
Report to Secretary, Department of Defense; by H. L. Krieger, Director, Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.

Issue Area: Personnel Management and Compensation (300);

Contact: Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.


Organization Concerned: Department of the Navy; Department of the Army; Department of the Air Force.

Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Armed Services; Senate Committee on Armed Services.


Since the all-volunteer force began, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services have substantially recruited the quantity and quality of personnel needed. Recruiting shortfalls from July 1 through December 31, 1976, aroused some concern for the level of recruiting that might be experienced over the next several years; however, the 6-month period from January through June 1977 showed improvement.

Findings/Conclusions: DOD and the military services have expanded the recruiting program to accommodate the volunteer force concept. More than 1,170,500 people have been recruited into the all-volunteer force through fiscal year (FY) 1976, at a cost of $1.48 billion. By the end of 1978, approximately 1,975,000 people will have been recruited at a 5-year recruiting program cost of about $2.66 billion. The management and operation of the recruiting program--consisting of the recruiting staff, advertising, enlistment bonuses, and recruit examining and processing--remain the key elements of recruiting success. The size and composition of the recruiting forces is believed to be closely related to success in meeting quantity and quality goals. For FY 1978, the recruiting forces will cost approximately $378.4 million; advertising will cost about $105.6 million. The enlistment bonus program has increased from $43 million during FY 1974 to a proposed $74.5 million for 1978.

(Author/SW)
Recruiting For The All-Volunteer Force: A Summary Of Costs And Achievements

Up to now the Department of Defense and the military services have largely met their goals for quantity and quality in recruits.

Various changes in recruiting management and operation have been implemented over the last few years. The Department and the services view many of these as ground breaking activity leading to further improvements.

Several major alternatives have been proposed to solve recruiting difficulties. Many appear worthy of further study.
The Honorable  
The Secretary of Defense  

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We have completed an overview of selected military recruiting activities. Because of the growing concern for the future of the all-volunteer force (AVF), we summarized and provided a more current view on primary areas of interest that were addressed in three previous reports. These reports are: "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits" (FPCD-75-170, Feb. 27, 1976), "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting" (FPCL-75-169, Mar. 5, 1976), and "Advertising for Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It?" (FPCD-76-168, Mar. 29, 1976).

As you are aware, due to the new level of concern for AVF's future, various groups, including DOD, have proposed many options and alternatives during the past year. Some of these proposals are associated with the management and operation of the recruiting program; others address some of the broader staffing policy questions and issues.

Despite the potential impact many of these proposals would have on the sustainability of the AVF concept, we nevertheless believe that efforts to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the recruiting program should be continued.

We had the opportunity to have representatives of the Accession and Retention Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), informally review the draft of this report to assure the correctness of the information presented. We did not attempt to verify the accuracy of the statistics and dollar figures obtained from various DOD reports, documents, or discussions with DOD personnel.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the
B-157371

House Committee on Government Operations; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

We appreciate the courtesy extended to us by your Department and service officials during this effort.

Sincerely yours,

H. L. Krieger
Director
Since the all-volunteer force began, the Department of Defense and the services have substantially recruited the quantity and quality of personnel needed. Recruiting shortfalls from July 1 through December 31, 1976, aroused some concern for the level of recruiting that might be experienced over the next several years; however, the 6-month period from January through June 1977 showed improvement. (See p. 5.)

The military forces have substantially met their quality recruiting goals (measured by the percentage of high school graduates and mental category). However, a basic question remains unanswered: What level of quality do the services need to efficiently match military skills and occupations? (See p. 8.)

Defense and the services have expanded the recruiting program to accommodate the volunteer force concept. More than 1,170,500 people have been recruited into the all-volunteer force through fiscal year 1976, costing $1.48 billion. By the end of 1978, approximately 1,975,000 people will have been recruited at a 5-year recruiting program cost of about $2.66 billion. (See p. 2.)

The management and operation of the recruiting program—consisting of the recruiting staff, advertising, enlistment bonuses, and recruit examining and processing—remain the key elements of recruiting success.

The recruiting staff is one of the most significant and costly components of the recruiting program. Defense and the
services believe the size and composition of their recruiting forces is closely related to their success in meeting quantity and quality goals. For fiscal year 1978, the recruiting forces will cost approximately $378.4 million. Due to the importance and cost of this staff, Defense believes that changes to its size and composition should be based on a long-term assessment of requirements and not the short-term market outlook. (See pp. 10 and 11.)

Advertising has become the second most costly aspect of the program and is one of the most difficult to assess and justify. For fiscal year 1978, the program will cost about $105.6 million. Defense and the services have recognized the need to determine how advertising affects total recruiting and have taken steps to improve the direction and effectiveness of advertising. Cost and evaluation warrant continued and special attention. (See pp. 12 to 15.)

Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations have changed their management and organization to include:

--Establishing a new joint command, Military Enlistment Processing Command on July 1, 1976, which assumed control of entrance testing and processing.

--Developing and using a common aptitude test in January 1976 to determine eligibility for service.

--Developing and using standardized enlistment forms, including a multipurpose military enlistment agreement. (See pp. 16 and 17.)

The enlistment bonus program has increased from $43 million during fiscal year 1974 to a proposed $74.5 million for 1978.

The success of the all-volunteer force depends largely on the efficiency and effectiveness of the management of the recruiting program. Nevertheless meeting recruiting
requirements is also dependent upon other driving policies and requirements which impact heavily on the size and complexity of the recruiting task. (See p. 19.)

Prior GAO reports have addressed particular aspects of recruiting management and operations. Appendixes I through VIII provide the digests of major reports and may be used as general reference to several issues mentioned in this report.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AFEES Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations
AVF all-volunteer force
DOD Department of Defense
GAO General Accounting Office
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Except for brief periods of time, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on a draft system for more than 30 years to obtain men for the Armed Forces. However, a return to an all-volunteer force (AVF) began in March 1969 with plans to rely entirely on volunteers after July 1, 1973. Following is a chronology of events leading to the current AVF.

--In March 1969 the President appointed a commission to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating the draft.

--In November 1969 the President, with congressional approval, reduced the period of prime draft vulnerability from 7 years to 1 year and provided draft selection by lottery.

--In February 1970 the Presidential Commission concluded that the Nation's interest would be better served by an AVF supported by an effective standby draft and that the first step was to remove the inequity in the pay of those serving their first terms in the Armed Forces.

--In October 1970 the Secretary of Defense directed the services to move toward an AVF by July 1, 1973.

--In January 1971 the President proposed that induction authority be extended to July 1, 1973, and said that every endeavor would be made to eliminate the draft by that time.

--In September 1971, after extensive debate, the Congress extended induction authority to July 1, 1973, and passed legislation on pay and benefits for an AVF.

