U.N. PEACEKEEPING

Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions
December 29, 1993

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Lee Hamilton
Chairman
The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

This report responds to your Committees' request that we examine lessons learned from the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Because of the importance of peacekeeping, we also performed limited analysis of the United Nations Operation in Somalia to help illustrate systematic issues in managing peacekeeping operations. The report discusses operational problems with implementing peacekeeping and the importance of clear mandates and a solid political framework for peace.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the United Nations, the Secretary of State, the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and other interested parties.

This report was prepared under the direction of Harold J. Johnson, Director, International Affairs Issues, who may be reached on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix VI.

Harold J. Johnson
Director, International Affairs Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) have endeavored to bring peace to nations where millions have died from civil war. UNTAC and UNOSOM were tasked with the most comprehensive objectives ever given to peacekeeping missions and authorized budgets exceeding $1 billion. These missions thus provide an excellent opportunity to examine the U.N.’s management of peacekeeping. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs asked GAO to examine UNTAC’s operations. This report is based largely on that examination. In addition, GAO performed limited analysis of UNOSOM, but did not conduct a field visit to the country. GAO uses the information on UNOSOM to help illustrate systemic issues in managing peacekeeping. GAO’s specific objectives were to (1) describe the results of UNTAC through July 1993, (2) study the U.N.’s capability to manage operations such as UNTAC and UNOSOM, (3) examine peacekeeping command in the field, and (4) examine peacekeeping mandates.

Background

Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has authorized more peacekeeping missions and more complex ones than ever before. In the 40 years from 1948 through 1987, the United Nations deployed 13 peacekeeping missions; in the 6 years from 1988 through October 1993, it deployed 18. Many of these missions outstripped previous ones in size and complexity, and both UNTAC and UNOSOM went far beyond the traditional peacekeeping approach of observing and monitoring ceasefires. This expansion has strained U.N. resources to effectively implement peacekeeping operations.

In October 1991, 4 Cambodian factions and 18 nations signed the Comprehensive Political Settlement ending nearly 20 years of civil war in Cambodia. The Security Council mandated UNTAC to implement the settlement, including demobilizing the four factions, repatriating refugees, ensuring human and political rights were respected, and organizing a free election. According to U.N. officials, UNTAC was authorized under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which provides for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

In January 1991, Somalia’s president was deposed and civil war and clan fighting ensued, leading to famine and lawlessness throughout portions of the country. In April 1992, the Security Council approved UNOSOM I, the first mission to Somalia, but UNOSOM I failed because peacekeepers were late in deploying and did not have adequate means to succeed under a
traditional peacekeeping mandate. The Security Council then authorized member states to use all means necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance in Somalia, and the United States led a coalition force to the country in late 1992. In May 1993, the United Nations resumed leadership under UNOSOM II. Unlike UNTAC, UNOSOM II was granted enforcement authority, as provided under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

**Results in Brief**

UNTAC has helped Cambodia take the first steps towards peace and national reconciliation by repatriating Cambodia's refugees and holding a free and fair nationwide election. A key element of this success was the Comprehensive Political Settlement, which provided the political framework for UNTAC's activities. UNTAC officials emphasized that the chances for success would have been substantially reduced without this framework. UNTAC was not completely successful: the factions did not disarm and demobilize their troops and UNTAC had limited success ensuring that human and political rights were fully respected.

GAO focused primarily on UNTAC because UNOSOM II was not fully developed at the time of this review and the operation is still in flux. Nonetheless, some problems were similar in both missions.

The United Nations has limited capability to implement peacekeeping missions such as UNTAC and UNOSOM. For example, (1) operational plans for UNTAC were not fully prepared before deployment, (2) supplies and equipment for UNTAC arrived long after deployment, and (3) military and civilian peacekeepers were late in deploying for both UNTAC and UNOSOM II, and some were unqualified. Based on experiences such as Cambodia and Somalia, the United Nations is taking steps to improve its management of peacekeeping.

UNTAC and UNOSOM II illustrate limits in U.N. command and coordination in the field. There was limited coordination of military and civilian activities in UNTAC, partly due to fragmentation in planning these activities. Also, UNTAC's large multinational force carried out orders inconsistently. In UNOSOM II, command and control sometimes broke down during operations. Despite initial problems, UNTAC's authority in the field allowed it to respond effectively to the changing situation.

The U.N. Charter does not specifically mention peacekeeping or cover the range of actions that missions such as UNTAC and UNOSOM II undertake.
Executive Summary

However, according to U.S. officials, peacekeeping is consistent with Chapter VI of the Charter, in which the consent and support of the parties is a key principle. UNTAC and UNOSOM II demonstrate that the support of the parties is important, regardless of the U.N. chapter under which peacekeeping missions are authorized. For example, much of UNTAC’s success can be attributed to its retaining international support and the support of three of the four factions. U.N. officials also emphasized the importance of the Comprehensive Political Settlement in providing the basis for this support. A similar settlement with broad support was not present in Somalia.

Principal Findings

First Steps Taken Towards Reconciliation in Cambodia

From May 23 to 28, 1993, over 4.2 million Cambodians—about 90 percent of the registered voters—elected national leaders. Subsequently, the major parties, excluding the Khmer Rouge, agreed to a provisional coalition government. To successfully hold the election, UNTAC developed an effective grass roots organization, conducted a nationwide education campaign about voting, and organized an electoral staff of over 50,000 during polling. UNTAC’s military, information, and civilian components helped provide confidence in the electoral process by guarding political party offices, providing electoral information, and conducting human and political rights investigations.

Providing the foundation for UNTAC’s electoral success was the Comprehensive Political Settlement. Taking about 4 years to negotiate, the settlement was signed by the 4 Cambodian factions, all permanent members of the Security Council, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and 11 other nations. The settlement set forth the basic principles for peace, and even when the Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate with UNTAC, it referred to the settlement to justify its stance.

UNTAC did not accomplish some key objectives. After the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm its troops, UNTAC ended attempts to demobilize the four factions. UNTAC made limited progress in creating an environment free from government and political intimidation. Between March and May 1993, over 200 people were killed in acts of political violence, primarily by the Khmer Rouge, but also by the existing government administration.
Executive Summary

Strains in U.N. Capability to Implement Peacekeeping Missions

The United Nations is ill-equipped to plan, logistically support, and deploy personnel to missions the size of UNTAC and UNOSOM II. As of May 1993, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations consisted of 14 political officers, 9 military planners, and 15 general service workers. The Field Operations Division had 33 professionals and 83 general service workers. These 2 units provided headquarters support to 13 peacekeeping missions with over 50,000 troops.

The small staff could not prepare detailed operational plans for all of UNTAC’s activities prior to deployment, and this hindered operations. Moreover, the planning was not integrated. The implementation plan, for example, did not specify what mission tasks had to be completed before related tasks could begin. Nor did the Secretariat do contingency planning. The United Nations also lacks a strong logistics system that can support large peacekeeping operations. It has no large supply depot, so it had to purchase almost all supplies for UNTAC, whose requirements overwhelmed U.N. procurement capabilities. Further, logistics and planning operations were fragmented both at headquarters and in the field. Finally, the U.N. process for recruiting member states to provide troop contingents and police for peacekeeping missions delayed the deployment of both UNTAC and UNOSOM II and resulted in some unqualified personnel being sent to Cambodia.

The U.N. Secretariat requires the assistance of member states to improve the implementation of peacekeeping operations. For instance, it relies on member states to provide qualified troops, police, and financial support in a timely manner. The U.N. Secretariat has proposed to improve its management of peacekeeping by, among other things, integrating its logistics and planning.

Command and Coordination Issues in the Field

UNTAC’s civilian and military units reported to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, but there was little military-civilian coordination early in the operation. As a result, duplication of some tasks occurred and the military could not properly plan security measures for civilian activities. In the provinces, there was no clear coordinating authority for military and civilian activities.

Although the U.N. Force Commander has overall authority for military operations, his orders and directives are carried out by each country’s national commander, and this led to some inconsistencies. For example, all UNTAC troop contingents had the same rules of engagement, but some
Executive Summary

were passive when threatened, while others were more assertive. In Somalia, some national contingents carried out actions independently of the U.N. command.

Despite difficulties in commanding a diverse multinational force, UNTAC’s broad field authority enabled it to respond flexibly to changes in Cambodia. For instance, UNTAC reconfigured the original military plan after the Khmer Rouge refused to participate in the peace process and was effective in redrawning new security zones.

Observations on Peacekeeping Mandates

Peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned in the U.N. Charter; thus mandates for missions are unclear when they call for actions that appear to combine peaceful measures called for under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter and forceful measures as provided for under Chapter VII. UNTAC, for example, was authorized under Chapter VI, but it was mandated to confiscate weapons and take corrective action on human rights abuses, implying that UNTAC was also authorized to take action allowed under Chapter VII. Unlike UNTAC, UNOSOM II is clearly authorized under Chapter VII and mandated to use all means necessary to provide a secure environment. However, in operational terms, it is unclear how enforcement can be used to provide conditions for relief and political reconciliation.

Regardless of whether a peacekeeping mission is authorized under Chapter VI or VII, the consent and support of all parties is crucial. In Cambodia, the Comprehensive Political Settlement provided a broadly supported political framework for peace; thus after the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm and even sporadically attacked UNTAC troops, UNTAC left an open door for the Khmer Rouge to rejoin the peace process. By refusing to act aggressively against the Khmer Rouge, UNTAC retained the support of the remaining factions and key nations such as China and Thailand. Although agreement on a framework for reconciliation was signed by major factions within Somalia, the agreement was developed in a few months, and, according to several U.S. officials, there was considerable pressure on the factions to sign the agreement.
Executive Summary

Recommendations

GAO makes no recommendations in this report.

Agency Comments

The U.N. Secretariat, Department of State, and U.S. Mission to the United Nations provided written comments on this report (see apps. III, IV, and V). GAO also discussed a draft of the report with the Department of Defense and UNTAC officials and incorporated their comments as appropriate.

The Department of State and the U.S. Mission agreed with the report, and the United Nations stated that the report was a timely and useful contribution to the discussion on peacekeeping. The United Nations emphasized that (1) to have a perspective on today's situation, the evolution of peacekeeping from traditional military observer operations to multifaceted ones such as UNTAC must be understood, (2) ensuring respect for human rights goes beyond the concept of peace enforcement, and (3) many problems GAO identified resulted from the application of rules and procedures established by the U.N. member states, especially in financing peacekeeping operations. GAO agrees that these are important matters and has expanded its discussion of these issues in the report text as appropriate.
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1
Introduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent Expansion of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Background in Cambodia and Somalia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC and UNOSOM Mandates Were Ambitious and Unprecedented</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Missions Operate Within U.N. Structure</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget and Financing</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives, Scope, and Methodology</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 2
National Reconciliation Begun in Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Settlement Provided Political Framework for UNTAC</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Provides Basis for National Reconciliation</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation Completed</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Process Continues</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC Actions Leave a Legacy for Peace</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 3
Limits on U.N. Capacity to Plan, Logistically Support, and Deploy Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Planning Capability Is Limited</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits of the U.N. Logistics System</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits of Peacekeeping's Voluntary Personnel System</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat Reforms and Member State Responsibilities</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 4
Limits on U.N. Field Coordination and Authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC's Military and Civilian Components Were Not Fully Coordinated</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits of the U.N. Military Command</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Authority Permits Responsive Action</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5
Observations on Peacekeeping Mandates

The U.N. Charter Does Not Specifically Address Peacekeeping
Political Feasibility
Ensuring Respect for Human Rights
Conclusions

Appendixes

Appendix I: Participants on the Peacekeeping Panel
Appendix II: Countries Contributing Military Personnel to UNTAC or UNOSOM II
Appendix III: Comments From the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of State
Appendix V: Comments From the United States Mission to the United Nations
Appendix VI: Major Contributors to This Report

Tables

Table 1.1: Current U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
Table 1.2: UNTAC and UNOSOM Appropriations

Figures

Figure 1.1: UNTAC Organizational Chart
Figure 2.1: Cambodians Register to Vote and Obtain Photo I.D.s
Figure 2.2: UNTAC Provides Security for Cambodian Refugees
Figure 2.3: Cambodian Human Rights Group’s Documentation of Abuses

Abbreviations

FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNITAF Unified Task Force
Introduction

The United Nations faces critical challenges in its management of peacekeeping operations. Not only has the U.N. Security Council authorized more peacekeeping missions than ever before, but also the missions are larger and more complex, as the United Nations attempts to implement its new concept of peacebuilding.1 The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) are the most complex of these peacebuilding missions and the first peacekeeping operations with annual budgets of over $1 billion. We focused primarily on UNTAC because UNOSOM II is still ongoing, and the operation is still in flux.

