Because of suffering in the Sahel brought about by the drought and famine of 1968 to 1973, the Agency for International Development (AID) was authorized to participate in a long-term development program supported by several countries and international organizations in consultation and planning with the Sahelian countries. The Club du Sahel, consisting of the Sahelian countries, the donor community, and the major international development institutions, was formed to undertake an overall development strategy and plan for the region.

Findings/Conclusions: The Club established a consensus about overall development and strategy, but its principal goal of developing a mutually agreed upon plan of action has not been met. The Sahel development program (SDP) is a useful first step, but issues such as export potential, pricing policy, and land-use management have not been adequately considered. There is a need to define interrelationships among the organizations involved and procedures for coordinating activities. There is concern about the ability of Sahelian countries to effectively use the available economic assistance, and AID should insure that development funding will not be dissipated while these problems are being resolved. AID's current and proposed projects are generally consistent with Club strategy, but it is too early to tell whether they will be integrated into the overall program. Much study and research has been done on development problems of the region but they have not always been productive because they were not project oriented.

Recommendations: The Administrator of AID, working together with involved donors and nations, should: establish a management system for disseminating data about ongoing development activities and providing for the review and evaluation of Club-sponsored programs and projects; take measures to supplement the Club's development program with
an analysis of issues not yet addressed, a method of assigning priorities, and an annual work plan; develop an overall management plan outlining the management for SDP, and strengthen planning and coordination; take action on the region's training shortfall and its inability to pay for costs of projects; determine that AIJ's projects are consistent with and complementary to the Sahel development strategy; have AID inform the Congress of infrastructure contemplated under the overall SDP and its role in financing infrastructure projects; and require future studies and research projects to be directly associated with development progress. (HTN)
The great drought of 1968 to 1973 brought focus on the longstanding problems of some of the most impoverished of the poor countries of the world, in the Sahel region of Africa. Through a coordinated forum called the Club du Sahel, these countries, supported by western nations and organizations, have made strides toward developing strategy and plans for achieving food self-sufficiency and economic growth in 20 to 30 years.

The Sahel development program, in which the United States participates, is to have $1 billion a year concentrated on such areas as agriculture and livestock. However, many problems remain concerning how external aid can be used to overcome Sahel development problems.
To the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report outlines the United States' progress in helping eight central and west African countries achieve food self-sufficiency and economic growth through the international Club du Sahel. Some of the problems confronting the achievement of those goals are examined. The report contains a number of recommendations for improving the effect of the United States' participation in the internationally supported Sahel development process.

The Agency for International Development has reviewed the draft of this report and basically agrees with its findings and recommendations.

Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Administrator, Agency for International Development; and the Secretaries, Departments of State and the Treasury.

[Signature]

ACTING Comptroller General of the United States
The great drought and famine of 1968 to 1973 that crippled a vast area of central and western Africa—a region generally referred to as the Sahel—is over. Yet food shortages still persist and the region continues to be in great need of external assistance. The region includes some of the most impoverished of the poor countries of the world.

To alleviate the human suffering during the drought, the international community provided a massive relief effort. The United States' share amounted to about $200 million in food and other emergency assistance.

Efforts are underway to help these countries—Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, and the Cape Verde Islands—repair the drought-caused damage and establish some measure of food self-sufficiency and economic improvement.

The Agency for International Development is authorized to participate in a long-term development program supported by several countries and international organizations in consultation and planning with the Sahelian countries. The Congress has initially authorized $200 million of which $50 million is appropriated to finance Agency efforts beginning in fiscal year 1978 for long-term development in the Sahel.

The Sahel countries and international members recognize the usefulness of coordinated planning and development. This belief led to forming the Club du Sahel, an organization to undertake an overall development strategy and plan for the region. It consists of the Sahelian countries, the donor community, and the major international development institutions.

This report outlines the progress made by the Club. It examines remaining problems
and the status of United States' participation in the overall development process.

The Club and the Sahel Development program, while still in their early stages, provide a unique and worthy approach to addressing the Sahel's development constraints. There are still issues and problems which must be confronted to meet the long-term objectives of the program. However, the progress made to date for implementing the overall concept indicates that the program deserves continuing United States support.

Through its planning teams the Club established a consensus about the region's overall development and the general strategy to be pursued. Its principal goal is developing a mutually agreed upon plan of action, including (1) a sense of priorities by development sectors, (2) a time frame for program implementation, and (3) measures to be undertaken by all the parties involved. Its goal has not yet been fulfilled.

Additional work is needed to establish a management system to (1) provide overall information on program direction and procedures to monitor project implementation and (2) review financial management and evaluate program/project performance. (See pp. 16 to 17.)

The Sahel development program, announced and approved at the May to June 1977 meeting of the Club in Ottawa, is a useful first step. Many issues, such as export potential, pricing policy, and land-use management, have yet to be adequately considered. Attention must be given to these shortfalls and to establishing an overall plan of how the development problems will be solved. (See pp. 26 to 27.)

A number of solutions for managing Sahel development have been presented, and it is generally recognized that the programs/projects for the Sahel should be implemented by the present national and regional development institutes. Yet there is a need to define the (1) interrelationships among all
the organizations involved and (2) procedures to be followed to coordinate donor activities and the program activities being carried out. (See p. 28.)

While the amount of economic assistance is increasing, there is much concern about the ability of the Sahelian countries to use this available assistance effectively. Constraints to effective development include

--the absence of enough locally trained administrative and technical personnel;

--limited internal sources to finance local costs of development;

--many physical infrastructure weaknesses, such as ports, roads, and transport facilities.

Attempts to resolve these problems are underway. While these efforts are being made, the Agency should insure that new development funding will not be dissipated because recipient countries may not be able to use this aid effectively. (See pp. 46 to 47.)

The United States is attempting to formulate its participation in the Sahel development by supporting strategies established and recommended by the Club. The Agency's current and proposed projects generally are consistent with Club strategy. It is too early to tell whether they are fully integrated with the overall program since a full range of project proposals has not yet proved useful in form and substance to Agency programers.

Also, the Agency is uncertain of the degree to which it should help finance some of the infrastructure projects necessary to effective development in the Sahel. (See pp. 52 to 53.)

Many of the Sahel's development problems have been intensively studied and researched. Yet some efforts have not been productive because they were too general and not project oriented. More work is needed to avoid...
unnecessary study and research and to be sure that more effective use is made of funds available. (See p. 59.)

In another review, GAO assessed the extent to which those drafting development plans for Sahel were considering the impact population growth would have on achieving development goals. Concluding that planners had not adequately considered this important issue, GAO made a number of recommendations for action.

GAO recognizes the complexity of the development effort underway in the Sahel. Effective implementation of the development strategy will require the coordination and cooperation of all the Sahelian countries and of the participating donor nations and development institutions. Accordingly, GAO recommends that the Administrator, Agency for International Development, continuing to support and exercise United States leadership in the Club development program and working with other donors and the Sahelian nation, take the following measures to improve the programming and implementing of the ongoing development activities in the Sahel:

--A management system should be established for disseminating essential data about ongoing development activities and providing for the review and evaluation of Club-sponsored programs and projects. (See p. 17.)

--The Club's development program should be supplemented with (1) an analysis of development problems and policy issues not yet explicitly addressed, (2) a method of identifying and giving priorities to projects with the greatest potential development, and (3) an annual work plan setting forth short- and long-term actions to be taken. (See p. 27.)

1/"Influencing Fertility Through Social and Economic Change in Developing Countries," ID-78-6.
--An overall management plan should be developed outlining the management for the Sahel development program; national and regional development planning and management capabilities should be strengthened and development coordination in the region should be improved. (See p. 36.)

--Action should be taken on the region's training shortfall, and its financial inability to pay the local and recurrent investment costs of development projects. (See pp. 46 to 47.)

--A special effort should be made to determine that the Agency's projects are consistent with the Sahel development strategy and effectively complement it and the development efforts of other participants. (See p. 54.)

--The Agency should inform the Congress (1) of the amount and type of infrastructure contemplated under the overall Sahel development program and (2) the role the Agency proposes to play in financing these infrastructure projects. (See p. 54.)

--Action should be taken to require future studies and research projects be directly associated with development progress. (See pp. 59 to 60.)

The Agency agreed with GAO's recommendations and said that appropriate actions will be taken to implement them.
DIGEST

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   Accomplishments and weaknesses
   Conclusions
   Recommendations
   1

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<td></td>
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ABBREVIATIONS

- **AID**: Agency for International Development
- **CILSS**: Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (Comite Inter-Etats pour la lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel)
- **DAC**: Development Assistance Committee
- **GAO**: General Accounting Office
- **OMVS**: Senegal River Valley Development Organization (Organization pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal)
- **SDP**: Sahel development program
- **U.N.**: United Nations
- **UNDP**: United Nations Development Program
THE SAHEL
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Congress has actively and strongly supported assistance to the Sahel in Africa for emergency relief and reconstruction and for a long-term comprehensive development program. Because of the 1968 through 1973 drought, the Congress appropriated $110 million for emergency and recovery needs in the Sahel and other drought-stricken African nations. Immediately following the drought, the Congress showed a continuing concern by authorizing the Agency for International Development (AID) to develop a long-term multidonor and multireipient program for the Sahel. This program would include consultation and planning among (1) the countries concerned, (2) other nations providing assistance, (3) the United Nations (U.N.) and other international organizations, and (4) others concerned with assisting the Sahel.

In response to this congressional mandate, AID is attempting to formulate and design a program reflecting the philosophy and goals of the Club du Sahel. 1/ (See ch. 2.) To meet these objectives, the Congress authorized $200 million for funding the initial U.S. share of the Sahel development program (SDP) on a multiyear basis. The Congress also appropriated $50 million to be available for use in fiscal year 1978 or until expended.

Before establishing SDP, AID missions in the Sahel were small. In recent years, AID has faced the problem of attracting qualified people to work in the Sahel because of the unpleasant climate and other hardships in central and western Africa.

For the expanded development effort in the Sahel, AID has established an SDP team in Washington to conceptualize the U.S. program and guide its formation. Staffing in the AID offices in the Sahel has grown considerably since the U.S. assistance began increasing in 1974. For instance on June 30, 1974, AID direct-hire staffers in the 8 Sahelian countries consisted of 25 Americans and 21 foreign nationals. However, on November 30, 1977, 87 American direct

1/The Club is composed of donor and recipient countries and organizations who plan development for the Sahel.
hires—still 50 below the 137 positions authorized—were employed along with 71 foreign-national direct hires. The number of Americans and foreign nationals working in the Sahel under contracts with AID also increased from 32 in June 1974 to 125 in November 1977. Nevertheless, the AID Auditor General reported in May 1977 that AID had not provided enough personnel on a timely basis to implement programs.

