

United States General Accounting Office Congressional Requesters

September 1989

COMPUTER SECURITY

Identification of Sensitive Systems Operated on Behalf of Ten Agencies



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GAO	United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548	
	Information Management and Technology Division	
	B-231257	
	September 27, 1989	
	The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.	
	Chairman, Committee on Government Operations	
	House of Representatives	
	The Honorable Robert A. Roe	
	Chairman, Committee on Science,	
	Space, and Technology	
	House of Representatives	
	This report responds to your November 29, 1988, request for informa- tion on the identification of sensitive computer systems by 10 federal agencies. In discussions with your offices, we agreed to obtain the agen- cies' lists of sensitive computer systems operated by contractors, states, or other organizations and descriptions of the approaches they used to respond to your November 29, 1988, and March 7, 1989, requests. As you know, federal agencies were to identify these systems and prepare security plans for them in accordance with the Computer Security Act of 1987. This letter summarizes the requested information. Appendix I provides more details on the number of sensitive systems the agencies identified and the approaches they used to identify the systems.	
Number of Sensitive Systems Operated by Contractors, States, or Other Organizations	Nine of the 10 agencies identified a total of 1,032 sensitive systems operated by contractors or other organizations and none operated by state governments. One agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, reported that it operates all of its own sensitive computer systems. Table 1 shows the total number of sensitive computer systems operated by contractors or other organizations on behalf of the agencies.	

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Table 1: Sensitive Systems Reported by				
the 10 Agencies in Response to the Committees	Department or Agency	November 1988 Request	March 1989 Request	Total Systems Reported
	Department of Agriculture	9	0	9
	Department of Defense	35	180	215ª
	Department of Energy	691	0	691
	Department of Health and Human Services	31	26	57
	Department of the Interior	4	8	12
	Department of Justice	4	0	4
	Department of Labor	4	5	9
	Department of the Treasury	5	1	6
	Environmental Protection Agency	0	0	0
	National Aeronautics and Space Administration	29	0	29
	Totals	812	220	1,032
Identify Systems	requested that 10 agencies provide list that are operated on the agencies' belorganizations. Generally, in respondin 10 agencies asked their main organizations asked their main organizations sitive computer systems that are oper- other organizations. Five agencies—to Interior, Justice, Labor, and Treasury of the Computer Security Act or agencies sensitive information, along with their cies' headquarters consolidated the in pared an agency response.	half by conting to the Control to the Department to the Control to	ractors, states mmittees' req ponents to ide atractors, state ents of Agricu- neir componer ions of terms, instructions.	s, or other uest, the ntify sen- es, or ulture, nts a copy such as The agen- and pre-
	In preparing their responses to the Nerices—the Departments of Justice, Deus they used computer security plans tion as a check to ensure that the list complete. The Committees sent a second letter,	fense, Labo s, inventorie s submitted dated Marc	r, and Treasur s, or other do to the Commi h 7, 1989, to t	ry—told cumenta- ttees were he 10
	agencies noting that their original res systems operated by contractors, sta fore, the Committees requested that t	tes, or other	· organization	s. There-

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	sensitive systems. In responding to the Committees' request, 5 of the 10 agencies—the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Interior, Labor, and Treasury—reported 220 additional systems oper- ated by contractors or other organizations and none by states. Four agencies—the Departments of Interior, Justice, Labor, and Treasury—said they reviewed computer security plans and verified the accuracy of their original responses. Appendix I describes the approaches used by the agencies to identify their sensitive systems operated by contractors or other organizations.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology	As agreed with the Committees' offices, our objectives were (1) to obtain the agencies' lists of sensitive systems that were provided in response to the Committees' request of November 29, 1988, and descriptions of the approaches used to identify the systems, and (2) review the 10 agencies' responses to the Committees' follow-up request of March 7, 1989, for any revisions to the original lists and obtain descriptions of how the agencies identified systems included in the revisions.
	To accomplish these objectives, we obtained copies of the lists of sensi- tive computer systems that were submitted to the Committees. We inter- viewed officials of each of the 10 agencies to ascertain how they identified their sensitive systems operated by contractors, states, or other organizations and whether any additional approaches were used to revise the lists initially sent to the Committees.
	We performed our work between January and July 1989 in the Washing- ton, D.C., area at the 10 agencies requested to respond to the Commit- tees. These agencies are the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Interior, Justice, Labor, Treasury, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration. We also contacted one organizational component of each of the 10 agencies to ascertain how they identified sensitive systems in response to the Committees' November 1988 request.
	In accordance with the Committees' wishes, we did not obtain agencies' comments on a draft of this report.