--In August 1972 the Secretary of Defense reported to the President and the Congress that DOD was within reach of achieving an AVF composed of 2.3 million active-duty and 1 million reserve forces.

--In January 1973 the Secretary of Defense announced that the draft had ended for all but doctors and dentists.
On March 21, 1973, the Secretary of Defense announced that the administration would not ask for renewal of the induction authority.

During this period DOD and the services began to expand their draft-supported recruiting effort into a higher cost network of recruiting organizations and associated programs. The true test of the services' ability to operate under AVF began on July 1, 1973.

In its first 3 years of operation, about 1,170,500 persons had been recruited under AVF at a cost of about $1.48 billion. More than 804,500 persons are planned to be recruited in fiscal years 1977 and 1978. For the 5-year period ending with fiscal year 1978, about 1,975,000 persons are expected to be recruited at approximately $2.66 billion.

Many organizations, including DOD and the services, have studied and analyzed various AVF activities, including the expanded recruiting effort. Some of the recent studies are:

--Achieving America's Goals: National Service or the All Volunteer Force, Dr. William R. King, University of Pittsburgh, December 1976.


--Manpower for the Military - Draft or Volunteer?, A Special Report, Association of the United States Army, April 1977.


As a result of many of these studies, basic questions continue to be raised, such as:

--Will the services be able to recruit the required quantity and quality of volunteers and at what cost?
What options or alternatives should be considered to improve recruiting?

Recruiting for AVF has created a growing level of congressional and public concern as to whether AVF will remain an effective and economically viable policy over the next several years. Some issues being discussed are:

--Further expansion and increased financial support to the principal recruiting program components, including the recruiting forces, advertising, and enlistment incentives.

--The level of efficiency and effectiveness of DOD and the services' management and operation of a higher cost and complex recruiting program effort.

--The relationship of quantitative and qualitative military staffing needs with the availability of manpower.

In addition, military policy questions are being discussed regarding retention of military enlisted personnel and the greater use of women, and civilians in noncombat-related occupational categories.

The several options and alternatives available to DOD and the services will require their special attention over the next several years. Although these options and alternatives are not new to DOD, they have again become primary topics of interest and study and will most likely be topics of discussion during future congressional oversight and appropriation hearings. The outcome of these discussions will have a major bearing on whether AVF, as presently established and operated, will remain the method to meet our military staffing needs.

We have also issued a series of reports on various recruiting and recruiting-related aspects of AVF. Our first report, "Problems in Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the All-Volunteer Force," B-177952, May 2, 1973 (see app. I) identified some of the significant topics, problem areas, and potential solutions known to DOD and the services. Some later reports have addressed particular aspects of recruiting management and operations. Appendixes I through VIII provide the digests of major reports and may be used as general reference to several issues mentioned in this report.
CHAPTER 2

ACHIEVEMENT OF QUANTITY OBJECTIVES AND QUALITY GOALS

QUANTITY OBJECTIVES AND ACHIEVEMENTS

The all-volunteer force recruiting from fiscal years 1974 through 1976, as reported by DOD, indicates that total recruiting objectives have been met

--96 percent in fiscal year 1974 (the first year of the AVF program),

--102 percent in fiscal year 1975, and

--100 percent in fiscal year 1976.

The services' quantity achievements as a percentage of objective follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An indication of a possible change in recruiting achievement surfaced on July 1 through December 31, 1976. With the exception of the Air Force, the services fell short of their nonprior recruiting objectives as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Percent of objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>95,500</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>-5,500</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>55,600</td>
<td>53,700</td>
<td>-1,900</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>26,200</td>
<td>23,800</td>
<td>-2,400</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>177,300</strong></td>
<td><strong>167,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>-9,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>95</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During recent congressional testimony, Defense officials said that recruiting may become increasingly challenging in the coming years. The testimony indicated that there is the potential for growing quantity shortfalls and lower
recruit quality coupled with requests for increased funding levels for recruiting activities.

However, recent statistics, reported by DOD, on total quantity achievement for January to June 1977 for all accessions indicate that the shortfall experience of the transition quarter and the first quarter of 1977 has been somewhat turned around. The following table shows this achievement. In addition, it should be noted that this is traditionally the slow recruiting period of the year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>49,800</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>22,400</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>37,900</td>
<td>37,900</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>201,100</strong></td>
<td><strong>197,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total recruiting objective for fiscal year 1977 is about 410,400; for fiscal year 1978, about 394,100, or 16,300 fewer nonprior service personnel or a reduction of about 4 percent compared to fiscal year 1977. The fiscal year 1978 recruiting objective is also the lowest in AVF history since fiscal year 1974.

**RECRUIT QUALITY**

Categorization of mental ability and educational achievement are the two most widely used measures of recruit quality. The services use the term "goals" rather than "requirements" because to establish requirements would necessitate precise and extensive analyses of the quality prerequisites for every military skill and occupation.

**High school graduate recruiting goals and achievements**

According to DOD the high school diploma is an indicator of an individual's motivation and discipline. Nonhigh school graduates (those who do not possess a high school diploma or the equivalent) tend to have more discipline problems, higher retraining rates, and a higher percentage of early discharges. We have made some of these observations in our report, "Problems Resulting from Management Practices in Recruiting, Training and Using Non-High School Graduates and Category IV Personnel," FPCD-76-24, January 12, 1976. (See app. III.)
In the DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1974, the Congress imposed restrictions on enlisting non-high school graduates and mental category IV recruits. The act reads:

"None of the funds in this Act shall be available for the enlistment or pay of non-prior service personnel during fiscal year 1974 when the enlistment will cause the percentage of non-high school graduate enlistments of the services concerned to exceed 45 per centum or the mental category IV enlistments to exceed 18 per centum of the total non-prior service enlistments for the entire fiscal year."

The Defense Supplemental Appropriation Authorization Act, approved June 8, 1974, removed the restriction on enlistment of non-high school graduates because the Army and Marine Corps anticipated problems in meeting these quality goals. The 1975 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act permitted the services to use high school graduation as an enlistment criterion, but did not prohibit enlisting non-graduates to meet strength goals. The 18-percent restriction on enlistment of mental category IV personnel remained in effect.

Independently, the services have established desired quality goals to be achieved by their recruiting programs for a fiscal year. The Air Force has not set numerical goals nor felt that they were needed in their recruiting program.

In fiscal year 1974, the first year of AVF, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps set desired goals for recruiting high school graduates. They were expressed as a percentage of the total non-prior service recruiting objective as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To provide perspective on the achievement of the desired goals for high school graduate recruitment, we compared the above with--fiscal year 1964, which was a pre-Vietnam draft year;
--fiscal year 1969, a peak Vietnam war draft year; and

The following table shows this achievement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage of High School Graduate Recruitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal years</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVF 1974</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual experience</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual experience</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual experience</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 transition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quarter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual experience</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual experience:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-December</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-March</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the 1974 congressional stipulation of 55 percent high school graduates has been met or exceeded with the exceptions of the

--Marine Corps in fiscal year 1974 by 1 percent and

--Army in the first half of fiscal year 1977.

