HONDURAN DEPLOYMENT

Controls Over U.S.
Military Equipment
and Supplies
Congressional Requesters

During March 1988, the U.S. Army deployed almost 3,000 U.S. combat troops and tons of equipment and supplies to the Republic of Honduras for an emergency deployment readiness exercise called GOLDEN PHEASANT. Various members of Congress became concerned that some of the equipment and supplies accompanying U.S. troops would be diverted to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance (Contra) forces. We reviewed Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT to determine whether U.S. combat troops had diverted any equipment and supplies to the Contra forces. This report responds to requests received from the Chairmen of the Committees and members of Congress listed at the end of this letter.

Based on our review of internal control documents and physical verification of organizational inventories, we concluded that military property had either been expended during Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT or returned to the United States. Military property deployed to Honduras from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Ord, California, included ammunition, explosives, vehicles, weapon systems, sensitive items (individual weapons and night vision devices), medical supplies, rations, and contingency stocks. We were unable to absolutely verify the return of two vehicles belonging to the 82nd Airborne Division because documentation provided by Division officials did not contain adequate identification data.

Based on our observations at training locations in Honduras, we believe that the nature of the deployment as well as the on-site controls made it unlikely that any military property was diverted to the Contras. Deployed units had not requisitioned large quantities of nonexpendable or expendable supplies prior to the deployment. Additionally, lost, damaged, or destroyed military property resulting from Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT was minor. (See app. I for additional details.)

To assess the use and disposition of U.S. military property associated with the exercise, we conducted audit work at training locations in the Republic of Honduras and division and installation level activities at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Ord, California. In Honduras, we visited Palmerola Air Base, San Lorenzo, Jamastran, Tamara, and Juticalpa. Through the reconciliation of available records and physical inspections of identified property on a total or sample basis, we determined whether deployed military property was returned to Forts Bragg.
and Ord. (See app. I for a detailed description of our objective, scope, and methodology.)

The Department of Defense reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments on our findings and conclusions. (See app. VI.) We plan no further distribution of this report until 10 days from its issue date unless you publicly announce its contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies to interested Committees and Members of Congress; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be made available to other interested parties on request.

Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General

List of Requesters

The Honorable Jack Brooks, Chairman
Legislation and National Security Subcommittee
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Nicholas Mavroules, Chairman
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Alan Cranston
The Honorable Tom Harkin
The Honorable Mark O. Hatfield
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
The Honorable Claiborne Pell
The Honorable Paul Simon
United States Senate

The Honorable Bill Alexander
The Honorable Edward F. Feighan
The Honorable Louise Slaughter
House of Representatives
Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix I</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls Over U.S. Military Equipment and Supplies</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective, Scope, and Methodology</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Deployment and On-Site Controls Made</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversion Unlikely</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Deployed to Honduras Either Returned or Expended</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Evidence That Large Quantities of Supplies Were Obtained From Other Sources</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost, Damaged, or Destroyed Government Property Was Minor</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix II</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition and Explosives Deployed and Redeployed</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix III</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Systems Deployed and Redeployed</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix IV</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles Deployed and Redeployed</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix V</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map of Honduras</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix VI</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments From the Department of Defense</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I.1: Task Force Training Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDRE</td>
<td>emergency deployment readiness exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>light anti-armor weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Modified Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I

Controls Over U.S. Military Equipment and Supplies

During March 1988, the U.S. Army deployed about 3,000 U.S. combat troops and tons of equipment and supplies to Honduras during an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) called GOLDEN PHEASANT. Various members of the Congress became concerned that some of the equipment and supplies accompanying U.S. troops would be diverted to Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance (Contra) forces. We reviewed the GOLDEN PHEASANT exercise to determine whether U.S. combat troops deployed to Honduras had diverted any equipment and supplies to the Contra forces.

Background

At the beginning of March 1988, the Nicaraguan government's armed forces (Sandinistas) began preparing for an offensive by moving supplies, vehicles, and heavy equipment into the Bocay valley near the Honduran border. On March 9, the Sandinistas deployed about 360 troops into the area. On March 15, Sandinista troops moved across the border into Honduras. The force, consisting of about 1,500 to 2,000 troops, advanced several miles inside Honduras with the support of artillery, aircraft, and helicopter gunships.