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This report was prepared under the direction of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Information Systems, (202) 275-9675. Other major contributors are listed in appendix II.

alph V. Carlone

Ralph V. Carlone Assistant Comptroller General

GAO/IMTEC-89-70 Computer Security: Ten Agencies

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Abbreviations

ADP	automatic data processing
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ESA	Employment Standards Administration
GAO	General Accounting Office
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
IMTEC	Information Management and Technology Division
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
SSA	Social Security Administration

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Department of Agriculture

Response to Committees' Request of November 29, 1988	Before the Committees' November 1988 request, the Department of Agriculture sent a letter to its components requesting that they identify computer systems containing sensitive information. The Department attached to its letter a copy of the Computer Security Act of 1987, and Agriculture's definition of sensitive information. This was done as part of Agriculture's effort to comply with the Computer Security Act.	
	In its response to the Committees' request, Agriculture reported nine sensitive computer systems operated by contractors and no systems operated by states or other organizations. In preparing its response, Agriculture sent a letter asking its components to submit lists of sensi- tive systems that are operated on the Department's behalf by contrac- tors, states or other organizations. According to Agriculture's Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Security Officer, Agriculture performed no verifi- cation of the lists submitted by its components. The Department com- piled a list of all sensitive systems identified by its components.	
	We contacted one Agriculture component, the Forest Service, to deter- mine how it identified its sensitive systems. Forest Service's ADP Secur- ity Officer said the Service received the Department's letter asking each component to identify its sensitive computer systems, a copy of the act, and a definition of sensitive information. The ADP Security Officer stated that Forest Service's headquarters identified all sensitive computer sys- tems from its central inventory of automated systems. The official said the Forest Service identified and reported to Agriculture three contrac- tor-operated sensitive systems.	
Response to Committees' Request of March 7, 1989	Agriculture reported that it reviewed its first response to the Commit- tees and reaffirmed that its response was accurate. The ADP Security Officer stated that, based on Agriculture's review of components' com- puter security plans, there were no additional systems to report.	

Department of Defense

Response to Committees' Request of November 29, 1988	The Department of Defense reported to the Committees 35 sensitive computer systems that are operated by contractors and no systems that are operated by states or other organizations. Defense said these sys- tems were identified by all of its components except the major ser- vices—Air Force, Army, and Navy—which would be reported to the Committees as soon as Defense received the information from the major services.
	The Information Systems Manager, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, said Defense sent to its components a letter that requested lists of their sensitive systems that are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations. Defense attached to its letter a copy of the Commit- tees' letter requesting this information.
	We contacted one Defense component, the Department of the Navy, to determine how it identified its sensitive systems. According to the Com- puter Security Coordinator, the Navy received Defense's letter and sent a copy of it to the Navy's components, including the U.S. Marine Corps. A Marine Corps headquarters computer security analyst stated that the Marine Corps sent to its components a letter requesting a list of sensitive systems along with copies of the Department of Defense's letter, the Committees' request letter, and definitions of a sensitive system and other terms. The analyst said two Marine Corps components identified sensitive systems operated by contractors. One of these components, the Manpower Department, identified from its inventory sensitive man- power systems that are operated by contractors. The analyst said Marine Corps headquarters checked the components' responses with its inventory of sensitive systems to ensure that they were accurate and complete. According to the Computer Security Coordinator, instead of holding the Marine Corps' response until the Navy completed its identific cation of sensitive systems, the Marine Corps' response was forwarded to Defense.
	The Information Systems Manager said Defense compared components'

The Information Systems Manager said Defense compared components' responses with its list of computer security plans to ensure that the responses were accurate and complete.

