United Nations Special Session
On Disarmament: A Forum
For International Participation

The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament was the first occasion since 1932 that virtually all countries met to review and appraise the status of arms control and disarmament. The Special Session concluded with consensus on a Resolution which set forth the final objective of general and complete disarmament and the immediate goal of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war. The Resolution also specified fundamental principles to guide negotiations, measures, and procedures for disarmament and priorities—attaching first priority to nuclear weapons. It established a U.N. Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body composed of all U.N. members and a Committee on Disarmament as a negotiating body with 40 members.
The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance  
The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

To acquire greater insight into U.S. arms control and disarmament objectives, the present international climate, the prospects for progress, and the importance of disarmament to international security, we monitored the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. This report is a summary, rather than an analysis, of the organization and procedures and the results of the Special Session, as well as the positions of some of the participating nations, U.N. affiliates, and nongovernmental organizations.

To obtain information for this report, we attended meetings of the Special Session at the U.N.; meetings of the U.S. delegation at the Department of State and at the U.S. Mission to the U.N.; reviewed documents from the U.N., the Department of State, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and interviewed members of the U.S. delegation during and after the Special Session.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Chairmen of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Sincerely yours,

J. K. Fasick
Director
The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) focused the attention of virtually every country on arms control and disarmament for the first time since the 1932 General Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations. It brought together 149 member nations, including France and China, which have not actively participated in recent disarmament conferences; numerous nongovernmental organizations; U.N. affiliates; and research institutes for a six-week session, from May 23 to June 30, 1978.

ORIGINS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

The Special Session on Disarmament resulted from a variety of factors, including international concern for the ever-increasing level of armaments worldwide; recognition of the relationship between disarmament, international security, and economic development; dissatisfaction with international progress on disarmament; and a desire to address these issues in a forum in which all nations could participate.

The SSOD, first proposed in 1961, was not convened to draft or negotiate specific arms control or disarmament agreements, but rather to review and appraise the present international situation in light of the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in this area; review the roles of the U.N. and other international institutions in disarmament negotiations; and adopt recommendations, a declaration, and a program of action for disarmament. (See ch. 1.)
given the opportunity to address the SSOD. Their comments dealt with:

--The diversion of funds (about $400 billion annually) from social and economic development to arms and military programs.

--The need to restructure existing international institutions for disarmament negotiations to make them more representative and responsive.

--The right of nonnuclear weapon states to have access to the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

--The growth of arms levels worldwide and the increasing sophistication of these arms.

--The renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.

--The obligation of nuclear weapon states to renounce the use of such weapons against nonnuclear weapon states.

--Nuclear disarmament.

--The need for worldwide education concerning arms control and disarmament. (See chs. 3 thru 7.)

THE FINAL DOCUMENT

The Special Session adopted by consensus a Final Document which recognized the continuing arms race and the need for disarmament and arms limitation to foster international peace, security and economic and social development. The Final Document set forth the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, in addition to the more immediate goal of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war. It also contained fundamental principles to guide disarmament negotiations and specific measures to enable disarmament to become a reality. Those principles and measures included
using both human and technological resources, released as a result of disarmament, to promote the well-being of all peoples;

-strengthening the U.N.'s role in and responsibility for disarmament, including dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament;

-undertaking negotiations to conclude and implement agreements designed to eliminate the danger of war and the use and threat of force in settling international disputes; and

--continuing international efforts to promote full implementation of and adherence to existing treaties and agreements.

Furthermore, it recognized that the right of all countries to develop, acquire, and use nuclear energy must be consistent with the need to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that effective arrangements to assure nonnuclear weapon states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons could strengthen peace and security.

The Final Document also described the process that had been agreed upon to guide work toward general and complete disarmament and assigned priorities in the disarmament process. These priorities are nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and armed forces. Specifically, it concluded that realistic progress in disarmament could be achieved by halting nuclear tests, establishing nuclear weapon free zones, reducing military budgets, and implementing international confidence-building measures. Nations were also encouraged to give priority to increasing the dissemination of information about the arms race and arms control efforts. The Document further stated that nations would be obligated to contribute manpower to U.N. peacekeeping efforts.
The Final Document created new machinery to accomplish the U.N.'s work on disarmament. First, the Committee on Disarmament was constituted. The Committee's membership will include all 5 nuclear weapon states and 35 non-nuclear weapon states, have a rotating chairmanship, and be reviewed regularly by the U.N. Second, it established a new Disarmament Commission within the U.N. as a deliberative body composed of all member states to consider and make recommendations in the field of disarmament. Third, it was stated that a second special session devoted to disarmament should be held on a date to be decided by the 33rd General Assembly. Fourth, it requested the Secretary General to establish an advisory board of eminent persons to advise the U.N. in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. Finally, the Final Document referred to the numerous proposals and suggestions submitted by the member states and requested the Secretary General to transmit them to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating bodies for more thorough study. (See ch. 8.)

REACTIONS TO THE SPECIAL SESSION

In commenting on the Final Document and the Special Session itself, U.N. members noted the following achievements: establishment of the new disarmament institutions; involvement of all U.N. members; adoption of the Final Document by consensus; security assurances pledged by the major nuclear countries to non-nuclear weapon states; announcement of intended adherence to existing international arms control agreements by additional countries; and the beginning of a process toward disarmament. (See ch. 9.)
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ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
CCD   Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CTB   comprehensive nuclear test ban
FRG   Federal Republic of Germany
GDR   German Democratic Republic
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT   Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PRC   People's Republic of China
PrepCom Preparatory Committee for the SSOD
SAALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SSOD  Special Session on Disarmament
UK    United Kingdom
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD), convened between May 23 and June 30, 1978, was the first occasion since the 1932 General Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations in which the attention of virtually all countries of the world was focused on arms control and disarmament. All 149 U.N. members sent delegations, including France and China, which have not actively participated in recent disarmament conferences. Numerous nongovernmental organizations, U.N. affiliates, and other groups sent observers.

Within less than 3 weeks, the SSOD heard statements by the leaders and representatives of 126 member states, among them 4 Heads of State, 16 Prime Ministers, 4 Vice Presidents and Deputy Prime Ministers, and 49 Ministers for Foreign Affairs. In addition, the Directors General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) spoke before the SSOD.

In his remarks, the President of the Special Session, Lazar Mojsov of Yugoslavia, stated that "The presence of such a large number of prominent world statesmen illustrates in itself the great importance of the special session and what the entire world expects of it." He added that as the largest gathering in the history of the U.N. devoted exclusively to disarmament, it underscored the importance attached to disarmament by all member states and by world public opinion.

Nongovernmental organizations and research institutes from around the world which work on disarmament were allowed to present statements to the SSOD in order that "world public opinion" could be heard.

THE U.N. AND DISARMAMENT

The first resolution adopted by the U.N., over 30 years ago, dealt with establishing a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy. One part of that resolution (Resolution 1, adopted January 24, 1946) directed the commission to make specific proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; * * *"
Later in the same session, another resolution adopted recognized "* * * the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces." The resolution (Resolution 41, adopted December 14, 1946) recommended that the U.N. Security Council promptly consider formulating the practical measures essential to regulate and reduce armaments and urged expeditious fulfillment by the commission of the responsibilities given to it by Resolution 1.

In his opening remarks, the President of the SSOD, Mr. Mojsov, stated:

"Since Resolution No. 1, the General Assembly has adopted 3,968 resolutions in all. Two hundred and twenty-eight of those resolutions deal with the problems of disarmament, and many of them reflect positive attitudes and positions. Certain steps towards halting the arms race, although of modest impact, have been made through patient negotiations. But in spite of all this we can say without any hesitation that from 1945 to this very day, from Resolution No. 1 through almost 4,000 resolutions, no serious breakthrough has been made in disarmament efforts in order to secure a lasting peace, promote development and guarantee world security without basing it all on the power of weapons."

On December 16, 1969, the U.N. adopted Resolution 2602 E (XXIV) which declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and called upon governments to intensify their efforts for measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, and a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) 1/ to resume its work and prepare a comprehensive program to chart the course of further work, with the aid of documents and records from

1/The CCD was a forum for multilateral arms control negotiations which met in Geneva. The CCD grew from the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee when that body, in 1969, began to expand its membership. The CCD included 31 members representative of the major political and geographic areas of the world with the United States and the Soviet Union as co-chairmen. Five conventions or treaties were achieved with the participation of the CCD. It essentially dissolved in summer 1978 after the SSOD created the Committee on Disarmament. (See app. I.)
U.N. meetings on disarmament, bearing in mind the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. The Resolution recommended channeling the resources freed by measures in disarmament to the aid of developing countries and requested the Disarmament Decade be publicized by countries in order to acquaint public opinion with its purposes and objectives.

U.N. Resolution 2930 (XXVII) of November 29, 1972, established a Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by governments on convening a conference. Disagreement over a formula for the participation of nuclear weapon states in the Special Committee precluded it from holding any formal meetings. On December 18, 1973, the U.N. passed Resolution 3183 (XXVIII) to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to carry out essentially the same task previously assigned to the Special Committee. Since then, the Ad Hoc Committee has been concerned mainly with carrying out its mandate and establishing the conditions for realization of a conference.

The Committee submitted reports to the General Assembly at its 29th, 30th, 31st, and 32d sessions to provide that body a thorough presentation of the views of governments on all relevant aspects of convening a world disarmament conference and related problems. The Ad Hoc Committee reported that various objectives for such a conference had been proposed by member states, including actual measures of disarmament, forums to review the progress toward disarmament, and guidelines for and review of negotiation machinery. The overwhelming majority of member states believed that a conference must be universal and, in particular, that the participation of all nuclear weapon states and militarily significant states was essential. 1/ From its study the Committee concluded that U.N. members in general were supportive of a conference, but with varying degrees of emphasis and with differences concerning the conference format and agenda.

1/Many U.N. members were apparently dissatisfied with what they regarded as slow progress in disarmament and, noting the absence of China and France from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, were searching for a forum where all states could participate.
CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION

According to the President of the SSOD, a special session on disarmament was first proposed as early as 1961 in Belgrade at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. Due to an inconclusive outcome of that and other initiatives, he continued, President Josip Tito of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia again pointed out the need for a special session on disarmament at the Fifth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in August 1976. This proposal became a joint initiative of all nonaligned countries. Later a resolution based on this initiative, calling for a special session on disarmament, was introduced in the U.N. by 72 countries. Ultimately passed by consensus, Resolution 31/189B of December 21, 1976 (see app. 11), provided for a special session of the U.N. devoted to disarmament to be convened in New York in May 1978. Hence the SSOD became associated with the nonaligned members rather than the superpowers.

The idea of a special session on disarmament had broad international support because many nations felt it was likely that all the nuclear weapons states would attend. Furthermore, they welcomed a forum in which they could bring their concerns to the attention of the leaders and peoples of the world and desired to acquire a larger role in disarmament and arms control discussion as well as a larger voice for the U.N. in these matters. Their concerns dealt with the need for the superpowers to more specifically commit themselves to steps beyond the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) negotiations, to halt the buildup of their nuclear arsenals, and to begin the process of reducing armaments. They also hoped to achieve wider acceptance of their belief that at least some of the savings resulting from disarmament should assist the developing countries.

The SSOD, hence, evolved somewhat as an alternative to a world disarmament conference. Although similar to such a conference, the SSOD was not established to draft or negotiate specific agreements. Rather its tasks were to:

--Adopt recommendations.

--Review and appraise the present international situation in light of the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament; the continuation of the arms race; and the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security, and economic development.
--Adopt a declaration on disarmament.

--Adopt a program of action on disarmament.

--Review the role of the U.N. in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament, particularly the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

The resolution establishing the SSOD also provided for a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), which was charged with examining all relevant questions relating to the Special Session, including the agenda, and submitting recommendations. The resolution called for the PrepCom to be composed of 54 member states, including the United States (see app. III), appointed by the President of the U.N. General Assembly on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. At the first meeting of the PrepCom, however, it was decided that states which were not PrepCom members could participate in its plenary meetings but without the right to vote. Also at the first meeting, Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina was elected Chairman.

During 1977, the PrepCom held 3 sessions, resulting in 16 recommendations covering topics such as provisional agenda, level of representation, public information activities, role of nongovernmental organizations, rules of procedure, dates and organization of the Special Session, and future PrepCom work. These were sent to the General Assembly, which on December 12, 1977, adopted a resolution endorsing all the recommendations, including the recommendation that SSOD decisions on matters of substance should, in so far as possible, be adopted by consensus (e.g., without formal objection). In practice, this means that those delegations who do not fully support a given action are willing simply to state their reservations for the record, rather than vote against it. A resolution passed by consensus is potentially more effective than one adopted by a small majority of votes. On the other hand, to achieve consensus may require diluting the substance of any declaration, and declarations adopted in this manner are sometimes considered less forceful than those adopted by unanimity which requires affirmative support of all participants.

Another recommendation endorsed by the General Assembly provided for two additional PrepCom sessions. During those sessions, January 24 to February 24, 1978, and April 4 to 21
1978, nine additional recommendations and a draft resolution embodying a draft final document were prepared for submission to the SSOD. These are discussed in the next chapter.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PREPARATIONS FOR THE SSOD

In 1977 the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) began developing a general approach to the SSOD. In August 1977 ACDA appointed Dr. Lawrence Weiler special coordinator for the Session. In February 1978 the National Security Council directed the formulation of an interagency backstopping committee with participation by the National Security Council, the Department of State, ACDA, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, and other interested agencies. The committee, chaired by a representative from ACDA, was responsible for providing policy guidance to the SSOD delegation and reviewing proposals the United States might advance at the Special Session.

To seek the advice and support of nongovernmental organizations, the Department of State held a 1-day conference in Washington, D.C., on March 11, 1978. Numerous groups submitted proposals on nuclear disarmament, methods to create support for disarmament, transfer of defense resources to human needs, conventional arms reductions, alternative security arrangements, peacekeeping, and peacemaking.

The U.S. representatives and alternative representatives to the SSOD were:

Representatives

Andrew Young (Chairman) 1/ Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary U.S. Representative to the U.N.

W. Averell Harriman
Harriman, New York

George McGovern
Senator from South Dakota

1/Vice President Walter F. Mondale served as chairman of the delegation, ex officio, during his presence at the Session. When the Vice President was not present, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance served as chairman, ex officio, during his presence at the Session.
Charles W. Whalen, Jr.
Representative from Ohio

Paul Newman
Westport, Connecticut

Alternate Representatives

Adrian S. Fisher
U.S. Representative to the CCD

James F. Leonard
Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N.

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
Senator from Maryland

Paul Simon
Representative from Illinois

Marjorie Craig Benton
Evanston, Illinois

(See app. IV for a complete list of the U.S. delegation.)
CHAPTER 2
ORGANIZATION OF THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

The Special Session on Disarmament convened its first meeting on May 23, 1978, at the U.N. Headquarters in New York City. Among the first orders of business was the election of the President, receipt of a report from the PrepCom, approval of the PrepCom recommendations, and the organization of the Session.

In keeping with procedures followed by preceding special sessions and in line with the PrepCom recommendations previously endorsed by the 32d General Assembly, the SSOD elected the President of the preceding regular session of the U.N. General Assembly, Mr. Lazar Mojsov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, as the President of the Special Session. Similarly the SSOD approved the proposal that the chairmen of the main committees, the vice presidents, and the members of the Credentials Committee be those of the 32d U.N. General Assembly.

In his statement before the opening session, Mr. Mojsov stated that "The cost of the qualitative arms race * * * today is far greater than the total cost of feeding the war machinery during the whole six-year duration of the Second World War." He pointed out that the "over-kill capacity" of weapons held in the arsenals of the world creates a tension upon which "rests the precarious peace of the world today, which is not a genuine peace but only an absence of global conflict." Citing the ability of all nations to express themselves on equal terms at the U.N., Mr. Mojsov stated that he was "convinced that the United Nations has the capacity to influence the creation of a new climate and set a new course in the quest for solutions to disarmament problems." He said that a "portion of the resources saved by checking the spiral of military expenditures should be channeled * * * to increase assistance to the developing countries."

The Secretary General of the U.N., Kurt Waldheim, elaborated that point by suggesting in his speech to the SSOD that member states "devote to national and international disarmament efforts $1 million for every $1,000 million currently spent on arms." He hoped the General Assembly would consider establishing a board of eminent persons in the field of arms control and disarmament to provide advice on the issues under consideration. During the next 24 meetings of the SSOD, statements were delivered by representatives of 126 members and the Directors General of UNESCO and IAEA.
REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND DRAFT DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE PREPCOM

The PrepCom held two sessions during 1978 to continue the work it had started in 1977, as well as to prepare a draft document on disarmament. At the first meeting of the SSOD, the PrepCom report was submitted. The report, in seven volumes, included information to facilitate the study and understanding of the problems relevant to disarmament; recommendations to the SSOD; and a draft of the final document. Most of the recommendations covered administrative and organizational matters. However, one recommended that the principal document to be adopted consist of four sections: Introduction, Declaration on Disarmament, Program of Action, and Machinery for disarmament negotiations. All the recommendations were endorsed by the SSOD at its first meeting.

