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entitled 'Defense Management: Army Needs to Address Resource and 
Mission Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command' which 
was released on February 10, 2003.



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Report to Congressional Requesters:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



February 2003:



Defense Management:



Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its 

Training and Doctrine Command:



GAO-03-214:



GAO Highlights:



Highlights of GAO-03-214, a report to

Congressional Requesters:



Why GAO Did This Study:



The Armyís Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) trains

soldiers and develops doctrine and future warfighting concepts to fight

the battles of today and tomorrow. As such, the Command has been

designated as the lead in the Armyís transformation from a Cold

War-oriented force into a rapidly deployable and responsive force

better able to meet the diverse challenges of the future. Concerns

have been raised at congressional hearings about TRADOCís

readiness to perform its mission, particularly within the context of

Army transformation and associated funding priorities. GAO

assessed the impact of budget, workload, and personnel changes,

as well as ongoing transformation plans, on TRADOCís ability to

perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to the combat

forces.



What GAO Found:



Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOCís workload has grown as a result 

of new mission requirements, the number of personnel authorized to meet

those requirements has declined. Also since fiscal year 1995, the 

Commandís operation and maintenance funding increased, but TRADOC 

allocated these and other operations money to support its highest 

mission priorityótrainingówhile other areas received less emphasis. The 

table below depicts the number of personnel TRADOC believes are needed 

to perform its workload (personnel requirements), as well as the number 

of personnel the Army has authorized for this purpose. Unresolved 

differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters over TRADOCís 

personnel requirements.



Amid the increases in workload and reductions in personnel 

authorizations, TRADOC has met its training mission, but with 
difficulty. 

Moreover, the Command has workload backlogs in other mission areas, 
such 

as developing training materials and Army doctrine. The effect of these 

backlogs is illustrated in TRADOCís monthly status reports, which show 

that the Command assigned the lowest readiness rating to more than two-

thirds of its units during fiscal year 2001 and into 2002 and 
attributed 

the low ratings primarily to the lack of personnel. Furthermore, two 

Army leadership panels concluded that TRADOCís training and development 

standards had deteriorated, and mechanisms for evaluating training and 

leader development programs were lacking.



Several ongoing and planned Army initiatives may affect TRADOCís 

ability to perform its mission in the future. These include efforts to 

reassess TRADOCís process for determining personnel requirements and 

ongoing efforts to transfer forces from TRADOC and other noncombatant 

commands to warfighting forces. At the same time, TRADOC is losing 

flexibility to shift funds from one mission area to another because the 

Army established the Installation Management Agency to manage its 

facilities. TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan that Command 

officials believe will increase TRADOCís efficiency and improve its 

ability to meet mission requirements; however, the costs, benefits, 

performance measures, and human capital issues associated with the plan 

are not yet clear.



What GAO Recommends:



GAO recommends that the Army validate TRADOCís workload and

personnel requirements before further reducing the Commandís

personnel authorizations, and ensure that the Commandís

reengineering plan adequately addresses efficiency, effectiveness,

and human capital issues. In commenting on the report, the

Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations related

to TRADOCís reengineering but expressed various concerns about

other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall

actions would be taken.



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While Budget 

Increases Have Gone to Training and New Workload:



TRADOCís Full Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met; Leadership 

Panels and Combat Forces Cite Quality Problems:



Effect of Ongoing and Planned Actions on TRADOC Is Uncertain:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:



Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions:



Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:



Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:



Tables:



Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:



Table 2: TRADOCís Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities 

(as of October 2002):



Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies Announced during 

Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002):



Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the Active 

Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001:



Figures:



Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations:



Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation:



Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area:



Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected Mission 

Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:



Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a 

Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:



Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission Areas for 

Fiscal Years 1995-2001:



Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal 

Years 1995-2001:



Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003:



Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002):



Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for 

the Period January 2001 - February 2002:



Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected 

Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:



Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected 

Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:



Abbreviations:



AMC: Army Materiel Command:



DOD: Department of Defense:



FORSCOM: Army Forces Command:



IMA: Installation Management Agency:



O&M: Operations and Maintenance:



OMB: Office of Management and Budget:



POI: Programs of Instruction:



TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command:



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February 10, 2003:



The Honorable Joel Heffley

Chairman

The Honorable Soloman P. Ortiz

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives:



The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War-oriented force 

into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet 

the diverse challenges of the future. The far-reaching organizational 

and operational changes that the Army plans will affect virtually every 

element of the Army. The Armyís Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 

has been designated the lead command for this transformation and, as 

the architect of the Armyís future, TRADOC has a key role in the 

transformation process. TRADOC is responsible for ensuring that the 

Army remains a modern and capable fighting force by developing 

warfighting concepts and doctrine and by providing recruiting, 

training, and associated support for military personnel. Like the 

Department of Defense (DOD) and other Army commands, TRADOC incurred 

significant decreases in its resources--particularly its personnel 

resources--during the 1990s as the department took major steps to 

reshape and reduce the size of its forces. Between fiscal years 1991 

and 2001, Army active duty military personnel and civilian personnel 

were reduced by about 33 percent and 42 percent, respectively. TRADOC 

incurred similar reductions during this period.



Each year, senior Army officials must decide how to allocate resources 

among competing priorities and programs within and among the Armyís 

operational and institutional forces. In recent years, the Army has 

chosen to give priority to its operational or warfighting units and 

accept a higher level of risk of mission failure in support 

organizations such as TRADOC. At the same time, at congressional 

hearings over the last few years, concerns have been raised about 

TRADOCís readiness to perform its mission, particularly within the 

context of Army transformation. At your request, we reviewed the 

resources and workload assigned to the Command and its readiness to 

carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were to examine 

(1) the Training and Doctrine Commandís personnel, workload, and budget 

trends since 1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on 

the Commandís ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained 

soldiers to the combat forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned 

that could have an effect on the Commandís ability to perform its 

mission.



In conducting this examination, we reviewed documents and interviewed 

officials at Army Headquarters, the Training and Doctrine Command, and 

Forces Command. Our analysis of the trends in the Commandís personnel 

and budgetary resources focused primarily on fiscal years 1995 through 

2001. A complete description of our methodology is shown in appendix I.



Results in Brief:



Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOCís workload has grown due to new 

mission requirements and its budget has increased in selected areas, 

its authorized personnel gradually decreased about 13 percent. 

Specifically, the number of authorized personnel declined during this 

period from about 63,000 to 55,000. The current authorization 

represents about 70 percent of the personnel that the Command believes 

are needed to perform its work (otherwise known as requirements), which 

have ranged from about 75,000 to 79,000 personnel.[Footnote 1] The 

reductions in authorized personnel were caused by a number of DOD and 

Army decisions. Key among these were reductions mandated by force 

structure reshaping decisions that began in the early 1990s, such as 

ďQuicksilver,Ē[Footnote 2] and other department initiatives that 

occurred since 1995, such as reductions recommended by the 1997 

Quadrennial Defense Review.[Footnote 3] While TRADOC officials believe 

that the Commandís reported personnel requirements are accurate, 

unresolved differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters staff 

over the accuracy of these requirements, particularly as they relate to 

the use of contractors. Despite personnel reductions, the Commandís 

primary funding source--operations and maintenance funding--increased 

about 23 percent (in constant dollars). However, at the Commandís 

discretion, funding for all of TRADOCís programs did not increase--

funding devoted to training increased about 13 percent, while funding 

devoted to base operations decreased about 20 percent as the Command 

reallocated limited resources to higher-priority missions. Also, a 

large portion of the increased funding was directed to hiring contract 

personnel to support new mission requirements such as Army 

transformation to a lighter force. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, 

contractor support funding increased by about 38 percent, or about 

$317 million, but this increase did not fully offset the loss of 

personnel authorizations, according to Command officials.



Amid these reductions in personnel authorizations, TRADOC met its 

highest mission priority, training, although not without some concerns 

about quality from other Army organizations. The Command has had more 

difficulty fully meeting other mission requirements--such as those 

involving the development of training materials and doctrine--many of 

which have sizeable workload backlogs. The effect of these workload 

backlogs is illustrated in TRADOCís monthly status reports. Our 

analysis of these status reports showed that the Command assigned the 

lowest readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its units during 

fiscal year 2001 and into 2002, and it attributed the low ratings 

primarily to the lack of personnel. The impact of these conditions has 

been observed by organizations outside TRADOC. Two Army leadership 

panels chartered by the Army Chief of Staff--one representing officers 

and one representing noncommissioned officers--concluded in 2001 and 

2002 that TRADOCís training and development standards had deteriorated 

and that mechanisms for evaluating training and leadership development 

programs were lacking. Officials with the Army Forces Command--a 

primary customer of TRADOC services--have also expressed concern about 

TRADOCís reduced capabilities, but the impact cannot be fully 

quantified due to a lack of Army empirical data and analysis. Although 

TRADOC does not have a formal process to obtain feedback on the quality 

and relevance of the products provided to its customers, Forces Command 

officials indicated that they believe the quality of TRADOCís 

individual training programs and doctrine products has declined. For 

example, they cite the lack of a training strategy to support 

operational unitsí adoption of digital technology, as well as the 

outdated condition of some doctrine used to guide tactics and 

procedures in the field. On the other hand, Forces Command officials 

noted that TRADOCís support for an element of the Army transformation-

-the Interim Brigade Combat Teams--had been good. Continuing 

disconnects between mission requirements and resources could adversely 

affect TRADOCís ability to carry out its mission and improve its 

readiness posture in the future as it continues to address additional 

transformation requirements, while also training and supporting the 

current force.



Several ongoing and planned actions may affect the Commandís ability to 

perform its mission in the future; however, the overall outcome is 

unclear at this time. In October 2002, a major Army Headquarters 

initiative, already underway, began shifting budgetary resources and 

about 10,000 personnel authorizations related to base operations away 

from the Command to the new Army Installation Management Agency. This 

reorganization will reduce TRADOCís mission requirements, but will also 

eliminate base operations funds that, in the past, were used by the 

Command as a source of training support; thus, in the future, the 

Command will have less flexibility to shift funding among its primary 

missions. Another Army Headquarters initiative is aimed at reassessing 

the process used to determine personnel requirements for TRADOC and 

other commands that support warfighting units, but the outcome is 

uncertain because differences of opinion exist over TRADOCís 

requirements and the extent to which its requirements have been offset 

by contractor support. Also, the Army is conducting commercial 

activities studies to identify opportunities to use in-house personnel 

more efficiently and to contract some activities to an outside vendor. 

Such studies are likely to lead to reduced personnel requirements in 

the activities studied but would not necessarily free personnel for 

assignment to other activities or mission areas where shortages exist. 

