SECURITY PROTECTION

Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight Committee on the Judiciary U.S. Senate

July 2000

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The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you requested, this report updates our December 1994 report in which we reviewed security protection for officials at 10 of the 14 Cabinet-level departments. You asked that we expand our 1994 report by addressing standardization and centralization issues regarding security protection. As agreed with the Subcommittee, this report includes data on the protection of all civilian executive branch officials except the President, Vice President, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials, and U.S. ambassadors to foreign countries.

This report provides information from agency security officials and protected officials on the following questions pertaining to fiscal years 1997 through 1999: (1) How many federal government officials were protected, who protected them, and how many security personnel protected them? (2) How much did it cost to protect these officials? (3) Under what legal authorities were agencies providing security protection? (4) Under what circumstances were officials protected? (5) How were agencies preparing threat assessments, and what are the implications of standardizing and centralizing threat assessments? (6) What training did protective personnel receive, and what are the implications of standardizing and centralizing security protection training? (7) What are the implications of centralizing protection services under one agency? and (8) What are the views of the protected officials regarding the need for and adequacy of their protection?

We collected this information by asking security officials from the 27 agencies that provided the protection to complete detailed questionnaires on these issues, reviewing documents, and visiting protection training facilities. We also sent letters directly to officials who were protected from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 requesting their views on their

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1 Security Protection: Costs of Services Provided for Selected Cabinet Officials (GAO/GGD-95-50, December 30, 1994).
protection and security standardization issues. Although we asked agencies for the bases of their decisions to protect officials, we did not independently assess whether particular officials should be protected or whether the level of protection being provided and resources being expended were appropriate.

Due to the sensitive nature of this information, we agreed to respond in two reports. This report addresses all eight questions by providing aggregate data. It does not provide information by agency or identify specific protected officials. A separate, classified report addressed to you on May 31, 2000, provided specific information on the security provided by position held and agency.

Results in Brief

From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, agency security officials said that security protection was provided to officials holding 42 executive branch positions at 31 executive branch agencies. These officials included all 14 Cabinet secretaries, 4 deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking officials (mainly heads of agencies). The 42 officials were protected by personnel from 27 different agencies. Thirty-six officials were protected by personnel from their own agencies or departments; and 6 officials were protected by personnel from other agencies or departments, such as the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Marshals Service.

Agencies reported that the number of full-time protective personnel increased by 73 percent from fiscal years 1997 through 1999. The 27 agencies also reported spending a total of at least $73.7 million to protect those officials during that 3-year period. The agencies reported they spent $19.1 million in fiscal year 1997, $26.1 million in fiscal year 1998, and $28.5 million in fiscal year 1999—a 49-percent increase between those 3 years. The agencies with the largest increases in costs and full-time protective personnel during those 3 years generally said that these increases were the result of increased travel by the protected officials and the provision of enhanced security to respond to potential terrorist threats.

Only two agencies—the Secret Service and the State Department—had specific statutory authority to protect executive branch officials. The other agencies relied on a variety of other authorities in providing protection to officials, such as having their protective personnel deputized by the U.S. Marshals Service to provide them with law enforcement authority.
Agencies reported that their officials received different levels and frequencies of protection and that protection was needed to respond to possible and actual threats. According to agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions, threat assessments form the basis for determining the need and scope of protection. However, nearly three-fourths of the agencies that provided protection said they had not prepared detailed, written threat analyses justifying their decisions to apply certain levels of protection and expend resources. Security personnel generally reported that their ability to prepare threat assessments depended in part on their access to information from other agencies about potential and actual threats against their officials, known as protective intelligence. Three agencies cited specific examples of when they had been unable to obtain needed intelligence from another agency about potential threats against their officials.

With regard to standardizing threat assessments, it is uncertain how agencies could obtain the protective intelligence they need from governmentwide sources to prepare the assessments and who would prepare them. Most agencies favored establishing a central repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of threat information about their officials. Security officials said the implications of establishing a central repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of such information among agencies would involve determining who should administer the repository, how it would operate, whether specific statutory authority would be needed, and the cost of establishing and administering it.

The agencies in our review reported that their protective personnel received different amounts of protection training and from different sources. Generally, protective personnel from the agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions reported having more training than those employed by the other agencies. The agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions reported that their training consisted of instruction in firearms; threat assessments; emergency medical training; practical protection exercises; security advance, motorcade, airport, and foreign travel procedures; defensive driving skills, defensive tactics, and legal authorities. Further, several agencies reported that their field staff, who provided protection as part of their collateral duties, received less protection training than the agencies’ full-time protective personnel based in Washington, D.C., or that their field staff had

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2 A Secret Service official defined protective intelligence as the programs and efforts that seek to identify, assess, and manage persons and/or groups who make or pose threats to public officials.
received no protection training. Six agencies said they had difficulty obtaining protection training for their personnel because of class availability, funding, or workload problems.

Most agencies favored establishing a standardized protection training program so that different agencies’ protective personnel would be trained in the same procedures and would react in a similar manner in case of an emergency. With regard to standardizing training for protective personnel, the implications of what subjects the training should include, what agency should provide the training, and the cost would need to be considered.

Security officials at most of the agencies in our review said they opposed centralizing security protection under one agency. They said it was more effective to use protective personnel who were employed by the officials’ own agencies because the personnel were knowledgeable about the agencies’ culture and operations. Protected officials who responded to our queries about the adequacy of their protection generally said they were satisfied with their protection and would like to continue with the current arrangements. The implications of centralizing security protection governmentwide involve many issues, including who would decide who is to be protected and the level of protection to be provided; who would provide the services; whether Congress would need to grant statutory authorities; and whether centralization would be the most cost-efficient and effective way of providing these services over the current, more decentralized approach.

We found that no single agency or official was responsible for handling issues relating to the routine protection of executive branch officials. This fragmentation of protective responsibilities among multiple executive branch agencies has implications regarding the functioning of government, in part, because 14 of the protected officials are in the line of presidential succession. Moreover, the lack of thorough threat assessments documenting the level of protection needed makes it difficult to determine the basis for and reasonableness of the protection being given, especially considering the growth in the costs of protection in recent years.

We are recommending that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in consultation with the President, designate an official or group to assess how protective intelligence should be shared among agencies, how best to link threat assessment with the need for protection and level of protection provided, who should provide protection, whether agencies should be provided with specific statutory authority to provide protection, what training should be provided to personnel protecting
federal officials, and who should provide it. We are also recommending that this official or group report its findings to the OMB Director and that the Director report his recommendations on these subjects to Congress. Once the Director submits his recommendations to Congress, Congress should enact legislation that would enable whatever agency or agencies that provide protection to have appropriate statutory authority and consider making the necessary resources available to effectively carry out these responsibilities.

According to the Secret Service, assassination of political leaders and other public figures has been a significant problem in the United States. Since 1835, 11 attacks on U.S. presidents have occurred, 4 of them resulting in the death of the president. In the past half-century, two presidential candidates and two Members of Congress have been attacked; several national political leaders have been assassinated; several state and federal judges have been murdered; and several celebrities, business leaders, and state and local elected officials have been attacked. In addition, an unknown number of would-be attackers have been deterred from carrying out harm through the intervention of law enforcement and security personnel. Recent terrorist incidents in the United States have also heightened concern about protecting high-ranking government officials.

Historical data on assassinations and assassination attempts against federal officials suggest that elected officials have been victims of attack more frequently than those holding high appointed positions.\(^3\) We found only one instance in U.S. history when a Cabinet secretary was physically harmed as part of an assassination attempt, which occurred when then-Secretary of State William Seward was attacked in his home by one of the Lincoln assassination conspirators in 1865. More recently, in 1987, a man was arrested in Washington, D.C., for threatening to kill the President and the U.S. Secretary of State. He was found in possession of a cache of weapons. And in 1988, a bomb exploded alongside a motorcade carrying the Secretary of State in Bolivia. The Secretary of State was not injured in that bombing incident.

\(^3\) A 1998 Marshals Service report, Hunters and Howlers, Threats and Violence Against Federal Judicial Officials in the United States, 1789-1993, quoted a 1970 report on political violence (commissioned by President Johnson after the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy) indicating that “the more powerful and prestigious the office, the greater the likelihood of assassination... [T] here is a much greater likelihood that the occupant of or aspirant to an elected public office will be the victim of an assassination than will the occupant of an appointed position, even though the position may be a powerful one, such as Secretary of State, Justice of the Supreme Court, or Attorney General.” In its report, the Marshals Service said that “[t]wenty years later and three assassinated federal judges later, it is doubtful that the commission would change its conclusions.”
Although we did not find that top appointed federal officials historically have been frequent victims of harm, security officials stressed that effective security protection serves as a deterrent to harm. Moreover, research on threat assessments suggests that top appointed federal officials may be vulnerable to attack. In 1998, the U.S. Secret Service published a report on its study of the thinking and behavior of people who were known to have attacked or approached to attack public officials in the United States from 1949 to 1996. The study found that many attackers and would-be attackers considered more than one target before attacking. Assailants often made final decisions about whom to attack because an opportunity presented itself or because they perceived another target was unapproachable, the study indicated. These findings have implications for high-ranking government officials, who may become targets of attack by potentially dangerous individuals who transfer their focus among different government officials. In addition, security protection for Cabinet secretaries has national security implications because they are in the line of presidential succession.

We asked the agencies in our review to indicate the number of direct threats (e.g., threat of direct physical harm, kidnapping, extortion, etc.) they had received against their officials from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and the number of arrests that were made to protect their officials. Of the 27 agencies in our review that provided protection, 18 agencies reported having received at least 1 direct threat against their protected officials during this 3-year period. The agencies reported receiving a total of 134 direct threats from fiscal years 1997 through 1999–72 in fiscal year 1997, 33 in fiscal year 1998, and 29 in fiscal year 1999. During the 3-year period, six arrests were made for threatening three of the protected officials.

Generally, personal security protection consists of having armed personnel within the vicinity of an official and in locations where the official plans to

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4 Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations, U.S. Secret Service, July 1998. One Cabinet secretary was identified in the study as the victim of a near-lethal approacher—the Secretary of State in the 1987 incident described above. The study was funded by the National Institute of Justice.

5 Under 3 U.S.C. 19, the line of presidential succession is as follows: Vice President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, President pro tempore of the Senate, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
Travel. In addition, protection involves making related security plans and analyzing possible and actual threats.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the heads of all of the agencies that either provided protection services or had protected officials during fiscal years 1997 through 1999, the OMB Director, the Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), and the Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs and Cabinet Secretary. Comments from the agencies that chose to provide them are discussed at the conclusion of this report. The written comments we received are contained in appendixes II through XI. We did our work in the Washington, D.C., area; Beltsville, MD; and at FLETC in Glynco, GA, from September 1999 through May 2000. We performed our audit work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our investigative work was done in accordance with investigative standards established by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. Our detailed scope and methodology for this review are contained in appendix I.

From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, security protection was provided on at least 1 occasion to officials holding 42 different positions at 31 executive branch agencies. These officials included all 14 Cabinet secretaries, 4 deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking officials (mainly heads of agencies).6 The 42 officials were protected by personnel from 27 different agencies. Protection was provided to officials holding 34 positions in fiscal year 1997, 37 positions in fiscal year 1998, and 39 positions in fiscal year 1999.

Thirty-six officials were protected by personnel from their own agencies or departments (primarily within offices of security or Inspectors General); and 6 officials were protected by personnel employed by other agencies (the Secret Service, State Department, Marshals Service, and Federal Protective Service).7 To avoid possibly compromising their security, we are not providing specific information in this report about which officials were protected, who protected them, or how many security personnel protected them.

6 We counted each of the Cabinet departments and their respective agencies separately in the total number of agencies. Several positions were held by different individuals during the 3-year period, so we counted the number of protected positions, not officials.

7 Another agency had a private security firm on retainer if it needed additional protective services.
Agencies reported that the number of full-time protective personnel increased by 73 percent from fiscal years 1997 through 1999. Information regarding the number of part-time protective personnel and the amount of time they spent on protection could not be quantified governmentwide.8 In our 1994 report, 10 Cabinet departments reported that they employed a total of 11 full-time personnel to protect their officials.9 Our review found that those same 10 Cabinet departments employed substantially more full-time protective personnel in fiscal year 1999. We are not disclosing in this report the number of employees being used to provide protection to avoid possibly compromising the officials’ security.

