Can The Individual Reserves Fill Mobilization Needs?

A steady decline in the number of Individual Ready Reserves and Standby Reserves since the draft ended in 1973 could result in serious shortages of pretrained personnel if the Nation is to rely on them in the early stages of mobilization.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is considering a number of actions to meet defense mobilization needs, including recalling retirees and drafting veterans.

However, efforts of this nature could hinder the services' ability to attract volunteers for the Active and Selected Reserve Forces.

In evaluating any legislative proposals intended to correct individual reserve shortages, the Congress should make sure that all principal alternatives have been adequately considered. The Congress should also require DOD to identify the probable impact of the proposed changes on other total force components.
To the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report points out some serious problems in the individual reserve pools that need to be resolved in the near future if the Nation is to rely on them as sources of pretrained manpower.

Officials in each of the services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget were given the opportunity to review the report and provide informal comment. Their comments were considered in preparing this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and other interested parties.

[Signature]
Comptroller General
of the United States
To bring the Nation's declining military forces up to wartime strength in the event of mobilization, Individual Ready Reserves and Standby Reserves (pretrained personnel) will be called to active duty before inductees can be drafted.

(However, there is a serious shortfall in pretrained personnel—possibly as high as 660,000 for the Department of Defense (DOD) of which 490,000 would be in the Army.)

Reserve personnel having prior military experience would fill the shortages in Active and Selected Reserve units and serve as casualty replacements.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has initiated or is considering programs for resolving the mobilization shortages:

--Extending the 6-year obligation to women. (See p. 16.)

--Stopping the automatic transfer of Individual Ready Reserve members to the Standby Reserve. (See p. 16.)

--Screening of active duty and Selected Reserve separatees for transfer to the Army Individual Ready Reserve. (See p. 17.)

--Using a direct enlistment program into the Individual Ready Reserve. (See p. 18.)

--Restoring the 2-year enlistment option for the Active Forces. (See p. 18.)

--Using retirees and civilians. (See p. 20.)

--Drafting veterans. (See p. 21.)
--Extending the 6-year obligation to 9 years. (See p. 22.)

Since some of these programs and policy changes are either just beginning or are still in the planning stage, the shortages will not be corrected in the near future. Plans to call up retirees are vague and actions have not progressed beyond the initial data gathering stage.

GAO believes it is highly unlikely that all of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's proposed improvements will materialize. GAO also believes that drafting veterans could hinder the services' ability to attract volunteers for the Active Forces, the Guard, and the Reserve Force. This could be particularly true if potential volunteers realize that they will have an additional obligation in the event of mobilization whereas their peers and associates would not have similar obligations.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of Defense should require the services to determine what pretrained personnel they will need in full mobilization and in what timeframe. The determination should include an assessment of the casualty rates, expected yield rates, and replacement requirements for the Active and Selected Reserve Forces.

The Secretary of Defense should also require the Army to determine the probable impact of any actions taken or planned to correct Individual Ready Reserves shortages on the other total force components, especially the Active and Selected Reserve Forces.
MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION
BY THE CONGRESS

In evaluating any legislative proposals intended to correct individual reserve shortages, the Congress should make sure that all principal alternatives have been adequately considered. The Congress should also require DOD to identify the probable impact of the proposed changes on other total force components. In considering the Administration's proposals, the Congress needs to assure itself that the actions proposed are responsive to the short- and long-term needs of the services.
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### ABBREVIATIONS

- **AVF**: All-Volunteer Force
- **DOD**: Department of Defense
- **GAO**: General Accounting Office
- **IRR**: Individual Ready Reserve
- **MOBEX**: mobilization exercise
- **NATO**: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- **OASD(MRA&L)**: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)
- **OSD**: Office of the Secretary of Defense
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. military forces are currently manned at a peacetime level. A large number of personnel is needed to bring the forces up to a wartime level. Personnel having military experience should be provided by the Active Forces, the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserves. In later months, these pretrained personnel could be supplemented by newly trained draftees or volunteers.

During the draft years the Guard and Reserve Forces had little or no difficulty meeting manning levels because many draft motivated individuals as well as other volunteers were satisfying their military obligation in the Reserves. The large numbers of personnel leaving the Active Forces were transferred to the IRR to complete their 6-year obligation. However, since the end of the draft the Active and Reserve Force strengths have been declining. The size of the pretrained pools (IRR and Standby Reserve) have declined, and the Selective Service System has been placed in a "deep standby condition." Consequently, the ability to supply the pretrained manpower in the numbers and the quality needed to meet the requirements of full mobilization, particularly for the Army, has become a major issue.

Major sources of pretrained individuals are the IRR and the Standby Reserve. The general purpose of the IRR and the Standby Reserve is to fill understrength Active and Selected Reserve units in the early phase of mobilization and to provide replacements for casualties until draftees from the Selective Service System or new volunteers can be trained and deployed.

The IRR is made up of individuals who have completed their active duty tour but still have time remaining on their 6-year military obligation. The IRR also contains some volunteers, officers and enlisted, who have extended beyond their 6-year obligation. IRR personnel can be transferred to the Standby Reserve after the 5th year of their 6-year obligation. The Standby Reserve also contains many inactive personnel, mostly older officers.

The IRR and Standby Reserve evolved from two major pieces of legislation: (1) the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (10 U.S.C. 267) which reorganized the Reserves into Ready, Standby, and Retired components and (2) the
Reserve Forces Act of 1955 (10 U.S.C. 269-272) which established a Reserve obligation following active duty. The military service obligation was set at 8 years and was later reduced to 6 years (10 U.S.C. 651(a)).

In 1972, the Department of Defense (DOD) developed the Total Force policy. The policy calls for reservists, rather than draftees or volunteers, to be the primary source of personnel for the augmentation of the Active Forces in all military emergencies. Two fundamental changes have taken place since the pre-Vietnam War years. First, the reductions in the manning levels of the Active Forces which happened during the initial All-Volunteer Force (AVF) years have been justified on the grounds that the Reserves will be able to provide combat-ready units and individuals on short notice. Second, because of the reduced size of the Active Forces, the Selected Reserve (reservists that drill in the National Guard and Reserves) has assumed a major role for meeting a Warsaw Pact attack on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Central Europe. A large and viable Selected Reserve, IRR, and Standby Reserve must be maintained to meet these new responsibilities.