The draft document in the PrepCom report was used by the SSOD as the starting point for drafting the principal resolution ultimately adopted. Drafts of the document had been introduced into the PrepCom by its members and were consolidated during the PrepCom sessions for submission to the SSOD. In these sessions, however, consensus was not achieved on a complete text. Since the PrepCom had not been able to produce a draft document agreeable to all its 54 members before it dissolved, that which was submitted to the SSOD reflected varying degrees of accord. The Introduction was not agreed upon because the PrepCom did not have time to debate it. The Declaration, Program of Action, and Machinery sections had areas of agreement, but differences remained on various substantive issues. The PrepCom chairman predicted that the Program of Action and Machinery sections would require the major endeavours of the SSOD.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE

The 32d General Assembly had approved the PrepCom recommendation that an Ad Hoc Committee, or committee of the whole, be established and be composed of as many open-ended groups or subsidiary organs as necessary. This Committee was entrusted with the task of considering proposals presented to the Special Session, including the draft document submitted by the PrepCom, and of reporting a final resolution and document on disarmament to the SSOD for action. Chaired by Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina, the Committee was responsible for reviewing and appraising (1) the present international situation and the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, (2) the continuation of the arms race, and (3) the interrelationship of disarmament, international peace and security, and economic
development. Its responsibilities also included reviewing the role of the U.N. in disarmament, the role of the international institutions for negotiating disarmament, and the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

While considering the proposals submitted on those topics and the PrepCom draft submissions, the Committee was to discuss, analyze, and draft a resolution and final document which could be accepted on a consensus basis by the SSOD. To do so the Ad Hoc Committee began by discussing the PrepCom draft document, since parts of it had already been agreed upon. The Ad Hoc Committee heard statements by representatives from 25 nongovernmental organizations, 6 research institutes and the Holy See, and the Executive Director of the U.N. Environment Program and the Administrator of the U.N. Development Program. It also heard delegations from numerous member states introduce proposals, suggestions, and draft resolutions.

During the Special Session, 39 documents and working papers containing numerous proposals and suggestions on various topics were submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee for consideration. A number of draft resolutions were also introduced. Supplied with these proposals and the draft document previously prepared by the PrepCom--which contained numerous areas of disagreement--the Ad Hoc Committee began preparing a draft final document for the SSOD. A considerable amount of negotiation was necessary to achieve consensus. Despite the number of committees and groups established by the SSOD where exchanges of views and ideas were possible, considerable discussion occurred outside of those formal groups. Members of the U.S. delegation, for instance, participated in discussions with representatives from other countries, groups of countries, and various nongovernmental organizations, and major regional and political groups in the U.N. also met to discuss issues.

On June 1, 1978, the Ad Hoc Committee established two working groups to draft a final document, which were open to any member. Working Group A was given responsibility for drafting the Introduction, Declaration, and Machinery sections of the text; Working Group B was responsible for the Program of Action section. To maintain an appropriate balance in the appointment of officers, Working Group A was chaired by Ambassador Malcolm Templeton of New Zealand and Working Group B was chaired by Ambassador Henryk Jaroszek of Poland. Both working groups were authorized to establish drafting groups as needed, provided they included representatives from any country interested in participating.
Subsequently five drafting groups were established which submitted texts to the working groups, but they could not reach agreement on all the issues. Prolonged internal negotiations were carried out in the Ad Hoc Committee over those portions of the working groups' texts which had not been adopted. While it had been agreed from the beginning that every effort should be made to ensure that the final document would be adopted by consensus, this goal appeared unobtainable at this stage. Responding to the appeal of the Ad Hoc Committee chairman, however, several separate draft resolutions were not pushed to a vote and others were withdrawn either to facilitate consensus or as a result of changes in the draft final document. In turn, it was agreed that in the Ad Hoc Committee's draft resolution all the proposals before the Committee would be recognized as an integral part of the SSOD's work and that the Secretary General would be requested to transmit the proposals to the appropriate disarmament organizations. Thus, consensus on a draft resolution embodying a draft final document was achieved.

SPECIAL SESSION ACTION

The Ad Hoc Committee submitted its report to the Special Session on June 30, 1978. The report contained a brief statement on the organization and functions of the Ad Hoc Committee, a list of the documents that had been submitted to it, a Draft Resolution, and two recommendations. First, it recommended that the Draft Resolution be adopted and, second, that the SSOD refer to the 33d General Assembly a draft resolution calling for all states to refrain from supplying arms and other military equipment to Israel that had been proposed by Iraq and 32 other countries. (See pp. 45 and 46.)

After the Rapporteur of the Ad Hoc Committee had introduced the Committee's report, the SSOD decided, pursuant to its rules of procedure, that the report would not be discussed and moved immediately to adopt the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations. Both recommendations were adopted without a vote. Following these proceedings, representatives to the Session were given the opportunity to make statements in explanation of their positions. The representative of Israel stated that if the recommendation concerning the Iraqi draft resolution had been put to a vote, the delegation of Israel would have voted against it.
CHAPTER 3

POSITIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

On March 17, 1977, in a speech to the United Nations, President Carter stated that the United States "...will make a strong and positive contribution" to the Special Session. This position was reiterated by Ambassador Young in a letter to Secretary General Waldheim on April 22, 1977, in which he said the United States believed that "...the central objective of the session should be to give a new impetus to productive negotiations on issues, old and new, of pressing concern."

Fundamental U.S. objectives at the SSOD were to

--develop support for arms control initiatives the administration had undertaken;

--work with other countries in developing new and realistic arms control proposals; and

--ensure that actions taken at the SSOD would be compatible with basic U.S. security interests and with effective and practical arms control agreements.

The United States envisioned the Special Session as an opportunity to enter into a dialog with countries that had not participated in disarmament negotiations thus far and to gain greater public support, both within the United States and abroad, for U.S. arms control goals.

During the Session, the U.S. position was set forth by various delegation members. Vice President Mondale presented a statement to the second meeting of the Special Session in which he set out eight objectives, including qualitatively and quantitatively restricting nuclear arms; halting nuclear explosions; working to ensure that no new nuclear weapon states emerge; seeking agreement to ban weapons of mass destruction; and slowing down and reversing the conventional arms race. Ambassador Young announced U.S. initiatives for peaceful nuclear cooperation which were designed to strengthen the U.S. commitment to meet the legitimate nuclear energy needs of developing countries while promoting international non-proliferation objectives. In Washington, Secretary of State Vance presented President Carter's declaration renouncing the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states in certain circumstances.
A U.S. representative to the SSOD, Mr. Paul Newman, discussed the availability of monitoring services similar to those which the United States provides in the Sinai to support the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire agreement and to protect against surprise attack. He stated that the United States would consider requests for similar services elsewhere. Ambassador Paul Warnke described the status of the arms control negotiations in which the United States participates. In addition, the United States introduced proposals to strengthen U.N. peacekeeping capabilities and to encourage the adoption of confidence-building measures, such as notification of military maneuvers.

VICE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

On May 24, 1978, Vice President Mondale spoke before the Special Session. Citing the initiative of the nonaligned states in calling for the Session, he quoted the "most vital and solemn obligation" of the U.N. Charter: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." He lauded the numerous nongovernmental organizations in attendance, calling them the "conscience and inspiration" of governments. The Vice President noted that the world spends $400 billion a year on arms—on means of destroying rather than enriching human life. Next, he called attention to the U.S. commitment to arms control and disarmament by citing President Carter's trip to the U.N. in October 1977 and the series of arms control negotiations in which the United States participates. The Vice President also called for a "program that is visionary in concept and realistic in action" since "the central issue of the arms race... is the concern of each nation and government for the security of its people." He stated that:

"The prudent policy of any nation must include both sufficient military preparedness and arms control efforts, if its security is to be assured. In the short run no nation can be asked to reduce its defenses to levels below the threats it faces. But without arms control among nations in the long run, weapon will be piled on weapon, with a loss in security for all."

"Today our defense budget is no larger in real terms than in the late 1950s, and less than it was a decade ago. But other nations have increased their military budgets in real terms by more than one third over the past decade."
Vice President Mondale set forth eight objectives:

--Substantial reductions in the number of strategic nuclear arms and increasingly stringent qualitative limitations on their further development. The SALT II agreement is rapidly taking shape, and the United States is committed to further substantial reductions in nuclear weapons and to stricter limits on modernization and new types of delivery vehicles.

--An end to explosions of nuclear devices. Citing existing treaties and noting the trilateral negotiations underway between the United Kingdom (UK), the Soviet Union and the United States in this regard, he announced that once a trilateral agreement had been reached, the United States would vigorously seek a multilateral comprehensive treaty banning nuclear explosions acceptable to all countries.

--Emergence of no additional nuclear weapon states. The United States will pursue the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation to “explore further how to insure the benefits of nuclear energy to all without its proliferation risks” and redouble efforts to “increase still further the distance between the military and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Citing the initiative of the Latin American countries which resulted in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States has called for increasing the number of nuclear-weapon-free zones. He reiterated the U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons except in defense of the United States or its territories, Armed Forces, or allies.

--Mutual and adequately verifiable agreements to ban other weapons of mass destruction. While the United States and the Soviet Union are moving closer to an agreement on banning radiological weapons, discussions on chemical weapons are proving more difficult.

--Effective multilateral conventional arms transfer restraints. The United States has placed a ceiling on the sale of weapons and related items to countries other than North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Furthermore, the United States (1) will not be the first to introduce into a region a new weapon system which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability, (2) will not sell any weapon systems until they are operationally deployed with U.S. forces, (3) will not permit development or
modification of systems solely for export, and
(4) has placed strict controls on co-production and
retransfers. To help achieve this objective, the
United States called for a multilateral effort at
restraint.

--Expanded and strengthened regional arms control
arrangements and capabilities. While Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions talks are progressing, talks
begun with the Soviet Union on the Indian Ocean have
been hampered by increases there in the Soviet Union's
naval presence. The United States offered to provide
monitoring systems to provide warning of surprise
attack in an attempt to strengthen regional stability
and proposed confidence building measures, such as
prior notification of military maneuvers, foreign
observers at maneuvers, and U.N. machinery to implement
them in an attempt to ease global military insecurity.

--Full development of institutions and expertise for arms
control. All countries must continue to strengthen
U.N. arms control institutions without undercutting
those already in place and examine the priority given
to disarmament by their own governments. He encouraged
a strong and prominent role for the U.N. and regional
organizations and proposed establishing a U.N. peace-
keeping reserve force.

--Release additional resources for economic and social
development through progress in arms control. Mr.
Mondale expressed strong U.S. support for the U.N.
study of the relationship between disarmament and
development but suggested that it also include consid-
eration of the economic problems which may result
from disarmament. The United States volunteered to
provide information on national military expenditures
to a U.N. pilot program testing a method to measure
such expenditures. He pointed out that the United
States has contributed $327 million in economic
assistance to African nations, compared to only $59
million in military aid—"a far better contribution
to the long-term future of the people of Africa"—and
called for arms suppliers to exercise restraint in
their arms sales policies.

Concluding, he said that arms control must not be the agenda
of only the SSOD, but rather the "moral agenda of our times"
and called for another Special Session in 1981.
U.S. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION INITIATIVES

Ambassador Andrew Young spoke before the Ad Hoc Committee on June 9, 1978, and announced U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation initiatives. The initiatives were designed to strengthen the U.S. commitment to meet the legitimate nuclear energy needs of the developing countries in a way that would promote international nonproliferation objectives. Ambassador Young proposed that to achieve those objectives, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) be strengthened through granting preference to NPT parties, enhancing the IAEA role in peaceful nuclear cooperation, and providing incentives to minimize the export of highly enriched uranium (a material used in nuclear weapons).

The specific proposals included:

--Establishment of a "trust" program under IAEA that would authorize up to $1 million annually for 5 years and be exclusively for assisting peaceful nuclear efforts of developing countries party to the NPT.

--A similar authorization of $5 million over 5 years to provide 20 percent enriched uranium fuel for research reactors through IAEA, with preference to developing countries party to the NPT.

--Provision of up to $1 million annually in fuel cycle services to assist countries in the use of lower enriched uranium levels in research reactors.

--A pledge of U.S. willingness to finance appropriate nuclear projects through the Export-Import Bank for countries which meet U.S. nonproliferation requirements, with preference to NPT parties.

DECLARATION OF SECURITY ASSURANCES

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance read a statement in Washington, D.C., on June 12, 1978, to announce the President's policy of negative security assurances. He said that after reviewing the current status of discussions at the SSOD, consulting with allies, and reviewing pertinent studies, the President had decided that "to encourage support for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, to increase international security and stability, and to create a more positive environment for success of the special session," the United States would elaborate its security assurances on the nonuse of nuclear weapons. The Secretary then read President Carter's declaration:
"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear weapon state, or associated with a nuclear weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

Continuing, Secretary Vance said:

"It is the President's view that this formulation preserves our security commitments and advances our collective security as well as enhances the prospect for more effective arms control and disarmament."

MONITORING SERVICES

On June 14, 1978, U.S. representative to the SSOD, Paul Newman, before the Ad Hoc Committee, elaborated on the announcement Vice President Mondale had made during the General Debate concerning technical monitoring services. The Vice President had announced that the United States is prepared to consider requests for monitoring services—such as aircraft photo reconnaissance and ground-sensor detection—where such "eyes and ears of peace" might support disengagement agreements or other regional stabilizing measures.

Mr. Newman noted that the agreement in the Sinai demonstrates the potential of modern technology in facilitating verification of compliance with disengagement agreements and assuring warning of surprise attack. He said the United States is prepared to consider, on a case-by-case basis, requests for monitoring services similar to those in the Sinai. The specific services the United States would consider providing, according to Mr. Newman, include land-based sensors to monitor movements in potential invasion routes and staging areas, as well as across borders, and assistance with aircraft photo reconnaissance and photo interpretation. He noted that such services, however, "cannot replace the political will and negotiating flexibility which must lie at the heart of effective arms control."
STATISTICS OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on June 23, 1978, Ambassador Warnke, Director the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, spoke on the status of U.S. arms control negotiations. Mr. Warnke said that it was important to be reminded of the worldwide concern about armament levels and of the fact that arms control and disarmament are recognized as a global imperative. Furthermore, the United States received a "clear and unmistakable" message:

"The world is impatient with and intolerant of the circumstances in which literally the survival of human society is threatened by the accumulation of more and more weapons with greater and greater destructive power."

Ambassador Warnke said SALT II would provide both quantitative and, for the first time, qualitative constraints on nuclear weapons and the proposed CTB would completely ban nuclear test explosions. Meanwhile, the United States urges all nations to adhere to the NPT in their own self-interest and in the interest of world peace. Ambassador Warnke also said verification has presented some problems in the negotiations on chemical weapons, but, nevertheless, good progress is being made. Negotiations are also underway to ban radiological weapons--those which produce lethal radiation without a nuclear explosion. Bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on limiting conventional arms transfers are currently active. The United States has unilaterally reduced the overall volume of its arms transfers. "However, if we are to succeed in restraining the flow of arms, we must involve both other suppliers and recipients in multilateral discussions." The multilateral discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe are again progressing after a long period in which little progress was made. Bilateral talks with the Soviet Union are also underway on Indian Ocean arms limitations and elimination of anti-satellite capabilities. Finally Mr. Warnke stated that development assistance is a high priority U.S. objective which deserves serious consideration in the reprogramming of savings which may accrue from disarmament.

SECURITY- AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

The United States introduced two proposals which it thought would strengthen international security and build confidence: (1) the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping reserve composed of national contingents earmarked by their governments for U.N. duty at the call of the U.N.
Secretary General and (2) the encouragement of confidence-building measures and stabilizing measures, including prior notification of military maneuvers, invitations for representatives of other nations to observe such maneuvers, and U.N. machinery to promote such measures. The United States also co-sponsored a memorandum supported by 13 other nations to strengthen the security role of the U.N. in the peaceful settlement of disputes and international peacekeeping missions. The memo said the SSOD should emphasize the importance of studying the existing facilities and mechanisms for promoting peace.
CHAPTER 4

POSITIONS OF WESTERN ALLIES

Most of the U.N. member states presented their positions on disarmament matters during the Special Session. In addition to statements made in the General Debate, proposals, draft resolutions, and further statements were presented during meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Some themes that appeared throughout the speeches and proposals of the Western Allies were:

--Disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, is the responsibility of everyone; hence, all countries should be involved in arms control and disarmament deliberations and negotiations.

--Nations should have access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

--Accurate and complete information on arms spending and defence budgets should be exchanged.