Protective personnel at the 27 agencies that provided protection were employed by 6 offices of security, 5 offices of investigation, 3 offices of Inspectors General, 3 police offices, and 10 other offices. Fourteen agencies primarily employed criminal investigators (job classification 1811) to protect their officials; 6 agencies primarily employed security specialists (job classification 0080); and the remaining 7 agencies primarily employed protective personnel with other job classifications.

Security officials at two agencies that employed security specialists said they would prefer to hire criminal investigators to protect their officials, but that Office of Personnel Management (OPM) personnel rules prohibited them from hiring criminal investigators for this purpose. These officials said that being able to hire criminal investigators as protective personnel would help in recruiting and retaining those employees because criminal investigators have better pay and retirement benefits, compared to the security specialists. In addition, these officials said they could impose physical fitness standards on criminal investigators that they could not impose on security specialists, and that criminal investigators generally have better investigative and analytical skills than security specialists do.

We asked the 27 agencies in our review to provide data on the protection costs that they incurred for salaries and overtime of security personnel; travel; special executive protection training; and other expenses, such as equipment and residential security. They reported spending a total of at

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8 Many of the agencies reported using employees, mainly in the field, to assist in providing protection as part of their collateral duties.

9 This included four departments with full-time protective personnel and six departments that used personnel who provided protection as part of their collateral duties. The 1994 report excluded data on protection provided at the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury.
least $73.7 million from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 to protect officials holding 42 positions from fiscal years 1997 through 1999.

Agencies reported that the amount of money spent to protect officials that they were able to identify increased by 49 percent from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 1999 (a 46-percent increase in 1999 dollars). To protect these officials, agencies reported they spent $19.1 million in fiscal year 1997 ($19.5 million in 1999 dollars), $26.1 million in fiscal year 1998 ($26.4 million in 1999 dollars), and $28.5 million in fiscal year 1999. However, these figures are understated because some agencies said they did not record and could not reconstruct certain protection costs. The agencies with the largest increases in costs and full-time protective personnel during those 3 years generally said that the increases were the result of increased travel by the protected officials and the provision of enhanced security to respond to potential terrorist threats, in light of international terrorist incidents.

Costs varied substantially among agencies because of the different levels of protection provided and other factors, such as the amount of foreign travel. Salaries and travel expenses represented the greatest portions of the total expenses. We are not disclosing in this report how much was being spent to protect specific officials to prevent the cost data from being extrapolated to possibly determine the level of protection being provided.

A comparison of costs incurred by 10 Cabinet departments for security protection that were included in our 1994 report showed that their costs of protection nearly tripled from fiscal years 1992 to 1999, after being adjusted for inflation. In 1994, we reported that 10 Cabinet departments (the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury were excluded) spent a total of $1.5 million in fiscal year 1992, $1.6 million in fiscal year 1993, and $2 million during the first 9 months of fiscal year 1994. (In 1999 dollars, the value of $1.5 million in 1992 would be $1.7 million; the value of $1.6 million in 1993 would be $1.8 million; and the value of $2 million in 1994 would be $2.2 million.) By contrast, these same 10 Cabinet departments spent a total $2.8 million in fiscal year 1997 ($2.8 million in 1999 dollars), $3.6 million in fiscal year 1998 (also $3.6 million in 1999 dollars), and $4.6 million on protection in fiscal year 1999.10 These 10...

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10 In 1986, we reported that 15 agencies (including 8 of the 10 Cabinet departments in the 1994 report) indicated they spent a total of $1.6 million to protect officials in each of fiscal years 1984 and 1985, and estimated they would spend $1.6 million in fiscal year 1986. (In 1999 dollars, the value of $1.6 million in 1984 would be $2.4 million, and the value of $1.6 million in 1985 and 1986 would be $2.3 million.) See Bodyguard Services: Protective Services Provided Selected Federal Officials (GAO/GGD-86-55FS, Feb. 28, 1986). The 1986 report excluded the costs of protecting officials at the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury.
Cabinet departments represented 16 percent of the total expenditures for protection incurred by all of the executive branch agencies in our review in fiscal year 1999.

Legal Authorities for Providing Protection

We asked agencies to provide their legal authorities for providing personal security protection. In response, agencies cited various legal authorities that they believed gave them the authority to provide such protection. Some agencies cited the Inspector General Act of 1978,\(^\text{11}\) the general authority of agency heads to issue regulations,\(^\text{12}\) a 1972 letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to Cabinet secretaries,\(^\text{13}\) a 1970 memorandum from the White House Counsel to a Cabinet department,\(^\text{14}\) special deputation from the Marshals Service,\(^\text{15}\) and a specific delegation of authority set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations.\(^\text{16}\) The Marshals Service, through its Deputy U.S. Marshals, is authorized by statute\(^\text{17}\) to provide security in various U.S. courts and to provide personal protection of certain government officials and other individuals in certain

\(^{11}\) 5 U.S.C., App. 3.

\(^{12}\) 5 U.S.C. 301.

\(^{13}\) The November 27, 1972, letter from Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz to all Cabinet heads renewed an offer to have the Secret Service provide training for the departments' protective personnel. The memo also indicated that following a discussion at the White House, "it was decided that each Department would provide and maintain a protective force, composed of their own employees. At the same time the President offered the assistance of [the] Secret Service in making available a protective training course for applicable personnel from other Departments...."

\(^{14}\) The December 1, 1970, memorandum from White House Counsel John Dean to a Cabinet department indicated that the Secret Service planned to conduct a training session for executive departments’ protective personnel.

\(^{15}\) Special Deputy U.S. Marshals are appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 561 (g) (the Marshals Service “shall command all necessary assistance to execute its duties” and 28 C.F.R. 0.112. \textit{See also} 7 OLC 86 (1983). Special Deputy U.S. Marshals are sworn and appointed to perform specific functions and have federal law enforcement authority to perform those functions. According to Marshals Service policy directive 99-13, issued February 5, 1999, deputized U.S. Marshals may, among other things, seek and execute arrest and search warrants; make arrests without warrant if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a violation of federal law; serve subpoenas and other legal writs; and carry firearms for personal protection or the protection of persons covered under the federal assault statutes. However, the policy also states that agency personnel who receive special deputation for personal protection do not have general arrest authority. The policy directive also indicates that applicants for deputation must, among other requirements, be employed by a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency or an agency approved by the Department of Justice; have successfully completed a basic law enforcement program; have previous law enforcement experience; qualify with firearms; and agree to comply with the sponsoring agencies’ or the Department of Justice’s policy on use of deadly force.

\(^{16}\) Under 7 C.F.R. 2.33 (a)(2), the Secretary of Agriculture delegated authority to protect the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to the Department’s Office of Inspector General.

\(^{17}\) 28 U.S.C. 566 (a), (e)(1)(B).
circumstances.\textsuperscript{18} However, beyond protection of federal judges and
government witnesses, the Marshals Service relies upon the direction of
the Attorney General before undertaking personal protection details for
other persons. The Marshals Service cites an 1890 Supreme Court
decision\textsuperscript{19} as supporting its inherent authority to provide personal
protection to persons as directed by the Attorney General to assure the
faithful execution of the federal law, even in the absence of a specific
federal authorizing statute. The Marshals Service also cites a recent
memorandum from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel as
further supporting its authority to protect agency officials.\textsuperscript{20}

Only two executive branch agencies in our review—the Secret Service\textsuperscript{21}
and the State Department\textsuperscript{22}—had specific statutory authority to protect
executive branch officials, including the authority to carry firearms in
carrying out their protective responsibilities. The Secret Service has broad
authority to make arrests in connection with its protective functions, but
the State Department told us that its protective agents can make such
arrests only for crimes committed in their presence. Although none of the
other agencies cited specific statutory authority to protect their officials,
that does not mean that the agencies are not authorized to provide such
services. In decisions of the Comptroller General, we have recognized that
under certain circumstances, agencies can expend appropriated funds to

\textsuperscript{18} Under 28 U.S.C. 566(a), the Marshals Service provides for the “security” of the U.S. District Courts,
U.S. Court of Appeals, and the Court of International Trade. Under 28 U.S.C. 566 (e)(1)(A), the
Marshals Service may protect “Federal jurists, court officers, witnesses, and other threatened persons
in the interests of justice where criminal intimidation impedes on the functioning of the judicial
process or any other official proceeding.” In addition, under 18 U.S.C. 3053, U.S. Marshals may carry
firearms and make arrests without warrants for “any offense against the United States committed in
their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony.”

\textsuperscript{19} The case is Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).

\textsuperscript{20} March 23, 2000, memorandum from Daniel Koffsky, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to
Deborah Westbrook, General Counsel, U.S. Marshals Service.

\textsuperscript{21} Under 18 U.S.C. 3056, the Secret Service may protect the President, Vice President (or other official
next in the order of succession to the President), the President-elect, the Vice President-elect, former
presidents, and their immediate families; visiting heads of foreign states or foreign governments; “other
distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States
performing special missions abroad” when directed by the President; and major presidential and vice
presidential candidates. Under this same statute, the President, Vice President (or other official next in
the order of succession to the President), the President-elect, and the Vice President-elect may not
decline this protection.

\textsuperscript{22} Under 22 U.S.C. 2709, the State Department may protect the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary
of State, official representatives of the U.S. Government in the United States or abroad; heads of a
foreign state; official representatives of a foreign government; “other distinguished visitors to the
United States;” and to the immediate families of all of the preceding; and foreign missions within the
United States.
protect their officials as a necessary expense. Such protection is warranted if it is administratively determined that the efficiency of the agencies would be affected because of threats or other legitimate concerns over the safety of officials that would impair their abilities to carry out their duties.

When agencies provide protection to their officials without specific statutory authority to do so, potential problems can arise, particularly with respect to whether their protective personnel have the necessary law enforcement authorities to make arrests, conduct investigations, and use force. The military agencies in our review, for example, indicated that their protective personnel had the authority to arrest military personnel, but not civilians, and that they had only the authority to detain civilians who constitute an immediate threat to the safety of a protected official. A security official at another agency said that the Marshals Service deputations of some of his protective personnel had expired, so that if these personnel needed to make an arrest, they would have to make a “citizen’s arrest” and contact the local police. Eight agencies also said that they did not have the authority to investigate threats against their protected officials. Those agencies said that they referred threats to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other agencies for investigation.

A security official at one agency that did not have specific statutory authority to provide protection said that he was concerned about potential legal liabilities if his personnel would have to use force, including the use of firearms, to protect the head of his agency. This official said that being given specific statutory authority by Congress to provide security protection would give his agency and personnel more protection against possible lawsuits associated with the use of force. In addition, this official said that being given specific statutory authority to provide protection would help his agency obtain authority from OPM to hire criminal investigators to provide protection, rather than security specialists.

Similarly, the Marshals Service advised us that to avoid potential problems in providing protection, agencies should have specific statutory authority to do so whenever possible. The Marshals Service also said that a statutory change would be necessary if the responsibility for investigating

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24 The official in charge of security protection at that agency said that the Marshals Service deputations of his personnel had not yet been renewed because the Marshals Service had imposed a new requirement that the personnel receive law enforcement training, which some of his personnel had not received. This official said that he planned to have these personnel receive this training.
threats related to protecting executive branch officials became a permanent part of the Service's mission. Further, the Marshals Service said that to provide and plan protection, agencies need to have arrest and threat investigation authority.

The primary protective personnel employed at 11 agencies, including 2 offices of Inspectors General, were deputized as U.S. Marshals to provide them with needed law enforcement authorities. Agencies must apply to the Marshals Service to deputize their protective personnel and renew the deputations periodically. According to Marshals Service officials, the Marshals Service may not renew these deputations after January 1, 2001, to highlight the need for Congress to provide agencies’ offices of Inspectors General with their own statutory authority to provide protection. Marshals Service officials said that if Congress does not provide statutory law enforcement authority to those agencies by January 1, 2001, it might be appropriate for the Marshals Service to assume those agencies’ protective responsibilities at that time. Further, the Deputy Director of the Marshals Service said the issue regarding some agencies’ lack of statutory authority to provide protection has not received severe scrutiny because no incidents have occurred that would bring this matter to the forefront.