Recruiting results by mental categories

Another of the most used and emphasized quality standards is the mental category derived from selection and classification tests given all potential recruits. The scores from these tests are used to classify potential recruits into mental category designations.

On the basis of their percentile scores, service applicants are divided into five mental categories, I through
V, in order of decreasing scores. Category III is average. Test scores in mental category V disqualify an individual for service induction.

The Congress imposed an 18-percent restriction on enlistment of category IV personnel for fiscal year 1974. The following table compares that restriction to the actual experience of previous and following fiscal years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of category IV personnel</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1964 (Pre-Vietnam draft year)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1969 (Peak Vietnam draft year)</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative restriction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of fiscal year 1974</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual Experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1974</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1975</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1976</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-December</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-March</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two facts are noteworthy:

-- The percentage of category IV personnel recruited annually has generally dropped and the congressional limitation of fiscal year 1974 has not been exceeded.

-- The percentage of category IV personnel recruited in any AVF year is much lower than either the pre-Vietnam draft year of 1964 or the peak-Vietnam draft year of 1969.

With this progressive decline in the number of category IV personnel over the years, there has also been a compensating increase in the average and higher mental categories.

To date, the services appear to have generally been able to meet their quality goals. The basic question remains, however, as to the appropriate level of quality the services actually need, as it relates to specific skills and occupations. Lacking that information quality
goals cannot be dealt with effectively as a criteria for either establishing recruiting objectives or judging recruiting results.

We addressed aspects of quantity and quality achievement in our report, "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits," FPCD-75-170, February 27, 1976. (See app. IV.)
CHAPTER 3

MANAGEMENT OF RECRUITING

PROGRAM COMPONENTS

As discussed in chapter 1, resources provided the Active Forces' recruiting program have been substantial. These resources are applied to four major program components:

1. Costs of the recruiters and their support.
2. Advertising costs.
3. Enlistment bonuses paid to certain recruits.
4. Costs of processing a recruit through the required entrance testing and examinations.

The following table sets forth these costs for fiscal years 1974 through 1978.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruiter force and support</td>
<td>$278.6</td>
<td>$328.0</td>
<td>$286.1</td>
<td>$314.6</td>
<td>$378.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>105.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlistment bonuses</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$454.0</td>
<td>$533.2</td>
<td>$471.4</td>
<td>$531.1</td>
<td>$620.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RECRUITING FORCES

Among the major recruiting program components, the services' recruiting forces are the most costly. The recruiting forces are to (1) find and sell potential recruits on the military way of life and (2) help determine whether potential recruits are eligible to enlist. DOD and the services believe a close relationship exists between the size of service recruiter forces and the level of success in meeting recruiting quantity objectives and quality goals. We discussed aspects of recruiting forces in our report,
DOD and the services have annually invested considerable resources in staffing recruiting forces. The following table shows investments for fiscal years 1974 through 1978.

### Recruiting Force Size and Annual Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production recruiters</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,927</td>
<td>10,920</td>
<td>11,588</td>
<td>12,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiter aides</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>1,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military support</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,019</td>
<td>6,846</td>
<td>5,770</td>
<td>6,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian support</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,163</td>
<td>2,146</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>2,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22,763</td>
<td>22,624</td>
<td>20,224</td>
<td>20,596</td>
<td>22,157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cost (millions)      | $278.6 | $328.0 | $286.. | $314.6 | $378.4 |

a/Distribution by personnel category not available for FY 1974.

b/Actual staff-years expended.

c/Estimated.

d/Budgeted request.

DOD and service officials agree that precise evaluations and determinations of recruiter force size and composition are difficult to make and must be viewed in perspective with other components and appropriately adjusted with changes in the recruit market. Because of the importance and cost placed on this particular component, DOD believes that changes to the recruiter force structure should be based on long-term assessments of recruiting requirements and not on short-term market outlook.
ADVERTISING FOR RECRUITING

The advertising program is the second most costly recruiting program component and is considered to be one of the more complex to evaluate and justify. Substantial resources have been provided for the advertising effort. In fiscal year 1973, the last year of the draft, advertising costs were $68.8 million; in fiscal years 1974 and 1975, $96.1 and $102.1 million, respectively.

For fiscal year 1976 DOD requested an advertising budget of $104 million; however, as a result of congressional review, the request was cut by 35 percent, establishing the funding level at $67.3 million. The Congress, at that time, felt that as the services gained several years experience in recruiting for AVF and as economic conditions fostered enlistments, such a reduction in advertising funding was appropriate. The program level for fiscal year 1977 is $89.2 million. DOD has requested $105.6 million for fiscal year 1978.

According to DOD and the services, the recruit advertising objectives are to

--create an awareness of and provide information on the service as a potential post-high school job opportunity,

--improve the attitudes of youth toward the services and create a favorable recruiting environment, and

--generate prospect leads thru advertising response mechanisms.

To achieve these objectives DOD and the services employ advertising agencies and market research groups to advise and help them identify the potential recruit market and design the appropriate methods and materials for advertising campaigns. The advertising media being used include outdoor billboards, posters, pamphlets, promotion items, public service and paid radio and television, and newspapers and magazines.

We have previously questioned whether the extent of the advertising program and costs were necessary to meet recruiting quantity objectives and quality goals. Essentially, this question was related to our concern about the dimension of the actual contribution advertising made to the success of the recruiting effort. From a management efficiency standpoint, we also found evidence of duplicative or inconsistent
practices among the services that offered potential for reducing cost and increasing the potential effectiveness of the advertising program. These topics were addressed in our report, "Advertising for Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It?" FPCD-76-168, March 29, 1976. (See app. VI.)

These management and operational problems have generally resulted from the highly independent manner in which each service has conducted its advertising business, regardless of basic commonality of the program. According to service officials, the rationale behind this approach is the uniqueness of each service and the need to tailor and direct their own special recruiting message. However, according to DOD and service sources, research shows that the items that attract youth to the services are relatively common to each service and have changed very little over the last several years; that is, pay, educational benefits, training opportunities, and travel. The recruiting messages that have been presented by each of the services have contained these basic messages.

DOD's attitude and awareness studies, made as recently as the fall of 1976, have pointed out that the way youths perceive the services can be an important factor on enlistments. Research has also pointed out that the services' images have not changed much in recent years. In effect, the percent of youths likely to join the service and the service they are most likely to join has not changed. This is important because a major objective of advertising is to improve the youth's attitudes and perceptions of military service.

