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United States Government Accountability Office: 


Before the Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency and 
Financial Management, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
House of Representatives: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Friday, September 23, 2011: 

DOD Financial Management: 

Improved Controls, Processes, and Systems Are Needed for Accurate and 
Reliable Financial Information: 

Statement of Asif A. Khan, Director: 
Financial Management and Assurance: 


GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-933T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Government Organization, Efficiency and Financial Management, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

As one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) faces many challenges in resolving serious 
problems in its financial management and related business operations 
and systems. DOD is required by various statutes to (1) improve its 
financial management processes, controls, and systems to ensure that 
complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information is prepared and 
responsive to the financial information needs of agency management and 
oversight bodies, and (2) to produce audited financial statements. 
Over the years, DOD has initiated numerous efforts to improve the 
department’s financial management operations and to try to achieve an 
unqualified (clean) opinion on the reliability of its reported 
financial information. These efforts have fallen short of sustained 
improvement in financial management or financial statement 

The Subcommittee has asked GAO to provide its perspective on the 
status of DOD’s financial management weaknesses and its efforts to 
resolve them. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD financial management has been on GAO’s high-risk list since 1995 
and, despite several reform initiatives, remains on the list today. 
Pervasive deficiencies in financial management processes, systems, and 
controls, and the resulting lack of data reliability, continue to 
impair management’s ability to assess the resources needed for DOD 
operations; track and control costs; ensure basic accountability; 
anticipate future costs; measure performance; maintain funds control; 
and reduce the risk of loss from fraud, waste, and abuse. DOD spends 
billions of dollars each year to maintain key business operations 
intended to support the warfighter, including systems and processes 
related to the management of contracts, finances, the supply chain, 
support infrastructure, and weapon systems acquisition. These 
operations are directly impacted by the problems in financial 
management. In addition, the long-standing financial management 
weaknesses have precluded DOD from being able to undergo the scrutiny 
of a financial statement audit. 

DOD’s past strategies for improving its financial management were 
ineffective, but recent initiatives are encouraging. In 2005, DOD 
issued its Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan for 
improving financial management and reporting. In 2009, the DOD 
Comptroller directed that FIAR efforts focus on financial information 
in two priority areas: budget and mission-critical assets. The FIAR 
Plan also has a new phased approach that comprises five waves of 
concerted improvement activities. The first three waves focus on the 
two priority areas, and the last two on working toward full 
auditability. The plan is being implemented largely through the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force military departments and the Defense Logistics 
Agency, lending increased importance to the commitment of component 

Improving the department’s financial management operations and thereby 
providing DOD management and Congress more accurate and reliable 
information on the results of its business operations will not be an 
easy task. It is critical that current initiatives related to 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial management 
have the support of DOD leaders and that of DOD’s Deputy Chief 
Management Officer and Comptroller continue with sustained leadership 
and monitoring. 

Absent continued momentum and necessary future investments, current 
initiatives may falter. Below are some of the key challenges that DOD 
must address for its financial management to improve to the point 
where DOD is able to produce auditable financial statements: 

* committed and sustained leadership,
* effective plan to correct internal control weaknesses,
* competent financial management workforce,
* accountability and effective oversight,
* well-defined enterprise architecture, and. 
* successful implementation of the enterprise resource planning 

View [hyperlink,]. For more 
information, contact Asif A. Khan at (202) 512-9869 or 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the status of the 
Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to improve its financial 
management operations and achieve audit readiness. At the outset, I 
would like to thank the Subcommittee for holding this hearing and to 
acknowledge the important role of such hearings in the oversight of 
DOD's financial management efforts. 

DOD is one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world. 
For fiscal year 2012, the budget requested for the department was 
approximately $671 billion--$553 billion in discretionary budget 
authority and $118 billion to support overseas contingency operations. 
The fiscal year 2012 budget request also noted that DOD employed over 
3 million military and civilian personnel--including active and 
reserve service members. DOD operations span a wide range of defense 
organizations, including the military departments and their respective 
major commands and functional activities, large defense agencies and 
field activities, and various combatant and joint operational commands 
that are responsible for military operations for specific geographic 
regions or theaters of operation. To execute its operations, the 
department performs interrelated and interdependent business 
functions, including financial management, logistics management, 
health care management, and procurement. To support its business 
functions, DOD has reported that it relies on over 2,200 business 
systems,[Footnote 1] including accounting, acquisition, logistics, and 
personnel systems. 

The department's sheer size and complexity contribute to the many 
challenges DOD faces in resolving its pervasive, complex, and long- 
standing financial management and related business operations and 
systems problems. Numerous initiatives and efforts have been 
undertaken by DOD and its components to improve the department's 
financial management operations and to arrive at a point where the 
reliability of its financial statements and related financial 
management information would be sufficient to pass an audit with 
favorable (clean) audit opinions. To date, DOD has not achieved 
effective financial management capabilities or financial statement 
auditability.[Footnote 2] 

Today, I will discuss the status of DOD's financial management 
weaknesses, its efforts to resolve those weaknesses, and the 
challenges DOD continues to face in its efforts to improve its 
financial management operations. In addition, I will outline the 
status of the department's efforts to implement its Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) systems,[Footnote 3] which represent a 
critical element of the department's Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness (FIAR) strategy. My statement today is based on our prior 
work related to the department's FIAR Plan[Footnote 4] and ERP 
implementation efforts.[Footnote 5] Our work was conducted in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and 
our previously published reports contain additional details on the 
scope and methodology for those reviews. Those standards require that 
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 


The department is facing near and long-term internal fiscal pressures 
as it attempts to balance competing demands to support ongoing 
operations, rebuild readiness following extended military operations, 
and manage increasing personnel and health care costs as well as 
significant cost growth in its weapon systems programs. For more than 
a decade, DOD has dominated GAO's list of federal programs and 
operations at high risk of being vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse. 
[Footnote 6] In fact, all of the DOD programs on GAO's High-Risk List 
relate to business operations, including systems and processes related 
to management of contracts, finances, the supply chain, and support 
infrastructure,[Footnote 7] as well as weapon systems acquisition. 
Long-standing and pervasive weaknesses in DOD's financial management 
and related business processes and systems have (1) resulted in a lack 
of reliable information needed to make sound decisions and report on 
the financial status and cost of DOD activities to Congress and DOD 
decision makers; (2) adversely impacted its operational efficiency and 
mission performance in areas of major weapons system support and 
logistics; and (3) left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and 

Because of the complexity and long-term nature of DOD's transformation 
efforts, GAO has reported the need for a chief management officer 
(CMO) position and a comprehensive, enterprisewide business 
transformation plan. In May 2007, DOD designated the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense as the CMO. In addition, the National Defense Authorization 
Acts for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 contained provisions that codified 
the CMO and Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) positions, required 
DOD to develop a strategic management plan, and required the 
Secretaries of the military departments to designate their 
Undersecretaries as CMOs and to develop business transformation plans. 