BACKGROUND

The Sahel area of central and western Africa was struck by a great drought from 1968 through 1973. Reportedly, as many as 100,000 men, women, and children may have died of starvation and disease. Millions of animals died, the incidence of disease and malnutrition rose sharply, millions of people experienced hardship and deprivation, and thousands were uprooted and impoverished. The great drought culminated in the disastrous harvest of 1972 to 1973 and the international disaster relief efforts of 1973 to 1974.

Most of these central and western African countries had gained independence in the early 1960s. Located between the northern fringe of the equatorial forests to the south and the great Sahara Desert to the north, the Sahelian countries had limited natural resources other than land and people. Even under normal climatic conditions, rainfall primarily supported subsistence farms and livestock herds. The Sahelians lacked formal education, and their national governments were fragile and poor. With a few exceptions, the French Central Bank supported the local currency—Franc Communauté Financière Africaine—in the Sahel. External assistance, which supplied most of the financing for economic and social development, had kept Sahelian countries' annual budgetary deficits low.

When rainfall began decreasing annually in 1968, the people of the Sahel were subjected to the very difficult elements of nature. Many could not survive the extended drought.

The great drought is over, except in Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania where arid pockets caused local food needs to persist in 1977.

1/Composed of Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, The Gambia, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, and the Cape Verde Islands.
However, AID reports that "life in the Sahel is seldom more than a few steps from disaster," and that if "even one rainfall cycle fails to produce its share of water * * * people begin to go hungry, crop production drops off and livestock perish."

In 1973 the international community became very concerned about the plight of the Sahelians. 1/ A large international drought relief effort was started in which commitments by donor countries and international organizations totaled over $754 million in 1974, $815 million in 1975, and $858 million in 1976. While some of the increase in commitments from 1974 to 1976 may be due to inflation, the increase also shows international concern to assist and rehabilitate the Sahel.

The following graph depicts external aid provided to the Sahel by certain donor countries and international organizations from 1974 to 1976.

1/Our report, "Need For An International Disaster Relief Agency" (ID-76-15, May 5, 1976 (pp. 15-16)), details the early international response to the 1968 to 1973 Sahelian drought.
TOTAL EXTERNAL AID PROVIDED THE SAHEL 1974–76
(BREAKDOWN BY DONOR)

LEGEND

1974–$754.9 MILLION

1975–$815.3 MILLION

1976–$650.2 MILLION

MILLIONS ($)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

BELGIUM

CANADA

FRANCE

GERMANY

NETHERLANDS

SWITZERLAND

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES

OTHER-DAC

EEC-JF

IBRD (IDA)

UN

ADB

OPEC

SOURCE CLUB DU SAHEL
Commitments to the Sahelian countries from 1974 to 1976 range from a low of $23.3 million to the Cape Verde Islands to a high of $400.2 million to Mali. Emergency aid to the Sahelian countries, however, has declined steadily following the drought. With that decline the commitments have shifted to more specific development areas in the Sahel, particularly to rainfed crop production, integrated rural development, agricultural irrigation, fisheries, and livestock development. Commitments in infrastructure also show large increases in primary road construction.

The graphs on pages 6 and 7 show breakdowns by sector and location of external aid to the Sahel from 1974 to 1976.

Also, in 1973, the Africans saw the need for a united effort to counteract the effects of the drought, and the Sahelian countries formally organized the Permanent Inter-state Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS). 1/ This organization has since become the major African group for coordinating and planning the use of external aid throughout the Sahel.

During 1973 the Secretary-General of the United Nations formed the U.N. Sahelian Office to work toward establishing international support for medium- and long-term activities fostered by CILSS. From the effects of the great drought and the interests of the Africans and international donors, there was a major effort to accelerate the development of the Sahel.

1/The French title is, "Comite Inter-Etats pour la lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel."
TOTAL EXTERNAL AID PROVIDED THE SAHEL 1974-1976 (BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development</td>
<td>$80.60</td>
<td>$45.95</td>
<td>$29.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>$40.35</td>
<td>$46.47</td>
<td>$26.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resource</td>
<td>$73.58</td>
<td>$102.69</td>
<td>$170.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>$161.65</td>
<td>$154.01</td>
<td>$858.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; Human Resources</td>
<td>$31.80</td>
<td>$62.47</td>
<td>$111.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, Nutrition &amp; Social Infrastructure</td>
<td>$19.54</td>
<td>$19.63</td>
<td>$74.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry &amp; Tourism</td>
<td>$24.13</td>
<td>$33.98</td>
<td>$62.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Costs &amp; Budget Support</td>
<td>$2.55</td>
<td>$2.55</td>
<td>$2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Aid</td>
<td>$57.48</td>
<td>$57.48</td>
<td>$111.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Aid</td>
<td>$94.40</td>
<td>$170.14</td>
<td>$334.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1974 = $754.9 Million
1975 = $815.3 Million
1976 = $858.2 Million

LEGEND:
- 1974
- 1975
- 1976

SOURCE: CLUB OF SAHEL
EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED THE SAHEL DURING

Development Assistance

1974 = $764.9 Million
1975 = $815.3 Million
1976 = $858.2 Million

Totals

Breakdown by Recipient

Legend:

1974
1975
1976

Source: Club du Sahel

Cape Verde
Chad
Cameroon
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Senegal
Upper Volta
Regional

300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Millions
AID strongly supports a comprehensive long-term multi-donor development program for the Sahel. Its position is based on two premises:

-- Without fundamental change in the systems of food production, the Sahelians will require even greater international food aid and donations to survive.

-- Given the Sahel's underdeveloped resources, transforming its productive capacities is desirable and possible provided there is adequate international development assistance.

Following is a chronology of major events leading to the creation of the internationally supported SDP.

-- AID officials and the French Minister for Cooperation, in November 1974, collaborated in requesting the Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to convene a meeting on aid coordination for the Sahel.

-- At such a meeting in Faris, in January 1975, two of the donor countries voiced concern about formalizing any coordinating mechanism for the Sahel. They believed the Africans would not approve formalizing such an effort.

-- In May 1975 the Chairman of DAC appeared in Niamey, Niger, before the CILSS Ministers and presented the advantages of a coordinated approach to Sahel development problems. The Ministers accepted his suggestions and authorized him to frame an approach for coordinating aid to the Sahel which would be acceptable to both the donors and the recipients.

In December 1975 the Chairman of DAC attended a meeting of the members of CILSS in Nouakchott, Mauritania, where he presented some of the basic concepts of integrated programming of multi-donor aid across the entire Sahelian zone. The Club's organizational concept was introduced and accepted by the Ministers of CILSS at this meeting. (See ch. 2.)
At its first meeting in Dakar, Senegal, in March 1976, the Club (1) concluded it should serve as the forum to coordinate and design an international development program for the Sahel, (2) concluded that a critical mass investment and program approach to food self-sufficiency could save money, (3) agreed that integrated regional planning is required and that programs must address Sahel's unique problems, (4) acknowledged that SDP should be managed by Sahelian countries as soon as possible, and (5) acknowledged that the Sahelian countries should have the right to determine their needs and priorities but that donors will require accountability of public funds provided.

An international working group was established and its initial meeting in June 1976 was led by the CILSS Minister-Coordinator. In establishing the group, food self-sufficiency was set as the primary objective of SDP. It was recognized that to attain food self-sufficiency requires self-sustaining agricultural production systems which entail improving distribution, marketing, and storage systems.

This group adopted a matrix management structure composed of four production working teams (Livestock, Irrigated Agriculture, Rainfed Agriculture, and Fisheries) and five horizontal teams (Ecology, Technical Adaptation, Human Resources and Health, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Price Policy, Marketing and Storage). A tenth team, a synthesis group, was formed to maintain integration among the other nine teams. (See page 14 for 1977 reorganizing.)

The Club again met in Ottawa, Canada, on May 30 through June 1, 1977, and adopted the strategies developed by the international working group to mobilize additional resources for SDP.

At Ottawa, various donor nations and international organizations indicated that their levels of support to Sahel were approximately as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation or organization</th>
<th>Amount (millions)</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$109</td>
<td>per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>for its program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Program (UNDP)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>per year for 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>per year for 9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>per year for 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>for fiscal year 1978 (note a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$727</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/An additional $150 million is authorized for an unspecified number of years.

Since July 1977, representatives of CILSS, AID, and other donors have participated in meetings concerning the design and implementation of the Club's specific programs. Currently, a Crop Protection Program and a Reforestation Program are the Club programs closest to being fully designed. However, they are not yet ready for implementation. (See p. 23.)

In the remainder of this report are discussions of matters pertaining to the organization and role of CILSS, the Club, and other organizations in SDP; potential constraints to development in the Sahel; and AID's efforts in, and interrelationships to, SDP.
CHAPTER 2

THE CLUB DU SAHEL—ITS PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS

The Club du Sahel is an informal mechanism by which participating donor and recipient countries and organizations jointly plan and coordinate the overall development of the Sahel. The Club is open to all governments and development agencies interested in participating in a collective and sustained effort to develop the economies of the Sahelian countries.

The principles and objectives for the Club were defined by CILSS, which is composed of the Sahelian countries, and were adopted at the Club's first meeting on March 29, 1976. Its broad purposes are to:

--Support action by CILSS, the principal agency for regional cooperation.

--Inform and create international awareness regarding the Sahel's development prospects and requirements.

--Encourage cooperation between donors to implement projects envisioned by Sahelian governments and regional organizations and to make it easier to get resources for development.

--Be a forum in which the Sahel countries can outline their policies and priorities for medium- and long-term development and discuss them with the donors.

--Meet at least once a year and set up working groups to study specific problems.

While Club membership is open, as of January 1978, 28 countries and development institutions were active participants. (See app. I for the Club's general scheme for planning and implementing development activities in the Sahel.)

The Club, which is intended to be a light and flexible structure, has a two-person Secretariat, headquartered in Paris. Working teams composed of representatives of the Club's members meet occasionally and are responsible for planning a medium- and long-term development program.
The Club meets periodically to ratify the work of its working teams and to discuss problems of mutual concern. The Club's most tangible work so far has been the Synthesis Report prepared by its working teams and presented at the Ottawa meeting. To develop an overall development strategy for the region, the Club had established 10 working teams as depicted on page 13.

The teams are responsible for developing the strategies to assure food self-sufficiency and alleviate the problems caused in the Sahel by such deficiencies as desertification, deforestation, declining land fertility, low human resource capacity, poor market access, and lack of market stabilization and production incentives.

Teams consisting of from 9 to 12 representatives of participating governments and development organizations were organized to study each of the sectors or subjects cited above. For instance, the livestock situation in the Sahel was analyzed from both a country and a regional perspective, and then the problems affecting development were approached by the Livestock Team. The Livestock Team was composed of representatives of eight countries and four development organizations. It was led by representatives from the Mali, Gambia, and Niger governments. The Team was cochaired by a representative from CILSS and a U.S. representative.

The Livestock Team operated through informal discussions, called dialogue missions, between representatives of the teams and government officials in each of the Sahelian countries. The purpose of these dialogues generally was to:

--Familiarize (1) the Sahelian governments with the team's objectives and the work plan and (2) the team with the practical realities and ideas of Sahelian officials.