--Resources now spent on arms should be transferred to development assistance.

BELGIUM

Mr. George Elliott, Belgium's Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N., elaborated his country's position on international machinery designed to deal with the problems of disarmament during a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. Belgium's position called for international community action to be taken by two levels. The first level should be deliberative and could be the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, while the second should be a negotiating body and possibly the CCD, as reconstituted. The problem, as Belgium interpreted it, is to reconcile two principles which seem 'contradictory'—universal and effectiveness. The first requires full participation, while the latter of necessity restricts participation to a relatively small number. Furthermore, Belgium warned that geographical and political distribution must be balanced. To achieve these objectives, Belgium proposed reorganizing the CCD.

CANADA

In his statement to the SSUD, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced Canada's priorities for international
arms control. The measures to implement the Canadian strategy included

-- a CTB to impede the further development of nuclear explosive devices,

-- an agreement to halt the testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles,

-- an agreement to prohibit the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, and

-- an agreement to limit and reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapon systems.

Mr. Trudeau said that: "While nuclear proliferation remains a source of concern, it has shown itself amenable to control more than can yet be said about the transfer of conventional weapons." He noted that 80 percent of the world's military expenditures are for "conventional purposes" and that it has been with conventional weapons that 133 wars had been fought since 1945, involving 80 countries and killing 25 million people.

FRANCE

French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing stated that France's approach to disarmament is based on three ideas. "First, there exists for every state a legitimate right to security." Drawing a parallel between world peace and internal law and order he elaborated:

"Proposing complete disarmament at the outset would not further the cause of disarmament and peace, no more, for that matter, would any of our states consider eliminating all internal normal means of keeping law and order, regardless of how much respect they might have for their citizens."

Second, "disarmament is not exclusive to a few countries but must instead become the business of everyone." Third, "the approach to disarmament must take into account regional situations."

The French position was that the General Assembly should designate permanent responsibility for disarmament issues to one committee which should include all countries. Noting that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament did not represent universality in its spirit, composition, and procedures, the French called for replacing it with another body having more concrete ties to the U.N., open
membership and equal standing for the participants. Once these principles have been adopted, France would participate in establishing such an organization and in its deliberations.

President Giscard stated that establishing nuclear-free zones creates an obligation on the part of nuclear weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against states in these areas. Participants in these arrangements should be assured access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided the proliferation risk associated with this access has been eliminated. Merely to establish nuclear-free zones is not enough. The threat of a conventional arms race in these regions must be blocked. France is prepared to adjust its arms sales policy to comply with any agreements which might be concluded. A meeting of both suppliers and purchasers was the method proposed as the most realistic approach toward limiting conventional arms sales.

President Giscard also noted the "rivalry" between the United States and the Soviet Union. He concluded from this that "It is indeed on the efforts of these two countries that halting the arms race will depend first and foremost."

The French proposals included arrangements to strengthen stability in Europe and establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, an international disarmament fund for development, and an international institute for disarmament research. Toward strengthening stability in Europe, the French advocated a conference to include those states which had participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This new conference would have on its agenda the implementation of arms control and confidence-building measures for the Continent as well as an increased exchange of information.

The functions of an international satellite monitoring agency as proposed by the French would include participation in monitoring the implementation of and compliance with international arms control and disarmament agreements. The agency, as envisioned, would be responsible for collecting, processing, and disseminating information secured by Earth observation satellites. Recognizing the complexity and costliness of monitoring from space, it was proposed that the agency be established in stages—from a processing center for data obtained from the satellites of member states to an agency complete with its own observation satellites. Subsequently the French submitted a draft resolution requesting states to continue their consideration of such an agency and requested the U.N. Secretary General to gather the member's views and transmit them to the 34th General Assembly.
The French also proposed the establishment of the International Disarmament Fund for Development, reflecting a belief that the Session should establish a link between disarmament and development and devise procedures for transferring resources from arms to development assistance. France later submitted a draft resolution requesting the Secretary General to report on the proposal to the 33d General Assembly.

Finally the Permanent Mission of France introduced a proposal to the Ad Hoc Committee for establishing an International Institute for Disarmament Research, whose purpose would be implementing a continuing and independent program of theoretical and applied research on disarmament and international security. France later introduced a draft resolution requesting the Secretary General to appoint a group of experts to prepare a report on the conditions under which such an institute might be established.

**FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) stated that a more stable international environment depended on

--political, strategic, and military balance;

--detente, conflict containment, and reconciliation of interests;

--effective crisis management; and

--predictable political and military conduct.

Furthermore, he noted that agreements between the nuclear powers cannot prevent the outbreak of conventional regional wars.

Chancellor Schmidt credited the NPT with halting the "geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons" noting that it also illustrates the intentions of the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear armaments. The FRG took the position that nonproliferation policy must not become an obstacle to the use of nuclear energy as guaranteed in the NPT and that this was the determining factor for ratification of the Treaty by the German Parliament. Continuing, Chancellor Schmidt said "The growing use of nuclear energy makes it necessary, however, to strengthen international measures to prevent its misuse, and this is especially true for the use of plutonium."

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Discussing chemical weapons, Mr. Schmidt noted that in 1954 the FRG renounced their production and submitted to international control. Having experienced such a verification system, the FRG maintains that such controls would not prejudice the "legitimate interests of civil industry and research" and could indeed be effective, economical and without economic harm.

Citing the relationship between the expenditures for military items and developmental purposes, the FRG called for regulating the international transfer of armaments. Attention was called to West Germany's policy of refusing, as a matter of principle, to grant aid for exporting weapons. Only in exceptional and limited cases does the FRG allow weapons to be supplied to countries outside its alliance and forbids exporting weapons to areas of international tension. On the other hand, the country's development aid budget has been increased to one-tenth of its defense budget and will be further increased.

In concluding, Chancellor Schmidt said:

"The task, as we see it, with regard to armaments is to bring about balanced and verifiable limitations, to effect specific and balanced reductions, and hopefully, one day to bring about the total elimination of arms."

In the Ad Hoc Committee, the FRG proposed implementing regional confidence-building arrangements as one step toward the objective of a worldwide convention on confidence-building measures. The primary purpose of these measures would be to give states more information on the military activities of their neighbors and thereby help to eliminate insecurity and mistrust. Proposed measures could include

--full information on military budgets as the prerequisite for possible agreement on limiting or reducing budgets;

--information about the strength of the armed forces and a description of their structure;

--notification of any changes in armed forces makeup;

--exchange of military personnel, including visits of military delegations;

--notification of military maneuvers, including minor exercises;
--exchange of manuever observers;

--notification of military movements; and

--establishment of internationally staffed observation posts and electronic monitoring stations in crisis areas and demilitarized zones.

The FRG also submitted a proposal to the Ad Hoc Committee pertaining to the seismic monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. FRG stated that it was willing to make available the Central Seismological Observatory at Graefenberg, together with its installations for inclusion into a network of similar stations stations designed to verify a CTB.

IRELAND

The Irish Delegation proposed during an Ad Hoc Committee meeting that the Secretary General, with the assistance of experts, study a system of targets and incentives to encourage progress in arms control and disarmament. The study, as perceived by Ireland, would consider the feasibility of setting ceilings for national defense expenditures and arranging for the savings to be used for development.

JAPAN

Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda advocated nonuse of nuclear weapons against states which have renounced them, conclusion of the CTB, a moratorium on nuclear testing until the CTB is implemented, and acceptance of IAEA safeguards by all nuclear weapon states. He stated that Japan has "consistently upheld the three non-nuclear principles, of not possessing, not manufacturing, and not permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons, even though it possesses the capacity to develop such weapons."

Mr. Sonoda said his country is firmly convinced that "the imperatives of preventing further nuclear proliferation and promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, an essential energy source, can and must be pursued in harmony." Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones could also contribute to stemming nuclear proliferation as could stopping the production of fissionable material for nuclear explosions and accepting IAEA safeguards to insure compliance.

With respect to other arms control issues, Mr. Sonoda stated that
progress is urgently needed toward banning chemical weapons,

Japanese policy has been one of eschewing the export of weapons,

resources spent for arms should be released for international development,

France and the People's Republic of China (PRC) should participate in disarmament negotiations and become parties to existing agreements, and

the United States and the Soviet Union should continue to strive for a SALT II agreement and further strategic arms controls.

TURKEY

The Turkish Government representative announced that country's intention to ratify the NPT during a speech at the Special Session. The Turkish Prime Minister stated that his country "while conscious of the imperfections of the Treaty, will nevertheless promptly request approval from Parliament of its ratification." He said that this action is being taken "in the hope of encouraging all countries to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thereby to give more vigor to the appeal directed to nuclear weapon states for quick and effective progress in the field of nuclear disarmament."

UNITED KINGDOM

United Kingdom Prime Minister James Callaghan began his speech to the SSOD by reaffirming the UK's willingness to play a central role in the search for disarmament. He announced that the UK is ready to introduce new proposals in the comprehensive test ban negotiations and is confident that an agreement is within reach.

Calling for an early settlement on SALT II issues, Britain declared full support for the emerging agreement but cautioned that SALT cannot be the "whole story" on nuclear weapons. Addressing the use of the nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Callaghan stated that the UK's long-established policy was "that these weapons should never be used except in self-defense under the most extreme circumstances."

Mr. Callaghan further stated that Britain recognizes that member states which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for more specific assurances that nuclear
weapons will not be used against them and placed his country on record as prepared "to take part with other nuclear powers in firm, far-reaching and permanent assurances, to the non-nuclear states."

Urging adherence to the NPT, but recognizing that some countries prefer not to become parties to it, Mr. Callaghan hoped those countries would renounce nuclear weapons in another way; in particular by accepting IAEA full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities.

With respect to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, Britain welcomed the joint declaration issued by President Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union and Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany which stated that "approximate equality and parity are adequate guarantees of defense; and that measures of arms control in keeping with that principle would be of great importance." Conceding that the statement concerned only a limited area of central Europe, Prime Minister Callaghan commented that it should serve as a principle which can be extended to other areas.

The UK proposed that the U.N. study how to apply the surveillance and monitoring activities supporting the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement to other regions in order to build confidence and verify arms control agreements. The Prime Minister announced the UK's willingness to participate in an international system of seismic monitoring as part of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and pledged to accept whatever further measures of verification are deemed necessary, including international inspection. On behalf of Great Britain, Mr. Callaghan asked that the United States-Soviet Union initiative on chemical weapons be submitted soon for multilateral negotiations in the CCD.

With respect to other arms control matters, the Prime Minister set forth the following positions:

--The United Kingdom favored an approach to limit conventional arms transfers which would (1) involve both suppliers and recipients and (2) address the problem from a regional perspective.

--The UK would increase its foreign aid program by 6 percent per year over the next 4 years and supported the Nordic proposal for a U.N. study on the relationship between disarmament and development.
—All states should report complete defense budget figures to the U.N. as a first step toward reducing military expenditures worldwide.

—The U.S. proposal to establish a U.N. peacekeeping reserve force was commendable, and the U.N. should study its peacekeeping role.

—The role of negotiating multilateral agreements belongs to the CCD, although its structure could be improved through reforming the co-chairmanship system, eliciting the participation of France and the PRC, fostering a closer relationship to the U.N., increasing its membership, and encouraging nonmember states to participate in its work.

—The role of the U.N. Secretariat in disarmament matters could be strengthened by making the Disarmament Centre a repository for data on disarmament.

—Another special session devoted to disarmament should be held in 1981.
CHAPTER 5

POSITIONS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), Romania, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Bulgaria, and other Eastern European countries were represented at the Special Session. These countries presented their positions on the topics before the SSOD and also set forth some general views:

--The arms race is becoming increasingly qualitative in character.

--Not all eligible countries are party to existing international arms control agreements.

--Dismantling or radically restructuring existing negotiating bodies may not be beneficial.

--Convening a world disarmament conference is desirable.

BULGARIA

Mr. Petar Mladenov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, warned that the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe looms over the world and that this possibility is made more likely by the process of constant qualitative improvements in and development of weapons of mass destruction. He lauded the contribution of the socialist countries to the conclusion of existing multilateral and bilateral arms control treaties and particularly the Soviet Union's proposals designed to avert nuclear war, end the arms race, and begin actual disarmament.

While noting that the process of relaxing international tension has become the dominant factor in international relations, he reminded the delegates that the military industrial complex and "some other notorious forces in the West" are trying to revive the cold war. Mr. Mladenov further stated that:

"* * * these forces * * * are maintaining the fallacious argument that political dentente is quite compatible with the arms race and that these two processes can co-exist and develop in parallel."

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"The advocates of the policy of a further increase in armaments justify that policy by the revived myth of a so-called Soviet threat and with assertions that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty Organization allegedly have been trying to gain military superiority over the West.

Dismissing these charges as completely unfounded, he stated that these "opponents of detente" have found themselves in growing isolation as international sentiment increasingly espouses detente and disarmament.

Mr. Mladenov then turned to the tasks facing the Special Session. He reiterated the general themes of the Special Session but cautioned that the only disarmament measures which can be successful are those "which do not lead to the attainment of benefits at the expense of the security of others." He concluded by acknowledging Soviet-American progress in seeking agreements limiting strategic arms, prohibiting chemical weapons, and banning radiological weapons as significant steps toward halting the arms race. He felt that the Special Session will provide impetus to successfully concluding these negotiations but stated that what is particularly needed is for the nations concerned to display the political will to do so.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Mr. Oskar Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the German Democratic Republic, echoed the themes of the U.S.S.R.'s earlier statement. He noted that the SSOD was the first time in the history of the U.N. that a special session was devoted to disarmament and considered it an expression of the growing awareness and desires of the world's people for arms limitation and disarmament.

Jointly, with other states of the socialist community, the GDR announced that it would pursue the objective of general and complete disarmament. To move toward the goal, the GDR took the position that if the SSOD were to succeed, it should

--initiate practical steps to end the arms race,

--agree on guidelines and principles for further arms limitation and disarmament,
--define common objectives and principles to govern negotiations on disarmament, and

--pave the way toward calling a world disarmament conference.

The GDR representative said "Effective arms limitation and disarmament may release substantial means" to benefit domestic and international peaceful programs. He reiterated the pledge made when the GDR was founded, that is "to do everything to ensure that a war will never again start from German soil." The GDR called for keeping the lessons of war--its horrors and sufferings--alive in the minds of present and future generations as an essential element in educating people in the spirit of international peace and understanding.

The GDR called for a ban on the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and a reduction of their stockpiles. The German Government categorically opposed any weapons of mass destruction and called for immediate agreement on ceasing their development. As for neutron weapons, Mr. Fischer said they increase the danger of nuclear war and are offensive weapons which work against nonproliferation objectives. To call for a ban on nuclear weapons should not diminish the importance of other partial measures, such as the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests.

Mr. Fischer suggested that the SSOD reaffirm the universality of the NPT, because of its utmost significance. The NPT does not, according to GDR, impede the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but rather promotes such use.

Noting that negotiations have been underway in Vienna for 5 years on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe but without results, Mr. Fischer attributed the lack of progress to the participating NATO countries which have insisted on arrangements that would give them unilateral military advantage.

The conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force is an "urgent" task, as a measure against the danger of war, according to the GDR. The "cardinal" point required for all disarmament efforts is political will on the part of governments. In concluding, Mr. Fischer said that the GDR deems the early convening of a world disarmament conference indispensable.
ROMANIA

The Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Mr. Manea Manescu, speaking before the SSOD, presented Romania's program for disarmament and enhancement of international security.

First, states should freeze military expenditures, forces, and armaments at the 1978 level while attempting to reduce them. The money thus saved could be used for peaceful purposes, both domestically and internationally.

Second, there should begin a process of military disengagement. States should refrain from stationing troops in other countries, gradually reduce existing forces deployed on foreign soil, establish demilitarized security zones, give notification of troop movements and maneuvers, and renounce multinational maneuvers near the frontiers of other states.

Third, the division of the world into military blocs should be terminated, including simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Fourth, the nations of Europe should conclude an all-European pact to renounce the use or threat of force, negotiate military disengagement and disarmament in Europe, and create conditions for protecting every nation from aggression, foreign interference, and pressure.

Fifth, the international community should give priority to nuclear disarmament but also halt production of other weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, ecological, and radiological), prohibit their use, remove them from military arsenals, and otherwise outlaw them. Furthermore, Romania declared itself in favor of (1) an agreement by the nuclear weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states, (2) renunciation by nuclear weapon states of placing new nuclear weapons in other countries, (3) cessation of refinement and production of nuclear weapons, (4) cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes, (5) reduction of nuclear weapons and
delivery systems until their complete liquidation, and (6) a solemn commitment to negotiate an agreement on total prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Sixth, under the aegis of the IAEA, a concrete program of action should be undertaken to promote international cooperation and collaboration in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to reaffirm that nuclear arms control should not be incompatible with the dissemination and use of nuclear technology and energy for peaceful purposes.