Overview of DOD's Accounting and Finance Activities: 

DOD financial managers are responsible for the functions of budgeting, 
financing, accounting for transactions and events, and reporting of 
financial and budgetary information. To maintain accountability over 
the use of public funds, DOD must carry out financial management 
functions such as recording, tracking, and reporting its budgeted 
spending, actual spending, and the value of its assets and 
liabilities. DOD relies on a complex network of organizations and 
personnel to execute these functions. Also, its financial managers 
must work closely with other departmental personnel to ensure that 
transactions and events with financial consequences, such as awarding 
and administering contracts, managing military and civilian personnel, 
and authorizing employee travel, are properly monitored, controlled, 
and reported, in part, to ensure that DOD does not violate spending 
limitations established by statute or other legal provisions regarding 
the use of funds. 

Before fiscal year 1991, the military services and defense agencies 
independently managed their finance and accounting operations. 
According to DOD, these decentralized operations were highly 
inefficient and failed to produce reliable information. On November 
26, 1990, DOD created the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS) as its accounting agency to consolidate, standardize, and 
integrate finance and accounting requirements, functions, procedures, 
operations, and systems. The military services and defense agencies 
pay for finance and accounting services provided by DFAS using their 
operations and maintenance appropriations. The military services 
continue to perform certain finance and accounting activities at each 
military installation. These activities vary by military service 
depending on what the services wanted to maintain in-house and the 
number of personnel they were willing to transfer to DFAS. As DOD's 
accounting agency, DFAS records these transactions in the accounting 
records, prepares thousands of reports used by managers throughout DOD 
and by the Congress, and prepares DOD-wide and service-specific 
financial statements. The military services play a vital role in that 
they authorize the expenditure of funds and are the source of most of 
the financial information that allows DFAS to make payroll and 
contractor payments. The military services also have responsibility 
over most of DOD's assets and the related information needed by DFAS 
to prepare annual financial statements required under the Chief 
Financial Officers Act.[Footnote 8] 

DOD accounting personnel are responsible for accounting for funds 
received through congressional appropriations, the sale of goods and 
services by working capital fund businesses, revenue generated through 
nonappropriated fund activities, and the sales of military systems and 
equipment to foreign governments or international organizations. DOD's 
finance activities generally involve paying the salaries of its 
employees, paying retirees and annuitants, reimbursing its employees 
for travel-related expenses, paying contractors and vendors for goods 
and services, and collecting debts owed to DOD. DOD defines its 
accounting activities to include accumulating and recording operating 
and capital expenses as well as appropriations, revenues, and other 
receipts. According to DOD's fiscal year 2012 budget request, in 
fiscal year 2010 DFAS: 

* processed approximately 198 million payment-related transactions and 
disbursed over $578 billion; 

* accounted for 1,129 active DOD appropriation accounts; and: 

* processed more that 11 million commercial invoices. 

Pervasive Financial Management Problems Continue to Affect the 
Efficiency and Effectiveness of DOD Operations: 

DOD financial management was designated as a high-risk area by GAO in 
1995. Pervasive deficiencies in financial management processes, 
systems, and controls, and the resulting lack of data reliability, 
continue to impair management's ability to assess the resources needed 
for DOD operations; track and control costs; ensure basic 
accountability; anticipate future costs; measure performance; maintain 
funds control; and reduce the risk of loss from fraud, waste, and 

Other business operations, including the high-risk areas of contract 
management, supply chain management, support infrastructure 
management, and weapon systems acquisition are directly impacted by 
the problems in financial management. We have reported that continuing 
weaknesses in these business operations result in billions of dollars 
of wasted resources, reduced efficiency, ineffective performance, and 
inadequate accountability. Examples of the pervasive weaknesses in the 
department's business operations are highlighted below. 

* DOD invests billions of dollars to acquire weapon systems, but it 
lacks the financial management processes and capabilities it needs to 
track and report on the cost of weapon systems in a reliable manner. 
We reported on this issue over 20 years ago,[Footnote 9] but the 
problems continue to persist. In July 2010, we reported[Footnote 10] 
that although DOD and the military departments have efforts underway 
to begin addressing these financial management weaknesses, problems 
continue to exist and remediation and improvement efforts would 
require the support of other business areas beyond the financial 
community before they could be fully addressed. 

* DOD also requests billions of dollars each year to maintain its 
weapon systems, but it has limited ability to identify, aggregate, and 
use financial management information for managing and controlling 
operating and support costs. Operating and support costs can account 
for a significant portion of a weapon system's total life-cycle costs, 
including costs for repair parts, maintenance, and contract services. 
In July 2010, we reported[Footnote 11] that the department lacked key 
information needed to manage and reduce operating and support costs 
for most of the weapon systems we reviewed[Footnote 12]--including 
cost estimates and historical data on actual operating and support 
costs. For acquiring and maintaining weapon systems, the lack of 
complete and reliable financial information hampers DOD officials in 
analyzing the rate of cost growth, identifying cost drivers, and 
developing plans for managing and controlling these costs. Without 
timely, reliable, and useful financial information on cost, DOD 
management lacks information needed to accurately report on 
acquisition costs, allocate resources to programs, or evaluate program 