In our March 1976 report, we recommended that DOD and the services

--devise methods to measure the effectiveness of the various types of advertising being used in recruit advertising and

--improve their interservice communication, coordination, and exchange of information on market research and review and analyze types and methods of advertising being employed to avoid duplication or unnecessary research or advertising efforts.

DOD and the services knew of many of the problem areas noted in our report and have been taking actions for improvement. They have recognized the need to initiate actions to better assess the impact advertising has on the total recruiting effort and have initiated several actions to improve the direction and effectiveness of advertising.
Among some of the specific areas of the advertising program in which DOD has taken or plans to take action include:

--Establishing an interservice committee, Joint Advertising Directors or Recruiting, which provides an informal means for service representatives to discuss mutual advertising problems and a means for coordinating service advertising activities.

--Designing and implementing a new semiannual youth awareness and tracking study which will also provide advertising effectiveness tracking information.

--Developing a joint market research program and has recently completed a test to measure the effectiveness of paid radio advertising.

--Establishing the Joint Market Analysis and Research Committee to conduct interservice discussion and improve the level of coordination and planning for advertising effectiveness analysis.

--Establishing the Joint Education Liaison Directors of Recruiting to improve coordination with educational communities.

DOD has also completed an evaluation of paid broadcast advertising and the impact it would have on public service advertising. The evaluation showed the market testing of paid radio had no systematic effect on the level of public service advertising support. The test also indicated that service advertising was not reaching the target audience. The four services, working within their budgets have begun paid radio and television advertising.

Our previous analysis of the advertising cost data provided by the services showed that what each service included as advertising costs varied significantly. It seemed that when the services were requested to submit advertising cost data to DOD or the Congress, each service used its own discretion in selecting the format and in determining what costs should or should not be included. Consistent comprehensive reporting is required so that the Congress can be informed, but that program managers also are in a good position to formulate effective plans and make sound decisions. DOD has informed us that they have developed and tested a format for the uniform reporting of services' advertising costs.
Although numerous efforts have been initiated to better manage the advertising programs, its high cost and the difficulty in evaluating its effectiveness warrant continued and special attention. The basis question that still remains unanswered is how many advertising dollars are needed to attract the quantity and quality of volunteers to meet service accession goals.

ENLISTMENT BONUSES

The Military Service Act of 1971 (P.L. 92-129) permitted the payment of enlistment bonuses to persons enlisting in combat arms elements of the armed services for 3 or more years. Public Law 93-64 extended this bonus authority to June 30, 1974.

The Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-277) removed the limitation on bonuses for the combat arms elements only and permitted payments to personnel on a selected basis in order to fill critical and shortage skills. The authority for these payments expires September 30, 1978.

The enlistment bonus, limited to $3,000, is to increase the number of initial enlistments in critical and shortage skills. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to determine critical skills. Currently, only the Army and Marine Corps pay enlistment bonuses in both combat arms and highly technical skills.

To be eligible for the bonus, an individual must meet the following requirements:

--Be a high school graduate or have successfully completed the General Educational Development program. In January 1975 the Army announced that effective June 1, 1976, personnel certified by the program would no longer be eligible for the enlistment bonus.

--Be classified as mental category group I, II, or III.

--Be qualified and serve in a bonus skill for at least 4 years.

Payment begins upon successful completion of bonus skill training.
From fiscal years 1974 through 1976 the services awarded 72,473 bonuses at an estimated $170.3 million. Projected bonuses and costs through fiscal year 1978 total an additional 61,141 at an estimated $140 million. The annual number of bonuses and costs are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Costs (millions)</td>
<td>$43.0</td>
<td>$58.8</td>
<td>$68.5</td>
<td>$65.5</td>
<td>$74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of payments</td>
<td>18,449</td>
<td>24,407</td>
<td>29,626</td>
<td>29,957</td>
<td>31,184</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average payment</td>
<td>2,331</td>
<td>2,409</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td>2,187</td>
<td>2,389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/Estimated (includes transition quarter costs).

b/Budgeted request.

PROCESSING AND SCREENING NEW RECRUITS

Determining mental, moral, and medical eligibility of new recruits, and processing them into individual services according to individual service standards is the responsibility of the Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES). AFEES is also responsible for quality control over enlistment paperwork.

Although the total annual costs of the recruit processing and screening component is less than the other recruiting program components, it is estimated that the cumulative cost for fiscal years 1974 thru 1978 budget request is about $257 million.

Our previous report about these activities, "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting," FPCD-75-169, March 5, 1976 (see app. V), revealed numerous administrative and operational problem areas which contributed to increased costs not only associated with processing and screening but also recruiting and training.

We reported that due to the subordinated level of AFEES to the recruiting commands and the fragmented and incomplete controls over service-administered mental examinations and
associated operational inefficiencies, AFEES had been hampered from acting as an effective operating component of the total recruiting program. Although of equal importance, AFEES were emphasizing examining and processing recruits into the military with little attention given to quality control. We believed that as a result, more recruits not meeting recruit standards were completing the enlistment process.

Some actions DOD and the services have taken to improve the processing and screening of recruits are:

--DOD has removed enlistment testing and processing for all nonprior service applicants from recruiting and placed the function under AFEES as of January 1, 1976. At the same time, the Armed Forces Vocational Testing Group was transferred to the Army from the Air Force as part of the centralization of entrance testing.

--On July 1, 1976, a new joint command, Military Enlistment Processing Command assumed control of entrance testing and processing. While operationally independent, the commanding general of the Army recruiting command will also command the Military Enlistment Processing Command.

--In January 1976 the services implemented a common aptitude test--Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery--to determine nonprior service applicants eligibility to serve. Although the services are now using the same test, the minimum acceptable scores vary.

--The services are taking steps to identify military jobs common to all services to facilitate agreement on common aptitude areas. DOD has stated that common composites must be based upon validation data and will be useful only if they are efficient for predicting performance for all services in the appropriate service occupations. Some measure of the feasibility of common composites will be possible in mid-1977. DOD will oversee the data collections and investigate the feasibility of common composites.

--DOD has developed a multipurpose enlistment agreement form which allows all enlistment transactions to be completed on one form. In addition, DOD and the services have either eliminated or replaced numerous recruiting and enlistment paperwork.
CHAPTER 4

SUMMARY

DOD and the services have generally been successful in recruiting sufficient quantity and quality of personnel for the Active Forces to meet their goals. Much of this success has been the result of modifying and expanding the scope of recruiting programs of the draft era, to a more complex and higher cost network of recruiting organizations and activities.

DOD and the services have changed and improved their management of the recruiting program. Review and evaluation of the recruiting program, with emphasis on its management, direction, and control, is a basic necessity if recruiting success is to continue and costs are to be constrained to reasonable levels.