BASIS FOR PLANS

Because of the difficulty in determining the intensity and duration of a Warsaw Pact attack, DOD and service plans are based on a sudden massive attack with little or no warning. This type of planning places the greatest demand for manpower in the shortest timeframe. These requirements are the basis for military manpower requirements. Whether or not this type of mobilization will ever occur is debatable.

DOD plans call for the full participation of all Total Force units and individuals. In short, as a DOD official stated:

"The first months of intensive combat would have to be fought with the Active and Reserve component force structures that existed before the war started." 1/

The manpower requirements, therefore, should be the standard against which the various manpower resources are compared. However, the official requirements at the end of fiscal year 1978 were not definitive due to ongoing reviews within the services of casualty estimates, staffing needs, discrepancies among manpower/supply/equipment utilization rates, and training demands.

As of April 1979, there were no DOD approved time-phased wartime manpower requirements against which to measure available assets. Nevertheless, time-phased wartime military manpower availability objectives have been derived from the Service Program Objective Memorandums for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. While inconsistencies exist, these objectives have been identified by the Secretary of Defense as goals subject to the refinement of the actual requirements by the services. In the Navy's case, wartime military planning objectives have not been established due to data inconsistencies. The Navy is developing wartime manpower requirements and is scheduled to complete them about September 1979. In the meantime, estimated manpower goals have been developed.

Because the classified wartime manpower planning goals are not reflected in this report, approximations of the mobilization needs have been derived from various public statements of DOD officials. For example, in 1978, testimony by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) (OASD (MRA&L)) indicated that the overall mobilization manning requirements for the four services would be about 3.8 million within 90 days of the mobilization decision. In addition to the 2.05 million personnel on active duty, this mobilized force would contain about 760,000 members of the Selected Reserve and, if available, about 1.0 million fillers from the IRR and other individual pools.

In the event of such a mobilization, the Army would make the greatest manpower demands. During the period between M-day (mobilization-day) and M + 120 days, the Army would require some 1,525,000 combat-ready troops and

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support personnel, plus an additional 200,000 pretrained individuals who would be used for casualty replacements. 1/

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review focused on whether pretrained personnel could meet manpower mobilization needs during the first few months of a conventional war. We examined what personnel the services and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) stated was needed: the previous, current, and projected inventories; the basis for both the expected reporting rates or "yields" from the various pools and the expected reporting dates; estimated casualty rates; and the historical use of the pretrained pools. We obtained data from and interviewed officials of OASD, Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps and their Reserve components as well as the National Guard Bureau. We evaluated the efforts which have been taken to correct the shortage problem, the proposals for further policy changes which are being considered within DOD as well as other major policy change actions which could be taken to either reduce or eliminate the mobilization shortfall.

This report is part of a current series of reports on DOD posture:


--"Needed--A More Complete Definition of a Quality First-Term Enlisted Person" (FPCD-79-34, Apr. 25, 1979).

--"Problems in Getting People Into the Active Forces After Mobilization" (FPCD-79-40, May 17, 1979).

Other aspects we are studying include recruiting for the Guard and Reserve; the manpower effectiveness of the Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces; the effectiveness of Guard and Reserve weekend training; and possible organizational changes for the Guard and Reserve. These studies are particularly important because AVF is a peacetime concept and the Nation will return to the draft in the event of a war or national emergency.

CHAPTER 2
SHORTAGES OF PRETRAINED INDIVIDUALS
DURING FULL MOBILIZATION

If the United States had been fully mobilized at the end of fiscal year 1978 it would have had shortages of pretrained individuals, particularly in the Army. Although the mobilization requirements and the manpower available to meet the requirements are not precise calculations, the fiscal year 1978 shortfall could have been over 660,000 people with about 490,000 of the shortage in the Army. Furthermore, the shortages have generally worsened since the beginning of AVF.

The Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps would have had relatively small shortfalls which could have been eliminated through the adoption of several minor internal policy changes. Consequently, the provision of additional manpower resources for these services is not a major issue. Because there is a much greater need for pretrained personnel, the mobilization manning problems of the Army will not be eliminated unless several major changes in policy are authorized. (These changes are discussed later in this report.)

MOBILIZATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

To illustrate surplus or shortages of military manpower (Active Forces, Selected Reserve, the IRR, and Standby Reserve) it is necessary to compare manpower requirements for mobilization with available manpower resources. The following table compares 1978 mobilization requirements and available resources with those of 1964, the last year of stable peacetime force levels before the Vietnam buildup.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization requirements</th>
<th>Manpower resources</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End fiscal year 1964</td>
<td>End fiscal year 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(616,000 surplus)</td>
<td>(661,000 shortfall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,800,000</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a/4,416,000</td>
<td>a/3,139,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/Assumes that the services at M-day would stop all losses of trained personnel.

Because about 490,000 of the shortage is in the Army, the remaining portion of this chapter will focus on the Army's projected mobilization shortage problems. While
the mobilization requirements of the Army for pretrained personnel have remained relatively constant. 1/ the proportion of the load borne by the Active Army has been significantly reduced. In 1964, the Active Army would have provided more than 56 percent of the 1,725,000 troops needed for a conventional conflict in Central Europe. By the end of fiscal year 1978, however, the 767,000 men and women in the Active Army would have provided only 44 percent of the troops needed. Thus during the AVF years, the major share of the Army's mobilization responsibilities shifted from the Active to the Reserve Forces. The Army's ability to meet its objectives will therefore depend on the strength and readiness of the units of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

The role that the Army Selected Reserve is expected to play in a conflict in Europe can be seen by examining the proportion of the Army's deployed forces which would be units of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. In the event of full mobilization and deployment, 52 percent of the infantry and armor battalions in Europe would be from these two components. They also would provide 57 percent of the field artillery, 65 percent of the combat engineers, and 65 percent of all of the tactical support units. 2/

To provide these forces for full mobilization, the Army Selected Reserve Forces would require a mobilized strength of 430,000 personnel in the National Guard and 276,000 men and women in the Army Reserve. 3/ In total,

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1/ Although the force structure requirements for the Army's scenario have not changed since 1964, increases have been made in combat replacement needs, due to assessments of the high casualty rates of the 1973 Middle East War.


3/ The Army National Guard is oriented toward combat involvement and it is composed of 5 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, and 1 mechanized division; 21 combat forces brigades or regiments; and assorted support units. The Army Reserve is oriented toward support and training. It is composed of the cadres of 12 training divisions, 8 combat support brigades, and a variety of smaller units.
these 706,000 individuals would provide some 41 percent of the total numbers of personnel required by the Army. Yet, units of both the National Guard and Reserve are not maintained at their mobilization strength level during peacetime. Rather, each year the Congress authorizes peacetime manning levels. These peacetime strength authorizations have been declining during AVF. If mobilization occurs, the understrength units would have to be brought up to their wartime strength by the assignment of individual reserve personnel. Also, the need for individual reserve personnel has been increasing during AVF.