On March 15, 1988, Honduran President Jose Azcona requested U.S. assistance in dealing with the incursion. The U.S. embassy forwarded the request to the State Department on March 16, 1988. The Inter-Agency Policy Review Group, chaired by the National Security Council representative, discussed the situation in Honduras and President Azcona's request for assistance. In addition to reviewing various diplomatic and political responses, the Group asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop several military options.

The Joint Chiefs and other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations had continually monitored activities in Honduras and at the time of the buildup had discussed various military options to deal with the incursion into Honduras and a possible request for assistance; therefore, it was able to respond quickly to the Group's request. The Joint Chiefs, after conferring with Department of the Army organizations, decided that a viable military response to the situation in Honduras to show support for the region would be an EDRE. An EDRE is a military operation initiated with little or no notice to evaluate a unit's ability to deploy under emergency conditions and perform its mission. As part of their planned training, the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California, would have been scheduled for such an exercise and therefore were the logical
units to deploy. These units had conducted previous EDRE exercises in Honduras in February and March 1987.

The 82nd Airborne Division is a parachute assault division with rapid strategic, combined arms, and forced entry capability. The 7th Infantry Division (Light) is one of the Army's five light infantry divisions and is designed to deploy rapidly to an area of conflict using a minimum number of aircraft. As part of the Army's rapid deployment forces, these divisions are required to get their first aircraft off the ground in 18 hours and complete their deployment in 96 hours.

On March 17, 1988, Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT began with the deployment of an infantry brigade task force consisting primarily of two battalions—the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 504th Infantry—of the 82nd Airborne Division from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and two battalions—the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 27th Infantry—of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) from Travis Air Force Base, California. Fifty-four Military Airlift Command aircraft were used to transport the personnel, equipment, and supplies to Honduras during the exercise. These aircraft deployed 1,793 personnel from Fort Bragg and 1,232 from Fort Ord to Honduras. The deployment was completed on March 18, 1988.

To carry out its training objectives, the task force of the 82nd Airborne and 7th Infantry Divisions deployed various amounts of equipment and supplies. Besides individual weapons, equipment included various sizes and type of trucks; observation, attack, and utility helicopters; and Sheridan tanks. In addition to ammunition and explosives, the task force also deployed with subsistence items, such as ready-to-eat meals, and medical supplies. The exercise ended when the last of the GOLDEN PHEASANT aircraft landed at Pope Air Force Base on March 31, 1988.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

As requested, we reviewed the use and disposition of equipment and supplies used in Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT. Specifically, our objective was to determine whether those U.S. combat troops deployed to Honduras diverted any equipment and supplies to the Contra forces.

We conducted audit work at training locations in the Republic of Honduras; DOD and Department of the Army staff agencies; deployment and redeployment terminals at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and Travis Air Force Base, California; and division level and installation level activities at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Ord, California.
In Honduras, we visited Palmerola Air Base, San Lorenzo, Jamastran, Tamara, and Juticalpa.

At each of the field locations visited, we reviewed available records and interviewed cognizant military and civilian officials to evaluate the status of equipment use during the exercise. In Honduras, we visited each training site to observe types and levels of equipment and supplies in use and each commander's controls over the use and disposition of that property. Controls over the use and disposition of Army property are prescribed in various Army regulations. From the Air Force and/or involved units, we obtained copies of deployment and redeployment manifests to identify equipment and supplies that were sent to and returned from Honduras. At Fort Bragg and Fort Ord, we evaluated the use and disposition of seven categories of deployed military property through accounting records (e.g., property books and ammunition issue and turn-in documents) and physical inspections of identified property on a total or sample basis. The seven categories of military equipment and supplies included

- ammunition and explosives,
- major weapons systems,
- vehicles,
- sensitive items (individual weapons and night-vision devices),
- medical supplies,
- rations/ready-to-eat meals, and
- contingency stocks.

Our detailed approach and methodology included numerous reconciliations of issue and turn-in records for ammunition and explosives, medical supplies, and assigned unit weapons and night vision devices. Additionally, we performed numerous physical counts of redeployed supplies and equipment, including major weapon systems, vehicles, and ammunition and explosives. Our physical inventory counts also included assigned unit weapons and night vision devices selected in total or through statistical samples. The results of our random statistical samples can be generalized with a 95-percent confidence level.