* In June 2010, we reported[Footnote 13] that the Army Budget Office 
lacked an adequate funds control process to provide it with ongoing 
assurance that obligations and expenditures do not exceed funds 
available in the Military Personnel-Army (MPA) appropriation. We found 
that an obligation of $200 million in excess of available funds in the 
Army's military personnel account violated the Antideficiency Act. The 
overobligation likely stemmed, in part, from lack of communication 
between Army Budget and program managers so that Army Budget's 
accounting records reflected estimates instead of actual amounts until 
it was too late to control the incurrence of excessive obligations in 
violation of the act. Thus, at any given time in the fiscal year, Army 
Budget did not know the actual obligation and expenditure levels of 
the account. Army Budget explained that it relies on estimated 
obligations--despite the availability of actual data from program 
managers--because of inadequate financial management systems. The lack 
of adequate process and system controls to maintain effective funds 
control impacted the Army's ability to prevent, identify, correct, and 
report potential violations of the Antideficiency Act. 

* In our February 2011 report[Footnote 14] on the Defense Centers of 
Excellence (DCOE), we found that DOD's TRICARE Management Activity 
(TMA) had misclassified $102.7 million of the nearly $112 million in 
DCOE advisory and assistance contract obligations. The proper 
classification and recording of costs are basic financial management 
functions that are also key in analyzing areas for potential future 

Without adequate financial management processes, systems, and 
controls, DOD components are at risk of reporting inaccurate, 
inconsistent, and unreliable data for financial reporting and 
management decision making and potentially exceeding authorized 
spending limits. The lack of effective internal controls hinders 
management's ability to have reasonable assurance that their allocated 
resources are used effectively, properly, and in compliance with 
budget and appropriations law. 

DOD's Past Strategies for Improving Financial Management Were 
Ineffective but Recent Initiatives are Encouraging: 

Over the years, DOD has initiated several broad-based reform efforts 
to address its long-standing financial management weaknesses. However, 
as we have reported, those efforts did not achieve their intended 
purpose of improving the department's financial management operations. 
In 2005, the DOD Comptroller established the DOD FIAR Directorate to 
develop, manage, and implement a strategic approach for addressing the 
department's financial management weaknesses and for achieving 
auditability, and to integrate those efforts with other improvement 
activities, such as the department's business system modernization 
efforts. In May 2009,[Footnote 15] we identified several concerns with 
the adequacy of the FIAR Plan as a strategic and management tool to 
resolve DOD's financial management difficulties and thereby position 
the department to be able to produce auditable financial statements. 

Overall, since the issuance of the first FIAR Plan in December 2005, 
improvement efforts have not resulted in the fundamental 
transformation of operations necessary to resolve the department's 
long-standing financial management deficiencies. However, DOD has made 
significant improvements to the FIAR Plan that, if implemented 
effectively, could result in significant improvement in DOD's 
financial management and progress toward auditability, but progress in 
taking corrective actions and resolving deficiencies remains slow. 
While none of the military services has obtained an unqualified 
(clean) audit opinion, some DOD organizations, such as the Army Corps 
of Engineers, DFAS, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the DOD 
Office of Inspector General, have achieved this goal. Moreover, some 
DOD components that have not yet received clean audit opinions are 
beginning to reap the benefits of strengthened controls and processes 
gained through ongoing efforts to improve their financial management 
operations and reporting capabilities. Lessons learned from the Marine 
Corps' Statement of Budgetary Resources audit effort can provide a 
roadmap to help other components better stage their audit readiness 
efforts by strengthening their financial management processes to 
increase data reliability as they develop action plans to become audit 

In August 2009, DOD's Comptroller sought to further focus efforts of 
the department and components, in order to achieve certain short-and 
long-term results, by giving priority to improving processes and 
controls that support the financial information most often used to 
manage the department. Accordingly, DOD revised its FIAR strategy and 
methodology to focus on the DOD Comptroller's two priorities--
budgetary information and asset accountability. The first priority is 
to strengthen processes, controls, and systems that produce DOD's 
budgetary information and the department's Statements of Budgetary 
Resources. The second priority is to improve the accuracy and 
reliability of management information pertaining to the department's 
mission-critical assets, including military equipment, real property, 
and general equipment, and validating improvement through existence 
and completeness testing. The DOD Comptroller directed the DOD 
components participating in the FIAR Plan--the departments of the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency--to 
use a standard process and aggressively modify their activities to 
support and emphasize achievement of the priorities. 

GAO supports DOD's current approach of focusing and prioritizing 
efforts in order to achieve incremental progress in addressing 
weaknesses and making progress toward audit readiness. Budgetary and 
asset information is widely used by DOD managers at all levels, so its 
reliability is vital to daily operations and management. DOD needs to 
provide accountability over the existence and completeness of its 
assets. Problems with asset accountability can further complicate 
critical functions, such as planning for the current troop withdrawals. 

In May 2010, DOD introduced a new phased approach that divides 
progress toward achieving financial statement auditability into five 
waves (or phases) of concerted improvement activities (see appendix 
I). According to DOD, the components' implementation of the 
methodology described in the 2010 FIAR Plan is essential to the 
success of the department's efforts to ultimately achieve full 
financial statement auditability. To assist the components in their 
efforts, the FIAR Guidance, issued along with the revised plan, 
details the implementation of the methodology with an emphasis on 
internal controls and supporting documentation that recognizes both 
the challenge of resolving the many internal control weaknesses and 
the fundamental importance of establishing effective and efficient 
financial management. The FIAR Guidance provides the process for the 
components to follow, through their individual Financial Improvement 
Plan (FIP), in assessing processes, controls, and systems; identifying 
and correcting weaknesses; assessing, validating, and sustaining 
corrective actions; and achieving full auditability. The guidance 
directs the components to identify responsible organizations and 
personnel and resource requirements for improvement work. In 
developing their plans, components use a standard template that 
comprises data fields aligned to the methodology. The consistent 
application of a standard methodology for assessing the components' 
current financial management capabilities can help establish valid 
baselines against which to measure, sustain, and report progress. 