For example, in early 1976 a DOD official told the Congress that the demand for individual reservists would be approximately 51,000 for the Active Forces, a minimum of 120,000 for the Selected Reserve, and some 100,000 individual reservists to staff unmanned units that would be needed for the NATO contingency force structure. In addition, if the forces were deployed in the kind of intense combat expected in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, about 200,000 additional men would be needed to replace casualties during the 4 to 5 months before the Army could train volunteers or draftees and assign them to combat units. In total, DOD saw the need for some 471,000 trained individual reservists to supplement and support the Total Force structure. 1/

Since then, the shortages in Selected Reserve units have increased the need for individual reservists. For example, by July 1976 or 4 to 5 months after DOD's requirements were presented to the Congress, the need for personnel to augment the Selected Reserve units had increased from a minimum of 120,000 to 176,000; by the end of fiscal year 1978 it had reached more than 200,000.

When the number needed to fill out the Active Forces, staff currently unmanned units, and provide casualty replacements is added in, the total Army requirement for individual reservists would reach about 550,000. When an allowance is made for the individual reservists who would not be called or would fail to report, the Army would have to maintain an individual reserve strength level of approximately 750,000. In early 1978, the Assistant Secretary

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of the Army informed the Congress that the pool requirement for pretrained personnel was 750,000 for fiscal year 1979. 1/

At the end of fiscal year 1978, there were far fewer pretrained individuals in the pools. The Army IRR contained 177,000; the Army Standby Reserve contained 83,000. Thus the total resources of pretrained personnel from these two pools would have been 260,000 or 490,000 below the necessary manning level.

REASONS FOR THE SHORTAGES
OF INDIVIDUAL RESERVES

Since the end of the draft in 1973, there has been a decline in the strength levels of the IRR and the Standby Reserve. In 1973 there were about 1.3 million in DOD's IRR pool and about 550,000 in the Standby Reserve. Of this number the Army had about 700,000 in its IRR and about 420,000 in its Standby Reserve. At the end of fiscal year 1979 DOD had about 356,000 in the IRR and about 183,000 in the Standby Reserve. The Army had 177,000 in the IRR and 83,000 in the Standby Reserve at the end of fiscal year 1978. There are several reasons for the declines in the Reserve pools. The force levels of the Active Forces and Selected Reserve Forces have substantially declined. When the strength at the end of fiscal year 1964 is compared with the end of 1978, the Active Forces have declined 24 percent and the Selected Reserve, 19 percent.

A decline in the Active and Selected Reserve Forces has the effect of less people flowing out of these forces and into the individual reserve pools. The volunteer method of acquiring personnel for the Active Forces has been accompanied by longer enlistment terms, higher attrition rates, increases in women enlistees, increased reenlistments, and a larger number of veterans who sign up for service with the Selected Reserve after their completion of active duty. These actions have resulted in fewer people flowing into the individual pools and/or having less time remaining on the 6-year military obligation.

Force level reduction--Army, 1964 and 1978

(An examination of the Army's Total Force elements in both fiscal year 1964 and 1978 shows that in 1978 the Army's

largest strength decline was in the IRR. Whereas the strength of the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve, collectively, declined about 20 percent, the primary pool of filler personnel—the IRR—has fallen from a level of 461,000 to only 177,000, a reduction of 62 percent.) As illustrated below, the Army Total Force of almost 2.3 million in 1964 has been reduced by more than 700,000.

FORCE LEVEL—FISCAL YEARS 1964 AND 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>End FY 1964 force level</th>
<th>End FY 1978 force level</th>
<th>Size of reduction</th>
<th>Percentage of reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Army</td>
<td>972,000</td>
<td>767,000</td>
<td>-205,000</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>382,000</td>
<td>341,000</td>
<td>-41,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>269,000</td>
<td>186,000</td>
<td>-83,000</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army IRR</td>
<td>461,000</td>
<td>177,000</td>
<td>-284,000</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Standby Reserve</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>-125,000</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,292,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,554,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>-738,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upon mobilization, not all members of the Selected Reserve, IRR, and Standby Reserve are expected to report, due to personal or family problems and employment in critical occupations. In addition, for the IRR and Standby reservists, a determination is made about the value of their skills in the mobilization effort. Accordingly, OASD has developed "yield" rates for each category of manpower resource, and these rates are reflected in the OASD Consolidated Guidance to the services for planning purposes.

Taking these yield rates for the Selected Reserve, IRR, and Standby Reserve into account, the size of the overall force level reductions, in terms of mobilized manpower, would be somewhat less severe. However, as shown on the following page, the Army Total Force on mobilization still would have been 584,000 fewer in 1978 than in 1964.
### MOBILIZATION FORCE LEVEL—FISCAL YEARS 1964 and 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>End FY 1964 mobilization force level</th>
<th>End FY 1978 mobilization force level</th>
<th>Size of reduction</th>
<th>Percentage of reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Army (100% of force level)</td>
<td>972,000</td>
<td>767,000</td>
<td>-205,000</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard (95% of force level)</td>
<td>363,000</td>
<td>324,000</td>
<td>-39,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve (95% of force level)</td>
<td>256,000</td>
<td>177,000</td>
<td>-79,000</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army IRR (70% of force level)</td>
<td>323,000</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>-199,000</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Standby Reserve (50% of force level)</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>-62,000</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,018,000</td>
<td>1,434,000</td>
<td>-584,000</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the assumptions proved valid and mobilization occurred many units would have had unfilled medical billets. There would have been shortages of combat engineers. More importantly, there would have been significant shortages in the combat arms specialties.
CHAPTER 3
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE INDIVIDUAL RESERVES
AS A MOBILIZATION RESOURCE

The previous chapter illustrated that the need for pre-trained individuals has been increasing during AVF while the resources have been decreasing resulting in a shortage, particularly in the Army. In addition to the numerical effect, there are several other major issues that need to be addressed.

DETERMINING THE SURPLUS OR SHORTFALLS

The determinations of requirements for service manpower provide the basis against which available manpower resources can be compared. Through this process, manpower surpluses and shortfalls are calculated.