Seventh, the Balkans should be made "an area of good neighborliness, peace and broad-based cooperation, without nuclear weapons," and other "zones of peace" should be established.

Eighth, an international agreement should be concluded by which all nations agree to settle any disputes by peaceful political means.

Ninth, the U.N. role in disarmament should be strengthened to include another SSOD and the CCD should be revamped by abolishing the co-chairmanship system, creating equal participation for all U.N. members, and democratizing its debates. The Romanian position also favored convening a world disarmament conference.

Tenth, the U.N. should establish within its framework an international body for disarmament open to participation of all member states, and the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly should deal exclusively with the problems of disarmament.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Mr. Andrei Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., presented his country's positions to the Special Session. He stated that if the chance to halt arms race is missed, then in "certain highly important areas, we could reach a point beyond which any possibility of concluding appropriate agreements would be altogether non-existent—and for obvious reasons, since
certain types of weapons which are being developed simply do not lend themselves to joint control over their quantity or qualitative characteristics."

He noted that a meeting of NATO was being held concurrently with the SSOD and asked, "what is basic to the policy planning of those states: the continuation of the arms race or the possibility of disarmament?"

Mr. Gromyko announced that "if other states are prepared to disarm the Soviet Union will not be found amiss." He set forth the following Soviet proposals:

--Cessation of the production of nuclear weapons.

--Cessation of the production and prohibition of all other types of weapons of mass destructive.

--Cessation of the development of new types of conventional armaments with great destructive capability.

--Renunciation of the expansion of armies and the buildup of conventional armaments of the permanent members of the Security Council and countries which have military agreements with them.

After stating those proposals, Mr. Gromyko said,

"It goes without saying that the elaboration and implementation of measures to end the production of nuclear weapons and gradually destroy their stockpiles should go hand-in-hand with and be inseparable from the strengthening of international legal guarantees for the security of the States."

The U.S.S.R. suggested that the Special Session adopt a decision of principle to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament and the nonuse of force.

The U.S.S.R. declared that it "will never use nuclear weapons against those states which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories." Mr. Gromyko quoted U.S.S.R. President Brezhnev who had stated:

"We are against the use of nuclear weapons; only extraordinary circumstances--aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear power--could compel us to resort to this extreme means of self-defense."
The Soviet Union also supported establishment of nuclear-free zones and submitted for discussion a proposal to ban the stationing of nuclear weapons in nations where there are presently no such weapons.

The Soviet Union felt the SSOD could give fresh impetus to the arms control and disarmament negotiations currently underway—specifically SALT, CTB, chemical weapons, radiological weapons, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, and Indian Ocean—and strongly hoped countries which had not done so would become parties to the international treaties already in force. Mr. Gromyko said,

"Why is it, I ask, that about one-third of Member States of the United Nations still have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? Why is it that almost one-third of United Nations Member States are not parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water? Why is it that more than half of them are not parties to the Convention banning bacteriological weapons, or to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor? Can one consider this situation as normal? It is a situation which calls, purely and simply, for accession to existing treaties and agreements rather than general statements on the desirability of disarmament. No excuse sounds convincing here."

Concerning international machinery designed to deal with disarmament problems, Mr. Gromyko questioned the benefit of dismantling "well-adjusted machinery." He saw no need to give up existing negotiating channels or to restructure them radically since "any machinery * * * can only be as good as the policies of the States represented on it." Mr. Gromyko pledged U.S.S.R. cooperativeness toward solving the problem of disarmament and noted that his country is not alone in favoring the convening of a world disarmament conference as a forum to adopt effective decisions truly binding on all member states.

With respect to other Soviet positions on arms control and disarmament matters, Mr. Gromyko stated that

--nations having large economic and military potential should agree to reduce their military budgets in absolute figures and divert some of these funds to the needs of developing countries,
--agreement should be sought to ban the production of enhanced radiation weapons,

--disarmament must not encroach "on the rights of peoples waging legitimate struggle for their liberation from colonial and racist oppression," and

--nonproliferation objectives would not hinder international cooperation in the civil application of nuclear energy.

The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Anatoly Kovalev, spoke to the Ad Hoc Committee on June 26, 1978. He cited the socialist countries' new initiative to break the deadlock in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks as "concrete evidence of the sincere desire to make progress in the talks now going on at various international meetings, with regard to the reduction of the arms race and disarmament." He pointed out again that the U.S.S.R. firmly believes "that the utmost use should be made of the existing forms of talks, but that their structures should be improved." These improvements include, among other things, making the public more informed on disarmament matters. In this vein, he proposed opening the CCD meetings to the press and the public.
CHAPTER 6

POSITIONS OF NONALIGNED COUNTRIES AND

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Some of the themes which appeared throughout the speeches and proposals presented by the nonaligned nations at the Special Session focused on:

--The need to restructure or revamp the existing disarmament negotiating bodies.

--The diversion of world resources (approximately $400 billion annually) from health, education, and general public welfare programs to weapons programs.

--The need to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

--The fact that only conventional weapons have been used in the wars since World War II despite the existence of nuclear weapons.

--The need for:

1. Nuclear-weapon-free zones.

2. Guarantees of "no first use" of nuclear weapons.

3. Guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against nonnuclear weapons states.

4. Halting the testing of nuclear weapons.

ARGENTINA

The chairman of Argentina's delegation, Mr. Oscar A. Montes, declared that disarmament must be a collective effort because of a common destiny -- the present ability to "destroy every vestige of life on this planet." Fully aware of the difficulties involved in complete disarmament, he regretted that current negotiations have not yet produced a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests or the use of chemical weapons. Argentina declared its opposition to nuclear arms and called for them to be totally eliminated as soon as possible. Mr. Montes explained that Argentina rejected the NPT because "it is clearly discriminatory...[and]...legitimates a division of the world into two categories of countries" -- those given a free hand in the nuclear field and those subject to
restrictions. Furthermore, to "arbitrarily" equate the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with the presumed possibility of producing nuclear weapons and therefore impose unjustified limitations is "tantamount to an attempt to perpetuate the scientific and technological oligopoly of * * * industrialized states to the direct detriment of * * * the developing countries." He stressed that his country would continue to "unreservedly support any fair and appropriate initiative" to prevent proliferation--specifically, cooperation with IAEA safeguards, but also stressed Argentina's right to acquire, refine, and apply nuclear technology.

Argentina has initiated the procedures necessary to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Mr. Montes announced. "Unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco recognizes no category of privileged countries." The Argentine Government has also started the proceedings to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. Mr. Montes also commented on the need to improve disarmament deliberative and negotiating bodies.

BRAZIL

Brazil's statement to SSOD was presented by Mr. Sergio Correa da Costa, chairman of the delegation. He declared: "There will be no disarmament while there is no peace and security. By the same token, there will be no peace and security while the arms race continues unabated * * *.

Brazil called for confronting the issue as a whole rather than proposing halfway measures.

The Brazilian representative stated that his Government signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco on the basis of the understanding that nuclear weapon states would respect nuclear-weapon-free zones. Furthermore, he said the Treaty implies that not only should the region remain free of nuclear weapons, but that it should be safeguarded against possible nuclear threats. Mr. Correa da Costa stressed that Brazil has committed itself to the Treaty's objectives even though the Treaty is not yet in force for Brazil. "While favoring the cessation of the utilization of nuclear energy for military purposes," Brazil believes safeguards must be applied to all states without discrimination.
The disarmament forums and processes will not be effective unless they are accompanied by the political will to put them into operation, according to the Brazilian position. Finally, Brazil maintained that a significant portion of the resources released by disarmament must be applied to economic and social development.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Huang, said in his speech before the SSOD that the People's Republic of China believes the convocation of the SSOD "is a reflection of the strong dissatisfaction of the Third World and the many small and medium-sized countries with the intensified arms race between the super powers, and with their fierce rivalry for hegemony, as well as a reflection of the eager desire of these countries to eliminate the danger of war."

He recalled that the United States and the U.S.S.R. issued a joint statement in 1961 listing eight principles as a basis for negotiations on disarmament. Noting that 17 years have passed, the PRC alleged that "not even a single one" of the principles has been put into practice. Furthermore, "the super powers are not at all working for general and complete disarmament, but for general and complete arms expansion."

According to China, the two superpowers' "armaments already far exceed their defense needs and are being used as tools of aggression and expansion and tools in the struggle for hegemony." As for the smaller countries, "armaments are their means of defense to safeguard their independence and security against aggression. Many Third World countries still lack adequate defense capabilities."

In conclusion, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the PRC

--has stood for complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons;

--will not be the first to use nuclear weapons;

--has always stood for dismantling and withdrawing all the military bases and forces stationed on foreign soil;
--upholds the complete prohibition and destruction of biological and chemical weapons;

--believes all countries have the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and opposes any attempt to hamper its development by other countries on the pretext of nuclear nonproliferation;

--opposes the use of military aid to extort privileges, threaten, or make exorbitant profits;

--has declared that it will never seek hegemony;

and

--had proposed a conference to be attended by all countries on the question of the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, but without response from the superpowers.

Finally, the PRC called for all nuclear weapon states to neither threaten nor use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states or in nuclear-free zones.

A PRC representative, during an Ad Hoc Committee meeting, elaborated on a proposal the PRC had submitted. Citing the "lack of sincerity for disarmament on the part of the superpowers" as the reason for a lack of progress in disarmament, the proposal called for the "superpowers to:

(a) Declare that they will at no time and in no circumstances resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones;

(b) Withdraw all their armed forces stationed abroad and undertake not to dispatch forces of any description to other countries; dismantle all their military bases and paramilitary bases on foreign soil and undertake not to seek any new ones;

(c) Stop their nuclear and conventional arms race and set out to destroy by stages their nuclear weapons and drastically reduce their conventional weapons;

(d) Undertake not to station massive forces or stage military exercises near the borders of other countries and not to launch military
attacks, including surprise attacks, against other countries on any pretext;

(e) Undertake not to export weapons to other countries for the purpose of bringing them under control or for fomenting wars or abetting threats of war.

Furthermore, the proposal said that the "superpowers" are advocating a total prohibition of nuclear tests, nuclear nonproliferation, and cessation of production of nuclear weapons for the purpose of "consolidating their nuclear monopoly * * * or * * * restricting or interfering with other countries' right to the peaceful use of atomic energy." China felt that if the existing international agreements on disarmament were mentioned in the final document, "it would be necessary to expose their hypocritical nature, instead of calling on more states to join them." With regard to international machinery designed to deal with the problems of disarmament, the PRC called for establishing a deliberative body and reforming the negotiating body to make it more representative.

CYPRUS

In his speech before the SSOD during the General Debate, President Spyros Kyprianou, of the Republic of Cyprus, proposed total demilitarization and disarmament of his republic. Cyprus also proposed a mixed police force of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, composed in accordance with the proportions of the population and under the permanent U.N. guidance and control.

INDIA

Prime Minister Morarji Desai, of the Republic of India, during his speech to the SSOD, reiterated his country's commitment to comprehensive disarmament and its pledge not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons even if the rest of the world does so. He abjured nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes but reiterated India's objection to the NPT "because it is so patently discriminatory." India's position is that the NPT gives nuclear weapons states "a monopoly of power and confers on them freedom for commercial exploitation of nuclear know-how, while * * * it places restrictions which may impede peaceful development of nuclear science" on "those devoted to the pursuit of nuclear research and technology entirely for peaceful purposes." Furthermore, India accused the NPT of failing "to arrest the growth of nuclear armaments as anticipated, either qualitatively or quantitatively."
The onus of finding the solution of the problems connected with nuclear disarmament lies heavily on the United States and the Soviet Union according to the Indian spokesman. He went on to say that "there cannot be a limited approach to the question of freedom from nuclear threats and dangers, [hence] the whole world should be declared a nuclear-free zone." Recognizing that the ultimate solution to the problem of violence was composed of steps, India believed that the first step should be composed of

- a declaration that the use of nuclear technology for military purposes should be outlawed;
- qualitative and quantitative limits on nuclear arms, an immediate freeze of stockpiles, and their placement under international inspection;
- formulation of a time-bound program (10 years or less) to gradually reduce nuclear weapons with a view to their elimination; and
- a CTB with safeguards provisions applied universally and without discrimination.

India advised the world not to wait until nuclear disarmament is completed before initiating a conventional disarmament program. Taking note of the world's resources "wasted" on destruction, India called for harnessing science and statesmanship to the "cause of the welfare and happiness of mankind." Prime Minister Desai suggested setting up a fund for studying disarmament and nonviolence and finding ways and means of "replacing bombs and bullets by bread and books."

India introduced two resolutions to the Ad Hoc Committee on June 23, 1978. Ethiopia joined as a sponsor to both draft resolutions while Cyprus became a sponsor of just the second.

The first requested all states, particularly nuclear weapon states to submit proposals to the 33d U.N. General Assembly concerning nonuse of nuclear weapons and avoidance of nuclear war, in order that an international convention might be formulated. The resolution also called for the General Assembly to declare that "nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security."

The second resolution called upon all nuclear weapon states to refrain from any further nuclear weapons tests pending conclusion of a CTB. It was based on the premise that continued testing exacerbates the arms race, poses a serious
danger to the environment, and constitutes a hazard to the health of present and future mankind.

**INDONESIA**

Indonesia expressed its intention to ratify the NPT during a speech to the SSOD. The Indonesia representative stated that the Treaty had been submitted to his Parliament for ratification. Furthermore, Indonesia, while recognizing the need to prevent nuclear proliferation, did not believe nonproliferation measures should in any way limit the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

**MEXICO**

Mr. Alfonso Garcia Robles, chairman of the Mexican delegation, restated a conviction of his country—that until everyone accepts the idea of convening and institutionalizing a world disarmament conference, special sessions of the U.N. devoted exclusively to disarmament must continue to be held. Mexico regarded the disarmament machinery available to the U.N. as "very deficient" and hoped that the SSOD would provide a forum for debate where all U.N. members could participate.

Mexico stated these five principles must be included in the SSOD's final document.

- All U.N. members must act in conformity with and fulfill in good faith the U.N. Charter.
- All the peoples of the world have a vital stake in the success of disarmament negotiations.
- The U.N. should play a role and assume a responsibility of primary importance in disarmament.
- Nuclear weapon states must fulfill their obligations toward nuclear-weapon-free zones and states part of such zones.
- A considerable part of the resources released as a result of disarmament must be devoted to economic and social development in the developing countries.

Mr. Garcia Robles noted that Mexico is perhaps the only country in the world to introduce an amendment to its constitution stipulating that nuclear energy may be used on its territory only for peaceful purposes.
SINGAPORE

The chairman of the Singapore delegation, Ambassador T. T. Koh, during his speech before the SSOD, stated that "The representatives of the 96 states who have spoken before me have been unanimous in condemning the arms race. If all of us are against the arms race, then the question is who is responsible for the arms race?" Continuing, the Singapore Chairman noted that the arms race is a universal phenomenon for which all states are responsible. Therefore, "if we are to reduce the arms race, we must all examine our own conduct critically, and not merely seek to put the blame and the responsibility on others."

Attributing fear of attack as the principal reason why nations arm themselves, Singapore "sought to establish that the system envisaged by the United Nations Charter for maintaining international peace and security has failed." According to Singapore, everyone has a right to demand SALT II and to hope for CTB. Furthermore, countries of Asia and Africa should emulate their colleagues of Latin America who created the first nuclear weapon-free zone. While the Third World should promote regional agreements, all countries must bear in mind that "the road to disarmament must pass through worldwide detente."

SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka proposed a world disarmament authority to collect and study data on the arms industry and the distribution of arms throughout the world. It was suggested that the authority could also monitor implementation of disarmament measures; develop realistic proposals and programs; and, after the world community had moved toward general and complete disarmament, control and regulate the production and distribution of any necessary armaments. The proposed authority would also be vested with the power to use arms to defend U.N. decisions. A draft resolution requesting the Secretary General to prepare a report for the 34th U.N. General Assembly on the conditions under which such an authority might be established was later submitted by Sri Lanka.

JOINT INITIATIVES

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Leaders of Delegations of Member States of the Non-Aligned Group of Countries met in extraordinary session on May 29, 1978, and unanimously endorsed the following statement, which they forwarded to the Ad Hoc Committee. Their positions included
--calling for a halt in the development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons; and renunciation by nuclear weapon states of the use of nuclear weapons;

--stressing that disarmament should release resources now devoted to the arms race for economic and social development;

--readjusting the machinery for discussion and negotiation of disarmament to enable all Member States to participate;

--promoting decisions aimed at dismantling foreign military bases;

--condemning Israel's military escalation and denouncing Israel's intentions of possessing nuclear weapons; and

--categorically condemning South Africa's plan to develop nuclear weapons.