	Appendix I Number of Sensitive Systems Reported and Approaches Used by the Ten Agencies to Identify the Systems
Response to Committees' Request of March 7, 1989	Defense reported 180 additional contractor-operated sensitive systems that were identified by the Army and Air Force. Defense indicated that information on the Navy's sensitive computer systems would be for- warded to the Committees along with any additional Service inputs after they are received by Defense.
Department of Energy	
Response to Committees' Request of November 29, 1988	In response to the Committees' request, the Department of Energy reported that it does not keep a central inventory of sensitive systems. However, Energy said it requested its components to certify that all sen- sitive systems operated by contractors, states, or other organizations had been identified.
	Energy's Acting Director of ADP Management stated that after respond- ing to the Committees, the Department requested its components to sub- mit lists of the sensitive systems they previously identified. Energy compiled the components' lists and submitted, as an additional response to the Committees, a list of 691 sensitive systems operated by contrac- tors and no systems operated by states or other organizations.
	We contacted one Energy component, the Morgantown Energy Technol- ogy Center, to determine how it identified its sensitive computer sys- tems. A program analyst said the Center received four memorandums from the Department regarding the identification of sensitive computer systems. The analyst stated that the Center reviewed its inventory of computer systems and determined that none of its sensitive systems are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations. The analyst said the Center's field unit has no computer systems. The Center sent a letter to Energy headquarters certifying that the Center had identified all of its sensitive systems.
Response to Committees' Request of March 7, 1989	Energy reported that the information requested was provided in the additional response to the Committees listing 691 sensitive systems operated by contractors.

Department of Health and Human Services	
Response to Committees' Request of November 29, 1988	The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reported 31 sensi- tive computer systems that are operated by contractors or other organi- zations and no systems operated by states.
	In preparing HHS's response, the Senior Information Resources Manager stated that the Department sent a letter to its five components request- ing that they submit lists of sensitive systems operated by contractors, states, or other organizations. This official said HHS verified the accu- racy and completeness of the lists with the Information Systems Secur- ity Officers of each component.
	We contacted one HHS component, the Social Security Administration (SSA), to determine how it identified its sensitive computer systems. SSA's Senior Computer Security Officer said the agency received a letter from the Department requesting that it identify its sensitive systems that are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations. The Senior Computer Security Officer stated that he developed SSA's response based on his knowledge of all systems. SSA reported that none of its sensitive systems are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations.
Response to Committees' Request of March 7, 1989	HHS reported to the Committees 26 additional sensitive systems operated by contractors or other organizations and no systems operated by states.
	In preparing its response, the Senior Information Resources Manager said HHS instructed all program offices, in conjunction with their attor- neys, to reexamine the computer systems that the program offices had originally identified as not processing sensitive information. As a result of the reexamination, HHS determined that 26 of the systems are sensi- tive computer systems that are operated by contractors or other organizations.

Department of the Interior

Response to Committees'	Before the Committees' November 1988 request, the Department of the
Request of November 29, 1988	Interior sent to its components a letter requesting lists of sensitive com- puter systems and providing instructions on the identification of such systems. This was done as part of Interior's effort to comply with the Computer Security Act of 1987.
	In its response to the Committees' request, Interior reported three sensi- tive computer systems operated by contractors or other organizations and no systems operated by states. Interior's Information Resources Security Administrator said Interior compiled its list from the compo- nents' lists of sensitive computer systems. The Administrator also said he verified the accuracy of the components' lists with their Information Resources Management Officers. The Administrator said that after reviewing components' computer security plans, Interior realized that it had omitted one system from its response. The official told us that a corrected response would be sent to the Committees.
	We contacted one Interior component, the U.S. Geological Survey, to determine how it identified its sensitive computer systems. The Informa- tion Resources Management Officer told us that the Geological Survey received the Department's letter with instructions to identify its sensi- tive computer systems. The officer stated that the Geological Survey requested its divisions to update their inventories of sensitive computer systems and sent to division representatives an information package consisting of the Computer Security Act and other information to help them update their lists. According to the officer, the division representa tives passed the information along to offices responsible for the systems and requested that they update their inventories of sensitive systems. The Geological Survey compiled the divisions' updated lists and reported to Interior that none of its sensitive systems are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations.
Response to Committees' Request of March 7, 1989	Interior reported to the Committees a total of 12 sensitive computer sys tems operated by contractors or other organizations. According to the Department's Information Systems Security Administrator, the Commit tees' March request prompted a reexamination of the computer security