Since such measurements are useful to DOD and the Congress, care should be taken to remember that the requirements statements are far from definite, objective decisions; rather, they are subjective judgments which reflect many assumptions and value judgments. Accordingly, the requirements for full mobilization are often changed, reflecting the judgment of military planners at that time and the then current assessments of a multitude of related factors. Thus while a specific full mobilization shortage of pre-trained individuals can be identified at the end of fiscal year 1978, future adjustments in the requirements will either reduce the projected shortage or make it worse.

In evaluating the shortage problem, it should be remembered that the requirements are determined based on a massive attack on NATO. Such an attack, of course, could occur and for this reason, the requirements process is a necessary tool. Conversely, however, such emphasis can create an exaggerated shortage of pre-trained personnel. While we do not question the use of this factor for the requirements determination process, suffice it to say that the projected full mobilization shortage in pre-trained individuals could be less under different circumstances.

Yield rates

The total number of pre-trained personnel in the individual and veterans pools could be substantially increased assuming that all group members can be quickly available to
meet mobilization requirements. However, these pools are reduced by 5 percent for the Selected Reserve, 30 percent for IRR, and various percentages for the other groups by DOD and service planners in estimating resources available for mobilization. Thus, the matching of mobilization numbers and requirements becomes highly questionable.

Three of the expected yield rates were developed during 1975 to 1976 as part of the DOD research effort on the "Guard and Reserve in the Total Force." Based primarily on the limited experience of the services in the Korean, Berlin, and Vietnam callups, yield rates were established for the Selected Reserve and the IRR. And as the services have never called up Standby reservists, an assumption as to availability (50 percent) was postulated. The estimate for retirees was postulated in an OSD study on the use of retirees. The estimated yield from the veterans pool is questionable although the authors estimated that the yield could be as high as 70 percent.

However, whether one agrees or disagrees with these estimates, it is clear that they lack definite justification and could be in error by significant degrees. Therefore, the true availability of these pools of pretrained manpower on mobilization is unknown. In terms of these pools, DOD needs to know the current addresses; availability; skills; medical conditions; and possible reasons for deferment, exemption, or delays to callup.

Concerning retirees, the estimated yield rates of 95 percent for those with 1 year of retirement, 90 percent for those within 2 years of retirement, etc., are even more uncertain. In fact, beyond gross numbers, ages, and service experience, DOD knows little about the retiree population and their probable response to a national emergency and recall action.

The use of veterans is a concept recently developed within OASD, and there is no doubt that such personnel are a source of pretrained manpower. Yet, DOD knows little about veterans' locations; availability; skills; medical conditions; and possible justification for deferments, exemptions, or delays on callup. Further, of all the various estimates on yield rates and pool sizes used herein, the estimates for veterans are by far the most uncertain.

The Air Force has recently completed a three-part study of IRR, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The study indicated that the show rate for the IRR would be 49 percent between M-day and M + 60 days, 67 percent by M + 90 days,
and 78 percent by M + 150 days. The study indicated that for the Standby Reserve only 28 percent would be available by M + 130 days, 33 percent by M + 160 days, and 35 percent by M + 210 days. These percentages are below those used in Defense-wide planning guidance. On the other hand, according to the Air Force the probable return from the Retired Reserve could be considerably higher than estimated. When considering only retirees who left the service within 3 years, the potential yield could be 64 percent by M + 60 days and more than 90 percent by M + 150 days. The Air Force effort was limited in scope. Nevertheless, the study was a step toward clearly defining the scope of the mobilization resources and potential problems.

Similar survey efforts were conducted during the recent mobilization exercise, NIFTY NUGGET, by both the Navy and Marine Corps, and their results should be available in June 1979. In addition, the Army conducted a 1976 survey during a mobilization exercise (MOBEX), of both the IRR and Standby members, but the results were not used due to the bias caused by a nonresponse rate of 65 percent of the sample. The Army has started a new survey by the Strategic Studies Institute, and the results should also be available in June 1979.

There are a variety of other factors which would influence the validity of the service yield rates. Among these would be attitude changes, type of conflicts, and uniform application of the rates. For example, the attitude of people toward military service in the context of the World War II/Korean War timeframe versus the antimilitary attitude of the Vietnam Era may invalidate the predictions for "yields" which are based on historical experience. Furthermore, the yields may vary drastically between a minor insurgency in a third-world country, a major war in Europe, or invasion of the United States. In addition, OASD applies the rates uniformly for all services, regardless of grade, skill, or obligation of the individual. Therefore, OASD is expecting the same yield from, for example, nonobligated, field-grade, noncombat officers as from obligated combat arms enlisted personnel. Such generalizations cannot be supported.

The 50-percent yield rate used by OASD for the Standby Reserve is questionable due to the large number of officers and inactive reservists in the ranks. For example, although the need for officers from the Standby Reserve on mobilization would be minimal, the fiscal year 1978 statistics for the Standby Reserve showed that 52 percent of those personnel were officers and that 75 percent of the officers were in an inactive status. Therefore, even if all of the active
enlisted reservists in the Standby Reserve were needed and responded to a mobilization call, the maximum overall yield from the pool would be 48 percent. And because of deferments, no-shows, and unneeded skills it is likely that very few personnel gains would be realized.

**MATCHING AVAILABLE RESOURCES AGAINST THE SPECIFIC SKILL/GRADE/AGE/EXPERIENCE NEEDS**

The discussion presented earlier did not discuss the requirements of matching mobilization needs with particular skilled and graded personnel but was limited to only numbers. (Concerning the IRR, it was stated that some 70 percent would report if called,) and the previous issue points out that yield rates should be used with caution.

How useful these people would be is another unanswered question. For example, approximately 75 percent of the filler and replacement needs for the Army would be in the combat arms, or the medical, combat engineer, and direct support fields. However, only 25 percent of the IRR personnel possess these primary skills.)

(It has not even been determined that the requisite skills of those in the IRR are usable.) Depending on the complexities, sophistication, or technical nature of the skill, an individual's ability to perform could degenerate in rapid fashion. However, (neither OASD nor the services have made provisions for any necessary retraining nor have they made an assessment of existing skills, the rate at which skills deteriorate, and whether in light of this, the people can be retrained in sufficient time to meet DOD needs.) In our opinion, this becomes crucial if individuals in the IRR have been away from active duty for extended periods and/or performance requirements for a given skill have changed significantly.

Not only are there shortages of absolute numbers in the Army IRR and questions with respect to the numbers of skilled individuals and how current those skills are, but there is a difference between the grades required versus those that exist in the IRR.