In addition, the Army has an initiative underway, known as ďManning the 

Force,Ē which is transferring military personnel from the noncombatant 

forces across the Army to warfighting forces to improve the Armyís 

combat readiness. This initiative, which continues through fiscal year 

2003, is reducing the number of military personnel assigned to TRADOC; 

however, the Command has not fully quantified the impact of this 

specific initiative. Finally, TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan 

that is intended to create a more streamlined and efficient command 

structure, rely more heavily on technology, and better position the 

Command to support current and future mission requirements. Command 

officials believe the plan, once finalized and implemented, will 

increase TRADOCís efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission 

requirements. However, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and 

human capital issues associated with implementing the plan are not yet 

clear. Also, the extent to which this effort will lead to 

organizational consolidations and reductions in personnel requirements 

remains unclear. These issues could take on more importance as the Army 

continues its transformation efforts and, if not adequately addressed, 

could place the Command at increased risk in its role as the Armyís 

architect of the future.



We are making recommendations for executive action to help the Command 

address workload backlogs; better measure the quality of its products 

and services; and ensure that its reengineering plan adequately 

addresses efficiency, effectiveness, and human capital issues and is 

properly resourced to support Army transformation. In commenting on a 

draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendations related to 

TRADOCís reengineering process but expressed various concerns about 

other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall actions 

would be taken.



Background:



The Army consists of both operational and institutional forces. The 

institutional forces support such activities as training, supply, and 

maintenance, and perform a broad range of noncombatant functions that 

enable operational forces--combat and support units--to deploy and 

fight in regional and theater wars. TRADOC is part of the Armyís 

institutional forces. The Command is viewed as the Armyís ďarchitect of 

the futureĒ because much of what it does is focused on identifying 

future warfighting requirements and developing organizations, training 

curriculum, doctrine, and people to fight the battles of tomorrow, as 

well as those of today.



TRADOCís Responsibilities:



TRADOC carries out its mission at 26 schools and several training 

centers located on 15 major installations throughout the continental 

United States. (See fig. 1.) The Command also has 11 battle 

laboratories, which support research and development activities 

associated with weapon systems and combat operations. The schools and 

battle laboratories specialize in developing and testing warfighting 

capabilities such as air defense, armor, artillery, aviation, infantry, 

and transportation. During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was authorized 

about 36,500 military personnel and 18,700 civilian personnel.



Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]





In general, TRADOCís overall mission focuses on five primary areas:



* Combat Development. Through its combat development mission, TRADOC 

identifies needed capabilities and requirements for new and existing 

weapon and battlefield management systems to improve warfighting 

capabilities and responsiveness. The capabilities and requirements are 

designed and incorporated into current and new weapon systems to 

improve the Armyís warfighting capabilities. As part of this effort, 

TRADOC provides an Armywide focus on research and development 

activities and conducts analysis and experimentation. The Commandís 

battle laboratories are heavily involved in the combat development 

mission.



* Doctrine Development. TRADOC develops doctrine to address the 

complete range of potential tactical and operational missions and 

operating environments--from infantry operations to aviation--that 

combat units might encounter. Doctrine establishes the tactics, 

techniques, and procedures the combat units might use to carry out 

their warfighting missions; it is essential for conducting warfare. 

Much of the Armyís doctrine is found in its field manuals, which number 

more than 600. Doctrine developers write and update the field manuals, 

as well as develop organizational structures for combat units.



* Training and Training Development. TRADOCís training and training 

development mission is directed at developing competent soldiers, 

capable leaders, and relevant training materials. TRADOC provides 

soldiers with initial individual entry-level training. The Command also 

provides advanced individual training, such as learning how to operate 

a tank. As the training developer, TRADOC develops course material for 

over 2,000 courses that support individual training. TRADOC also 

develops training material for unit training, which takes place in the 

combat units. In addition, through training development, TRADOC 

certifies staff and faculty associated with its schools, develops a 

distance-learning curriculum, and promotes continuing education for its 

military personnel. During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC trained about 

323,000 military and civilian personnel at its schools.



* Accessions/Recruiting. TRADOC is responsible for recruiting soldiers 

for the Army. Recruiting activities are conducted throughout the United 

States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and at U.S. facilities 

in Germany and Asia. Recruiting is carried out by a TRADOC subcommand 

called the Accessions Command, which was established in February 2002. 

From the beginning of fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001, 

accessions activities were carried out by the Army Recruiting Command, 

the Cadet Command, and the Military Entrance Processing Command. These 

commands are now components of the Accessions Command.



* Base Operations. TRADOC has historically maintained the school 

buildings, barracks, roads, training ranges, and other structures used 

to carry out its mission. Base support activities have included 

facilities maintenance as well as equipment repair. However, in October 

2002, base operations support across the Army was consolidated and 

transitioning to a new Army agency called the Installation Management 

Agency was begun. Like other Army commands, TRADOC will no longer have 

direct responsibility for base operations. A large portion of the 

TRADOC personnel and funding resources associated with base operations 

is being transferred to the new agency.



TRADOC is also the lead command for Army transformation. This 

transformation, which was announced in October 1999, is a plan to move 

the Armyís Cold War organization and equipment to a lighter, more 

strategically responsive force to fill what the Army sees as a 

strategic gap in its warfighting capabilities. The transformed force is 

expected to be capable of responding to a broad range of operations--

from peacekeeping to regional conflicts to major theater wars. To 

realize the transformation, the Army plans to develop new equipment, 

revise its operating concepts and doctrine, build unit-level 

organizations that can quickly adapt to changes in the intensity of a 

given military operation, and change how it trains its soldiers and 

leaders. Transformation will touch on all of TRADOCís mission areas 

because TRADOC is heavily involved in developing requirements for 

current and new equipment, revising doctrine, developing new 

organizations, and training soldiers and leaders. As part of its 

transformation responsibilities, TRADOC has already played a lead role 

in developing and fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams--commonly 

referred to as the Stryker brigades--which are being organized and 

equipped to deploy nearly as quickly as light infantry units but with 

more lethality and survivability.



Overview of TRADOC Funding:



In fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was provided a budget of about $3.2 billion 

to carry out its mission.[Footnote 4] This total, however, does not 

include funding to pay the Commandís military personnel, who are paid 

from funds that are centrally managed at Army Headquarters. Figure 2 

depicts TRADOCís funding by appropriation.



Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]





The largest segment of the budget was comprised of Operations and 

Maintenance (O&M) funding. It totaled approximately $2.9 billion, or 

about 91 percent of TRADOCís total budget. Figure 3 shows how O&M 

funding was allocated among TRADOC mission areas.



Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]





Training and base operations were allocated most of the O&M funding. 

Funding for doctrine development is included in both combat 

developments and training development.



TRADOCís O&M funding increased to about $3.5 billion for fiscal year 

2002--about $600 million more than fiscal year 2001. A large portion of 

the increase resulted from additional funding to support the global war 

on terrorism.



TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While Budget 

Increases Have Gone to Training and New Workload:



Since at least fiscal year 1995, the number of personnel that TRADOC 

has been authorized to accomplish its mission has been less than the 

number of personnel that TRADOC officials believe are required. While 

personnel requirements remained relatively steady between fiscal years 

1995 and 2001, TRADOCís workload increased and its personnel 

authorizations decreased as a result of DOD and Army efforts to reshape 

and constrain the size of the in-house workforce. TRADOC and Army 

Headquarters officials do not agree on the accuracy of TRADOCís 

personnel requirements. As personnel authorizations decreased, 

TRADOCís budget increased; however, the increase was not applied 

uniformly across all of TRADOCís programs or mission areas. An 

increasing percentage of the budget was shifted to the Commandís 

highest-priority mission area--training. In addition, a portion of the 

budget increase was directed to new mission requirements related to 

Army transformation. Because TRADOC did not have the in-house personnel 

to address the new requirements, the Command increased its use of 

contractors to satisfy some of the new mission requirements.



TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Are Down Despite Increasing Workload 

and Associated Personnel Requirements:



Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOCís personnel requirements, as identified 

by the Command, have remained somewhat steady. Yet, its personnel 

authorizations and the actual number of personnel on hand have 

gradually declined by nearly 13 percent--from about 63,000 to 55,000--

to where they represent about 71 percent and 65 percent, respectively, 

of the Commandís personnel requirements. Table 1 details these 

personnel trends.



Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:



Requirements; 1995: 79,298; 1996: 77,069; 1997: 76,650; 1998[A]: 

75,613; 1999[A]: 76,139; 2000[A]: 76,409; 2001: 78,255.



Authorizations; 1995: 63,139; 1996: 57,814; 1997: 57,700; 1998[A]: 

56,814; 1999[A]: 55,852; 2000[A]: 54,659; 2001: 55,204.



Actual; 1995: 61,207; 1996: 57,036; 1997: 57,273; 1998[A]: 54,839; 

1999[A]: 53,699; 2000[A]: 51,993; 2001: 50,936.



Authorizations as a percent of requirements; 1995: 80%; 1996: 75%; 

1997: 75%; 1998[A]: 75%; 1999[A]: 73%; 2000[A]: 71%; 2001: 71%.



Actual as a percent of requirements; 1995: 77%; 1996: 74%; 1997: 75%; 

1998[A]: 72%; 1999[A]: 71%; 2000[A]: 68%; 2001: 65%.



Actual as a percent of authorizations; 1995: 97%; 1996: 99%; 1997: 98%; 

1998[A]: 97%; 1999[A]: 96%; 2000[A]: 95%; 2001: 92%.



Source: TRADOC.



[End of table]



[A] Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent elimination of 

personnel requirements and authorizations, and actual personnel that 

are associated with two TRADOC subcommands: the Recruiting Command and 

Military Entrance Processing Command. (For additional information, see 

app. I).



TRADOC also experienced a reduction in actual staffing levels between 

fiscal years 1995 and 2001. As shown in table 1, the Command was 

staffed at 77 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 1995 and at 

only 65 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 2001. The table also 

shows that the Command has experienced a decline in the number of 

actual personnel assigned to the Command. According to TRADOC 

officials, this shortfall in actual personnel provides an even clearer 

indication that the Commandís full workload cannot be accomplished. The 

reductions in TRADOCís personnel authorizations were similar to those 

of the Army overall, as well as for selected commands. See appendix II 

for a comparison of TRADOCís personnel authorizations with those of 

other selected major Army commands.



Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOCís workload has grown due to the addition 

of several new mission requirements. A number of these are associated 

with supporting Army transformation requirements that began to emerge 

after transformation plans were announced in 1999. The Command acquired 

responsibility for conceptualizing and developing two new aspects of 

the Armyís fighting forces--the interim and objective forces--while 

still retaining the responsibilities for supporting, modernizing, and 

transforming the current force. These new responsibilities include 

developing weapon systems requirements, combat and training doctrine, 

and training courses to facilitate the transformation.



