEU fresh and/or spent fuel 
from Soviet-supplied research reactors repatriated to Russia, and the 
cumulative number of fuel assemblies containing U.S.-origin spent fuel 
returned from foreign research reactors. However, neither of these 
measures appears in the fiscal year 2007 performance report, and they 
were replaced with a new single measure: the cumulative kilograms of 
nuclear material (HEU and plutonium) removed or disposed. 

In other cases, measures included in the budget requests for some 
programs were missing and not updated with a new measure in the 
performance reports. For example, in the fiscal year 2009 budget 
request, NNSA indicated that one of the Nonproliferation and 
International Security program performance measures for the year would 
be the cumulative number of displaced weapons experts in Russia and 
the former Soviet Union employed in Global Initiatives for 
Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program grants or private sector jobs. 
However, the DOE performance report for fiscal year 2009 did not 
assess program performance against this measure at all. As a result, 
in some cases the measures NNSA identified to Congress for assessing 
DNN program performance during a fiscal year were not those against 
which actual progress was assessed at the end of the fiscal year. 

NNSA officials stated that for any given fiscal year there can be 
differences between the performance measures presented in the budget 
requests to Congress and evaluated in the DOE end of fiscal year 
performance reports. However, these officials noted that performance 
measures identified in a budget request can be developed 9 months 
prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, with the final performance 
report issued several months after the end of the fiscal year, or a 
period of 24 months which may pass from the time the performance 
measures are developed until performance is evaluated. NNSA officials 
noted that during this time, DNN programs can be reorganized, be 
reevaluated, or experience other changes that result in differences 
between the measures in the budget request and the final performance 
reports. However, the end of fiscal year performance reports we 
reviewed did not include explanations in those instances where the 
performance measures changed from the measures proposed in the budget 
requests. 

Table 9: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Performance 
Measures, from Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010, As Presented in Annual 
Budget Requests: 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative: 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of targeted 
research/test reactors converted from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to 
low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel; Fiscal Year 2007 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative number of targeted research/test reactors 
converted from HEU to LEU fuel; 
Fiscal Year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative HEU reactors 
converted[A]; Fiscal Year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative HEU 
reactors converted or shutdown[A]; Fiscal Year 2010 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative number of HEU reactors converted or verified as 
shutdown prior to conversion. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative kilograms of HEU 
fresh and/or spent fuel from Soviet- supplied research reactors 
repatriated to Russia; Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: 
Cumulative kilograms of HEU fresh and/or spent fuel from Soviet- 
supplied research reactors repatriated to Russia; Fiscal year 2008 
Performance Indicator: Cumulative kilograms of nuclear material (HEU 
and plutonium) removed or disposed[A]; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative kilograms of 
nuclear material (HEU and plutonium) removed or disposed; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of kilograms 
of vulnerable nuclear material (HEU and plutonium) removed or disposed. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of fuel 
assemblies containing U.S.-origin spent fuel returned from foreign 
research reactors; Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative 
number of fuel assemblies containing U.S.-origin spent fuel returned 
from foreign research reactors[A]. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of U.S. 
excess sealed sources recovered; Fiscal year 2007 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative number of U.S. excess sealed sources 
recovered[A]; Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative 
radiological sources removed or disposed; Fiscal year 2009 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative U.S. radiological sources removed or disposed; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of excess 
domestic radiological sources removed or disposed. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of high 
priority sites with vulnerable radiological material secured; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of high 
priority sites with vulnerable radiological material secured[A]; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative high priority 
radiological sites protected; Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: 
Cumulative high priority international radiological sites 
protected[A]; Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative 
number of buildings with high priority nuclear and radiological 
materials secured 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable[A]; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative funds to support 
threat reduction work contracted directly with the private sector; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative funds to support 
threat reduction work contracted directly with the private sector[B]; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Nonproliferation and Verification R&D: 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Annual number of advanced 
radiation and remote sensing technologies developed and evaluated 
through customized tests that challenge and characterize their 
operating parameters. These advanced technologies are intended to 
improve U.S. capability to detect the early stages of nuclear weapon 
programs[A]; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect uranium-235 enrichment activities. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect uranium-235 enrichment activities. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect uranium-235 enrichment activities. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect uranium-235 enrichment activities. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”). 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect plutonium reprocessing activities. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect plutonium reprocessing activities. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect plutonium reprocessing activities. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect plutonium reprocessing activities. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect plutonium reprocessing activities. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”). 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect special nuclear material movement. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); Fiscal year 2007 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative percentage of progress toward demonstrating the 
next generation of technologies and methods to detect special nuclear 
material movement. (Progress is measured against the baseline criteria 
and milestones published in the “FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect special nuclear material movement. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); Fiscal year 2009 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative percentage of progress toward demonstrating the 
next generation of technologies and methods to detect special nuclear 
material movement. (Progress is measured against the baseline criteria 
and milestones published in the “FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”); 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress toward demonstrating the next generation of technologies and 
methods to detect special nuclear material movement. (Progress is 
measured against the baseline criteria and milestones published in the “
FY 2006 R&D Requirements Document”). 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Annual number of advanced 
technologies and operational systems (e.g. satellite payloads and 
seismic stations calibration data sets) delivered to U.S. national 
security users which improves the accuracy and sensitivity of nuclear 
weapons test monitoring[A]; Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: 
Annual index that summarizes the status of all NNSA nuclear explosion 
monitoring R&D deliveries that improve the nation’s ability to detect 
nuclear explosions; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Annual index that summarizes 
the status of all NNSA nuclear explosion monitoring R&D deliveries 
that improve the nation’s ability to detect nuclear explosions; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Annual index that summarizes 
the status of all NNSA detonation detection R&D deliveries that 
improve the nation’s ability to detect nuclear detonations; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Annual index that summarizes 
the status of all NNSA detonation detection R&D deliveries that 
improve the nation’s ability to detect nuclear detonations. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Percentage of research 
projects for which an independent R&D merit assessment was completed 
during the second year of effort and again within each subsequent 
three year period to assess scientific quality and mission relevance; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
active research projects for which an independent R&D peer assessment 
of the project’s scientific quality and mission relevance has been 
completed during the second year of effort (and again within each 
subsequent three year period for those projects found to be of merit); 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
active research projects for which an independent R&D peer assessment 
of the project’s scientific quality and mission relevance has been 
completed during the second year of effort (and again within each 
subsequent three year period for those projects found to be of merit); 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
active research projects for which an independent R&D merit review of 
the project’s scientific quality and mission relevance has been 
completed during the second year of effort (and again within each 
subsequent three year period for those projects found to be of merit); 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
active research projects for which an independent R&D merit review of 
the project’s scientific quality and mission relevance has been 
completed during the second year of effort (and again within each 
subsequent three year period for those projects found to be of merit). 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Annual number of professional 
papers/exchanges presented, each representing science and technology 
knowledge and U.S. leadership in program areas; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Annual number of articles 
published in peer reviewed professional journals/forums representing 
leadership in advancing science and technology knowledge; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Annual number of articles 
published in peer reviewed professional journals/forums representing 
leadership in advancing science and technology knowledge; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Annual number of articles 
published in peer reviewed professional journals/forums representing 
leadership in advancing science and technology knowledge; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Annual number of articles 
published in peer reviewed professional journals/forums representing 
leadership in advancing science and technology knowledge. 