We contacted an Associate Deputy Attorney General about this issue, who said that the administration sent a proposal to Congress that would provide statutory law enforcement authority to the 18 presidentially appointed Inspectors General if they met certain conditions regarding training, firearms, and operating procedures. However, the Associate Deputy Attorney General said that this legislative proposal would not provide specific authority to offices of Inspectors General to provide protection. He said that specific statutory authority for the Inspectors General to provide protection could be provided only by amending the Inspector General Act.

In providing comments on a draft of this report, three agencies expressed concern about how their protective operations would be affected if the Marshals Service deputations of their protective personnel were not renewed. One of those agencies, for example, said that nonrenewal of Marshals Service deputations would make it impossible for agencies to carry out their protective responsibilities by eliminating the law

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25 Marshals Service policy provides different periods of expiration for special deputation. Deputation for Special Agents employed by Offices of Inspectors General and federal security and protection agencies expires after 3 years.
enforcement powers of their protective personnel to carry firearms and make arrests.

### Circumstances Under Which Officials Were Protected

The agencies in our review reported that their officials received different levels and frequencies of protection, which generally included protection while they worked in their offices, attended public events, and traveled on official business. Certain officials were also protected during private time. To avoid compromising their security, we are not disclosing any specific information about when the officials were protected.

### How Agencies Were Preparing Threat Assessments and the Implications of Standardizing and Centralizing Threat Assessments

Security officials generally said they determined their officials needed protection as a result of possible threats and actual threats received from individuals who were (1) opposed to the policies and issues being handled by their agencies, (2) apparently suffering from mental problems, (3) opposed to the officials personally, and (4) terrorists. Security officials also said the level of protection provided was determined by a variety of factors, including the sensitivity of issues being handled by the agency, the visibility of the protected officials to the public, travel needs, and the officials’ personal preferences.

According to the Secret Service, threat assessment is “the process of gathering and assessing information about persons who may have the interest, motive, intention, and capability of mounting attacks against public officials and figures.” The Secret Service believes that gauging the potential threat to and vulnerability of a targeted individual is key to preventing violence. The Air Force, which requires that detailed, written threat assessments be prepared regarding its protected officials, indicates that the assessment is “the initial element of any protective operation. It forms the basis for determining the need and scope of a formal protective service operation.” Air Force policy requires that threat assessments include a discussion of risk factors, including the officials’ visibility, vulnerability to attack, and threat motivation factors; a categorization of the types of threats; and a discussion of procedures for the collection and evaluation of protective intelligence.

The agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions (the Secret Service, Marshals Service, and the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service) and most of the Department of Defense (DOD) agencies had prepared written, detailed threat assessments regarding their

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We reviewed threat assessments prepared by the seven agencies in our review that had detailed, written threat assessments on their protected officials. These assessments generally contained discussions of the officials' backgrounds, their visibility to the public, potential threats to the officials posed by individuals and groups, current events affecting the agencies, and other data. Some agencies also rated the levels of threat against their officials in low, medium, or high categories, both overall, and for specific trips that the protected officials planned to take. Officials at some of those agencies told us that threat assessments should be prepared when protective assignments begin and be a continuous process of gathering and analyzing information about potential threats against the protected officials and the locations they plan to visit.

However, 20 of the 27 agencies said they had no detailed, written threat assessments on their protected officials or documentation of their decisions to provide certain levels of protection. Security officials at agencies without such documentation said that protection was provided to respond to specific or perceived threats, available protective intelligence, and the protected officials' wishes. In addition, the seven agencies that did have written threat assessments did not detail how decisions were made regarding the size of the protective force needed. Without assessments that link the level of threat to the size of the protective force, it would be difficult to determine whether the level of protection provided and the amount of money spent on protection were appropriate.

At least two agencies protected officials only after their officials received direct threats. However, research on protective intelligence and threat assessments suggests that the number of threats received against protected officials may not be the most accurate measure of the level of threat against officials. According to the Secret Service, persons who pose actual threats often do not make threats, especially direct threats. In the Secret Service's study of the 83 attackers and near-lethal approachers of prominent public officials and figures from 1949 to 1996, less than one-
tenth communicated a direct threat to the target or to a law enforcement agency.29

Who decided the level of protection to be applied varied from agency to agency. Security officials at 6 of the 27 agencies indicated that the protected officials decided their overall level of protection on the basis of their personal preferences and sometimes upon the recommendations of their security staffs. At eight agencies, security officials said the level of protection provided was decided jointly by them and the protected officials on the basis of actual and perceived levels of threat against the agencies and the protected officials. With regard to the other 13 agencies that provided protection, including the agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions, security officials said they, and occasionally with input from other staff, decided the level of protection on the basis of protective intelligence.

Several agencies with protective responsibilities did not have the authority and resources to gather protective intelligence nationwide. Without such information, the Secret Service said, a competent threat assessment cannot be done regarding a person’s capacity and intent to act violently toward a public official. Security officials at three agencies provided specific examples of when they had not received timely protective intelligence from another agency about potential threats against their officials.

The Secret Service indicated that it would be helpful for agencies to share information about people who come to their attention because of inappropriate behavior or communication. According to the Secret Service’s 1998 study, attackers and would-be attackers often consider multiple targets, who may live in different jurisdictions with various law enforcement agencies and security agencies responsible for physical protection and protective intelligence. To facilitate the detection of patterns of behavior in known would-be attackers, the study said, law enforcement agencies should implement information-sharing programs with other such agencies.

To facilitate this sharing of protective intelligence, the Secret Service is considering the creation of a protective intelligence repository, which would permit agencies to determine whether a person of possible protective concern to them had previously come to the attention of any other agency for protective reasons. According to the Secret Service, each

protective agency would share information with other agencies consistent with its own protocols. However, Secret Service officials said that a protective intelligence repository would have to be designed with privacy and other legal considerations in mind. A Secret Service official said the agency may not be able to release all of the information it has if it involves individuals’ medical records, for example.

The Secret Service also said that it already has been sharing protective intelligence with agencies. It recently formed the Protective Detail Intelligence Network, consisting of protective personnel from all agencies, to formalize the sharing of protective intelligence. The Network, led by the Secret Service, plans to meet quarterly to discuss protection issues and share protective intelligence.

In our discussions with security officials, the issue of standardizing threat assessments focused on how agencies can obtain the protective intelligence they needed from governmentwide sources to prepare thorough analyses. One means discussed to facilitate the sharing of such information involved the idea of establishing a central repository of protective intelligence. The implications of establishing a central repository of protective intelligence primarily involved issues of control and legal authority. On one hand, security officials said that establishing a central repository for protective intelligence could provide a formal mechanism for sharing threat data, which could give agencies additional information about threats against their officials and other individuals who may be in the officials’ presence. On the other hand, some security officials feared that a central protective intelligence repository could result in the creation of a new bureaucracy and said that privacy and recordkeeping concerns would need to be taken into consideration in the design of the repository. Additional considerations involve whether legislation would be needed to authorize an agency to establish the repository and the costs of establishing and administering it.

We asked the 27 agencies that provided protection whether they favored the establishment of a central repository of protective intelligence as a means of facilitating the sharing of threat information among agencies.

Proposed legislation in the 106th Congress, H.R. 3048, would authorize the Secret Service to establish a National Threat Assessment Center to facilitate the sharing of threat information by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with protective responsibilities. This bill passed the House of Representatives on June 26, 2000.

The Network held its first meeting in February 2000. It held a second meeting in April 2000 to share protective intelligence relating to, among other things, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meeting in Washington, D.C.
Security officials at 18 of the 27 agencies that provided protection said they favored the establishment of a central protective intelligence repository, security officials at 4 agencies said they did not favor it, and 5 had no opinion. Security personnel at agencies favoring the establishment of a central protective intelligence repository said it would (1) allow access to protective intelligence by agencies that cannot afford to establish their own intelligence-gathering operations, (2) provide uniformity in the dissemination and access to intelligence, and (3) allow agencies to be informed about threats against other individuals who are in the presence of their officials.

Security officials at seven agencies said the Secret Service should be given the responsibility of administering a central protective intelligence repository. Some of these officials said the Secret Service should administer the repository because it already has a database of such information regarding its protected officials. Security officials at three agencies said that the repository should be administered by the FBI, which collects information on potential terrorist activity through its Terrorism Task Force. At three other agencies, security officials suggested that administering a repository of protective intelligence should be an interagency effort.

In providing comments on a draft of this report, the Marshals Service said that a central repository of protective intelligence would be a valuable resource. However, the Marshals Service said that an evaluation of controversial issues and events outside the normal realm of law enforcement data would need to be included to make the database applicable to a wide range of protected officials. The Marshals Service said that representatives from executive branch agencies would need to routinely update intelligence managers on issues, policies, and events that could trigger controversy among groups or individuals.

Security officials at the three agencies that did not favor the establishment of a protective intelligence repository gave several reasons. An official at one agency said such a repository probably would become a bureaucratic clearinghouse through which important information could easily “slip through the cracks” because the personnel might not recognize something that would be of interest to a particular agency. An official at another agency said it did not need access to a protective intelligence repository.

Security officials at two additional agencies suggested that the Secret Service administer the repository with the FBI. A security official at one of those agencies said administering the repository should be an interagency effort.
We did not identify any governmentwide standards or criteria for training federal protective personnel. The 27 agencies that provided protection generally required their full-time protective personnel to receive basic military or law enforcement training, plus specific protection training. However, the amount of protection-related training received by protective personnel governmentwide varied considerably. In addition, some agencies that did not provide their own protection training reported difficulty in obtaining training they needed from other sources.

Eleven of the 27 agencies reported that they provided some or all of their own protection training to their personnel in the form of initial instruction or annual refresher training, or both. The other 16 agencies obtained their protection training from other sources. The Secret Service, Marshals Service, State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), and the Army were the primary providers of protection training for federal protective personnel. These agencies’ protection training consisted of instruction in firearms; threat assessments; emergency medical training; practical protection exercises; security advance, motorcade, airport, and foreign travel procedures; defensive driving skills, defensive tactics, and legal authorities. Seven other agencies offered initial or refresher training that lasted between 2 days to 3 weeks. Table 1 shows the amounts of training protection training provided by the Secret Service, Marshals Service, State Department, and the Army to their protective personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Initial protection training</th>
<th>Annual refresher training</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret Service</td>
<td>7.8 weeks</td>
<td>3 to 5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshals Service</td>
<td>7.6 weeks</td>
<td>2 to 3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
<td>2 to 5 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>2 to 3 days</td>
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33 Twenty-four of the 27 agencies reported that their primary protective personnel received basic military or law enforcement training. At 1 of the agencies that employed security specialists to provide protection as collateral duties, 4 of the 12 employees had not received basic military or law enforcement training. At another agency, two of the three security specialists had not received basic military or law enforcement training.

34 DSS is the State Department bureau responsible for providing security protection.

35 The Navy’s protective personnel also receive their protection training from the Army.

36 Seven other agencies offered initial or refresher training that lasted between 2 days to 3 weeks.
The Secret Service indicated that its full-time protective personnel received about 11 weeks of agency-oriented training on the agency’s dual missions relating to protection and counterfeiting. The agency reported that 71 percent of this training was devoted to protection, or 7.8 weeks. Secret Service special agents who protect the President and Vice President receive continuous advanced protection training. Secret Service agents who protect former Presidents, presidential and vice presidential candidates, and foreign dignitaries also received annual refresher training. In addition, Secret Service agents in field offices received annual refresher protection training.

Amount of refresher training received by U.S. Marshals who protect an executive branch official full-time. In addition, the Marshals who protect the executive branch official received 2 weeks of advanced training every 4 years.

The State Department reported that its full-time protective personnel received 15 weeks of training, 3 weeks of which is protection-related. In addition, all of the DSS agents receive 2 weeks of refresher training every 5 years, 2-½ days of which is protection-related.

The Army reported that its protective personnel received 8 weeks of basic military training; 16 weeks of criminal investigative training, 1 week of which is protection-related; 3 weeks of protection training; 4 days of antiterrorism evasive driving training; 1 week of training in combating terrorism on military installations; and 1 week of combat lifesaver training.