As stated previously, the Army feels it needs roughly 200,000 casualty replacements for Europe. These casualties, according to Army estimates, will be predominantly in the lower grades. However, only 25,000 of the Army's IRR are in grades E-1, -2, and -3.
The issue is compounded further by an examination of officer–enlisted requirements and available personnel. Whereas the mobilization needs of the Army are mostly for young low-ranked enlisted personnel, a disproportionate number of men and women in the supplementary pools are noncommissioned officers or officers.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSITIONS

The following chapters point out the available initiatives to reduce the mobilization shortages. The reaction of OASD (MRA&L) to our report and questions during hearings on April 10, 1979, before the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, is that the initiative will solve or has solved the shortage and that it does not exist.

In our opinion, there is little likelihood that all of the initiatives will be approved by the Congress and the Administration. In the meantime, the shortages will not be corrected. Consequently, to speak of the shortages as nonexistent or resolved appears at best optimistic.
CHAPTER 4

INITIATIVES TO REDUCE MOBILIZATION SHORTAGES

OF PRETRAINED INDIVIDUALS

DOD and the Army are well aware of the shortages of the individual pools and have taken or are in the process of taking or proposing management improvement actions and policy changes to reduce these shortages. These management actions can be separated in three categories: (1) ongoing, (2) planned or being considered, and (3) those that should be looked into and considered.

As a result of legislation and actions by OSD and the Army, attempts to reduce the shortages have been made which include:

--Extending the 6-year obligation to women.

--Stopping the automatic transfer of IRR members to the Standby Reserve.

--Screening of active duty and Selected Reserve separa-tees before the end of their contracts for inclusion in the IRR pool.

--Direct enlisting of personnel into IRR.

--Restoring 2-year enlistments in the active duty.

EXTENDING THE 6-YEAR OBLIGATION TO WOMEN

In 1977 legislation was enacted which extended the 6-year service obligation to women who, previously, had not been subject to service in the IRR or the Standby Reserve.

Since the move will contribute to an increased IRR when those women who enlisted in 1978 and beyond complete their active duty tours (normally 4 years), the action will have little effect on the projected deficit in mobilization manpower in the near future.

STOPPING THE AUTOMATIC TRANSFER OF IRR MEMBERS TO THE STANDBY RESERVE

Before April 1978, Army members were automatically transferred to the Standby Reserve for the last year of their military service obligation provided they had satisfactorily
performed for a period of 5 years. Yet, as the Standby Reserve is also a mobilization resource, the net gain from stopping automatic transfers is marginal. Indeed, the gains will be limited to the difference between the projected 50-percent show rate for the Standby Reserve and the 70-percent show rate for the IRR. However, because of the requirement that the Selective Service System screen all Standby reservists for availability, the action to keep reservists in IRR for their 6th and final year of military obligation also should allow the affected reservists to report for active duty sooner than the Standby reservists.

Since this program was initiated by the Army in April 1978, the automatic transfer to Standby for the last year of the obligation is now accomplished only at an individual's specific request. For the first 8 months of the program no such requests were received. Accordingly, the Standby Reserve will no longer exist in the future.

SCREENING OF ACTIVE DUTY AND SELECTED RESERVE SEPARATEES FOR TRANSFER TO THE ARMY IRR

The Army plans to select certain men and women from those who are discharged before the completion of their initial term of service for transfer to the IRR. Before 1979, although all dischargees retained a 6-year total service obligation, the Army and the other services did not require these personnel to serve in the Reserve. In 1979 and later years, however, those men and women discharged under honorable conditions will be required to complete their 6-year term of service in IRR.

If implemented in fiscal year 1979 as planned, estimates are that by the end of fiscal year 1983 the projected IRR strength could be increased by 60,000. (See table on p. 19.)

The House Armed Services Committee in its Report 95-1118 on the fiscal year 1979 DOD Authorization Bill directed the Army to change procedures so that individuals discharged under the Expeditious Discharge Program with an honorable discharge or a discharge under honorable conditions can be placed in the IRR. The Army has developed criteria for the implementation of the program and is coordinating them with OASD.
USING A DIRECT ENLISTMENT PROGRAM INTO THE IRR

Starting in March 1979, the Army is experimenting with a special enlistment directly into the IRR. Limited to combat skills and including a short period of active duty for training, the program will offer no special enlistment incentives. Nevertheless, Army officials believe that the program may appeal to certain groups—such as college students—who do not now enlist in the active service or Selected Reserve. We found no evidence to support this supposition.

RESTORING THE 2-YEAR ENLISTMENT OPTION FOR THE ACTIVE FORCES

Beginning in January 1979, the Army accepted certain volunteers for 2-year enlistment terms. The plan will be limited to recruits with high qualifications who elect to serve in the combat arms. Such enlistees will qualify for an enhanced Veterans Education Assistance Program, which will allow them to accumulate up to $7,400 for educational expenses.

Because the enlistees will have 4 rather than 2 or 3 years remaining on their 6-year obligation, the change will also enhance the manning of the Reserve; however, any increases in the IRR will not be until fiscal year 1981 and beyond.

Each of the above programs does not significantly increase the projected size of the IRR in future years. Collectively, however, the five ongoing initiatives could have a major effect in fiscal year 1981 and beyond. The following schedule shows that the gain from these programs could reach some 102,000 by fiscal year 1984.
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extend Reserve Service obligation to women</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict transfer of IRR members to Standby Reserve</td>
<td>a/9,000</td>
<td>a/8,000</td>
<td>a/9,000</td>
<td>a/9,000</td>
<td>a/8,000</td>
<td>a/9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require certain dischargees to fulfill IRR obligation</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement special IRR enlistment/extension schemes</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore 2-year enlistments for Active Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>43,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>73,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>87,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>97,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>102,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers reflect net gain in mobilization manpower.*
In addition to the ongoing actions, OASD and the Army are considering proposals to recall retired personnel, draft veterans, and use civilians to help reduce the shortages. OASD and the Army are also considering proposals extending the length of service obligation from 6 to 9 years or to a specific age. We believe that DOD and the Army need to consider all actions that will reduce the shortages. We have serious reservations, however, on the probable success of some of the proposed actions.

USING RETIREES AND CIVILIANS

Two ways in which the Army believes that additional pretrained personnel could be made available for deploying units are (1) an increased use on mobilization of military retirees and (2) a post-mobilization program for quickly civilianizing certain military support positions.