On June 7, 1978, the representative of Iraq introduced a draft resolution which

--expressed concern over the continued and rapid Israeli military buildup;

--displayed alarm over the increasing evidence regarding acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel;

--indicated alarm over the use of cluster bombs by Israel against civilian targets in Lebanon;

--revealed concern that the United States was continuing to give Israel advanced military weapons;

--recalled condemnations of military collaboration between Israel and South Africa;

--requested the Security Council to call upon all states to refrain from any supply of arms to Israel (directly or indirectly) and to end all transfer of nuclear equipment, fissionable material, or technology to Israel; and
--requested the Security Council to establish machinery for supervising implementation of the above measures.

The resolution received the support of 27 delegations but on June 23, 1978, was revised to delete references to the United States. This revised resolution was ultimately sponsored by 33 delegations, but in the interest of preserving consensus and in response to an appeal from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, was withdrawn at the last Ad Hoc Committee meeting on June 29, 1978, with the provision that it be forwarded to the 33d U.N. General Assembly for consideration.

In addition, a proposal to achieve a comprehensive approach to planning international arms control and disarmament studies was transmitted to the Ad Hoc Committee by Austria, Egypt, India, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Norway. This proposal suggested that the Secretary General appoint an advisory board of eminent persons to advise and assist him and the U.N. in planning and executing such studies.
CHAPTER 7

POSITIONS OF U.N. AFFILIATES, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

Agencies and affiliates of the United Nations, 25 nongovernmental organizations, and 6 research institutes made their positions known to the Special Session. Most of these positions echoed those of the U.N. member nations already discussed:

--The need for action on disarmament.

--Diversion of resources from social and economic development to arms and military instruments of war.

--The need for improved disarmament negotiations and strengthened deliberative and negotiating bodies.

--The need for more people, both in and outside government, to be better informed about arms control.

--The ultimate need for general and complete disarmament.

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Addressing the Special Session during the General Debate, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, Director General of the IAEA, stated that a significant achievement in controlling the spread of atomic weapons has been "the prevention of the rapidly spreading peaceful nuclear technology as the basis for weapons production." Citing statistics, he emphasized that "it is quite obvious that there is no direct correlation whatsoever between the growth of civil nuclear power and the spread of nuclear weapons." He said that by far the highest priority now must be given to consolidate and universalize the NPT, strengthen IAEA safeguards and make more rigorous the political and economic consequences that any country would suffer by breaching the NPT and its safeguards obligations. Dr. Eklund commented that the two major agenda items of various international conferences to date have been adequate energy supplies for all countries and nuclear nonproliferation. Expressing his personal conviction, he said that "in the long term,
policies aimed at restraining and denying the transfer of nuclear or any other technology cannot be successful and could in the end prove to be counter-productive." Suggesting that the same ingenuity that has gone into developing nuclear power be deployed to prevent its misuse, the Director General said comprehensive and effective safeguards can be further improved.

Turning to the CTB, Dr. Eklund said conclusion of an agreement would be "an expression of good faith of the nuclear-weapon states in discharging" their obligations under the NPT and would also outlaw further proliferation, both vertical and horizontal. Concluding, he recalled that the NPT contains a commitment by all parties to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear power.

OTHER U.N. AGENCIES AND AFFILIATES

The Administrator of the U.N. Development Program, Mr. Bradford Morse, said before the Ad Hoc Committee that arms production strains technological resources, absorbing 40 percent of the world's outlays for research and 50 percent of its scientific and technological manpower. Furthermore, "$1 billion spent on education creates about 30,000 more jobs than the same amount spent on defense," and mutually beneficial integration of national economies removes potential causes of conflicts and makes economics so dependent on one another as to preclude war. Continuing Mr. Morse said

"So far as deterrence is concerned, it should be sufficient, perhaps, to recall that the Nobel Peace Prize is named after a man who honestly believed that his invention of dynamite would make war too frightful to contemplate."

The Executive Director of the U.N. Environment Program said in his speech to the Ad Hoc Committee that,

"It would be redundant to reiterate here all the environmental consequences of the arms race " " . Suffice it to say that the development, testing, transport and use of weapons, not only of weapons of mass destruction but also of conventional weapons, have varying but clear deleterious effects on man's health as well as on the health of the environment * * * let alone the irrational use of our scarce natural resources and the irrational use of much needed human and financial resources."

Elaborating on human resources, he said that "some 500,000 of the world's best scientists and engineers are
engaged in military research and development, which costs almost as much as all other global research and development activities."

The Chairman of the United Nations Children's Fund, in his letter to the SSOD, appealed to the Special Session to assure that expenditures on armaments are reduced so that a portion of the savings can be channeled toward meeting the minimum requirements of children everywhere.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization also called for reducing military expenditures and using the resources which would thus become available for development purposes. In its resolution on disarmament, forwarded to the SSOD, the World Food Council reiterated the necessity of allocating a share of the resources freed as a result of reducing military expenditures to finance measures for advancing the development of countries, especially improving their food situation.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

At the very start of the SSOD, the World Peace Council presented 500 million signatures on the New Stockholm Appeal to end the arms race. The appeal, which purported to represent "the will of all the peoples of the world, proclaims that peace can be defended and a world of peace can be built." The Peace Council said,

"Public opinion in all parts of the world naturally views with regret and dismay, as well as with a sense of shock, the fact that exactly at the same time as the General Assembly at the Special Session is seriously discussing concrete proposals for the ending of the arms race, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has decided on a steady quantitative and qualitative increase in armaments."

Representatives of 25 nongovernmental organizations appeared before the Ad Hoc Committee to present their views on disarmament. (See app. V.) The "three Ds"—detente, disarmament, and development—all received considerable attention from these organizations. One of their primary concerns was the diversion of funds from economic and social development into armaments. In their view, a nation's population and overall development suffers as a result of continued spending on weapons and military forces. The need for sincere efforts to reach peace was another of their primary concerns. Citing the negotiations underway, such as SALT II and the CTB, and
the apparent lack of progress, these organizations called for all parties concerned to make additional efforts to successfully conclude ongoing negotiations, as well as to convene a world disarmament conference.

Focusing on the continuing arms race and the horrors of war, most of the nongovernmental organizations advocated some type of disarmament. While some called for immediate general and complete disarmament, others proposed specific measures of disarmament—conventional, nuclear, and/or chemical. Most stated that disarmament is the responsibility of all and that more needs to be done to educate the people of the world about arms control and disarmament.

RESEARCH INSTITUTES

Representatives of six research institutes addressed the Ad Hoc Committee on June 13, 1978. (See app. VI.)

Center for Defense Information

The Center's Director, Rear Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, U.S. Navy (Ret.), referred to a recent U.S. Government study which stated that 140 million people in the United States and 113 million in the Soviet Union would be killed in a major nuclear war and nearly 75 percent of the economy of each nation would be destroyed. In such a conflict, the study concluded, "neither side could conceivably be described as a winner."

The nuclear arms race continues, in the Center's view, because of the apathy about the danger of nuclear war and the belief that nuclear weapons will never be used. No serious disarmament, however, can take place without full information about military forces. The center suggested that to resolve those problems

--the role of the U.N. as a repository of information on world military activities be strengthened;

--both the United States and the U.S.S.R. adopt measures to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

--both countries eliminate most, if not all, nuclear weapons from their naval surface ships, without significantly reducing their military capabilities; and
--both begin to reduce the numbers of their land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Institute for World Economics and International Relations

The Institute for World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., took the position that "the expansion of military arsenals does not strengthen, but actually weakens, general security." Citing their own studies, the Institute representative stated that they have evidence that it will hardly be possible to solve such global problems as food, health, housing, energy and environment if states "continue to spend such colossal sums of money for military purposes." The Institute said "the arms race poisons the political climate in the world" and makes international cooperation difficult. Restraint of the arms race would provide encouraging prospects for solving general human problems, converting military industries to peaceful production, earmarking the funds saved for Third World development, and restructuring international economic relations.

The International Institute for Peace

The Institute presented a report to the Ad Hoc Committee which stated that

--there is no reasonable alternative to a policy of detente since the arms race has reached global dimensions,

--military detente concerns other nations besides the superpowers and must extend beyond limited arms control measures,

--military detente is necessary for solving economic and social problems in both developed industrial and Third World countries,

--nuclear-free zones and universal acceptance of the NPT would represent important steps toward a complete ban on all weapons of mass destruction,

--"the arms limitation agreements which have been reached so far show the path along which we shall have to proceed in order to reach the final goal of general and complete disarmament."
The Association stated that nuclear weapons are no longer seen as the "ultimate deterrent never to be used," but rather have reached a level of usability which makes their application ever more thinkable. Turning to nuclear power programs and fuel cycles, the Association called for more stable and predictable international nuclear transactions. The long-term viability of nuclear power programs must be guaranteed through national and multinational measures at both ends of the fuel cycle. "To avoid further proliferation there is no substitute for measures devaluing the military and political utility of nuclear weapons." Such measures include nonuse pledges by nuclear weapon states to nonnuclear weapon states, no-first-use agreements involving all nuclear weapon states, and an international instrument banning the use of nuclear weapons. In conclusion, the Association said:

"It is difficult indeed to imagine how the hungry can be fed, the economy improved, the environment conserved, peace established, and war avoided with the arms race running its present course, and without decisive steps being taken for genuine and effective disarmament."

Stanley Foundation

The Foundation directed its comments to the management of the disarmament process. Since the success of the Special Session would be dependent upon the seriousness of the U.N. members in addressing arms reduction and disarmament, the Foundation offered five suggestions regarding the deliberations. First, the SSOD "is not an end in itself, but a unique opportunity to take a step along the rugged path to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament." Second, "sensible" priorities must be established. Third, a large body to deliberate on disarmament and a smaller body to negotiate it are needed. Current institutions should be improved and strengthened. Stronger national will to make the disarmament institutions and bodies work is vital, for without the good management of those institutions and bodies, the best conceptual program will go astray. Fourth, the "disarmament constituency must be broadened" to include more people and more nations. Fifth, "leadership must be stimulated." The rest of the world "has held back too long, awaiting U.S.S.R. and United States leadership."
The Institute began its presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee by noting that more and more countries are producing their own weapons. Meanwhile, qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons continue virtually without restraint. The Institute proposed negotiation of an integrated approach to disarmament--large packages of measures comprising quantitative reductions and qualitative restrictions to be carried out simultaneously. The integrated approach would place the main emphasis on multilateral negotiations, but would not be incompatible with bilateral or regional disarmament negotiations.
CHAPTER 8

FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

The major tasks assigned to the Special Session included reviewing and appraising the present international situation in the field of disarmament, adopting both a declaration and a program of action on disarmament, and reviewing the role of the U.N. and other international bodies in disarmament negotiations. A Resolution, which included the Final Document, was adopted by the Special Session on a consensus basis. The Final Document consisted of four basic parts—Introduction, Declaration, Program of Action, and Machinery—and an appendage which referred to the numerous proposals and suggestions submitted by member states. (See app. VII.)

The Final Document recognized the continuing arms race and the need for disarmament and arms limitation as essential to international peace and security and economic and social advancement. It also set forth the final objective of general and complete disarmament, as well as the immediate goal of eliminating the danger of nuclear war. It noted, however, that the Disarmament Decade declared by the U.N. in 1969 is drawing to a close and the objectives established on that occasion "appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further."

The Final Document's Declaration set forth fundamental principles to guide disarmament negotiations and measures to enable disarmament to become a reality. These measures were selected by common accord as the ones which could be realized in the short run. The Program of Action section set forth the procedures for monitoring fulfillment of the obligation to move toward general and complete disarmament, in addition to specific priorities and measures of disarmament; the first disarmament priority was given to nuclear weapons. The section on Machinery established a new Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body composed of all U.N. members to consider and make recommendations on disarmament. It also constituted a negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament, which would include the nuclear weapon states and 32 to 35 other states.

In conclusion, the Final Document noted the contributions of the member states and requested that the Secretary General transmit their suggestions and proposals to the Disarmament Commission and Committee on Disarmament for further study. The Resolution reaffirmed the determination of the member states to work for general and complete disarmament and to try
to strengthen peace and international security. The General Assembly expressed its satisfaction that the proposals submitted and the deliberation held had made it possible to reaffirm and define in the Final Document fundamental principles, goals, priorities, and procedures for disarmament. The Resolution called attention to the number of states, nongovernmental organizations, and research institutes that had participated, as well as the high level of participation.

AGENDA FOR DISARMAMENT

In the Resolution adopting the Final Document of the Special Session, the General Assembly recognized that arms control and disarmament are essential for international peace, security, and economic and social development. It resolved to lay the foundation of an international strategy through which the U.N. should play a more effective role aimed at general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Specifically, the Final Document stated that the continuing international arms race

--weakens international security and aggravates international tensions,

--is incompatible with the principle of sovereignty,

--adversely affects the rights of people to freely determine their systems of social and economic development, and

--hinders the struggle for self-determination.

It postulated that:

"Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

The Final Document maintained that while the ultimate objective remains general and complete disarmament under international control, "the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path,
towards lasting peace." This objective may be reached by concluding and implementing agreements, especially those to prevent nuclear war and the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction or those which are excessively injurious. Furthermore, negotiations should be conducted on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments and on limiting international transfers of conventional weapons. These nuclear and conventional arms control measures, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken to contribute to the creation of favorable conditions for adopting additional disarmament measures.

The Final Document listed the priorities for disarmament as "nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces." It stated that concurrent negotiations in these areas should not be precluded and that the implementation of this disarmament agenda should lead to general and complete disarmament.

PRINCIPLES OF DISARMAMENT

The Final Document contained principles to guide states in disarmament negotiations. These principles recognized that:

--All U.N. members should refrain from the threat or use of force, should not intervene or interfere in the internal affairs of other states, should maintain the inviolability of international frontiers, should settle disputes peacefully, and should recognize the right to self-defense in accordance with the U.N. Charter.

--The U.N., because of its "central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament," should be kept informed of all disarmament negotiations.

--All states have the duty to contribute to and the right to participate in efforts in the field of disarmament. The nuclear weapon states have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant states, for halting and reversing the arms race.
--The objective of all disarmament measures should be equitable and undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments.

--A balance of responsibilities and obligations for both nuclear weapons states and nonnuclear weapon states be observed.

--Agreements should provide for verification measures to create confidence in disarmament.

--Arrangements by nuclear weapon states to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen peace and security.

--The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and respect for such zones by nuclear weapon states constitute important disarmament measures.

--Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, development, peaceful settlement of disputes, and strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any one area benefits all others and, in turn, failure in one area negatively affects the others.

--Disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all states to develop, acquire, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be recognized, and international safeguards should be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis.

--Negotiations on partial disarmament should be conducted concurrently with comprehensive measures and precede general and complete disarmament negotiations.

--Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race.

--Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among states.
--Early and successful completion of arms control negotiations currently underway, or unilateral action, could contribute to limiting the arms race.

--All states should do everything possible to create a favorable climate for disarmament.

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

In adopting the Final Document, the Special Session espoused the belief that a close relationship exists between expenditures on armaments and economic and social development. It concluded that military spending diverts both human and technical resources from the tasks of development. Thus, gradual reduction of military budgets, particularly by nuclear weapon states, would not only contribute to curbing the arms race but would also increase the possibilities of reallocating resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development.

The Secretary General was encouraged to initiate a study on the relationship between disarmament and development, submit an interim report to the 34th General Assembly, and submit the final results to the 36th General Assembly. It was proposed that the study focus on ways that disarmament can contribute to establishment of the new international economic order; be forward-looking and policy-oriented; place special emphasis on both the desirability and feasibility of such a reallocation of resources; and guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate resources at the local, national, regional, and international levels.

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

The Final Document called for simultaneous negotiations on nuclear disarmament, limitation or reduction of armed forces, and constraints on conventional weapons. In addition, it called for continued full implementation and adherence to existing arms control treaties and urged states not yet parties to consider adherence to these agreements. Recommendations in many arms control and disarmament areas were also set forth. These areas and recommendations are discussed in the following sections.

Arms control in Europe

The achievement of an agreement on initial reductions of forces and arms limitations in Europe would create a more stable situation on that Continent, strengthen the security
of Europe generally, and constitute a significant step toward international peace and security. Toward these objectives, bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements, consultations, conferences, and other measures should be pursued; specifically, current efforts should be continued "most energetically."

Conventional arms

A United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects is to be held in 1979. In the Program of Action all states were called upon to contribute to the work of the Conference. States producing these weapons were particularly urged to consider the Conference results in their policies concerning the international transfers of such weapons.

Consultations should be carried out between major arms suppliers and recipients aimed at limiting the international transfer of conventional weapons.

Chemical and radiological weapons

The Program of Action termed the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction "one of the most urgent measures of disarmament." It called for concluding negotiations, which have been underway for several years, and the early signature and ratification of a treaty. A similar treaty on radiological weapons should also be concluded.