--Recognize the plans and planning already undertaken by the Sahelian governments.

--Direct the team to the needs and capacities of each country by encouraging Sahelian officials to plan the fullest role in the team's preparations.

--Define long-range options and implement related actions immediately.
ORGANIZATION OF THE PRODUCTION AND INTEGRATING TEAMS OF THE CLUB DU SAHEL

INTEGRATING PROGRAMS TEAMS

ECOLOGY
TECHNOLOGY ADAPTATION
HUMAN RESOURCES & HEALTH
TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE
PRICE POLICY, MARKETING & STORAGE

PRODUCTION PROGRAMS TEAMS

LIVESTOCK
RAINFED AGRICULTURE
IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE
FISHERIES

SYNTHESIS GROUP

NOTE: FOR PHYSICAL BREAKDOWN OF EACH TEAM SEE APPENDIX II
The 10 teams' work was synthesized and analyzed and then presented in a working report which suggested an approach for developing each sector. The combined work of all the groups was presented at the May to June 1977 meeting of the Club in Ottawa, Canada, where the results of the work were generally endorsed by Club members.

Resulting from decisions made at Ottawa, the 10 working teams have since been reorganized into 6 specialized teams, plus the synthesis group. The teams are the

--Crop Production Team (includes rainfed and irrigated agriculture, sources of water, and crop and harvest productions);
--Livestock Team;
--Fisheries Team;
--Ecology Team;
--Transport Team; and
--Human Resources Team.

The Synthesis Group is chaired by the Secretariat of CILSS and is composed of representatives of the Sahelian governments who serve as leaders of the six specialized teams and cochairmen of each specialized team. One cochairman will represent CILSS, and one will represent an external donor.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND WEAKNESSES

What the Club can or cannot do is difficult to assess. The Club is flexible and not bound by rigid rules or procedures. Its expressed goals are to develop (1) a mutually agreed upon plan of action, (2) a sense of priorities by sector, (3) a time frame for program implementation, and (4) measures to be undertaken by all the parties involved--Sahelian countries and donor organizations--to give development a reasonable chance of success.

The Club, which participates in a long-term development effort, is far from achieving the above goals. Yet, the Club has some very useful and unique characteristics and accomplishments: It:

--Established a consensus about the region's overall development needs and the general strategy that
should be pursued in meeting those needs. The Sahel countries and the donors agreed that a long-term development program was needed to solve the region's development problems. The dimensions of the problems and a broad strategy for addressing them were discussed at the Club's Ottawa Conference in June 1977. A consensus was reached on the need for special measures to suit the situation in these countries.

-- Provided a forum in which interested governments and development organizations can jointly plan specific development endeavors. An example is the work underway in the development of a coordinated crop protection program for the region. Through the Club, participating governments, such as the United States', Canada's, and France's; Sahelian institutions such as CILSS; and development organizations, such as the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization, have met and are negotiating a joint agreement to participate in a multidonor cooperative project. The project would deal with such problems as pest management, protection against crop diseases, and procedures to reduce postharvest food losses.

-- Provided a mechanism where donors and recipient governments can discuss broad development policy issues and goals. The Sahelian countries want to be partners in their own development. Under the Club arrangement, Africans are working along side with development experts from donor countries and development institutions. Additional support of Sahelian institutions, like CILSS, has demonstrated that donors are willing to let the Sahelian countries bear a larger share in managing development activities. The announcement of increased aid flows through the auspices of the Club demonstrates donor commitment to participate in developing the region and establishes a high degree of rapport.

-- Established a rapport among the Sahelian nations, donors, and development institutions. Multidonor meetings with Sahelian officials are occurring more often. Joint meetings have been held to implement the strategy adopted in Ottawa. Other meetings have been held to discuss and agree on the criteria for specific projects such as the Sahel Institute.
While charged with a planning task, the Club neither directs the combined development efforts of donors nor accounts for the successful implementation of specific development projects or programs.

To manage a development program, a basic management information system is needed. This system would specifically identify the total development efforts underway and relate the efforts to the overall development needs of the region. No single organization has a complete listing of ongoing projects nor is there an available system to produce this type of information. It is essential to have this information to manage and direct the development of the Sahel.

Therefore, it is difficult to see how the area’s development will be managed in an orderly and effective manner unless some organization is explicitly given this responsibility. Under the established informal rules which permit donor governments to participate in what suits them, we foresee problems of program coordination and direction.

Throughout the planning process the need to establish procedures to (1) monitor project implementation, (2) review financial management, and (3) evaluate project performance against overall project and program goals has been generally recognized. A group established to achieve these purposes could measure the rate of implementation and report whether the goals of the program were being achieved.

AID recognizes the need for a system to oversee SDP’s management and implementation. Yet this issue was not discussed in the May to June 1977 Club meeting in Ottawa. To date, no procedure has been established to achieve this goal.

CONCLUSIONS

It is too early to judge the overall effectiveness of the Club’s planning and coordinating of the overall development activities in the Sahel. The Club has performed effectively in focusing on the development needs of the region and generating political support to address these needs. It has established a rapport among the Sahelian countries, the donors, and development institutions and has helped develop a consensus about the region’s broad development needs and the means to meet them.
However, while hoping to establish a comprehensive development program, the Club does not have any inherent power to achieve this goal. The Club's success depends on the willingness of donor countries and institutions and the Sahelian countries to lead and direct it. The Club is not authorized to direct the activities of any of its members and is not capable of acting as a program manager. The Club does not have a management system capable of identifying ongoing development activities, allocating available resources to priority concerns, and reviewing and evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of development activities.

We believe SDP can build upon the Club's work improving the capabilities of CILSS and helping it become a central focus for regional development in the Sahel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, we recommend that the Administrator, AID, working with other Club members, take steps to improve CILSS's ability by

--developing an information system which accumulates essential data about ongoing development activities and relates available resources to unmet priority needs and

--establishing a review and evaluation procedure which provides an effective and independent appraisal of the efficiency and effectiveness of all Club-sponsored programs and projects.

The donors and Sahelian national governments should also specify the Club's responsibilities including its role in assuring that development resources provided under its sponsorship are effectively used.
The drought affecting the Sahel from 1968 to 1973 called international attention to the basic poverty and underdevelopment of the area and its vulnerability to an uncertain climate. There has since been an effort to organize and mobilize a long-term development program to help the Sahelian countries achieve relative food self-sufficiency and improve their economic and social conditions.

Much has been done to reach this goal. However, no single development program governing the development process is now underway in the Sahel; instead many systems exist. Donor countries, like Canada, France, and the United States, and international organizations, like the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, are operating under their traditional systems. At the same time, efforts are underway to develop what is loosely termed a Sahel development program sponsored by the Club.

By definition SDP is the product of the Club's planning effort and does not necessarily include the total amount of development effort underway or to be programmed in the Sahel. The major donors will be guided by the strategy outlined by the Club and will incorporate their ongoing and future development efforts into the overall SDP. However, the total dimensions of SDP and the participation of each of the individual donors and international organizations will not be known until such actions are taken.

SDP

SDP, accepted at the May to June 1977 Club meeting in Ottawa and again by the eight Sahelian countries, is a broad analysis of the development problems facing the Sahelian countries and an outline of a broad strategy for dealing with the problems. It represents the product of the working teams which analyzed the following subjects or sectors of the economy and developed a synthesis report.

--Ecology.

--Technology Adaptation.
In general, SDP is a useful beginning for establishing a long-term development program for the Sahel. Nevertheless, many important issues affecting development progress have been discussed but not yet adequately dealt with by the Club. These include the

-- need for an incentive agriculture pricing policy;
-- absence of a land-use policy to govern the use of rangeland and other resources;
-- absence of a realistic, prioritized, and comprehensive list of specific projects which could effectively implement the adopted strategy; and
-- absence of an explicit analysis of the region's trade potential as a means of promoting development.

In addition, the program does not clearly establish the measures to be undertaken by all the parties involved or explicitly analyze the interrelationship between proposed development plans and the population pressures of the region.

**Marketing, pricing and storage**

Any program to increase agricultural productivity must consider associated problems of marketing, pricing, and storage. Incentive pricing will stimulate production, and disincentive pricing will not. Farmers must be able to market their extra production or they will not grow more. Adequate storage facilities are also needed to accommodate excess production.
The Club's working teams noted that the Sahelian countries needed to adopt price and marketing policies consistent with the goal of providing large-scale assistance to increase rural income and agriculture production. Furthermore, the teams recognized that a sound storage policy was essential to counter the effects of future droughts.

The Club's team working on this problem recognized that marketing, price, and storage policies were priorities; however, its analysis produced no approach on how to deal with them. The team generally concluded that not enough information was available on grain production and quantities marketed on which to base sound judgments. Information on the size and capability of storage facilities was found fragmentary, and little was determined about pricing practices and their effect.

The team recommended a program of studies aimed at clarifying fundamental issues on marketing and pricing policy and storage. We were told in January 1978 that a group of storage experts is now analyzing the existing storage facilities in the Sahel and will propose a storage strategy for the present and the future.

In our opinion, the issue of marketing and pricing and storage needs continuing attention. Any program to expand production should deal with the basic policy constraints which would counteract the development aid provided.

**Range-management policies**

Raising livestock is an important element of the economy of the Sahelian countries. During the 1960s, herds increased substantially due to animal health measures and the development of watering sites. This herd population increase was not accompanied by changes in the method of raising livestock and thus led to overgrazing and debasing the pastureland. The drought caused heavy cattle losses, and the reduced size of the herds alleviated soil deterioration by overgrazing. Much of the current and proposed development activity in the Sahel is aimed at reconstituting and increasing the livestock herds.

From 1974 through 1976 a large amount of external assistance was committed to a wide variety of livestock projects. In June 1977 the Club outlined an ambitious effort in the livestock sector to:
1. Improve national animal health programs.
2. Embark on a national rangeland development.
3. Integrate livestock and agriculture projects and programs.
4. Improve training and communications.
5. Develop better marketing arrangements.

The estimated cost of suggested projects to implement the Club strategy amounted to about $330 million.

Notwithstanding the absence of any firm national or regional land-use policy, the Livestock Team has outlined a work program aimed at improving the quality of the projects proposed in the first-generation program and obtaining donor support for them. The team has outlined three principal objectives to guide its work, including efforts to

-- facilitate financing for proposed projects;
-- work with the national CILSS committees and CILSS to improve project proposals; and
-- do more project planning and analysis to make project proposals more responsive to the Club's strategy.

The Club's strategy recognizes that overgrazing is one of the main causes of soil deterioration and explains the need to define rangeland potential and the maximum carrying capacity of cattle. However, the analyses performed thus far do not clearly define how the Sahelian countries, CILSS, and the Club will handle the development of national and regional range-management policies to govern the correct use of grazing land and combat negative environmental trends.