In addition, a number of other DOD and Army decisions resulted in 

TRADOC gaining new mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995 

and 2001, the Command assumed responsibility for several smaller 

commands and agencies, including the Army Recruiting Command, the 

Military Entrance Processing Command, and the Army Management Staff 

College.[Footnote 5] Each of these commands and agencies brought new 

workload requirements with them. However, they also brought most of the 

personnel authorizations associated with that workload.



The personnel requirements associated with the Commandís major mission 

areas, as identified by TRADOC, fluctuated only slightly between fiscal 

years 1995 and 2001, as depicted in figure 4.



Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected Mission 

Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Note: The training component of TRADOCís training and training 

development mission area has the single most personnel requirements and 

is shown in the chart separately from the training development 

component. The doctrine development mission area is included in the 

figure, but TRADOC does not account for doctrine development personnel 

separately. Instead, doctrine development personnel are accounted for 

in the training development and combat developments mission areas.



As shown in figure 4, requirements in TRADOCís training mission area 

ranged from about 35,000 to 37,000, with slight reductions between 

fiscal years 1996 and 1999. Likewise, the personnel requirements for 

the training development, combat development, and base operations 

mission areas had some minor changes from year to year.



The reductions in personnel authorizations between fiscal years 1995 

and 2001 forced TRADOC to set priorities among its mission areas to 

ensure that it successfully performed its highest-priority function--

training. Figure 5 shows TRADOCís authorization allocations relative to 

personnel requirements during this period. In comparison to the other 

mission areas, training was authorized the highest percentage of 

personnel authorizations in each year. Furthermore, training 

authorization levels remained relatively steady, while those in the 

base operations mission area were steadily reduced.



Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a 

Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Several DOD and Army force structure decisions were responsible for a 

large portion of TRADOCís personnel authorization reductions. 

Throughout the 1990s, DOD implemented several force structure reshaping 

initiatives--including those resulting from the 1997 Quadrennial 

Defense Review--that were aimed at streamlining the military services. 

Most of these initiatives directed across-the-board cuts in personnel 

authorizations and often left the military services and their commands 

to determine how to allocate the reductions. For example, one such 

initiative--referred to as ďQuicksilverĒ--was implemented between 

fiscal years 1991 and 1996 to reduce the Armyís force structure to 

create a balanced, versatile, smaller, more lethal, and more ready 

force than existed in the late 1980s. As a result, the initiative 

eliminated 3,134 civilian positions and 6,224 military positions at 

TRADOC between fiscal years 1991 and 2001.



TRADOC officials expressed confidence in the accuracy of their reported 

personnel requirements. They cite the validation of their requirements 

determination process in 2001 by the Army Manpower Analysis Agency as 

proof that their process produces valid requirements.[Footnote 6] Also, 

representatives of the Manpower Analysis Agency stated that TRADOCís 

personnel requirements determination process was based on a sound 

methodology. However, unresolved differences remain between TRADOC and 

Army Headquarters officials regarding the accuracy of the Commandís 

personnel requirements. Representatives of the Armyís Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations and Plans question the methods and assumptions 

used by TRADOC to link workload and personnel. More specifically, these 

officials told us they believe that TRADOC does not accurately account 

for work being done by contract personnel, and thus the difference 

between the Commandís requirements and authorizations is not as large 

as it appears. They believe that contractors are filling the gap 

between requirements and authorizations. However, these officials did 

not provide any objective analysis to document the extent to which this 

might be the case. Similarly, TRADOC officials did not have sufficient 

data to show the extent to which they were relying on 

contractors.[Footnote 7] However, according to TRADOC officials, the 

Commandís personnel requirements determination process appropriately 

considers work being done by contractors. Although we did not 

independently validate TRADOCís personnel requirements processes, our 

discussions with knowledgeable officials and review of available 

documentation indicated that their requirements analysis was based on a 

rigorous multistep process and gave due consideration to the work being 

performed by contractors. Furthermore, as discussed later in this 

report, TRADOC frequently cited personnel shortfalls as a cause of low 

readiness ratings.



TRADOC Received Budget Increases, but Additional Funds Benefited 

Limited Areas:



Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, TRADOCís O&M budget increased $544 

million, or about 23 percent (expressed in constant fiscal year 2001 

dollars). However, this increase in funding was not uniform across all 

of TRADOCís mission areas or budget categories. For example, funding 

for the base operations mission decreased by around $20 million, or 

about 2 percent, while training mission funds increased by around $326 

million, or about 36 percent. Over time, funding allocated to the 

recruiting or accessions mission area increased by about $200 million, 

or almost 100 percent. (See fig. 6.):



Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission Areas for 

Fiscal Years 1995-2001:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]





Likewise, the increase in funding was not uniform across TRADOC budget 

categories. For example, between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, funding in 

the civilian personnel budget category decreased by $60 million, while 

contract funding increased by $317 million. The decrease in civilian 

personnel funding resulted from the loss of personnel authorizations.



During this period, an increasing percentage of the budget was shifted 

from base operations accounts to the Commandís highest priority 

mission--training. This is shown in figure 7. This practice generally 

left TRADOC in a position to conduct only minimal repair and 

maintenance on its facilities.



Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal 

Years 1995-2001:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]





The largest increases in TRADOCís budget were directly related to 

contracting and added mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 

1995 and 2001, the amount of funding spent on contracting increased by 

38 percent, or about $317 million (in constant fiscal year 2001 

dollars). According to TRADOC budget officials, a large portion of this 

contract funding was used to support Army transformation initiatives. 

They noted that in several instances the Army provided funding for 

transformation-related activities but did not provide the associated 

personnel authorizations. TRADOC did not have available in-house 

personnel to address the new requirements, which effectively forced the 

Command to contract for those activities. In fiscal year 2001, the 

Command received $289 million related to new mission funding. Of that 

total, $150 million, or 52 percent of new mission funding, was directly 

associated with Army transformation and was used to acquire contractor 

support. For example, contractors were used to develop doctrine and 

training materials for the new Stryker brigades.



TRADOCís Full Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met; Leadership 

Panels and Combat Forces Cite Quality Problems:



Reductions in personnel authorizations, coupled with unchanged 

personnel requirements, have affected TRADOCís ability to meet workload 

requirements in some mission areas. The Command has been able to 

perform its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, backlogs 

of work exist in the training development, doctrine development, combat 

development, and base operations mission areas. The Commandís inability 

to address its personnel shortages and workload backlogs are reflected 

in its monthly readiness reports, which consistently show low readiness 

levels throughout the Command. At the same time, TRADOC lacks a formal 

process for obtaining customer feedback information to evaluate the 

effectiveness of its mission and alert Army leaders to potential 

problem areas. Two Army leadership panels completing their work in 2001 

and 2002 identified concerns about TRADOCís ability to effectively 

carry out its mission. Also, anecdotal evidence from U.S. Army Forces 

Command (FORSCOM)--a major TRADOC customer--indicates that the quality 

of TRADOC training provided to individuals has declined and confirms 

that some doctrine is not up to date. Army transformation and other 

potential future requirements will likely place new demands on TRADOC, 

making it even more challenging for the Command to perform its mission 

at its current resource levels.



TRADOC Performed Training Mission but Experienced Difficulty Meeting 

Other Mission Workload:



Over the past several years TRADOC has been able to perform its 

training mission, but officials noted some concerns about the quality 

of the training. As shown in figure 8, the number of full-time 

equivalent students per year--referred to as the training workload--

decreased significantly between fiscal years 1991 and 1994, primarily 

as a result of DOD downsizing. Since approximately 1994 the training 

workload has remained relatively steady, between 60,000 and 70,000 

full-time equivalent students annually. Due to the high priority placed 

on meeting the training workload, TRADOC ensures that the students 

arriving at its schools receive timely scheduled training.



Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



However, officials located at both TRADOC Headquarters and the TRADOC 

schools we visited expressed concern about a decline in quality in some 

aspects of the training provided by the Command. They believe that the 

Command does not have enough experienced training instructors to 

provide the quality of training they would like. They noted that 

personnel reductions have resulted in the loss of some of the corporate 

knowledge necessary to develop training courses and doctrine 

publications and that personnel who were once devoted solely to writing 

doctrine are now asked to conduct training first and to write doctrine 

as a secondary responsibility. Furthermore, they told us that the 

decreasing number of personnel, coupled with increasing class sizes, 

resulted in more students per instructor and less individual training 

time.



Workload Backlogs Exist in Some Mission Areas:



Workload backlogs are evident in some of TRADOCís primary mission 

areas. A training and doctrine development backlog exists throughout 

the Command. Moreover, the combat development backlog is growing. 

Finally, declining personnel and budgetary resources have affected the 

Commandís ability to carry out base operations.



TRADOC Has Training and Doctrine Development Backlogs:



According to TRADOC workload data, a training and doctrine development 

backlog exists throughout the Command. Army training and doctrine 

materials must complement one another so that soldiers are trained 

according to current doctrine. However, as a result of an insufficient 

number of training development personnel, TRADOC has not been able to 

maintain the currency of its highest-priority training courses--

commonly referred to as programs of instruction (POI)--and associated 

doctrine. TRADOC officials stated that to compensate for the shortage 

of doctrine development personnel, the Command has used contractors in 

some instances to write and revise doctrine publications. Even with the 

use of contractors, backlogs continue.



TRADOC managers use a database to manage the Commandís highest-priority 

training and doctrine development workload. TRADOC leadership uses the 

information contained in this database to make resource and workload 

allocation decisions. Table 2, which shows data extracted from the 

database, identifies the Armyís top 13 training and doctrine 

development priorities as understood by TRADOC. However, these top 

priorities do not represent the entirety of the Commandís training and 

doctrine development workload. The work associated with these 

priorities is expressed in terms of staff-years of work and staff-years 

available to perform the work. As the table shows, TRADOCís available 

personnel cannot complete the workload associated with these top 

priorities--only 45 percent of the staff-years required for the top 

priority training and doctrine development work were available, 

indicating a significant shortfall in personnel available to do this 

work.



Table 2: TRADOCís Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities 

(as of October 2002):



Priority ranking: 1; Workload categories: Contemporary operating 

environment/force protection; Staff-years: 717.98.



Priority ranking: 2; Workload categories: Unit set fielding - 1st 

Cavalry; Staff-years: 108.49.



Priority ranking: 3; Workload categories: Interim B\brigade combat 

teams (Stryker brigades); Staff-years: 850.22.