Specific planning for the use of retirees has not been completed; however, OASD officials have increasingly concluded that retirees are a mobilization resource. The most available of these personnel are retired enlisted personnel of the Army who have not yet reached their 30th service anniversary. They totaled about 82,000 in 1978. Not all of these personnel, however, would be available or of use to the service when mobilization starts. Many could be disqualified or granted deferments or exemptions. While detailed estimates have not been prepared, a recent OASD study estimated that 90 percent of those who retired within 1 year and 85 percent of those that retired within 2 years

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1/Commencing in mid-1977, the Army began to collect minimum data on retiring Army personnel. Additional resources have been provided to construct the data base on persons who retired before mid-1977. By mid-1979, the Army expects to have a usable data base on the approximately 110,000 individuals who retired since mid-1974. At the same time, the Army has initiated a research effort to identify those mobilization positions which could be filled by retirees. During this same period the Army expects to have gathered the information necessary for consideration of policy changes concerning the post-mobilization use of retirees.
would be available. Overall, the study estimated a yield rate of about 70 percent and in the case of the Army, over 56,000 would report if called.  \(^1\)

The civilianization of additional support positions may also reduce the projected shortfall. Again, no specific plans have been developed although OASD estimates that 10,000 a month is achievable. OASD assumed that the first increment of uniformed personnel relieved from support positions by civilianization would occur by M + 90 days. We found no basis for the estimate.

If plans were developed for the recall of retirees and the civilianization of military support positions, the Army's projected shortfall following mobilization in pretrained individuals could be reduced by up to 76,000.

### ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF PRETRAINED MANPOWER-

**ARMY TOTAL FORCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Mobilization manpower gains (cumulative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M + 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callup retirees</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilianize support positions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DRAFTING VETERANS**

Another change being considered is requesting legislation which would grant authority to recall (draft) veterans—those men and women who have completed their 6-year military service obligation. In terms of their usefulness to the Army, the prime group of veterans would be those who left the Army at "expiration of term of service," are not members of Reserve units, and are under age 30. Within this definition, a 1977 OASD study concluded that there were 585,305 veterans of Army service. Of these, about 25 percent were


21
trained combat soldiers and another 5 percent were medics. 1/ There is no precedence for establishing a yield rate for recalling veterans. Since a yield rate of 50 percent has been established for the Standby Reserve, it appears reasonable to use the same rate for veterans. Furthermore, it is assumed that Vietnam veterans would be excluded from the action. Such an exclusion would reduce the size of the veterans pool by about 25 percent.

The drafting of veterans, however, would likely raise multiple questions, be subject to court suits, and be the subject of heated debate. Drafting veterans would also be the subject of strong controversy in the Congress due to the inequity of placing an additional burden of responsibility on those who have already served.

EXTENDING THE 6-YEAR OBLIGATION TO 9 YEARS

As currently being discussed by OASD, extending the obligation would be effective only for those who enter the Armed Forces after the date of congressional approval. At best, this action would serve to increase the size of the IRR in 1985 and later years. It is possible that the obligation of those currently in Active and Reserve status could be extended.

Even the extension of those who would enter the Armed Forces in coming years could be the subject of controversy in the Congress, due to the inequity of again placing a larger burden of national defense responsibilities on those who have already served. The change could also have an adverse effect on military recruiting. The extension of the obligation would significantly increase IRR strength, although the increase would not take place until 1985 and beyond. The extension of the service obligation, however, could face the same degree of opposition as the recalling of veterans.

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The impact of extending the obligation and veterans recall proposals is summarized in the following schedule. As noted, the implementation of the veterans recall scheme could eliminate most of the Army's projected manpower.

1/Study by Linton and Co., Inc., for OASD (MRA&L), "Mobili-
ization Requirements, Assets, and Shortfalls," December
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO REMAINING MANPOWER

SHORTFALL—ARMY TOTAL FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extend military obligation from 6 to 9 years (for personnel enlisting in fiscal year 1979 and beyond)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall veterans (men who have completed 6 years of obligated Active/Reserve service)</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>367,000</td>
<td>293,000</td>
<td>267,000</td>
<td>271,000</td>
<td>188,000</td>
<td>188,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>367,000</td>
<td>293,000</td>
<td>267,000</td>
<td>271,000</td>
<td>188,000</td>
<td>271,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

shortfall in pretrained individuals. The final approval and implementation of this proposal, however, contains many uncertainties.

Major policy changes have been discussed. However, only those two which offer the least relief from the shortfall problem (increased use of Retirees and post-mobilization civilianization) can be developed as reasonable policy options. The remaining two alternatives, extending the obligation or providing the Army with authority to recall veterans, would provide the needed additional manpower. It is not clear the controversial programs will be approved. Both of them contain many political and emotional overtones, and if approval finally is obtained, it is likely that these actions would be taken only after a period of extended congressional and public debate. It is clear, therefore, that the Army's projected shortfall will be somewhat reduced by the less-controversial actions which are within the purview of DOD, but that major mobilization manpower shortfalls will persist for at least several years.

Consequently, if the Army is to be provided with the mobilization resources it needs, other sources of manpower will have to be developed.
We believe that there are additional actions that should be considered to reduce the shortages. These include:

--Actions during the premobilization warning time.

--Improving the manning levels in the Selected Reserves.

--Improving the managing and use of existing individual reserves.

The above actions are discussed in more detail in the following sections of this chapter.

**ACTIONS DURING THE PREMOBILIZATION WARNING TIME**

Some of the projected mobilization manning shortfalls in pretrained individuals could be eliminated if certain actions were taken during a period before the actual mobilization. The degree to which these actions would reduce the shortfall would depend on the time available before M-day.

The Army's requirement of pretrained individuals covers the period from M-day to M + 120 days. Therefore, any actions, including the training of new recruits, which provide trained personnel to units within the 120-day period can be considered as producing additional pretrained personnel.

One way to gain in this area would be to resume registration under the Selective Service System and we so recommended in February 1979. At present, the System could not begin inducting until 3 or 4 months after mobilization. Regarding this, we note that legislation is pending in the Congress for the reinstatement of registration for the draft. In our report on the Selective Service System, "What Are the Capabilities of the Selective Service System?" dated December 14, 1978, we stated that under current conditions the Selective Service System could not deliver 100,000 inductees to the training bases before 125 days. DOD has stated that it needed 100,000 inductees within 60 days following mobilization with the first inductees to report in 30 days.