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production: 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards refurbishing a fossil plant in Seversk facilitating 
shut down of two weapons-grade plutonium production reactors; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards refurbishing a fossil plant in Seversk shutting down 
two weapons-grade plutonium production reactors; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards refurbishing a fossil plant in Seversk shutting down 
two weapons-grade plutonium production reactors; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards refurbishing a fossil plant in Seversk facilitating 
the shut-down of two weapons-grade plutonium production reactors; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards constructing a fossil plant in Zheleznogorsk 
facilitating shut down of one weapons-grade plutonium production 
reactor; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards constructing a fossil plant in Zheleznogorsk shutting 
down one weapons-grade plutonium production reactor; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards constructing a fossil plant in Zheleznogorsk shutting 
down one weapons-grade plutonium production reactor; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards constructing a fossil plant in Zheleznogorsk 
facilitating the shutdown of one weapons-grade plutonium production 
reactor; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards constructing a fossil plant in Zheleznogorsk 
facilitating the shut down of one weapons-grade plutonium production 
reactor. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Annual percentage of Russian 
weapons-grade plutonium production capability eliminated from its 2003 
baseline of 1.2 metric tons (MT) per year (0.4 MT per reactor); 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Annual percentage of Russian 
weapons-grade plutonium production capability eliminated from its 2003 
baseline of 1.2 MT per year (0.4 MT per reactor per year). 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative actual costs per 
budgeted cost of work performed at Seversk; Fiscal year 2007 
Performance Indicator: Annual costs performance index for Seversk 
construction as measured by the ratio of budgeted costs of work 
performed to actual costs of work performed; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Annual costs performance index 
for Seversk construction as measured by the ratio of budgeted costs of 
work performed to actual costs of work performed; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not applicable[C]; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Annual costs performance index 
for Zheleznogorsk construction as measured by the ratio of budgeted 
costs of work performed to actual costs of work performed. 

Nonproliferation and International Security: 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Annual average cost per review 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological export license applications[A]; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable;
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable;
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not applicable;
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of 
international and domestic experts trained in nuclear nonproliferation 
since 9/11 (e.g., IAEA inspectors, export control officers, etc.)[A]; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Annual number of international 
and domestic experts (e.g., IAEA inspectors, export control officers, 
physical protection personnel) trained in nonproliferation to fulfill 
the President’s policy delineated on February 11, 2004 and implement 
the U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1540 criminalizing 
proliferation; Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Annual number 
of international and domestic experts (e.g., IAEA inspectors, export 
control officers, physical protection personnel) trained in 
nonproliferation to fulfill the President’s policy delineated on 
February 11, 2004 and implement the U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 criminalizing proliferation; Fiscal year 2009 
Performance Indicator: Annual number of international and domestic 
experts (e.g., IAEA inspectors, export control officers, physical 
protection personnel) trained in nonproliferation to fulfill the 
President’s policy delineated on February 11, 2004 and implement the 
U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1540 criminalizing 
proliferation[A]; Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not 
applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress towards redirecting former Libyan WMD scientists and 
instituting conformance with Libya’s international nonproliferation 
obligations[A]; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
progress in development of the next- generation Attribute Measurement 
System to determine the mass and isotopics of a nuclear warhead, 
warhead component or fissile material without revealing classified 
information[A]; Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Annual percentage of operation 
of the Blend-Down Monitoring Systems during the HEU blend-down 
process[A]; Percentage of the year that the on-site Transparency 
Monitoring Office is staffed at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated 
Plant; Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative metric tons 
of Russian weapons-usable HEU that U.S. experts have confirmed as 
permanently eliminated from the Russian stockpile under the HEU 
Purchase Agreement; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative metric tons of 
Russian weapons-usable HEU that U.S. experts have confirmed as 
permanently eliminated from the Russian stockpile under the HEU 
Purchase Agreement; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative metric tons of 
Russian weapons-usable HEU that U.S. experts have confirmed as 
permanently eliminated from the Russian stockpile under the HEU 
Purchase Agreement; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative metric tons of 
Russian weapons-usable HEU that U.S. experts have confirmed as 
permanently eliminated from the Russian stockpile under the HEU 
Purchase Agreement. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Annual percentage completed of 
the 24 annually allowed special monitoring visits to the four Russian 
HEU-to-LEU processing facilities to monitor conversion of 30 MT per 
year of HEU to LEU[A]; Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not 
applicable; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Annual number of special 
monitoring visits completed to the four Russian processing facilities 
that downblend HEU to LEU to monitor and confirm the permanent 
elimination of 30 MT of Russian HEU from the Russian weapons stockpile 
under the HEU Purchase Agreement. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Annual number of former Soviet 
weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians engaged[A]; 
Cumulative number of technologies commercialized or businesses 
created/expanded[B]; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of the 
Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program target 
population of displaced Russian and FSU WMD experts who are currently 
employed in GIPP grants or long-term private sector jobs (and 
cumulative number who are employed in long- term private sector jobs 
resulting from GIPP grants); Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: 
Cumulative number of the GIPP target population of displaced Russian 
and FSU WMD experts who are currently employed in GIPP grants or long- 
term private sector jobs (and cumulative number who are employed in 
long-term private sector jobs resulting from GIPP grants); Fiscal year 
2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of the GIPP target 
population of displaced Russian and FSU WMD experts who are currently 
employed in GIPP grants or long- term private sector jobs (and 
cumulative number who are employed in long-term private sector jobs 
resulting from GIPP grants); Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: 
Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Annual percentage of non-U.S. 
government (USG) project funding contributions obtained[A]; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of non-
USG (private sector and foreign government) project funding 
contributions obtained relative to cumulative USG GIPP funding 
contributions' Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative 
percentage of non-USG (private sector and foreign government) project 
funding contributions obtained relative to cumulative USG GIPP funding 
contributions' Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative 
percentage of non-USG (private sector and foreign government) project 
funding contributions obtained relative to cumulative USG GIPP funding 
contributions' Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative 
percentage of non-USG (private sector and foreign government) project 
funding contributions obtained relative to cumulative USG GIPP funding 
contributions. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Not applicable[A]; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Annual number of technologies 
transferred to international regimes and other countries to prevent 
and counter WMD proliferation and nuclear- related terrorism; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Annual number of technologies 
transferred to international regimes and other countries to prevent 
and counter WMD proliferation and nuclear- related terrorism; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Annual number of technologies 
transferred to international regimes and other countries to prevent 
and counter WMD proliferation and nuclear- related terrorism; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not applicable[F]; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of countries 
where International Nonproliferation Export Control Program is engaged 
that have export control systems that meet critical requirements. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not applicable[G]; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Annual number of safeguards 
systems deployed and used in international regimes and other countries 
that address an identified safeguards deficiency. 