Recent Expansion of Peacekeeping

The number of peacekeeping missions has increased dramatically in recent years. In the 40 years from 1948 through 1987, the United Nations deployed 13 peacekeeping missions; in the 6 years from 1988 through October 1993, the United Nations deployed 18. As of October 1993, 17 missions were active, compared to 5 in 1987. This expansion has strained U.N. resources, as recent missions have been undertaken simultaneously. For example, when UNTAC was just getting underway, the missions in Somalia and Yugoslavia were simultaneously being planned and implemented, and missions such as El Salvador, Angola, and Lebanon were ongoing. See table 1.1 for a list of ongoing U.N. peacekeeping missions and their activities.

Table 1.1: Current U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Description*</th>
<th>Mission components</th>
<th>Annual cost$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)</td>
<td>June 1948</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fires along Israeli borders (20)</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>$31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)</td>
<td>Mar. 1964</td>
<td>Monitor buffer zone separating Greek and Turkish communities (163)</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)</td>
<td>Mar. 1978</td>
<td>Establish buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon (193)</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In the U.N. report, "An Agenda for Peace," the Secretary General introduces the concept of peacebuilding operations. These are missions that not only deter conflict but also attempt to rebuild the structures that support enduring peace.
At the same time, the concept of peacekeeping has evolved from situations where U.N. peacekeeping troops essentially monitored cease-fire agreements to operations in Cambodia and Somalia where troop contingents monitor and investigate cease-fires and civilian peacekeepers attempt to rebuild national institutions and forge cooperative relations among the warring parties. Further, peacekeeping missions have
traditionally been authorized under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which provides for the peaceful resolution of disputes and depends on the consent of the parties. But UNOSOM II was authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to use all means necessary to create a secure environment in Somalia. Reflecting both the increasing number of missions and their increasing complexity, expenditures for peacekeeping have ballooned from $364 million in 1986-1987 to $3.6 billion in 1992-1993. The number of U.N. troops and police serving as peacekeepers has also risen from about 20,000 in 1990 to over 70,000 in September 1993.

Political Background in Cambodia and Somalia

Both Cambodia and Somalia have been devastated by turmoil and civil war. The end of the cold war, however, allowed the Security Council to agree on assertive action to end the bloodshed.

International Cooperation Underpins Cambodian Settlement

On October 23, 1991, Cambodia’s 4 major factions and 19 nations, including all permanent members of the Security Council, all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Australia, Japan, Vietnam, and others signed the Comprehensive Political Settlement ending years of civil war in Cambodia. It was hoped this would end a tragic period for Cambodia that began in 1975, when the Khmer Rouge, now called the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, took power in Cambodia. Over the next 4 years, Khmer Rouge policies and practices led to the deaths of an estimated 1 million Cambodians, over 10 percent of the population. In 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and installed a new government, referred to as the State of Cambodia. Two noncommunist Cambodian resistance forces cooperated with the Khmer Rouge against the State of Cambodia until the signing of the peace settlement. UNTAC was identified in the peace document as the entity to help ensure that the terms of the settlement were implemented.

Evolution of UNOSOM’s Mandate

In January 1991, Somalia’s president was deposed and civil war and almost total lawlessness existed throughout the southern and central portions of the country. By January 1992, Somali government and society had broken down and an estimated 500,000 Somalis had died; many more were in...
danger of dying from starvation and strife. The U.N. Security Council established initial operations—the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)—in April 1992 to provide military observers to monitor cease-fires and military security personnel to escort relief supplies.

However, UNOSOM I failed due to the late deployment of security forces and the constraints of the traditional peacekeeping approach. Traditionally, the United Nations has obtained agreement from local authorities to deploy peacekeepers, and missions are mandated under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which does not provide for the use of force to maintain peace. UNOSOM I did not have the full agreement and cooperation of local authorities, but still attempted to operate under Chapter VI.

Gradually, a consensus began to emerge from the international community that the traditional peacekeeping used for UNOSOM I was not suitable for Somalia. In late 1992, the Security Council passed a resolution that (1) welcomed the offer of a member state to establish another mission in Somalia and (2) authorized member states to cooperate in using all means necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. The United States, which had originally proposed this mission, then led the coalition force, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF was specifically mandated under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows member states to use a range of enforcement actions, including action by air, land, or sea, as necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The United Nations resumed its leadership of Somalia operations in May 1993, under UNOSOM II, an expansion of UNOSOM I operations. Unlike the original U.N. operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II was authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Currently, the United States is working under UNOSOM II to provide logistical support. In addition, U.S. combat troops are stationed off shore as a quick reaction force under U.S. command. These combat troops are intended to support UNOSOM II operations, but technically are not part of UNOSOM II and receive no U.N. funding support.

UNTAC and UNOSOM II

Mandates Were Ambitious and Unprecedented

The mandates for UNTAC and UNOSOM II were the most ambitious ever authorized by the U.N. Security Council and called for complex peacebuilding activities such as control of the civil administration in Cambodia and creation of civil institutions in Somalia. UNTAC was mandated for an 18-month period, from March 1992 to August 1993, and
was planned to have about 16,000 military, 5,796 international and local civilian staff, 3,600 civilian police, and 62,000 Cambodians to help during the election. UNTAC's major functions were to

- supervise the cease-fire and disarm and demobilize an estimated 450,000 Cambodian troops and militia,
- supervise an estimated 60,000 Cambodian police to ensure that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially,
- provide Cambodians with human rights education and investigate and take action against human rights abuse,
- directly control and supervise Cambodia's administrative agencies in fields such as public security to ensure a neutral political environment,
- repatriate 360,000 Cambodian refugees under the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
- provide food security and health services and restore basic infrastructure and public utilities; and
- organize and administer a free and fair election so that the Cambodian people could choose representatives to a constituent assembly.

The Security Council clearly stated that UNOSOM II was authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and was mandated to ensure security and disarmament of the various factions, provide relief and reconstruction, assist in national political reconciliation, and rebuild the Somali system for administering justice. UNOSOM II faces a special challenge because the Somali economy and governmental structure have been almost completely destroyed. Also, the Somali factions have yet to complete a political framework for peace, which is freely consented to and which they fully support.

Both UNTAC and UNOSOM II have similar organizational structures. We use UNTAC to illustrate peacekeeping's organization. UNTAC's day-to-day operations were directed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, who was located in Phnom Penh. Figure 1.1 shows the overall organization.
Chapter 1
Introduction

Figure 1.1: UNTAC Organizational Chart

(Figure notes on next page)
Although day-to-day operations were managed in Cambodia, UNTAC operated within the U.N.'s structure for peacekeeping. The Special Representative reported directly to the Secretary General, who ultimately answered to the Security Council and the General Assembly. In Somalia, major offices include the Force Commander; Political Affairs; Coordination of Humanitarian Relief and Rehabilitation; Public Affairs; Administration; and the Office for Justice, Law, and Order.

Several other units at U.N. headquarters in New York are part of the U.N.'s peacekeeping organization, particularly the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Field Operations Division, which has now been merged into the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has the main responsibility for planning peacekeeping missions, reporting on them, and providing them with policy guidance. The Field Operations Division plans and arranges the mission deployment, including staffing, accommodation, transport, communications, equipment, and supplies; prepares budgets for the mission; and provides guidance for field procurement and logistics operations.

**Budget and Financing**

Most peacekeeping missions must obtain a separate budget for operations. After a peacekeeping mission is approved by the Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations prepares an implementation plan, and the Field Operations Division prepares the mission's budget and deployment plan. Because the Security Council approves the mission before the budget is submitted, the full cost implications of a mission are not known when it is approved. Once the Secretariat completes the budget, it is reviewed by the U.N.'s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and then by the Fifth Committee. The budget is then sent to the U.N. General Assembly to be decided upon. If approved, the member states pay for the mission through their peacekeeping assessments; the U.S. assessment is 30.4 percent.4

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4The U.S. assessment for the regular budget is 25 percent, but it is assessed at a special rate of 30.4 percent for peacekeeping. The United Nations has proposed to increase the U.S. peacekeeping assessment from 30.4 to 31.7 percent to make up for the shortfall from the former Soviet Union. The United States has not paid the increase, pending an overall review of assessments.
When the U.N. Secretariat first estimated UNTAC's budget to be $1.9 billion in February 1992, member states were concerned because it was the most expensive peacekeeping mission ever proposed. The Secretariat revised the estimate to $1.7 billion in May 1992 and again lowered the estimate to $1.6 billion in November 1992. As of July 1993, UNTAC's estimated budget was $1.6 billion.

In addition to assessed dues, the Secretariat held a pledging conference in June 1992 to obtain voluntary contributions for longer term reconstruction and development of Cambodia. At this conference, $880 million was pledged, with the United States pledging $135 million. Similarly, the United Nations held a pledging conference to fund its near term relief and rehabilitation program for Somalia in March 1993. U.N. officials told us that $125 million was pledged.

The U.N. General Assembly did not approve UNTAC's or UNOSOM's estimated budgets in total, but authorized funding in increments. For example, in February 1992, the Security Council approved an advance appropriation of $200 million to pay UNTAC's initial costs. Table 1.2 shows the appropriations for UNTAC and UNOSOM II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.2: UNTAC and UNOSOM Appropriations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dollars in millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNTAC</strong> appropriation</td>
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<td>483</td>
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<td>236</td>
</tr>
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</table>

We initiated this study in response to a request from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs to examine lessons learned from the Cambodia operation. Our specific objectives were to (1) describe the operation and status of UNTAC through the May 1993 election, (2) study the U.N.'s capability to manage peacekeeping operations such as UNTAC and UNOSOM II, (3) examine peacekeeping organization and coordination in the field, and (4) examine peacekeeping mandates. Because of the growing importance of peacekeeping and the lessons that are applicable to peacekeeping operations in other countries,
we examined efforts in Somalia, but the effort there was still ongoing and in flux.

We performed our work at the U.N. Secretariat in New York, in Thailand where the refugee camps are located, and at UNTAC operations throughout Cambodia. U.N. officials at all levels cooperated with us in the study. At the Secretariat, we interviewed officials in the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Administration and Management, the Field Operations Division, and the Executive Office of the Secretary General about proposing, planning, and providing support for peacekeeping operations. We obtained and analyzed reports and documents from them on planning for UNTAC, as well as how the operations were being implemented. Also, we examined the U.N.’s organizational, logistical, and financial manuals related to peacekeeping operations.

In Cambodia, we visited UNTAC operations in nine provinces, which contained about 60 percent of the country’s population. We discussed operations with numerous UNTAC staff, including the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the Force Commander, the Deputy Special Representative, the directors of all components, military observers and troops, line staff in all components, U.N. volunteers, and the local-hire Cambodian employees. We obtained and analyzed statistical information, reports on each component, operational orders, memorandums, and other documents on UNTAC operations. We discussed rehabilitation and repatriation efforts with private voluntary organizations, such as the American Red Cross and various Cambodian human rights groups. To gain information concerning the repatriation, we visited refugee camps along the Thailand-Cambodia border.

To gain the perspectives of the parties to the peace process, we met with leaders of the four Cambodian factions and discussed the political situation with several of their provincial officials. We spoke with officials at the Department of State, the U.S. mission to the United Nations, and the Department of Defense to determine issues of particular concern about UNTAC and the U.N. peacekeeping strategy. We also discussed the Cambodian operations with foreign ministry officials from Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines.

To obtain expert views on Cambodia and U.N. peacekeeping, we cosponsored a panel with the Congressional Research Service and the Center for Strategic and International Studies on February 10, 1993. Appendix I lists the expert panelists. Numerous House and Senate staff, as
well as other experts on Cambodia and peacekeeping, attended the panel and contributed to the discussion. Results of the panel discussion are used in the report as part of our analysis of U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.

As part of our work to monitor U.S. and U.N. involvement in Somalia, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the Agency for International Development. We met with U.N. officials in New York from the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian Affairs, and Political affairs, the Field Operations Division, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the United Nations Development Program. We also spoke with a former U.N. Special Representative to Somalia and representatives from private organizations conducting relief programs in Somalia. However, we did not perform fieldwork in Somalia.

We obtained written comments from the United Nations, the Department of State, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. We also obtained oral comments from the Department of Defense and from UNTAC. We have incorporated their comments in the report as appropriate. We conducted our work between May 1992 and August 1993 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
National Reconciliation Begun in Cambodia

The Comprehensive Political Settlement established a sound political framework for UNTAC activities. Within this framework, UNTAC has begun the process of national reconciliation in Cambodia by holding a fair nationwide election and repatriating Cambodia's refugees. In the election, nearly 90 percent of the registered voters cast ballots, and the two parties that captured 84 percent of the vote—the Cambodia People's Party and FUNCINPEC—have agreed to a provisional coalition to lead Cambodia's first national government since the 1970s. National reconciliation is proceeding, but remains fragile because the factions did not disarm and UNTAC had limited success in ensuring that human rights were fully respected or that the civil administration acted impartially. Some UNTAC actions, such as helping establish a U.N. human rights center in Phnom Penh, may also help Cambodia as it continues to rebuild a peaceful society.