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1/GAO testimony on Feb. 15, 1979, before House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel.
One of the factors affecting how quickly inductees can report to the operational Army is the statutory limitation on deployability that inductees must receive 12 weeks of training. Consequently, if the System can deliver inductees before M-day, newly trained conscripts would be available for deployment within the period M-day to M + 120 days and there would be a corresponding reduction in the need for pretrained personnel.

**IMPROVING THE MANNING LEVELS IN THE SELECTED RESERVE**

One of the major factors contributing to the large requirement for pretrained individuals is the shortage in the Army Selected Reserve, a condition prompted by recruiting and retention difficulties during the AVF years. If improvements were made in Selected Reserve manning, there would be corresponding reductions in the need for pretrained individuals. In this regard, several actions could be considered.

The physical standards for enlistment could be lowered. There is evidence that the standards have been unnecessarily high, a luxury that was permissible during the draft years but is questionable in the limited marketplace of AVF. The Rand Corporation, for example, conducted an extensive analysis of physical standards for enlistment and determined that these were higher than the entry standards for the Armed Forces of other advanced nations as well as for employment in entry-level jobs in the civilian sector.

1/ Pointing out that the entry standards also were higher than those for retention in the services or recall in the event of mobilization, the Rand study stated there could be a 40-percent reduction in the rate of rejection for failure to meet the physical standards.

The second management action that could increase the supply of potential recruits for the Reserve Forces concerns the minimum mental qualifications for entry both into the armed services generally and into specific skill areas. The Reserve Forces are already recruiting a large portion

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of candidates who rank in the lower categories on the standard intelligence test they administer; maybe more such candidates could be enlisted.

It is noted, however, that during the AVF years DOD and the services have defined "quality of enlisted personnel" in terms of mental categories and high school graduates. Under these criteria high school graduates and higher mental category enlistees generally have a greater propensity to complete their tour of duty.

During the AVF years the Selected Reserves have had a severe turnover problem where more people are leaving than they have been recruiting. This phenomenon should be carefully considered before further lowering of either the physical or mental enlistment standards.

Another method of improving the Guard and Selected Reserve recruiting and retention is providing incentives for enlistments and retentions such as bonuses, postservice scholarships, or higher drill pay. To this end, the Congress appropriated some $25 million in fiscal year 1979 for a test of Selected Reserve enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and enlistment educational incentives. (Educational Benefits 10 U.S.C. 2131, Public Law 95-79.)

IMPROVED MANAGEMENT AND USE OF IRR RESOURCES

In addition to the actions which would increase the strength of the Selected Reserve or provide newly trained conscripts within 120 days, several policy changes could result in a more effective use of the limited AVF manpower resources. In particular, these changes would reduce the Army's critical mobilization shortage of trained combat arms replacements.

For example, there are surpluses within the Army IRR pool in noncombat skill areas, and many of these men could be used as combat arms replacements. Men in all Army occupational fields once had at least basic individual training as infantry riflemen; some had actual combat experience. Such surpluses exist in several occupations that lend themselves to relatively rapid conversion, for example, from military policemen to riflemen and from artillerymen to mortarmen or tank gunners.

In other specialties where conversion is more difficult, a multimove could be considered. For example, moving
someone from administration to military police, thus, freeing a military policeman for combat duty. The physical condition and capability of the individual would have to be considered. Nevertheless, there may be a sufficient number of qualified men in the specialties outside combat arms to help meet the requirements of combat arms mobilization.

There is also a potential for cross-service use of pre-trained reservists, since the Navy and the Air Force do not contemplate a great need for fillers but do have IRR pools. In some instances fairly direct transfers of occupational skills could be made. For example, a former air policeman should be readily available as an Army military policeman; certain supply and engineering jobs appear similar enough for cross-branch transfers, as do those of cooks, clerks, medics, drivers, and many others. We are not suggesting that other services' individual reservists fill the Army's needs in the combat arms directly; however, a multimove in such instances in common specialties could be accomplished.

Another alternative for consideration is a limited draft for the IRR. This would insure a functioning Selective Service System, result in a probable delivery by Selective Service of new inductees earlier than currently planned, and reduce the number of pre-trained individuals needed after mobilization. However, it also would have some social implications.

As noted earlier, the Army IRR pool could be short up to 490,000 personnel in fiscal year 1979. Under the IRR draft scheme, this manpower could be provided by a variety of training and recall obligation plans. For example, 490,000 could be trained each year. Following 4 months of basic and advanced training, participants would be liable for immediate recall in the event of an emergency for the following 8-month period. The induction each year of these youths would not come close to exhausting the potential pool of inductees (which would total more than three million men and women). The resistance to the IRR draft could be considerably less than resistance to a return to Selective Service inductions for the Active Forces. The combination of a shorter training period, a limited period of recall obligation, and a greater degree of participation of the Nation's youth could make the IRR draft more acceptable.

On the other hand, the Army would need authorization for more military personnel and funds to accommodate both the IRR trainees and the necessary increases in the training staff. In addition, careful consideration would have to be given to the polarization of the U.S. society which
occurred during the Vietnam War and draft years, and whether this polarization would return if an IRR draft is implemented.
CHAPTER 5

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATIONS

We did not obtain formal written comments on this report because of time constraints. We received oral comments from the Office of Management and Budget and OASD. The Office of Management and Budget felt that the issue was one of national concern, was worthy of debate, and suggested several clarifications which were incorporated in the report.

We met with officials of OASD (MRA&L) (Reserve Affairs) to discuss the report. OASD officials briefed us on DOD's current management actions to alleviate the pretrained manpower shortage. In essence, OASD officials stated that based on the management actions in process or planned there is no shortfall of pretrained personnel in the event of mobilization. A summary of the OASD position follows.

OASD plans to treat all pretrained pools as mobilization resources. The total pool will consist of the IRR, Retired reservists, the Emergency Reserve (noncombat veterans under 30 years of age), and the Standby Reserve.

The following programs and actions are in process or planned according to OASD.

--IRR management program (includes improving the administration of the IRR pool).

--Retired personnel utilization program (using Retired reservists to fill certain pretrained requirements).

--Emergency Reserve program (drafting noncombat veterans under 30 years of age as pretrained resources).

--Standby Reserve program (transferring volunteer Standby reservists to the IRR).

--Improving the yield factors (improving administration of all the pretrained pools).

IRR MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

The IRR management program is a plan to improve the peacetime administration of IRR personnel. It includes a program of career management to maintain contact, to classify, and to allocate each member to a management category
preassigned to a unit or base. The plan also calls for procedures to notify IRR personnel and transport them to mobilization assignments.