During appropriations hearings, DOD officials advised the Congress of the need for stronger centralized management oversight and direction of the total recruiting effort and that a first step toward this goal is commonality between the services recruiting program components and to address these components as interrelated parts of a total recruiting system. Managements decisions to establish greater uniformity and coordination in recruit testing and processing is a major step in this direction.

DOD and the services are also aware of the complexities in evaluating recruiting program components and the necessity for making sound management decisions for establishing and adjusting these components. DOD and service officials admit that they have not mastered the management and evaluative techniques for making changes and adjustments to the program mix, but admit they are learning to manage the recruiting effort under the volunteer concept, and that special emphasis must be given to understanding the effects of changing the program mix. Also, many of the management and operational improvements which have been taken during the last several years are viewed as ground breaking activity, providing the basis for further refinements in recruiting program management and evaluation. DOD and the services should be encouraged to aggressively seek solutions to improve management capability.

It should also be pointed out, however, that improvements on the management and direction of the principal recruiting program components may not be the total solution to
the problem of meeting military personnel strength requirements. Some of the other related policies and practices could be modified to reduce the burden on the recruiting system.

--Reevaluation of physical and mental enlistment eligibility standards based more specifically on military occupational requirements.

--Reevaluation of policies concerning the recruitment and use of women in as many occupational areas as possible. ("Job Opportunities for Women in the Military: Progress and Problems," FPCD-76-26, May 11, 1976 (see app. VII).)

--Adjustments to policies concerning the use of civilian personnel in occupational areas not specifically needing military personnel as well as the greater use of private contract services where operationally and economically feasible.

--Improvements to retention/reenlistment management with concentration on hard to fill occupational areas, and the redirection (retaining) of young career personnel to shortage areas. ("Military Retention Incentives: Effectiveness and Administration," B-160096, July 5, 1974 (see app. II).)

--Establishing a wider variety of enlistment and reenlistment periods and options.

--Improving training capabilities and efficiency which have the impact of reducing enlistment requirements. ("Marine Corps Recruiting and Recruit Training: Policies and Practices," FPCD-77-18, February 10, 1977 (see app. VIII).)

--Improving the process and methodologies, including enlisted career profile planning, used to determine enlisted personnel requirements.

The success of the all-volunteer force depends largely on the efficiency and effectiveness of managing the recruiting program. Nevertheless, meeting recruiting requirements is also dependent upon other driving policies and requirements which impact heavily upon the size and complexity of the recruiting task.
APPENDIX I

COMPROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

W I G E S T

WHY THE STUDY WAS MADE

As July 1, 1973, draws near, the Congress is faced, essentially, with three choices in legislating the future method for obtaining men and women to serve in this country's Armed Forces.

--Let the present draft authority expire and rely entirely on volunteers.

--Extend the present system of inducting men into the service.

--Rely on an all-volunteer force (AVF), but enact some form of standby draft authority for the President to use in case of an emergency or the development of manpower shortages that cannot be met through voluntary methods.

In this report GAO has sought answers to some of the major issues associated with putting the volunteer system into operation.

GAO focused on the practicality and cost of meeting military manpower objectives--both quantitative and qualitative--in fiscal year 1974. The report is based on data obtained from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the military services, and the Research Analysis Corporation, an Army contractor.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

BACKGROUND

In October 1968 the President started actions to move toward the AVF.

In January 1971 he proposed that the Congress extend induction authority to July 1, 1973, but indicated that every effort would be made to eliminate the use of the draft by that time.

In March 1973 the Secretary of Defense announced that the Administration would not ask for renewal of the induction authority.

This has been made possible by

--significant improvement in first-term pay,

--improved conditions of service life,

--training and assignment options,

--bonuses,

--greatly increased recruiting programs, and

--reduction of the military force structure to its lowest level since 1951.
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM TO REMAIN

The Congress grants the President induction authority for fixed periods of time—to supplement voluntary recruiting into the Armed Forces—in accordance with the Military Selective Service Act.

Although this authority expires June 30, 1973, all other sections of the act remain unchanged. Section 10(h) specifically prescribes the functions to be performed by an active standby Selective Service System.

These include
-- registering men,
-- holding an annual lottery,
-- classifying registrants, and
-- maintaining viable procedures and facilities to use in case reinstatement of induction authority becomes necessary. (See p. 8.)

PROBLEMS IN MEETING ACTIVE FORCE REQUIREMENTS

Obtaining and retaining sufficient officers, except those in the health professions (discussed below), does not appear to be a problem.

However, there appears to be less optimism about the ability of the services to obtain a sufficient quantity of qualified enlisted personnel. For the Active Forces, the key question is:

Can the military services obtain a sufficient number of new enlistments in fiscal year 1974 and at the same time meet their quality goals—i.e., volunteers with the ability to learn and perform the hundreds of skills found in the military?

To answer the question, GAO obtained data on true volunteers for a 3-year period and projected fiscal year 1974 enlistments. GAO compared these past trends and projections with fiscal year 1974 service quantity requirements and quality goals—such as limitations on personnel in the below-average mental category and non-high-school graduates. (See pp. 11 to 16.)

If these quality goals were rigid requirements (which they are not) there could be a shortfall of between 11,000 and 83,000 new enlistments in fiscal year 1974, compared with a total requirement of 354,000. (See pp. 25 and 26.)

The shortfall would occur primarily in the Army and the Marine Corps and to a small degree in the Navy. (See p. 26.)

To avoid these shortfalls the services can accept more mental category IV men and more enlistees who have not graduated from high school. For example, to meet its fiscal year 1974 enlistment requirement of 162,000, the Army may need to accept between 21 and 33 percent of mental category IV enlistees compared with a desired limitation of 20 percent. (See p. 17.)

Service quality goals have been set at levels difficult to obtain.

-- The Army's high school graduate goal, 70 percent, has been achieved with true volunteers in only 1 month since January 1970. (See p. 18.)

-- The Marine Corps' goal, 65 percent, has not been achieved at all during this period. (See p. 21.)

-- The Navy's goal, 80 percent, has been achieved in only 1 month. (See p. 23.)
APPENDIX I

--The Air Force has had no difficulty in maintaining quality. (See p. 24.)

DOD officials, in commenting on these matters, stated that the Air Force's force is substantially richer than it was in the years of heavy draft use and that service quality standards are unrealistically high. DOD forecasts that military performance standards will not be lowered because of any inability to obtain recruits of the quality needed.

The importance of obtaining the desired quality of enlistees is illustrated by the fact that the services now have imbalances in skills resulting from a combination of

--insufficient men of required aptitude and school preference (see pp. 28 to 30) and

--inadequate retention of men in desired skills. (See pp. 31 to 40.)