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation: 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of Russian 
Navy warhead sites secured[A]; Cumulative number of Russian Strategic 
Rocket Forces and 12th Main Directorate sites secured[A]; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of warhead 
sites with completed MPC&A upgrades; Fiscal year 2008 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative number of warhead sites with completed MPC&A 
upgrades; Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of 
warhead sites with completed MPC&A upgrades; Fiscal year 2010 
Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 600 
MTs of weapons-usable nuclear material secured[A]; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of buildings 
with weapons-usable material secured Fiscal year 2008 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative number of buildings with weapons-usable material 
secured[A]; Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number 
of buildings containing weapons-usable material with completed MPC&A 
upgrades; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of buildings 
containing weapons-usable material with completed MPC&A upgrades. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative cost in millions of 
dollars per metric ton to complete rapid security upgrades on Russian 
weapons usable nuclear material; Fiscal year 2007 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative cost in millions of dollars per metric ton to 
complete rapid security upgrades on Russian weapons usable nuclear 
material[A]; Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of MPC&A 
regulations in the development phase for the Russian Federation and 
FSU countries; Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative 
number of MPC&A regulations in the development phase for Russia and 
other FSU countries. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative metric tons of HEU 
converted to LEU; Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative 
metric tons of HEU converted to LEU; Fiscal year 2008 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative metric tons of HEU converted to LEU; Fiscal year 
2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative metric tons of HEU converted to 
LEU; Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative metric tons of 
HEU converted to LEU. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of Second 
Line of Defense (SLD) sites with nuclear detection equipment installed 
and cumulative number of megaports completed; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of SLD sites 
with nuclear detection equipment installed and cumulative number of 
megaports completed; Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: 
Cumulative number of SLD sites with nuclear detection equipment 
installed and cumulative number of megaports completed; Fiscal year 
2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of SLD sites with 
nuclear detection equipment installed and cumulative number of 
megaports completed; Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: 
Cumulative number of SLD sites with nuclear detection equipment 
installed and cumulative number of megaports completed. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Not applicable
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable[H]; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of megaports 
with host country cost-sharing, resulting in decreased cost to the US 
program, with estimated cost sharing value; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative number of megaports 
with host country cost-sharing, resulting in decreased cost to the US 
program, with estimated cost sharing value. 

Fissile Materials Disposition: 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of the 
design, construction, and start-up activities completed for the Pit 
Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF); 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of the 
design, construction, and cold start-up activities completed for PDCF; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of the 
design, construction, and cold start-up activities completed for PDCF; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of the 
design, construction, and cold start-up activities completed for PDCF; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of the 
design, construction, and start-up activities completed for the Mixed 
Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of the 
facility and equipment design, construction, and cold start-up 
activities completed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of the 
design, construction, and cold start-up activities completed for the 
MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility; Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: 
Cumulative percentage of the design, construction, and cold start-up 
activities completed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility; Fiscal 
year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of the design, 
construction, and cold start-up activities completed for the MOX Fuel 
Fabrication Facility. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of the 
design, construction, and cold start-up activities completed for the 
Waste Solidification Building; Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: 
Cumulative percentage of the design, construction, and cold start-up 
activities completed for the Waste Solidification Building. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative percentage of 
design, construction, and startup activities completed for the Russian 
MOX fuel fabrication facility[A]; Fiscal year 2007 Performance 
Indicator: Cumulative percentage of design, construction, and cold 
start-up activities completed for the Russian MOX fuel fabrication 
facility[A]; Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Not applicable; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Not applicable. 

Fiscal year 2006 Performance Indicator: Cumulative amount of surplus 
U.S. HEU downblended or shipped for downblending; 
Fiscal year 2007 Performance Indicator: Cumulative amount of surplus 
U.S. HEU downblended or shipped for downblending; 
Fiscal year 2008 Performance Indicator: Cumulative amount of surplus 
U.S. HEU downblended or shipped for downblending; 
Fiscal year 2009 Performance Indicator: Cumulative amount of surplus 
U.S. HEU downblended or shipped for downblending; 
Fiscal year 2010 Performance Indicator: Cumulative amount of surplus 
U.S. HEU downblended or shipped for downblending. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data. 

[A] In these 32 cases, the performance measures used to evaluate 
progress in the Department of Energy (DOE) Annual Performance Report 
for that fiscal year were different from the performance measures 
presented by NNSA in its budget justification to Congress for those 
programs and that fiscal year. 

[B] In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2007 
included a performance measure to assess the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative's cumulative funds contracted directly with the private 
sector, though no such metric was presented for the program in NNSA's 
FY 2007 budget request to Congress. 

[C] In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2009 
included a performance measure to assess the Elimination of Weapons- 
Grade Plutonium Production program's annual costs performance index 
for Zheleznogorsk construction as measured by the ratio of budgeted 
costs of work performed to actual costs of work performed, though no 
such metric was presented for the program in NNSA's FY 2009 budget 
request to Congress. 

[D] In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2009 
included a performance measure to assess the Nonproliferation and 
International Security program's annual number of special monitoring 
visits completed to the four Russian processing facilities that 
downblend HEU to LEU to monitor and confirm the permanent elimination 
of 30 metric tons of Russian HEU from the Russian weapons stockpile 
under the HEU Purchase Agreement, though no such metric was presented 
for the program in NNSA's FY 2009 budget request to Congress. 

[E] In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2006 
included a performance measure to assess the Nonproliferation and 
International Security program's annual number of technologies 
transferred to international regimes and other countries to prevent 
and counter WMD proliferation and nuclear-related terrorism, though no 
such metric was presented for the program in NNSA's FY 2006 budget 
request to Congress. 

[F] In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2009 
included a performance measure to assess the Nonproliferation and 
International Security program's cumulative number of countries where 
International Nonproliferation Export Control Program is engaged that 
have export control systems that meet critical requirements, though no 
such metric was presented for the program in NNSA's FY 2009 budget 
request to Congress. 

[G] In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2009 
included a performance measure to assess the Nonproliferation and 
International Security program's annual number of safeguards systems 
deployed and used in international regimes and other countries that 
address an identified safeguards deficiency, though no such metric was 
presented for the program in NNSA's FY 2009 budget request to Congress. 