U.N. officials believe, and we agree, that without the political framework established by the Comprehensive Political Settlement, the chances of success in Cambodia would have been substantially reduced. A similar political framework has been lacking in Somalia.

Comprehensive Settlement Provided Political Framework for UNTAC

The Comprehensive Political Settlement, signed in Paris in late 1991, provided a political framework for UNTAC operations and gave all parties a legitimate document to guide the peace process. The settlement, plus its five annexes and related declarations, covered issues ranging from Cambodia's territorial integrity, to principles for a Cambodian constitution, to the free election of a constituent assembly. Nineteen nations, including all permanent members of the Security Council and all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Australia, Japan, Vietnam, and other nations were involved in working out the agreement. The Settlement was finalized after 4 years of difficult negotiation. According to a U.N. official, there were disputes over many issues, including the description of recent Cambodian history as "Cambodia's tragic recent history." Nevertheless, the completed settlement provided an anchoring point for the Cambodian factions and other nations. The Special Representative to the Secretary General said the settlement provided UNTAC with a firm foundation and the political cohesion for action. Even the Khmer Rouge referred to the settlement to justify its refusal to cooperate with UNTAC.
Chapter 2
National Reconciliation Begun in Cambodia

Election Provides Basis for National Reconciliation

From May 23 to 28, 1993, about 4.27 million Cambodians—about 90 percent of the country's registered voters—elected representatives to Cambodia's Constituent Assembly. On June 10, 1993, the Secretary General's Special Representative declared that the election was free and fair and accurately reflected the will of the Cambodian people. UNTAC reported that even some Khmer Rouge troops had turned out to vote. On June 14, Cambodia's elected Constituent Assembly began work and established a committee to begin drafting Cambodia's constitution. Subsequently, Cambodia's factions, except for the Khmer Rouge, agreed to an interim provisional government.

UNTAC Grassroots Efforts Provided Environment for Election

UNTAC components worked at the village and commune level throughout Cambodia to provide enough confidence in the electoral process to allow the Cambodian people to vote. Most importantly, UNTAC's electoral component put together a well-organized system for carrying out the election. Electoral activities included organizing a nationwide voter education campaign, registering nearly 5 million Cambodians and providing them with photo identification cards, and supervising a staff that grew to over 50,000 during the election. Electoral operations relied on a grassroots campaign that went directly to the villages and communes throughout the countryside. About 400 U.N. volunteers\(^1\) were the primary international field staff organizing the election at the local levels. Also helping organize the election at the local level were over 50,000 Cambodians, hired as polling officers, data entry staff, interpreters, and other staff. The Cambodians worked in their own communities and, according to UNTAC electoral officials, were recognized local leaders, such as teachers and village headmen. Figure 2.1 shows local Cambodians on the UNTAC electoral staff working directly with villagers in a remote location in Cambodia.

\(^1\)U.N. volunteers are similar to Peace Corps volunteers. U.N. volunteers receive a stipend, airfare, insurance, and living expenses. The program, which began in 1971, is operated under the United Nations Development Program, and recruits international volunteers for U.N. operations in the field. As of December 1992, the average volunteer was 30 years old and had 10 years professional experience.
The information campaign was also important to the election effort. UNTAC's public information unit distributed radios throughout Cambodia and set up radio relay stations to publicize the election. Although television was unavailable outside of Phnom Penh, UNTAC provided electoral videotapes to restaurants, hotels, and video parlors in rural areas. In the locations we visited, the UNTAC tapes with entertainment and electoral messages were among the few tapes available. According to UNTAC officials, credible information was important to combat false information about the election disseminated by the Khmer Rouge and other parties.
Violent incidents occurred in the months preceding the election, but the approximately 16,000 UNTAC troops, 3,500 civilian police, and 1,500 international civilian peacekeepers provided a presence throughout Cambodia that helped provide confidence in the electoral process. For example, UNTAC's human rights and civil administration components, in conjunction with the military and police, conducted over 1,000 investigations of human rights abuses, cease-fire violations, and violations of due process. The military component conducted a civic action campaign in the countryside to reinforce UNTAC's commitment to the Cambodian people. UNTAC troops provided free medical care for Cambodians; built roads, bridges, and schools; and dug wells for local villages. As figure 2.2 shows, the military component also provided security for refugees returning from the camps on the border with Thailand.
Chapter 2
National Reconciliation Begun in Cambodia

Figure 2.2: UNTAC Provides Security for Cambodian Refugees

On March 30, 1993, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) presided over the closing of Site 2, the last Cambodian refugee camp in Thailand. By May 1993, over 360,000 Cambodians had been repatriated in time for the May election. To enable refugees to get started after their return to Cambodia, UNHCR gave them a reintegration amount of
$50 per adult and $25 per child. According to UNHCR officials, many returnees wanted agricultural land, but land in the areas of their choice was studded with land mines. Returnees were then given several alternatives, but most opted for the cash.

One area of continuing concern, however, is the slow pace of mine clearing. As of May 1993, 15,000 mines and other pieces of unexploded ordinance out of an estimated 2 to 4 million had been cleared. Responsibility for mine clearing has been transferred to the Cambodian Mine Action Center, which receives UNTAC support, but is intended to continue its work with international assistance once UNTAC leaves Cambodia.

**Peace Process Continues**

Following the successful election and formation of a national coalition government, the process of national reconciliation continued, with three issues in particular to be resolved by Cambodia's new government. First, since UNTAC did not disarm and demobilize the factions, there is a potential for renewed fighting. Second, ensuring a respect for human rights remains an important issue. Third, since UNTAC gained only limited control of the administrative structures of all factions, the new government will have to ensure an impartial civil service.

**Factions Are Armed and Mobilized**

UNTAC began the demobilization process on June 13, 1992, but the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm and demobilize its troops. By September 1992, 50,000 troops from the three factions other than the Khmer Rouge were in UNTAC cantonment sites. The Secretary General announced the effective end of the cantonment process in January 1993, after the Khmer Rouge continued in its refusal to demobilize its soldiers, claiming that UNTAC had not fully implemented the peace agreement.

As stipulated in the Comprehensive Political Settlement, three of the four Cambodian factions began forming a unified national army after the election. According to U.S. officials, even this limited merger substantially reduced the likelihood of future fighting. Nonetheless, since the Khmer Rouge did not participate in the election, a military working group of the Cambodian factions stated that a policy towards the Khmer Rouge had to be developed.
Human Rights Continue to Be an Issue

Protection of human rights in Cambodia remains an important issue for the new government. These concerns are reinforced both by Cambodia's recent past in which an estimated 1 million people were killed by the Khmer Rouge and UNTAC's experience trying to deal with human rights abuses. From March 1992 to December 1992, UNTAC investigated 339 cases of human rights abuses, primarily harassment, land disputes, and unlawful imprisonment. By November 1992, the nature of these abuses became more violent and political. From March 1993 to mid-May 1993 leading to the election, human rights abuses were significant. UNTAC investigations of political violence during this period confirmed 200 deaths, 338 injuries, and 114 abductions. UNTAC attributed 131 of those killings to the Khmer Rouge and 15 to the State of Cambodia government. Many of those killed were Cambodians of Vietnamese descent.

Although the Khmer Rouge and State of Cambodia government violated human rights on many occasions, UNTAC's presence kept pressure on the factions. Numerous investigations, as well as training seminars and courses, helped focus attention on human rights violations. According to officials of two Cambodian human rights groups, UNTAC should have done more to prevent human rights abuses. One group, however, said that UNTAC's presence allowed his group to function. Figure 2.3 shows documentation this group used to expose human rights abuses.
UNTAC Had Limited Control of the Administrative Structure

UNTAC did not fully control and supervise Cambodia's administrative structures in the fields specified by the comprehensive settlement. UNTAC's civil administration component focused on the State of Cambodia's ministries with an estimated 140,000 civil servants spread over 21 provinces. With only about 200 professional staff in this component, UNTAC...
tried to monitor State of Cambodia correspondence and instructions and revise the instructions as necessary before issuance. However, according to UNTAC officials, instructions were sometimes transmitted informally or deliberately hidden from UNTAC.

The UNTAC police component was supposed to play an integral part in ensuring Cambodia's police forces were fair and impartial. However, according to several UNTAC officials, the performance of the UNTAC police was disappointing. One UNTAC official said some UNTAC police were unfamiliar with fair investigative procedures and also became too close to their Cambodian counterparts to effectively monitor them. In the provinces, UNTAC officials said the provincial governors controlled the bureaucracy, including the Cambodian police and the justice system. A Cambodian judge in one province told us that he fully understood the concept of an independent judiciary, but the provincial governor could ignore his ruling or even intimidate him.

Despite having only limited control of the bureaucracy, UNTAC pressured the State of Cambodia to remain neutral. UNTAC’s civil administration component met with Cambodian officials, translated their official documents, and conducted inspections. For example, the office in charge of supervising the State of Cambodia’s defense ministry completely mapped out the ministry's organization, along with the names of office holders. The unit dealing with foreign affairs also had considerable success in ensuring that passports and visas were handled consistently.

Several UNTAC activities will continue beyond the end of UNTAC’s final departure and may help Cambodia rebuild a peaceful society. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights plans to establish a permanent center for human rights in Cambodia. UNTAC’s work in human rights training and work with Cambodian human rights groups helped provide the support for establishing a permanent office. One of UNTAC’s initial activities was to review Cambodia’s existing statutes. As part of that review, Cambodia adopted laws incorporating some U.N. international conventions on due process and human rights, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. UNTAC also established an ongoing mechanism called the mixed military working group for all the factions’ military forces to meet. This group met continuously throughout UNTAC operations, right up to the eve of the election, when the Khmer Rouge threatened to disrupt the voting.
Following the election, this group continued to meet and has provided military continuity in addressing ongoing security issues.

**Conclusions**

UNTAC did not accomplish several elements of its peacebuilding goals, including disarming the factions and creating an environment in which human and political rights were fully respected. The Khmer Rouge and the State of Cambodia did not fully honor the peace settlement as they had agreed to do. However, by establishing a well-organized framework for the election and working at the grassroots to build confidence in the process, UNTAC provided the foundation allowing the Cambodian people to begin national reconciliation.

Three clear lessons emerge from the results of UNTAC activity. First, a sound political framework, agreed to by all parties, provides the anchoring point for any peacekeeping operation. Second, a strong grassroots approach working directly with the people can be an effective tool in gaining their cooperation and support for the peacekeeping mission. Third, peacebuilding is a long process for which effective tools still need to be developed to ensure the sustainability of the mission's goals.
# Limits on U.N. Capacity to Plan, Logistically Support, and Deploy Peacekeeping Operations

Attention is often focused on peacekeeping actions, but the ability to act depends heavily on the U.N. Secretariat effectively planning missions, logistically supporting them, and deploying competent peacekeepers on schedule. The Secretariat has had a limited capacity to provide these services. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the FieldOperations Division have primary responsibility for these functions, but their staff is small and their organization is ill-suited to respond quickly to the needs of large missions such as UNTAC and UNOSOM II. Until recently, these two units worked independently and reported through different sections of the U.N. organization. Further, the United Nations must rely on member states to volunteer troops and police for missions and must recruit civilian staff, but the recruitment process is time-consuming and yields some unqualified staff.

Both the U.N. Secretariat and the member states share responsibility for improving these functions. Member states are responsible for providing overall direction, peacekeeping troops and police, and timely budget support so the peacekeeping operations can proceed. For its part, the U.N. Secretariat has undertaken major steps to address some of its institutional limitations. For example, in September 1993, the Secretariat announced the merger of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Field Operations Division into a single unit. This is a first step to integrating the planning and logistical functions for missions.

## U.N. Planning Capability Is Limited

UNTAC and UNOSOM II strained the U.N.'s planning apparatus and revealed weaknesses in the Secretariat's institutional ability to plan large and complex missions. These weaknesses are reflected in (1) the lack of detailed operational plans prior to deployment, (2) the fragmentation in the planning process, (3) the limits on U.N. information gathering, and (4) the lack of contingency planning.

## Lack of Detailed Operational Planning

UNTAC's implementation plan was approved by the Security Council in February 1992. Initial deployment occurred in March 1992. However, the implementation plan did not provide sufficient detail to begin operations. For example, only the electoral and military components had timelines identifying when tasks would begin and end and in what order they would be sequenced, and none of the plans contained the specific operational or logistical details needed to begin work. The implementation plan explained that information was incomplete and changes would have to be made based on experience in Cambodia. But UNTAC staff in the field had to
do considerable operational planning after deployment, and this caused delays. For example:

- The UNTAC civilian administration component was to “supervise and control” the State of Cambodia’s defense establishment to ensure its neutrality. However, this staff spent the initial months in-country defining how to control the ministries, identifying logistical needs, and mapping out the organization of the ministries. According to UNTAC officials, critical time was lost in planning logistical and operational requirements rather than taking control of the bureaucracy at a time when it was still willing to cooperate.