First-generation projects

The Club has produced proposals for first-generation projects and programs to represent the initial application of its strategy. The proposals were presented at the Club's second meeting in Ottawa and were generally endorsed as a useful itemization of the region's development needs for the next 5 years.
### FIRST GENERATION PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS
Recapitulatory Schedule by Country and by Sector ($000,000)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY SECTOR</th>
<th>CAPE VERDE</th>
<th>GAMBIA</th>
<th>UPPER VOLTA</th>
<th>MALI</th>
<th>MAURITANIA</th>
<th>NIGER</th>
<th>SENEGAL</th>
<th>CHAD</th>
<th>REGION</th>
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**GRAND TOTAL OF FIRST GENERATION PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS IN THE SAHEL REGION** $3,281.5

**SOURCE:** Club du Sahel
However, the first-generation projects have not been completely analyzed. Serious reservations continue on whether these projects adequately reflect the criteria and approach endorsed by the Club's overall development strategy. For example, the proposals have been criticized as lacking any sense of priorities and understanding among the sectors. One working team characterized the first-generation projects generally as mere program outlines which had to be revised and developed. Another working team stated that some of the defined options do not totally coincide with Sahelian countries' priorities.

One donor representative believed that although his government was committed to supporting the Club's work, the projects were not consistent and lacked priorities. Other representatives expressed similar concerns.

In our discussions with U.S. officials involved in the planning exercise, several said that the proposed first-generation projects had to be thoroughly reviewed and analyzed. They also said that projects were needed which give attention to all aspects of rural development, including agriculture and livestock, and appropriately consider reforestation and soil restoration and health and training activities.

Since the 1977 Club meeting, efforts have been made to consolidate and integrate some of the suggested projects. For example, action is underway to determine donor interest in a $70 million crop protection program. By mid-January 1978, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, West Germany, the United States, UNDP, and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization had made commitments totaling $57 million to that program.

The Club and CILSS sponsored a series of meetings which led to an agreement in July 1977 on the steps necessary to start implementing a broad-scale crop protection program for the Sahel. The program contains eight components.

1. Strengthening national plant protection services.
2. Integrating pest management for food crops.
3. Controlling locusts.
4. Protecting against grain-eating birds.
5. Improving postharvest crop protection.
6. Improving rodent control.

7. Documenting regional information and disseminating information.

8. Training staff.

CILSS will be responsible for the financial and administrative aspects of the Crop Protection Program. The successful design and initiation of the Crop Protection Program will represent the first detailed project planned, programmed, and funded by the Club.

The overall planning task of the Club, even as it concerns the first-generation projects, is far from completed. The Club feels that follow-on design is required to complete the design of a revised, more complete, better structured, and more coherent program. Some of the followup planning effort includes developing an integrated approach to deal with the reforestation problems of the region and a joint project to improve the livestock industry. In addition, similar meetings concerning fisheries, road maintenance, rehabilitation of irrigated perimeters, and agriculture are scheduled during the first half of 1978.

Interrelationship between population growth and development

Plans to reach development goals in the Sahel must take into account population growth and must assess the varying impacts of alternative growth rates. In a separate review we examined the extent to which population growth was being considered in Sahel development planning. We found that, in general, population factors were not being given adequate attention. While there was planning in all sectors, the projections of population growth were based on inadequate population surveys to calculate needs. Further, how population growth would affect the achievement of program goals had not been carefully estimated to determine if higher or lower growth rates would be desirable.

International officials associated with the Sahelian development effort were generally reluctant to confront the implications of population dynamics for development in the Sahel early or directly in the planning process. The desire seemed to be to delay action in this area or include it in other areas.
Population growth and related demographic factors, such as migration, personnel availability, and age distribution, clearly will affect the shape and the rate of Sahel development. But demography as a separate topic is not accorded much emphasis in the planning process since it falls within the broad mandate of the Human Resources Team.

In the Club's May 1977 synthesis report, there is no reference to (1) population growth as a possible constraint to development or (2) the need to determine if rapid growth is a constraint. Where it is mentioned, population growth is treated as a factor beyond influence.

AID has initiated some actions to improve the situation. For example, its Bureau for Africa is developing a demographic project for the Sahel. AID discussed this project at recent Club meetings where it was agreed to pursue this project further through the planned Institute du Sahel in Mali. While these actions hold promise, we believe a more thorough analysis is needed of the interrelationships between population growth and development, including the development of specific strategy for achieving desired objectives.

**Sahelian exports**

The Sahel countries depend on exports for financial income. Exports to gross domestic product in the Sahel range from 54 percent in Mauritania, down to 7 to 9 percent in Upper Volta. Even for the countries with low-export ratios, exports are likely to be a major determinant of money income.

With the exception of Senegal which has a more diversified and developed economy, Sahelian exports are highly concentrated; two or three products generally represent most of the exports. Except for iron ore in Mauritania and uranium in Niger, the Sahelian countries generally have common exports—livestock, cotton, and groundnuts.

Export potentials have not been fully considered in SDP, although the program does consider increased production of livestock and fish, which are exported.

We believe exports are essential for the Sahel. They are needed to earn foreign exchange for importing the capital goods and other production inputs necessary for development. Exports also play a key role in helping to monetize the Sahel, as noted above. We therefore urge AID and other Club participants to work toward including development of exports in SDP.
One important issue is the adequacy of producer prices and marketing arrangements for cash (export) crops in the Sahel. Sahelian governments, through various stabilization funds and marketing boards, kept producer prices low, increased them very little when world prices rose, and cut them quickly and substantially when world prices fell. Although local prices have been increased substantially since 1974, the prices still do not encourage small farmers to increase production. The proceeds of the government agencies involved in marketing export crops have been used in part to subsidize the cost of importing grain for urban consumers.

Another area which may be important is the role of exports in irrigated agriculture. Diverse exports are now limited by a number of factors including the shortage of water. With irrigation from future basin development, the cash crop possibilities should be improved. Just as there are plans for substituting domestic for imported food grains by irrigation, there similarly needs to be planning for export crops which can be effectively irrigated. The extension to exports should also help reduce the costs of irrigated agriculture.

A third area which may be worthwhile is impediments to exports of manufactured goods. These may include high-wage rates, high protection given to local industries, and poor quality of products.

CONCLUSIONS

The planning exercise sponsored by the Club has produced a broad analysis of the region's development needs and a series of suggested projects to meet these needs. The Club's actions are a useful and important first step in the planning and programing process.

More work is necessary to refine and move forward with the planning process. Additional analyses must be made and strategies developed on how to deal with the problems of marketing, pricing, storage, rangeland management, population, trade, and many other issues affecting development progress. Also, there is a need to take the additional step of transforming accomplished work into an actual program format. A clear outline of the dimensions of SDP and the role of each participant is needed before the planning work performed can be characterized as a long-term, fully integrated and coordinated program. The Club's basic goal must be fulfilled and that goal is the development of a
mutually agreed upon plan of action, a sense of priorities by sector, a timetable for project implementation, and measures to be undertaken by all the parties involved.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Accordingly, we recommend that the Administrator, AID, acting with other donors and CILSS, take steps to:

--- Supplement the current SDP with a more comprehensive analysis of those development problems and policy issues in the Sahel which have not yet been explicitly or adequately addressed; these problems include export potential, integrated farm production system, agricultural pricing, and population factors.

--- Establish a method to identify those programs and projects which have the greatest development impact and should receive priority.

--- Urge the establishment of an annual work plan which sets forth the short- and long-term actions to be taken to implement the overall SDP.
CHAPTER 4

THE STRUCTURE FOR MANAGING DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL

Proposals for a large number of new development projects in the Sahel raise the question of whether there is adequate management to effectively implement them. Currently numerous regional and national organizations are involved in development planning and project implementation throughout the Sahel. Each government has its national development planning organization. Some regional organizations are involved in river basin development, and others are involved in water resource, meteorology, and pest control programs.

The Club has not developed a management model for program/project implementation but has provisionally concluded that because of the nature, complexity, and diversity of proposals, the adoption of a single model cannot be recommended. Club members also feel that existing national and regional development structures should, as far as possible, be responsible for project execution. However, they recognize the need to strengthen these structures.

We agree that existing organizations should be used as much as possible. The planning capabilities of the national governments should be strengthened and effective CILSS national committees established. Beyond that, however, there is a need to conceptualize and define the (1) interrelationship among all the organizations involved and (2) procedures to follow to coordinate donor and program activities.

A description of the various Sahelian institutions and/or organizations involved and some comments on their activities follow.

THE ROLE OF CILSS

Located in Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, CILSS was established in September 1973 at the height of the great drought. It was founded by the six Sahel countries of central and western Africa to rally donor support for their national and regional development needs. The Gambia and the Cape Verde Islands later joined CILSS. During 1973 to 1975, CILSS, with a very small Secretariat, sought donor financing for short- and medium-term activities on behalf of the members.
In March to June 1976, CILSS accepted a major new challenge—to guide and coordinate planning for the comprehensive long-term development of the Sahel. This additional responsibility required a staff expansion as well as an expansion in CILSS activities and responsibilities.

The CILSS reorganization plan calls for establishing three operating divisions in charge of

--administration and finance,
--documentation and information, and
--programs and projects.

These divisions are directed by the Executive Secretary and the Minister Coordinator who receive policy guidance from the Council of Ministers.

In September 1977 CILSS was attempting to staff its Program and Projects Division with a diversified staff of economists, engineers, and management experts. Of the 17 positions needed, 11 had been filled, and efforts were underway to obtain the other 4. Also CILSS planned to organize a Regional Management Unit which would have overall responsibility for managing the crop protection project being planned through the Club.

CILSS will continue to play an important role in SDP's planning and programming. CILSS provided the framework for bringing together the views of the Sahelian countries, and, along with the Club, sponsored the work of the international development planning teams. CILSS is the forum for regional discussion and ratification of the actions proposed under Club/CILSS auspices. CILSS will play an even more important role by directing and coordinating the daily refinement and development of the planning efforts.

We agree that an organization such as CILSS is needed and endorse the actions taken thus far to improve its ability to plan and coordinate development efforts in the Sahel. The Sahelian countries neither have the financial nor technical capability to fully support CILSS. Continued donor support for the future will be needed.

THE SAHEL INSTITUTE

More an evolving idea than a functioning institution, the Sahel Institute was officially approved by the 6th
Council of Ministers of CILSS in December 1976. The Institute, which was headquartered in Bamako, Mali, was to coordinate research by and for CILSS countries. Its functions were to be in the following four areas:

--Collecting and distributing research results.

--Transferring and adopting technology.

--Promoting and coordinating research.

--Offering specialized training and refresher programs to research workers.

Since its creation there has been much discussion concerning the eventual role and form of the Institute. Representatives of CILSS member country governments and research organizations, regional organizations, foreign research organizations, and donors attended a meeting on the Institute in Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, in October 1977. A wide range of potential roles for the Institute was discussed, but many issues remained unresolved. Among these were the:

--Actual scope of the Institute's activities.

--Relationship of the Institute to the CILSS Executive Secretariat.