[H] In this case, the DOE Annual Performance Report for FY 2008 
included a performance measure to assess the International Nuclear 
Material Protection and Cooperation program's cumulative number of 
Megaports with host country cost-sharing, with estimated cost sharing 
value, though no such metric was presented for the program in NNSA's 
FY 2008 budget request to Congress. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: U.S. Programs Contributing to Overseas Nuclear 
Smuggling Prevention and Detection: 

National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development; Office of 
Proliferation Detection; This program supports long-term R&D of 
nuclear material detection technologies, including detecting shielded 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapon-grade plutonium. 

Office of Nonproliferation and International Security; International 
Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP); Helps build and 
maintain foreign export control systems through long term partnerships 
with counterpart technical experts and agencies to strengthen export 
control licensing procedures and practices, promote industry 
compliance with national export control norms and strengthen 
enforcement capabilities. INECP's export control work began in 1995 in 
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine and has expanded to adjacent countries 
and to Southeast Asia. 

Office of Nonproliferation and International Security; Cooperative 
Border Security Program (CBSP); Created in 2007, CBSP works to 
strengthen the capacity of its foreign partners to monitor and improve 
the security of volatile borders through technical exchanges and 
border security workshops, as well as other measures designed to help 
facilitate holistic approaches to addressing border security 
challenges. CBSP works in Latin America, the Mediterranean region, 
Transahara Africa, Iraq, and Southeast Asia, among other places. 

Office of Nonproliferation and International Security; Interdiction-
Enforcement Program; 
Through an Interdiction Technical Analysis Group, which draws on 
technical expertise from Department of Energy national laboratories, 
this program supports technical assessments of potential nuclear 
smuggling or trafficking cases, provides technical support to 
interagency meetings on nuclear interdiction, and provides training on 
nuclear commodities and technologies related to customs enforcement 
and border security. 

Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation; Second 
Line of Defense (SLD) Core Program; Initiated in 1998, the SLD Core 
Program installs radiation detection equipment at international land 
borders, airports, and strategic feeder seaports in the former Soviet 
Union, Turkey, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 

Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation; SLD 
Megaports Initiative; 
Established in 2003, the Megaports Initiative provides radiation 
detection systems at key international seaports to screen cargo 
containers for nuclear and other radioactive materials regardless of 
the container destination. 

Department of Defense: 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency; 
International Counterproliferation (ICP) Program; The ICP program 
prevents the spread of weapons of mass destruction, components, and 
related materials through borders and across territories of 
participating nations in the former Soviet Union, Baltic region and 
Eastern Europe, through training courses and equipment deliveries 
targeted at foreign government law enforcement, border security, and 
first-responder personnel. 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency; 
Regional Combating WMD Program (RCP); The RCP program develops 
regional networks--primarily among countries in the Black Sea and 
Southern Caucasus regions--in which countries work collaboratively to 
build and sustain long-term defenses against WMD on a regional basis, 
including interdiction of WMD trafficking. Program activities have 
focused on information exchange through workshops on topics related to 
counter-trafficking. 

Cooperative Threat Reduction program; WMD Proliferation Prevention 
Program (WMD-PPP); WMD-PPP assists non-Russia former Soviet Union 
states, and others as determined by the Secretary of Defense in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, in building capabilities to 
stem the potential proliferation of WMD. The program works with 
foreign border guards and customs officers to detect and interdict 
possible WMD trafficking by enhancing land and maritime borders 
through provision of equipment and training. 

Department of State: 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Export Control 
and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program; The EXBS program assists 
development of capabilities in foreign countries to detect, deter, and 
interdict illicit nuclear trafficking, and prevent the authorization 
of transfers of such items to end-uses and end-users of proliferation 
concern. EXBS assistance includes placement of in-country advisors and 
provision of specialized training and equipment. 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Nuclear 
Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI); Started in 2004, NSOI works with 
other countries to identify gaps in their capabilities to prevent, 
detect and respond effectively to nuclear smuggling incidents, 
addresses those gaps by negotiating a joint action plan to improve 
anti-nuclear smuggling capabilities, and identifies assistance 
projects for implementing the joint action plan. 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Preventing 
Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP); PNSP was started in 2007 to help 
address funding gaps for programs involved in preventing nuclear 
smuggling overseas, including funding projects developed by NSOI where 
no donor can be found, or to serve as a source of funding to attract 
and leverage foreign government donations. 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Nuclear 
Trafficking Response Group (NTRG); The NTRG, chaired by State, was 
established in 1995 to coordinate U.S. government interdiction and 
other responses to incidents of illicit nuclear and radiological 
smuggling overseas. The NTRG focuses on nuclear material smuggling and 
trafficking cases at the "non-state actor" level, and works to 
prosecute nuclear smugglers overseas and develop information on 
nuclear smuggling-related threats. 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Office of 
Counterproliferation Initiatives (CPI); Among other things, CPI 
supports efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling overseas through its 
chairmanship of the interagency Nuclear Interdiction Action Group 
(NIAG), whose primary purpose is to interdict shipments or potential 
shipments of nuclear-related equipment, materials, and technology of 
proliferation concern. The NIAG focuses primarily on incidents at the 
state level involving transfers or potential transfers of nuclear and 
dual-use items of concern from both US and foreign markets. 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF); Started in 1994, NDF 
provides a source of contingency funding for the U.S. government to 
respond rapidly, on an ad hoc basis, to nonproliferation and 
disarmament opportunities, circumstances, or conditions that are 
unanticipated or unusually difficult, but of high priority. While NDF 
does not maintain a program focused on counter smuggling, in the past, 
NDF support has enabled the acquisition and deployment of radiation 
detection equipment in Eastern and Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, as well as the purchase of radiation detectors for the 
Russian Customs Service in support of NNSA's SLD program, and 
represents a potential source of future support of unanticipated, 
short notice initiatives focused on the nuclear smuggling threat. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Container Security Initiative 
(CSI); Initiated in 2002, CSI involves identifying high risk maritime 
cargo containers at foreign seaports and requesting that foreign 
authorities examine the containers in coordination with CBP before 
they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States. CSI efforts 
are under way at 58 foreign ports. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Secure Freight Initiative (SFI); 
Initiated in 2006, SFI was created in response to legislative mandate 
that, by 2012 or earlier, 100 percent of maritime cargo bound for the 
United States be scanned at the foreign seaport. SFI includes an 
integrated scanning system, consisting of radiation detection 
equipment and non-intrusive inspection imaging systems. CBP also 
requires importers to provide CBP with additional data, or a "Security 
Filing" prior to loading the maritime cargo on vessels bound for the 
United States to assess and identify high-risk U.S.-bound maritime 
cargo. SFI pilots have been completed at ports in Hong Kong, South 
Korea, the United Kingdom, and Honduras, with SFI operations 
continuing at the port in Qasim, Pakistan. 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO); Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture (GNDA) and related programs and activities; 
DNDO is responsible for coordinating the development of the GNDA-- 
which DNDO describes as a worldwide network of sensors, 
telecommunications, and personnel, with supporting information 
exchanges, programs, and protocol, to detect, analyze, and report on 
nuclear and radiological materials outside of regulatory control. In 
addition, DNDO supports bilateral engagements with international 
partners to exchange best practices and collaborate on research and 
development and testing and evaluation programs. DNDO also leads and 
participates in multilateral initiatives to develop international 
guidance on nuclear detection architectures. Furthermore, DNDO 
supports geographic and transnational studies assessing gaps and 
vulnerabilities in nuclear detection architectures and identifying 
potential solutions. 