Priority ranking: 4; Workload categories: Distance learning courseware; 

Staff-years: 1,911.81.



Priority ranking: 5; Workload categories: Doctrine (field manuals, 

joint and NATO pubs); Staff-years: 306.82.



Priority ranking: 6; Workload categories: Mission training plans; 

Staff-years: 1,403.97.



Priority ranking: 7; Workload categories: Soldier training pubs; Staff-

years: 17.02.



Priority ranking: 8; Workload categories: TRADOC transformation; Staff-

years: 103.80.



Priority ranking: 9; Workload categories: Institutional digital 

education plan; Staff-years: 84.00.



Priority ranking: 10; Workload categories: Interim division; Staff-

years: 187.18.



Priority ranking: 11; Workload categories: Individual training 

requirements (POI, etc.); Staff-years: 1,326.19.



Priority ranking: 12; Workload categories: Total army training system 

courseware; Staff-years: 35.17.



Priority ranking: 13; Workload categories: Warrior training support 

packages; Staff-years: 265.43.



Priority ranking: Total staff-year requirements; Workload categories: 

[Empty]; Staff-years: 7,318.08.



Priority ranking: Total staff-years available; Workload categories: 

[Empty]; Staff-years: 3,294.00.



Priority ranking: Shortfall in 

staff-years; Workload categories: [Empty]; Staff-years: (4,024.08).



[End of table]



Source: TRADOC.



Most of the Commandís training and doctrine developers are focusing on 

the top four priorities. TRADOC officials stated that the first and 

fourth priorities are both being filled at nearly 100 percent of the 

staff-years required, while attention given to other areas--such as 

Mission Training Plans and TRADOC Transformation--varies.[Footnote 8]



Although many of the areas represented in table 2 have a component of 

doctrine writing, priority number 5 is the area most directly related 

to TRADOCís doctrine mission. TRADOC doctrine development officials 

told us that the Command had enough personnel to complete about 40 

percent of its existing doctrine development workload. A large portion 

of this backlog involves field manuals, which have to be written, 

reviewed periodically, and revised.[Footnote 9] In total, TRADOC is 

responsible for more than 600 field manuals and publications, which 

include joint operations with other military services and U.S. allies.



We calculated that as of January 2002 only about 33 percent of the 

field manuals in the inventory were up to date. (See fig. 9.) The other 

67 percent of the manuals required work, including the development of 

at least 81 new publications, the review of 129 existing publications, 

and the revision of 205 outdated publications. Of the 81 new 

publications, 26 are directly related to the Stryker brigades and Army 

transformation. Without updated field manuals, the Armyís combat units 

may not have the benefit of the tactics, techniques, and procedures 

needed to help them better perform their missions in future conflicts.



Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002):



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]







Doctrine writing is one mission area that relies on contractors to 

satisfy some workload requirements. For example, Fort Benning, which is 

responsible for supporting the development and fielding of the Stryker 

brigades, is using contractor personnel to develop doctrine for the new 

brigades. In this particular situation, Fort Benning officials told us 

that the contractor used retired military personnel with infantry 

experience to help write the field manuals. The officials noted that 

the retired military personnel being used by the contractor had 

relevant experience needed for writing doctrine; however, they also 

expressed concern that reduced personnel authorizations may eventually 

shrink the pool of available retired military personnel with the 

experience needed to fill the contract positions.



Combat Development Backlog Is Growing:



TRADOC is also experiencing growing workload backlogs in its combat 

developments mission area. The backlogs include tasks required to 

develop and analyze warfighting concepts and materiel requirements 

related to force modernization and transformation, among other things. 

According to TRADOC officials, the Command is responsible for about 

46,200 combat development tasks per year. Those same officials noted 

that the Commandís workload backlog is growing at a rate of about 33 

percent per year because the mission area does not have enough 

personnel to address the large volume of tasks that needs to be 

completed.



Declining Resources Affect TRADOCís Ability to Provide Base Operations:



TRADOCís base operations mission area, which involves activities like 

logistics and the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of real 

property, has also been affected by declining resources. TRADOC 

officials told us that they frequently were able to provide only 

emergency or minimal real property maintenance at installations between 

fiscal years 1995 and 2001, due to insufficient personnel and funding. 

Moreover, during that time, TRADOC shifted O&M funding from base 

operations accounts to training accounts to ensure that the training 

mission could be accomplished. This explains, in part, the backlog of 

reported real property maintenance. For example, for fiscal year 2001, 

the funding level for the Commandís base operations was set at about 70 

percent of its workload requirements, thus TRADOC was able to make more 

funding available for higher-priority mission areas, such as training.



Various TRADOC officials have also expressed concern about the 

difficulty of staffing and maintaining training ranges. For example, 

officials from both TRADOC and FORSCOM noted that the National Training 

Center, which is used to conduct large-scale collective training 

exercises, has not been adequately staffed to observe the training and 

provide feedback to units involved in the exercises. As a result, 

FORSCOM units have had to use their own personnel to augment National 

Training Center personnel, particularly in the area of forward 

observers; consequently, some FORSCOM combat personnel were not able to 

participate fully in training exercises.



Readiness Reports Show Personnel Shortages and Effects:



TRADOC prepares a monthly status report that assesses the readiness of 

most of its organizational units. These monthly reports are provided to 

the Army Chief of Staff. Our review of these reports showed that a 

majority of the Commandís organizations were assigned the lowest 

readiness rating throughout most of fiscal year 2001 and into fiscal 

year 2002 and that 17 of TRADOCís 30 reporting units identified 

personnel shortages as the primary reason for their lower readiness 

status.[Footnote 10] TRADOCís readiness rating criteria call for a unit 

to be rated low in the category of personnel if it has less than 70 

percent of the personnel it requires. Figure 10 shows how the 30 units 

included in the reports were rated.



Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for 

the Period January 2001 - February 2002:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Note: GAO analysis of TRADOC monthly status reports.



A few units that did not report problems with personnel shortages had 

other problems that caused them to report low readiness ratings. For 

example, one reporting unit that was consistently at a C-4 rating 

identified the lack of equipment on hand rather than insufficient 

personnel as the reason for its low readiness ratings.



Unit commanders include written comments that accompany the readiness 

ratings they provide on monthly readiness reports. The comments 

highlight the types of problems being experienced and the effect those 

problems have on the unitís mission performance. We reviewed the 

comments for the period covered in figure 10, and the following quote 

is representative of many of the comments that appeared in the monthly 

reports:



[The] lack of personnel and funding, especially a very limited officer 

presence, has put Combat, Doctrine and Training Development at risk 

resulting in the use of outdated doctrine and training materials.ÖThe 

Operating Force has to compensate by developing what it needs on its 

own.



According to our analysis, commanders most often reported the shortage 

of doctrine, training, and combat developers as their top readiness 

concern. For example, one comment stated that TRADOC needs funding for 

400 permanent civilian training development positions to eliminate the 

Commandís large training development backlog. Another comment noted 

that the 70 percent reduction in military and civilian training 

developers severely degraded the Commandís capability to maintain 

current force training materials as well as support the evolving future 

forcesí requirements. Between January 2001 and January 2002, 28 units 

reported a shortage of developers as a major concern at least once.



Other comments regarding the lack of personnel referred to reductions 

in the required rank of soldiers that were filling supervisory/training 

positions, thus assigning training responsibilities to less experienced 

military personnel. Likewise, commanders noted that personnel 

reductions had placed civilian personnel in positions for which they 

were marginally qualified or not qualified at all.



DOD also reports on the readiness of the military services to perform 

their respective training functions. This readiness assessment is 

presented to Congress in the departmentís quarterly and annual 

Institutional Training Readiness reports. Although TRADOC has 

consistently reported a low overall readiness status, the quarterly 

reports DOD provided to Congress generally showed Army institutional 

training readiness at the C-1 and C-2 levels. The readiness reports 

provided to Congress, however, only reflect the training portion of 

TRADOCís mission and do not rate the Commandís readiness to carry out 

training, doctrine, and combat development. For example, the 

departmentís annual Institutional Training Readiness Report for Fiscal 

Year 2001, issued January 2002, showed TRADOCís institutional training 

readiness to be either C-1 or C-2 for six of the seven training 

categories assessed.[Footnote 11] The report did note, however, that 

personnel and funding shortages caused some ratings to drop below C-1, 

particularly in the flight training area. The report also noted that 

TRADOC had to put other mission areas--combat, doctrine, and training 

developments--at risk to meet its primary mission of training. In 

addition, DODís Institutional Training Readiness reports compare the 

number of students projected to enter the training system and the 

number that actually receive training. For this reason, the reports do 

not provide a measure of training quality.



TRADOC Lacks Information to Evaluate Its Mission Effectiveness:



While TRADOC readiness reports show a significant degradation in 

readiness--often attributed to resource constraints--the impact on its 

ability to support operational forces is not well established and is 

often limited to anecdotal concerns voiced by operational leaders. 

TRADOC previously collected and evaluated such anecdotal information in 

the form of feedback from its customers, but it does not currently have 

the capability to do so. According to TRADOC officials, this capability 

was eliminated in the early 1990s as part of the Commandís response to 

reduced personnel authorizations. Nevertheless, collecting feedback 

from customers is a good management practice. The Government 

Performance and Results Act[Footnote 12] as well as prior GAO reports 

reference the need to obtain and analyze data related to the quality of 

services provided by and to government organizations.[Footnote 13] 

Obtaining feedback from customers is an important aspect of assessing 

the quality of services. Without a systematic process to collect and 

evaluate customer feedback information, the ability to plan and 

prioritize workload based on customersí needs is hindered.



The Command decided in fiscal year 2002 to reestablish a quality 

assurance program. According to TRADOC officials, the programís 

objectives would be to (1) establish and maintain an organizational 

structure within TRADOC to ensure the quality and standardization of 

education/training across components; (2) ensure that all components 

are trained to the same standard and trained to perform in a 

contemporary operating environment;[Footnote 14] (3) ensure that 

students can perform to training standards; and (4) ensure that 

education/training meets the needs of the legacy, interim, and 

objective forces. However, it is unclear how many resources TRADOC 

would be able to allocate to this program and whether the program would 

incorporate a customer feedback component.



Army Leadership Panels and FORSCOM Officials Believe the Quality of 

TRADOC Products Has Declined:



Two recent Army training and leader development panels and various 

FORSCOM officials indicate that the quality of TRADOCís products--such 

as well-trained soldiers and adequate field manuals and training 

materials--has declined. Also, officials at FORSCOM Headquarters and at 

one of its major installations, Fort Hood, Texas, provided us with 

anecdotal information about the quality of TRADOCís products that 

reinforced the panelsí observations.