Numerous Challenges Must Be Addressed In Order For DOD to Successfully 
Reform Financial Management: 

Improving the department's financial management operations and thereby 
providing DOD management and the Congress more accurate and reliable 
information on the results of its business operations will not be an 
easy task. It is critical that the current initiatives being led by 
the DOD DCMO and the DOD Comptroller be continued and provided with 
sufficient resources and ongoing monitoring in the future. Absent 
continued momentum and necessary future investments, the current 
initiatives may falter, similar to previous efforts. Below are some of 
the key challenges that the department must address in order for the 
financial management operations of the department to improve. 

Committed and sustained leadership. The FIAR Plan is in its sixth year 
and continues to evolve based on lessons learned, corrective actions, 
and policy changes that refine and build on the plan. The DOD 
Comptroller has expressed commitment to the FIAR goals, and 
established a focused approach that is intended to help DOD achieve 
successes in the near term. But the financial transformation needed at 
DOD, and its removal from GAO's high-risk list, is a long-term effort. 
Improving financial management will need to be a cross-functional 
endeavor; requiring improvements in some of DOD's other business 
operations such as those in the high-risk areas of contract 
management, supply chain management, support infrastructure 
management, and weapon systems acquisition. As acknowledged by DOD 
officials, sustained and active involvement of the department's CMO, 
the DCMO, the military departments' CMOs, the DOD Comptroller, and 
other senior leaders is critical. Within every administration, there 
are changes at the senior leadership; therefore, it is paramount that 
the current initiative be institutionalized throughout the department--
at all working levels--in order for success to be achieved. 

Effective plan to correct internal control weaknesses. In May 2009, we 
reported[Footnote 16] that the FIAR Plan did not establish a baseline 
of the department's state of internal control and financial management 
weaknesses as its starting point. Such a baseline could be used to 
assess and plan for the necessary improvements and remediation to be 
used to measure incremental progress toward achieving estimated 
milestones for each DOD component and the department. DOD currently 
has efforts underway to address known internal control weaknesses 
through three integrated programs: (1) Internal Controls over 
Financial Reporting (ICOFR) program, (2) ERP implementation, and (3) 
FIAR Plan. However, the effectiveness of these three integrated 
efforts at establishing a baseline remains to be seen. As discussed in 
our recent report,[Footnote 17] the lack of effective internal 
controls, in part, contributed to the DOD Inspector General issuing a 
disclaimer of opinion[Footnote 18] on the Marine Corps' fiscal year 
2010 Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR). The auditors reported 
that ineffective internal control and ineffective controls in key 
financial systems should be addressed to ensure the reliability of 
reported financial information.[Footnote 19] Examples of the problems 
identified include the following: 

* The Marine Corps did not have effective controls in place to support 
estimated obligations, referred to as "bulk obligations," to record a 
payment liability, and, as a result, was not able to reconcile the 
related payment transactions to the estimates. The Marine Corps 
estimates obligations in a bulk amount to record payment liabilities 
where it does not have a mechanism to identify authorizing 
documentation as a basis for recording the obligations. 

* The auditors found ineffective controls over three major information 
technology systems used by the Marine Corps and reported numerous 
problems that required resolution.[Footnote 20] For example, the 
auditors identified a lack of controls over interfaces between systems 
to ensure completeness of the data being transferred. System interface 
controls are critical for ensuring the completeness and accuracy of 
data transferred between systems. 

The report also noted that the Marine Corps did not develop an overall 
corrective action or remediation plan that includes key elements of a 
risk-based plan. Instead, its approach focuses on short-term 
corrective actions based on manually intensive efforts to produce 
reliable financial reporting at year-end. Such efforts may not result 
in sustained improvements over the long term that would help ensure 
that the Marine Corps could routinely produce sound data on a timely 
basis for decision making. We previously reported that using 
principles of risk management helps policymakers make informed 
decisions about best ways to prioritize investments, so that the 
investments target the areas of greatest need.[Footnote 21] However, 
we found that the Marine Corps' SBR Remediation Plan focused on 
individual initiatives to address 70 auditor Notices of Findings and 
Recommendations that included 139 recommendations, without assessing 
risks, prioritizing actions, or ensuring that actions adequately 
responded to recommendations.[Footnote 22] Further, the plan did not 
identify resources, roles and responsibilities, or include performance 
indicators to measure performance against action plan objectives. 
[Footnote 23] 

Given the current efforts, goals, and timeframes for achieving 
auditability of the Marine Corps' Fiscal Year 2011 SBR, the current 
approach is understandably focused on short-term actions. However, 
achieving financial accountability that is sustainable in the long 
term will require reliable financial systems and sound internal 
controls. An effective remediation plan would help ensure that audit 
recommendations are fully addressed to deal with the short-term and 
long-term goals. 

The Marine Corps reported that actions on 88 of the 139 
recommendations, including weaknesses related to accounting and 
financial reporting and information technology systems were fully 
implemented; however, the completeness and effectiveness of most 
Marine Corps' actions have not yet been tested. DOD Inspector General 
auditors told us that tests performed during the Marine Corps' fiscal 
year 2011 SBR audit effort will determine whether and to what extent 
the problems identified during the fiscal year 2010 SBR audit effort 
have been resolved. They also confirmed that as of August 25, 2011, 
the Marine Corps had remediated the problems on 11 of the information 
technology audit recommendations. 

Because of the department's complexity and magnitude, developing and 
implementing a comprehensive plan that identifies DOD's internal 
control weaknesses will not be an easy task. But it is a task that is 
critical to resolving the long-standing weaknesses and will require 
consistent management oversight and monitoring for it to be successful. 