- The Superintendent of UNTAC civilian police said a final implementation plan was never completed for their component, and the activities of police monitors were delayed because the original planning did not contain details on the transportation needs of police monitors, such as motorbikes for villages and rural areas and boats for the many settlements along Cambodia’s waterways.

- Actions to canton, disarm, and demobilize all the factions’ troops were due to start in mid-June 1992 and be completed in August 1992, but operational orders with the details of deployment, roles, duties, assignments, and logistics were developed in the field by UNTAC. Operational orders were completed in June 1992, about 1 week prior to beginning to demobilize the factions’ troops.

- Human rights were a cornerstone of the operation, yet the implementation plan did not specify how human rights activities were to be carried on outside of Phnom Penh. Although the plan called for a nationwide human rights education plan, there was no provision for provincial human rights officers. UNTAC officials in Cambodia said the implementation plan was not sufficiently detailed to identify the need for additional human rights officers, and this delayed attempts to quickly begin programs for human rights education and monitoring.

Several factors limited the U.N. Secretariat’s ability to prepare operational plans. First, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations did not have sufficient staff. In May 1993, the Department consisted of 14 political officers, 9 military planners, and 15 general service workers. In addition to planning, these staff were responsible for providing 13 ongoing missions with political guidance, coordinating the actions of other U.N. offices involved in peacekeeping, and drafting reports on the missions. According to officials from the United Nations and several member states who participated in the planning, the U.N.’s peacekeeping staff was already stretched thin. For example, in January 1993, the United States sent a
dozen military planners to New York to help the United Nations prepare plans for supporting UNOSOM II. However, the U.S. contingent was too large for the United Nations to work with since, according to a U.S. official, the United Nations had a limited number of staff to plan UNOSOM II. To avoid overwhelming U.N. planning, the United States scaled back its UNOSOM II planning team in New York to five people. Further, compounding the shortage of staff is the lack of specialists. When UNTAC was being planned, there were no specialists on the U.N. peacekeeping staff dedicated to planning police, human rights, democracy building, or oversight of civilian government activities—tasks that peacebuilding missions have increasingly taken on.

In addition, the Secretariat did not have experience in planning missions as large and complex as UNTAC and UNOSOM II. According to member state officials, the Secretariat did not fully recognize the scope of planning necessary to meet UNTAC and UNOSOM’s needs. For example, UNTAC’s field hospital support group was provided an estimate of medical supplies to bring with them for field operations. However, according to the unit's commander, the hospitals used up the medical supplies, and he was having difficulty being resupplied. A U.S. official said that U.S. personnel had to be evacuated from the country on several occasions, and he attributed the initial shortfalls to a lack of comprehensive planning and competent staff for medical requirements. Several Department of Defense planners noted that the Secretariat planned UNTAC from scratch; typically, large military operations begin with “off-the-shelf” plans, which provide a preliminary template. According to these planners, operations often have to get off the ground quickly and model plans speed up the process by setting out, in detail, common procedures and logistical and personnel needs.

Both the electoral and repatriation planning illustrate the value of having an institutional structure to help in planning. Electoral and repatriation plans were prepared by or with the assistance of two U.N. units specializing in these activities—the U.N.’s Electoral Assistance Unit and the High Commissioner for Refugees. The preliminary plan for elections laid out electoral activities in detail and prepared the way for operations. The preliminary electoral plan contained 12 chapters, ranging from developing the electoral law, to registering voters, to setting up the structure for administering the election. Once in Cambodia, the electoral component still had to identify logistical needs and polling sites, but the plan provided a blueprint that was used for the actual operation.
Planning Is Fragmented

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Field Operations Division have major roles in planning peacekeeping missions. However, when UNTAC and UNOSOM II were being implemented, the peacekeeping department reported directly to the Secretary General, although the field division is located in another department and reported to the Undersecretary General for Administration and Management. This caused some difficulties and tension in planning. For example, U.N. officials stated that the peacekeeping department developed the overall implementation plan for UNTAC, but once the broad implementation plan was completed, logistical planning was turned over to the Field Operations Division. When plans had to be revised based on experience in Cambodia, the preparation of detailed operational plans with logistical specifications and deployment schedules was delayed because the two units could not agree on priorities, and there was no single authority short of the Secretary General to set the priorities for both units. The U.N. Secretariat announced that as of September 1, 1993, the Field Operations Division was incorporated into the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The effectiveness of this move has yet to be determined as the United Nations is working on the reorganization.

Fragmentation also occurred in planning substantive activities of operations. According to a U.N. official, planning for each UNTAC component was compartmentalized, and little communication occurred among the staff planning different activities. For example, planners on the military, civil administration, and electoral survey missions traveled to Cambodia in November and December 1991. But they did not meet about their work, except on an informal basis. An UNTAC military official said there was never a joint strategy-setting session for civilian and military components. The military therefore had no input into planning civilian activities that might require security assistance. An UNTAC civilian police official also commented that there was no joint staff to help plan and coordinate activities.

Although UNTAC’s implementation plan discussed the need to coordinate activities, the plan did not identify specific ways to coordinate activities and did not link related tasks of one component with tasks of other components. For example, a precondition for holding the election was the establishment of a neutral political environment, with UNTAC exercising the degree of control over the State of Cambodia bureaucracy believed necessary to create such an environment. However, there were no specific dates in the plan linking control of key government ministries with the election dates. Similarly, control of the bureaucracy required that UNTAC’s
police component adequately monitor the Cambodian police. However, no
dates were proposed for UNTAC police to complete key monitoring tasks to
allow effective control of the bureaucracy and subsequent impartial
campaign activities. According to Secretariat officials, the level of detail
needed to specify mechanisms for coordination and the linking of tasks
could not be completed before initial deployment. On the ground, UNTAC
officials said that the lack of detail made it difficult to effectively
coordinate key events and activities with the other components.

Planning Information Is Weak

The U.N. Secretariat did not have an intelligence service to help in
planning peacekeeping missions. To plan UNTAC, for instance, the United
Nations conducted survey missions in Cambodia. Teams of U.N. and
member state officials conducted surveys of Cambodia’s infrastructure in
1989 and 1990; a survey of Cambodia’s government administration in 1990;
and military, electoral, and government administration surveys from
October to December 1991.

According to U.N. and UNTAC officials, the surveys were of limited value in
preparing detailed operational plans. The information was out of date,
inaccurate, or incomplete. For example, because the infrastructure reports
were published in 1990, much of that information was outdated by the
time UNTAC began operations in 1992. Several UNTAC officials said the
condition of roads and bridges had deteriorated in the 2 years between the
survey and the beginning of UNTAC operations, and some roads initially
thought usable were barely passable when UNTAC deployed. In one
instance, heavy trucks rented by the United Nations to transport military
supplies could not move over the roads to resupply an infantry battalion
that had deployed to stabilize a potential conflict between the Khmer
Rouge and State of Cambodia forces. Further, the military survey mission
did not obtain accurate information on the factions’ troop locations and
specific unit strength. According to a military spokesman, the factions had
agreed to provide this information at a later time, but did not. Also, the
information on Cambodia’s administrative structure was incomplete, and
the situation had changed considerably by mid-1992 when UNTAC deployed.

According to U.N. officials, updated intelligence information would have
been useful for U.N. planning, but member states did not always provide
this information. For example, UNTAC officials requested detailed maps and
political and military information about a number of provinces to plan
voter registration and polling. They were provided only with the general
intelligence reports already given to the Secretariat. Officials from three
member states told us that they provided some information to the United Nations for planning UNTAC. However, sensitive intelligence was not provided because this information could be leaked and the sources compromised.

Lack of Contingency Planning

U.N. Secretariat officials did not develop contingency plans for UNTAC to be implemented if one or more of the factions violated the peace agreement. According to U.N. officials, all parties had agreed to the Comprehensive Political Settlement. Therefore, developing contingency plans would have suggested that the United Nations distrusted one or more of the parties involved. This would have been viewed as an act of bad faith by the factions and could have undermined the U.N.'s role in implementing the agreement. However, UNTAC officials as well as officials from other member states and even some U.N. Secretariat officials told us that some contingency planning was essential because of the high risk that the factions would not cooperate.

Although detailed contingency planning probably would not have been productive, general contingency plans would have been useful, according to UNTAC officials. For example, the role of the UNTAC police force focused on monitoring Cambodian police, but no broad options were laid out if the factions did not cooperate. When the police mission was expanded to guard political party offices, UNTAC police officials said they were unprepared for this additional role and did not see how they could accomplish their overall mission. They also said it took more time to readjust to this mission and some contingency planning would have helped. These UNTAC military officials said contingency planning might have helped them identify the need to more closely coordinate their actions with U.N. civilian workers. According to both UNTAC civilian police and military officials, contingency plans would have enabled them to react more promptly to banditry.

Limits of the U.N. Logistics System

The United Nations lacks a strong logistics system to support operations as large as UNTAC. The U.N. logistics system lacks (1) a procurement organization that can make large and timely purchases, (2) an integrated logistics and administrative system that can be quickly and effectively established for peacekeeping missions, and (3) logistical staff that can be deployed quickly.
Chapter 3  
Limits on U.N. Capacity to Plan, Logistically Support, and Deploy Peacekeeping Operations

Procurement for UNTAC Was Delayed

The United Nations does not have large supply depots; therefore, it must purchase supplies for each peacekeeping mission after the mission is approved. However, the operations in Cambodia and Somalia have shown that the U.N. procurement system cannot efficiently handle the volume of supplies and equipment needed by large missions. For example, according to the Director of the Field Operations Division, purchasing supplies in the quantity needed by UNTAC took much longer than expected. There were problems with identifying reliable suppliers, reviewing the bids, and ensuring delivery to Cambodia. One procurement officer said the United Nations did not have adequate and reliable suppliers for the diversity and quantity of supplies needed. We found numerous instances where slow U.N. procurement hindered both UNTAC and the Somalia operation. For example:

- UNTAC faced a shortage of vehicles in the early months, with some U.N. military observers being unable to deploy to their positions. One UNTAC inspector who monitored the State of Cambodia's defense ministry said he sometimes had to use local pedicabs to monitor events because there was one car available for three inspectors. At one point, he was called to UNTAC headquarters to discuss a report he had written on the State of Cambodia naval service, but without a car he could not get to the meeting when State of Cambodia officials demanded. UNTAC officials said suppliers could not immediately deliver the 8,000 vehicles ordered.
- The United Nations began procuring nearly $100 million worth of modular offices in April 1992 for UNTAC, but these offices were not delivered until November 1992 because the lead time on such a large order was several months and getting them to Cambodia was difficult. As a result, UNTAC's components were spread out over Phnom Penh in over 20 different locations until late 1992.
- UNTAC tried to purchase 2,500 electrical generators needed for field operations. To expedite delivery, it tried to obtain the generators within the region. But UNTAC needed more than were immediately available from the region and had to procure them elsewhere.
- U.N. civilian staff lacked radios, computers, adequate housing, water, and other equipment in the beginning of the Somalia mission, according to U.S. officials. A non-U.N. organization working in Somalia provided desks for the U.N. staff. A similar situation existed in Cambodia. In one province, the

1The United Nations has one supply depot in Pisa, Italy, but it is limited in its stocks and is too small to provision peacekeeping missions the size of UNTAC.

2According to the Deputy Special Representative, UNTAC had the largest delegation of authority for procurement ever given to a peacekeeping mission—$500,000 for the local procurement region. The procurement region included Cambodia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
civilian administration staff had received its first shipment of office supplies in mid-December 1992, 10 months after the operation started, and it still did not have generators, chairs, or tables for the office.

UNTAC was also ill-prepared to cope with U.N. procurement regulations, which state that "except as provided in rule 110.9, contracts for the purchase or rental of services, supplies, equipment and other requirements shall be let after competitive bidding or calling for proposals." Under competitive bidding, the deputy chief of UNTAC's integrated services explained that the following steps were needed to obtain items: (1) a requirement in the field is identified, justified, and certified by an authorized officer; (2) three bids are solicited, with newspaper or other advertising sometimes required; (3) sealed bids are opened, usually at a public meeting; (4) bids are evaluated for the lowest price that meets technical standards; (5) if the bid exceeds $70,000, the local Committee on Contracts in Phnom Penh reviews the bid and sends it to the Secretariat in New York to be reviewed; (6) if approved, a purchase order is issued, and the items are shipped to Cambodia, assuming the bidder actually has the items; (7) purchases are unloaded and go through customs; (8) a receipt and inspection report are prepared and matched with the purchase order; and (9) purchases are then taken to the depot for delivery. U.N. peacekeeping missions may also use the letter of assist to authorize procurement directly from a member state for items that only the home government can reasonably provide, such as special military vehicles and parts.