--Work to be carried out by a core staff of the Institute and the size of that staff.

At a meeting later in 1977, the Sahelian Chiefs of State accepted the legal statutes drawn up for the Institute. Although these statutes did not resolve the outstanding issues concerning the Institute, they established the focus of the Institute on reinforcing national institutions. A modest beginning centering on a small number of realistic elements is envisioned with expansion depending on the demonstrated capacity of the Institute.

SENEGAL RIVER DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

In 1963, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal—which were concerned with stabilizing and improving conditions in the river basin—created the Senegal River Development
Organization (OMVS). Its goals were directed at (1) agricultural development, (2) energy production, (3) industrial development, and (4) navigation conditions improvement on the Senegal River. In 1971, Guinea withdrew its membership for political reasons.

OMVS' operating budget is met through proportional assessments made against each member country. In 1977, the operating budget was $1.7 million, with a 10-percent increase expected for 1978. Additionally, OMVS members have an agreement for financing, designing, constructing, and operating the major mainstream facilities. However, OMVS and the international donors recognize that nearly all project costs will have to be financed through external donor assistance.

In 1972 OMVS decided that its first stage of basin development would include:

--A hydroelectric regulating dam at Manatali on the Bafing tributary in Mali, which is expected to cost around $300 million.

--A salt water intrusion dam at Diama in the delta area of Mauritania, which is expected to cost $150 million.

--River and seaports at St. Louis, Senegal, and a river port at Kayes, Mali.

--Improving ports of call and bed sills along the Senegal River.

All of these projects are to be completed during the midterm phase (1982 to 1990).

Key midterm projects are the Manatali and Diama dams, which will provide the necessary water and energy for expanded agriculture and mining production and improved river navigation. The proposed long-term integrated river basin development will require 35 to 40 years, with about $4 billion in investments required. OMVS has solicited external donor assistance to help finance its midterm program. Total commitments to the organization, which have been made since the first donor conference in 1974, are estimated at $300 million.

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1/The French title is, "Organization pour la Mis en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal."
OTHER REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

There are many additional regional organizations involved in some phase of the Sahel development effort. Following is a summary of some of these other organizations.

Interafrican Committee for Hydraulic Studies

Formed in 1960 as a regional and multinational approach to water resource development, the Interafrican Committee for Hydraulic Studies concentrates uniquely on western and central Africa. Composed of 13 member and 4 observer countries, the Committee is headquartered in Ouagadougou, Upper Volta.

The Committee's objectives are to assure a permanent means of exchanging information between its members in the field of water; to define both scientific and project-oriented studies on national and multinational bases and to try to fund them; and to provide technical assistance and study for preparing, implementing, and monitoring projects at its members' request.

In 1973 the United States established additional assistance in developing the Committee's capacity to (1) analyze regional water requirements and formulate an action program to meet them and (2) serve as a central dissemination agent for water-related information. These activities are organized as the Savanna Regional Water Resources and Land Use Project.

Joint Organization for Control of Locusts and Birds

The Joint Organization for Control of Locusts and Birds has the statutory responsibility for (1) preventive controlling of the desert locust and (2) controlling operations of grain-eating birds. Besides these responsibilities the Organization has been called upon to implement large-scale operations for controlling grasshoppers and other crop pests and to promote various pest control activities. The Organization is composed of 10 member countries—Benin, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, the Gambia, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad.

West Africa Rice Development Association

The West Africa Rice Development Association, headquartered in Monrovia, Liberia, is an intergovernmental
regional organization whose main aim is to make West Africa self-sufficient in rice. Formed in December 1971, its members are the Sahelian countries of the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal and other west African countries of Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Nigeria. Guinea Bissau became an associate member in 1975.

The members contribute to the Association's administrative budget, and cooperating countries and organizations finance research and development projects. The donors are the United States, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the Ford Foundation, UNDP, and the Consultative Group on International Research.

**Niger River Commission**

The Niger River Commission is an intergovernmental organization consisting of the countries of Cameroon, Chad, Benin, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Upper Volta. It was formed in 1963 to provide international cooperation for the development of the Niger basin's resources.

The Commission's functions are to:

-- prepare general regulations and, in particular, specific regulations for river navigation;

-- coordinate and maintain liaison between members;

-- assemble information and disseminate both data and project progress;

-- arrange bilateral and multilateral assistance for the execution of projects and studies; and

-- enter into agreements for such work.

**Lake Chad Basin Commission**

The Lake Chad Basin Commission was formed in 1964 by Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria to recommend, coordinate, and evaluate surveys and projects affecting this vast freshwater basin system. By special designation, it may also carry out specific projects.

Since 1969 the United States has assisted the Lake Chad Basin Commission with staff advisors, telecommunications, and road links between Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria, and a model livestock production project.
Each Sahelian country is responsible for its own national development planning and for implementing its own externally financed economic assistance projects. Yet the Sahelian countries have a limited capability to develop these plans and lack trained personnel to effectively implement them. This limitation has been identified as a fundamental constraint to program administration that needs to be changed.

Sahelian national development plans

We visited Senegal, Mali, and Upper Volta and found that each had a multiyear development plan intended to serve as a general guide to resource allocation. These countries' plans differed in such areas as format, sophistication, size, and the amount of financial information disclosed.

For example, Senegal's development plan included a comprehensive plan of execution updated quarterly. It provided detailed information on how the development was being implemented and financed. On the other hand, the Upper Volta plan was limited in scope. A technical advisor to the Upper Volta Ministry of Plans and many in-country donor officials said that Upper Volta's last plan, which ended in 1976, was basically a list of unintegrated projects suggested as possible ways to help the country's development. Upper Volta's current 5-year plan had not been published at the time of our review but was expected to be only slightly more complete than the last plan. The plan was not foreseen as an integrated plan for development.

None of the three countries had implemented all of the projects included in their previous plan. Also donor country officials and Sahelian officials were unable to state specifically the extent to which the governments' goals were fulfilled. In Upper Volta, UNDP officials estimated that the government had completed less than half the projects of its last 5-year plan; however, an advisor to the Ministry of Plans estimated the figure to be closer to 70-percent completion.

A Malian official stated that Mali had neither completed nor expected to complete all the projects in its last 5-year plan. By including more projects in a plan than can be completed, the Mali Government offers a catalog of projects from which donors can choose. In doing this, Mali attempts to
--include projects which address high priority needs,
--satisfy donors' special interests, and
--maintain a reserve of projects which can be implemented if additional resources become available.

Donor and Sahelian officials indicated that generally the projects in a country's national development plan should not be used as an indicator of the country's absorptive capacity. They suggested that these projects should be viewed as a country's ambitions but not necessarily what it could do even with unlimited funding. We were not given information on specific projects that could not be implemented currently even with unlimited funding. However, if these donor and Sahelian officials' perceptions are valid, the respective countries have absorptive capacities below the development level of 30 to 50 percent of the projects in the plans. Therefore, external donors should not assume that because a project appears in a country's development plan the country supports or can assume responsibility for that project.

**National CILSS committees**

A national organization is needed to fully integrate the results of CILSS' planning and programming work into the national development plan of each of the Sahelian countries. This role is assigned to the national CILSS committees, which are expected to:

--Clarify the design of CILSS first-generation projects and follow up on their execution.

--Assure the overall integration and coherence of CILSS national projects.

--Finalize the strategy of the different sectoral activities.

--Study or further work to improve the planning and execution of projects as well as to identify the second- and third-generation projects and programs.

--Assemble and distribute all information relating to CILSS and donor activities.

At the time of our review, only three national CILSS committees had been organized.
These committees are necessary to translate the programing work of the Club and CILSS into concrete national plans and projects. CILSS has requested member states to designate and organize committees which can effectively handle the CILSS programing process and has offered to help in organizing the committees.

PROGRAM COORDINATION

In the planning and programing process, how the various regional, national, and donor organizations will work together to implement SDP is not entirely clear. Little has been done to define the interrelationships among all the countries and organizations now engaged in development. For example, OMVS is responsible for the overall planning for the integrated development of the Senegal River Basin, yet the relationships among this organization, CILSS, and SDP have not been established.

Efficient implementation of the active and planned development activities in the Sahel requires a management structure to coordinate the efforts of all these organizations. In addition, completing the work in process to improve the capability of regional and national organizations involved in the development process is essential.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, we recommend that the Administrator, AID:

--Encourage the donors, CILSS, and national governments to develop an overall management plan which spells out how SDP will be managed. This plan should identify the role and responsibilities of the organizations, institutions, and governments involved.

--Assist in strengthening the development planning and management capabilities of the regional and national organizations responsible for planning and implementing SDP.

--Continue to work with CILSS, national governments, and other donors to establish more effective methods for coordinating the work of the donor governments and international organizations.
CHAPTER 5

POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE
UTILIZATION OF EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE BY THE SAHELIAN COUNTRIES

The success of the proposed escalation in external assistance to the Sahelian countries depends heavily upon the countries' ability to utilize effectively the expected aid. Concerning the potential constraints to such effective utilization in Senegal, Mali, and Upper Volta, we concentrated on officials' perceptions concerning the

-- strengths and weaknesses of the country in physical institutional infrastructure,

-- saturation points at which the country will be unable to effectively absorb further development assistance and strategies developed or being developed to deal with increasing the absorptive capacity of the country, and

-- type and size of development program that the country could support.

Sahelian officials appear enthusiastic about development and desire more assistance. In general, the Sahelians are anxious to get projects underway and are concerned about the laxity of the donor project approval process. They have indicated that less study and more action is required. Sahelian officials did not foresee major problems in absorbing additional assistance provided donors are willing to fund a large part of the local and recurring costs. However, an AID official indicated that some Sahelian officials do not conceptualize their country's capacity to absorb increased amounts of assistance in the same way Europeans do. Instead, Sahelians believe they can effectively absorb the level of assistance currently being developed.

ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

Definitions of a country's absorptive capacity are not precise. Absorptive capacity is generally understood as barriers inherent in the Sahelian countries which constrain the identification, design, implementation, or continuance of development projects and programs.
Senegal, Mali, and Upper Volta shared many of the same absorptive capacity constraints but to different degrees. The countries' greatest problems centered around:

--Lack of trained administrative and technical personnel and structural weaknesses within the governments.

--Weak road network.

--Limited internal sources of financial resources.

A discussion of these problems follows.

Lack of trained administrative and technical personnel

The lack of trained administrative and technical personnel is considered by many Sahelian and donor officials to be the Sahelian countries' greatest development constraint. The magnitude of this problem varies from country to country. AID officials indicated that Senegal has a much greater number of technicians and administrators than any other Sahelian country, while Chad and Mauritania have almost no trained personnel.

Although Senegal is considered to have the greatest supply of trained people, there is a shortage of competent administrators to effectively manage the current levels of development assistance. Senegal officials at the very top of each ministry are able managers with the authority and initiative to make decisions. However, the top officials are often carrying large workloads, causing eventual delays in making many decisions regarding a major project.