Competent financial management workforce. Effective financial 
management in DOD will require a knowledgeable and skilled workforce 
that includes individuals who are trained and certified in accounting, 
well versed in government accounting practices and standards, and 
experienced in information technology. Hiring and retaining such a 
skilled workforce is a challenge DOD must meet to succeed in its 
transformation to efficient, effective, and accountable business 
operations. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2006[Footnote 24] directed DOD to develop a strategic plan to shape 
and improve the department's civilian workforce. The plan was to, 
among other things; include assessments of (1) existing critical 
skills and competencies in DOD's civilian workforce, (2) future 
critical skills and competencies needed over the next decade, and (3) 
any gaps in the existing or future critical skills and competencies 
identified. In addition, DOD was to submit a plan of action for 
developing and reshaping the civilian employee workforce to address 
any identified gaps, as well as specific recruiting and retention 
goals and strategies on how to train, compensate, and motivate 
civilian employees. In developing the plan, the department identified 
financial management as one of its enterprisewide mission-critical 

In July 2011, we reported[Footnote 25] that DOD's 2009 overall 
civilian workforce plan had addressed some legislative requirements, 
including assessing the critical skills of its existing civilian 
workforce. Although some aspects of the legislative requirements were 
addressed, DOD still has significant work to do. For example, while 
the plan included gap analyses related to the number of personnel 
needed for some of the mission-critical occupations, the department 
had only discussed competency gap analyses for 3 mission-critical 
occupations--language, logistics management, and information 
technology management. A competency gap for financial management was 
not included in the department's analysis. Until DOD analyzes 
personnel needs and gaps in the financial management area, it will not 
be in a position to develop an effective financial management 
recruitment, retention, and investment strategy to successfully 
address its financial management challenges. 

Accountability and effective oversight. The department established a 
governance structure for the FIAR Plan, which includes review bodies 
for governance and oversight. The governance structure is intended to 
provide the vision and oversight necessary to align financial 
improvement and audit readiness efforts across the department. As 
noted in our recent report,[Footnote 26] both DOD and the components 
have established senior executive committees as well as designated 
officials at the appropriate levels to monitor and oversee their 
financial improvement efforts. These committees and individuals have 
also generally been assigned appropriate roles and responsibilities. 
To monitor progress and hold individuals accountable for progress, DOD 
managers and oversight bodies need reliable, valid, meaningful metrics 
to measure performance and the results of corrective actions. In May 
2009, we reported[Footnote 27] that the FIAR Plan did not have clear 
results-oriented metrics. To its credit, DOD has taken action to begin 
defining results-oriented FIAR metrics it intends to use to provide 
visibility of component-level progress in assessment; and testing and 
remediation activities, including progress in identifying and 
addressing supporting documentation issues. We have not yet had an 
opportunity to assess implementation of these metrics--including the 
components' control over the accuracy of supporting data--or their 
usefulness in monitoring and redirecting actions. 

Ensuring effective monitoring and oversight of progress--especially by 
the leadership in the components--will be key to bringing about 
effective implementation, through the components' FIPs. However, as 
noted in our recent report,[Footnote 28] we found that weaknesses in 
the Navy and Air Force FIAR Plan implementation efforts indicate that 
the monitoring and oversight of such efforts have not been effective. 
More specifically, we found that component officials as well as the 
oversight committees at both the component and DOD levels did not 
effectively carry out their monitoring responsibilities for the Navy 
Civilian Pay and Air Force Military Equipment FIPs. For the two FIPs 
that we reviewed, neither individual officials nor the executive 
committees took sufficient action to ensure that the FIPs were 
accurate or complied with the FIAR Guidance. As a result, the Navy 
concluded that its Civilian Pay was ready for audit, as did the Air 
Force with respect to its Military Equipment, even though they did not 
have sufficient support to assert audit readiness. 

On the other hand, once the Navy and Air Force submitted the FIPs to 
DOD in support of their audit readiness assertions, both the DOD 
Inspector General and the DOD Comptroller carried out their 
responsibilities for reviewing the FIPs. In their reviews, both 
organizations identified issues with the FIPs that were similar to 
those we had identified. The DOD Comptroller, who makes the final 
determination as to whether an assessable unit is ready for audit, 
concluded that neither of these FIPs supported audit readiness. 

Effective oversight and monitoring would also help ensure that lessons 
learned from recent efforts would be sufficiently disseminated 
throughout the department and applied to other financial improvement 
efforts. In commenting on our report about the FIPs, the DOD 
Comptroller stated that it is critical that the department continues 
to look at how effectively it applies lessons learned. 

Furthermore, effective oversight holds individuals accountable for 
carrying out their responsibilities. DOD has introduced incentives 
such as including FIAR goals in Senior Executive Service Performance 
Plans, increased reprogramming thresholds granted to components that 
receive a positive audit opinion on their Statement of Budgetary 
Resources, audit costs funded by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense after a successful audit, and publicizing and rewarding 
components for successful audits. The challenge now is to evaluate and 
validate these and other incentives to determine their effectiveness 
and whether the right mix of incentives has been established. 

Well-defined enterprise architecture. For decades, DOD has been 
challenged in modernizing its timeworn business systems. Since 1995, 
we have designated DOD's business systems modernization program as 
high risk. Between 2001 and 2005, we reported that the modernization 
program had spent hundreds of millions of dollars on an enterprise 
architecture and investment management structures that had limited 
value. Accordingly, we made explicit architecture and investment 
management-related recommendations. Congress included provisions in 
the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2005 that were consistent with our recommendations. In response, 
DOD continues to take steps to comply with the act's provisions and to 
satisfy relevant system modernization management guidance. 
Collectively, these steps address best practices in implementing the 
statutory provisions concerning the business enterprise architecture 
and review of systems costing in excess of $1 million. However, long-
standing challenges that we previously identified remain to be 
addressed. Specifically, while DOD continues to release updates to its 
corporate enterprise architecture, the architecture has yet to be 
federated[Footnote 29] through development of aligned subordinate 
architectures for each of the military departments. In this regard, 
each of the military departments has made progress in managing its 
respective architecture program, but there are still limitations in 
the scope and completeness, as well as the maturity of the military 
departments' architecture programs. For example, while each department 
has established or is in the process of establishing an executive 
committee with responsibility and accountability for the enterprise 
architecture, none has fully developed an enterprise architecture 
methodology or a well-defined business enterprise architecture and 
transition plan to guide and constrain business transformation 
initiatives. In addition, while DOD continues to establish investment 
management processes, the DOD enterprise and the military departments' 
approaches to business systems investment management still lack the 
defined policies and procedures to be considered effective investment 
selection, control, and evaluation mechanisms. Until DOD fully 
implements these longstanding institutional modernization management 
controls its business systems modernization will likely remain a high-
risk program. 