Department of Justice: 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); WMD-Directorate; 
FBI conducts extensive outreach and liaison internationally on 
incidents that may involve illicit nuclear trafficking. This includes 
maintaining a legal attaché program which enables FBI to assist 
investigation and prosecution of nuclear smuggling crimes overseas. At 
the request of foreign governments, and by working with other U.S. 
government programs, FBI also provides training to foreign law 
enforcement organizations on nuclear smuggling detection, response, 
investigation and prosecution issues. 

Criminal Division; 
Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training 
(OPDAT); 
OPDAT works to strengthen foreign criminal justice institutions in 
combating terrorism and transnational crimes including WMD 
trafficking, by providing legal, enforcement, and prosecution-related 
assistance that helps foreign governments prosecute such cases. 
Activities include encouraging legislative and justice sector reform 
in countries with laws deemed inadequate and improving the skills of 
foreign prosecutors, investigators, and judges. 

Criminal Division; 
International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program 
(ICITAP); 
ICITAP provides assistance to help foreign governments develop 
professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect 
human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of 
transnational crime and terrorism, including potential WMD smuggling. 
ICITAP's activities include working to enhance foreign investigative, 
enforcement, and response functions through technical assistance and 
training to foreign law enforcement agencies through full-time 
programs staffed in overseas field offices, and intermittent 
deployments of technical advisors and trainers. 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA, DOD, State, DHS, and Justice information. 

[End of table] 

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

US. Department of Homeland Security: Washington, DC 20528: 

November 30, 2011: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office: 441 G Street NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-12-71, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Action Needed 
to Address NNSA's Program Management and Coordination Challenges" 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) work in planning and 
conducting its review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note GAO's positive recognition of the 
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's (DNDO) role in helping to 
reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation to United States and 
international security. Although the report does not contain any 
recommendations specifically directed at DES, the Department remains 
committed to continuing its work with interagency partners. The 
following paragraphs provide additional insight into our work as it 
relates to this particular audit. 

The advancement of international capabilities in nuclear forensics is 
a priority for the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical 
Working Group to support the prevention of illicit nuclear trafficking 
and nuclear terrorism. DNDO, along with U.S. Government (USG) 
partners, is working through these and other forums to advance 
international collaboration in nuclear forensics and improve the 
ability of governments to identify the nature and source of 
interdicted or seized nuclear and radiological materials and weapons. 
DNDO performs a major role in several key initiatives. Specifically, 
DNDO: 

* Works with its interagency partners (e.g., U.S. Department of 
Energy, U.S. Department of State, etc.) and the IAEA on efforts to 
develop national nuclear forensics libraries. The purpose of national 
libraries, which contain information regarding the holdings of nuclear 
and radioactive materials within a country, is to enable states to 
credibly assess whether nuclear or radioactive material encountered 
outside of regulatory control originated domestically or somewhere 
else. The design and development of these libraries will provide a 
framework for fostering cooperation between governments investigating 
illicit uses of nuclear or radioactive material, a top USG priority. 

* Works with the IAEA on the revision of its Nuclear Security Series 
No. 2, Nuclear Forensics Support, which provides technical information 
and guidance on nuclear forensics response. This effort includes the 
drafting of a "Definitions" or glossary section that will aid in the 
development of a community-authored international nuclear forensics 
lexicon, another identified priority of the Nuclear Security Summit 
and the GICNT, which will help enhance communication and understanding 
among international partners. 

* Assists the IAEA and USG partners with a number of international 
technical nuclear forensics training activities, such as the regional 
workshop, "Radiological Crime Scene Management and an Introduction to 
Nuclear Forensics." 

* Participates in GICNT Nuclear Forensics Working Group activities, 
which have recently included assisting in the development and 
execution of an international nuclear forensics tabletop exercise and 
drafting a Nuclear Forensics Fundamentals for Policymakers document. 

* Performed an integral role in the most recent Round Robin exercise 
of the ITWG, in which more than 30 countries participate. DNDO 
supported the planning, execution, and evaluation of this laboratory 
analysis exercise, the latest in a series of unique exercises that 
improve international cooperation and communication in a nuclear 
material security incident. 

In December 2010, the Department submitted a strategic plan for the 
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). The GNDA Strategic Plan 
is a jointly developed, interagency product of the U.S. Departments of 
Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, and State: the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence: and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. The plan identifies high-level goals for the GNDA and 
objectives and performance goals for the USG in support of the GNDA. 
In addition, it identifies agencies or departments that lead or 
support each performance goal and includes language to describe the 
roles and responsibilities of each participating department. The 
completion of the first-ever GNDA Strategic Plan represents successful 
cooperation and coordination among the interagency to create a 
document that will guide multiple USG efforts to fulfill the 
objectives and goals set forth in the plan. 

In June 2011, the Department submitted the report on the GNDA Joint 
Annual Interagency Review 2011. which was also a jointly developed, 
interagency product by the same partners as for the strategic plan. 
This report fulfilled a requirement of the Implementing 
Recommendations of the WI I Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). The 
2011 report includes information about the multiple USG programs that 
collectively seek to prevent nuclear or radiological terrorism against 
the United States by means of detection, analysis, and reporting on 
nuclear or radiological materials out of regulatory control. In 
support of previous reviews, DNDO has issued data calls to agencies 
performing GNDA functions; the data call for this report was augmented 
to reflect the recently completed strategic plan, collecting 
information about support for the performance goals. The report 
represented an important step forward in the understanding of the 
GNDA, with new details about agency activities in support of the GNDA, 
graphical representations of the assets and capabilities, and a set of 
recommendations for future activities. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. General and technical comments were provided under 
separate cover. We look forward to working with you on future Homeland 
Security issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix X: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Department of Energy: 
National Nuclear Security Administration: Washington, DC 20585: 

November 29, 2011: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director: 
National Resources and Environment: Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the 
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 
draft report, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Action Needed to Address NNSA 
's Program Management and Coordination Challenges, GA0-12-71. I 
understand that GAO was asked to assess: (1) the extent of annual 
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) uncosted, or unexpended, 
balances; (2) the level of financial support from foreign donor and 
recipient governments to the DNN programs; (3) the effectiveness of 
DNN program performance measures; and (4) the effectiveness of 
strategies for coordinating DNN and other agency nonproliferation 
programs. 