We did not review the extent to which competitive bidding or other procurement procedures were followed or exceptions were granted. However, according to UNTAC officials, the normal procurement was slow and procedures were too onerous to follow in some instances. For example, one procurement official said bids were sometimes taken over the phone to expedite procurement, and inspection reports were often signed without a physical inspection of the goods delivered. According to an UNTAC military official, the letter of assist process was also slow, compounded by problems in obtaining proper documentation. For example, only two military contingents had prepared itemized lists of equipment they had brought with them, the cost of which the United Nations was obligated to reimburse.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{Irregularities and allegations of fraud in procurement and awarding of contracts for UNTAC are being investigated by the United Nations. However, examining specific allegations and procurement action was outside the scope of our review.}\]
Chapter 3
Limits on U.N. Capacity to Plan, Logistically Support, and Deploy Peacekeeping Operations

According to an IJNTAC procurement officer, the U.N. procedures are reasonable under normal circumstances. However, for the system to work efficiently (1) procurement must be planned in advance, preferably during the survey mission; (2) potential suppliers and bidders have to be contacted and notified that procurement is expected as soon as a budget is approved by the U.N. General Assembly; (3) when standardized equipment and services are needed, such as setting up a communications network, the system requirements have to be specified and approved up front; and (4) experienced procurement officers who are familiar with the U.N. system need to be assigned immediately.

Fragmented Logistics System Impedes Operations

The U.N. logistics system for large missions such as Cambodia and Somalia is fragmented. The logistics organization consists of three units: (1) the Field Operations Division, which provides headquarters support and guidance; (2) each mission's civilian administrative unit, which procures supplies for the mission and handles other administrative duties; and (3) the military logistics and support unit, which helps move supplies and equipment to military and civilian units and provides engineering and communications support. Further, the mission's chief administrative officer, who is located in the field, reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, but also receives instruction from the Field Operations Division in New York.

Although an integrated support system was identified in UNTAC’s implementation plan, civilian and military logistics units were not fully integrated when we visited Cambodia in December 1992. For example, civilian personnel responsible for procuring supplies for the entire mission and providing some delivery were not yet collocated with military logistics, which forwarded military procurement requests and also warehoused and delivered the supplies. Both military and civilian components had transportation units, but these were not integrated to ensure that all parts of Cambodia had sufficient transportation services. The communication network for Cambodia was not yet complete, and both military and civilian units had to share the military lines, but a fully integrated service was unavailable in December 1992, 9 months after operations had begun in March 1992.

The fragmented logistics system added to the confusion over providing supplies. After receiving numerous requests from civilians for vehicles, supplies, and housing, the military logistics unit issued a memorandum to all civilian components explaining that the military could not procure
supplies and had no provisions to give out. All procurement, even for the military, was done by UNTAC’s civilian administrative unit, which was running several weeks to months behind in obtaining supplies. After the logistics system was fully operational and integrated, the military would store and make available fuel, drinking water, and consumable office supplies. Moreover, since the supplies for many civilian workers in the provinces were delivered by the military contingent in that area, each of the 21 civilian provincial directors had to make arrangements for obtaining supplies with the local contingent commander.

Lack of Logistics Staff Hinders Operations

A lack of logistical and administrative staff throughout the U.N. system and their late deployment in the field further hampered UNTAC’s logistics. At U.N. headquarters, the Field Operations Division had a total of 33 professional and 83 general service staff in May 1993. This staff had to provide headquarters logistical support for over 54,000 military and civilian peacekeepers deployed on 13 ongoing missions and also support U.N. personnel on 14 other field operations, such as the U.N. depot in Italy and the Office for Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan. According to U.N. officials, the surge in peacekeeping missions and the increase in their size and complexity made it extremely difficult for the field division to plan and provide logistics support for UNTAC.

In the field, UNTAC’s military logistics battalion was small and deployed late. The logistics battalion consisted of 830 personnel. According to an UNTAC logistics planner, the military logistics support group should have been much larger. This official compared the size of UNTAC’s military component to that of a light infantry division, saying that a light division is usually supported by 2,000 to 2,200 logistics personnel. U.N. officials said it was difficult to recruit logistics forces for UNTAC because they were in high demand for other peacekeeping missions. Compounding the problem, logistics units for the operation deployed late and four of five logistics companies arrived in Cambodia in July 1992, after all infantry battalions had been deployed.

UNTAC’s civilian field administration was also slow in deploying. The administrative unit was authorized a total of 63 professionals and 449 general service workers in such areas as procurement, communications, transportation, budgeting, and personnel. However, in December 1992, 10 months after the mission started, many of these personnel were still not deployed. According to UNTAC’s director of personnel, the administrative staff was 80 percent staffed in December; he could not provide us with
precise numbers because he had arrived only a few days before. U.N. field service administrators were also late in arriving. These employees provided the primary liaison between military and civilian units in the provinces. One U.N. official called them the backbone of a mission because they ensured the work in the provinces were supplied.

We found numerous examples of how late deployment of logistical and administrative staff hampered procurement and UNTAC operations. For example:

- UNTAC had problems handling freight due to staff shortages. Even though many tons of equipment and supplies arrived in Bangkok, Thailand, during March and April 1992, UNTAC could not move them into Cambodia because it did not have staff available to do so.
- Civilian components had difficulty communicating with their operations in the provinces because the communication network was several months behind schedule. An UNTAC communications officer said the delays were caused by the lack of specialized personnel to install the system.
- In June 1992, a company from an infantry battalion in northwest Cambodia was ordered to deploy and stabilize a situation developing between two armed factions. The company, however, had to deploy with just essential equipment and was desperate for water and fuel because UNTAC did not yet have the logistics base to support the battalion.

Under UNOSOM II, the United States is providing logistical support for operations, with a unit of over 2,200 logistics personnel. According to U.S. officials, the logistics unit provides food, fuel, and water for the operation because these are necessities that the United Nations has had difficulty providing in past operations.
guarantee a consistently high quality of peacekeepers, and we found that some of the military, police, and civilian peacekeepers obtained for UNTAC were unqualified.

### The Process for Obtaining Troops and Civilian Police

**Delays Deployment**

The United Nations seeks to have a broad representation of member states contribute national troop contingents for peacekeeping missions. However, the process is time-consuming. For example, obtaining UNTAC's multinational force involved several steps. First, Secretariat officials began informally contacting member states in late 1991 about contributing troop contingents. After the Security Council approved UNTAC’s implementation plan, the Secretariat prepared guidelines for potential contributors and then held a troop contributors meeting. Fifty-four countries attended the meeting, and 32 countries eventually sent troops to Cambodia (Appendix III lists these countries.) After the meeting, the Secretary General decided that more national contingents from French-speaking countries were needed. A final troop contributor's meeting was held in April 1992 to prepare the contributing troop contingents for Cambodia. This meeting occurred only about 1 month prior to the scheduled deployment of all 16,000 UNTAC troops.

After the final troop requirements were worked out, the United Nations arranged for airlift to deploy the national troop contingents. According to U.N. officials, however, two factors further delayed deployment. First, coordinating transportation for 16,000 troops from 32 countries, all bringing different amounts of equipment, and having different time frames for preparation, took considerable time. For example, one troop contingent brought its own helicopter, one brought a satellite dish to communicate with its capitol, and another came without food rations or tents. Second, because Cambodia lacked airports and infrastructure, the troops had to be gradually deployed, with some flown to Thailand. A U.S. military planner told us that since a large number of countries with differing military requirements were asked to participate, the United Nations needed longer lead times, carefully worked-out commitments from the countries, and detailed planning to ensure a timely deployment.

Partly as a result of the slow recruitment and deployment process, UNTAC's military was not in the field in time to begin disarmament and demobilization operations, scheduled to begin in June 1992. Only 5 of the required 12 infantry battalions were deployed when the operation officially began. Three battalions were in Cambodia but not yet in their field.

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*The U.N. contracts for airlift for either commercial firms or a member state.*
locations, and four battalions were not even in Cambodia. According to the UNTAC head of operations, the shortfall of infantry battalions made it impossible to staff all demobilization sites, while some sites were manned by task forces headed by junior officers. A Cambodian general from one of the factions told us he was surprised that all agreed-upon cantonment sites were not fully staffed when the process began, and he would not permit his soldiers to demobilize until he was sure they could be protected. All 12 infantry battalions were fully deployed by mid-July, about 1 month after disarmament started.

Delays in deploying the full peacekeeping force also hindered implementation of both UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. A former U.N. Special Representative to Somalia told us that the 500-person UNOSOM I peacekeeping force was ineffective in providing security to relief efforts in part because it deployed months after negotiations with factional leaders had been completed. In this official’s opinion, by the time the contingent arrived in October 1992, the situation on the ground had deteriorated to the extent that an additional 3,000 troops were needed. For UNOSOM II, about 20,000 of the originally planned 28,000-troop peacekeeping contingent had been deployed as of July 1993. In August 1993, the Secretary General reported that the lack of sufficient troop strength in Somalia and the lack of proper equipment within some contingents hindered UNOSOM’s ability to fulfill its mandate and emboldened certain elements in Somalia bent on undermining the U.N.’s efforts there. He called for an additional brigade beyond the 28,000-troop target.

To address the issue of deploying U.N. troops quickly when the United Nations is called upon to restore and maintain agreed upon cease-fires, the Secretary General proposed peace enforcement units. These units would be available on call from U.N. member states for clearly defined circumstances and with terms of reference specified in advance. The Secretary General proposed that the Security Council would authorize their operation and deployment, and the units would be under the command of the Secretary General of the United Nations. According to the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. government does not support this proposal because it would (1) restrict the United States in its conduct of foreign policy; (2) subject U.S. forces, possibly under fire, to command and control of the United Nations; and (3) restrict U.S. capability to manage its armed forces by identifying specific peace enforcement units in advance. However, the executive branch policy position on this matter

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (Report of the Secretary General, June 17, 1992), p. 13, paragraph 44.
Chapter 3
Limits on U.N. Capacity to Plan, Logistically
Support, and Deploy Peacekeeping Operations

was still under review by the National Security Council as of December 1, 1993.\(^5\)

Recruitment of national civilian police contingents for UNTAC was also late. About 50 percent of the planned police force of 3,600 had arrived in Cambodia by July 1992, and 73 percent were in Cambodia by September 1992, 7 months after the operation began. The complete police force was not deployed until November 1992. U.N. officials tried to obtain police contingents from a representative group of member states. According to UNTAC officials, however, few countries have national civilian police forces that can be volunteered for 1 year or longer. A total of 32 countries eventually contributed police.

Recruitment for Civilian Peacekeepers

The Secretariat's process for obtaining civilian peacekeepers is voluntary. The United Nations recruits civilian peacekeepers from four sources: (1) the U.N. Secretariat or other agencies of the U.N. system, (2) outside experts under contract to the United Nations, (3) officials from member states who are seconded to the United Nations for the mission, and (4) U.N. volunteers. For UNTAC operations, relying on this system resulted in delays that eroded mission effectiveness. For example, the component overseeing the State of Cambodia bureaucracy was authorized 197 professionals, but as of September 1992, only 117 were in-country. According to an UNTAC official trying to oversee revenue expenditures, Cambodian officials had been willing to work with him when he arrived in June, but by the time some provincial staff were deployed in October, the bureaucracy refused to cooperate.

In a series of reports, the United Nations highlighted the problem of slow deployment. For example, in a May 1992 report, the U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions expressed concern over the fact that only 180 of UNTAC's authorized 1,020 international civilian personnel were in place in Cambodia. In a December 1992 report, the Secretary General acknowledged the late deployment of military and civilian personnel. About $23.8 million had been saved because the military contingents and their support units were deployed behind schedule, and $10.58 million was saved because the civilian staff was hired late. The report did not measure the cost of the late deployment to the mission's overall credibility and effectiveness.

\(^5\)According to State and Defense Department officials, the U.S. position on these matters will be articulated in the forthcoming Presidential Review Document No. 13.
Deployment of civilian staff in Somalia has also been difficult. Less than one-fourth of the planned 880 international staff were in Somalia by the end of May 1993. U.N. officials told us that the increasing demand for civilian staff to serve on peacekeeping missions has thinned the available pool of U.N. personnel. As a result, U.N. officials have begun relying more on outside contractors and searching for ways to expedite external hiring.