plans. According to the administrator, these systems were not reported because of a misinterpretation by Interior's Office of Information Resources Management as to what constituted a contractor-operated system. Department of Justice Before the Committees' November 1988 request, the Department of Jus-**Response to Committees'** tice sent a memorandum to 33 component managers or information Request of November 29, resources management officials requesting that they identify all sensi-1988 tive computer systems and provide lists of such systems to Justice headquarters to comply with the Computer Security Act of 1987. The memorandum included a definition of a sensitive system and other terms, a copy of the Computer Security Act, a list of implementation dates, and a form to collect data on all sensitive computer systems. Justice's Systems Policy Staff reviewed the components' lists of sensitive systems and compared the lists with departmental budget information to ensure that all systems were identified. In its response to the Committees' request, Justice reported to the Committees four sensitive computer systems that are operated by contractors and no systems operated by states or other organizations. In preparing its response. Justice sent a memorandum to its components and asked them to review and revise their lists of sensitive computer systems. Justice used the revised lists to compile its response to the Committees. We contacted one Justice component, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), to determine how it identified its sensitive computer systems. INS' Chief of ADP Security stated that upon receipt of the Department's memorandum, the Associate Commissioner sent a memorandum to three assistant commissioners and four regional ADP officers requesting that they identify their sensitive computer systems. The memorandum included guidance information and a data collection form supplied by Justice. The completed forms were returned to INS' headquarters where they were compiled into a list of sensitive systems that was forwarded to Justice.

	Appendix I Number of Sensitive Systems Reported and Approaches Used by the Ten Agencies to Identify the Systems	
Response to Committees' Request of March 7, 1989	Justice reported that it identified no additional sensitive computer sys- tems that are operated by states or other organizations. In preparing its response, the Department said that it reviewed components' computer security plans to determine whether any additional sensitive systems are operated by states or other organizations.	
Department of Labor		
Response to Committees' Request of November 29, 1988	Before the Committees' November 1988 request, the Department of Labor sent a letter to its components stating that they were required to identify sensitive computer systems and provide the lists to the Depart- ment to comply with the Computer Security Act of 1987. Labor also sent guidance to the components, which included a copy of the act, require- ments relating to the act, information collection forms, and the Depart- ment's definitions of a sensitive system and other terms. Labor compiled an inventory from its components' lists of sensitive systems.	
	In its response to the Committees' request, Labor reported four sensitive systems that are operated by contractors or other organizations and no systems operated by states. In preparing its response, the Director of the Office of Information Resources Management Planning, Policy and Eval- uation told us that Labor requested that its components ensure that their lists of sensitive systems were up-to-date and that they provide to the Department lists of sensitive computer systems operated by contrac- tors, states, or other organizations. According to the Director, Labor compared the lists with components' computer security plans to ensure that the lists were complete and accurate.	
	We contacted one Labor component, the Employment Standards Admin- istration (ESA), to determine how it identified its sensitive computer sys- tems. ESA's Director stated that the agency distributed Labor's memorandums and other information to its program managers and asked them to identify sensitive systems that are operated by contrac- tors, states, or other organizations. ESA identified one sensitive computer system that is operated by a contractor.	
Response to Committees' Request of March 7, 1989	Labor reported to the Committees a total of nine sensitive computer sys- tems operated by contractors or other organizations and no systems operated by states. In its response, the Department stated that during	