We conducted our review between March and June 1988 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Based on our observations at training locations in Honduras, we believe that the nature of the deployment as well as the on-site controls made it unlikely that any military property had been diverted to the Contras while U.S. troops were in Honduras for Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT.

The Deployment

Before the GOLDEN PHEASANT exercise deployment, approximately 3,150 U.S. personnel were in Honduras. Joint Task Force Bravo, which is headquartered at Palmerola Air Base near Comayagua, Honduras, provides command, control, and communications and logistical support for U.S. exercises and deployments for training in Honduras. As of March 1988, about 1,100 DOD personnel were assigned to this headquarters. Additionally, 850 National Guard, Reserve, and active duty engineers were conducting a road-building exercise in the Yoro District in north-central Honduras, about 1,100 U.S. military personnel were conducting an engineer field-training exercise called AHUAS TARA 88 jointly with Honduran forces in the Gulf of Fonseca area; and about 100 National Guard engineers on a training deployment were based at Palmerola. Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT, therefore, almost doubled the number of U.S. personnel in Honduras by adding approximately 3,000 troops. No other combat-oriented exercises were being conducted by U.S. forces in Honduras.

Based on our observations and information we obtained from commanders and troops in Honduras, we do not believe that surplus quantities of equipment and supplies, such as boots or tents, were available for diversion. Upon notification to deploy, commanders from the 82nd Airborne and 7th Infantry Divisions determined what items, such as weapon systems and vehicles, in their Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) to take. According to the commanders we interviewed, no stocks were ordered in excess of their MTOEs. Other than cases of ready-to-eat meals, troops deployed with what they carried on their backs. Many troops informed us that they had only one uniform. At the four sites we visited, we saw no tents; each camp was austere, and troops slept in the open. We did not find any storehouses of equipment.

According to commanders, this situation is typical of an emergency deployment, for which there is little logistical support. If this exercise had lasted longer, the logistical support units would have followed with...
required items such as tents and uniforms. In this case, the troops operated with what they brought with them along with the limited support from Joint Task Force Bravo in Palmerola, such as fuel, water, and fresh fruits.

On-Site Controls

In addition to showing U.S. support for the government of Honduras and, on a broader scale, the other governments of Central America, the EDRE tested the proficiency of the four battalions from the 82nd Airborne and 7th Infantry Divisions. Each battalion was to link up with its Honduran military counterpart and conduct combined exercises in different operating areas. Combined training was conducted at the locations shown in table I.1 (see map in app. V).

Table I.1: Task Force Training Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>U.S. unit</th>
<th>Honduran unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Lorenzo</td>
<td>2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, 7th Light Infantry Division</td>
<td>11th Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamastran</td>
<td>3rd Battalion, 27th Infantry, 7th Light Infantry Division</td>
<td>9th Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamara</td>
<td>2nd Battalion, 504th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division</td>
<td>2nd Infantry Battalion Airborne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juticalpa</td>
<td>1st Battalion, 504th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division</td>
<td>16th Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific training objectives included

- joint deployment training (airborne operations),
- joint command and control (infantry squad and platoon battle drills),
- joint operations planning (squad and platoon patrolling),
- combined arms (integrated live-fire training with mortars), and
- airborne operations (attack helicopters and land navigational exercises).

Company and battalion commanders at the sites we visited in Honduras followed similar procedures to account for weapons, equipment, and ammunition. Basic controls over weapons and equipment were visual inspections combined with tight physical security. In addition, a paper trail was maintained for all ammunition. These procedures work in conjunction with accountability requirements under the Army’s property book concept. In this regard, asset management at the division level is transferred to the property book officer, who maintains property book accountability for the division. The property book includes a record of all nonexpendable items. Nonexpendable items deployed in this exercise
were on file with the property book officer and were to be cleared with him after redeployment to prove that they had been returned. This type of reconciliation is used to verify that items are sufficiently safeguarded from theft or not inadvertently lost while in the field.