Successful implementation of the ERPs. The department has invested 
billions of dollars and will invest billions more to implement the 
ERPs. The implementation of an integrated, audit-ready systems 
environment through the deployment of ERP systems underlies all of 
DOD's financial improvement efforts and is crucial to achieving 
departmentwide audit readiness. According to DOD, the successful 
implementation of the ERPs is not only critical for addressing long- 
standing weaknesses in financial management, but equally important for 
helping to resolve weaknesses in other high-risk areas such as 
business transformation, business system modernization, and supply 
chain management. Successful implementation will support DOD by 
standardizing and streamlining its financial management and accounting 
systems, integrating multiple logistics systems and finance processes, 
providing asset visibility for accountable items, and integrating 
personnel and pay systems. Previously, we reported that delays in the 
successful implementation of ERPs have extended the use of existing 
duplicative, stovepiped systems, and have continued the funding of 
these systems longer than anticipated.[Footnote 30] To the degree that 
these business systems do not provide the intended capabilities, DOD's 
goal of departmentwide audit readiness by the end of fiscal year 2017 
could be jeopardized. 

Over the years we have reported[Footnote 31] that the department has 
not effectively employed acquisition management controls to help 
ensure the ERPs deliver the promised capabilities on time and within 
budget. As we reported in October 2010, DOD has identified 10 ERPs--1 
of which had been fully implemented--as essential to its efforts to 
transform its business operations.[Footnote 32] We are currently 
reviewing the status of two of these ERPs--the Army's General Fund 
Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) and the Air Force's Defense 
Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS). GFEBS is intended 
to support the Army's standardized financial management and accounting 
practices for the Army's general fund, except for funds related to the 
Army Corps of Engineers. The Army estimates that GFEBS will be used to 
control and account for approximately $140 billion in annual spending. 
DEAMS is intended to provide the Air Force with the entire spectrum of 
financial management capabilities and is expected to maintain control 
and accountability for approximately $160 billion. GFEBS is expected 
to be fully deployed during fiscal year 2012, is currently operational 
at 154 locations, including DFAS, and is being used by approximately 
35,000 users. DEAMS is expected to be fully deployed during fiscal 
year 2016, is currently operational at Scott Air Force Base and DFAS, 
and is being used by about 1,100 individuals. 

Our preliminary results identified issues related to GFEBS and DEAMS 
providing DFAS users with the expected capabilities in accounting, 
management information, and decision support. To compensate, DFAS 
users have devised manual workarounds and several applications to 
obtain the information they need to perform their day-to-day tasks. 
Examples of the issues in these systems that DFAS users have 
identified include the following: 


* The backlog of unresolved GFEBS trouble tickets has continued to 
increase from about 250 in September 2010 to approximately 400 in May 
2011. Trouble tickets represent user questions and issues with 
transactions or system performance that have not been resolved. 
According to Army officials, this increase in tickets was not 
unexpected since the number of users and the number of transactions 
being processed by the system has increased, and the Army and DFAS are 
taking steps to address issues raised by DFAS. 

* Approximately two-thirds of invoice and receipt data must be 
manually entered into GFEBS from the invoicing and receiving system 
(i.e., Wide Area Work Flow).[Footnote 33] DFAS personnel stated that 
manual data entry will eventually become infeasible due to increased 
quantities of data that will have to be manually entered as GFEBS is 
deployed to additional locations. Army officials acknowledged that 
there is a problem with the Wide Area Work Flow and GFEBS interface 
and that this problem reduced the effectiveness of GFEBS, and that 
they are working with DOD to resolve the problem. 

* GFEBS lacks the ability to run ad hoc queries or search for data in 
the system to resolve problems or answer questions.[Footnote 34] The 
Army has recognized this limitation and is currently developing a 
system enhancement that they expect will better support the users' 


* Manual workarounds are needed to process certain accounts receivable 
transactions such as travel debts. DFAS personnel stated that the 
problem is the result of the data not being properly converted from 
the legacy systems to DEAMS. 

* DFAS officials indicated that they were experiencing difficulty with 
some of the DEAMS system interfaces.[Footnote 35] For example, the 
interface problem with the Standard Procurement System has become so 
severe that the interface has been turned off, and the data must be 
manually entered into DEAMS. 

* DFAS officials stated that DEAMS does not provide the capability--
which existed in the legacy systems--to produce ad hoc reports that 
can be used to perform the data analysis need to perform daily 
operations.[Footnote 36] They also noted that when some reports are 
produced, the accuracy of those reports is questionable. 

The Army and Air Force have stated that they have plans to address 
these issues, and the Army has plans to validate the audit readiness 
of GFEBS in a series of independent auditor examinations over the next 
several fiscal years. For DEAMS, the DOD Milestone Decision 
Authority[Footnote 37] has directed that the system is not to be 
deployed beyond Scott Air Force Base until the known system weaknesses 
have been corrected and the system has been independently tested to 
ensure that it is operating as intended. 

Closing Comments: 

In closing, I am encouraged by the recent efforts and commitment DOD's 
leaders have shown toward improving the department's financial 
management. Progress we have seen includes recently issued guidance to 
aid DOD components in their efforts to address their financial 
management weaknesses and achieve audit readiness, and standardized 
component financial improvement plans to facilitate oversight and 
monitoring, as well as sharing lessons learned. In addition, the DOD 
Comptroller and DCMO have shown commitment and leadership in moving 
DOD's financial management improvement efforts forward. 

The revised FIAR strategy is still in the early stages of 
implementation, and DOD has a long way and many long-standing 
challenges to overcome, particularly with regard to sustained 
commitment, leadership, and oversight, before the department and its 
military components are fully auditable, and DOD financial management 
is no longer considered high risk. However, the department is heading 
in the right direction and making progress. Some of the most difficult 
challenges ahead lie in the effective implementation of the 
department's strategy by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA, including 
successful implementation of ERP systems and integration of financial 
management improvement efforts with other DOD initiatives. 