In the Army and the Marine Corps, for example, over half of the skill categories were either overmanned or undermanned by more than 20 percent as of June 30, 1972.

These problems are likely to persist, and perhaps worsen, under the AVF. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus proposed by DOD is one technique designed to cope with this problem. (See p. 38.)

Renewing the Combat Arms Bonus appears essential to avoid a shortfall which could reach 20 percent in the Army's combat arms enlistments in fiscal year 1974. Furthermore, DOD estimates that continuing the bonus at current levels will reduce the annual enlistment requirement by at least 5,700 from fiscal year 1975 on and that by 1979 the annual reduction could be as high as 9,400. (See pp. 41 to 43.)

Problems in obtaining enough physicians

At the end of calendar year 1972, only 16 percent of the physicians who entered military service in fiscal year 1970 were still in service. Few physicians have been drafted. To avoid being drafted, more physicians in medical training joined the military service under special programs. The largest of these is the Berry Plan which, in exchange for a 2-year service obligation, permits full deferment from active duty until specialty training has been completed. (See p. 44.)

The number of physicians participating in the Berry Plan and in other programs is expected to decline sharply without a draft. DOD expects, however, that a scholarship program established in September 1972 and the proposed special pay and enlistment bonuses for health care professionals will help alleviate shortages of physicians in future years. (See p. 45.)

Future requirements for physicians can be reduced significantly by exploiting many opportunities for conserving medical manpower resources. (See pp. 46 to 49.)

Alternatives for meeting Active Force military requirements

Alternatives to using male volunteers to fill military requirements include

--increasing the use of military women and

--converting military positions to civilian positions.

In addition, recruiting men and women with civilian-acquired skills directly into upper enlisted grades (known as lateral entry programs)
could assist in alleviating the problem of skill imbalances.

Women

In fiscal year 1972 women (including nurses) represented 1.9 percent of military strength. If the services' goals are met, women will represent 4.2 percent of military strength by the end of fiscal year 1977.

It is apparent that much greater potential exists to use women in uniform. (See pp. 50 and 51.)

Civilians

As of December 31, 1972, about 1.08 million civilians worked for DOD, or about 32 percent of the total DOD manpower. In October 1972 a DOD task force issued a report on substituting civilians for military personnel in the Armed Forces. The task force concluded that, theoretically, 102,862 enlisted support positions in the continental United States could be converted to civilian positions in fiscal year 1974.

Two plans were considered realistic—one to convert 35,000 military positions to civilian positions (low plan), another to convert 70,000 (high plan).

In December 1972 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Army, Navy, and Air Force each to convert a minimum of 10,000 military positions to civilian positions in fiscal year 1974. The Marine Corps was directed to convert at least 1,000. Here again, significant additional potential exists. (See pp. 52 to 54.)

Lateral entry

DOD requirements for high-quality military personnel can also be met by recruiting those who have acquired advanced skills in civilian life and who can be used without a great amount of further training. The services' lateral entry programs have been very limited. (See pp. 54 and 55.)

Problems in meeting the manpower requirements of the Reserve components

On February 15, 1972, the Secretary of Defense told the Congress that, under the President's policy, the Reserve and Guard would be the initial and primary sources for increasing the Active Forces in any future emergency. On January 20, 1973, the Secretary told the Congress that unit structures and mission assignments were being revised to make them more compatible with mobilization needs and that priority missions were being transferred from the Active Forces to the Guard and Reserve where the ability to perform such missions has been demonstrated.

This increased emphasis on Reserve components makes shortsalls more significant. DOD is predicting that Guard and Reserve Forces' manning levels will decline from 914,000 on June 30, 1973, to about 875,000 by June 30, 1974. This could be 97,000 below the mobilization objective level of 971,000 for June 30, 1974. (See pp. 56 to 62.)

Cost of the AVF

DOD programs for the AVF have contributed about 23 percent of the increased manpower costs which have occurred since 1968. OSD's Project Volunteer costs budgeted for fiscal year 1974 are about $3.192 billion (including $225 million for the proposed Uniformed Services Special Pay Act).
The Army has budgeted about $2.022 billion, exclusive of Project Volunteer funding, in soldier-oriented improvements, some of which received priority because of the effort to move to an AVF. GAO estimates the incremental costs primarily related to the AVF, may be as much as $1.090 billion.

The transition to an AVF in recent years has been accompanied by decreasing force levels and increasing manpower costs. If force levels need to be increased in the future, the cost of volunteers may increase sharply. (See pp. 63 to 69.)

**MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS**

1. What are realistic minimum quality standards for each service, both for Active and Reserve Forces?

2. What is the probable force level of minimum quality that can be supported without using the draft? If unemployment rates for young men decrease, will this make it more difficult to attract qualified personnel?

3. Should some form of standby induction authority be enacted -- to save time in the event of an emergency? -- to provide a means of meeting serious shortages in peacetime?

4. Will some type of draft be required if there are not enough physicians after fiscal year 1974?

5. Will some type of draft be required if deficits in the Reserve components cannot be overcome?

6. Will the Uniformed Services Special Pay Act overcome the above problems?
APPENDIX II

MILITARY RETENTION INCENTIVES:
EFFECTIVENESS AND ADMINISTRATION
Department of Defense  B-160096

DIGEST

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

GAO wanted to find out how well variable reenlistment bonuses (VRBs) worked in helping the Department of Defense (DOD) eliminate career-manning shortages in critically needed skills and how well DOD was carrying out its incentive programs.

Basic facts

To encourage qualified enlisted personnel--especially those with critical skills--to remain after their first enlistments, the Congress authorized DOD to pay several kinds of monetary incentives:

--A VRB for first-term reenlistees who have critical skills (primarily skills having high training costs and being in short supply).

--A regular reenlistment bonus for all first-term personnel upon reenlistment.

--A shortage specialty proficiency pay for career personnel having critical skills in short supply that continue to have insufficient retention after maximum VRB is applied.

DOD plans to spend $405 million on these incentives in fiscal year 1974. In spite of these incentives, DOD still has low first-term reenlistment rates in many critical skills.

Legislation to eliminate regular reenlistment bonuses and VRBs and to combine their most effective features in a new selective reenlistment bonus was approved May 10, 1974. If this new bonus proves effective, DOD will phase out shortage specialty proficiency pay.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

VRB effectiveness

Although DOD considers VRB effective, VRB does not produce enough first-term reenlistments to eliminate career-manning shortages.

On the average, VRBs increase first-term reenlistments. However, VRB's effect on reenlistment rates in individual skills cannot be predicted accurately. This is because of the strong influence of factors other than money on reenlistment decisions. (See pp. 6 to 9.)