Sources: Secret Service, Marshals Service, State Department, and the Army.

Security personnel at six agencies reported difficulty in obtaining training because of class availability, funding, or workload problems. Some security officials said they had to rely on personal contacts with agencies that offered protection training to secure the training needed by their personnel or obtain training outside the Washington, D.C., area. Because of the lack of available executive protection training in the Washington, D.C., area, for example, one agency sent its protective personnel to West Sacramento, CA, to receive training by the California Highway Patrol. A law enforcement agency received protection training from a diverse array of sources, including the CIA and Scotland Yard in Great Britain; and another agency had its protective personnel trained by a private security company. Security officials at five agencies also said they had hired personnel who had previous protection training and work experience at the Secret Service, State Department, or Marshals Service.

Twenty of the 27 agencies that provided protection said they relied on their field personnel to provide or supplement protection when their protected officials leave the Washington, D.C., area. Security officials said the number of field staff who supplemented protection ranged from 3 at 1 agency to about 250 at another. The amount of protection training received by field personnel who provided protection varied considerably among the 27 agencies. Agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions indicated that their field personnel received more training and protection experience than field agents at some other agencies.

The California Highway Patrol protects California state officials.
Security officials at one agency that did not have security protection as one of its primary missions and used many field staff for protection said it was too expensive to provide the same level of protection training to field personnel that is provided to the full-time staff based in Washington, D.C. Several agencies did not provide specific data on the amount of protection training that their field staff had received, if any; but two agencies without security protection as one of their primary missions indicated that their field personnel received about 2 to 3 days of protection training. Three agencies reported that their field personnel who were used to provide protection had received no protection training.

We did not conduct an exhaustive analysis of the content of courses that protective personnel in our review had received because some of the courses were taken several years ago and because some agencies did not maintain records of the specific courses that their protective personnel had received. However, as examples of protection-related skills in two areas, we specifically asked agencies about whether their protective personnel were tested regularly in firearms proficiency and were trained in emergency medical treatment. All of the agencies said they required their personnel to requalify regarding firearms proficiency at least annually. With respect to emergency medical treatment, 2 of the 27 agencies reported that none of their primary protective personnel were trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). At 12 agencies, none of the primary protective personnel were trained in the use of a First Aid Trauma (FAT) kit or a defibrillator. By contrast, the Secret Service, Marshals Service, and DSS reported that all of their primary protective personnel had received training in CPR and using the defibrillator, and most had received training in using the FAT kit.

A 1985 report on security issues at the Department of State recommended that 12 to 15 percent of diplomatic protective personnel’s time be devoted...
to training. In January 2000, the Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement, an independent advisory body established under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, criticized the lack of standardized training for federal law enforcement officers, which includes protective personnel. The Commission recommended that a Federal Law Enforcement Officer Training Board, consisting of law enforcement experts from federal, state, and local agencies, among others, review training, certify the adequacy of both basic and in-service training programs, identify innovative training programs and curricula, and recommend needed additional training programs to agencies.

<table>
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<th>Implications of Standardizing and Centralizing Protection Training</th>
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<td>Security officials said the implications of establishing a standardized protection-training program involve questions of whether providing the same training to all federal protective personnel would result in more consistency of protection procedures governmentwide and whether particular agencies’ special training needs would be addressed. In addition, if a standardized protection-training program were established, it is uncertain what it would cost in terms of facilities and human resources or which agency should provide the training. The issue of centralizing protection training involves whether one agency should provide a standard protection-training program and, if so, who should provide it, and how would the additional capacity needed be funded.</td>
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We asked the 27 agencies that provided protection whether they favored the establishment of a standardized protection training program for all federal protective personnel. Security officials at 21 of the 27 agencies said that they favored the establishment of a standard protection training program for all federal agencies, security officials at 2 agencies said they did not favor it, and security officials at 4 other agencies had no opinion. The agencies favoring a standard protection training program said it would provide consistency in training curricula, including protection concepts and terminology; that it would train protective personnel to perform their duties in a uniform fashion and react the same way in case of emergency; and would make protection training more available. Security officials from the Marshals Service, the Secret Service, and DSS, who favored the establishment of a standard protection training program for federal agencies, said they have observed a lack of uniformity in how other federal agencies’ security personnel protected their officials in terms of advance work and operating procedures.

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Security officials at the two agencies who did not favor a standardized training program said that training was important, but that they preferred to conduct their own training tailored to address their own needs and unique environments. One of those agencies, for example, said that as a military organization, it must train its personnel to provide protection in combat situations.

Security officials at 12 agencies favored having the Secret Service conduct a standard protection training program. Some of these officials said they favored having the Secret Service conduct the training because of its expertise in the field and its existing training facilities.\textsuperscript{43} At three agencies, security officials suggested that the State Department conduct the training because of its experience with protecting foreign dignitaries, which generally involves using fewer resources than the Secret Service uses to protect the President and Vice President; its training may be more pertinent to protecting Cabinet officials; and because the State Department has experience providing protection overseas.\textsuperscript{44}

The Secret Service said that it was interested in providing standardized protection training for federal agencies. Although the Secret Service said that its current protective training curriculum is focused on providing protection with a large number of personnel, such as that provided for the President, when requested, it has provided protective detail training on a smaller scale for other federal agencies.\textsuperscript{45} If given responsibility for providing protection training to other federal agencies, the Secret Service said it would consult with the participating agencies and modify its curricula accordingly. It also said that additional employees and funding would be required to create an adequate infrastructure to support such an effort. We toured the Secret Service’s training facility in Beltsville, MD, to learn about its protection training curricula. An official at that facility said that standardized protection training for all federal protective personnel would enhance operational cooperation and develop the skills needed for personnel to react the same way in emergencies.

\textsuperscript{43} Security officials at four additional agencies suggested that the Secret Service conduct a standardized protection training program with other agencies, including the State Department, the Marshals Service, and FLETC.

\textsuperscript{44} Security officials at two additional agencies suggested that the State Department conduct a standardized protection training program with other agencies, including the Secret Service and FLETC.

\textsuperscript{45} The Secret Service said it also provides protection for other officials using fewer resources than those used to protect the President, such as for former presidents.
Officials from the Marshals Service said it could conduct training for personnel protecting agency heads at FLETC\(^{46}\) in Glynco, GA, but thought that the training should take place near Washington, D.C., where most of the protective personnel are located. The FLETC Director told us that FLETC currently does not have the facilities, expertise, or funding to train all federal personal security personnel at its Glynco facility. However, the Director also expressed an interest in having FLETC coordinate personal security training at a new facility in the Washington, D.C., area. He said that one site that is being considered for such a facility is located at an abandoned Navy facility in Indian Head, MD.

A State Department training official suggested that a standard protection training program be conducted by FLETC with input from the State Department, because of its experience in providing protection overseas, and the Secret Service, because of its experience in providing protection domestically.\(^{47}\) The official also said that the State Department, which currently trains its protective personnel at facilities in Dunn Loring, VA, and Summit Point, WV,\(^{48}\) could train other agencies’ protective personnel at the proposed Center for Anti-terrorism and Security Training, an interagency facility planned for the Washington, D.C., area to be managed jointly by DSS and the U.S. Capitol Police. The official estimated that to accommodate protection training for other agencies at the Indian Head site, for example, it would cost at least $13 million over and above the $30 million that is being proposed to build the antiterrorism facility.\(^{49}\)

The State Department indicated that if it were to conduct a standardized protection training program for federal agencies, it would offer a 3-week entry-level protection course for protective personnel who have not received formal protection training. The course would consist of training in firearms; first aid; chemical/biological weapons; legal issues; driving; motorcades; and fundamentals of protection, including a 2-day practical protection exercise. The Department would also offer a 2-week intermediate class for protective personnel who have had some formal protection training or had considerable on-the-job experience. This course

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\(^{46}\) FLETC is a Treasury agency that conducts law enforcement training for 73 federal agencies.

\(^{47}\) The State Department official said the Department would need to add about 15 full-time equivalents to provide this training for other federal agencies if it were a FLETC program with input from State.

\(^{48}\) The State Department uses office space in Dunn Loring, VA, for classroom instruction and a privately owned facility in Summit Point, WV, for its practical protection and driving training.

\(^{49}\) This official said that the actual costs of developing the Indian Head site are unknown and could be higher. A State Department budget official said that $30 million for the antiterrorism facility was included in the President’s fiscal year 2001 budget submission.
would be devoted primarily to specialized areas, such as preparing advance work for major events, surveillance detection, and chemical and biological weapons countermeasures. Finally, it would offer a 1-week refresher course on the subjects covered in the basic and intermediate courses.

We asked a random sample of four agencies that did not offer their own protection training what issues they would like included in a standard protection training program. They generally said the curriculum should include, but not be limited to, security advance procedures, air travel, protection in foreign countries, defensive driving skills, motorcade procedures, emergency medical treatment, protective technology, protective intelligence, and threat assessments.

We also contacted six state and local law enforcement agencies that protect governors or mayors about their protection training needs. Officials from five of six agencies (the California Highway Patrol operated its own protection training program) said that a national protection training program should be established because protection training was not readily available for their personnel. We also contacted the National Governors’ Security Association, an association of law enforcement officials from all 50 states involved in protecting governors, which recommended the establishment of a national protection training program.

The implications of centralizing security protection governmentwide involve many issues, including who would decide who is to be protected and the level of protection to be provided; who would provide the services; whether Congress would need to grant statutory authorities; and whether centralization would be the most cost-efficient and effective way of providing these services over the current, more decentralized approach. The agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions said they could not precisely predict the level of protection they would provide, if they were given the responsibility of protecting officials governmentwide, without having specific protective intelligence regarding all of the potential protected officials. Further, the cost implications could not be determined without the agencies knowing the level of protection that would be provided and number of protected officials.

Security officials at 20 of the 27 protective agencies said they did not favor centralizing security protection under 1 agency and preferred to retain

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Footnote: We judgmentally selected these six agencies to provide a mix of jurisdictions with small, medium, and large populations.
responsibility for protecting their officials. The Marshals Service was the only agency that favored centralizing security protection services. The Marshals Service said it was interested in assuming responsibility for protecting agency officials, provided that it received the needed resources to accomplish this mission. Security officials at six agencies that provided protection did not offer an opinion on centralizing security protection services governmentwide.

The agencies that did not favor centralizing security protection generally said each agency has its own needs and unique environments where they protect their officials. They said it was advantageous for them, as employees of the protected officials’ agencies, to know the policies, programs, and culture of those agencies and how to coordinate protection internally within the organizations. Further, some of these security officials said that if protection were transferred to another agency, (1) the protected officials would lose some control over their own protection, (2) the existing professional relationships that the protected officials currently have with the protective personnel would be disrupted, and (3) a new bureaucracy would be created in the form of the agency that would provide the protection. Another security official said that if protection were centralized under one law enforcement agency, protection might be based on the protected official’s office, rather than the actual threat, for resource allocation purposes.

We met with the Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs and Cabinet Secretary to determine whether the administration had adopted any policies regarding the routine protection of Cabinet secretaries. This White House official said that to his knowledge, no such policy had been adopted governmentwide and that individual agencies may decide the level of protection needed for their officials. He added that the government could benefit from coordinating protection among agencies, particularly when protected officials are in the same locations.

Marshals Service officials said that if they were tasked with the responsibility for protecting other agency officials, they would use well-trained protective personnel who would operate in a consistent and coordinated fashion governmentwide and could provide certain economies of scale in terms of resources and equipment. In addition, the officials said the Marshals Service could draw on a pool of personnel to supplement

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51 One agency that protected an official during fiscal years 1997, 1998, and part of 1999, before those protective responsibilities were transferred to another agency, said it favored standardizing security protection under one agency because it would result in uniformity of training, equipment, and radio frequencies.
protection in certain threat situations. Moreover, the Marshals Service stressed that it has nationwide law enforcement authority.

We met with senior aides to an executive branch official who is protected by the Marshals Service. The aides said that the protected official was very satisfied with the Marshals Service’s training, access to intelligence, legal authorities, and ability to respond rapidly to threat situations. In addition, these aides said that it was not necessary for the Marshals Service’s protective personnel to be knowledgeable about that agency’s programs to effectively protect the agency head. Representatives of officials who were protected by the Secret Service and State Department also expressed satisfaction with their training, legal authorities, resources, and access to protective intelligence.