GAO will continue to monitor the progress of and provide feedback on 
the status of DOD's financial management improvement efforts. We 
currently have work in progress to assess implementation of the 
department's FIAR strategy and efforts toward auditability. As a final 
point, I want to emphasize the value of sustained congressional 
interest in the department's financial management improvement efforts, 
as demonstrated by this Subcommittee's leadership. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions 
that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Asif 
A. Khan, (202) 512-9869 or Key contributors to this 
testimony include J. Christopher Martin, Senior-Level Technologist; F. 
Abe Dymond, Assistant Director; Gayle Fischer, Assistant Director; 
Greg Pugnetti, Assistant Director; Darby Smith, Assistant Director; 
Beatrice Alff; Steve Donahue; Keith McDaniel; Maxine Hattery; Hal 
Santarelli; and Sandy Silzer. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I" FIAR Plan Waves: 

The first three waves focus on achieving the DOD Comptroller's interim 
budgetary and asset accountability priorities, while the remaining two 
waves are intended to complete actions needed to achieve full 
financial statement auditability. However, the department has not yet 
fully defined its strategy for completing waves 4 and 5. Each wave 
focuses on assessing and strengthening internal controls and business 
systems related to the stage of auditability addressed in the wave. 

Wave 1--Appropriations Received Audit focuses on the appropriations 
receipt and distribution process, including funding appropriated by 
Congress for the current fiscal year and related apportionment/ 
reapportionment activity by the OMB, as well as allotment and sub- 
allotment activity within the department. 

Wave 2--Statement of Budgetary Resources Audit focuses on supporting 
the budget-related data (e.g., status of funds received, obligated, 
and expended) used for management decision making and reporting, 
including the Statement of Budgetary Resources. In addition to fund 
balance with Treasury reporting and reconciliation, other significant 
end-to-end business processes in this wave include procure-to-pay, 
hire-to-retire, order-to-cash, and budget-to-report. 

Wave 3--Mission Critical Assets Existence and Completeness Audit 
focuses on ensuring that all assets (including military equipment, 
general equipment, real property, inventory, and operating materials 
and supplies) that are recorded in the department's accountable 
property systems of record exist; all of the reporting entities' 
assets are recorded in those systems of record; reporting entities 
have the right (ownership) to report these assets; and the assets are 
consistently categorized, summarized, and reported. 

Wave 4--Full Audit Except for Legacy Asset Valuation includes the 
valuation assertion over new asset acquisitions and validation of 
management's assertion regarding new asset acquisitions, and it 
depends on remediation of the existence and completeness assertions in 
Wave 3. Also, proper contract structure for cost accumulation and cost 
accounting data must be in place prior to completion of the valuation 
assertion for new acquisitions. It involves the budgetary transactions 
covered by the Statement of Budgetary Resources effort in Wave 2, 
including accounts receivable, revenue, accounts payable, expenses, 
environmental liabilities, and other liabilities. 

Wave 5--Full Financial Statement Audit focuses efforts on assessing 
and strengthening, as necessary, internal controls, processes, and 
business systems involved in supporting the valuations reported for 
legacy assets once efforts to ensure control over the valuation of new 
assets acquired and the existence and completeness of all mission 
assets are deemed effective on a go-forward basis. Given the lack of 
documentation to support the values of the department's legacy assets, 
federal accounting standards allow for the use of alternative methods 
to provide reasonable estimates for the cost of these assets. 

In the context of this phased approach, DOD's dual focus on budgetary 
and asset information offers the potential to obtain preliminary 
assessments regarding the effectiveness of current processes and 
controls and identify potential issues that may adversely impact 
subsequent waves. 

[End of section] 


[1] DOD excludes from its business systems those designated as 
national security systems under section 2222(j) of Title 10, United 
States Code. National security systems are intelligence systems, 
cryptologic activities related to national security, military command 
and control systems, and equipment that is an integral part of a 
weapon or weapons system or is critical to the direct fulfillment of 
military or intelligence missions. 

[2] DOD's auditors have reported material financial management 
weaknesses in the following areas: (1) Financial Management Systems, 
(2) Fund Balance with Treasury, (3) Accounts Receivable, (4) 
Inventory, (5) Operating Materials and Supplies, (6) General Property, 
Plant, and Equipment, (7) Government-Furnished Material and Contractor-
Acquired Material, (8) Accounts Payable, (9) Environmental 
Liabilities, (10) Statement of Net Cost, (11) Intragovernmental 
Eliminations, (12) Other Accounting Entries, and (13) Reconciliation 
of Net Cost of Operations to Budget. 

[3] An ERP system uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software 
consisting of multiple, integrated functional modules that perform a 
variety of business related tasks such as general ledger accounting, 
payroll, and supply chain management. 

[4] GAO, Financial Management: Achieving Financial Statement 
Auditability in the Department of Defense, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 

[5] GAO, DOD Business Transformation: Improved Management and 
Oversight of Business Modernization Efforts Needed, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 
2010); Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve Implementation of 
the Army Logistics Modernization Program, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 
2010), DOD Business Transformation: Air Force's Current Approach 
Increases Risk That Asset Visibility Goals and Transformation 
Priorities Will Not Be Achieved, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 
2008), DOD Business Systems Modernization: Important Management 
Controls Being Implemented on Major Navy Program, but Improvements 
Needed in Key Areas, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 
2008), and DOD Business Transformation: Lack of an Integrated Strategy 
Puts the Army's Asset Visibility System Investments at Risk, 
[hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 27, 2007). 

[6] DOD bears responsibility, in whole or in part, for 14 of the 30 
federal programs or activities that GAO has identified as being at 
high risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. The seven 
specific DOD high-risk areas are (1) approach to business 
transformation, (2) business systems modernization, (3) contract 
management, (4) financial management, (5) supply chain management, (6) 
support infrastructure management, and (7) weapon systems acquisition. 
The seven governmentwide high-risk areas that include DOD are: (1) 
disability programs, (2) interagency contracting, (3) information 
systems and critical infrastructure, (4) information sharing for 
homeland security, (5) human capital, (6) real property, and (7) 
ensuring the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. 
national security Interests. 