For the 4-year period ended June 30, 1972, VRBs had only a marginal impact on attaining the required career-manning level in 129 of the eligible skills with the largest requirement for enlisted personnel. (See pp. 9 and 10.)

A long time is needed to overcome career-manning shortages if VRBs are the only incentive. GAO estimates that the average Army skill less than 80-percent manned and receiving the maximum VRB gains 10 additional reenlistees because of VRB. Other variables constant, it would take about 26 years for the additional
reenlistees to eliminate the average career-manning shortage. (See pp. 11 and 12.)

**Factors influencing reenlistment decisions**

GAO interviewed 2,240 military personnel who either had reenlisted recently for the first time or were approaching their first-reenlistment decision. GAO found:

--- VRB influenced reenlistment of only 8 percent of the eligible first-term critical-skill population. (See pp. 13 and 14.)

--- Larger bonuses could attract 15 percent more of the critical-skill population sampled. (See pp. 13 and 14.)

--- VRB was the prime reason for reenlistment for only 13 percent of the critical-skill personnel sampled. Job satisfaction, job security, and educational opportunities ranked higher. (See p. 14.)

--- Factors most influencing first-term critical-skill personnel not to reenlist were (1) family separations, (2) lack of personal freedom, (3) poor supervision and leadership, (4) work details, and (5) living conditions. (See p. 14.)

--- An alternative for increasing first-term reenlistments would be to allow reenlistment for an unspecified time. About 36 percent of the critical-skill personnel not reenlisting claimed they would reenlist for unspecified periods. (See p. 14.)

**Effectiveness of regular bonus and shortage specialty proficiency pay**

DOD found in 1971 that:

--- About 25 percent, or $40 million, of the regular reenlistment bonus was paid each year to individuals serving in skills in which adequate retention could be sustained without incentive payments. This is because the law requires that the bonus be paid to all reenlistees. DOD concluded the bonus was unnecessary.

--- A major part of shortage specialty proficiency pay was paid to careerists already past critical-retention points. DOD concluded that this incentive had only a marginal effect on influencing reenlistments and was extremely cost ineffective. This is because, to yield reenlistments, payments were made to all careerists in a skill rather than only to those reenlisting in the skill.

Responses to GAO's interviews confirmed that shortage specialty proficiency pay had little effect on reenlistment decisions. Of 62 individuals in GAO's sample who were eligible for the pay and reenlisting, only 5 said that shortage specialty proficiency pay had influenced their decisions. (See p. 14.)

**Effectiveness of program administration**

The Army, Navy and Marine Corps cannot develop proper first-term reenlistment objectives because they have not established long-range requirements planning in their
enlisted force management systems. As a result, these services use VRBs to correct total career-manning shortages rather than to attract only the required number of first-term personnel needed, by skill, to enter the career force each year to maintain proper grade structure. This shortcoming has greatly reduced effective program administration. (See pp. 20 to 24.)

At the recommendation of the House Armed Services Committee, in 1968 DOD directed each service to develop a long-range planning system for managing its career enlisted force. (See p. 22.)

By 1973 only the Air Force had developed such a system. The Air Force system identifies manning deficits by skill and years of service. VRBs can be used to attract each year only the actual number of first-term reenlistees needed by skill. If each service were to establish a similar system, management of first-term retention could be improved. This could result in a more balanced career force. (See p. 22.)

Although DOD guidelines provide that certain characteristics be considered in applying VRBs, firm criteria have not been developed for the services to follow in applying, adjusting, or removing VRB. As a result, decisionmakers have to use their judgment in specifying use of VRBs. (See pp. 24 to 31.)

Most regular bonuses and VRBs are computed, in part, on already obligated service time, because each service, in allowing its personnel to reenlist before completing their initial enlistments, counts the time remaining in the initial enlistments in computing the bonuses.

GAO estimates that about 15 to 25 percent of all bonuses are for already obligated service. This problem was overcome by enactment of the selective reenlistment bonus program. (See pp. 31 to 33.)

Problems occurring after payment of bonuses

Many Army and Marine Corps individuals receiving VRBs were not working in the skills for which VRBs had been paid. (See pp. 36 to 37.)

A serviceman, once awarded a reenlistment bonus, must either complete his tour of duty or refund the unearned part of the bonus. A review of 443 cases requiring such refunds disclosed that recoupment efforts had been largely unsuccessful. (See pp. 39 and 40.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Because individuals place major importance on factors other than money in deciding whether to reenlist, the Secretary of Defense should impress upon the services the need for: Ensure that individuals:

--Do not have their personal freedom restrained during off-duty hours.

--Receive the highest quality supervision and leadership.

--Are effectively used in the skills for which they are trained.

The Secretary should also:

--Consider recommending legislation which would allow enlisted personnel to reenlist for unspecified periods.
--Develop optimum bonus administration criteria that can be used in conjunction with approved long-range career management systems.

--Improve the bonus administration criteria that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps must use until they develop enlisted career management systems that can predict reliably skill retention requirements by years of service. These criteria should clearly delineate the circumstances under which a bonus should be applied, adjusted, and removed.

--Insure that (1) the services use VRB recipients in the skills which qualified them for the VRBs, unless the Secretary of the service determines that waivers are necessary in the interest of the service concerned, and (2) misassigned VRB recipients are identified and properly assigned.

The Secretaries of the Army and Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps should establish priorities for developing long-range requirements planning in their enlisted personnel career management systems.

The Secretaries and the Commandant should review how well individuals awarded reenlistment bonuses are screened and the adequacy of the system for recouping unearned bonuses.

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

DOD generally agrees with many of GAO's findings and recommendations. DOD concurs that it is difficult to quantify effectiveness of VRB in attracting additional reenlistments, particularly on an individual-skill basis. DOD's comments are included as appropriate in the report.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

The military services should be required to develop, as soon as possible, enlisted personnel management systems which would be responsive to the House Armed Services Committee's 1968 recommendation.

Since the advantages of such systems are fully accepted, the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees may want to:

--Inquire why the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are taking so long to develop such systems.

--Consider restricting funds for enlisted retention incentives in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps if enlisted personnel management systems are not developed and approved by a specified date.
As of June 30, 1974, almost half a million military servicemen were non-high-school graduates and Category IV (low-aptitude) personnel. This group has been experiencing noticeably higher rates of disciplinary actions and administrative discharges than other personnel.

GAO found that the military services do not have a directed policy for training and using non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel. From the data collected, we also identified a series of management practices that may be contributing to the problems we noted. They included

--- alleged recruiting irregularities (see p. 12),
--- training and assignment promises perceived as made but not honored (see p. 10),
--- underuse of skills and training (see p. 16), and
--- lack of encouragement to participate in educational programs (see p. 18).