During 2001 and 2002, two Army Training and Leader Development Panels-

-one representing officers and one representing noncommissioned 

officers--raised issues about the quality of TRADOCís products. The 

purpose of these panels, which were chartered by the Army Chief of 

Staff, was to assess the quality of the Armyís training and leader 

development programs and identify areas needing improvement. In 

particular, the panels were to determine the relevancy of existing 

training and leader development programs to the needs of the future 

forces. The first panel focused on evaluating training and leader 

development efforts related to commissioned officers, and the second 

panel focused on noncommissioned officers.



* The officer panel concluded that (1) TRADOC was not providing the 

Army with up-to-date training and educational products due to a severe 

lack of training development resources; (2) TRADOC was not updating or 

developing training and education products fast enough to support both 

the current and future forces; (3) many of the foundational 

publications and products related to standards-based training and 

leader development were obsolete; and (4) mechanisms for evaluating 

training and leader development programs were lacking. The panel made 

the general observation that the Armyís combat forces were evolving at 

a pace that was not allowing the institutional training base to provide 

up-to-date training and educational products.



* The noncommissioned officer panel presented similar but more detailed 

conclusions than the officer panel. The panel noted, among other 

things, that (1) more than 40 percent of Army military occupational 

specialties did not have current manuals; (2) the Army training and 

development standards had deteriorated since the early 1990s; and (3) 

the Armyís failure to keep its standards up to date since the Gulf War 

had created a generation of senior noncommissioned officers that do not 

know and are not executing the principles and processes of Army 

training doctrine.



FORSCOMís observations complement the findings of the two Training and 

Leader Development Panels. FORSCOM officials consistently noted that 

soldiers graduating from TRADOC schools are not as well trained as they 

once were because TRADOC no longer has the number of personnel it needs 

to ensure comprehensive, quality training. Nor did they feel that 

TRADOC had adequately developed or communicated a strategy for training 

personnel on digital equipment like the new Army Battle Command System. 

Moreover, they noted that some of the equipment being used for training 

was not current, and thus the training being provided on those systems 

was not properly preparing soldiers to operate the equipment that their 

operational units were using. For example, they said that armor 

officers were being trained on older versions of Abrams tanks at 

TRADOC, while several operational units were already using newer 

digitized versions. Several armor battalion commanders at Fort Hood 

said that they had to frequently provide individual training to armor 

officers coming from TRADOCís Armor School in order to familiarize the 

officers with the digital equipment being used in battalion tanks.



Some FORSCOM officials also expressed concerns about the age of Army 

doctrine publications, several of which are Cold War-era documents. 

They noted that the lack of current doctrinal publications causes units 

in FORSCOM to develop battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures 

based on doctrinal foundations that do not reflect the current 

operating environment. FORSCOM officials did note one exception to 

their general observations about doctrine: they believed TRADOC had 

provided both timely and quality doctrine development and related 

support for the new Stryker brigades.



TRADOC Likely to Face Additional Workload Challenges as the Armyís 

ďArchitect of the FutureĒ:



TRADOCís ability to meet its future responsibilities will likely be 

challenged because the Command continues to acquire new mission 

requirements that will continue to compound its already large workload 

backlogs. For example, Army transformation requirements will continue 

to place new demands on TRADOC over the next several years.[Footnote 

15] Transformation will bring changes in equipment as the Army 

modernizes existing equipment and transitions to the interim and 

objective forces. This, in turn, will necessitate changes in operating 

concepts, doctrine, and training.



The Armyís plans, however, do not call for the total elimination of 

current capabilities. While it is developing the objective force and 

establishing the interim force, such as the Stryker brigades, the Army 

plans to sustain, recapitalize (upgrade and rebuild), and modernize 

many of the systems currently in use. For example, all of the Abrams 

tanks currently in the Armyís arsenal will eventually be equipped with 

digital battlefield command systems as part of modernization and 

transformation efforts and will remain in the arsenal until about 2031. 

Maintaining and upgrading current capabilities will continue to place 

demands on TRADOCís combat, doctrine, and training developments mission 

areas.



Available budget data indicate that TRADOC could face increased funding 

challenges as the Army proceeds with its transformation efforts and 

continues to maintain its current weapon systems. We reported in May 

2001 that the modernization and transformation of the current force 

will require significantly more resources--current systems alone would 

require substantial investment to sustain and modernize.[Footnote 16] 

As we noted in the report, the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) said on September 6, 2000, 

that the Army would require 

$23 billion to modernize its current forces during fiscal years 2002 to 

2007, but projected that it would only have about $15.5 billion for 

that purpose, a $7.5 billion shortfall. Given this magnitude of budget 

shortfalls, without additional budgetary resources and improved 

operating efficiencies, the Army will have to make trade-offs between 

modernization initiatives and operational demands. Moreover, Army 

Headquarters has not been persuaded to provide TRADOC with 

significantly more resources, primarily because it does not have extra 

resources available. Officials involved in prioritizing Army budgetary 

resources stated that the Army simply had too many other, higher-

priority programs and requirements to satisfy before it could provide 

TRADOC with additional funding.



Effect of Ongoing and Planned Actions on TRADOC Is Uncertain:



Both Army Headquarters and TRADOC have actions or plans in process that 

could affect TRADOC, but it is unclear how these actions will affect 

the Commandís resource posture or its ability to perform its mission. 

Armywide actions include the transfer of responsibility for base 

operations away from all of its commands to a new Armywide 

organization, a reassessment of the process used to determine personnel 

requirements for TRADOC and the other institutional forces, and ongoing 

commercial activities studies that may cause TRADOC to rely more on 

contractors to support future operations. The Command is also losing 

some military personnel to the combat forces as part of the Armyís 

ďManning the ForceĒ initiative. Finally, TRADOC is in the process of 

developing a commandwide reengineering plan, which is intended to 

streamline its organizational structure, make better use of information 

technology, and be more responsive to the Armyís combat forces. Issues 

and questions related to these various initiatives remain unresolved or 

unanswered.



Base Operations Mission Transferred to New Organization:



As part of its effort to transform, streamline its headquarters, and 

improve resource management, the Army announced plans in October 2001 

to create a new agency for managing all of its base operations 

activities. The new agency, called the Installation Management Agency 

(IMA), was activated in October 2002 and assumed management 

responsibilities for base operations activities such as force 

protection, logistics, public works, facilities maintenance, and morale 

and welfare programs under one management organization.[Footnote 17] 

The Army hopes to achieve several goals with IMA, which include 

improving the efficiency and effectiveness of installation management 

and allowing mission commanders to focus more on maintaining readiness. 

The Army expects to transfer about 35,000 personnel authorizations and 

about $8 billion in funding from various Army commands to IMA during 

fiscal year 2003.



For fiscal year 2001, TRADOC had about 18,100 personnel requirements 

and about 10,350 personnel authorizations for base operations. The Army 

began to transfer personnel authorizations and associated funding from 

TRADOC to IMA in October 2002. As many as 10,000 personnel may be 

transferred, although the number had not been finalized. The personnel 

authorizations to be transferred represent most of the authorizations 

allocated to TRADOCís base operations mission area.



The loss of the base operations mission will result in TRADOC having 

less flexibility to shift funding among its primary mission areas. In 

the past, TRADOC has been able provide additional funding to its 

higher-priority mission areas by taking some funds from base 

operations. For example, in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, the 

Command moved $115 million, 

$98 million, and $145 million, respectively, from investment accounts-

-which were primarily base operations accounts--to training 

accounts.[Footnote 18] As a result, TRADOC was able to complete its 

primary mission--training--at the expense of some base operations 

activities, such as the maintenance and rehabilitation of facilities. 

TRADOC officials told us they will no longer have the flexibility to do 

this after base operations funding is reallocated to IMA.



Army Reassessing Process for Determining Institutional Force Personnel 

Requirements:



The Army is reassessing the process it uses to determine personnel 

requirements. Army regulations require that the institutional forceís 

personnel requirements be based on workload. A sound workload analysis 

is needed to allocate personnel resources among institutional 

organizations throughout the Army and to ensure that the highest-

priority functions and missions are funded first. Moreover, current law 

specifies that civilian personnel are to be managed solely on the basis 

of the workload required to carry out the functions and activities of 

their respective military department and the funds made available to 

the department.[Footnote 19] The law also requires the military 

department secretaries to report annually on their compliance with the 

provisions of this law.



However, the Army has had longstanding issues with its institutional 

force personnel requirements, as documented in previously published GAO 

and Army Audit Agency reports.[Footnote 20] Since early 1995, the Army 

has developed plans and taken steps to improve the processes used to 

develop personnel requirements for the institutional forces. 

Nevertheless, we reported in May 2001 that the accuracy of the 

personnel requirements for the Armyís institutional forces was 

questionable.[Footnote 21] We recommended that, among other things, the 

Army use the results of Army Manpower Analysis Agency reviews to 

improve the personnel requirements of the institutional forces.



While some progress to develop more accurate personnel requirements has 

been made, the Army is still concerned about two primary problems: (1) 

the validity of workload estimates and the resulting personnel 

requirements and (2) the extent to which contractors are satisfying 

workload requirements. For example, in fiscal year 2002, the Army did 

not have accurate information about the size and use of the contractor 

workforce. As a result, the Army was unable to report that it was 

managing its civilian personnel solely on the basis of the workload 

required to carry out the functions and activities of the department 

during fiscal year 2002. A major issue involved the extent to which 

contractors were meeting workload requirements. Although the Army 

expends about one-third of its total obligation authority for 

contractor support, its estimates of the number of contractor personnel 

supporting the Army ranges from about 125,000 to 600,000.[Footnote 22] 

Without accurate information about the contractor workforce, the Army 

was not confident that its civilian personnel requirements were valid. 

In 2002 the Army began an effort to identify the size of its contractor 

workforce; this effort is still underway.



In early 2002, concerned about the accuracy of its personnel 

requirements and the widening gap between personnel requirements and 

authorizations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 

within Army Headquarters initiated a study of the requirements 

determination process for all of the commands that comprise the 

institutional forces.[Footnote 23] The intent of the study was twofold-

-to arrive at a process that produces valid requirements and to 

strengthen the role of Army leadership components in the review and 

approval of the requirements. Among other things, the study team 

proposed in August 2002 that personnel requirements simply be adjusted 

downward so that they would equal personnel authorizations. This 

proposal applied to TRADOC even though its personnel requirements 

determination process had previously been certified as valid by the 

Armyís Manpower Analysis Agency. The proposed change in the process was 

expected to pressure the commands that comprise the institutional force 

to rejustify their respective personnel requirements and give Army 

Headquarters more control over the process. However, the commands, as 

well as some Headquarters offices, opposed the proposal for several 

reasons. They believed that it did not (a) acknowledge valid 

requirements processes that were already in place; (b) acknowledge 

existing workload backlogs in excess of resource levels, which makes 

areas of risk more visible to senior managers; (c) acknowledge the role 

the commands play in validating requirements; and (d) comply with 

legislative requirements to manage personnel requirements solely on the 

basis of workload. As a result of the commandsí concerns, the proposal 

has been abandoned. However, the study team continues to seek out other 

options for strengthening senior Army managersí control over the 

process and to identify potential new policy guidance related to the 

personnel requirements determination process for institutional forces. 