One major problem with the voluntary system is the lack of incentive for U.N. staff to participate in peacekeeping missions. The missions are limited-time events that are not part of most staff members' career tracks. In this regard, the U.N.'s Office of Human Resources Management, along with the Field Operations Division and the Department of Peacekeeping, screen and identify potential peacekeepers from a roster of about 6,000 U.N. employees willing to participate in missions. However, some of the best candidates on this roster are not available because, when needed for a mission, they are on a career path at their home agency. For instance, one staff member from a U.N. agency was asked to join UNTAC's civil administration component. By then, however, he had been assigned to a high priority project at his home agency and was being considered for promotion. He said his work was critical to the project and he did not want to jeopardize his chances for promotion by leaving. Further, UNTAC staff told us many fellow workers from their home agency had little incentive to serve on a peacekeeping mission that would take them away from home, possibly for over a year in dangerous conditions without the comforts of home.

Peacekeepers Were of Uneven Quality

Most UNTAC military contingents were considered competent professionals by U.N. officials and officials from the Departments of State and Defense. The seven contingents we observed, plus the headquarters unit, appeared organized in their work and were knowledgeable about the operation. However, the operational readiness of some contingents was questionable when they initially arrived in-country. For example, at least one battalion arrived without necessary equipment such as tents and field rations to sustain them for 60 days, as required for the mission. Another battalion arrived without food supplies for the field. Consequently, UNTAC had to supply the battalion with these basic field necessities. One contingent had little or no military experience, resulting in numerous disciplinary problems. As of December 1992, 56 members of this country's 746-member infantry battalion, including 8 officers, had been returned to their home country for disciplinary reasons. The head of UNTAC's operations branch acknowledged the difference in performance among troop contingents,
but also said it was a few unprofessional troops that gave the military component a bad reputation. A U.N. official acknowledged the problems in recruiting a broad multinational force and said the Secretariat was attempting to better screen the offers of troop assistance from contributing countries.

According to UNTAC officials and member state officials, some fundamental training in peacekeeping is needed for all countries that contribute peacekeeping troops. Although some countries that frequently contribute peacekeeping troops have standard training, many poorer countries do not. For instance, two commanders of national contingents said that they learned about peacekeeping on the job. Although certain aspects, such as civic action, were part of their military doctrine, peacekeeping was not in their training.

UNTAC officials also said some countries contributed unqualified civilian police personnel. UNTAC guidelines outlined three qualifications for civilian police: (1) 6 years of police experience; (2) the ability to speak, read, and write English or French; and (3) a valid national or international driver's license. Some police, however, did not have a driver's license or could not speak English or French. Some countries sent personnel with little or no police experience; one country sent a medical doctor as a police monitor. According to UNTAC officials, experience and fluency in the working languages of the mission were essential for UNTAC police because they did not deploy in large national contingents and would be expected to work closely with each other and through Cambodian translators who spoke English or French. Further, since they carried no weapons, they had to rely on their communication skills and professional experience to be effective.

To try and improve the quality of police in the future, the Secretary General sent a letter to member states, emphasizing the necessity of contributing civilian police who could drive and speak either English or French. The letter further asked that the United Nations be allowed to test their language and driving skills before deployment. In addition, we found that training might be effective. We interviewed police from one country who said they had 8 weeks of specialized training before deploying to Cambodia. The program consisted of mental stress testing, physical conditioning, intercultural communication, and effective leadership. They were also given history and cultural awareness sessions by national university professors. According to UNTAC human rights officers and electoral workers, these police were among the most effective and
energetic in Cambodia. We saw a situation where a policeman from this
country preceded electoral workers and their military escort to a site that
was rumored to be mined by the Khmer Rouge, and then brought State of
Cambodia Police to investigate who had actually planted the mines.

The Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Deputy
Special Representative considered their top civilian managers to be
competent professionals. However, they noted that some of the mid-level
managers and line staff were inexperienced and did not have the right
temperament to work on a high pressure peacekeeping mission. For
example, according to the Deputy Special Representative, the first head
procurement officer was inexperienced and had never been in a high
pressure situation; this was not the person to be heading an operation that
expected to procure hundreds of millions of dollars worth of supplies
within a few months. He left after 6 months on the job. The director of one
component said that some of his staff could not deal with problems in the
provinces. Some lacked leadership and organizational skills; thus they
could not command the respect needed to lead operations and take the
initiative in dealing with Cambodian nationals. The personnel director of
this component said that several staff simply did not understand the
difficult conditions and high level of productivity expected. Several left
after the initial 6 months.

State Department and UNTAC officials, however, had high regard for many
U.N. workers, including the U.N. volunteers who were the primary field
staff organizing the election in Cambodia. The Special Representative to
the Secretary General also said that officials, seconded to UNTAC from their
home governments, were generally experienced and good performers. For
example, one electoral official seconded from his government had worked
in Cambodia for 10 years and could speak the language fluently. Similarly,
an official from another country headed UNTAC’s information unit; he had
worked in Cambodia previously and was fluent in Khmer.

Secretariat Reforms
and Member State
Responsibilities

The U.N. Secretariat is taking steps to improve its capability to implement
larger and more complex operations. In June 1993, the Secretariat
proposed to integrate the Field Operations Division with the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations. The new unit would be called the
Department of Peace and Security Operations and would unite the
logistics, budgeting, and deployment functions of the field division with
the planning and coordination of peacekeeping missions in the field. The
proposal also called for several changes in operating procedures such as
(1) using a template of peacekeeping operations from which to begin planning new missions; (2) ensuring that the surveys for peacekeeping missions included such staff as procurement, human resources, and medical personnel; and (3) integrating civilian and military logistics. In September 1993, the Secretariat began restructuring the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but the process of integrating logistics, operational planning, and other functions had just begun.

To more effectively support peacekeeping missions, the U.N. Secretariat proposed an increase of 34 positions in the number of permanent logistics staff. These staff were to include specialists in personnel, logistics, communications, and budgeting. The General Assembly subsequently approved this increase in May 1993. The Secretariat has also opened a 24-hour situation room to communicate with the field and provide greater coordination between headquarters and the field.

Some of the operational and logistics problems are beyond the capabilities of the U.N. Secretariat to solve. In his report, "An Agenda for Peace," the Secretary General recognized the crucial role that the U.N.'s member states play in providing troops, civilian personnel, supplies, and timely budgetary support for peacekeeping operations. Providing competent peacekeeping troops and skilled logisticians is crucial because the United Nations cannot field an operation without these personnel.

Timely budgetary support is also important because the United Nations must purchase most of its supplies. For example, even though UNTAC was provided an advance budget of $200 million, it still did not have funds to procure some items. One of the first military units to deploy to Cambodia could not operate its engineering equipment when it arrived because it had no fuel. UNTAC could not obtain fuel for the equipment because it had no fuel contract, which was pending the release of a further budget appropriation. According to a U.S. official, the Secretariat's budget estimates are unreliable, especially at the beginning of a mission. Therefore, member states are reluctant to appropriate advance amounts until they have more confidence in the Secretariat's estimates.

Conclusions

UNTAC and UNOSOM were unprecedented in size and scope and illustrated weaknesses in U.N. planning, logistics, and deployment for peacekeeping missions. The process for planning was fragmented. Logistics planning was not integrated with the substantive tasks, and the military and civilian tasks were never integrated into a unified mission plan. Detailed
operational plans were not completed prior to deployment, nor was contingency planning done at the Secretariat. Part of the problem is a lack of staff and the lack of internal coordination within the U.N. system.

To provision peacekeeping missions, the United Nations must purchase most supplies and equipment. But the procurement process is slow, and the United Nations does not plan for procurement during its survey missions. Logistics is also hindered by a shortage of personnel, fragmentation of operations both at headquarters and in the field, and the lack of detailed plans to integrate logistics operations prior to deployment.

The U.N. system for obtaining peacekeepers is voluntary; it depends on member states to contribute troops and civilian police and depends on U.N. civil servants to volunteer for potentially dangerous assignments away from home. Further, it is time-consuming and results in the deployment of some unqualified personnel. Although many nations contribute troops, some do not provide peacekeeping training. Peacekeeping staff on the ground were in agreement that basic peacekeeping training would help.

The United Nations is taking steps to address some of these problems, such as integrating the units responsible for peacekeeping operations and logistical support. However, some of the problems, such as obtaining competent peacekeeping troops and police, require closer cooperation between the U.N. Secretariat and member states.

We recognize the limits on the Secretariat's capability to support peacekeeping operations and the necessity for international cooperative efforts to improve these capabilities. The Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations have been active in supporting these reform efforts.
Chapter 4

Limits on U.N. Field Coordination and Authority

The U.N. Secretariat in New York does not have a central command capability, so control is maintained in the field. We focused primarily on UNTAC because UNOSOM II was not fully deployed at the time of our review. Nonetheless, UNTAC has a similar organizational structure to UNOSOM II, and some early problems were similar in both missions. Initially for UNTAC, there was limited coordination between military and civilian components. The lack of coordination led to some duplication of efforts, and there were initial problems in ensuring security for civilians in the provinces. Both UNTAC and UNOSOM had difficulty forming a unified peacekeeping force. In both cases, troop contingents from 32 countries had different approaches to military operations and conduct and spoke different languages; these differences led to inconsistencies in executing orders. Despite difficulties in forming a cohesive force, UNTAC's authority in the field allowed it to take initiatives in responding to the changing situation.

UNTAC's Military and Civilian Components Were Not Fully Coordinated

In Cambodia, both military and civilian components reported to the Special Representative, but there was no joint military-civilian staff initially to help coordinate their activities. There were weekly coordination meetings involving all components, but according to UNTAC military officers, this was initially at a policy level, and not at the working level. A joint working staff from the beginning would have facilitated the planning and implementation of UNTAC operations. One officer, for example, said the military had little input into the planning for civilian activities even in areas where similar tasks were planned. This led to some overlap and duplication. For example, UNTAC's civilian components planned several projects, such as road building and water sanitation, with private voluntary organizations working in Cambodia. Due to the lack of coordination, some of these projects, which were intended to provide income and skills to the local population, were preempted and completed by the military as part of its civic action campaign. According to the Force Commander, providing security and proceeding with the civic action campaign were crucial to the success of the mission and could not be delayed until the civilians were in place to begin planning and coordinating rehabilitation.

In the provinces, there was also limited coordination initially. For example, in one province, the U.N. civilian director complained about the lack of cooperation he was getting from the military in protecting U.N. staff. He said some electoral workers had requested protection from the local U.N. military unit. When they did not receive protection, they postponed operations. An UNTAC military observer told us that the electoral...
workers had not coordinated their activities and the military could not immediately reassign troops from already planned commitments. Another U.N. civilian director said banditry was a problem because, after the factions refused to disarm and demobilize, many Cambodian troops turned to banditry to survive. He had asked the military for help and was told the UNTAC police would provide protection. After the UNTAC police could not provide protection, the military began patrolling for bandits. UNTAC officials in other provinces noted that cooperation between military and civilian components was good despite the lack of a formal coordinating mechanism. However, this was because the civilian administrators and military commanders had established good working relationships based on a respect of each other’s professional competence.

The lack of coordination was due in part to the fragmentation in planning. As discussed in chapter 3, no formal coordination took place between the planners working on military and civilian tasks. The implementation plan viewed disarming and demobilizing the factions as quite distinct from much of the civilian activity, and it had in fact called for initial withdrawal of the military in October 1992, months before much of the civilian activity was to take place. Further, the military and civilian components did not initially coordinate geographic zones of responsibility. Troop contingents divided Cambodia into 12 geographic zones based on locations that each of Cambodia's four factions controlled. Civilian operations were based on Cambodia's 21 provinces, with 21 civilian administration directors assigned to these provinces.

An UNTAC strategy document in late 1992 commented on the lack of formal coordination in the provinces. The document pointed out that while an overall policy for Cambodia had been worked out, an operational strategy linking civilian and military tactics and police forces for the provinces had not yet been developed. The document recommended that a central authority be formed to carry out the operational strategy in each province and that the senior U.N. representative in each province coordinate the strategy.

Mission Force Commanders have overall authority for military operations, and their orders and directives are to be carried out by each battalion’s national commander. Each national commander, however, has discretion in how to carry out the orders, and in both UNTAC and UNOSOM this led to some disruption in the chain of command. For example, UNTAC officials told us that there were sometimes delays in executing operational orders.
While some delay was related to logistical problems, at least on one occasion, a national contingent delayed deployment to a sector because the national contingent commander was awaiting direction from his capital. In a report to the Security Council, the Secretary General said that the structure of command and control in UNOSOM II was weakened by independent actions of some contingent commanders. Some contingents appeared to act independently of the directives and orders issued by the force commander. The report further emphasized that the integrity of the command and control of peacekeeping operations had to be respected to minimize risks on the ground and to effectively use available resources to achieve the missions' objectives.