Congress has recognized the unique nature of the DNN program in 
legislation, Section 3121 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for 2004 (50 U.S.C. § 2454). This legislation requires semi-annual 
financial commitment reporting on the DNN program because of this 
unique nature. This should continue to be the basis for measuring DNN 
financial performance. 

Overall, NNSA is concerned with the way that the draft GAO report is 
written, as we believe it distorts the facts, and reinforces 
misperceptions about DNN's financial, procurement, and performance 
management. DNN's approach, though unique, is sound. The report's 
factual inaccuracies begin in the Highlights page and are carried 
through the rest of the document. The GAO's approach is sure to 
prejudice the reader and leave the false impressions that DNN has 
unused funds and does not make effective program management a 
priority. Below are comments to clarify points in the draft report. 

Uncosted/Uncommitted Carryover: The Department of Energy (DOE) 
threshold for DNN programs applies to uncosted/uncommitted balances 
only, and not uncosted balances as the GAO indicates. Contrary to the 
GAO contention on the Highlights page, DNN programs have not exceeded 
their thresholds by hundreds of millions of dollars. In fact, for 
every year of the study, DNN uncosted/uncommitted carryover was 
hundreds of millions of dollars below the DOE carryover threshold 
percentage (13%) — a fact that this report buries on page 16. Further, 
the statement "However, much of the annual uncosted DNN-wide funding 
balances were committed for future expenditures" clearly understates 
DNN's fiscally prudent approach and achievement. The amounts committed 
to contracts that include work in future fiscal years by DNN each year 
represent over 80 percent of GAO's claimed uncosted balances, making 
the actual amount of funding unused at the end of the year a small 
fraction of the $1.5 billion cited by GAO. DOE aligns DNN thresholds 
to uncosted/uncommitted funds because DNN intentionally withholds 
payments on many foreign security and proliferation projects until 
work is complete and verified as acceptable. Because contracts can 
only be signed if the full value of the contract is available to be 
committed, and complex technical work often spans more than a single 
fiscal year, funds must be legally committed on contracts up front, 
but may not be fully costed until some future fiscal year after the 
final deliverable is evaluated and accepted. This practice ensures 
U.S. tax dollars are expended only after DNN can verify the work is 
complete to our standards. This is why, as GAO indicates, NNSA 
provides semiannual reports to Congress on uncommitted balances. This 
is the only way to accurately present funds that are unused at the end 
of a fiscal year. Lastly, the GAO's contention that these 
uncosted/uncommitted carryover funds should be considered "available 
to reduce future NNSA budget requests" is untrue and has dangerous 
implications in the current budget environment; amounts committed to 
signed contracts must be retained to fulfill the terms of the 
contract. Their rescission would create significant program delays 
making it impossible to meet Presidential commitments, as well as 
result in possible contract-related penalties. 

Tracking Cost-Sharing Data: The GAO asserts that "NNSA does not 
systematically track and maintain (cost sharing) data," but neglects 
to mention the inherent difficulties associated with assessing levels 
of cost-sharing with foreign partners at sensitive sites. It is not 
reasonable for the GAO to expect DNN to audit another country's books 
in the case of cost-sharing. Foreign counterparts such as Russia 
consider material security funding classified and IMPC does not have 
the legal ability to audit foreign recipients of upgrade assistance. 
IMPC teams can make general assessments of Russian contributions to 
security upgrades by validating their contributions during site 
visits, but estimates of funding contributions are complicated due to 
uncertainties associated with Russian labor rates, labor hours, 
material costs, overhead rates, etc. There may be some cases where 
estimates can be made on the basis of cost avoidance, i.e. the amount 
that the United States would have had to bear had it funded the full 
project. However, when DNN asked GAO if that or other methodologies 
might be used as a satisfactory way to calculate foreign 
contributions, GAO responded that it could not provide any 
prescriptive advice on how to approach the issue. 

Performance Measures: The GAO states that some DNN program performance 
metrics are not effective measures, some DNN results appear to be 
overstated, and because DNN changed performance measures from year to 
year, it is difficult to evaluate progress over time. Specifically, 
the GAO stated that Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 
(MPC&A) performance metrics are unclear and potentially misleading 
because they do not include information about quantities of material 
being secured by the program. They also note that DNN does not adjust 
the total numbers of buildings complete each time new upgrade work is 
initiated. DNN does not track amounts of material secured because 
estimates of inventories are highly uncertain and specifics are 
considered sensitive or classified. If our foreign counterparts were 
willing to declassify this information and provide it to us, we could 
track it as a metric. Further, too much emphasis on material quantity 
can be misleading, since buildings containing 100 kg of weapons usable 
nuclear material can present as great or greater vulnerabilities than 
buildings containing larger amounts of material, depending on many 
other vulnerability indicators. As the GAO indicates, DNN does not 
"reclassify" buildings previously deemed "complete" if a new upgrade 
project is initiated. The buildings complete metric baseline was 
established at a given point in time and represents the suite of 
upgrades planned for execution at that time. If DNN were to re- 
baseline the metric each time a new upgrade project was agreed to 
(such as smaller insider-related projects now receiving increased 
attention), the metric baseline would change so frequently as to make 
it unusable, creating the incorrect impression that the program was 
regressing, instead of reflecting additional progress being made on 
insider threats. DNN is working to establish a new metric to capture 
project-level MPC&A upgrade progress to capture new, smaller projects 
and provide even more resolution on performance at foreign facilities. 

The GAO report implies that the Global Threat Reduction Initiative had 
an ulterior motive for changing its reactor conversion measure. We 
would have preferred for the GAO to point out this change, as this is 
a good example of clarifying a measure without changing its historical 
reference point. The explanation that GTRI provided to the GAO never 
made it into the report. The GAO noted that GTRI's description of its 
HEU conversion performance measure changed over time to include the 
phrase "or shutdown" starting in FY 2009. To clarify, HEU minimization 
can be accomplished two ways: (1) converting cores from HEU to LEU; 
and (2) shutting down reactors prior to conversion. Through FY 2008, 
GTRI had converted 57 reactors and verified the shutdown of an 
additional 5 for a total of 62 converted or verified as shutdown. 
Starting around the President's Prague speech, GTRI began more 
aggressively to encourage regulators to consider shutting down 
underutilized reactors in order to accelerate threat reduction efforts 
and reduce costs since shutdowns are more cost effective than 
conversions. If a host nation decides to shut the reactor down. GIRT 
can provide limited support in this process. Since the start of FY 
2009, GTRI has converted 5 reactors and verified the shutdown of an 
additional 9 for a cumulative total of 76 reactors converted or 
verified as shutdown. Therefore, GTRI clarified this growing success 
with the additional "or shutdown" text the measure. 