The follow-on study is not expected to be completed until sometime 

during fiscal year 2003.



Commercial Activity Studies Likely to Reduce Personnel Requirements and 

Authorizations:



Studies conducted as part of the Armyís commercial activities program 

will likely lead to some reduction in personnel authorizations at 

TRADOC. To help meet DOD force reshaping and downsizing goals, the Army 

established a goal for TRADOC to study about 13,600 positions under 

Office of Management Budget Circular A-76. One goal of the A-76 studies 

is to identify commercial functions that could be performed more 

efficiently, either by a streamlined in-house workforce or a contract 

with the private sector. In either case, the required number of 

personnel authorizations would likely be reduced--either because the 

in-house workforce would become more efficient and would not require as 

many staff or because the function would no longer be performed by 

current federal employees. However, these studies by themselves will 

not free personnel for assignment to other mission areas where 

shortages exist.



Most of TRADOCís commercial activity studies were initiated in fiscal 

years 1997 and 1999. Because studies generally take from 2 to 4 years 

to complete, TRADOC did not begin to implement decisions until fiscal 

year 2001. As of November 2002, decisions on 39 of the 57 studies had 

been made. Decisions implemented thus far resulted in a majority of the 

activities under study going to private-sector contractors. Remaining 

decisions will not be made until sometime in fiscal year 2003. Table 3 

shows the status of the studies.



Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies Announced during 

Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002):



Studies announced; 1997: 13; 1999: 44; Total: 57.



Total positions to be studied; 1997: 4,833; 1999: 3,999; Total: 

8,832.



Civilian; 1997: 4,709; 1999: 2,043; Total: 6,752.



Military; 1997: 124; 1999: 1,956; Total: 2,080.



Studies completed; 1997: 13; 1999: 26; Total: 39.



Positions retained in-house; 1997: 935; 1999: 1,429; Total: 2,364.



Positions to contract; 1997: 3,898; 1999: 423; Total: 4,321.



Source: TRADOC.



[End of table]



The studies reviewed a number of commercial activities; however, most 

of the larger studies fell within the base operations mission area and 

involved the logistics and public works functions. Because TRADOCís 

base operations mission was transferred to IMA beginning in October 

2002, the Command will not be affected in the future by most of these 

studies. Of TRADOCís remaining primary mission areas, training and 

training support will be most affected by some of the smaller 

commercial activities studies that are currently underway.



In addition to the above studies that are nearing completion, the Army 

announced plans in October 2002 to further study all of its functions 

that do not necessarily require military personnel to perform. If these 

plans are carried out, Army officials estimate that as many as 150,000 

personnel authorizations Armywide could be eliminated as work shifts to 

the private sector. To what extent this will affect TRADOC remains to 

be seen.



Further, although commercial activity studies can reduce TRADOCís 

personnel requirements and improve operating efficiencies, they can 

increase the Commandís budget requirements when their outcome results 

in military positions being replaced by civilian or contractor 

personnel. In these instances, the Army plans to reallocate the 

military positions to other needs. However, the increase in budgetary 

requirements occurs because the Command must budget for the cost of its 

civilian personnel and contractors, which are paid from O&M funds. They 

no longer have the benefit of the military personnel who were paid by 

Army Headquarters from centrally managed funds. These additional costs 

are referred to as ďmilitary buy-backĒ costs. In September 2001, TRADOC 

estimated that its military buy-back costs would be about $44 million, 

$90 million, and $92 million for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, 

respectively.



ďManning the ForceĒ Initiative Is Reducing TRADOCís Military 

Authorizations:



The Armyís ďManning the ForceĒ initiative was announced in fiscal year 

2000 and is intended, in part, to transfer military personnel from the 

institutional to the operational forces to improve the readiness of 

combat forces. This initiative will continue at least through fiscal 

year 2003. Initially, TRADOC expected to lose about 1,400 military 

personnel to the combat units as a result of the ďManning the ForceĒ 

initiative. Since a lack of military personnel is already contributing 

to workload backlogs and low readiness reports, the initiative is not 

likely to improve TRADOCís ability to reduce backlogs and improve 

readiness. Furthermore, the loss of authorized military personnel will 

not free funds for the Command because, as discussed above, military 

personnel are not paid from TRADOCís O&M funds.



However, TRADOC officials were not able to identify the number of 

military personnel that either have been or will be sent to the combat 

units as a result of the ďManning the ForceĒ initiative. They explained 

that several initiatives affecting the number of military personnel 

assigned to TRADOC, such as ďQuicksilver,Ē were already underway when 

the ďManning the ForceĒ initiative began.



TRADOCís Plan to Reengineer the Command Is Still Evolving:



TRADOC has begun developing a plan to overhaul its structure and 

processes, and that plan is still evolving. TRADOC officials believe 

that the Command must reengineer or overhaul its structure and 

processes to ensure that it continues to support the combat forcesí 

readiness and Army transformation. They believe that an overhaul is 

needed because (1) the rapid pace of change related to transformation 

is stressing the systems and processes associated with combat, 

doctrine, and training development; 

(2) the current procedures are too resource-intensive; (3) the weapon 

systems requirements determination process does not respond to the 

needs of the combat forces in a timely manner; and (4) the cost of 

maintaining TRADOCís current organizational structure cannot be 

sustained.



In May 2002 the Command received approval from the Army Chief of Staff 

to develop a reengineering plan. Its draft plan, referred to as the 

TRADOC Transformation Operational and Organizational Plan, is linked to 

Armywide plans that provide overall strategic direction--the 2002 Army 

Modernization Plan and the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. The 

TRADOC plan is based on two primary goals: (1) streamline the Commandís 

organization and processes and (2) make better and more extensive use 

of information technology. The Commandís staff is also in the process 

of updating policies and regulations to support the reengineering 

effort.



Although TRADOCís draft plan has not been finalized, the Command is 

considering the following organizing concepts to help it achieve its 

goals:



* Implement new teaming and partnering arrangements. TRADOC is 

considering establishing new teaming and partnering arrangements across 

organizational boundaries to better focus its resources on key mission 

areas. Command officials believe that this approach will maximize 

personnel resources and expertise across the Command to produce better 

products and eventually result in more effective partnership 

arrangements. As part of this organizing concept, the role of TRADOC 

Headquarters will evolve from program management to the integration of 

functions and organizations within TRADOC.



* Establish a Combined Arms Command. TRADOC is considering establishing 

a subcommand, notionally being referred to as a Combined Arms Command. 

This command will focus on training and leader development. Most of 

TRADOCís educational institutions will be placed under this 

organization, which will oversee the activities of the schools.



* Centralize development for training materials, doctrine, and combat 

systems. TRADOC is considering centralizing development activities as a 

by-product of its adoption of a standard schoolhouse model (as 

discussed in the following point). Responsibility for training 

development, doctrine development, and combat development for the 

future force would be shifted from the current 26 schools to six 

primary battlefield mission areas associated with future combat 

operations--maneuver, maneuver support, maneuver sustainment, fires, 

command and control, and special purpose forces. Development of each of 

these primary battlefield mission areas would be under the command of a 

general officer. In addition, each primary battlefield mission area 

would be supported by a battle laboratory. The six battlefield areas 

would report to the Combined Arms Center, leaving the individual 

schools to become more focused on the primary mission of training 

soldiers. TRADOC believes doing this would help the command become more 

efficient and effective.



* Readopt the standard schoolhouse model. After TRADOC was established 

in the 1970s, it established school houses/training centers (infantry, 

armor, artillery, etc.) that followed a standard model in the way they 

were organized and staffed. As resources became more constrained, the 

schools were given more flexibility to organize in a manner that suited 

the commandersí needs and, theoretically, would make the best use of 

TRADOC resources. Management became more decentralized. TRADOC is 

considering a move away from the decentralized management approach and 

back to a standard schoolhouse model. In addition, the schools would be 

clustered or organized under the primary battlefield mission areas 

associated with future combat operations.



* Refocus battle laboratories and centralize their management. The 

commandís 11 battle laboratories are currently aligned with TRADOCís 

schools. For example, an armor battle laboratory is part of the armor 

school at Fort Knox, and the infantry battle laboratory is part of the 

infantry school at Fort Benning. TRADOC is considering centralizing the 

management of six laboratories and refocusing them on the six primary 

battlefield mission areas discussed above. TRADOC believes realigning 

the laboratories, along with creating new teaming and partnering 

arrangements, will better focus its resources on broader issues, such 

as Army transformation.



* Use distance learning more extensively. Distance learning is expected 

to become an integral part of the Commandís training curriculum. 

Implementation of this concept has been underway for some time at 

TRADOC. In general, it allows soldiers to complete computer-based 

training courses or selected modules of a course at their permanent 

duty location rather than traveling to a TRADOC facility to complete 

the course. TRADOC expects to develop at least 525 distance learning 

courses by 2010.



TRADOC officials also believe that better and more extensive use of 

information technology is just as important as the organizational 

changes it is considering. These officials state that information 

technology will be the basic building block of the reengineering 

effort. TRADOC officials believe the Command has to address mission 

requirements more quickly with fewer resources. They also believe 

improved processes built on the latest technology will allow TRADOC and 

its customers to share data and develop products--such as doctrine, 

training materials, and operational requirements documents--in a timely 

manner.



At the time we completed our review of TRADOC, the Command had not yet 

developed costs and benefits associated with the reengineering plan, 

and it was not clear to what extent the reengineering effort would 

result in organizational realignments or consolidations that might 

reduce personnel requirements. TRADOC officials told us that an 

analysis of costs and benefits would take place and be incorporated 

into an implementation plan after the reengineering concepts and 

organizing principles were agreed to within the Army. The analysis is 

to be completed by mid-fiscal year 2003.