OASD is acting to increase IRR strengths. These steps—taken and planned—include (1) stopping automatic transfer to the Standby Reserve, (2) screening Active and Selected Reserve obligated losses for transfer to the IRR, (3) increasing Selected Reserve reenlistments through bonuses, (4) not counting time in the delayed enlistment program toward the military service obligations, (5) extending the military service obligation to enlistees 26 years of age and older, (6) testing direct enlistment into the IRR, and (7) initiating a program to reduce Active Forces turnover by 20 percent. OASD officials stated that these initiatives will increase IRR strength by about 109,000 personnel by 1981 and 168,000 by 1985.

Other proposals include extending the military service obligation to women, IRR reenlistment programs, and restructuring the length of military service obligations between the Active Forces and Reserve components.

RECALLING RETIRED PERSONNEL

The Retired personnel utilization program as proposed includes

---identifying suitable wartime positions which could be filled by personnel under age 60 and retired less than 10 years;

---maintaining communication with them to survey their attitudes, their availability for military service, and to gain information on their mobilization limitations; and

---establishing M-day procedures for notification and movement to mobilization assignments.

OASD expects the Retired Reserve to have a potential of 910,000 mobilization resources by the end of fiscal year 1978 and projects 890,000 in fiscal year 1980 and 870,000 in fiscal year 1984.

RECALLING (DRAFTING) OF VETERANS

The Emergency Reserve according to OASD consists of veterans under 30 years of age who served in the Army as enlisted personnel and did not serve in combat. The Emergency Reserve mobilization program consists of asking veterans to
volunteer and ordering special groups of other veterans to report. These and other actions will require legislation to permit DOD to identify and manage the pool of veterans.

OASD stated that the Emergency Reserve has a potential of 1,170,000 mobilization resources at the end of fiscal year 1978. Projected strengths are 1,040,000 for fiscal year 1980 and 960,000 for fiscal year 1984.

CHANGING STANDBY RESERVE PROGRAM

The Standby Reserve program changes consist of requesting legislation to eliminate Selective Service System processing of all Standby reservists and screening the Standby Reserve to (1) transfer volunteers to the IRR and (2) provide the Selective Service System with only the names of remaining personnel.

OASD stated that this program will make more people immediately available for mobilization at the end of fiscal year 1979 and a projected 70,000 by fiscal year 1980 and 10,000 by fiscal year 1984.

YIELD FACTORS

Earlier, OASD planning factors relied on yield rates of 70 percent for the IRR, 50 percent for the Standby Reserve, and 10 percent of retired personnel reporting during mobilization. Since the veterans have not previously been an OASD planning factor, no yield rate has been established.

Problems with these yield rates include:

--They were derived from previous dissimilar mobilizations.

--They are universally applied regardless of service or military occupational specialty.

--They did not include time phasing.

--The rates for the Standby Reserve and Retired reservists are not verifiable since these resources have never been mobilized.

OASD officials, therefore, have proposed to disregard these current yield rates in favor of (1) establishing yield factor goals for the IRR and (2) developing programs to obtain specific personnel from Retired, Emergency, and Standby Reserves as previously described.
These goals for fiscal year 1981 are 80 percent for the IRR, 30 percent for the Retired Reserve, and 20 percent for the Emergency Reserve. By fiscal year 1985, OASD predicts a 90-percent yield for the IRR and a 50-percent yield for the Retired Reserve. No yield rates were predicted for the Standby Reserve in fiscal year 1981 or the Emergency and Standby Reserves in fiscal year 1985.

SUMMARY

It is OASD's position that the shortage of pretrained individuals has been significantly modified. This is based on OASD's adjustment to previous data to

--decrease the force structure requirements,
--increase the inventory of the existing force,
--increase the number of available trainees, and
--increase yield rates.

According to OASD, these changes along with the recalling of retirees and the drafting of veterans, plus other actions, have substantially, if not totally eliminated the manpower shortage.

As stated previously in this report, neither the supply of nor the demand for people to meet military needs is subject to precise calculations because of the imprecise nature of strategic military planning. However, even given this imprecision, the facts do not support OASD. We found no basis nor did OASD offer any basis to presume that (1) the Congress will enact legislation permitting the drafting of veterans, (2) changes of yield rates to "goals" and arbitrary increases in percentages will dramatically increase the number of available pretrained individuals, (3) new trainees will be available in the indicated numbers, (4) the numbers of people in the Selected Reserve will increase, (5) other alternative practices if implemented will have the necessary effect before fiscal year 1984, and (6) the number of people needed is significantly lower than in prior years.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

There is currently a shortage of pretrained personnel in the individual reserves to meet full mobilization requirements. The shortage problem is significant in the Army. Many subjective factors are considered in determining the requirements for full mobilization. Estimates of casualty rates, time it will take to report for duty, and the percentage of people who will report after notification, result in very subjective estimates. Changing any of the factors has a significant impact on the need for such people and the projected shortages.

In commenting on our report OASD changed its previous assumptions and calculations. OASD also plans to recall Retired reservists and veterans. Based on these changes, OASD has stated there is no shortage of pretrained personnel.

OASD provided no empirical evidence to change our opinion about the shortage of pretrained people. We also believe there is considerable doubt that the Congress will approve drafting veterans and concur with OASD's proposed actions. We believe the drafting of recent veterans will not be an incentive but instead could be a barrier to achieving the recruiting goals of the Active and Selected Reserve Forces. Given the difficulty that Active Service and Selected Reserve components have in currently achieving recruiting objectives, and given the possible societal reaction to imposing an additional obligation on those who have served without considering a similar obligation for those who have not served, the Executive and the Congress may in this indirect fashion adversely affect the ability to attract volunteers for the Active and Selected Reserve Forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of Defense should require the services to determine what pretrained personnel it will need in full mobilization and in what timeframe. The determination should include an assessment of the casualty rates, expected yield rates, and the requirement for fillers in the Active Forces and Selected Reserve.
The Secretary of Defense should insure that any action taken by the Army to resolve the shortage problem of the IRR has considered and determined the impact of the action on the other elements of the total force.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS

In evaluating any legislative proposals intended to correct individual reserve shortages, the Congress should make sure that all principal alternatives have been adequately considered. The Congress should also require DOD to identify the probable impact of the proposed changes on other total force components. In considering the Administration's proposals, the Congress needs to assure itself that the actions proposed are responsive to the short- and long-term needs of the services.
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