There are differences of opinion on the extent to which the Force Commander's orders must be carried out. For example, according to U.S. officials, respecting the integrity of the chain of command is important; in almost all instances an order or directive given by the Force Commander should be carried out by national contingent commanders. However, each national contingent commander ultimately has the right to decide on whether to execute an order and commit his troops to action that he deems to be harmful.

In addition to lapses in the chain of command, various national contingents executed orders inconsistently. For example, according to private voluntary organization representatives in Cambodia, two different national contingents guarded refugee centers very differently. One battalion secured the area with four checkpoints along the perimeter on a 24-hour basis, while the other national contingent patrolled the front gate of the centers.

Another area of inconsistency in UNTAC was interpretation of the rules of engagement. Although UNTAC's rules of engagement allow troops to use fire when they or other civilians are put at risk, troops from certain nations returned fire when fired upon and generally responded assertively when there was an immediate threat. According to a military observer, troops from other nations acted less assertively and did not use their weapons when threatened in similar situations. According to a Cambodian general of one of the factions, the Khmer Rouge, as well as the other forces, knew which military troops should be respected and which could be taken advantage of. UNTAC's rules of engagement, however, still emphasized that UNTAC was a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. Also, U.N. and other officials said some discretion in interpreting

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1 All peacekeeping forces have the inherent right of self-defense.
directives and commands is the only practical way to carry out a mission composed of forces from so many nations with different training and operating procedures.

Another area of inconsistency was in military discipline. Force commanders have limited authority over the discipline of infantry battalions. Instead, each battalion or national contingent commander has the authority to discipline troops and is responsible for ensuring that troops meet his country's military code of conduct. The force commander can recommend, but not order, that a battalion commander or a soldier be repatriated for disciplinary reasons. For example, UNTAC's Force Commander requested that a high-ranking officer be replaced. His request was being considered by the officer's home country when we were in Cambodia.

The behavior of some troops, ranging from reckless driving to physically threatening Cambodians, reduced the respect that Cambodians had for UNTAC and made it easier for opponents to discredit the operation. One official from a private voluntary organization said many UNTAC troop contingents performed positive service, but misbehavior by some tarnished the positive work. Concerned about such behavior, the Force Commander issued a memorandum on discipline to all troop contingents in October 1992. In that memorandum, the Commander noted the special obligation of peacekeeping troops to maintain their credibility with the Cambodian people through appropriate behavior. A similar memorandum was issued to U.N. military observers explaining that leaders had to insist on the highest standards of behavior, military bearing, and appearance.

Interoperability Concerns

While visiting Cambodia, we identified several instances where differences in equipment and language hindered operations. For example:

- Several infantry battalions deployed in remote locations in Cambodia ran out of chemicals for their water purification plants. Because each country required different chemicals, UNTAC could not supply these items, and the situation became serious. According to one logistics officer, the countries had not specified the exact chemicals needed for their plants because they had assumed the purification plants were standard.
- Each national contingent was expected to deploy with vehicles and the means to maintain and repair the vehicles. UNTAC's military logistics unit would provide backup maintenance. However, when many national troop contingents, particularly the infantry battalions, did not have full capability
to repair their vehicles, the logistics unit could not repair the different makes and models of vehicles from all the countries.

- Following the decision to redeploy the military to increase the security in Cambodia, one infantry battalion deployed to a remote location requested a logistics company to be stationed with them. A company from another country was assigned to the infantry battalion’s area, but few of them spoke English. As a result, the infantry battalion had to use its own logistics personnel.

- UNTAC’s military operations center in Phnom Penh was staffed with officers from several national contingents, partly to ensure orders and directives were properly routed and understood by the contingents. However, several of the battalions did not have enough English or French speakers, the official languages of UNTAC, and key military observers had to be pulled from their assignments and used in the operations center.

**Field Authority Permits Responsive Action**

Despite the limitations of command in peacekeeping missions, maintaining operational authority in the field permits flexible action within the parameters set by the Security Council. UNTAC’s authority in the field, for example, allowed it to improve operations and take initiatives in responding militarily and politically after the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm its troops.

**UNTAC’s Military Responds to Security Threat**

In late 1992, the United Nations authorized the full complement of UNTAC’s 16,000 troops to remain in Cambodia beyond the originally scheduled withdrawal to help complete the mission. (Originally, 6 of 12 infantry battalions were scheduled to withdraw by December 1992). By the time formal approval was received, UNTAC components had already taken action to protect voter registration, campaigning, and polling.

For example, one of the first actions UNTAC undertook was to improve its coordination between civilian and military components, particularly in providing security for the election. In November 1992, the military component established operating procedures for electoral support coordination centers at UNTAC headquarters and in each province. The centers included staff from the civilian police, electoral, and military components and were manned on a 24-hour basis. The Force Commander also called for the military component to readjust sector boundaries, redeploy forces to address potential threats, and create the ability to react swiftly where required within the sectors.
In carrying out this order, UNTAC units took the following actions:

- Infantry battalions and U.N. military observers redeployed to new sectors that corresponded with provinces rather than with areas controlled by the four Cambodian parties. The new sector borders coincided with the operating areas of UNTAC electoral teams and were designed to shorten the time needed to respond to potential threats.
- Each infantry battalion and the strategic investigation team established a mobile reserve unit capable of responding to threats within 1 hour and other mobile reserve units capable of responding within 6 hours.
- Engineering units directed their efforts towards repairing roads and bridges needed by electoral teams for access to remote areas.
- Armed elements of infantry battalions and unarmed U.N. military observers provided security, when necessary, at voter registration sites and for mobile electoral teams. Both mobile and other units also provided security during the elections.

According to UNTAC officials, their authority to plan and implement operations on the ground made considerable sense because they had more complete and current information than headquarters in New York. Also, UNTAC had an operations structure with planning and intelligence units to carry out initiatives. As discussed in chapter 3, the U.N. Secretariat has a limited capacity in these areas and has numerous peacekeeping missions to monitor.

**UNTAC's Political Initiatives**

UNTAC obtained broad approval from the Secretary General and the Security Council for major political initiatives but had considerable leeway in carrying them out. For example, after the State of Cambodia took little action on murders and numerous acts of political intimidation during the months of October and November 1992, UNTAC officials proposed establishing a U.N. Special Prosecutor's Office. This proposal was debated as UNTAC tried to determine if it had the authority to establish a prosecutor's office and whether this violated Cambodia's sovereignty. UNTAC finally established a special office in January 1993 with powers to arrest, detain, and prosecute individuals who committed political crimes and human rights violations.

The special office was innovative and had not been conceptualized during planning. However, it was formed 10 months after the start of UNTAC operations and 2 months after an internal UNTAC study verified that the existing government administration had taken no action against human
Chapter 4
Limits on U.N. Field Coordination and Authority

rights offenders. According to an UNTAC official, the decision came too late to significantly improve the situation.

According to the Special Representative, UNTAC's authority in the field also allowed it to initiate several other actions, in consultation with the Secretary General and the U.N. Security Council. For example, after the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm and demobilize its troops, UNTAC tried to work out solutions by meeting with all factions during its normal meetings in Phnom Penh. When these proved ineffective, UNTAC met with the factions and key leaders several times in China, where it was hoped the Chinese could persuade the Khmer Rouge to be more cooperative.

Conclusions
UNTAC military and civilian operations were not fully coordinated, partly because the implementation plans did not fully integrate the work of all components in carrying out joint activities and partly because a working-level military-civilian staff was not established at the beginning of operations. Both UNTAC and UNOSOM II demonstrated inherent limits on command and control in multinational operations. Some operations were not carried out as ordered; some actions, particularly in UNOSOM II, were carried out independent of the Force Commander's orders; some orders were executed inconsistently; and the conduct of the multinational force was not uniformly high. Although standard peacekeeping training would help in areas such as expected standards of behavior and expectations in multinational operations, there are differences of opinion on the extent of a Force Commander's authority over national contingents. Despite limits on the Force Commander's authority and the Special Representatives's overall control of operations, the authority given to UNTAC in the field allowed it to make corrections in carrying out its mission and take the initiative in responding to the changing security situation.
Peacekeeping missions have become increasingly complex and taken on expanded roles, as noted in the Secretary General's report, "An Agenda for Peace." Yet the link between a mission's mandate and the U.N. Charter remains unclear because, in many instances, the charter does not specifically address the range of actions now undertaken by peacekeeping missions. A related question is the extent to which peacekeeping missions may be carried out within sovereign states that do not endanger other countries. Regardless of a peacekeeping mission's basis, the support of all parties involved in the operation is crucial. In Cambodia, UNTAC kept the door open for the Khmer Rouge to participate in the peace process and did not act aggressively against the faction, in part, because it probably would have lost the support of most factions and key nations such as China and Thailand. UNTAC may have successfully enforced human rights without losing this support, but UNTAC's mandate was authorized under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter and the extent to which UNTAC could enforce human rights was unclear. This delayed action to protect Cambodians.

The U.N. Charter Does Not Specifically Address Peacekeeping

Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter are used as the basis for authorizing peacekeeping missions, although the charter itself does not refer to peacekeeping as a U.N. function. In addition, the charter does not specifically address the range of actions that peacekeeping missions as large and comprehensive as UNTAC and UNOSOM II might undertake. The absence of specific provisions has periodically raised questions regarding the nature and scope of U.N. peacekeeping missions under the charter. Chapter VI, entitled the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," states the following:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

However this chapter of the charter is silent on whether it applies to disputes between sovereign states only, or whether it also applies to internal civil disputes. Chapter I of the charter states that "nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."
Chapter 5
Observations on Peacekeeping Mandates

Chapter VII also does not mention "peacekeeping," but authorizes U.N. enforcement action to maintain and restore peace, apparently even in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. It authorizes the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace and states that the Security Council "shall make recommendations, or decide upon what measures shall be taken...to maintain or restore international peace and security." Some of the specific actions include the interruption of economic relations, blockade, and the use of force by military means.

In practice, the mandates for peacekeeping missions often fall between Chapters VI and VII, according to the Secretary General and a U.N. publication. This is particularly true of recent peacekeeping missions, which are larger and more complex than their predecessors. UNTAC, for example, operated between Chapters VI and VII. According to U.N. officials and UNTAC's rules of engagement, UNTAC was authorized under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter and could only use peaceful means to implement its mandate. However, UNTAC's mandate authorized it to locate and confiscate weapons, investigate human rights complaints and take corrective action, and directly supervise and control Cambodia's public bureaucracies in key areas. Moreover, the creation of a special prosecutor's office appeared to be more assertive than the measures allowed under Chapter VI of the charter. Further indicating the ambiguity with regard to how far UNTAC might go in enforcing provisions of the Comprehensive Political Settlement, both U.N. Secretariat and UNTAC officials said UNTAC operated under "Chapter VI and three-quarters." Unlike most missions, the authority for UNOSOM II to conduct peacekeeping activities is clearly addressed in its mandate, where the U.N. Security Council specifically states that it is acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in authorizing UNOSOM II to use force to carry out its mission.

In commenting on the question of peacekeeping, the Secretary General refers to peacekeeping operations as illustrating the principal deficiency of the U.N. Charter, namely that peacekeeping is a missing link between Chapters VI and VII. However, the Secretary General concludes that
Chapter 5
Observations on Peacekeeping Mandates

before the U.N. Charter is revised to address peacekeeping, further thought is needed on the role of the United Nations in the peace process.

Political Feasibility

A mandate is politically feasible, according to U.N. officials, if the parties to the agreement support its implementation. Both UNTAC and UNOSOM II demonstrate that this concept is crucial whether a mission is authorized to use peaceful means to implement a settlement or authorized to use force. For example, as discussed in chapter 2, the foundation for UNTAC was established by the Comprehensive Political Settlement, to which all parties had consented. After the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm and denied UNTAC access to territory it controlled, some officials from member states urged UNTAC to be more assertive in enforcing the terms of the settlement. UNTAC did not act aggressively and continued to negotiate and propose compromises to the Khmer Rouge, even after Khmer Rouge attacks on UNTAC. According to U.N. officials, UNTAC did not retaliate against the Khmer Rouge, in part, because there was no consent for such action and China, Thailand, and the Cambodian factions might have turned against UNTAC and jeopardized the election. According to the Special Representative, aggressive attempts to get the Khmer Rouge to disarm would probably have destabilized the situation by making it appear that UNTAC was siding with the State of Cambodia. Officials from the foreign ministries of Singapore and Thailand as well as the leaders of two factions in Cambodia stated that UNTAC was right not to use force against the Khmer Rouge because this would have given the State of Cambodia government too much power.