We also inquired about development of performance measures to gauge the 

progress of the reengineering effort and a human capital plan to 

support the effort. Ideally, a reengineering effort such as the one 

being undertaken by TRADOC is guided by an overall strategic framework, 

which sets out the strategic goals to be attained and performance 

measures to be used to measure and report progress toward reaching the 

goals. Moreover, the Government Performance and Results Act requires 

DOD to develop a strategic framework to improve its performance. In 

addition, it is important for DOD and its components to align their 

human capital policies with their strategic goals.[Footnote 24] A human 

capital plan that supports or is integrated with an overall strategic 

plan can help align the policies and identify the necessary workforce 

size and skills mix and where those skills need to be deployed. When 

the right personnel are on board and provided the training, technology, 

structure, incentives, and accountability to work effectively, the 

likelihood of organizational success will be increased.



We found that TRADOC recognized the need for performance measures but 

had not yet developed them. We also found that the Command has not 

developed a human capital plan to support the reengineering effort; 

however, it has identified the elements needed for a human capital 

plan, which is to be completed during fiscal year 2003. Thus far, the 

effort addresses civilian personnel and how the Command can better cope 

with the civilian personnel reductions it has incurred; it does not 

address workforce issues associated with military personnel or 

contractors, which, in a broad sense, are also part of the Commandís 

human capital. Given the personnel downsizing that TRADOC has 

experienced and its potentially increasing reliance on contractors to 

meet its workload, a human capital plan could help the Command 

thoroughly assess its personnel requirements and integrate them into 

the reengineering effort.



Conclusions:



Although TRADOCís budget has increased in recent years, the Command has 

experienced reductions in personnel authorizations that have challenged 

it to fully meet its workload in most mission areas. TRADOC data 

indicate that its primary problems relate to personnel shortages, and 

its readiness reports indicate that more than two-thirds of its units 

were not ready to perform their missions due primarily to a lack of 

personnel. Most of the training workload is getting done, but a 

significant amount of mission work associated with training material, 

doctrine, and combat developments is not. In addition, TRADOC does not 

know how well it is accomplishing its mission because it does not have 

a process in place to obtain systematic feedback from its customers on 

the quality and relevance of its training and doctrine. Without this 

type of information, the Army and TRADOC are not in a sound position to 

fully assess the Commandís mission effectiveness, which could lead to 

inefficient allocation of resources and ranking of requirement 

priorities. Army Headquarters officials are aware of some of TRADOCís 

difficulties, but, operating within existing resource constraints, 

officials have had to make difficult choices and allocate resources to 

higher Army priorities.



However, issues related to TRADOCís personnel and workload could take 

on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts 

and, if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased 

risk in its role as the Armyís architect of the future. TRADOC is 

currently developing a plan to reengineer its mission areas. The extent 

to which this effort could lead to organizational consolidations and 

reduced personnel requirements remains to be seen. A broad assessment 

of TRADOCís workload requirements and backlogs in conjunction with its 

reengineering plans would help it set its future direction. Because the 

Commandís reengineering effort is still evolving, the Army and TRADOC 

have an opportunity to establish a plan based on a strategic framework 

for addressing resource and mission requirements, human capital, 

reengineering costs, and performance measures.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



To ensure that TRADOC retains sufficient resources to carry out all of 

its missions in an effective and efficient manner--supporting current 

forces as well as the transformation effort--we recommend that the 

Secretary of the Army direct the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Manpower & Reserve Affairs) to work with the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations and Plans, as part of their personnel and force management 

oversight responsibilities, to examine TRADOCís workload requirements, 

the adequacy of TRADOCís resources, and TRADOCís mission performance as 

it finalizes plans for its reengineering efforts. In doing this, action 

is needed to:



* reassess TRADOCís backlog of current work and future work 

requirements across all mission areas to ensure that all personnel 

requirements are identified and validated before further reducing 

TRADOCís personnel authorizations;



* develop a human capital plan in conjunction with TRADOCís 

reengineering plan that addresses issues associated with the mix and 

skills of civilian, military, and contractor personnel;



* establish performance measures to gauge progress and identify the 

costs and benefits associated with the reengineering effort; and:



* develop a feedback system so TRADOC is acquiring the best information 

possible about the quality and relevance of the products and services 

it provides to its customers.



Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:



In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense (Program Integration) stated that the department agreed with 

the recommendations related to TRADOCís reengineering process without 

elaborating on planned actions, but expressed various concerns about 

the recommendations related to reassessing TRADOCís personnel 

requirements and developing a customer feedback system--leaving unclear 

what overall actions would be taken. The departmentís written comments 

are reprinted in Appendix III.



DOD interpreted our recommendation to reassess TRADOCís backlog of 

current workload and personnel requirements before further reducing 

TRADOCís personnel authorizations as a recommendation to fence TRADOCís 

current work force, and it cited resource constraints and competing 

demands as making it impractical to do so. Further, the departmentís 

response expressed concern that our report did not quantify the 

resources required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine, 

and combat developments. Our recommendation was not intended to be 

taken in isolation or to suggest an absolute fencing of TRADOC 

personnel, but rather to encourage a reassessment of workload and 

personnel requirements as part of TRADOCís ongoing reengineering 

effort. Likewise, our intent was not to quantify the resources required 

to remedy the backlogs of work in the various areas noted. That effort 

can best be done by the Army in the context of a number of 

considerations. From our perspective, the Army and TRADOC have several 

options if they are to effectively deal with reported shortfalls in 

personnel related to workload requirements. The options include 

identifying functions and activities that may no longer be required, 

identifying opportunities to reduce personnel requirements or 

reallocate resources through its reengineering efforts, obtaining 

additional resources, or some combination of these. Given that TRADOCís 

reengineering effort is still underway, and we understand that TRADOCís 

new commander has recently directed his staff to focus on the potential 

for reducing workload requirements, it remains unclear what changes in 

resource requirements will ultimately be necessary. Given the resource 

constraints identified by TRADOC commanders in their monthly readiness 

reports, we continue to believe it appropriate that TRADOC reassess its 

work requirements as part of its reengineering efforts.



Concerning our recommendation for developing a customer feedback 

system, DOD commented that existing informal feedback mechanisms help 

evaluate TRADOCís support to its customers. It indicated they would 

evaluate our recommendations in terms of the costs, benefits, and 

likely accuracy of more formal reporting processes. DOD also noted that 

it would evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further improve 

product relevance and customer responsiveness as part of the TRADOC 

reengineering process. Separately, DOD expressed concern that our 

report did not quantify the impact of shortcomings noted in our report 

on operational force readiness. Our assessment of impact was, aside 

from information contained in TRADOCís readiness reports, more 

qualitative in nature based on the results of internal Army studies and 

our limited discussions with leaders in the Armyís Forces Command. 

Given the nature of the concerns identified, we continue to believe 

that the Army could benefit from a more formal feedback system, one 

that, if appropriately designed, could be useful to the Army in better 

determining how well TRADOC supports the operational readiness of the 

combat forces. Absent such a system, it will be more difficult to fully 

assess the impact of the shortcomings noted in our report.



We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Army; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; 

and interested congressional committees and members. We will also make 

copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please 

contact me on (202) 512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov. Other GAO contacts and 

staff acknowledgments are identified in appendix IV.



Signed by Barry W. Holman:



Barry W. Holman, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management:



[End of section]



Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:



As requested by the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on 

Readiness, we examined the workload, funding levels, and personnel 

resources at the Armyís Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Our 

review was structured to determine if the Command was adequately 

resourced to carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were 

to examine (1) TRADOCís personnel, budget, and workload trends since 

1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on the Commandís 

ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to 

combat forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned that could have an 

effect on the Commandís ability to perform its mission.



To determine the extent to which TRADOC has experienced budget, 

personnel, and workload changes over the past several years, we met 

with Army Headquarters and TRADOC budget, personnel, operations, and 

training officials. Pertinent budget, personnel, and workload 

documentation/data were obtained and analyzed to determine the 

magnitude of the changes. We focused our analyses primarily on 

documentation from fiscal years 1995 through 2001 because we were able 

to obtain more complete information for these years. Fiscal year 2002 

budget data had not been finalized at the time we completed our 

analysis. We also examined relevant DOD and Army senior leader 

guidance, including the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Army 

Transformation Campaign Plan, TRADOC mid-year budget reviews, and 

TRADOC command plans. We also discussed the allocation of Army 

personnel among its commands resulting from the Total Army Analysis 

process. We identified the primary TRADOC mission areas--combat 

development, doctrine development, training and training development, 

accessions (more commonly referred to as recruiting), and base 

operations--and structured our analysis of budget, personnel, and 

workload data around these mission areas. Our analysis of budget data 

was limited to budgetary obligations for the fiscal years we reviewed. 

Our analysis of personnel data compared the differences in required, 

authorized, and available personnel for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. 

We also discussed and reviewed available documentation pertinent to the 

process used by TRADOC to develop and validate its personnel 

requirements. We held discussions and reviewed documentation with 

TRADOC, Army Manpower Analysis Agency, and Army Force Management 

Support Agency representatives. The documentation included 

mathematical models and studies completed by TRADOC to develop manpower 

estimating criteria. We also compared the changes in TRADOCís civilian 

and military authorizations with those of the total active Army and two 

of the Armyís largest commands--Army Materiel Command and Forces 

Command--to put the personnel changes into an overall Army context. We 

also identified the changes in budgetary resources allocated to 

TRADOCís mission areas for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. Because 

aspects of TRADOCís accessions mission were added to its 

responsibilities in fiscal year 1998 and subsequently eliminated from 

its responsibilities, we excluded the accessions mission when we 

analyzed the trends in personnel and workload. This included personnel 

requirements, which averaged about 12,400 for fiscal years 1998 through 

2000, and personnel authorizations, which averaged about 11,900 for 

this 3-year period. The analyses that excluded the accessions mission 

are noted, where appropriate, in the report.



To determine the effect of personnel and budget changes on the 

Commandís ability to perform its mission, we met with officials from 

TRADOC and Forces Command Headquarters and several of their 

installations. At TRADOC Headquarters we discussed and obtained 

documentation related to the Commandís ability to measure mission 

effectiveness. This included reviewing the Commandís monthly readiness 

reports for the period November 2000 through April 2002 for all of its 

schools and training facilities; these reports are provided to the Army 

Chief of Staff each month. We also compared TRADOCís readiness reports 

with DODís Institutional Training Readiness reports issued during the 

same period to identify similarities and/or differences between the 

two; the Institutional Training Readiness reports are provided to 

Congress annually. At the TRADOC facilities we visited--the armor 

school, the air defense school, and the infantry school--we discussed 

the resources available to support the facilitiesí workload. We also 

identified examples of impacts that resulted from resource shortages 

and obtained information about how the facilities were measuring their 

mission effectiveness. At Forces Command Headquarters and one of its 

heavy armor installations, Fort Hood, we discussed the quality of 

soldiers coming out of TRADOC schools and requested available data that 

measured the quality of TRADOC products--trained soldiers, doctrine, 

and training support materials. We also reviewed numerous reports and 

analyses of agencies and groups that have examined TRADOC--such as RAND 

Corporation, TRADOC Analysis Center, and the Defense Science Board--to 

obtain any additional observations and findings not revealed during our 

review of TRADOC.