The Secret Service, which protects the President, Vice President, and other individuals, said it was not currently interested in assuming responsibility for protecting all agency heads. However, the Secret Service said an advantage of centralizing security protection services would be streamlined communications among different protection details and with the White House and the establishment of a focal point for funding and inquiries. At the same time, the Secret Service said that effective protection requires close proximity of the protected officials and their protective personnel, facilitated by the trust and confidence developed between them. The Secret Service said that its experience has shown that a bond of trust is greater when security personnel are from the official’s department and that a direct correlation exists between the trust and confidence and the effectiveness of the security detail.

A security official at one agency did not provide a definitive opinion on whether security protection services should be centralized under one agency but offered opinions on some advantages and disadvantages. This official said an advantage would be that the agency would not have to be concerned about staffing and training its own protective personnel, and the resources of another agency such as the Secret Service would be available across the country. On the other hand, this security official said, giving protective responsibility to another agency would result in the loss of his agency’s control over that protection. He also questioned whether another agency would provide sufficient resources to protect his agency’s official.

52 This agency reimburses the Marshals Service for the cost of providing protective services.
A security official at an agency that did not provide protection during the period of our review, but has protective personnel available if needed, said he would favor having another agency provide protection when required. According to that security official, a single agency could provide a well-trained cadre of security personnel who are good at their jobs and become better through experience. That same official said a disadvantage would be that the personnel from another agency would have to work with many different protected officials and develop a working relationship with each of them. However, the Marshals Service said that protected officials of other agencies would become comfortable with their protective personnel because the protected officials would be confident about the Marshals’ training.

Marshals Service officials said that if they assumed responsibility for protecting agency heads, they would need to enhance their own intelligence-gathering operations. At the same time, Marshals Service officials said, agencies with substantial intelligence-gathering capabilities, such as the State Department, could continue to gather intelligence and share that information with the Marshals Service. Further, Marshals Service officials said that protection training and experience are more important than knowledge about agencies’ particular issues or programs.

The State Department official in charge of protection said that in an ideal situation, it would be beneficial for one agency to provide protection because all of the protective personnel would have received the same training. But the official also said that it would not work because the agencies would want to continue using their own employees. This official also said that if the State Department received the necessary resources, it might be interested in protecting Cabinet secretaries. The official stressed the State Department's protection expertise, especially internationally, with agents in place worldwide to assist, and the Department's domestic field offices. This State Department official said that if security protection were centralized under one agency, Cabinet departments might feel more comfortable with DSS providing the protection, compared to a traditional law enforcement agency.

For comparison purposes, we contacted security officials from five other democratic, industrialized countries to determine whether their highest

53 The official said that with the change in the administration next year, the next head of that agency may choose to be protected, as previous heads of that agency had.
Some security officials expressed a concern about having personnel from agencies’ offices of Inspectors General providing protection because of a potential conflict of interest. They said if offices of Inspectors General were investigating officials whom they also were protecting, it could result in an atmosphere of distrust between the protective personnel and the officials. However, security officials from the three offices of Inspectors General with protective responsibilities disagreed. Security officials at two of those agencies that employed criminal investigators for protection said their offices’ protective responsibilities were separate from their investigative functions, which removed a potential conflict of interest. An official at the third agency said a potential conflict of interest did not exist because its protective personnel were employed as miscellaneous administrative staff (job classification 0301), not as criminal investigators.

In providing comments on a draft of this report, the Marshals Service provided a March 2000 legal memorandum from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding special deputation of Inspector General personnel to protect agency heads that addressed this issue. The memorandum indicated that:

“In effectively allowing IG agents to participate in program operating responsibilities, these temporary [protection] details arguably could compromise the IG’s independence and objectivity in performing an agency watchdog function. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which these internal details would give rise to at least an appearance of conflict of interest for an IG. The IG may be responsible, for example, for investigating alleged fraud in the security office to which IG agents have been detailed or for auditing the costs, including those of a detailed IG security agent, associated with a trip taken by the Agency head. In those instances, because of conflicting loyalties, the IG conceivably might prove less aggressive in carrying out his or her statutory responsibility of uncovering fraud, abuse, waste, and mismanagement. Even in situations that do not involve actual conflicts, the appearance of conflicts could undermine the effectiveness of an IG in pursuing his or her watchdog function.”

54 We chose these five countries because they were also democratic, industrialized nations and because we had contacts with the police liaison officers in their embassies.

55 March 23, 2000, memorandum from Daniel Koffsky, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Deborah Westbrook, General Counsel, U.S. Marshals Service.
her mission. Such an arrangement, however, might be acceptable in the short term to address the immediate dangers facing agency officials, especially if, in any subsequent investigation by the IG of the office responsible for security, IG personnel detailed to that office were recused from taking part. We would, however, caution against using this sort of arrangement on a long-term basis because it might appear to circumvent Congress’ prohibition against vesting program operating responsibilities in the IGs. If the Department and Agencies wish to continue to rely on these special deputations, we recommend that they seek legislation to expand the scope of IG authority.”

We were unable to determine how the costs of protection would be affected if a single agency protected agency heads because of the number of variables involved, such as the threat level against different protected officials and the protected officials’ preferences regarding their protection. The Secret Service said that it could not provide a meaningful estimate of the costs of protecting other officials without having specific protective intelligence about them. In addition, the Secret Service said that any single agency that would be given full responsibility for the training, intelligence assessments, and protection of all Cabinet-level officials would require significant increases in funding and staffing and substantial lead time. According to the Secret Service, this would enable the agency to properly develop an infrastructure to adequately support this activity. The Marshals Service provided an estimate of the number of protective personnel it believed it would need to protect agency heads governmentwide, which we are not disclosing in this report for security reasons.

From our review of data provided on agencies’ protective personnel, we observed that Marshals Service personnel who were protecting an executive branch official were mainly employed at the GS-12 level, compared to protective personnel at the Secret Service, who were generally employed at the GS-13 level. This would suggest that the Marshals Service might have lower personnel costs for protection. However, the Marshals Service also said that it would probably provide a level of protection to agency heads that exceeds what is currently being provided to some officials by their own agencies, which could increase costs.

We asked the protected officials in our study whether they believed that security protection should be provided automatically to the persons holding their positions, and why or why not. In addition, we asked them whether they believed their protective personnel have adequate resources, training, legal authorities, and access to protective intelligence to protect them. We also asked the officials who were not protected by one of the agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions whether they believed it would be better to have the Secret Service, Marshals
Service, or State Department protect them, and why or why not. Twenty-one protected officials or members of their immediate staffs responded to our queries.\textsuperscript{56}

Most of the protected officials or their staffs said the individuals holding these positions automatically should receive security protection because of their visibility and the types of issues that they handled. They said that officials who deal with the public—particularly those charged with enforcing laws and regulations—are potential targets for harm. In addition, they said they needed to travel to parts of the country where conflict and controversy existed over the proper role of the federal government. The officials also said they traveled sometimes or frequently to foreign countries with a high risk of threat.

Top aides to some agency heads who responded to our queries said that the functioning of government and the economy could be negatively affected if the officials were harmed. According to one agency’s Chief of Staff, “the potential of a threat to the safety and security of the government and its leaders by terrorists, subversive groups, and members of the public is a reality. An attack on the chief official of an agency could seriously affect public confidence in the [agency’s program].” A top aide to a military official said that this official holds one of the most visible sub-Cabinet positions in government; and because of his authorities and responsibilities, he is often perceived as being responsible for government actions and decisions affecting individuals, corporations, and foreign governments, including judicial punishment for personal misconduct, adverse personnel actions, corporate financial problems, and foreign military defeats.

One official who is the head of a law enforcement agency said there was an inherent threat to the person holding that position. The official said that if harm would come to the person holding that position, “it would bring embarrassment and disruption to [the agency’s] mission, [the department], the government in general, and to the health, safety, and welfare of the public.” The Chief of Staff for another law enforcement agency head said that his agency is involved in investigating “some of the most violent criminal organizations in the world,” which have threatened agency heads in the past, and therefore the agency head is entitled to

\textsuperscript{56} We sent letters to 33 officials who were protected from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and were still serving in office during our review. We asked that if the officials designated someone on their immediate staffs to respond, they not be directly involved in the officials’ protection. Four of the officials met with us or sent us letters directly, and 17 officials responded to us through their designees.
security protection. Presidential succession was cited as another reason for protecting Cabinet secretaries. By contrast, an aide to another official said that agency's top official did not need regular protection because that agency's mission is not as controversial, compared to other agencies’ missions. That aide said it was a personal decision of the agency head whether to receive security protection.

The protected officials or members of their staffs who responded to our queries generally said they believed their protective personnel had adequate training, access to intelligence, and legal authorities to carry out their jobs. Officials who were protected by personnel from their own agencies that did not have security protection as one of their primary missions said they would like to continue having their own agencies’ personnel protect them. The head of one agency, for example, said that he would like to continue having his agency's personnel protect him because his protection is tailored to his needs and preferences. Other respondents said that it was advantageous for protective personnel to be employed by the protected officials’ respective agencies because the protective personnel had a greater personal interest and sense of loyalty to the agencies and the protected officials and were knowledgeable about the organizations’ missions, cultures and operations.

We met with one Cabinet secretary who said that personal security protection must be balanced with a need for privacy. At the same time, this Cabinet secretary said that for someone in that position, the question about whether to be protected was not entirely a personal decision, and protection for Cabinet secretaries governmentwide needed to be assessed considering presidential succession issues.

Conclusions

The safety of the government’s highest officials is important to maintain the orderly functioning of the government. Individuals serving in the government’s highest offices can be vulnerable to threats from individuals who are opposed to their agencies’ policies and actions, emotionally unstable people, and terrorists. Because 14 of the protected officials in our review are in the line of presidential succession, their protection has national security implications. At the same time, protection for federal

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57 An aide to one agency head said that his agency lacked the personnel and proper training to effectively protect that official on a continuous basis, but U.S. Marshals were used to augment protection when needed. An aide to another official who had been protected temporarily by the Federal Protective Service (FPS) because that official's agency had no protective personnel said the agency probably would use FPS in the future if needed. However, an FPS official said that it did not have the resources to provide protection on a regular basis. Another protected official said that he was “personally unaware” of whether his agency’s protective personnel have adequate resources, training, legal authorities, and access to intelligence.
officials should be based on thorough threat assessments using protective intelligence from governmentwide sources documenting the need and plan for protection. Threat assessments should also show linkages between identified threats and the nature and level of protection to be provided. Moreover, thorough threat analyses should be conducted regarding the need and plan for protection for all officials who routinely receive security protection, regardless of whether the officials are in the line of presidential succession.

Our review indicated that some of the government’s highest officials were being protected by personnel who said they did not have sufficient access to protective intelligence and protection training. Further, some agencies said they lacked the legal authority to make arrests and conduct threat investigations to protect their officials. Additional sharing of protective intelligence, establishing a standardized protection training program, and providing agencies with specific statutory authority to provide protection could help enhance security protection for top federal officials.

Access to protective intelligence among agencies is an essential element in preparing threat analyses. Without assessments that link the level of threat to the size of the protective force, it would be difficult to determine whether the level of protection provided and the amount of money spent on protection were appropriate. Further, a standardized security protection training program could instruct federal protective personnel in the same basic techniques and procedures, which would help to ensure effective coordination of protection when protective personnel from multiple agencies are working at the same events. However, it is less clear what the training curricula should be, who would provide that training, or whether a central threat repository is the best means of sharing protective intelligence among agencies. It is also not clear whether centralizing security protection under one agency would be more cost-effective or would better address the needs of the protected officials than the current arrangements. In addition, some security officials questioned whether offices of Inspectors General should protect agency heads because of a potential conflict of interest between investigative and protective responsibilities.