As a result of UNTAC’s stance to maintain an open door in dealing with both the Khmer Rouge and the State of Cambodia, broad support for the mission was retained. According to UNTAC officials, this ultimately helped contain the Khmer Rouge. For example, Security Council Resolution 766, passed in July 1992, expressed the Council’s commitment to UNTAC activities and asked all parties, particularly the Khmer Rouge, to cooperate. Resolution 792, passed in November 1992, again expressed the Council’s support for UNTAC actions, identified the Khmer Rouge as violating the peace settlement, and called on nations to prevent the supply of petroleum products to areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge. Resolution 810, passed in March 1993, reaffirmed support for UNTAC. In October 1992, Japan and Thailand attempted a joint diplomatic effort to get the Khmer Rouge to cooperate in the peace process. In March 1993, China sponsored meetings between the Khmer Rouge, UNTAC, and the other factions in
March and May 1993 to try and reach an accommodation on the election and the peace accord.

Although retaining the consent of the parties was a crucial factor in UNTAC's decision not to act more aggressively with the Khmer Rouge, UN, and member state officials pointed out that such action was not feasible. UNTAC did not have the military capability to enforce the agreement. According to military observers and an expert on our panel, Khmer Rouge troops were better armed than UNTAC and were experts at unconventional warfare. According to U.N. and other estimates, the Khmer Rouge had about 5,000 to 10,000 troops spread throughout the countryside, with some 30,000 support elements, and was organized through a tightly disciplined military cadre. UNTAC did not have enough troops, nor were they properly equipped to respond to non-conventional action.

In contrast to UNTAC, UNOSOM II has a mandate that clearly authorizes the use of force to restore security to Somalia. Despite having clear authority to enforce its mandate, UNOSOM II did not have the consent and cooperation of all parties involved in the agreement. Although agreement on a framework for reconciliation was signed by major warlords within Somalia, the agreement was developed in a few months and signed after UNOSOM II's mandate had already been agreed upon. According to several U.S. officials, there was considerable pressure on the warlords to sign the agreement and fundamental issues were still unresolved. As UNTAC demonstrated, if a complex peacekeeping mission is to succeed, such as in Cambodia or Somalia, a sound political framework agreed upon by all parties and the continued cooperation of the warring factions, as well as the international community, seem to be prerequisites.

Ensuring Respect for Human Rights

Ensuring a respect for human rights is increasingly cited as an important element of U.N. peacekeeping missions and was a major factor in establishing both UNTAC and UNOSOM II and missions such as the former Yugoslavia. However, broad resolutions aimed at ensuring respect for human rights appear to be unfeasible without specific and practical procedures agreed to by the parties to the settlement. For example, the U.N. operation in Somalia was explicitly authorized to use force to ensure respect for human rights. Security Council Resolution 794 condemns all violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia and states that the Council, "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary General and Member States...to use all means..."
Chapter 5
Observations on Peacekeeping Mandates

necessary to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief." But such a broad resolution in the absence of an agreement and explicit procedures for ensuring human rights has not succeeded.

For UNTAC, such a broad mandate authorizing forceful means to ensure a respect for human rights was not feasible, as previously discussed. However, UNTAC probably could have provided a more secure environment for human rights if specific procedures, such as the special prosecutor's office described in the previous chapter, had been specified during negotiations and agreed upon by the parties. For example, some UNTAC officials said the special prosecutor's office could have been effective earlier in the operation, when Cambodian officials were willing to work with UNTAC. UNTAC officials further reasoned that a respect for human rights was crucial to the settlement, was strongly supported by all parties to the agreement, had the widespread support of the Cambodian people as well as the international community, and could be carried out using police and limited security work rather than full military force. However, by the time the special prosecutor was established, it was too late to vigorously prosecute offenders. Resistance within Cambodia had become too strong.

Actions such as the special prosecutor's office could not have ensured a respect for human rights in all cases. For example, when Cambodians of Vietnamese descent were massacred on several occasions by Khmer Rouge troops or when the State of Cambodia's security force was engaged in political intimidation, it would have been difficult for UNTAC to protect human rights without using broad military enforcement. Nonetheless, taking active steps to ensure respect for human rights, as opposed to trying to disarm an entire mobilized faction, may have been effective because UNTAC's investigations focused on identifying individuals rather than blaming an entire faction.

Conclusions

The experiences from UNTAC and UNOSOM reinforce two lessons about peacekeeping operations:

- The consent and support of all parties to the agreement is essential and can provide an important source of political will for the process as well as diplomatic support. In this regard, a sound political framework, such as the Comprehensive Political Settlement, is crucial.
- A clear mandate closely linked to the political framework and specifying the authority of a peacekeeping mission is vital. This is particularly
important because the U.N. Charter does not specifically address peacekeeping, and the mission may need to initiate legitimately authorized courses of action to carry out its objectives.
Appendix I

Participants on the Peacekeeping Panel

The panel was sponsored by GAO, the Congressional Research Service, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Panelists

Frederick Brown, Director, Southeast Asian Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University

Michael Haas, Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii

Christopher LaFleur, Director, Office of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Department of State

Edward Luck, President, United Nations Association of the United States

John Mackinlay, Director, Second Generation Multinational Operations, The Watson Institute, Brown University

Mark Palevitz, Assistant Director, Department for Democracy and Peacekeeping, Department of Defense

Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director, Human Rights Watch

Michael Stopford, Director, United Nations Information Center, Washington, D.C.

Michael Swaine, Principal Investigator, Rand Corporation

Moderators

Marjorie Brown, Specialist in International Relations, Congressional Research Service

Harold Johnson, Director, International Affairs Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office
### Countries Contributing Military Personnel to UNTAC or UNOSOM II

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Dear Mr. Conahan,

Thank you very much for sharing with our department the draft report prepared by your office entitled: "U.N. Peacekeeping, Lessons Learned in Recent Missions". The report is a most timely and useful contribution to the ongoing discussion on United Nations peacekeeping operations. I also would like to thank you for the opportunity to provide you with comments from our department on your report. Below you will find our observations, which are limited to general points of a political nature.

First of all, we feel that the report might benefit if it contained an early reference to the essential characteristics of peace-keeping operations as well as to the recent changes and developments affecting them. In the latter, we see a twofold trend: first, from essentially military peace-keeping operations to multi-faceted operations, such as UNTAC; secondly, from operations based on the consent of the parties to enforcement operations, under Chapter VII of the Charter, where that element is absent. While many peacekeeping operations are sui generis, a clear understanding of these basic elements would be useful in evaluating any given operation.

In this connexion, we would like to suggest that efforts made to ensure respect for human rights not be discussed in terms of enforcement, with its obvious connotations of military-style Chapter VII operations. In the case of UNTAC for example, the establishment of a Special Prosecutor may be perceived as an act of enforcement, but throughout its existence care was taken to ensure that the sovereign act of and responsibility for trial and punishment of offenders would rest with the Cambodian authorities.

Mr. Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
A second observation concerns the current problems and shortcomings related to organization and logistics that are discussed in your report. The United Nations, and the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations in particular, is well aware of these problems. We should like to point out, however, that many of these problems are a result of the rapid recent expansion of peace-keeping activities. Many also result from application of rules and procedures established largely by the Member-States of the United Nations, especially with regard to the financing of operations. While the Secretariat is endeavouring to streamline relevant procedures within its areas of competence, a clearer distinction between these and others where action by the Member States is required would provide a more realistic perspective.

Finally, as is mentioned in your report, many discussions were held between GAO and United Nations' staff both in the field and at Headquarters. We were pleased to receive GAO staff and extend our full co-operation and we trust that comments and suggestions made will be duly reflected in the final report.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Kofi Annan
Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
Dear Mr. Conahan:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report, "U.N. PEACEKEEPING: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions," GAO Job Code 472274. On behalf of the Chief Financial Officer, we are submitting comments and suggested changes.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please call Robert Loftis, IO/PHO, at 647-2708.

Sincerely,

Carolyn S. Lowengart
Director
Management Policy

Enclosure:
As stated.

cc:
GAO - Mr. Miyabara
State - Mr. Loftis

Mr. Frank C. Conahan,
Assistant Comptroller General,
National Security and International Affairs,
U.S. General Accounting Office.
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of State

GAO Report 472274
UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions

The Department of State generally agrees with the conclusions reached in the GAO report on peacekeeping in Cambodia and Somalia. The report accurately reflects the difficulties encountered in establishing and running UNTAC, and the problems encountered in Somalia during the scope of this report. We provide the following specific and general comments. (Additions are underlined, deletions are bracketed.)

Throughout the document: Replace "chapter 6 and 7 of the UN Charter" with "Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter."

Page 2, 2nd para: "...UNOSOM I failed because peacekeepers were late in deploying and did not have either the authority or the manpower to enforce a ceasefire"...Also, the United States maintained [has deployed] U.S. combat troops..."

Page 6, 2nd para: The text seems to imply support for a standing UN army. U.S. policy does not support the creation of such a force for a variety of reasons, among them costs and the question of command arrangements.

Page 15, 1st para: The text says the two non-communist resistance forces "allied" with the Khmer Rouge. This is not an accurate reflection of their relationship, which could be more accurately characterized as reluctant cooperation against a historical threat to Cambodian sovereignty.

Page 17, 3rd para: UNOSOM II was an expansion of the authority, mandate, and size of UNOSOM I, not a "new" operation.

Page 24, 1st para: change "$145 million" to "$135 million."

Page 72, 2nd para: insert "Departments of State" and "in last sentence.

Page 78: Add a footnote that all peacekeeping forces have the inherent right of self-defense.

Page 86, 1st para: It would be helpful to clarify what the report means by "enforcing" human rights.
Dear Mr. Conahan:

Thank you for your letter of October 14, 1993 in which you transmit the draft report on "U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions" (GAO code 472274).

Enclosed you'll find a page with a few suggested edits, although overall, there is very little that USUN has to add to this excellent report. In our view, it validates with concrete examples the major areas of difficulties that large, peacekeeping operations have been encountering in recent years. As you may be aware, USUN brought together a "contact group" comprising thirty-some countries with strong interests in peacekeeping matters. The group met in New York in August and September to share common concerns and identified generic problem areas as well as possible solutions. Appropriate Secretariat officials were included in the discussions. A summary of discussions resulted (copy enclosed), which is being shared with the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Security Council and pertinent UNGA Committee chairmen. We intend to pursue the areas of common interest in discussions on the budget and on reform during the current General Assembly. You will see that many of the same problem areas identified by your report were raised in the "contact group":

--need for clear mandates from the very beginning

--limitations in UN's abilities to plan, deploy and support logistically large operations such as UNTAC and UNOSOM

--problems with piecemeal, off-cycle budgets

--limitations of UN's procurement capabilities
Appendix V
Comments From the United States Mission
to the United Nations

--command and control problems in the military context in
the field, and in the chain of command between the field
and headquarters

Indeed, the lessons to be learned from Cambodia continue, as
we deal with the problems arising from the phasing out of
UNTAC and the need to continue certain crucial operations in
a post-UNTAC Cambodia (de-mining, human rights center).

I appreciate your sharing the draft report with this office,
and look forward to continued close cooperation on similar
issues in the future.

Sincerely,

Madeleine K. Albright

Enclosures:
As stated
p.4 para 3, delete 1st 3 sentences, replace with:
While UN peacekeeping missions are not explicitly prescribed by the UN Charter, they are consistent with the spirit of Chapter VI of that document. Thus the consent of the parties, a key principle of Chapter VI, plays a crucial role in peacekeeping as well.

p.8 para 3, delete 1st sentence, replace with:
Mandates for peacekeeping missions are ambiguous when they appear to combine both consensual and compulsory elements.

p.8 para 3, delete final sentence, replace with:
Questions on use of force with regard to UNOSOM II have less to do with its legal basis than with how it is used to provide secure conditions for relief and political reconciliation.

p.33 first caption change "Foundation for Enduring Peace is Fragile" to "Foundation for Enduring Peace is Strengthened"

p.33 line 1, replace "Despite" with "Prior to"; line 2, replace "remains" with "was"

p.33 para 1, add sentence at end of para: However, once the coalition government was in place and three of the four factions combined their armies, the risks of renewed fighting and the importance of UNTAC administrative control significantly lessened.

p.33 second caption, delete the words "Are still"

p.33, last para., delete from "a military working group . . . to end of para on p. 34. Replace with "only the other three factions actually merged their forces. But even this limited merger substantially reduced the likelihood of future fighting.

p.38 para 1, last sentence, replace "begin the process of" with "establish a good foundation for".

p.78 para 2, final line:
the word "host" should be changed to "homed" - it is the capital of the officer's country of origin that currently makes such a determination.
Appendix VI

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C.

- Leroy Weaver Richardson, Assistant Director
- Tet Miyabara, Senior Evaluator
- Kay Brown, Senior Evaluator
- David Mauer, Evaluator

Far East Office

- Reginald Furr, Assistant Regional Manager
- Judith McCloskey, Site Senior
- Ernest Doring, Evaluator

New York Regional Office

- John Tschirhart,
- Kimberly Gianopoulos, Site Senior
- Pam Mancini, Evaluator
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