Verification

States should accept provisions for verification in disarmament agreements to facilitate their conclusion and effective implementation and create confidence. The problem of verification should be further examined, and methods and procedures which are nondiscriminatory and do not unduly interfere with states' internal affairs or jeopardize their economic and social development should be considered.

Nuclear disarmament

Since nuclear weapons pose the "greatest danger" to mankind, it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and ultimately eliminate such weapons. Nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements for
--cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems;

--cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems as well as fissionable material for weapons purposes; and

--a program with agreed timeframes for progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles and delivery systems, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination as soon as possible.

The Final Document stressed that (1) ongoing negotiations should be vigorously pursued, (2) further negotiations should be initiated to expedite nuclear disarmament, and (3) all states should actively participate in efforts to bring about a "code of peaceful conduct" which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

Nonproliferation and peaceful uses of atomic energy

The goals of nuclear nonproliferation are to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear weapon states and to progressively reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Universal and nondiscriminatory measures should be taken, unilaterally and through international agreements, to minimize the danger of nuclear proliferation without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development and application of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development. Furthermore, international cooperation for the promotion of the transfer and use of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened. All states should have access to technology, equipment, and materials for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. International nuclear cooperation should be under safeguards applied through the IAEA on a nondiscriminatory basis.

Nuclear weapons tests

The cessation of such testing would be in the interest of mankind and would contribute to ending the qualitative arms race and nuclear proliferation. The negotiations in progress on a treaty prohibiting these tests and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be concluded urgently.
Strategic arms limitation

The United States and the Soviet Union should conclude, as soon as possible, the agreement they have been pursuing in SALT II. They were invited to transmit a text of the agreement to the General Assembly. This should be followed by further negotiations leading to reductions in and qualitative limitations on strategic weapons.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Establishing such zones "constitutes an important disarmament measure." The ultimate objective of such zones is a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the U.N. Security Council shall prevent the frustration of this objective. The proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be seriously considered in accordance with General Assembly resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, states of the region should renounce production, acquisition, or possession of nuclear weapons and explosive devices and should not permit nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories. Furthermore, they should place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. As states in South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons, they should take no action which might deviate from that objective.

Confidence-building measures

"Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and settling international disputes by peaceful means." It should include an obligation of states to place at the U.N.'s disposal necessary manpower for an international peace force equipped with "agreed types of armaments." "Arrangements for the use of this force should insure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

Since confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to future progress in disarmament, these measures should be taken:

--Hot lines and other methods to improve communications between governments should be established to prevent war caused by accident, miscalculation, or communications failure.
Military research and development programs should be assessed for their arms control implications.

Reports should be submitted by the Secretary General to the General Assembly concerning the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its effects on world peace and security.

Other issues

The Final Document advocated that to impede the qualitative arms race and release scientific and technological resources for peaceful purposes, specific agreements be concluded to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction. It recognized the need for further prohibition of environmental warfare techniques, as well as further measures to promote the peaceful use of the ocean floor, ocean subsoil, and outer space. In both cases negotiations should be conducted in the spirit of the multilateral treaties already in force—specifically the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

The U.N. role and responsibility in disseminating information on the arms race and disarmament should be strengthened. If people recognize and understand the dangers of the present situation, international conscience and world public opinion may exercise a positive influence toward disarmament.

The Final Document recommended that to increase the dissemination of information worldwide,

--governmental, nongovernmental, and U.N. information agencies give priority to disarmament and arms control activities;

--the U.N. Centre for Disarmament and UNESCO intensify their activities to encourage study and research on disarmament;

--nongovernmental organizations increase their participation in disarmament activities, through closer liaison with the U.N.;

--governments and international organizations develop educational programs for disarmament and peace studies;
--UNESCO step up its program to develop disarmament education by preparing teachers' guides, textbooks, readers, and audiovisual materials;

--member states encourage the incorporation of arms control and disarmament studies into the curriculums of their educational institutes; and

--20 disarmament fellowships be established from the U.N. budget to promote disarmament expertise in accordance with guidelines prepared by the Secretary General and submitted to the 33d General Assembly.

INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT MACHINERY

The Final Document stated that the international machinery for disarmament should be improved to enable the Special Session's Program of Action to be implemented. The Final Document recommended that for maximum effectiveness both a deliberative and negotiating body be created.

In adopting the Resolution at the conclusion of the SSOD, the General Assembly established a Disarmament Commission 1/ as a deliberative body composed of all U.N. members and staffed through the Secretary General's office. Its functions are to monitor implementation of recommendations from the Special Session and to make its own recommendations concerning disarmament. As a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission is to report annually to it.

Committee on Disarmament

Recognizing the work done by the CCD since 1962 as well as "the considerable and urgent work that remains to be accomplished" the Final Document noted that there remains "the continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size" and attached "great importance to the participation of all nuclear weapon states in an appropriately constituted negotiating body."

The Resolution therefore established a Committee on Disarmament, in effect replacing the CCD, which was to convene in January 1979 and consist of the nuclear weapon states

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1/ The U.N. originally created a Disarmament Commission in 1952. Since 1958 it has held only two sessions—in 1960 and in 1965—with no results concerning disarmament agreements.
and 32 to 35 other states chosen in consultation with the President of the 32d General Assembly. (See app. VIII.)

The Committee on Disarmament is to

-- have its membership reviewed at regular intervals;
-- conduct its work by consensus;
-- adopt its own rules of procedure;
-- rotate the chairmanship among all members on a monthly basis;
-- adopt an agenda taking into account the recommendations by the General Assembly and the proposals of Committee members;
-- submit a report to the General Assembly at least annually and provide its documents to the U.N. member states regularly;
-- arrange for states which are not members of the Committee to submit proposals on subjects under negotiation in the Committee and to participate in ensuing discussions; and
-- invite states which are not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those states are under discussion.

Additional measures

The Final Document recommended that the U.N. Centre for Disarmament be strengthened and its research and information functions extended. The Centre should also recognize the possibilities offered by other U.N. specialized agencies and institutions and by nongovernmental organizations and research institutes. The Secretary General was also requested to establish an advisory board of eminent persons, selected on the basis of their expertise and geographical representation, to advise him on studies to be made, under U.N. auspices, in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. It was also agreed that the First Committee of the General Assembly deal only
with disarmament and international security issues and that a second special session on disarmament should be held on a date to be decided by the 33d General Assembly. 1/

1/In the Fall of 1978, the 33d General Assembly decided that a second Special Session on Disarmament should be convened in 1982.
CHAPTER 9

REACTIONS TO THE SPECIAL SESSION
AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ACTION

Many nations represented at the Special Session expressed their views on its accomplishments and their reservations concerning its outcome. It was generally agreed that the SSOD was significant because it

--established both deliberative and negotiating bodies on disarmament issues;

--involved 149 nations, as well as U.N. affiliates, nongovernmental organizations and research institutes;

--adopted the Final Document by consensus; and

--marked the beginning of a process to achieve international peace and security.

UNITED STATES

Members of the U.S. delegation believed that the SSOD was successful for various reasons. First, it stimulated interest in arms control and disarmament while educating national representatives and publics about these subjects. Second, the active participation of the delegations led to their commitment to do even more in the future. The Chinese, for example, indicated their intent to participate in the Disarmament Commission and have considered taking their place on the Committee on Disarmament. Third, the Special Session illustrated the international pressures for disarmament which may enhance the climate for continuing arms control negotiations. Fourth, it enhanced the U.N. role in disarmament matters through establishment of the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament and the announcement of another special session to be held in the future. Fifth, recognition of the necessity of establishing controls over conventional armaments, including their international transfer, was achieved. The importance of negotiating limitations concurrently on conventional and nuclear arms was also recognized. Sixth, all nations were required to review their policies on arms control and disarmament. The major nuclear weapon states gave security assurances to nonnuclear weapon states. Seventh, it gave impetus to ongoing arms control negotiations and was viewed as the beginning of an international effort toward disarmament. Several countries announced their intention to adhere to existing arms control agreements.
Since the SSOD was not designed to negotiate a specific treaty, some delegates noted immediate results were not readily apparent. However, great significance was attached to the disarmament machinery created at the Session. The United States welcomed the return to active negotiations of France in the Committee on Disarmament and looked forward to the participation of the PRC. Finally, it was hoped that the active international disarmament process begun at the Session would be facilitated by the approach of the next special session.

At the last meeting of the SSOD, Ambassador Leonard presented the U.S. reaction to the Special Session. While the speech praised the Final Document, it also included an interpretation of paragraphs in that document. It pointed out that the United States supported international nuclear cooperation but, this cooperation must be pursued with the realization that all nations must share in the responsibility to limit the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes.

The U.S. position on "zones of peace" was that arrangements for them must be appropriately defined and freely determined by all states concerned wherever situated, and must be consistent with the inherent right of

"self-defense guaranteed in the Charter or other rights recognized under international law, including the right of innocent passage, historic high seas freedoms, and other relevant rights."

Although the United States supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones under appropriate circumstances, the substantive procedures and provisions for such undertakings must be negotiated with the competent authorities of the respective zone.

The United States endorsed the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, but could not accept an immediate moratorium on nuclear testing since adequate verification measures had not yet been agreed to. Likewise the United States endorsed the international limitation and reduction of military budgets but regretted that consensus was not achieved on language identifying the essential first steps—standardized measurement and reporting, development of techniques for international comparison and verification of data.

Ambassador W. Averell Harriman assessed the Special Session on June 30, 1978. The Ambassador said:
"Most of the delegations representing 149 nations have indicated that they expected more of the United States in the reduction of nuclear arms and in other steps to reduce the dangers of a nuclear disaster. They showed disappointment in the failure of the United States to have done more over the years. They expected greater leadership from the United States in this vital direction throughout the period."

He noted also that "A number of unrealistic proposals and demands have been made." However, he continued,

"The discussion of these matters, I believe, has led to a better understanding throughout the world of the difficulties involved. The mutual exchange of opinion has been valuable on this and other matters."

Ambassador Harriman, in closing, stated that he was convinced that the Special Session was of "real value" and focused public attention on "reduction of nuclear and conventional arms leading to peace on this earth."

WESTERN ALLIES

Australia felt three matters were not fully recognized in the Final Document. First, it did not explicitly recognize the fact that the NPT is the "only comprehensive international instrument directed against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or to the fact that it is accepted by a substantial majority of the international community." Second, it did not make sufficiently clear that the right of all nations to develop peaceful nuclear programs calls for a reciprocal obligation or binding commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Third, it did not make it explicit that international safeguards arrangements may need to be strengthened to provide a climate of confidence that will foster a stable international nuclear market and closer international cooperation.

Mr. Andre Ernemann of Belgium said that the text on machinery represented one of the more significant achievements of the Special Session and credited this accomplishment to the nuclear powers. He was pleased that conventional arms control was cited as a priority to be addressed concurrently with nuclear arms control and that regional security and arms control arrangements were considered important by the Session.
The Canadian representative, Mr. William Barton, said that if Canada had not been loyal to the agreed objective of a consensus document, then "Certainly our deeply held convictions of the necessity of strengthening the international non-proliferation system and for encouraging broader adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty" would have been reflected differently. He continued:

"The fact is, of course, that all of us have had to make significant concessions on many points of special interest to our Governments and peoples. In doing so we have, nevertheless, managed to create a final consensus document that is important, both for what it contains and for the fact that it carries with it the agreement of virtually the whole world."

Denmark's representative, Mr. Wilhelm Ulrichsen, spoke on behalf of the nine countries of the European Community. 1/ He said:

"In view of the complicated problems confronting us, it is the more remarkable that we have succeeded in hammering out a final document which marks a certain degree of international consensus on these difficult and urgent issues. No doubt many of us feel that the Programme of Action is not fully balanced and does not go so far as many of us would have wished. But it does convey a sense of urgency regarding the dangers of the continuing worldwide arms race, and it does set out certain relevant priorities."

Mr. Ulrichsen further stated that the machinery structure would give a new impetus to the multilateral negotiating process and that discussions during the Session contributed not only to better understanding of national positions, but to stimulating public interest as well.

The French representative, during his speech to the final meeting of the SSOD, stated his Government's disagreement with the paragraphs in the final document referring to proposals for limiting or prohibiting nuclear weapons. The French considered that the cessation of nuclear tests must be dealt with in the context of a genuine disarmament process and that to

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1/Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
believe that a halt to testing would produce a qualitative freeze in nuclear weapons is erroneous.

While the French representative declined to announce France's decision on participation in the new Committee on Disarmament, they later announced that they would participate. Finally the French reserved the right to submit, to the 33d General Assembly, draft resolutions concerning creation of an international institute for disarmament research, an international satellite monitoring agency, and an international disarmament fund for development which had it submitted but not pressed to a vote during the Special Session.

New Zealand expressed disappointment that a CTB did not reach the CCD, that the Final Document did not call for such a treaty to be submitted to the 33d General Assembly, and that the reforms which resulted in the establishment of the Committee on Disarmament were insufficient to make this new structure adequately representative.

The representative of Turkey, Mr. Tugay Ulucevik, noted that although the Final Document provided for expanded membership for the Committee on Disarmament and a review of the membership at regular intervals, it did not provide for a rotation of membership or a definite length for the interval between membership reviews. He hoped that a formal understanding would emerge to clarify those points.

Sir Derick Ashe of the UK delegation said that the British Government had manifestly accorded great importance to the Special Session and would continue to pursue a number of significant ideas—regardless of whether they appeared in the Final Document. He said the SSOD achieved

--a greater awareness of disarmament;

--the increased interest of both governments and nongovernmental organizations in disarmament;
and

--progress on the question of machinery; i.e., "more representative and better structured."

He felt the SSOD was also disappointing in several aspects. To elaborate:

"I wish above all that we could point to agreement on one or more realistic new ideas launched at the session which might produce specific results to enhance international security. I wish the
Final Document and the covering resolution were more balanced in the emphasis they place on conventional and nuclear disarmament and on the measures to prevent nuclear proliferation."

With regard to other matters, he stated that the references in the Final Document on the right of peoples to self-determination do "not in any way imply our acceptance of the desirability of using force to resolve conflicts arising from the search for self-determination." Turning to the use or threat of force, he said, "My government cannot renounce or circumscribe in principle its right to use, if necessary, any of the means available for defense." As far as the membership of the new Committee on Disarmament, he stated that it was his Government's understanding that the present CCD members should be members of the new Committee on Disarmament, if they wished. In conclusion, he said "let us take encouragement from what we have been able to do and from the knowledge that for the first time ever the whole world has been able to agree on a single document about disarmament."

EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION

The representative from Bulgaria was most pleased to note at the final meeting of the SSOD that despite the complexities of the problems and differing views, goodwill prevailed and a Final Document was adopted by consensus. He felt that it was the most convincing evidence of the common concern about the danger of military confrontation and the strong desire for peace. While Bulgaria would like to have seen more precise and more far-reaching solutions to some substantive issues, it concluded on a positive and optimistic note by stating that practical measures to achieve the common goals must be implemented.

The German Democratic Republic did not express its views at the last SSOD meeting. In an East Berlin Radio interview, however, a member of the German delegation said the most important result of the SSOD was that a consensus document was adopted. He explained that the agreement of every delegation present was required for every individual passage contained in the Final Document—which might account for the fact that not all the proposals were reflected with the necessary clarity. As for making progress in the field of disarmament, the delegate felt that it is now a matter of fully using the framework now marked out for concrete disarmament measures. The GDR will, he said, be in the front line to achieve ongoing results.
At the final session, Romania expressed its appreciation of the positive results achieved by the SSOD, but at the same time noted the limitations and gaps in the final document, particularly concerning adoption of specific disarmament steps, primarily in the nuclear field. The SSOD was regarded as the beginning of a fresh approach to ending the serious dangers which the arms race represents. For that reason, Romania attached importance to the active participation of all states in the debate on disarmament and to the more detailed study of the proposals and initiatives set forth at the Special Session.

The Soviet Union did not present a statement to the SSOD during its final meeting on June 30, 1978. However, Mr. Brezhnev, speaking in Minsk, noted that the ideas and proposals put forward at the SSOD would undoubtedly continue to live on and have their effect. He went on to say that the struggle for real deeds for curbing the arms race and promoting disarmament is continuing and must be stepped up. The Moscow Domestic Service termed the SSOD's Final Document "a concrete and positive outcome reflecting what is most important—the will and striving of peace-loving forces to undertake practical disarmament steps." Moscow's IZVESTIYA called the SSOD a "positive new stimulus." While the SSOD did not work a miracle and bring about disarmament, it did, according to the news media, bring to light the nature of the obstacles to disarmament and outlined the top-priority measures essential for progress.