Field accountability measures appeared adequate. At the training sites, we observed that vehicles not in use were within the camp area under camouflage netting and, according to commanders, were closely guarded at night. Prior to the deployment, each soldier had signed for his individual sensitive items—such as M-16s and night-vision goggles—and therefore was personally responsible for their security and financially responsible in the event of their loss. As a further measure of accountability, company commanders conducted a sensitive-item check routinely at sunrise and sunset and after any troop movement.

Additional measures were taken to ensure that all ammunition was accounted for. At each site, a field ammunition supply point was set up with perimeter fencing and at least one guard. Each site was similar in that ammunition was separated by designation—unit basic load or training, type (caliber), and residue. For example, shell casings were placed in their original boxes to be weighed later as proof they had been expended. Forms used to document change of control and issue and turn-in of ammunition appeared to be properly filled out. The supply point at Palmerola maintained overall document control for the EDRE.

Based on our review of available records and physical inspections of organizational inventories at Fort Bragg and Fort Ord, we concluded that ammunition, explosives, vehicles, weapon systems, sensitive items, medical supplies, rations, and contingency stocks deployed to Honduras were either expended during Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT or returned to the United States. We were unable, however, to absolutely verify the return of two vehicles belonging to the 82nd Airborne Division.

Our reconciliation of internal control documents and our physical inventories of selected critical items showed that ammunition and explosives issued to troops deployed to Honduras were either expended during the exercise or returned to Fort Bragg or Fort Ord.

Troops deployed to Honduras with allotments of their unit basic load and training ammunition. The basic load is the quantity of ammunition and explosives kept by a unit to sustain its operations in combat for a
set time. Training ammunition, as the name implies, is that part of the unit's ammunition authorization that is expended to achieve required readiness levels.

Accountability for ammunition and explosives is maintained through the unit's property book and the ammunition supply point's stock record account. Supply point and unit controls over issue, receipt, and turn-in are maintained primarily through the use of Army Form 581 (Request for Issue and Turn-in of Ammunition) and hand receipts. For example, Army Form 5515-R (Training Ammunition Control Document) can be used as a hand receipt for training ammunition. The combined quantities of live ammunition and residue turned in on Form 581 must balance with the quantities of ammunition initially issued from the supply point. Turn-in quantities are reconciled using weight factors for residue and item counts for live ammunition.

We reconciled the records of all ammunition and explosives sent to Honduras by reviewing documents showing the quantities requested, issued, expended, and turned in to the ammunition supply point upon redeployment (see app. II). Additionally, we counted certain critical items on a 100-percent or judgmental sample basis. Records showed that residue amounts supported quantities expended. Although unit basic load was returned intact, our test counts included items common to both unit basic load and training ammunition. The following are examples:

- Stinger, Dragon, Shillelagh, and TOW (tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided) missiles are serially numbered; therefore, accountability is maintained by individual serial number. From various control documents, we identified 132 of these missiles that had been deployed as unit basic load or training ammunition. We inspected and/or reconciled documentation for each redeployed missile and verified that its serial number was one of those listed on issue and turn-in documents used in the deployment. We also reconciled documents for the four missiles that had been expended or destroyed during training.

- Based on available documentation and/or our physical inventories, we verified that the 780 LAW (light anti-armor weapon) rockets deployed to Honduras as unit basic load or training ammunition had been returned with their respective units.

- Grenades, mines, and small arms ammunition are identified on issue and turn-in documents by lot number. We identified the lot numbers for these items from available documentation. We reconciled issue and turn-in documents for the grenades and mines in these lot numbers. Our count of grenades and mines agreed with the quantities recorded by the
Appendix I
Controls Over U.S. Military Equipment
and Supplies

Army as returned from Honduras. Thus, our document reconciliation
and physical inventory verified that all mines and grenades deployed
were returned or expended during this exercise.

- We also selected a judgmental sample of small arms ammunition
(5.56 ball, 5.56 tracer, and 7.62 ball) from different lot numbers issued
for the deployment. Based on our review of available documentation
and inspections of unopened ammunition boxes, we believe that the
small arms ammunition had been expended in Honduras or returned to
the United States. We did find one instance in which 9,840 rounds of
5.56 tracer ammunition for the M-16 rifle had been recorded as
expended on Fort Bragg’s records but had, in fact, been returned to Fort
Ord.