To identify Army actions taken or planned that might have an effect on 

the Commandís ability to perform its mission, we met with Army 

Headquarters officials and TRADOC officials to discuss past, current, 

or future initiatives that could affect the resources TRADOC will have 

available to carry out its mission. During these discussions, we 

obtained documentation and testimonial evidence regarding several 

initiatives. These included the Commandís commercial activities 

program, the Armywide Transformation of Installation Management 

initiative, and the Commandís plan to reengineer itself. We analyzed 

the impact of the commercial activities program, which is being carried 

out under OMBís Circular A-76 process, on TRADOCís budget and personnel 

since fiscal year 1995. We determined the number of positions announced 

for competition, the number of positions awarded to contractors, and 

the number of positions retained by TRADOCís in-house workforce. We 

also discussed the scope and implementation schedule for the Armyís 

Transformation of Installation Management initiative, which is an 

Armywide program that is moving base operations and support from 

garrison commanders to a new agency called the Army Installation 

Management Agency. Finally, we discussed the status of plans to 

reengineer TRADOC, which involves organizational streamlining and 

better use of information technology.



We communicated regularly with Department of the Army and TRADOC 

officials during the analysis process to ensure that our analysis 

appropriately considered their views, and we conducted work at the 

following locations:



* Army Headquarters, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia;



* TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia;



* Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky;



* Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas;



* Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia;



* Forces Command Headquarters, Fort McPherson, Georgia;



* 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas;



* Army Manpower Analysis Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and:



* Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.



We conducted our review from September 2001 through October 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.



[End of section]



Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions:



Since the early 1990s, the Armyís civilian and military personnel 

authorizations have been significantly reduced as DOD reshaped and 

reduced the size of its institutional and operational forces. Overall, 

the Armyís authorizations for civilian and active duty military 

personnel have been reduced by about 41.5 percent and 33.8 percent, 

respectively, since fiscal year 1991.[Footnote 25] The following 

figures show the reductions for the Army and three of its largest 

commands: TRADOC; the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), which provides 

unit training for combat forces; and the Army Materiel Command (AMC), 

which is responsible for acquiring and supporting weapon systems.



Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected 

Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.



Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected 

Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.



As shown by these figures, all three commands realized significant 

reductions in civilian personnel. Table 4 summarizes the reductions 

that occurred from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 2001.



Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the Active 

Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001:



Active Army; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 153,200; 

Civilian personnel: Percent: -41.5; Military personnel: Number of 

reductions: 245,400; Military personnel: Percent: -33.8.



TRADOC; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 13,515; Civilian 

personnel: Percent: -41.9; Military personnel: Number of reductions: 

13,549; Military personnel: Percent: -27.1.



FORSCOM; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 10,056; Civilian 

personnel: Percent: -36.4; Military personnel: Number of reductions: 

28,694; Military personnel: Percent: -12.4.



AMC; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 41,561; Civilian 

personnel: Percent: -45.5; Military personnel: Number of reductions: 

5,915; Military personnel: Percent: -79.5.



Source: Army.



[End of table]



Note: GAO analysis of Army data.



[End of section]



Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:



PERSONNEL AND READINESS:



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:



Mr. Barry W. Holman:



Director, Defense Capabilities and Management United States General 

Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:



Dear Mr. Holman:



This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO, draft 

report, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission 

Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command, dated 

December 13, 2002 (GAO Code 350113).



We support the recommendations that suggest improvements to the Army 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) re-engineering process, but take 

specific issue with the reportís recommendation that no further 

reduction of TRADOCís military or civilian personnel occur until this 

review is completed. We do not believe it appropriate to fence TRADOCís 

current work force mix or resourcing based on the data supplied in the 

draft report alone. Further, resource constraints and competing 

demands, particularly the global war on terrorism, make it impractical 

for the Army to fence TRADOC authorization levels until process 

improvements have been implemented.



We are also concerned that the report does not quantify the resources 

required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine, and combat 

developments, nor does it quantify the impact of those backlogs on 

operational force readiness. The report acknowledges that contractors 

may be mitigating some doctrine-writing workload, but forces Army G-3, 

rather than TRADOC as claimant for additional resources, to quantify 

the magnitude of that offset.



In addition, the report cites the absence of processes for systematic 

customer feedback on the quality and relevance of TRADOCís products. 

Although thereís always room for improvement, existing informal 

feedback mechanisms help evaluate TRADOCís support to its customers. We 

plan to evaluate the GAO recommendations in terms of the costs, 

benefits and likely accuracy of more formal reporting processes. 

Further, we will evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further 

improve product relevance and customer responsiveness during the TRADOC 

business process re-engineering effort.



My point of contact is Colonel Sid Evans of the Requirements 

Directorate, (703) 695-0813, sidney.evans@osd.mil.



Sincerely,



Signed by Jeanne B. Fites:



Jeanne B. Fites Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 

Integration):



[End of section]



Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contact:



James E. Fuquay, (937) 258-7963:



Acknowledgments:



In addition to the person named above, James Hatcher, Nancy Lively, 

Travis Masters, Debra McKinney, Robert Preston, and R.K. Wild made key 

contributions to this report.



FOOTNOTES



[1] Throughout this report, we refer to personnel requirements and 

personnel authorizations. Personnel requirements refer to the number of 

personnel, both civilian and military, deemed necessary by TRADOC to 

support its workload. Personnel authorizations refer to the number of 

personnel an organization, in this case TRADOC, is allowed to hire. 

Personnel authorizations are often less than requirements because of 

budget constraints.



[2] ďQuicksilverĒ was an Army initiative intended to reduce its force 

structure and create a more balanced, versatile, lethal, smaller, and 

ready force.



[3] The Quadrennial Defense Review analyzes military strategy for U.S. 

forces.



[4] We focused primarily on TRADOCís fiscal year 2001 budget because 

the Command had not yet received its final 2002 budget authorization at 

the time we conducted a significant portion of our analysis.



[5] TRADOC also assumed responsibility for the Army Civilian Training 

Education Development Student Detachment, the Army Aeronautical 

Services Agency, and the Army Nuclear Chemical Agency.



[6] The Army Manpower Analysis Agency is assigned responsibility for 

overseeing and certifying the Army requirements determination processes 

used by Army commands. The Manpower Analysis Agency reports to the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs).



[7] During fiscal year 2002, the Army began collecting information to 

identify the size of its contractor workforce.



[8] TRADOC does not track actual staff-year data. However, officials 

were confident that the Contemporary Operating Environment/Force 

Protection and the Distance Learning Courseware priorities were filled 

to 100 percent. They identified other areas that have received 

resources, but could not provide a measure of the level of resourcing 

for these areas.



[9] The Army doctrine development (field manual development) cycle has 

six phases: 

(1) assessment, (2) planning, (3) development, (4) production, (5) 

print and dissemination, and (6) implementation and evaluation. This 

process may take from 18 to 24 months to complete. The length of time 

varies depending on whether a field manual is being newly written or 

revised, the scope and complexity of the material, the extent of the 

staffing/review required, and the level of approval authority required.



[10] Readiness ratings are based on specific criteria related to 

personnel levels, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and 

training. The ratings are measures of a unit/componentís ability to 

perform its mission. A C-1 rating represents the highest readiness 

position, denoting that the mission can be fully performed. Conversely, 

a C-4 rating represents the lowest readiness position, denoting that 

the mission cannot be accomplished.



[11] The seven categories of institutional training that were assessed 

were (1) recruiting, 

(2) one-station unit training, (3) officer acquisition, (4) initial 

skill training, (5) skill progression training, (6) functional 

training, and (7) flight training.



[12] The Government and Performance and Results Act requires federal 

agencies to set strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the 

degree to which the goals are met. Its intent is to focus agencies more 

on results, service delivery, and program outcomes (P.L. 103-62, 1993).



[13] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Improving 

Customer Feedback Program Could Enhance DLAís Delivery of Services, 

GAO-02-776 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2002); Tax Administration: IRS 

Faces Challenges in Measuring Customer Service, GAO/GGD-98-59 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 1998); and Federal Prison Industries: 

Limited Data Available on Customer Satisfaction, GAO/GGD-98-50 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 1998).



[14] According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 02-

8, Operation Enduring Freedom Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, the 

contemporary operational environment is the overall operational 

environment that exists today and in the near future, out to the year 

2020. The range of threats during this period extends from smaller, 

lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to 

larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more 

conventional, symmetrical ways.



[15] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army 

Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces 

Major Challenges, 

GAO-02-96 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001).



[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisition: Army 

Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges, GAO-01-311 

(Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001).



[17] IMA is comprised of a headquarters located in the Washington, D.C. 

area and seven regional offices--four located within the continental 

United States and one each in Hawaii, Germany, and Korea. 



[18] The investment accounts included funds for (a) infrastructure 

sustainment, rehabilitation, and modernization; (b) facility 

reduction; (c) integrated training management; and (d) combat 

developments.



[19] The legislative requirements are set out in 10 U.S.C. Section 129; 

the annual reports are to be completed by February 1 of each year.



[20] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Armyís 

Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few 

Results, GAO/NSIAD-98-65 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1998) and U.S. 

Army Audit Agency, Managing Workload, Organizations and Staffing, HQ 

94-751 (Alexandria, Va.: June 23, 1994). 



[21] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Projected 

Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well Established, GAO-01-485 

(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2001).



[22] The estimate is based on a study sponsored by the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), which was completed 

in March 2002. The Assistant Secretary (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) is 

responsible for Army personnel policies. 



[23] The Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for 

conducting the Total Army Analysis, which determines the allocation of 

personnel resources among the operational and institutional forces. 

Within Operations and Plans, the Force Management Division has had a 

long-standing role in determining personnel allocations for the Armyís 

combat forces. The Force Management Division was the sponsor of this 

study and believes it needs to be more involved in allocating personnel 

authorizations to the institutional forces. The Chief of Staff for 

Operations and Plans also receives TRADOCís monthly status reports on 

readiness. 



[24] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self-

Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, 

D.C.: September 2000, Version I); U.S. General Accounting Office, Human 

Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the Departments of Defense 

and State, GAO-01-565T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2001); and U.S. 

General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed 

to Help Maintain Momentum of DODís Strategic Human Capital Planning, 

GAO-03-237 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2002).



[25] The totals do not include members of the Army Reserve and National 

Guard.



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