NONALIGNED COUNTRIES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Mr. Carlos Antonio Bettencourt Bueno of Brazil commented on references to regional agreements on conventional disarmament in the Final Document. He said, "We do not oppose the negotiation of agreements . . . ." however,

"regional disarmament is a concept that should be based only on specific interests that are limited to those countries of a certain region or a concept that necessarily embraces all the components of a regional organization and/or the totality of the countries of the same region."

Regional disarmament also requires "binding undertakings on the part of the States which do not belong to the region not to use or threaten to use force against the States of the region . . . ." Since the final text "lacks these elements" which the Brazilian representative considered essential for the preservation of the national security of the states concerned, his delegation placed on record its reservations
on the two paragraphs and disassociated itself from the concept embodied in them. In the final meeting of the Special Session, Mr. Sergio Correa da Costa recorded Brazil's general reservations on the Final Document until after his Government had the chance to carefully consider it.

The People's Republic of China expressed reservations on the Introduction and Declaration sections of the Final Document because of the failure to "pinpoint the intensifying rivalry between the two super-powers for world hegemony as the source of a new world war." Furthermore, China felt the "unassailable principle that disarmament must start with the two superpowers" should have been included in the Final Document. China stated that the document failed to place enough stress on reducing the conventional armaments of the superpowers. References in the Final Document to prohibiting nuclear tests and ceasing production of nuclear weapons were totally unacceptable to the Chinese. They took the position that "the so-called international treaties and agreements on disarmament do not have the least effect on curbing the arms race or reducing the threat of war." The Chinese also accused the superpowers of obstructing the attempt to reform the disarmament machinery and to retain control of it.

The representative of Cyprus, Mr. Zenon Rossides, thought the SSOD had "far more merits than demerits." He pointed out that "one important and positive effect" of the Session had been that it "brought out more emphatically the relationship of disarmament to international security." Hence, he proposed that the next special session be called the Special Session on Disarmament and International Security.

The representative of India expressed his country's concern that the Final Document did not reflect the sense of urgency and the need to formulate a timetable for implementing disarmament measures. India reserved its right to initiate a discussion of the CTB at the 33d General Assembly (in accordance with the draft resolution it submitted to the SSOD but withdrew in the interest of preserving consensus), if the nuclear weapon states do not respond positively on the need for an immediate moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. Similarly India announced that if no action was taken on prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, it intended to reactivate the proposal on that subject it had introduced at the SSOD, but had withdrawn in the spirit of cooperativeness.

The representative of Jordan stated in the Ad Hoc Committee that he believed the SSOD to be a "great success because for the first time in history it has alerted the masses of humanity, as well as the decision-makers, to the graveness of
the situation in which the whole world finds itself today." Later, in the final meeting of the Special Session, a Jordanian delegate criticized the Final Document because it did not address the factors which cause nations to acquire arms. He stated that "once these causes are dealt with—especially the causes of conflict in the Middle East—and eventually removed, it will be a great step leading to the process of disarmament.* * *" He felt that pledges given by the nuclear states to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states were inadequate. Furthermore, he noted, the Final Document failed to recognize the obligation of the nuclear powers to give nonnuclear weapon states party to the NPT guarantees against nuclear attacks by third parties.

The representative of Pakistan noted that while many differences were apparently reconciled in the Final Document, there still exist "deep underlying differences of philosophy and approach" concerning security and disarmament. Pakistan also stated that while nuclear weapon states seemed hesitant about accepting minimal obligations on the threat or use of nuclear weapons, they sought to impose restraints and restrictions on nonnuclear weapon states with regard to arms transfers and transfer of nuclear technology. Pakistan therefore entered a formal reservation on paragraph 36 of the Final Document.

The representative of Sri Lanka was pleased that some basic positions of the nonaligned movement were incorporated in the Final Document, but was less than satisfied. He stated that a more accurate appraisal of the present situation could have been made and that the U.N. should have reserved to it the primary role in the field of disarmament. "[A matter of particular regret" for the nonaligned was that the incompatibility between the maintenance of military bases and troops in foreign territories and international peace and security was not recognized in the Final Document. Furthermore, Sri Lanka received "only limited satisfaction" concerning nuclear disarmament. "For the nuclear weapon States security was still based on the theory of mutual deterrence, and the survival of mankind was subordinated to their security." It was also regrettable to Sri Lanka that the proposal to declare the Mediterranean a zone of peace was summarily rejected. In contrast, the nuclear weapon states appeared to impose obligations and restrictions on the nonnuclear weapon states without assuming any obligations for nuclear disarmament or the nonuse of nuclear weapons themselves.
Yugoslavia said the Special Session represented "substantial progress towards opening a new phase in the process of disarmament with more direct participation by the world international community." The importance of the SSOD was illustrated by the very fact that it was held and that all states took part. Yugoslavia regretted the "lack of readiness" on the part of nuclear weapon states to offer to nonnuclear weapon states unequivocal security guarantees concerning the nonuse or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They were also "surprised" by the opposition shown toward zones of peace.

SPECIAL SESSION OFFICERS

After the draft Final Document had been adopted in the last Ad Hoc Committee meeting, the chairman noted a need to:

"harmonize the international cooperation that is inescapable if we are to achieve disarmament goals with the vital requirements for the security of every state. The complexity of that interrelationship explains the difficulties of the entire proceedings and also highlights the merits of the results achieved. The other factor is the universal and active participation of all members of the General Assembly."

The SSOD was also unique, according to the chairman, in that

--a large number of heads of state and government participated;
--a very high level of representation was achieved;
--issues were treated in political depth;
--many important proposals were submitted;
--there was a comprehensive approach toward determining the essential elements of a "new strategy for disarmament";
--U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and research institutes participated; and
--the procedures were democratized by the participation of all, leading to an active and genuine consensus.
The chairman continued, "One of the most far-reaching aspects is the improvement of the deliberative and negotiating bodies of the United Nations for disarmament." Furthermore, he said "We have all gained; we have all won because a new impetus has been given to the disarmament cause."

Once the General Assembly had adopted the final resolution, the Secretary General commented that "at this session there has been the most extensive and useful discussion of disarmament on a worldwide basis that has yet been held." Furthermore, he felt that the breadth and level of participation in the SSOD demonstrated that governments and peoples throughout the world are aware of the threat posed by the arms race. Overall, he believed that one of the great achievements has been construction of a comprehensive framework for disarmament, with agreement on the basic principles and priorities in order to move toward general and complete disarmament.
APPENDIX I

MEMBERS OF THE CCD

The 31 members included: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, Yugoslavia, and Zaire.

Conventions or treaties achieved with the participation of the CCD are (1) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (2) Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and on the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, (3) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, (4) Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, and (5) Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

1/Although a member of the CCD, France did not participate in its work.
APPENDIX II

U.N. RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR THE SSOD

The General Assembly,

Mindful that the continuation of the arms race endangers international peace and security and also diverts vast resources urgently needed for economic and social development,

Convinced that peace can be secured through the implementation of disarmament measures, particularly of nuclear disarmament, conducive to the realization of the final objective, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Reaffirming that disarmament is one of the essential objectives of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind that the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, called for a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and made specific suggestions in this regard in its declaration and resolution on disarmament,

1. Decides to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978;

2. Further decides to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, composed of fifty-four Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with the mandate of examining all relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session appropriate recommendations thereof;

3. Invites all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session of the General Assembly not later than 15 April 1977;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the replies of Member States pursuant to paragraph 3 above to the Preparatory Committee and to render it all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records;
5. Requests the Preparatory Committee to meet for a short organizational session not longer than one week, before 31 March 1977, inter alia to set the dates for its substantive sessions;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session an item entitled: "Special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament".

Sponsoring Countries:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, the Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierre Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.
MEMBERS OF THE PREPCOM

In accordance with paragraph 2 of the resolution establishing the PrepCom (see app. II), the President of the General Assembly, after consultation with the chairmen of the regional groups, appointed the following countries to be members of the Preparatory Committee: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guyana, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.
U.S. DELEGATION TO THE SSOD

Representatives

Andrew Young (Chairman) 1/
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
U.S. Representative to the U.N.

W. Averell Harriman
Harriman, New York

George McGovern
Senator from South Dakota

Charles W. Whalen, Jr.
Representative from Ohio

Paul Newman
Westport, Connecticut

Alternate Representatives

Adrian S. Fisher
U.S. Representative to the CCD

James F. Leonard
Deputy U.S. Representative
to the U.N.

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
Senator from Maryland

Paul Simon
Representative from Illinois

Marjorie Craig Benton
Evanston, Illinois

1/Vice President Walter F. Mondale served as chairman of the Delegation, ex officio, during his presence at the Session. When the Vice President was not present, the Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance served as chairman, ex officio, during his presence at the Session.
Congressional Advisors

Senator James Abourezk
Senator John Glenn
Senator Mike Gravel
Senator Gary Hart
Senator Jacob Javits
Senator Claiborne Pell
Senator Charles H. Percy
Representative William V. Alexander
Representative John B. Anderson
Representative Thomas L. Ashley
Representative Robin L. Beard
Representative Berkley Bedell
Representative Anthony Beilenson
Representative Jonanthan B. Bingham
Representative Michael T. Blouin
Representative Don L. Bonker
Representative William S. Broomfield
Representative George K. Brown, Jr.
Representative John Buchanan
Representative M. Caldwell Butler
Representative M. Robert Carr
Representative William Cohen
Representative Cardiss Collins
Representative John Conyers
Representative Robert K. Dornan
Representative Thomas J. Downey
Representative Robert F. Drinan
Representative Frank E. Evans
Representative Donald Fraser
Representative Richard Gephardt
Representative Willis D. Gradison
Representative William J. Green
Representative Lee H. Hamilton
Representative James M. Hanley
Representative Elwood H. Hills
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman
Representative Frank Horton
Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier
Representative Jack F. Kemp
Representative Joseph A. Le Fante
Representative Robert L. Leggett
Representative William Lehman
Representative Manual Lujan, Jr.
Representative Mike McCormack
Representative Matthew F. McHugh
Representative Abner Mikva
Representative Stephen L. Neal
Representative Shirley N. Pettis
Representative Melvin Price
Representative Charles Rangel
Representative Edward R. Roybal
Representative Phillip E. Ruppe
Representative Patricia Schroeder
Representative Richard T. Schluze
Representative John F. Seiberling
Representative Robert L. Sikes
Representative Newton Steers
Representative Ted Weiss
Representative Charles H. Wilson
Delegate Antonio Won Pat
Representative Clement J. Zablocki

Senior Advisers

Charles William Maynes
Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs

David Newsom
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs

Richard Petree
Minister Counselor
United States Mission to the United Nations

Paul C. Warnke
Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Thomas Watson
Chairman, General Advisory Committee
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Lawrence Weiler
Special Coordinator for the
United Nations General Assembly
Special Session on Disarmament
APPENDIX IV

Adam Yarmolinsky  
Counselor  
Arms Control And Disarmament Agency

Special Advisers

Katherine L. Camp  
President, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Ruth Clusen  
President, League of Women Voters

Jean Eckstein  
President, National Council of Catholic Laity

George Kistiakowsky  
Harvard University

Josephine Pomerance  
Consultant, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Harold Willens  
President, Factory Equipment Corporation  
Los Angeles, California

Margaret Bush Wilson  
President, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Congressional Staff Advisers

Ruth Clavelaux  
Staff Assistant to Senator McGovern

Richard B. L. Creecy  
Adviser to Congressman Whalen

John Holm  
Staff Assistant to Senator McGovern

William Stepankus  
Staff Assistant to Congressman Whalen

Casimir Yost  
Staff Assistant to Senator Mathias
APPENDIX IV

Advisers

David Adamson
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Department of State

Michael Areitti
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State

Gordon Barc
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Sheila Buckley
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense

Michael Congdon
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Susan Flood
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense

Charles Flowerree
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Zachary P. Geaneas
Counselor, United States Mission to the
United Nations

John L. Hirsch
United States Mission to the
United Nations

Betty Jane Jones
United States Mission to the
United Nations

Carl J. Lidel, Captain USN
United States Mission to the
United Nations

Peter Perenyi
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State

Blair Murray
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Herbert K. Reis  
Counselor, United States Mission  
    to the United Nations

Robert B. Rosenstock  
United States Mission to the  
    United Nations

Alexander H. Schnee  
Bureau of Congressional Relations  
    Department of State

Deborah Schwarts  
Bureau of International Organization Affairs  
    Department of State

Steven E. Steiner  
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs  
    Department of State

William J. Stibravy  
Minister Counselor, United States Mission  
    to the United Nations

Robert Strand  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Archelaus R. Turrentine  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

John H. Willett  
United States Mission to  
    the United Nations
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ADDRESSING THE SSOD

Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization
Asian-Buddhist Conference for Peace
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs
Friends World Committee for Consultation
Gandhi Peace Foundation
International Association for Religious Freedom
International Co-operative Alliance
International Fellowship of Reconciliation
International Peace Bureau
International Youth and Student Movement for the United Nations
Liaison Conference of Japanese National Nongovernmental Organizations at the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament
Organization of Traditional Religions of Africa
PUGWASH Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Socialist International
Women's International Democratic Federation
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
World Association of World Federalists
World Conference on Religion and Peace
World Federation of Democratic Youth
World Federation of Scientific Workers
World Federation of United Nations Associations
World Peace Council
World Union of Catholic Women's Organizations
World Veterans Federation
Yugoslav League for Peace, Independence and Equality of Peoples
RESEARCH INSTITUTES ADDRESSING THE SSOD

Center for Defense Information

Institute for World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

International Institute for Peace

International Peace Research Association

The Stanley Foundation

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation inflicted by all wars,

Convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order,

Having resolved to lay the foundations of an international disarmament strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations should play a more effective role, aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Adopts the following Final Document of this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future.

2. Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind.

3. The dynamic development of détente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all regions of the world, with the participation of all countries, would create conditions conducive to the efforts of States to end the arms race, which has engulfed the world, thus reducing the danger of war. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

4. The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further because the arms race is not diminishing but increasing and outstrips by far the efforts to curb it. While it is true that some limited agreements have been reached, “effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” continue to elude man’s grasp. Yet the implementation of such measures is urgently required. There has not been any real progress either that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Furthermore, it has not been possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and human, which are wasted on the unproductive and spiralling arms race and which should be made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a race places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries”.

5. The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.
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6. Thus a powerful current of opinion has gradually formed, leading to the convening of what will go down in the annals of the United Nations as the first special session of the General Assembly devoted entirely to disarmament.

7. The outcome of this special session, whose deliberations have to a large extent been facilitated by the five sessions of the Preparatory Committee which preceded it, is the present Final Document. This introduction serves as a preface to the document which comprises also the following three sections: a Declaration, a Programme of Action and recommendations concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations.

8. While the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. Negotiations on the entire range of those issues should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere. The aim of the Declaration is to review and assess the existing situation, outline the objectives and the priority tasks and set forth fundamental principles for disarmament negotiations.

9. For disarmament—the aims and purposes of which the Declaration proclaims—to become a reality, it was essential to agree on a series of specific disarmament measures, selected by common accord as those on which there is a consensus to the effect that their subsequent realization in the short term appears to be feasible. There is also a need to prepare through agreed procedures a comprehensive disarmament programme. That programme, passing through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Procedures for watching over the fulfilment of the obligations thus assumed had also to be agreed upon. That is the purpose of the Programme of Action.

10. Although the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the “political will” of States, especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a significant role can also be played by the effective functioning of an appropriate international machinery designed to deal with the problems of disarmament in its various aspects. Consequently, it would be necessary that the two kinds of organs required to that end, the deliberative and the negotiating organs, have the appropriate organization and procedures that would be most conducive to obtaining constructive results. The structure of the Final Document, section IV, has been prepared with that end in view.

II. DECLARATION

11. Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and material resources. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds, to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose inescapable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war.

12. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the right of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist regimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such regimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council.

13. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

14. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security. Therefore the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of dis-
armament, in accordance with its Charter, must be strengthened.

15. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full cooperation of Member States.

16. In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

17. Disarmament has thus become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community. No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of reduction of armaments. However, certain positive changes in international relations in some areas of the world provide some encouragement. Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction\(^4\) and excluding particular areas from the arms race. The fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. For more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament.

18. Removing the threat of a world war—a nuclear war—is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.

19. The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The principal goals of disarmament are to ensure the survival of mankind and to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. Progress towards this objective requires the conclusion and implementation of agreements on the cessation of the arms race and on genuine measures of disarmament, taking into account the need of States to protect their security.

20. Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.

21. Along with these measures, agreements or other effective measures should be adopted to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority.

22. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfers of conventional weapons, based in particular on the same principle, and taking into account the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States,\(^6\) as well as the need of recipient States to protect their security.

23. Further international action should be taken to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be excessively injurious, cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects.

24. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.

25. Negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament shall be guided by the fundamental principles set forth below.