Weapon Systems, Vehicles,
and Sensitive Items
Based on our review and reconciliation of available documents and on
our physical inspections, we concluded that all weapon systems and sen-
sitive items deployed to Honduras with the 82nd Airborne and 7th
Infantry Divisions had been returned in the redeployment. We were
unable to verify the return of 2 of the 191 vehicles that had been used in
the exercise.

Nonexpendable property, such as helicopters, tanks, artillery, vehicles,
and sensitive items, is issued to Army organizations as authorized in the
MKIE, which prescribes the organization, personnel, and equipment nec-
essary for a specific unit’s combat operational needs. Nonexpendable
items are required to be accounted for at the using unit level through
property book procedures. Army regulations provide guidance for com-
manders to properly manage and account for nonexpendable property
on the property book through the use of temporary and permanent hand
receipts and periodic physical inventories. For example, all sensitive
items, such as weapons and night vision devices, kept by the using unit
are required to be inventoried by serial number each month.

The 82nd Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg with eight heli-
copters (utility, observation, and attack), two Sheridan tanks, and eight
howitzers, and the 7th Infantry Division deployed from Fort Ord with
four howitzers and four mortars. (See app. III.) At Fort Bragg, we recon-
ciled the number of weapon systems on the deployment and redeploy-
ment manifests and identified specific equipment identifiers—bumper
and/or registration numbers. We inspected each item and verified that
its registration number was one of those listed on the unit’s property
book. At Fort Ord, we identified all howitzers and mortars belonging to
the deployed unit from inventory reports. We reconciled pre- and post-
Appendix I
Controls Over U.S. Military Equipment and Supplies

deployment inventory reports, inspected the items, and verified that serial numbers were the same as those listed on inventory reports or in the property book.

Our reconciliation of the 191 deployed vehicles was similar (see app. IV). We identified vehicles from deployment and redeployment manifests. We physically inspected each vehicle, matched the bumper number with the number listed on the manifest, and verified that the serial or registration number was one of those listed in the property book.

We were unable to verify the return of two vehicles belonging to the 82nd Airborne Division. Division officials insisted that the vehicles had indeed been redeployed to Fort Bragg; however, they could not provide adequate documentation to support their assertion. They surmised that the missing vehicles had been redeployed on a flight for an exercise other than GOLDEN PHEASANT. We could not verify this explanation as some of the transportation documents lacked sufficient information to identify either individual pieces of equipment and/or the accountable unit.

Sensitive items, such as individual weapons (rifles, pistols, and machine guns) and night-vision devices (goggles and sights), are assigned to and closely controlled by individual unit commanders. Each month, unit commanders are required to verify on inventory reports that all sensitive items assigned to their units have been counted and serial numbers verified. We reconciled pre- and post-deployment inventory reports on sensitive items. Additionally, we counted all the weapons for the 10 units deployed from Fort Ord and conducted sample inventories for 11 units representing 55 percent of the troops in the 40 units, or parts of units, that deployed from Fort Bragg. Consequently, we concluded that units and portions of units that deployed to Honduras did not leave sensitive items there.

Rations and Medical Supplies

Based on our discussions with unit officials and reviews of control documents, we concluded that rations and medical supplies deployed to Honduras were, for the most part, expended in Honduras or returned to the United States. Small quantities of medical supplies were left at Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras.

1The results provided a sampling error of $\pm3.24$ percent at a 95-percent confidence level.
According to our analysis of rations (ready-to-eat meals and T-rations) sent from Forts Bragg and Ord, along with additional rations purchased from Joint Task Force Bravo, the Army could have justified substantially more rations for Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT than were actually deployed or purchased. Subsistence items are accounted for on the unit property book and/or stock record accounts of the supply support activity. During Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT, the 82nd Airborne Division, as the task force leader, controlled issues of rations to individual units from Forts Bragg and Ord.

To assess the reasonableness of rations deployed, we reviewed the Division's stock records showing the amounts of food sent to Honduras and the amounts procured in Honduras. We estimated that the Army could have justified 107,730 meals, but only 68,112 had been deployed or purchased. We predicated our analysis on a daily average of 2,565 U.S. troops operating during the 14-day exercise, and we allowed for three meals per person a day. However, according to Division officials, troops did not always consume their allotted rations because of the heat.