The GAO incorrectly claims that the Next Generation Safeguards 
Initiative (NGSI) performance measure is not sufficiently balanced. 
Part of the problem is that the GAO did not include the full text of 
the measure, leaving out the word "deployed" as it relates to 
safeguards technologies. NGSI has five sub-programs that work in 
concert to achieve its goals. The NGSI metric captures this synergy 
measuring and demonstrating how NGSI's technology development, 
international engagement, and human capital development subprograms 
work together to develop technologies either for or cooperatively with 
partners that address a specific safeguards deficiency. These three 
areas provide the core technology, international engagement and 
facility access, and human capital necessary to ensure that safeguards 
systems are deployed in an effective manner. As the report indicates, 
DNN programs are allowed only a limited number of representative 
published performance metrics by OMB. This particular measure is an 
attempt to measure performance across the NGSI sub-programs. 

Lastly, the GAO criticized the lack of a commercialization results 
metric for Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP). 
GIPP has worked with the United States Industry Coalition (USIC) to 
improve the collection of commercialization data. GIPP also has 
improved collection of other data including the number of WMD experts 
engaged. DNN programs are granted a limited number of representative 
"published" performance metrics. As a result of the referenced GAO 
report, an OMB streamlining exercise, and the 2010 Reassessment 
reported to Congress, it was determined that commercialization is no 
longer a leading program metric; it is a secondary benefit of the 
program as it is not the main nonproliferation objective of the 
program. Therefore, there is no "published" commercialization metric. 
We continue to collect the data for internal purposes. In addition to 
the comments above, we offer the enclosed specific comments to the 
draft report. 

If you have any questions related to this response, please contact 
Dean Childs, Director, Office of Management Controls and Assurance at 
301-903-1341. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Kenneth W. Powers: 
Associate Administrator for Management and Budget: 

cc: Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

[End of section] 

Appendix: XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Glen Levis (Assistant 
Director), Bridget Grimes, William Hoehn, William King, and Kevin 
Remondini made key contributions to this report. Other technical 
assistance was provided by Allison Bawden, Antoinette Capaccio, 
Rebecca Shea, Ben Shouse, and Kiki Theodoropoulos. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Weapon-usable nuclear materials are highly enriched uranium, 
uranium-233, and any plutonium containing less than 80 percent of the 
isotope plutonium-238. Such materials are also often referred to as 
fissile materials or strategic special nuclear materials. 

[2] NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999). It is a separate 
semiautonomous agency within DOE, with responsibility for the nation's 
nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. 

[3] Radiological sources include radioactive material, such as cobalt- 
60, cesium-137, and strontium-90. While these materials cannot be used 
to create a nuclear weapon, they could be fabricated into a so-called 
dirty bomb or device to disperse radioactive materials. 

[4] IAEA is an independent international organization based in Vienna, 
Austria, that is affiliated with the United Nations and has the dual 
mission of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verifying 
that nuclear technologies and materials intended for peaceful purposes 
are not diverted to weapons development efforts. Safeguards allow IAEA 
to independently verify that nuclear material and other specified 
items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses by, among other 
things, inspecting all facilities and locations containing nuclear 
material declared by countries to verify its peaceful use. For more 
information, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened 
Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to 
Be Addressed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-93] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005). 

[5] An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal 
liability of the government for the payment of goods and services 
ordered or received, or a legal duty on the part of the United States 
that could mature into a legal liability by virtue of actions on the 
part of the other party beyond the control of the United States. 

[6] For more information on DOE's no-year funding, see GAO, DOE's No- 
Year Funding, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-95-91R] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 1995). 

[7] The terms "costed" and "expended" are often used interchangeably 
by NNSA and used interchangeably in instances in this report, but 
there are minor technical differences between them. Specifically, DNN 
funds are costed after the invoice for work has been received, the 
work has been completed to government satisfaction, and the invoice is 
approved for payment. Expenditures, or outlays, refer to when an 
obligation is actually liquidated through issuance of a check, 
electronic transfer of funds, or disbursement of cash. 

[8] The NNSA definition of a commitment is the outstanding contractor 
encumbrances by the M&O contractors--such as the national laboratories-
-plus the full amount of uncosted obligations for direct contracts 
awarded to non-M&O contractors. The "outstanding contractor 
encumbrances" include the uncosted balances under contracts awarded by 
the M&O contractor and can consist of, among other things, uncosted 
balances on contracts or subcontracts awarded or purchase orders 
issued by the M&O contractor. 

[9] For more information on DOE's funding process and carryover 
balances, see GAO, DOE Management: DOE Needs to Improve Its Analysis 
of Carryover Balances, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-96-57] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
12, 1996). 

[10] In September 2010, we issued a classified report to you on the 
results of our work on U.S. efforts to secure nuclear materials 
worldwide, and issued an unclassified version of that report in 
December 2010. See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. 
Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable 
Nuclear Materials Worldwide, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-227] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 
2010). 

[11] For example, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to 
Address Uncertainties with and Strengthen Independent Safety Oversight 
of Its Plutonium Disposition Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-378] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 
2010); Nuclear Nonproliferation: National Nuclear Security 
Administration Has Improved the Security of Reactors in its Global 
Research Reactor Program, but Action Is Needed to Address Remaining 
Concerns, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-949] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009); Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's 
Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries 
Needs to Be Reassessed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-
189] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2007); and Nuclear Nonproliferation: 
Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the 
Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is 
Uncertain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-404] 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007). 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-96-57]. 

[13] For instance, in our 1996 report, we identified almost $500 
million in uncosted obligations over 3 prior years that were 
classified as necessary to meet the requirements of DOE's programs 
when they should have been categorized as available to reduce DOE's 
budget request. 

[14] For example, in fiscal year 2010, the International Nuclear 
Materials Protection and Cooperation program threshold was 14 percent, 
while the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program 
threshold was 17 percent. 

[15] 42 U.S.C. § 13526 (2006). 

[16] 50 U.S.C. § 2454 (2006). 

[17] The United States can receive donations without any particular 
statutory authority. An agency, however, must have statutory authority 
to receive and use those donations. 

[18] The law providing the authorization refers specifically to the 
"Russian plutonium disposition program"; however, in NNSA budget 
documents this program is generally formally identified as the Russian 
Surplus Materials or the Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition 
program. In this report, we use the program names interchangeably. 

[19] DTRA is DOD's official combat support agency for countering 
weapons of mass destruction. 

[20] The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation was 
formed as a result of a 2005 State reorganization that combined 
nonproliferation and arms control issues under one bureau. For more 
information on this reorganization, see GAO, State Department: Key 
Transformation Practices Could Have Helped in Restructuring Arms 
Control and Nonproliferation Bureaus, GAO-09-738 (Washington, D.C.: 
July 15, 2009). 