Some donor officials concluded that the shortage of decisionmakers was more severe in the other Sahelian countries. Some officials commented that though many administrators had the ability and authority to make decisions, some lacked the initiative to act. The donors believed the Sahelian countries' greatest administrative deficiencies were at the middle- and lower-management levels. There seems to be a chronic shortage of administrators capable of managing and implementing programs. Administrative personnel shortages include planners, managers, financial and accounting personnel, and trained extension agents. In the past, this deficiency was not so apparent or critical because the expertise needed was supplied by the donor through an expatriate. This practice is now resisted by the Sahelians.
because they want to participate more actively in their own development.

Sahelian officials do not generally agree that there are shortages of capable government administrators. One Malian official, for example, states that there is a surplus of trained administrative personnel in Mali. These officials will likely identify the lack of trained technicians such as agronomists, geologists, engineers, hydrologists, range and livestock management experts, marketing advisors, and forestry specialists. Virtually all technical skills needed in an underdeveloped country are needed in the Sahel.

The shortage of trained technicians is worsened by the use of technicians as administrators. Sahelian students sent abroad are usually trained as technicians rather than administrators. However, to satisfy their countries' administrative needs, technicians often become administrators after working a few years in their technical fields. Many technicians are not using their skills, and many administrators lack administrative skills.

For example, there are only 10 native physicians in the entire country of Upper Volta, and 6 are in administrative positions while 4 actually practice medicine. A similar situation exists in veterinary medicine, where out of 18 trained veterinarians in Upper Volta, only 1 works as a veterinarian; the rest are administrators.

Host government structural weaknesses

Personnel problems are frequently compounded by the organizational structure of the Sahelian governments. The governments' structure is similar to that of the former colonial governments. When the Sahelian countries became independent, nationals were moved into the positions formerly occupied by the colonial bureaucrats with very few changes in the ministries' organization. Government business often must pass through many channels before any decision is made. Frequently business matters reach the top of a ministry before a decision is finally reached.

Strategies employed to address personnel and structural constraints

The primary strategies used in the Sahelian countries to address the need for more administrative and technical skills include:
-- Increasing the use of university or technical training in-country at such institutions as the Veterinarian Science Institute; the Polytechnical Institute in Senegal; the Malian University Livestock Agricultural Training School, supported by the African Development Bank; the Malian Institute, supported by UNDP in Mali; and the National Education Institute in Upper Volta.

-- Sending qualified Africans abroad for technical or university training.

-- Redesigning the primary and secondary school curriculums to relate more to the needs of the general population in the Sahel.

-- Providing training in administrative skills on a somewhat limited seminar basis by the Pan African Institute. The seminars have centered on practical midlevel instruction, without a fixed curriculum.

-- Training technicians and lower-level operators through a training component in virtually every development project being designed and implemented. Training is being requested by the Sahelians and is seen as a vital, necessary element of the project.

-- Relying on expatriates to provide technical assistance and to administer development projects. Although not a desirable alternative, expatriates are prevalent because of the skill shortages. Expatriates are expensive; contracted U.S. personnel in Upper Volta can cost more than $100,000 a year a person. In Senegal, the cost of an expatriate technician is estimated to be seven or eight times more expensive than a comparable Senegal technician. The use of expatriates deprives Sahelians of opportunities to obtain needed experience, which further retards the country's development. In addition, expatriates do not always understand or take into account cultural constraints and are not fully familiar with the relevance of certain development concepts.

-- Instituting certain government reforms. Rather than direct changes to existing ministries, regional or commodity development organizations have been created and used to make administering
development assistance more efficient. These organizations (1) are usually quasi-governmental, (2) have their own budgets, and (3) operate semi-autonomously from ministries. They are generally geared for a particular region, type of development, or commodity.

The Club's synthesis report on human resources outlined a strategy for addressing the improvement and expansion of trained administrative and technical personnel in the Sahel. This strategy calls for redesigning the existing education and training systems and institutions. The report recommended that the strategy:

-- Harmonize various training schemes.
-- Appraise existing training institutes.
-- Adjust the training curriculum in line with Sahelian evolution.
-- Orient training development to all levels.

Along these lines, AID signed a grant agreement with the International Labor Organization, which is assessing training needs in the Sahel. The study is intended to rapidly compile existing information on the supply and demand for training on a country-by-country as well as a regional basis. The study will provide AID and other Club participants with essential information to plan systematic training programs over the next 4 to 5 years. It will emphasize middle- and high-level training needs in the principal sectors covered by the Club's working groups and should provide relevant information on the numbers of qualified candidates available to receive training.

Inadequate roads

Sahelian countries have many physical infrastructure weaknesses. The lack of adequate roads in the Sahel is a major barrier to development. Many areas of the region are almost inaccessible, and the few existing roads often become impassable during the rainy season. Inadequate or nonexistent roads generally were viewed by donors as well as Sahelians to be the most critical structural weakness. Only in western Senegal have enough roads been constructed to cause instead an emphasis on dams or irrigation system projects. Even Senegal, however, lacks roads along its inland borders and in the entire eastern area.
In Upper Volta and Mali, transporting goods or commodities in or out of these countries or even from one part to another is difficult due to poor roads. The UNDP Resident Representative in Upper Volta said there was not a food deficiency in Upper Volta in the worst years of the drought but a lack of means to move food to needy areas.

Transportation problems worsened in Mali and Upper Volta because they are landlocked. Both countries have some access to port facilities in neighboring countries. However, the long distances to the ports make transportation slow and costly. When commodities cannot be transported far because transportation is uneconomical, farmers have no markets for their commodities.

Officials in the Sahel cited many other economic and social problems associated with the lack of roads, such as an extremely short vehicle life, time lost in traveling, and the difficulties of uniting and developing areas when the people are physically isolated.

**Strategies addressing transportation problems**

There is general agreement that adequate roads are needed in all the Sahelian countries for increasing their ability to absorb funding. However, very little information was available on specific strategies needed to address the road problem. In effect, the only strategies identified by officials were "a road should be built from here to there," or "we are building a road here," and similar generalities.

We noted that the following transport strategy was in the Club's synthesis report:

---In the short term the Sahel needs to upgrade and maintain the existing roads, which entail urgent actions to protect the existing structure. In the short term a few new roads will be required to support certain production programs.

---In the medium term the Sahel needs to adapt its transport network to agricultural development needs. The main concerns are (1) connecting isolated production zones with commercial circuits, (2) building new roads and rural access roads to complement the new irrigated areas and the newly opened lands, and (3) adapting the network to the present flow of traffic.
In the long term the Sahel needs to restructure its roads to focus more on trade within its countries.

The report concluded that the present roads fragment, and therefore weaken, the Sahelian market and potential internal supply systems. The roads facilitate the import of manufactured goods from many non-African countries to the Sahel but make inter-African trade very difficult. The Sahel transport system can be used as a limited development tool. However, the network is an outgrowth of the colonial period and is generally designed to complement French commerce. The system is not very effective today in promoting economic cooperation for the Sahel.

The Club synthesis report also states that there is a need for an East-West heavy transport artery linking the Sahelian countries with each other, opening markets, and increasing access to the sea for the landlocked countries. The report states that a study of such a system should be started soon so that the related engineering work could be completed before the end of the century.

In February 1978 AID said additional road studies had been completed; a report, "Road Maintenance Diagnostic Study for the Sahel," was recently published. We have not analyzed this report, which was prepared for the Club's Transport and Infrastructure Working Group. It focuses on the formulation of a 6-year road maintenance program in the Sahel.

**Limited financial resources**

Sahelian countries have limited financial resources to fund needed projects and to maintain the projects. Many donor and Sahelian officials view financing of recurring projects and local investment costs for externally supported projects as serious barriers to development.

Although donors' policies vary considerably, often external development aid covers only the foreign exchange portion of project costs. The recipient has usually been asked to pay for the local resources associated with the initial investment (labor or locally produced inputs) and invariably must absorb the recurring costs, such as maintenance and operation, of the project. A small number of projects and a small amount of required domestic funding allowed this system to function acceptably. This system assured that the recipient country was involved and had a
stake in the success of the project. It also enabled external donors to give their limited resources to a few needy countries.

However, when there are a large number of projects requiring a lot of foreign aid—which appears to be the long-range intention for the Sahel—the local cost to the recipient can be enormous. This situation can impede those recipient countries which have limited financial resources from fully supporting the local costs of the projects.

A working paper, "Foreign Aid and the Domestic Costs of Sahel Development Projects," written by a team of AID contractors, was prepared to describe a possible technique for analyzing recurring costs and their implications. In the paper an illustration was used which simulated a $10 billion investment program with expenditures spread equally over 10 years. Although the examples given were not intended to be definitive or empirical, the resulting levels of local investment and recurring costs were immense. For example, $6.8 billion would be needed to cover local investment and recurring costs over the first 10 years for a $10 billion investment program. The authors placed these figures in perspective by noting that the combined gross national product of the Sahelian countries was only about $3.2 billion and government revenue was $483 million in 1974. Therefore, the sum of the average annual local investment costs and the average annual recurring costs required by the illustration was 1.4 times the 1974 government revenues, or 21 percent of the Sahel's gross national product for that year. Although these projections are not exact, the implications of such a situation suggest that the donors need to explore alternatives to the Sahelian countries' assuming such large local investment and recurring costs.

Strategies being used to address limited financial resources constraints

The Sahelians have taken certain actions to address limited financial constraints. These include

--encouraging foreign private investment,
--promoting export of local goods and commodities,
--imposing some import restrictions,
--encouraging domestic production providing substitutes for imports, and

--developing new cash crops primarily for export.

Experts also are examining the problems caused by the general requirement that Sahel countries finance the local investment and recurring costs of development projects. Donor and Sahelian authorities hope to find practical alternatives to the present cost requirement, which the Sahelian countries will be able to satisfy in the immediate future.

OPINIONS EXPRESSED REGARDING CONSTRAINTS AND STRATEGIES

Both Sahelian and donor officials stated that Senegal, Mali, and Upper Volta can effectively absorb more assistance. Most officials believe, however, that the extent to which more assistance can be effectively absorbed depends on the mix of projects. Many officials believe that increases in assistance can be absorbed easiest in the form of large infrastructure projects. Ideally, such assistance would be grant assistance with donors assuming a portion of the local and recurring costs. Officials generally agreed that infrastructure projects require less administrative effort from local officials and fewer technical counterparts, and that local governments will be more inclined to support these projects after external assistance has ended. These officials also reiterated that such projects are severely needed and will serve as the basis for other forms of development.

Some donor officials said that rural development projects have been difficult for the Sahelian countries to absorb. The management oversight required is frequently disproportionately large for the size of the project. Also, the local governments have difficulty providing the technicians required because of

--lack of trained local personnel,
--inability to pay additional salary costs, or
--resistance to placing people in remote outlying areas.