At Fort Bragg, we reviewed internal control documents showing the types and quantities of medical items requisitioned, issued, prescribed to individuals, and returned to base inventories. At Fort Ord, we reviewed supply records at the division level and resupply requests at the unit level. Based on our review of stock records and reconciliations of items issued, consumed, and returned, we concluded that most medical supplies had been returned. In fact, officials from one battalion of the 7th Infantry Division informed us they had used so little of their unit medical supplies that they did not replace them on their return. Officials from the Division's other battalion informed us that they did leave several cases of intravenous fluids, commonly used to treat heat cases, with Joint Task Force Bravo upon their redeployment.

No Evidence That Large Quantities of Supplies Were Obtained From Other Sources

Based on discussions with officials and reviews of supply requests and issues at Fort Bragg and Fort Ord supply activities that support units of the 82nd Airborne and 7th Infantry Divisions, we found that units deployed to Honduras had not requisitioned large quantities of nonexpendable or expendable contingency or other supplies prior to the deployment. Those supplies that were requisitioned from alternative supply sources were either returned or expended. For example, the Central Issue Facility at Fort Bragg made four small issues to the 82nd Airborne Division, one of which was 52 entrenching tools. Many of the entrenching tools were broken during use in Honduras. Records showed
that all but two had been returned to the unit's warehouse. We found a
bookkeeping error that accounted for one of the tools; the other broken
entrenching tool was given to a member of a congressional delegation
visiting the troops during the deployment.

Lost, Damaged, or
Destroyed
Government Property
Was Minor

Army regulations require that Army property be accounted for on a
property account. If property cannot be accounted for, Army procedures
allow for the use of reports of survey and statements of charges to pro-
vide relief from accountability. Reports of survey are used when negli-
gence or misconduct is suspected and liability is not admitted. The
statement of charges is used when an individual acknowledges that gov-
ernment property was lost or damaged.

According to 7th Infantry Division officials, no Army property was lost,
damaged, or destroyed during the Honduras deployment; therefore, no
reports were required. The combined total on statements of charges and
reports of survey attributed to Exercise GOLDEN PHEASANT for the
82nd Airborne Division was about $28,000. The type and unit cost of
some items in the reports of survey were machine gun components
($528) and parachutes ($613). Investigations for all but one of the nine
reports of survey were still in progress at the time of our review. The
amounts on the six statements of charges that were filed totaled about
$319.
Appendix II

Ammunition and Explosives Deployed and Redeployed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category*</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Expended or destroyed*</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deployed¹</td>
<td>Redeployed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
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<td>6,849</td>
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¹Except for some demolition material, the unit of issue for ammunition and explosives is “each” or “rounds.”
²In some instances, more ammunition and explosives were issued than deployed. In those cases, we reconciled all records.
³Army records showed that residue amounts support quantities expended.
⁴There was a shortage of 10,040 rounds in small arms training ammunition. Most of this shortage can be attributed to the 9,840 rounds of 5.56 ammunition reported by Fort Bragg as expended but actually returned to Fort Ord as live ammunition.
⁵There was an overage of 9,910 rounds in small arms unit basic load ammunition. Most of this was due to the 9,840 rounds deployed from Fort Bragg and erroneously returned to Fort Ord as unit basic load ammunition.
# Appendix III
## Weapon Systems Deployed and Redeployed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deployed</th>
<th>Redeployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helicopters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60 (Utility) Blackhawk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-58 (Observation) Kiowa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-1S (Attack) Cobra</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm Howitzer</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-mm Mortar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheridan tank</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Vehicles Deployed and Redeployed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deployed</th>
<th>Redeployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1/4 Ton</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1/2 Ton</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Ton</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal trucks</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
<td><strong>134</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailers</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water purification unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>191</strong></td>
<td><strong>189</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*pVarious troop and cargo carriers.

*eWe were unable to verify the return of two vehicles.*
Appendix V
Map of Honduras
In Reply Refer to: I-88/10352B

Mr. Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
National Security and
International Affairs Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Conahan:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "HONDURAN DEPLOYMENT: Controls Over U.S. Military Equipment and Supplies," dated August 1, 1988 (GAO Code 463767/OSD Case 7720).

The DoD has reviewed the report and has no comment on the GAO findings and conclusions. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft report.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Brown
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Inter-American Affairs
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