[21] For information on DNDO, see GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: 
DHS Improved Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, 
but Preliminary Results Show Limits of the New Technology, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-655] (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 
2009); and Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should 
Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 29, 2009). 

[22] For information on the global nuclear detection architecture, see 
GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not 
Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection 
Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-883T] (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2010); and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic 
Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-869T] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 26, 2011). 

[23] For further information on the Container Security Initiative and 
the Secure Freight Initiative, see GAO, Supply Chain Security: CBP 
Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security 
Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-538] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 
2008); and Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing 
the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-12] (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 30, 2009). 

[24] Two prior foreign contributions, outside the time frame of our 
review, were made in fiscal year 2005--contributions of $7.3 million 
by Canada and $5.5 million by the United Kingdom to the EWGPP program. 

[25] Under the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons 
and Materials of Mass Destruction, which was announced by the G-8 
nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) at their 2002 summit, the G-8 member 
countries agreed to raise $20 billion over 10 years for 
nonproliferation-related assistance. The United States agreed to 
provide $10 billion, or half of the total funding. 

[26] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and 
Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear 
Materials Worldwide, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-227] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 
2010). 

[27] The GTRI program determination of high-income and non-high-income 
countries is based on World Bank categories. 

[28] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 
1996). 

[29] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax 
Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 
2002). 

[30] NNSA conducts MPC&A security upgrades in two phases: Rapid 
upgrades include improvements such as bricking up windows where 
material is stored; installing strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear 
container seals; and establishing controlled access areas. 
Comprehensive upgrades include electronic systems to detect intruders, 
central alarm stations, and computerized nuclear material accounting 
systems. 

[31] Downblending is the process of converting HEU to low-enriched 
uranium by mixing it with other forms of uranium, such as natural or 
depleted uranium, to dilute and reduce the enrichment level of 
uranium- 235 thereby rendering the material less suitable for weapons 
purposes. 

[32] See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE's Efforts to 
Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-99-54] (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 19, 1999). 

[33] See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist 
Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be 
Reassessed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-189] 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2007). 

[34] In 2002, the IPP program and another similar DOE nonproliferation 
program, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, were placed under a common 
management organization within DOE and designated the Russian 
Transition Initiatives program. In 2006, the Russian Transition 
Initiatives program was renamed the Global Initiatives for 
Proliferation Prevention and adopted the mission of addressing the 
proliferation of WMD expertise globally. 

[35] See GAO, Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National 
Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy and a Designated 
Leader, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-645] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010); and Combating Terrorism: Selected 
Challenges and Related Recommendations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-822] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 
2001). 

[36] In prior reports on nonproliferation, we have used the term 
overarching strategic plan to describe a national strategy for 
nonproliferation efforts governmentwide. For purposes of this report, 
we use the term national strategy to include strategic plans. 

[37] See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected 
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

[38] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but 
Not Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection 
Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-883T] (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2010). 

[39] In addition, DNDO produces in cooperation with other members of 
the interagency a "Joint Annual Interagency Review of the Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture" which is used to provide information 
on the current objectives and status of multiple U.S. programs seeking 
to prevent nuclear or radiological terrorism against the United States 
by means of detection, analysis, and reporting on nuclear and 
radiological materials which the agencies have determined as being 
outside of regulatory control. 

[40] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Developed a Strategic 
Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-869T] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 26, 2011). 

[41] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other 
Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and 
Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-426] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002). 

[42] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and 
Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation 
Detection Equipment to Other Countries, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-311] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 
2006). 

[43] According to NNSA, CBSP is no longer an independent program, and 
its functions were merged into the International Nonproliferation 
Export Control Program in June 2010. 

[44] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need 
Better Integration, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-157] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 
2005). 

[45] In this report, and as we have done in previous reports, we use 
the term fragmentation to refer to those circumstances in which more 
than one federal agency, or more than one organization within an 
agency, is involved in the same broad area of national need. We use 
the term overlap to refer to circumstances when multiple agencies and 
programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or 
strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries. The 
presence of overlap can suggest the need to look closer at the 
potential for unnecessary duplication. However, our review did not go 
to sufficient depth to determine whether and to what extent the 
programs are actually duplicative, which occurs when two or more 
agencies or programs are engaged in identical activities or provide 
the same services to the same beneficiaries. For more information on 
fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in federal programs, see GAO, 
Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, 
Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 
2011); and Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address 
Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-97-146] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
29, 1997). 

[46] Prior to fiscal year 2011, this CTR program activity was referred 
to as the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention 
Initiative, or WMD-PPI. 

[47] Dual-use refers to equipment or technology that can contribute 
both to nuclear energy and other peaceful nuclear applications or 
nuclear weapons development or production. 

[48] See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 
Recommendations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-822] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001); and Biosurveillance: Efforts to 
Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy 
and Designated Leader, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-
645] (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010). 

[49] National Security Presidential Directive-43/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-14. 

[50] The IPCs were called Policy Coordination Committees, or PCCs, 
during the George W. Bush administration, and Interagency Working 
Groups during the Clinton administration. 

[51] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 
1996). 

[52] The four characteristics are overarching, thus there is not 
necessarily a direct link between any one attribute and any one 
characteristic. 

[53] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax 
Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 
2002). 

[54] NNSA conducts MPC&A security upgrades in two phases: Rapid 
upgrades include improvements such as bricking up windows where 
material is stored; installing strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear 
container seals; and establishing controlled access areas. 
Comprehensive upgrades include electronic systems to detect intruders, 
central alarm stations, and computerized nuclear material accounting 
systems. 

[55] See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving 
Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of 
U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-404] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 
2007). 

[56] Downblending is the process of converting HEU to LEU by mixing it 
with other forms of uranium, such as natural or depleted uranium, to 
dilute and reduce the enrichment level of uranium-235 thereby 
rendering the material less suitable for weapons purposes. 

[57] At the national level in Russia, NNSA is working to enhance 
infrastructure to sustain MPC&A systems for nuclear materials in 10 
ongoing project areas, including enhancement of Russian nuclear 
security culture, developing Russian regulations for MPC&A operations, 
and strengthening Russian inspection and oversight capabilities. NNSA 
is also working to develop MPC&A sustainability practices and 
procedures at individual Russian nuclear material sites in seven 
sustainability areas, such as developing an effective MPC&A management 
structure at the site that plans, implements, tests, and evaluates the 
site's MPC&A systems. 

[58] In 1993, the United States and Russia signed a government-to- 
government agreement to downblend 500 metric tons of HEU from Russian 
nuclear warheads into LEU used to fabricate fuel for commercial 
nuclear power plants. Under the agreement, the HEU would be converted 
in Russia and purchased by the United States. The United States 
Enrichment Corporation serves as U.S. executive agent. NNSA implements 
transparency measures under the agreement to, among other things, 
monitor Russian HEU downblending. 

[End of section] 

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