It is important that the government is assured that it has a reasoned approach to protecting its highest officials, considering the national security implications of protecting officials who are in the line of presidential succession and the substantial recent increases in resources being expended to protect them. However, no one in the executive branch is currently responsible for handling issues relating to the routine
protection of executive branch officials. Because the protection of executive branch officials involves the expenditure of substantial amounts of appropriated funds and considering the national security implications involving presidential succession, we believe that the OMB Director, in consultation with the President, should designate an appropriate official or group to assess issues relating to security protection for executive branch officials. These issues should include how protective intelligence should be shared among agencies, how best to link threat assessment with the need for protection and the level of protection provided, what training should be provided to federal protective personnel and who should provide it, who should provide protection, and whether agencies and/or Offices of Inspectors General should be provided with specific statutory authority to provide protection. The designated official or group could provide the information needed for the OMB Director to act or to make recommendations to the next administration and Congress on issues that cannot be addressed during this administration or that would require legislation or additional funding.

We recommend that the OMB Director, in consultation with the President, designate an appropriate official or group to assess security protection issues for top-level federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment should include such issues as

- how agencies can best obtain protective intelligence from governmentwide sources needed to prepare thorough threat assessments, including an assessment of whether a central protective intelligence repository should be established and, if so, who should administer it;

- how best to ensure that a clear linkage exists between the documented threat assessments and the need for and level of protection for the routine protection of top executive branch officials;

- what training should be provided to federal protective personnel, to what extent the training should be standardized, and who should provide it;

- whether security protection should be centralized under one agency or, if not, whether any changes in the way protection is currently being provided should be made;

- whether agencies and/or offices of Inspectors General should be provided with specific statutory authority to provide protection, and whether the Marshals Service should continue to renew its deputation of agencies’
protective personnel;

- whether the administration should adopt a policy regarding the routine protection of top executive branch officials; and

- whether an official or group should be designated to oversee security protection issues for top executive branch officials on an ongoing basis.

To ensure that the benefits of this assessment are realized, we further recommend that the individual or group conducting the assessment produce an action plan that identifies any issues requiring congressional action.

Once the OMB Director has submitted his recommendations to Congress, Congress should consider enacting legislation that would provide whatever agency or agencies that provide protection with specific statutory authority to effectively carry out these responsibilities. In addition, should it be determined that centralized protection training, threat assessment, or protection services are appropriate, Congress should consider making the resources available to the appropriate agency or agencies that are designated to provide these services and provide any needed legislative changes.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the heads of agencies with protected officials and agencies that provided protection, the OMB Director, FLETC, and the Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs and Cabinet Secretary. We received written comments on the report from the Departments of Commerce, Education, and Energy; FLETC; the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Marshals Service; the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) of the Executive Office of the President; the Secret Service; the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA); and the U.S. Agency for International Development. We received oral comments from the Federal Protective Service (FPS); from OMB’s General Counsel and from security officials at the Department of Agriculture (USDA), DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The State Department, the White House, and the remaining agencies that had protected officials did not provide comments on the report. The agencies that provided comments generally agreed with the report’s conclusions and recommendations.

On June 23, OMB’s General Counsel provided oral comments on the draft report. He said that OMB concurred with the recommendations, with three conditions. First, he said that OMB would need sufficient resources
to conduct the assessment, which could include retaining a panel of outside experts. Second, OMB would need more time to complete the assessment than the December 31, 2000, time frame that we proposed in our draft report. And finally, the General Counsel said that as an outcome of the assessment, OMB could (1) develop the process and broad principles that agencies should follow in determining whether and how much protection should be provided to executive branch officials and (2) address the other issues that we recommended OMB should assess. However, the General Counsel said that OMB would not be in a position to determine whether particular officials should be protected or the level of protection they should receive.

We believe that OMB’s comments are reasonable and recognize that OMB would need sufficient resources to conduct the assessment and that it may take longer than December 31, 2000, to complete the assessment. We revised the report to remove mention of a specific time frame to complete the assessment, but believe that the assessment should be completed as soon as practical. Although we did not recommend that OMB determine whether particular officials should be protected or the level of protection that should be provided, we believe the specific information that we provided in our classified report regarding the protection of executive branch officials should be helpful to OMB in its overall assessment. Further, we believe that the process and principles that OMB develops through its assessment should be helpful to those executive branch officials who make and review decisions regarding who should be protected and how much protection they should receive, as well as to Congress in carrying out its legislative and oversight functions.

The Secret Service Director said the report incorporated all of the relevant issues related to security protection. The Director also said that he firmly believed that one agency should be responsible for the overall threat assessment of all executive-level and Cabinet-level officials and for the training of the personnel who protect those officials. In addition, the Director said that the Service leaves to the discretion of the White House and OMB whether one agency or various agencies should provide protection for all executive and Cabinet-level officials.

The Marshals Service Director said that the draft report was well researched and is a fair assessment of the current state of executive level personal protection. The Director also provided some comments and clarifications regarding the implications of standardizing and centralizing threat assessments, the amount of training that its protective personnel received, and the potential conflict of interest involved in using deputized
U.S. Marshals in agencies’ offices of Inspectors General to provide protection. We incorporated those comments and clarifications in the report.

The Marshals Service also provided some additional information about its legal authority to provide protection, which we generally incorporated. The Marshals Service cited an 1890 Supreme Court decision as supporting its inherent authority to provide personal protection to persons as directed by the Attorney General to ensure the faithful execution of federal law, even in the absence of a specific federal authorizing statute. It also cited a recent OLC memorandum as further supporting its authority to protect agency officials. The OLC memorandum concluded that under federal statutes criminalizing attacks on agency officials, the performance of protective functions for agency heads falls within the mandate of the Marshals Service.

We noted the Marshals Service’s interpretation of the Supreme Court decision in the report. Although it is not clear to us that the Supreme Court’s 1890 decision should be interpreted as authorizing the Marshals Service to protect officials who are outside of the judicial branch of government, we believe that the rationale of the cited OLC opinion provides an adequate basis for the Marshals Service’s authority to perform protective functions for executive branch officials. The OLC memorandum also addressed the use of protective personnel from agencies’ offices of Inspectors General. We have included an excerpt from that memorandum in the final report. We also revised our recommendation to OMB that it assess whether agencies should be provided with specific statutory authority to provide protection to also include an assessment of whether statutory authority to provide protection should be provided to offices of Inspectors General.

The Secretary of Commerce said that the Commerce Department was concerned about its lack of specific statutory authority to provide protection to the Secretary. He said that the Department relies on Marshals Service deputation of security specialists and that if the deputation is not renewed after January 1, 2001, the Department would be without authority. The Secretary said that the Department would like to retain its protective responsibilities and therefore supports the establishment of appropriate legislative authority. The Secretary also said that the Department supports legislation that would authorize the Secret Service to maintain a repository of protective intelligence and share the information with participating agencies.
The Secretary of Commerce also said the Department supports the development of government standards or criteria for training federal protective personnel. He said that creating a standardized protection training curriculum for non-law enforcement agencies at FLETC or the Secret Service's training facility in Beltsville, MD, would significantly enhance the skills of the Department's personnel. He added that a joint agency training effort by the Secret Service, Department of State, and the Marshals Service is a viable option, but if a single agency is designated as the training provider, the Department believes the Secret Service is best suited for that assignment. The Secretary also said that the Department does not support the centralization of Secretarial protection under one agency. He said that as long as the Department continues to receive external protective intelligence and training support, it believes that its security detail should be staffed from within the Department, which would allow it to have the flexibility and institutional knowledge afforded by its own personnel.

The Department of Education's Executive Officer said that the Department agreed with the information contained in the report.

The Department of Energy's Director of the Office of Security and Emergency and Operations said the report was a thoughtful treatment of the major issues facing federal executive protection programs and that the Department was in complete agreement with the issues raised in the report as well as with the recommendations for addressing them.

FLETC's Senior Associate Director, Washington Operations, said that the report accurately reflected the information provided by its officials. FLETC indicated that although it does not have the facilities, expertise, or funding to conduct standard protection training, it does offer several law enforcement courses that include protection issues. In addition, FLETC noted that the section of the report containing the agencies' views on establishing a standardized protection training program were statements of opinion and priority related to the various needs and desires of the agencies that were interviewed. FLETC said that the agencies' statements should be considered in light of the fact that they may be driven by each agency's particular agenda.

We recognize that the security officials who provided their views on the standardization issues could be making statements on the basis of their agencies' agendas, as FLETC indicated, or could be affected by their personal interests. We attempted to balance the security officials' opinions
with views from multiple sources, including the protected officials and White House officials.

The Staff Director for Management of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System said that the Board generally concurred with the report’s conclusions and recommendations and emphasized that it would like to continue protecting its own officials. The Board said that protection is best achieved when protective personnel are within the agency’s chain of command and are subject to its rules of procedure. The Board also said that it was concerned that the report indicated that the Marshals Service may not renew the deputations of protective personnel after January 1, 2001. The Board said that nonrenewal of deputations would eliminate the law enforcement powers of its protective personnel and would make it impossible for the agency to carry out its protective responsibilities.

ONDCP’s Deputy Chief of Staff said the Office did not believe that centralizing security protection under one agency is needed or beneficial. It said that centralizing security protection would raise too many questions about the scope and power the single agency would have and would limit the flexibility of high level appointed officials over their own security needs. ONDCP said that if a single agency were to assume responsibility for protecting all Cabinet-level officials, a substantial amount of funding and resources would be required to accomplish this. Further, ONDCP said that a standardized protection training program and facility would be beneficial and economical for the government, and it agreed with the idea of establishing a protective intelligence repository. ONDCP noted that Congress would need to provide a protection training facility and protective intelligence repository with sufficient funding.

TVA’s Chief Administrative Officer and Executive Vice President, Business Services, said that TVA concurred with the general consensus of the survey results that agencies with sworn officers should continue to provide protection for the presidential appointees of their respective agencies. The official also said that TVA agrees with the agencies that recommended that the Secret Service provide standardized training for executive protection and develop a repository of threat information for use by all federal agencies with protective responsibilities. In addition, he said that Congress should provide statutory authority to agencies that provide executive protection.

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Management, said that the report represented a
balanced and thoughtful evaluation of the subject and endorsed the recommendations.

In providing oral comments on the draft report, the Special Agent in Charge, Investigative Operations Division, Office of Inspector General, at USDA said on June 27, 2000, that the report may have inaccurately conveyed the impression that appointed Cabinet officials did not face a serious level of threat, compared to the level faced by elected officials. This official said that the Secretary of Agriculture had been described recently in a national news report as being the most attacked Cabinet-level official; has been assaulted four times in recent years; and has been the target of 78 written, verbal, and physical threats since 1995. In addition, he said that in January 1999, a heavily armed individual was arrested for repeatedly threatening to use deadly force against the Secretary or any other government employee who attempted to foreclose on his farm.\(^{58}\)

With regard to the level of threat faced by Cabinet officials, we note that the report discusses (1) the finding of the Secret Service’s 1998 study that many attackers and would-be attackers considered more than one target before attacking, which suggests that high-ranking government officials may become targets of attack by potentially dangerous individuals who transfer their focus among different government officials; (2) the number of direct threats received against executive branch officials during a 3-year period; and (3) the views of the protected officials on their need for protection.

The USDA official also said the Department supported centralized protection training to enhance the effectiveness of joint operations conducted with other agencies. In addition, the official asked that we note that the authority of USDA’s Office of Inspector General to provide protection is based on a delegation of authority from the Secretary of Agriculture set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, which we included in the report.

In oral comments, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Personal Security said on June 16, 2000, that the Department generally agreed with the content of the report and emphasized DOD’s opposition to centralizing security protection services under one agency. This official said that protecting DOD officials is unique and indigenous to the defense environment and agenda. He said that DOD protective personnel frequently must operate in hostile fire zones and military environments.

\(^{58}\) According to the Agriculture Department, this individual pled guilty to felony charges and served 13 months in a federal psychiatric facility.
Thus, he said these personnel are selected, trained, and employed in much different circumstances compared to what might be expected for protective personnel of other top-level federal officials. In addition, he said that the same DOD personnel who protect the Department’s civilian officials also protect the senior military leadership; and continuity of personnel, training background, communications, and operability is integral to the protective mission. Further, the official said that DOD’s protected officials are satisfied with the quality and level of protection being provided and that training and development of the Department’s protective personnel is highly adequate. He said that the protective support mechanism at DOD has been in place for over 30 years and is considered to be both highly effective and cost efficient.