Officials pointed out that (1) rural development projects often take decades to produce any great changes and (2) local governments have tended to drop such projects after donor support ceases or during difficult economic
periods. Yet rural development projects are generally recognized as important means for external assistance to reach the poorest people in the Sahel.

CONCLUSIONS

The ability of the Sahelian countries to effectively absorb considerable amounts of external development assistance for a long time—and thereby increase their capacity to more effectively achieve future growth—is crucial for Sahel development. Even if comprehensive, integrated, and sophisticated planning processes are developed to define specific development needs and detailed projects, efforts will not be successful or lasting unless the constraints are conscientiously, adequately, and continually addressed.

We recognize that strategies are being developed and studies undertaken which begin to address these constraints or attempt to measure their impact or magnitude. Such studies include the AID International Labor Organization study and the local and recurring cost inquiry. These studies are necessary first steps and further efforts should be encouraged and pursued. But beyond strategy formulation and studies, projects should be designed to maximize improvement of the region's limitations. Also, AID should establish common approaches among donors for addressing the various constraints in the Sahel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Administrator, AID, insure that each of its assistance projects in the Sahel:

-- Trains individuals to alleviate the region's lack of skilled administrative and technical personnel and to help insure continuity of the development process.

-- Includes a stipulation clearly stating the extent that AID will finance recurring investment costs and establishes a timetable which specifies when the recipient must absorb this financial responsibility.

-- Considers the need for local cost financing and, where justified, provides it.
We also recommend that the Administrator encourage other donors, countries, and organizations participating in the development process to apply these principles in regard to training and local and recurrent investment cost financing as used by the United States.
CHAPTER 6

UNITED STATES’ PROGRAM AND SDP--

THEIR RELATIONSHIP

Since the mid-1970s, AID's bilateral programs in the Sahel have been operating in food production, livestock production and marketing, and health and human resources. The Club considers these sectors integral to the Sahel's development process. Therefore, AID's policy is to actively support the Club and participate in its establishing long-range strategies for Sahel development.

Under that policy AID's ongoing regular bilateral projects, which are consistent with the Club strategies, are to be phased into SDP. For instance, 10 of the 22 projects for which funding was requested for SDP in 1978 are continuations of 1977 regular bilateral projects. Additional regular bilateral projects are being considered for shifting to special funding in 1979.

After 1980 most of AID's regular bilateral projects in the Sahel will be focused on the same sectors as the Club. However, some projects will remain outside the Sahel funding account, such as regional projects which provide linkage between Sahelian countries and neighboring countries like Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria.

As stated on page 9, the development strategies presented at the Ottawa meeting were accepted by Club members. However, these strategies were not precise enough to assure immediate formulation of an overall development program which, when implemented, would achieve food self-sufficiency in the Sahel.

PAST AND CURRENT U.S. ASSISTANCE

The United States began providing bilateral assistance to Chad, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta in 1961; Mauritania in 1958; the Gambia in 1956; and the Cape Verde Islands in 1975. Cumulatively through September 30, 1977, U.S. assistance, including food made available under Public Law 480, was valued at about $475 million. However, most of that aid--$306 million--was provided following the great drought of 1968 to 1973. Almost two-thirds of the aid since 1973 has consisted of emergency food supplies and
special drought relief projects. As of September 30, 1977, $25 million of the $306 million programmed after the drought remained unspent.

The following summary table shows the total U.S. assistance planned for the Sahel as presented to the Congress for fiscal year 1978.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Regular law 480 programs</th>
<th>Public Law 480 projections</th>
<th>SDP</th>
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<tr>
<td>Food and nutrition</td>
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<td>a/$26.5</td>
<td>$15.1</td>
<td>b/c/$23.8</td>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>e/ 2.6</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP planning</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$99.4</td>
<td>$34.3</td>
<td>$15.1</td>
<td>d/$50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/Includes $2 million programmed for Sahel regional activities started in previous years.

b/Includes rainfed and irrigated agriculture and livestock.

c/Includes AID's estimated first-year costs of $5 million attributed to the recently negotiated Sahel Crop Protection Program.

d/Includes $200 million authorized for SDP on a multiyear basis and $50 million appropriated to remain available until expended.

e/Includes work on environmental factors contributing to endemic diseases and nutritional deprivation.
FUTURE U.S. ASSISTANCE

Over the next 5 years, AID is principally concerned with using existing methods and technology for crop production, protection, and storage in developing the Sahel region. During 1978 to 1982 AID will consider various ways to develop rainfed agriculture, range management, and livestock production along with feeder road and health care programs. However, nearly all future aid is in the early project design stage.

As its initial effort in developing AID's 1979 country program, AID missions in the Sahel proposed projects estimated at approximately $150 million. The missions proposed continuing to fund a mixture of training, institutional, and research projects in the human resource, agriculture, livestock, and health sectors. The proposals represented few newly innovative U.S.-financed projects. They are generally efforts to overcome specific constraints to improving agricultural production and health delivery systems in the Sahel.

For 1982 to 1990 AID sees U.S. assistance being directed at (1) extending farm production throughout the Sahel in conjunction with developing an adequate and equitable distribution of improved farm services, (2) developing extensive storage facilities, crop protection services, and marketing systems, (3) promoting programs to improve commercial sales of livestock and management of range resources, (4) continuing to expand education, training, and health programs, and (5) promoting family planning.

By 1990 a number of Sahel water basins--Senegal River, Niger River, Gambia River, and Lake Chad/Logone River--will be developed. AID believes that some large irrigation development will be underway. It feels that over a long-term period, the institution building, training, and research projects, undertaken before 1990, will contribute heavily toward economic growth and food self-sufficiency.

In October and November 1977, AID evaluated its originally proposed 1979 AID country programs and projects to reduce differences between AID's SDP and Club strategies to achieve food self-sufficiency in the Sahel. Each AID mission in the Sahel was required to review Club strategy documents and analyze the

--relationship of Club sectoral strategies to AID programs proposed by 1979,
contribution of current and proposed AID projects to the Club sectoral goals, and

integration of AID and other donor programs.

Teams of specialists from AID headquarters in Washington and AID's regional development office in the Ivory Coast visited the missions to assist in the strategy analysis and preparation of country statements on U.S. program strategy.

We do not know the final impact of that inhouse review upon AID's later SDP programming. However, the review tried to (1) provide a fuller understanding of how actual assistance flows into the Sahel relate to Club program strategies and (2) develop concepts for AID's 1979 SDP report to the Congress. There was a general consensus that AID's 1979 proposed projects and much of the assistance provided by other Club donors were consistent with the broad Club strategies. Yet, AID programming officials at overseas missions were not qualified to suggest projects which were fully integrated with the overall SDP. The SDP programming process had not yet produced a full range of project proposals in a form and substance useful to AID programmers.

This review implied that the sector strategies produced by the Club and CILSS did not adequately consider the complexities involved in project design and implementation. Also cited was the danger of moving ahead too fast given the limited ability of the Sahelian countries to absorb large amounts of development aid. In addition, much more consideration should have been given to the sociological changes implied in the Club and CILSS strategies. This latter point was also seen from the view that the Club established strategies in terms of national production targets instead of targets for satisfying individual needs.

At selected AID missions in the Sahel which we visited between August and November 1977, SDP, the Club, and CILSS were viewed favorably by mission and embassy officials. They saw SDP as a new source of financing and providing increased levels of AID country programs. Thus, they perceived an increased management responsibility at the missions. However, they did not foresee any large immediate changes in the type of AID projects they have been managing. Officials also expressed concern about the past difficulties in recruiting qualified French-speaking Americans to implement and manage U.S.-financed development projects in the villages of the Sahel.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, THE CONGRESS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN THE SAHEL

The role of infrastructure in SDP is very important. SDP recognizes the need for the long-term development of the river basins and the corollary need to establish the infrastructure essential to effective development.

One of the major long-term development opportunities in the Sahel is the major river basins of the Senegal, Niger, and Volta Rivers. This development would involve constructing major dams and large-scale irrigation in conjunction with agriculture development projects. On the other hand development is hindered by a shortage of basic physical infrastructure, such as inadequate roads.

AID, however, doubts its ability to participate in financing major Sahel projects. AID also has reservations about financing major road projects. Officials believe the projects are inconsistent with the congressional mandate of insuring that projects are aimed at the poor majority.

In authorizing $200 million for the initial U.S. share of the Sahel development effort, the Congress has allowed AID to participate in infrastructure projects to a limited degree.

AID's General Counsel analyzed the legislative history of the Sahel legislation, including the language contained in the fiscal year 1978 Conference Report. It concluded that while there were some problems of interpretation, the authorizing legislation can be construed as granting authority for the United States to participate in financing a "fair share" of SDP infrastructure. The General Counsel also noted that the Conference Report invited a dialogue between congressional committees and AID regarding the (1) amount of infrastructure contemplated under the total SDP, (2) kind of capital activities to be developed, and (3) role of the United States in such activities.

CONCLUSIONS

The international efforts to develop an overall SDP have resulted in a broader range of knowledge for achieving food self-sufficiency and improving economic and social conditions in the Sahel. However, the combined efforts for developing an operational SDP are only beginning. Much additional refinement of broad sectoral strategies and the
association of those strategies with individual country resources and needs are required. Until an operational SDP is developed, the assurance that available internal and external resources are being used effectively will remain uncertain.

AID, for instance, is carrying out a 1978 program and proposing another for 1979; both are generally consistent with the Club's broad strategies. However, there is no existing strategy or criteria assuring that the $99 million AID programed for 1978 and the amounts proposed for 1979 will be fully complementary to the detailed projects of the SDP planning process.

Since the momentum of international efforts to attain food self-sufficiency in the Sahel is well underway, we believe AID should set an example by not committing large sums of funds to projects which may not represent the most effective way to achieve the program goal. The overall effort to explore problems and development strategy should continue with AID's assistance. However, AID should carefully examine the funding of U.S. projects already underway in the Sahel and the newly proposed projects with a view toward timing the orderly incorporation of the U.S. program with the overall SDP.

AID seems unsure of how it can effectively participate in the major infrastructure development opportunities in the Sahel. In our opinion, for effective development in the Sahel, the major infrastructure problems must be remedied. Also, some of the region's more promising development opportunities should be taken advantage of.

The need to clarify AID's role concerning infrastructure in developing countries has been recognized in the proposed revision to the foreign assistance legislation, introduced in the Senate on January 30, 1978 (S. 2420). The bill clearly outlines the importance of basic infrastructure, such as marketing facilities, rural infrastructure, rural utilities, institutional development, and transportation and communications systems to the development process. Enactment of these or similar legislative proposals would clarify AID's authority for financing infrastructure projects and allow it to participate more effectively in the development process in the Sahel.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

In developing the composition of U.S. assistance programs for the Sahel for fiscal year 1979 and beyond, we recommend that the Administrator, AID, insure that the U.S. programs are consistent with overall SDP and complement donor programs. We recommend that he consider the absorptive ability of the individual countries and the entire Sahel region. In doing this, the Administrator, AID, should time the beginning of new projects so that the projects can be effectively phased into the overall SDP.