[7] Support infrastructure includes categories such as installations, 
central logistics, the defense health program, and central training. 

[8] Sec. 31 U.S.C. §3515(a),(c); OMB Bulletin No. 07-04, Audit 
Requirements For Federal Financial Statements, Appendix B (Sept. 4, 

[9] GAO, Financial Audit: Air Force Does Not Effectively Account for 
Billions of Dollars of Resources, [hyperlink,[ (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
23, 1990). 

[10] GAO, Department of Defense: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 
Financial Management of Military Equipment, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C. July 26, 

[11] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs Better Information and 
Guidance to More Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating and Support 
Costs of Major Weapon Systems, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 

[12] GAO reviewed the following seven major aviation systems: the 
Navy's F/A-18E/F; the Air Force's F-22A, B-1B, and F-15E; and the 
Army's AH-64D, CH-47D, and UH-60L. 

[13] GAO, Department of the Army--The Fiscal Year 2008 Military 
Personnel Army Appropriation and the Antideficiency Act, B-318724 
(Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2010). 

[14] GAO, Defense Health: Management Weaknesses at Defense Centers of 
Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury Require 
Attention, [hyperlink,] 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2011). 

[15] GAO, Financial Management: Achieving Financial Statement 
Auditability in the Department of Defense, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 

[16] [hyperlink,]. 

[17] GAO, DOD Financial Management: Marine Corps Statement of 
Budgetary Resources Audit Results and Lessons Learned, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 

[18] In a disclaimer of opinion, the auditor does not express an 
opinion on the financial statements. A disclaimer of opinion is 
appropriate when the audit scope is not sufficient to enable the 
auditor to express an opinion, or when there are material 
uncertainties involving a scope limitation--a situation where the 
auditor is unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence. 

[19] Internal control comprises the plans, methods, and procedures to 
provide reasonable assurance that objectives are being achieved in the 
following areas: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) 
reliability of financial reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations. 

[20] The three systems are the Marine Corps Total Force System 
(MCTFS), which is an integrated military personnel and payroll system; 
the Standard Accounting, Budgeting, Reporting System (SABRS), which is 
the Marine Corps' general ledger accounting system; and the Defense 
Departmental Reporting System (DDRS), which is a DOD-wide financial 
reporting system. 

[21] GAO, Defense Business Transformation: DOD Needs To Take 
Additional Actions to Further Define Key Management Roles, Develop 
Measurable Goals, and Align Planning Efforts, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 
2011); and Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management 
Principles at Homeland Security, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 

[22] The Marine Corps SBR Remediation Plan consists of a written plan 
covering the initial 11 financial statement process notices of 
findings and recommendations (NFR) to comply with DOD IG audit 
requirements and 59 additional NFRs that were addressed in separate 
plans of action and milestones. 

[23] Some of these elements are consistent with the FIAR Guidance 
requirements for a corrective action plan, such as identifying 
required resources and ensuring that actions address the identified 

[24] Pub. L. No. 109-163, div. A, § 1122, 119 Stat. 3136, 3452 (Jan. 
6, 2006). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
made this strategic plan into an annual requirement. Pub. L. No. 111-
84, div. A, § 1108, 123 Stat. 2190, 2488 (Oct. 28, 2009), codified at 
10 U.S.C. § 115b. 

[25] GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Competency Gap Analysis and Other 
Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Strategic Workforce Plans, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 

[26] GAO, DOD Financial Management: Improvement Needed in DOD 
Components' Implementation of Audit Readiness Efforts, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 

[27] [hyperlink,]. 

[28] [hyperlink,]. 

[29] A federated architecture consists of a family of coherent but 
distinct member architectures in which subsidiary architectures 
conform to an overarching corporate architectural view and rule set. 

[30] GAO, DOD Business Transformation: Improved Management Oversight 
of Business System Modernization Efforts Needed, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 

[31] [hyperlink,]; DOD Business 
Systems Modernization: Navy Implementing a Number of Key Management 
Controls on Enterprise Resource Planning System, but Improvements 
Still Needed, [hyperlink,] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2009); [hyperlink,]; [hyperlink,]; DOD Business Systems 
Modernization: Key Marine Corps System Acquisition Needs to Be Better 
Justified, Defined, and Managed, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 
2008); [hyperlink,]. 

[32] [hyperlink,]. The 10 ERPs 
are as follows: Army--General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), 
Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army), and Logistics 
Modernization Program (LMP); Navy--Navy Enterprise Resource Planning 
(Navy ERP) and Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC); 
Air Force--Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) 
and Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS); Defense--Service 
Specific Integrated Personnel and Pay Systems and Defense Agencies 
Initiative (DAI); and Defense Logistics Agency--Business System 
Modernization (BSM). According to DOD, BSM was fully implemented in 
July 2007. 

[33] Office of Federal Financial Management, Core Financial System 
Requirements (Washington, D.C.: January 2006) states that a Core 
financial system must deliver workflow capabilities including 
integrated workflow, workflow process definition and processing 
exception notices. 

[34] Office of Federal Financial Management, Core Financial System 
Requirements, states that a Core financial system must provide an 
integrated ad hoc query capability to support agency access to and 
analysis of system-maintained financial data. 

[35] Office of Federal Financial Management, Core Financial System 
Requirements, states that a Core financial system financial 
transaction can be originated using multiple external feeder 
applications. These feeder systems and the Core financial system must 
interface seamlessly so that data can move effectively between them. 
The Core system must be able to process and validate the data 
independent of origination. There must also be a process for handling 
erroneous input and correction. 

[36] Office of Federal Financial Management, Core Financial System 
Requirements, states that a Core financial system financial 
transaction must deliver an integrated ad hoc query capability to 
support agency access to and analysis of system maintained financial 

[37] The Milestone Decision Authority is the senior DOD official who 
has overall authority to approve entry of an acquisition program into 
the next phase of the acquisition process and is accountable for cost, 
schedule, and performance reporting, including congressional reporting. 

[End of section] 

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