The General Services Administration’s (GSA) Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of the Federal Protective Service (FPS), said in oral comments on June 16, 2000, that FPS provides protection to thousands of government buildings, federal courthouses, and their occupants; investigates threats against public officials that occur within GSA properties; protects officials when requested by the threatened individuals or other federal law enforcement agencies; and protects public officials when the President, Vice President, and other high-ranking officials visit federal buildings. The FPS official said that if centralized or specialized training for protective personnel is developed, the agency would like that training to be made available to its special agents. In addition, he said that if legislation is developed to correct any deficiencies in the law, FPS would like its special agents to be consulted and included in any corrective legislation.

On June 8, 2000, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security and Law Enforcement at VA provided oral comments and said the report was fair and candid, and he agreed with the recommendations. This official was concerned about how the Department’s protective operations would be affected if the Marshals Service did not renew the deputations of VA’s protective personnel after January 1, 2001. The official added that he believed that agencies’ offices of Inspectors General should not be responsible for protecting officials because of potential conflicts of interest that could arise from having protective and investigative responsibilities part of the same office.

We modified the report to reflect some agencies’ concern that the Marshals Service may not renew the deputations of their protective personnel after January 1, 2001, and about whether potential conflicts of interest existed between investigative and protective responsibilities of offices of...
Inspectors General. We also revised our recommendation to OMB that it assess whether agencies should be provided with specific statutory authority to provide protection by adding that the assessment should also include the issues of whether the renewal of Marshal Service deputations of agencies’ protective personnel should continue and whether statutory authority to provide protection should be provided to offices of Inspectors General.

Agencies’ comments generally supported the report’s conclusions, which indicated that a standardized security protection training program could help to ensure effective coordination of protection when protective personnel from multiple agencies are working at the same events. In addition, USDA, the Secret Service, ONDCP, and TVA specifically mentioned their support for centralizing or standardizing protection training in their comments. Therefore, we included in our recommendation to OMB that it also assess the extent to which training should be standardized.

With regard to the several agencies that indicated in their comments that they believed security protection services should continue to be provided in the current, decentralized fashion, we believe that OMB should consider those views, as well as the government’s overall security and financial interests.

As agreed with the Subcommittee, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the President; the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director of OMB; Senator Charles Schumer, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman, and Representative John Conyers, Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on the Judiciary; and to the heads of the agencies covered in our review. Copies will be made available to others upon request.
Key contributors were Robert G. Homan of the General Government Division and Thomas J. Wiley and Patrick F. Sullivan of the Office of Special Investigations. Please contact me on (202) 512-8387 or Robert Hast on (202) 512-7455 if you have any questions about this report.

Sincerely yours,

Bernard L. Ungar
Director, Government Business Operations Issues

Robert H. Hast
Acting Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations
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Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

We initiated this review by sending questionnaires to all executive branch agencies and departments asking whether any of their officials received security protection from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and, if so, who protected them. We then contacted security officials from the agencies that provided the protection and asked them to complete detailed questionnaires about their legal authorities to provide protection; threat assessment procedures; the circumstances and type of protection provided; number and training of protective personnel; security equipment; costs of protection; and views on standardization and centralization of security protection threat assessment, training, and protection services. We did not obtain information on the protection of the President, Vice President, Central Intelligence Agency officials, U.S. ambassadors to other countries, uniformed military officials, or officials working in the judicial or legislative branches of government.

For background information on security protection for federal officials, we reviewed relevant reports issued by GAO, the Department of Justice, Secret Service, State Department, Congressional Research Service, Marshals Service, and Commission on the Advancement of Law Enforcement. We also reviewed historical literature on assassinations and assassination attempts against federal officials. In addition, we analyzed the legal authorities that the agencies cited for providing security protection and related legislative material.

For comparison purposes, we also contacted security officials from five other countries to determine whether their top officials received security protection and, if so, who protected them. We obtained information from those countries because they were also democratic, industrialized nations and because we had contacts with the police liaison officers in their embassies. We also contacted law enforcement agencies in 4 states and 2 large cities. These six agencies were judgmentally selected to provide a mix of jurisdictions with small, medium, and large populations. We recognize that this information is not projectable to all countries, states, or cities. In addition, we contacted the National Governors’ Security Association (NGSA) to ask about protection training needs because NGSA

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1 We obtained information that an agency that was abolished in December 1999 protected two of its officials during fiscal years 1997 through 1999, but we were unable to obtain cost information or views on security standardization issues from that agency because it no longer exists. Therefore, this report contains a discussion of information about protected officials from 31 agencies, rather than 32, regarding 42 officials, rather than 44. We also refer to views obtained from security officials at 27 agencies that provided protection, rather than 28. Some agencies protected more than one official. We counted officials who had been protected at least on one occasion during that 3-year period lasting at least 1 day.
represented security officials involved in protecting governors in all 50 states.

To determine the costs of protecting federal officials, we asked agencies to provide data on salaries, overtime, and travel of protective personnel; special executive protection training; equipment; and residential security costs. We asked the agencies to provide costs in these categories, based on records of actual costs incurred in those categories, or estimates if actual cost data were not available. Agencies that used part-time staff to protect their officials were asked to provide the number of protective personnel used, by fiscal year, and to provide prorated shares of their salaries based on timekeeping records or estimates of the amount of time spent on protection. We included the salaries of the protectees’ drivers if they were members of the protection unit, were law enforcement personnel, or had received special protection-related driving training.

We asked agencies to provide information on travel expenses (per diem and transportation expenses) incurred by security personnel while protecting officials and to include the cost of vehicles only if the protectees were transported in armored vehicles. In instances when Department of Defense (DOD) officials were transported in DOD aircraft, agencies did not report their operating costs. Instead, DOD reported only the costs incurred by protective personnel traveling on commercial carriers.

Training costs included tuition and related travel expenses for specialized, executive protection courses. Costs for residential security consisted of expenses incurred for the installation of command posts and security systems and security system monitoring. Agencies also reported other costs for security equipment acquired during the period, such as radios and ammunition, which we included. We did not verify the accuracy of the cost data provided. In this report, we report the aggregate costs of protection governmentwide. We did not report the costs incurred by specific agencies to avoid compromising their security.

With regard to threat assessment procedures, we reviewed the threat assessments that seven agencies had prepared regarding their protected officials to determine what factors were considered. We also collected data from agencies about the number of direct threats that their officials faced.
had received during the 3-year period. We defined direct threats as threats of direct physical harm, kidnapping, and extortion.

To assess what training federal protective personnel had received, we asked agencies to provide specific information on what training their protective personnel had received, including the training providers, names of the courses, dates when the courses were taken, and the number of course hours. We also asked a random sample of four agencies that did not have security protection as one of their primary missions what subjects they believed a standardized training protection program should include. We also visited the Secret Service’s training facility in Beltsville, MD; the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service’s facilities in Dunn Loring, VA, and Summit Point, WV; and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA, to observe their executive protection training and review their training curricula.

We reported on the implications of standardizing threat assessment, training, and protection services by asking each of the agencies providing protection for their views on these issues and from using our own analysis of the data provided. In addition, we sent letters to 33 officials who received security protection during fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and were still serving in those positions during our review. In our letters to the protected officials, we asked whether they believed that security protection should be provided automatically to the persons hold their positions, and why or why not. In addition, we asked them whether they believed their protective personnel had adequate resources, training, legal authorities, and access to protective intelligence to protect them. For those protected officials who were not protected by one of the agencies with security protection as a primary mission (Secret Service, Marshals Service, and State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service), we asked whether they believed it would be better to be protected by one of those agencies, and why or why not. We asked these officials whether they would like to meet with us without their security staffs to discuss their protection, designate someone such as their Chiefs of Staff who was not directly involved in their protection to meet with us, or provide comments in writing. Twenty-one of 33 protected officials, or their designees, met with us or responded in writing to our letters. We also met with White House officials to ask about the administration’s policy on security protection for Cabinet officials.

We did our work from September 1999 through May 2000 in the Washington, D.C., area; Beltsville, MD; Summit Point, WV; and Glynco, GA, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology

Our investigative work was done in accordance with investigative standards established by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. We provided a draft of this report to each agency that provided protection services or had officials who were protected during fiscal years 1997 through 1999, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs and Cabinet Secretary, and the FLETC Director.
Appendix II

Comments From the Secret Service

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

Bernard L. Unger
Director, Government Business Operation Issues
441 G Street NW
Room 2A10
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Unger:

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on your draft report, Security Protection Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials, concerning the protection of executive branch officials. I commend the leadership and foresight of Senator Strom Thurmond in raising the profile of this important issue.

As you know, the Secret Service prides itself on well-established principles, techniques and measures in the area of physical protection that validate our theories and programs. Experience is the best teacher, and we have been in the protection business since 1901. Key ingredients in the creation of a safe environment for all of our protectees is founded on the art of threat assessment and proven training techniques. Training techniques incorporate the delicate balance between intelligence, threat assessment, physical protection techniques, and protective advance theories.

I commend the report because its discussion incorporates all of these relevant issues: the importance of physical protection, advance methods, threat assessment, and training. I firmly believe that one agency should be responsible for the overall threat assessment of all executive-level and cabinet-level officials. Threat assessment validates the level of protection provided to any one protectee. I also believe that one agency should be responsible for the training of those mandated with the protection of executive and cabinet-level officials. A single training theory eliminates any confusion between protective details when more than one protectee is present at any given site. Regarding the physical protection of executive and cabinet-level officials, whether one agency or various agencies should be charged with this duty is a question I leave to the discretion of the White House and the Office of Management and Budget, as your report aptly suggests. The budgetary impact of this issue alone validates this suggestion.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for the opportunity to comment on the report. If you need any additional information on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact Paul D. Irving, Executive Assistant for Congressional Affairs, at (202) 406-5676.

Sincerely,

Brian L. Stafford
Appendix III

Comments From the Marshals Service

U.S. Department of Justice
United States Marshals Service
Office of the Director

Arlington, Virginia 22202-4210
June 15, 2000

Bernard L. Unger
Director, Government Business Operations Issues
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Room 2A10
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Unger:

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on your draft report, Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials (GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139, Code 240357) concerning protection provided to executive branch officials. The document appears to be well researched and is a fair assessment of the current state of executive level personal protection. However, a few clarifications regarding the United States Marshals Service should be included in your final document.

Legal Authorities for Providing Protection (p. 20)

The text should be amended to reflect the following: We asked agencies to provide their legal authorities for providing personal security protection. In response, agencies cited various legal authorities that they believed gave them the authority to provide such protection. Some agencies cited the Inspector General's Act of 1978, the general authority of agency heads to issue regulations, a 1972 letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to Cabinet secretaries, a 1970

1/ 5 U.S.C., App. 3
2/ 5 U.S.C. 301.
3/ The November 27, 1972 letter from Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz to all Cabinet heads reviewed an offer to have Secret Service provide training for the departments' protective personnel. The memo also indicated that following a discussion at the White House, "It was decided that each Department would provide and maintain a protective force, composed of their own employees. At the same time, the President offered the assistance of the Secret Service in making available a protective training course for applicable personnel from other Departments..."
memorandum from the White House Counsel to Cabinet departments, and special deputation from the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). The USMS, through its Deputy U.S. Marshals, is authorized by statute to provide security in various U.S. courts and to provide personal protection of certain government officials and other individuals in certain circumstances. However, beyond protection of federal judges and government witnesses, the USMS relies upon the direction of the Attorney General before undertaking personal protection details for other persons. Thus, in an 1890 Supreme Court decision, the Supreme Court held that the USMS had inherent authority to provide personal protection to persons as directed by the Attorney General to assure the faithful execution of the federal law, even in the absence of a specific federal authorizing statute.

A recent legal opinion from the Department of Justice entitled "Special Deputation of Inspector General Personnel to Protect Agency Heads" supports this position and is enclosed for your reference.

Implication of Standardization and Centralization of Threat Assessments (p. 33)

The recommendation to establish a central repository for protective intelligence would be a valuable resource. However, evaluation of controversial issues and events outside of the normal realm of law enforcement type data would need to be included to make the data base applicable to a wide range of protectees. Representatives from executive level agencies would need to

14 The December 1, 1970, memorandum from White House Counsel John Dean to a Cabinet department indicating that the Secret Service planned to conduct a training session for executive departments' protective personnel.