	the course of its evaluation of computer security plans, it discovered, in addition to the four systems reported in its original response, five addi- tional contractor-operated systems and facilities that should have been reported to the Committees.
Department of the Treasury	
Response to Committees' Request of November 29, 1988	Before the Committees' November 1988 request, the Department of the Treasury sent a letter to its components requesting them to identify sen- sitive computer systems to comply with the Computer Security Act of 1987. The Department attached a copy of the Computer Security Act and pointed out important provisions of the act including the definition of sensitive information. Treasury's letter also discussed the actions needed to meet the requirements of the act.
	In its response to the Committees' request, Treasury reported to the Committees five sensitive systems that are operated by contractors or other organizations and no systems operated by states. In preparing its response, Treasury sent a letter to its components requesting lists of their sensitive systems that are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations. The Department verified the lists with components' offi- cials and compared the lists with computer security plans to ensure the lists were accurate. If discrepancies were found, the components were asked to determine whether the systems were sensitive and to identify the operators of the systems.
	We contacted one Treasury component, the Bureau of Public Debt, to determine how it identified its sensitive computer systems. The Director of Automated Information Systems Planning and Policy said the Bureau identified twelve sensitive systems, one of which is contractor-operated. The Bureau provided this information to the Department.
Response to Committees' Request of March 7, 1989	Treasury reported to the Committees one additional sensitive system that is operated by another organization. According to its response, Treasury identified the additional system during its review of compo- nents' computer security plans.

Environmental **Protection Agency** The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used a questionnaire to **Response to Committees'** assist its components in identifying sensitive computer systems. The Request of November 29, questionnaires were completed during face-to-face interviews between 1988 EPA headquarters officials and responsible officials at EPA's components. According to EPA's Information Security Officer, this was done before enactment of the Computer Security Act of 1987. A Systems Manager from one component, the Office of Administration and Resources Management, confirmed that EPA used this approach to identify its sensitive systems. In its response to the Committees' request, EPA reported that it does not have any sensitive computer systems that are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations. In preparing its response, EPA reviewed the questionnaire responses and compiled them to respond to the Committees. EPA again reported that it does not have any sensitive systems that are **Response to Committees'** operated by contractors, states, or other organizations. EPA said that Request of March 7, 1989 state governments or contractors may be involved in gathering and reporting information, but they do not operate sensitive systems on the EPA's behalf. National Aeronautics and Space Administration The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) reported 15 **Response to Committees'** sensitive computer systems that are operated by contractors and no sys-Request of November 29, tems operated by states or other organizations. According to a represen-1988 tative of the Office of the Assistant Associate Administrator, NASA inadvertently omitted from its response one page containing 14 sensitive computer systems. The official stated that the complete list would be sent to the Committees.

	Appendix I Number of Sensitive Systems Reported and Approaches Used by the Ten Agencies to Identify the Systems
	In responding to the Committees' request, the official told us that NASA sent to its 10 computer centers a letter requesting that they identify their sensitive computer systems that are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations. The computer centers used their own methodologies to identify the sensitive systems and sent lists of the sys- tems to NASA headquarters. NASA headquarters compiled a list from the 10 computer centers' lists and sent it to the Committees.
	We contacted one NASA component, the Goddard Space Flight Center, to determine how it identified its sensitive computer systems. The Center's Computer Security Officer stated that after it received the letter from headquarters, the Center reviewed its inventory of sensitive computer systems. According to the Computer Security Officer, the Center deter- mined that it has no sensitive systems that are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations.
Response to Committees' Request of March 7, 1989	NASA reported that it identified no additional sensitive computer systems that are operated by contractors, states, or other organizations. In NASA's response to the Committees, the Acting Assistant Administrator for Con- gressional Relations said NASA recently completed an on-site review of systems at the Ames Research Center and found the Center's list of sys- tems that are operated by states or other organizations to be accurate. The Acting Assistant Administrator added that NASA plans to conduct similar reviews at two more centers this year.

Appendix II Major Contributors to This Report

Information Management and Technology Division, Washington, D.C. David G. Gill, Assistant Director Mary J. Dorsey, Evaluator-in-Charge

GAO/IMTEC-89-70 Computer Security: Ten Agencies

Related GAO Products

Computer Security: Status of Compliance With the Computer Security Act of 1987 (GAO/IMTEC-88-61BR, Sept. 22, 1988)

Status of Compliance With the Computer Security Act of 1987 (GAO/T-IMTEC-88-8, Sept. 22, 1988)

Computer Security: Compliance With Training Requirements of the Computer Security Act of 1987 (GAO/IMTEC-89-16BR, Feb. 22, 1989)

Status of Compliance With the Computer Security Act of 1987 (GAO/T-IMTEC-89-1, Mar. 21, 1989)

Computer Security: Compliance With Security Plan Requirements of the Computer Security Act (GAO/IMTEC-89-55, June 21, 1989)