We also recommend that the Administrator, AID, inform the Congress of the (1) amount of infrastructure contemplated under SDP, (2) priority and potential of these projects, and (3) role of the United States in such activities.
The increase in commitments in the Sahel from 1974 to 1977 demonstrates the continuing concern to assist and rehabilitate the least developed, poorest nations. Yet there is some concern that much of the effort has not been fully productive and that more attention should be given to action rather than research studies.

Research and studies have been a major part of AID's development assistance efforts in central and western Africa. In addition to AID's regular research and study activities in the Sahel, the Congress appropriated $5 million under the African Development Program in fiscal year 1976 for continuing studies, research, and planning activities for the Sahel. Under this program, AID awarded 15 contracts to American universities, private and international organizations, and Sahelian governments to undertake studies and projects along the lines proposed for ODP and presented to the Congress in 1976. AID programmed another $3.5 million for project design activities in fiscal year 1977 to fund research and study activities.

AID considered the studies started in fiscal year 1976 and continued in fiscal year 1977 necessary to provide the preliminary information and data vital to long-term development. AID also plans to finance a $5.5 million project in fiscal year 1978 to establish an analytic data base for identifying investment opportunities which are necessary for sound program design and implementation.

Along with numerous other donors, AID completed studies during the same time frame which determined the Sahel's long-term development needs. Among the first of these studies was the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's "Framework for Evaluating Long-Term Strategies for the Development of the Sahel-Sudan Region" funded by AID. Other studies included the U.N. Sahelian Office's "An Approach to Recovery and Rehabilitation of the Sudano-Sahelian Region," the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's "World Bank Approach to Economic Development of Sahel," the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization's "Perspective Study of Agricultural Development in Countries of the Sahel Area," UNDP's "Progress Report on the Drought-Stricken Regions of..."
Africa and Adjacent Areas," the Centre for Research on Economic Development's "Recent Economic Evaluation of the Sahel," and reports of various French agencies. AID concluded:

"These studies all suggest the necessity of planning for the Sahel as a single economic entity, including the Sahel's vitalities to contiguous territories, especially those along the coast. Furthermore, the major studies all support, subject to more precise definition, the declared long-term objectives of the CILSS: food self-sufficiency in the context of accelerated, economic and social development. The major studies are also unanimous in respecting the long-term nature of the task (20-30 years). These studies assume that the comprehensive character of the Sahel program will necessitate an integrated development in which agronomists, river basin engineers, educators, health specialists, and other specialists must work together. It is expected that no single donor can provide the level or even the type of assistance which are required."

An analysis and synthesis of these studies were also carried out by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. According to the Organization, the studies reviewed the possible strategies in the areas of (1) traditional nonirrigated crops, (2) irrigated crops, and (3) animal husbandry achieving a new agriculture livestock balance. In these three areas the studies concluded that many constructive actions could be taken.

These studies also concluded, as indicated by the Organization, that the Sahel region could reach food self-sufficiency within the next 20 to 30 years. Actions toward this goal should be:

--Large scale rather than piecemeal because they should affect the majority of the populations.

--Diversified to take into account different climatic and soil characteristics in the region.

--Cautious because dry-land farming and its techniques are adapted to a difficult environment.
To also assist and rehabilitate the Sahel, numerous international bodies studied problem areas in the Sudano-Saharan region.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>International body</th>
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<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>Nov. 1973</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Foreign Trade</td>
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<td>Human Resources</td>
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<td>Livestock</td>
<td>U.N. Sahel Office</td>
<td>Nov. 1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meteorological and Hydrological Services</td>
<td>World Meteorologist Organization</td>
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<td>Transport</td>
<td>U.N.</td>
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<td>Water Management</td>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>Nov. 1973</td>
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**STUDIES THAT DID NOT LEAD TOWARD SOLUTIONS**

Some development officials fear that many studies have not led to any development. For example, the Livestock Team noted that the Sahelian countries did not have the amount or quality of information to evaluate the extent livestock production can be developed without causing over-exploitation. Much of the information made available from past research and study activities is not effectively usable. The information is often incomplete and limited to a small number of irrelevant themes.
The Livestock Team unanimously agreed that (1) past studies did not provide complete knowledge of the livestock production problems, (2) more complete information of the natural resources was vital, and (3) SDP objectives could be achieved by closely associating research and action. Some Sahelian officials, however, were concerned that long periods of studies could delay concrete actions.

In Mauritania, AID is financing five separate studies directed toward working out development strategies. These studies are centered on personnel, employment, rural sector assessment, health, and renewable resources analyses. Addressing these AID efforts, Mauritania officials said they did not want additional academic studies but comprehensive ones that could be directed toward development action.

The issue of research studies appears to be equally important to AID. AID is also concerned that the (1) proposed studies are too academic, (2) they are financing too ambitious projects, and (3) Mauritania may not participate fully in these studies.

STUDIES BEYOND THE SAHELIAN'S CAPABILITIES

Certain development officials are also apprehensive that some research and study activities are far beyond the capabilities of the Sahelian governments.

AID awarded a $519,880 contract in fiscal year 1976 to a private organization charged with providing Mali with basic information. This information was to be on the soil and vegetation resources of specific land areas for (1) planning, designing, and implementing an extensive grazing project and (2) providing baseline data on soil and vegetation resources for use in evaluating the ecological impact of the project. The contractor and Malian counterparts worked on the contract between May 1976 and February 1977. During this period AID provided technical liaison and logistical support.

In February 1977 the contractor presented a final report to the Malian government and AID. Various aspects of the report concerning cartographic presentation, accuracy, validity, analysis, and interpretation were questioned by Mali. AID then reviewed the report to determine if the contractor had satisfactorily fulfilled contract requirements.

The field review team determined that the report was generally below acceptable levels and did not reflect the
situation in many aspects. However, it also concluded that Mali did not fully appreciate the ecological approach to resource inventory and evaluation and its usefulness in rangeland planning, development, and management. Without additional training in rangeland resource planning development and management, the Malians may not be able to fully utilize outputs of the completed resource inventory and analysis.

CONCLUSIONS

The studies performed so far suggest the need for coordination among development institutions and for better direction over the research effort.

Generalized studies of the broad development problems in the Sahel have been made by the World Bank, the United Nations, AID, and others. Many of these analyzed similar problems and issues and reached the same basic conclusions. Despite the need for sound information as a basis for planning, some of the studies have not been fully productive. For example, the Livestock Team discounted the usefulness of previous studies and suggested the need for a series of additional studies to provide a base for development planning.

We believe there is a need for more coordination among the donors and Sahelian governments to guard against making unnecessary duplicate studies. Also, there is a need to make future studies or research more active and to avoid using sophisticated methods which cannot be used effectively by Sahelian governments.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, we recommend that the Administrator, AID, work collectively with the international community to limit future research and study to studies needed to supplement existing ones. Nonproductive studies should be eliminated, and research actually performed should result in effective follow-on development. Such actions should include:

--Capitalizing on existing studies and research to obtain maximum utilization of previous efforts.

--Directing future studies toward specific problems to obtain practical solutions.
--Coordinating study and research activities among American universities, Federal agencies, foundations, donor and host countries, private and international organizations, and financial institutions.
CHAPTER 8

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed the legislation pertinent to U.S. participation in the evolving SDP. We accumulated and reviewed data relative to (1) the formulation and operations of CILSS and the Club, (2) AID's activities for assisting the Sahel, and (3) the participation of external donors, including the United States, in the overall assistance efforts in the Sahel. We held discussions with AID officials and, in the United States, obtained data from officials of certain international organizations, American universities, voluntary agencies, and western African regional organizations.

During August through November 1977, we visited the Sahel countries of Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, and Niger. We obtained and reviewed pertinent data, observed selected development projects and, talked with appropriate officials of the United States, foreign national governments, international and regional organizations, and other donors. During that period we also visited, obtained data, and talked with appropriate officials of the Secretariat, the Club in Paris, France; the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization and U.S. mission to the Organization in Rome, Italy; and AID's West African Regional Economic Development Services Office in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

Our work was directed primarily toward (1) examining AID's efforts to carry out the congressional mandate to develop and implement a long-term, multilateral, multirecipient program for the Sahel, (2) identifying problems and constraints facing the success of those efforts, and (3) understanding the interrelationship of Sahelian national governments, CILSS, the Club, West African regional organizations, and donors in developing the Sahel.
GENERAL SCHEME FOR PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE SAHEL

ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES AND INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL ACTIVITIES

SUPPORT TO NATIONAL COMMITTEES

PROGRAMING PLANNING COORDINATING REGIONAL MANAGEMENT

APPLIED RESEARCH AND INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION

MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

WORKING GROUP

IMPLEMENTATION OF REGIONAL PROJECTS

SOURCE: CLUB DU SAHEL
MEMBERS OF THE PRODUCTION AND INTEGRATING TEAMS OF THE CLUB DU SAHEL

LIVESTOCK
- Mali
- U.S.
- Gambia
- Chad
- FAO
- France
- CILSS
- FED
- IBRD
- Netherlands
- Niger

RAINFED AGRICULTURE
- Chad
- FAO
- Niger
- France
- U.S.
- CILSS
- UNDP
- IBRD
- Netherlands

IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE
- Senegal
- France
- Canada
- Mauritania
- IBRD
- UNDP
- CILSS
- FAO
- WARDA
- U.S.
- Netherlands

FISHERIES
- Mali
- Canada
- France
- CILSS
- CEAO
- Germany

ECOLOGY
- Care Verde
- Switzerland
- France
- Germany
- U.S.
- Canada
- IBRD
- Belgium
- UNDP
- FAO

TECHNOLOGY ADAPTATION
- Gambia
- Germany
- Belgium
- Switzerland
- UNDP
- CILSS
- Canada
- U.S.

HUMAN RESOURCES & HEALTH
- Niger
- UNDP
- WHO
- UNESCO
- UNICEF
- NGOs
- France
- CILSS
- Senegal
- UNDP
- U.S.

TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE
- Chad
- CILSS
- IBRD
- Mauritania
- France
- UNSO
- Mali
- Canada
- UNDP

MARKETING PRICE POLICY, STORAGE
- Senegal
- FED
- U.S.
- Gambia
- Mali
- Niger
- WARDA
- UNSO
- FAO
- Upper Volta


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APPENDIX III

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS CURRENTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE:
Cyrus R. Vance Jan. 1977

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ADMINISTRATOR:
John J. Gilligan Mar. 1977

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR AFRICA:
Goler T. Butcher Apr. 1977

COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, MALI:
Ronald Levin Nov. 1974

COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, NIGER:
Jay P. Johnson Nov. 1977

AREA DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, SENEGAL:
M. Norman Schoonover Sept. 1974

COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, UPPER VOLTA:
John Hoskins Aug. 1974

DIRECTOR, REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SERVICES OFFICE/WEST AFRICA:
Miles Wedeman June 1974

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