15 Special Deputy U.S. Marshals are appointed pursuant to 28 USC 566(c). 566 (c) (the USMS "shall command all necessary assistance to execute its duties"). 28 CFR 0.112. See also 5 U.S.C. 66 (1980). Special Deputy U.S. Marshals are sworn and appointed to perform specific functions and have federal law enforcement authority to perform those functions. According to USMS Policy Directive 59-13, issued February 5, 1999, appointed U.S. Marshals may, among other things, issue and serve arrest and search warrants; make arrests without warrant if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a violation of federal law, serve subpoenaas and other legal writs; and carry firearms for personal protection or the protection of persons covered under the federal assault statutes. While the policy also states that agency personnel who receive special deputation for personal protection details do not have general arrest authority, they do have the necessary arrest authority under the special deputation to perform the personal security mission. The policy directive also indicates that applicates for deputation must, among other requirements, be employed by a federal law enforcement agency or an agency approved by the Department of Justice, have successfully completed a basic law enforcement program, have previous law enforcement experience, have passed firearms tests, and agree to comply with the sponsoring agencies' or the Department of Justice policy on the use of deadly force.

16 28 USC 566(d), (e)(1)(B).

17 Under 28 USC 566(d), the USMS provides for the "security" of the U.S. District Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, and the Court of International Trade. Under 28 USC 566 (d)(1)(A), the USMS may protect "Federal jurists, court officers, witnesses, and other threatened persons in the interests of justice where criminal intimidation impedes or delays the functioning of the judicial process or any other judicial proceeding." In addition, under 18 U.S.C. 3053, U.S. Marshals may carry firearms and make arrests without warrants for "any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony."
routinely update intelligence managers on issues, policies and events which may trigger controversy among various groups or individuals. The recent attack on the Secretary of Agriculture by an animal rights activist reconfirms the need for department/agency specific intelligence.

**Protection Training** (p. 38)

The information contained in Table 1: *Amounts of Protection Training Provided by the Secret Service, Marshals Service, State Department and the Army* should be corrected to include 7.55 weeks of Marshals Service initial protection training. The 7.55 weeks includes instruction on firearms, security advance procedures, threat assessments, emergency medical training, practical protection procedures, defensive driving, defensive tactics, foreign travel, airport procedures and legal authorities. The draft report includes a figure of 19 hours, which only includes specific training on personal security services.

I wish to thank you for the opportunity to comment on this report. Should you require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact Frank E. Skroski III, Chief Protective Operations, on 202-307-9150.

Sincerely,

John W. Marshall
Director

Enclosure not included.
Mr. Bernard L. Ungar  
Director, Government Business  
Operations Issues  
U.S. General Accounting Office  
441 G Street, N.W., Room 2A10  
Washington, DC 20548  

Dear Mr. Ungar:  

Thank you for providing a draft copy of your report, Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials (GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139, Code 240357).  

An area of concern to this Department is the lack of specific statutory authority for providing personal protection to the Secretary of Commerce. Presently, we rely on the deputation of Security Specialists (GS Series 080), by the U.S. Marshals Service. However, if the U.S. Marshals Service does not renew deputations after January 1, 2001, we face the possibility of not having this statutory authority. Our goal is to retain protective responsibility. Therefore, we support the establishment of appropriate legislative authority as suggested in your report.  

The Department of Commerce actively participates in the Secret Service Protective Detail Intelligence Network. We view it as an excellent means of sharing and evaluating information. We would support any legislation required to authorize the Secret Service to maintain a repository of this type of information, and fully share it with participating agencies.  

We also support the development of Government standards or criteria for training federal protective personnel. Creating a standardized protective training curriculum for non-law enforcement agencies at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), or at the Secret Service training facility in Beltsville, MD, would enhance significantly the skills of our personnel. A joint agency training effort by the Secret Service, Department of State and the U.S. Marshals Service is also a viable option. However, if a single agency is designated as the training provider, we believe the Secret Service is best suited for that assignment.
The Department of Commerce does not support the centralization of Secretarial protection under one agency. As long as we continue to receive external protective intelligence and training support, we believe the security detail should be staffed from within this Department. We prefer to have the flexibility and institutional knowledge afforded by Department personnel. You are welcome to share our concerns and observations in your report.

We appreciate the opportunity to share our observations and concerns.

Sincerely,

William M. Daley
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of Education

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

JUN 16 2000

Mr. Bernard L. Ungar
Director, Government Business Operations Issues
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Room 2A10
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Ungar:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials.

We are in agreement with the information in the report.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 401-3082.

Sincerely,

JoAnn Ryan
Executive Officer

400 MARYLAND AVE., S.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20020-0100
Our mission is to ensure equal access to education and to promote educational excellence throughout the Nation.
Department of Energy  
Washington, DC 20585  

June 27, 2000  

Mr. Bernard L. Ungar  
Director, Government Business Operations Issues  
United States General Accounting Office  
Washington, DC 20548  

Dear Mr. Ungar  

This is in response to your letter dated May 31, 2000 to Secretary Richardson concerning your draft report: “Security & Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials.”  

My staff has reviewed the draft report and has found it to be a well written and thoughtful treatment of the major issues facing federal executive protection programs such as the one administered here at the Department of Energy. We are in complete agreement with the issues raised in your report as well as your recommendations for addressing them.  

We commend your staff for their collective efforts in this report but particularly Bob Homan and Tom Wiley for their personal attention and dedication to this project.  

Sincerely,  

Eugene H. Habiger, General, USAF (Retired)  
Director, Office of Security and Emergency and Operations
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226  

FIN 2-2 (WO)  
June 14, 2000

Mr. Bernard I. Ungar  
Director  
Government Business Operations Issues  
US General Accounting Office  
441 G Street, NW  
Room 2A10  
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Ungar:


Pursuant to your request the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) has reviewed and commented on the draft report. Enclosed please find two documents (1) a five page commentary entitled FLETC Related Excerpts from GAO Draft, May 2000 and (2) a two page document from D. Kenneth Keene, Assistant Director, Office of Training, dated June 13, 2000 with FLETC specific comments.

Should further clarification or information be needed, please contact Deputy Associate Director Bruce J. Bowen at 202-927-8940.

We are pleased to assist in matters of mutual interest.

Sincerely,

John C. Doehler  
Senior Associate Director  
Washington Operations

Enclosure
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER
GLYNCO, GEORGIA 31524

FIN 2-2 (OFT:AD) June 13, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: John Dooler
Senior Associate Director
Washington Office

THRU: W. Ralph Basham
Director

Paul A. Hackenberry
Associate Director
Training Directorate

FROM: D. Kenneth Keene
Assistant Director
Office of Training

SUBJECT: GAO Draft Comments

The following is in response to the FLET related excerpts from the GAO draft, May 2000:

FLET Specific Comments

1. FLET was, in fact, visited by members of GAO during this period.

2. & 3. We cannot comment on suggestions reported to GAO but have no reason to dispute their account.

4. As indicated in the Director's comments, the FLET does not have the facilities, expertise, nor the funding to conduct "standard protection training." There do exist several courses of instruction for classes that deal with protection. They are taught in larger unrelated programs that deal with other law enforcement matters. Those were developed in the past, and although a cursory review reveals that they are based on sound principles, there isn't sufficient expertise at the FLET to deliver them effectively in an independent program.
5. This is currently a correct figure.
6. The Director’s statement speaks for itself.
7. This review confirms the statement, as quoted.
8. We cannot dispute the GAO statement.
9. This review confirms the statement, as quoted.

General Comments Related to Training Issues

1. This is simply a statement of one of the GAO questions which were addressed in the draft Report.

2., 3., 4., 5., & 6. These are statements of opinion and priority related to the various needs and desires of the agencies that were interviewed. They should be considered in light of the fact that they may be driven by agenda particular to the interest of the agency quoted. Our review detected no factual errors in any of the quotations.
Appendix VIII

Comments From the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20551

-Revised-

June 16, 2000

Mr. Bernard L. Ungar
Director, Government Business Operations Issues
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W., Room 2A10
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Ungar:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the GAO’s draft report on Security Protection Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials (#240357).

The draft report appears consistent with the information provided to you by the Federal Reserve Board (Board) in a survey questionnaire concerning our Protective Services Unit (PSU). We appreciate the manner in which you presented the information in the draft report, so as not to compromise or identify details of the specific protective programs.

We generally concur with your conclusions and recommendations. We are, however, concerned with the position taken by the U.S. Marshals Service regarding the non-renewal of their special deputation credentials after January 1, “2001”, for agency PSUs, including the Board. Non-renewal of the credentials would in essence make it impossible for agencies, including the Board, to carry out their protective responsibilities. Non-renewal would eliminate the law enforcement powers (e.g., carrying weapons and limited arrest authority) of a PSU.

The Federal Reserve Board strongly believes that the physical protection of senior protectees, such as Chairman Greenspan, should remain the responsibility of each agency. There are sound reasons for this position. Of prime importance is the critical need for the protection detail to command a high level of trust and confidence between itself and the protectee, which is best achieved by agents who are within the agency’s chain of command and subject to its rules of procedure.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Mail Stop 50, Washington, DC 20551
Telephone: (202) 452-2801 • Internet: steve.malphrus@fsb.gov • Facsimile: (202) 728-5832
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
Washington, D.C. 20503

June 12, 2000

Mr. Bernard L. Ungar
Director, Government Business Operations Issues
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Room 2A10
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Ungar:

ONDCP appreciates the opportunity to read and review your report to the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, entitled, “Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials.” We would like to make the following points in response.

1. Security for executive branch officials is adequately handled by the various agencies such as the U.S. Marshals and Secret Service. We do not believe that a single security agency is needed or beneficial. A single security agency would raise too many questions about the scope and power it would have and would limit the flexibility of high level appointed officials over their security needs.

2. If a single agency assumes the responsibility of protecting all cabinet level officials, it will require a substantial amount of funding and resources to accomplish its mission around the country and abroad. For example, the U.S. Marshals can assume the extra responsibility of protection for cabinet officials because it has a large amount of field offices throughout the country, but it would need a larger amount of resources such as cars, radios, and personnel to assume the additional responsibility.

3. As mentioned in the report, a standardized training program and facility similar to the National Law Enforcement Training Center at Glynco, Georgia will be both beneficial and economical for the government. The facility should be staffed with members of all the law enforcement and security agencies to develop a comprehensive-training curriculum. This
will help foster confidence among the various agencies in their training and certification.

4. The idea of a protective security intelligence repository is a sound one. Such a repository will allow the free exchange of information among the various agencies and foster a better atmosphere of cooperation. The repository should also be appropriately linked to the U.S. Intelligence Community because they may have useful information on foreign threats to government officials.

5. If a single training facility and/or a repository where created, it should be authorized by Congress with a sufficient level of appropriation.

I hope that the following suggestions are helpful to you and the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me directly at (202) 395-6699.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Lee Bennett
Deputy Chief of Staff
Appendix X

Comments From the Tennessee Valley Authority

Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902-1499

Norman A. Zigrossi
Chief Administrative Officer and Executive Vice President
Business Services

June 19, 2000

Mr. Bernard L. Ungar
Director, Government Business Operations Issues
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G. Street, NW
Room 2A10
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Ungar:

Thank you for providing TVA the opportunity to review the draft report, Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials.

We concur with the general consensus of the survey results that agencies with sworn officers should continue to provide protection for the presidential appointees of their respective agency.

Additionally, TVA supports the inclusive recommendations that:

- The Secret Service be given the lead and necessary resources to:
  - Develop and provide standardized training in executive protection.
  - Develop a repository of threat information for utilization by all agencies providing executive protection.

- Congress should provide statutory authority to agencies that provide executive protection.

As stated in our survey response, we are satisfied with our current security staff and believe the above steps would enhance the level of service they currently provide to the agency.

We look forward to working with you and your staff in the future development of a standardized system of protection.

Sincerely,

Norman A. Zigrossi

Printed on recycled paper

Page 64 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
June 14, 2000

Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General
National Security and International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W. – Room 4039
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Hinton:

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled “Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials” (May 2000).

Our assessment of the draft report is that it represents a balanced and thoughtful evaluation of the subject matter and its recommendations are endorsed.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Nygard
Acting Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Management

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Washington, D.C. 20523
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