



Highlights of [GAO-07-641](#), a report to congressional committees

## Why GAO Did This Study

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations affected 62 percent of the flying units in the Air National Guard (ANG) with 14 units losing their flying mission, and others converting from one type of aircraft to another, or increasing or decreasing assigned aircraft. To implement the recommendations, ANG must relocate hundreds of aircraft and retrain or recruit about 15,000 personnel by 2011. In this report, GAO addresses the status of efforts to implement the ANG BRAC actions. GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the process to provide replacement missions to units losing flying missions, (2) the progress and challenges in implementing the BRAC actions, and (3) changes to the cost and savings estimates. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO conducted its work at the Air Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11 states affected by BRAC 2005.

## What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the Department of Defense develop a strategy to address challenges, enhance communication, and provide more transparent cost reporting. DOD partially concurred with the recommendations on strategy and communication, but did not concur with the recommendation on cost reporting.

[www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-641](http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-641).

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or [leporeb@gao.gov](mailto:leporeb@gao.gov).

# MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

## Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations

### What GAO Found

Through a consultative process that involved key stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG assigned 30 replacement missions for affected units that supported either the future force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force developed a prioritized list of potential mission areas for ANG, but let ANG, with input from state leadership, decide which missions to assign to specific units. ANG assigned affected units 23 missions from the prioritized list. ANG also assigned 7 new flying missions to affected units on the basis of its leadership goal to have at least 1 flying mission per state and to maximize the number of flying missions where possible.

ANG is making progress in planning to implement the BRAC recommendations, but lacks a strategy to address implementation challenges. Without such a strategy, several challenges could delay when some units are able to perform their new missions. ANG has developed programming plans for the BRAC-related actions affecting the ANG and a plan to move hundreds of aircraft. However, ANG faces challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions required to implement BRAC, such as developing manning documents that provide the specific skill mixes required, and in ensuring there is sufficient space in Air Force schools to accommodate personnel requiring training. For example, ANG projects that about 3,000 personnel need to be trained for intelligence missions, but the school can currently accommodate only a portion of this requirement. ANG has worked with the Air Force to develop potential solutions, but these have yet to be fully implemented. There may also be delays in obtaining security clearances for personnel due to the lengthy clearance process. Further, bridge missions have not been identified for some units that will face a gap between old and new missions. ANG also faces possible delays in obtaining required funding for new equipment, construction, and training. Finally, some ANG units believe there has been insufficient communication with ANG headquarters about new mission requirements, which impacts their ability to recruit and train personnel.

GAO's analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there will be annual recurring costs of \$53 million rather than estimated \$26 million annual recurring savings for the ANG related actions. Further, the Air Force is not using BRAC funds for over \$300 million for military construction, training, and equipment to establish replacement missions for units losing their flying mission. However, because these costs are not included in the Air Force BRAC budget submission, Congress does not have full visibility over BRAC-related implementation costs.