\(^4\) Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

\(^6\) Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex.
APPENDIX VII

26. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

27. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

28. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

29. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantage over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

30. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

31. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

32. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

33. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

34. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

35. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

37. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

38. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

39. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

40. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are
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implemented over the next few years, as well as other
mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is es-
ticual those among them which possess the most im-
injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduc-
including chemical weapons; conventional weapons,
context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
phrases to prepare the way for future
measures and studies to prepare the way for future
the specific measures of disarmament which should be
the present Programme of Action enumerates the
the specific measures of disarmament which should be
armars race and to giving the necessary
force, and to giving the necessary
measures in the field of disarmament that States should
undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halt-
ning and reversing the arms race and to giving the nec-
modelled or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduc-
armament leading to general and complete disarm-
under effective international control.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of action on disarma-
ment, in accordance with the goals and principles es-
cluded in the Declaration on disarmament. The
priority of disarmament negotiations shall he:
arms race and to giving the necessary
measures in the field of disarmament that States should
undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halt-
ning and reversing the arms race and to giving the neces-
sary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine
disarmament leading to general and complete disarm-
under effective international control.

45. Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be:

(a) Nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical weapons; conventional weapons;
including any which may be deemed to be excessively
injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduc-
tion of armed forces.

46. Nothing should preclude States from conduct-
ing negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

47. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to
mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is es-
tial to halt and reverse the arms arms race in
its aspects in order to avert the danger of war in-
volving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this
context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

48. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear
 disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in par-
cular those among them which possess the most im-
portant nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

49. The process of nuclear disarmament should be
carried out in such a way as to require measures to
ensure that the security of all States is guaranteed at
progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking
into account the relative qualitative and quantitative
importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-
weapon States and other States concerned.

50. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will
require urgent negotiations of agreements at appropriate
stages and with adequate measures of verification sat-
factory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and
development of nuclear-weapon systems;
(b) Cessation of the production of all types of
nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of
the production of fissile material for weapons
purposes;
(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with
agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive
and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weap-
ons and their means of delivery, leading to their ul-
imate and complete elimination at the earliest possible
time.

Consideration can be given in the course of the nego-
tiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibi-
tion, without prejudice to the security of any State,
of any types of nuclear armaments.

51. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all
States within the framework of an effective nuclear
disarmament process would be in the interest of man-
kind. It would make a significant contribution to the
aim of ending the qualitative improvement of
nuclear weapons and the development of new types
of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. In this context the negotiations
now in progress on “a treaty prohibiting nuclear
weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear ex-
plodons for peaceful purposes, which would be an
integral part of the treaty,” should be concluded ur-
geously and the result submitted for full consideration
by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the
submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly
at the earliest possible date. All efforts should be made
by the negotiating parties to achieve an agreement
which, following endorsement by the General Assem-
bly, could attract the widest possible adherence. In this
context, various views were expressed by non-nuclear-
weapon States that, pending the conclusion of this
treaty, the world community would be encouraged if
all the nuclear-weapon States refrained from testing
nuclear weapons. In this connexion, some nuclear-
weapon States expressed different views.

52. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the United States of America should conclude at the
earliest possible date the agreement they have been
pursuing for several years in the second series of
the strategic arms limitation talks. They are invited
to transmit in good time the text of the agreement
to the General Assembly. It should be followed
promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotia-
tions between the two parties, leading to agreed signi-
ficant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on,
strategic arms. It should constitute an important step
in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately,
of establishment of a world free of such weapons.

53. The process of nuclear disarmament described
in the paragraph on this subject should be expedited by
the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful con-
clusion of ongoing negotiations and the urgent initi-
tion of further negotiations among the nuclear-weapon
States.

54. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament
would be facilitated both by parallel political or inter-
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national legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

55. Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis.

56. The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

57. Pending the achievement of this goal, for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and of the use of force in international relations, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including the use of nuclear weapons.

58. In this context all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. All States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

59. In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure.

61. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

62. With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:

(a) To respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;

(b) To refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

63. In the light of existing conditions, and without prejudice to other measures which may be considered in other regions, the following measures are especially desirable:

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed at the tenth special session on the adherence to it;

(b) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so;

(c) In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the Security Council of the United Nations shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(d) The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps, as described in the paragraphs above, required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions, where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where the danger of nuclear-weapons proliferation exists. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

(e) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

64. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In this regard, the General Assembly notes the proposals for the establishment of zones of peace, inter alia, in:

(a) South-East Asia where States in the region have expressed interest in the establishment of such a zone, in conformity with their views;

It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of this Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

Efforts should be made to conclude the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation strictly in accordance with the objectives set out in the final communiqué of its Organizing Conference.

All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

States should also consider the possibility of adhering to multilateral agreements concluded so far in the disarmament field which are mentioned below in this section.

The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification.

A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

The Committee on Disarmament should keep under review the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use.

In order to promote the peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, the Committee on Disarmament is requested in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and taking into account the proposals made during the 1977 Review and Extension

6 See A/C.1/33/7.
8 Resolution 2660 (XXV), annex.
Conference of the parties to that Treaty and any relevant technological developments—to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in that environment.

80. In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

81. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional arms reductions.

82. In particular the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of all States with full respect for security interests and independence of States outside military alliances, by agreement on appropriate mutual reductions and limitations would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security. Current efforts to this end should be continued most energetically.

83. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include those in the following two paragraphs.

84. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiatives envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

85. Consultations should be carried out among major arms supplier and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

86. The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, to be held in 1979, should seek agreement, in the light of humanitarian and military considerations, on the prohibition or restriction of use of certain conventional weapons including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. The Conference should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which were the subject-matter of previously conducted discussions.

87. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task.

88. The result of the Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.

89. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

90. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

92. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

93. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following, and other measures yet to be agreed upon, should be undertaken:

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11 Resolution 2222 (XXI), annex.
12 See A/10044, annex.
(a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of “hot lines” and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(b) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament;

(c) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

94. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, the Secretary- General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action.

95. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development18 appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/68 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, and the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels.

96. Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.

97. The Secretary-General shall, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, continue the study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security requested in Assembly resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977 and submit it to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

98. At its thirty-third and subsequent sessions the General Assembly should determine the specific guidelines for carrying out studies, taking into account the proposals already submitted including those made by individual countries at the special session, as well as other proposals which can be introduced later in this field. In doing so, the Assembly would take into consideration a report on these matters prepared by the Secretary-General.

99. In order to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted.

100. Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority to the preparation and distribution of printed and audio-visual material relating to the danger represented by the armaments race as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures.

101. In particular, publicity should be given to the Final Document of the tenth special session.

102. The General Assembly proclaims the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.

103. To encourage study and research on disarmament, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of information concerning the armaments race and disarmament. Also, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is urged to intensify its activities aimed at facilitating research and publications on disarmament, related to its fields of competence, especially in developing countries, and should disseminate the results of such research.

104. Throughout this process of disseminating information about developments in the disarmament field of all countries, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer liaison between them and the United Nations.

105. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

106. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

107. The General Assembly welcomes the initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education and, in this connexion, urges that organization to step up its programme aimed at the development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study through the preparation, inter alia, of teachers' guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials. Member States should take all possible measures to encourage the incorporation of such programmes.
of such materials in the curricula of their educational institutes.

108. In order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries, the General Assembly decides to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament. The Secretary-General, taking into account the proposal submitted to the special session, should prepare guidelines for the programme. He should also submit the financial requirements of twenty fellowships to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations, bearing in mind the savings that can be made within the existing budgetary appropriations.

109. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exercised in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme.

110. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations, agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

111. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

112. In addition to the several questions dealt with in this Programme of Action, there are a few others of fundamental importance, on which, because of the complexity of the issues involved and the short time at the disposal of the special session, it has proved impossible to reach satisfactory agreed conclusions. For those reasons they are treated only in very general terms and, in a few instances, not even treated at all in the Programme. It should be stressed, however, that a number of concrete approaches to deal with such questions emerged from the exchange of views carried out in the General Assembly which will undoubtedly facilitate the continuation of the study and negotiation of the problems involved in the competent disarmament organs.

IV. Machinery

113. While disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, has become a necessity for the survival of mankind and for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, little progress has been made since the end of the Second World War. In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved implementation of Action and help the United Nations to fulfill its role in the field of disarmament. In spite of the best efforts of the international community, adequate results have not been produced with the existing machinery. There is, therefore, an urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character. For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament—deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.

114. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field and, in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures—unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral—and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations organs, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

115. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures. An item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" shall be included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly.

116. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

117. The First Committee of the General Assembly should deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions.

118. The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission originally established by resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, a Disarmament Commission, composed of all States Members of the United Nations, and decides that:

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(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission should, inter alia, consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament;

(b) The Disarmament Commission shall function under the rules of procedure relating to the committees of the General Assembly with such modifications as the Commission may deem necessary and shall make every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on substantive issues be adopted by consensus;

(c) The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly and will submit for consideration by the Assembly at its thirty-third session a report on organizational matters; in 1979, the Disarmament Commission will meet for a period not exceeding four weeks, the dates to be decided at the thirty-third session of the Assembly;

(d) The Secretary-General shall furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the effective accomplishment of the Commission’s functions.

119. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held on a date to be decided by the Assembly at its thirty-third session.

120. The General Assembly is conscious of the work that has been done by the international negotiating body that has been meeting since 14 March 1962 as well as the considerable and urgent work that remains to be accomplished in the field of disarmament. The Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus. It attaches great importance to the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States in an appropriately constituted negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament. The Assembly welcomes the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the Member States during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the Committee on Disarmament will be open to the nuclear-weapon States, and thirty-two to thirty-five other States to be chosen in consultation with the President of the thirty-second session of the Assembly; that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament will be reviewed at regular intervals; that the Committee on Disarmament will be convened in Geneva not later than January 1979 by the country whose name appears first in the alphabetical list of membership; and that the Committee on Disarmament will:

(a) Conduct its work by consensus;

(b) Adopt its own rules of procedure;

(c) Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Committee on Disarmament, to appoint the Secretary of the Committee, who shall also act as his personal representative, to assist the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and time-tables of the Committee;

(d) Rotate the chairmanship of the Committee among all its members on a monthly basis;

(e) Adopt its own agenda taking into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly and the proposals presented by the members of the Committee;

(f) Submit a report to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently as appropriate, and provide its formal and other relevant documents to the States Members of the United Nations on a regular basis;

(g) Make arrangements for interested States, not members of the Committee, to submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents;

(h) Invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion;

(i) Open its plenary meetings to the public unless otherwise decided.

121. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

122. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

123. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by this special session, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened and its research and information functions accordingly extended. The Centre should also take account fully of the possibilities offered by specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament. The Centre should also increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions in view of the valuable role they play in the field of disarmament. This role could be encouraged also in other ways that may be considered as appropriate.

124. The Secretary-General is requested to set up an advisory board of eminent persons, selected on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation, to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies.

125. The General Assembly notes with satisfaction that the active participation of the Member States in the consideration of the agenda items of the special session and the proposals and suggestions submitted by them and reflected to a considerable extent in the Final Document have made a valuable contribution to the work of the special session and to its positive conclusion. Since a number of those proposals and sugges-
tions, which have become an integral part of the work of the special session of the General Assembly, deserve to be studied further and more thoroughly, taking into consideration the many relevant comments and observations made in both the general debate in plenary meeting and the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, the Secretary-General is requested to transmit, together with this Final Document, to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with the questions of disarmament all the official records of the special session devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the recommendations which the Assembly may adopt at its thirty-third session. Some of the proposals put forth for the consideration of the special session are listed below:

(a) Text of the decision of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party concerning Romania’s position on disarmament and, in particular, on nuclear disarmament, adopted on 9 May 1978;

(b) Views of the Swiss Government on problems to be discussed at the tenth special session of the General Assembly;

(c) Proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on practical measures for ending the arms race;

(d) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency;

(e) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Institute for Research on Disarmament;

(f) Proposal by Sri Lanka for the establishment of a World Disarmament Authority;

(g) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled “Contribution to the seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban”;

(h) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled “Invitation to attend an international chemical-weapon verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany”;22

(i) Working paper submitted by China on disarmament;

(j) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning zones of confidence;

(k) Proposal by Ireland for a study of the possibility of establishing a system of incentives to promote arms control and disarmament;

(l) Working paper submitted by Romania concerning a synthesis of the proposals in the field of disarmament;

(m) Proposal by the United States of America on the establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Reserve and on confidence-building measures and stabilizing measures in various regions, including notification of manœuvres, invitation of observers to manœuvres, and United Nations machinery to study and promote such measures;

(n) Proposal by Uruguay on the possibility of establishing a polemological agency;

(o) Proposal by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping;

(p) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development;

(q) Proposal by Norway entitled “Evaluation of the impact of new weapons on arms control and disarmament efforts”;

(r) Note verbale transmitting the text, signed in Washington on 22 June 1978 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, reaffirming the principles of the Declaration of Ayacucho with respect to the limitation of conventional weapons;

(s) Memorandum from Liberia entitled “Declaration of a new philosophy on disarmament”;33

(t) Statements made by the representatives of China, on 22 June 1978, on the draft Final Document of the tenth special session;

(u) Proposal by the President of Cyprus for the total demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus and the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations;

(v) Proposal by Costa Rica on economic and social incentives to halt the arms race;

(w) Amendments submitted by China to the draft Final Document of the tenth special session;

(x) Proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation of the nuclear arms race.

APPENDIX VII

APPENDIX VII


A/S-10/14.

A/S-10/AC.1/1.

A/S-10/AC.1/4.

A/S-10/AC.1/7.

A/S-10/AC.1/6.

A/S-10/AC.1/9 and Add.1.


A/S-10/AC.1/13.

A/S-10/AC.1/17.
(y) Draft resolution submitted by Cyprus, Ethiopia and India on the urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons;\textsuperscript{49}

(z) Draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and India on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war;\textsuperscript{50}

(aa) Proposal by the non-aligned countries on the establishment of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean;\textsuperscript{51}

(bb) Proposal by the Government of Senegal for a tax on military budgets;\textsuperscript{52}

(cc) Proposal by Austria for the transmission to Member States of working paper A/AC.187/109 and the ascertainment of their views on the subject of verification;\textsuperscript{53}

(dd) Proposal by the non-aligned countries for the dismantling of foreign military bases in foreign territories and withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories;\textsuperscript{54}

(ee) Proposal by Mexico for the opening, on a provisional basis, of an ad hoc account in the United Nations Development Programme to use for development the funds which may be released as a result of disarmament measures;\textsuperscript{55}

(ff) Proposal by Italy on the role of the Security Council in the field of disarmament in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations;\textsuperscript{56}

(gg) Proposal by the Netherlands for a study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization;\textsuperscript{57}

126. In adopting this Final Document, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war; implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race; strengthening the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; and reducing military expenditures and utilizing the resources thus released in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

127. The General Assembly expresses its satisfaction that the proposals submitted to its special session devoted to disarmament and the deliberations thereon have made it possible to reaffirm and define in this Final Document fundamental principles, goals, priorities and procedures for the implementation of the above purposes, either in the Declaration or the Programme of Action or in both. The Assembly also welcomes the important decisions agreed upon regarding the deliberative and negotiating machinery and is confident that these organs will discharge their functions in an effective manner.

128. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the number of States that participated in the general debate, as well as the high level of representation and the depth and scope of that debate, are unprecedented in the history of disarmament efforts. Several Heads of State or Government addressed the General Assembly. In addition, other Heads of State or Government sent messages and expressed their good wishes for the success of the special session of the Assembly. Several high officials of specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system and spokesmen of twenty-five non-governmental organizations and six research institutes also made valuable contributions to the proceedings of the session. It must be emphasized, moreover, that the special session marks not the end but rather the beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

129. The General Assembly is convinced that the discussions of the disarmament problems at the special session and its Final Document will attract the attention of all peoples, further mobilize world public opinion and provide a powerful impetus for the cause of disarmament.

27th plenary meeting
30 June 1978

* * *

The President of the General Assembly subsequently informed the Secretary-General\textsuperscript{48} that the Committee on Disarmament, referred to in paragraph 120 of the above resolution, would be open to the nuclear weapon States and to the following thirty-five States: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

\textsuperscript{49} A/5-10/AC.1/L.10.
\textsuperscript{50} A/5-10/AC.1/L.11.
\textsuperscript{51} A/5-10/AC.1/37, para. 72.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., para. 101.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., para. 113.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., para. 126.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., para. 141.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., para. 179.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., para. 186.
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

In a letter dated September 19, 1978, the President of the 32d General Assembly informed the Secretary General that after exhaustive consultations with member states, it was decided that the Committee on Disarmament would be open to the nuclear weapon states 1/ and to the following 35 states:

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire.

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1/Nuclear weapon states: The People's Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

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