We compared the relationship of these questionable management practices to several performance indicators and found that

--- many men were claiming that they spent little or no time doing the work for which they were trained,
--- participation in education programs was low compared to the interest expressed in educational incentives, and
there were undesirable effects associated with underuse and lack of training in the form of lower individual performance and retention of personnel in the service.

High rates of disciplinary action and administrative discharges adversely affect the operational capability of the military services. They are also costly from a monetary as well as human standpoint. To improve management of recruiting, training, use, and education of non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require each service Secretary to implement specific policies and practices for these personnel. Particular consideration should be given to:

--Strengthening and monitoring controls aimed at insuring compliance with entrance screening procedures.

--Policies governing the assignment of first-term personnel to advanced or on-the-job training to insure that servicemen receive opportunities for skill training commensurate with their ability and that such training is optimally used.

--Educational programs and related policies to insure that servicemen with low educational attainments are encouraged and provided appropriate opportunities to increase their education.
DIGEST

Due principally to the dedicated efforts of the recruiting commands, the Department of Defense has essentially met the services' strength goals without any appreciable drop in quality in fiscal year 1974, the first full year of operation under the all-volunteer force concept. Recruiting successes during fiscal year 1975 were even better, but were probably helped by depressed economic conditions.

Department of Defense reports show that the personnel recruited into the all-volunteer force, when compared to their counterparts who either volunteered or were inducted into the services in a previous year (fiscal year 1964) and during the Vietnam War (fiscal year 1969), were of higher quality by some standards and lower by others, with no apparent preponderance in either direction.

Using traditional quality measures, GAO found a slight decline in the number of enlistees both with high school diplomas and with scores above or below average on the military aptitude test. There was a moderate increase in the number of enlistees with average tests scores. GAO also found evidence that Defense may overstate quality in its reports. (See pp. 6 to 12.)

GAO looked at the mental testing practices of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. At the beginning of the review, no single mental test was acceptable to all the services and the tests used could be compromised.

When GAO brought this matter to the attention of Department officials, they reacted immediately with a directive specifying a common test to be given at Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations for all
the services. The Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations were given central management control over a single aptitude test to be used by all services as of January 1, 1976.

Defense officials also said they are exploring ways to prevent compromising the test. The promptness of this action fortified GAO's belief, gathered throughout its review, that neither the services nor Department of Defense want or will condone these practices. Although the services are progressing satisfactorily toward adopting a common test, they are not doing enough to reach an agreement on an interpretation of its results. (See pp. 18 and 19.)

The Department of Defense spent about $4.7 million during fiscal year 1974 to support its high school recruiting and testing program, testing about 1.1 million students for enlistment eligibility. Of 307,000 male seniors, only 196,000 were potential enlistees. Only 9,700 were enlisted on the basis of the test given them in high school. About 33,700 enlistees who had been tested in high school appear to have been unnecessarily retested at enlistment. (See pp. 23 to 25.)

In 1973, the Department of Defense established the Armed Forces Vocational Testing Group to manage the high school recruiting and testing program and to present the military services to the educational community as a single entity.

This latter objective has not been fully achieved because all the services, except the Marine Corps, developed separate programs to further their recruiting interests with the educational community. These programs are similar in many respects but are funded and managed independently. Each program employs civilians with a background in education to improve the service's image through better communications with the educational community. (See pp. 26 and 27.)
In order to improve the quality of personnel recruited, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense:

--Establish a time frame for the services to agree on common aptitude or occupational areas composed of common composites. (See p. 20.)

--Evaluate the high school recruiting and testing program and the services' various liaison programs with the educational community. If these programs are found justified, their management should be consolidated under one agency, independent of service affiliation. (See p. 30.)

Defense officials agreed with this report and its recommendations, except that they are not yet satisfied that common composites can be developed. They believe that test results must relate to performance in job training which is different among the services.
DIGEST

Recruiting costs increased from $430 million during the last year of the draft, fiscal year 1973, to $508.1 million during the first year of the All-Volunteer Force, fiscal year 1974. Second year budgeted, costs rose to $511.3 million.

Although all services except the Air Force encountered initial problems recruiting in a nondraft environment, the Department of Defense has essentially met the services' strength goals without any appreciable drop in quality in fiscal year 1974, the first full year of operation under the all-volunteer force concept. Recruiting successes were even better in fiscal year 1975, but were probably helped by depressed economic conditions.

There is no central focus for monitoring quality control, recruiter malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment. As a result, many unqualified recruits slip through the enlistment process, fail during training, and receive early discharges. Forty-one thousand early discharges during fiscal year 1974 for conditions which were potentially identifiable before enlistment cost the services about $70 million.

Although many of these conditions are difficult, if not impossible, to detect during preenlistment screening, each 1-percent reduction can save $700,000. (See pp. 4 to 6.) All the services recognize the damage such practices can cause and have worked hard to prevent them. However, the principal thrust of their efforts has been after the fact, that is, identifying those instances that do occur and attempting to relate them back to the recruiter.
The Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations are best suited to perform quality control over mental and medical examinations, moral fitness, and enlistment paperwork. They have been precluded from independently monitoring these functions because of subordination to the recruiting services, fragmented and incomplete procedural controls, noncompatible recruiting boundaries, and service-administered mental examinations. (See pp. 6 to 12.)

Inefficiencies caused by distorted workload standards, monthly enlistment quota systems, varying service-imposed paperwork requirements, and double contract processing of individuals who delay entry into the military also wasted valuable time and increased examining station costs. (See pp. 16 to 21.) GAO estimated that standardizing paperwork and eliminating double contract processing could save $1.2 million annually.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Service Task Force have acted to develop a standard enlistment application and an enlistment agreement which would allow all possible enlistment transactions to be completed on one form and would revise examining station workload standards and adjust staffing levels. (See p. 24.)

The Defense Department has issued instructions to the services that require a single mental test for all the services to be given under the control of the examining stations.

In addition, GAO reviewed the management of the services' recruiter forces. Since 1971, Defense has increased recruiter staff-years by 3,800 and the services have made numerous changes to increase recruiter effectiveness. The services used increased effectiveness to eliminate enlistment incentives and end 2-year enlistments instead of reducing recruiter force size. GAO believes force size can be reduced at least 10 percent at a $16 million annual savings. Congress decreased the military personnel recruiting budget request for fiscal year 1976 by about 9 percent. (See pp. 25 and 27.)
Each service used nonrecruiting personnel to help recruiters locate prospects. Army studies show that nonrecruiting personnel productivity is higher than that of additional recruiters. None of the services, however, have conducted controlled field testing to explore the potential for using nonrecruiting personnel to reduce recruiter force size. (See pp. 33 to 35.)

GAO learned numerous organizations, military and contractor, evaluate recruiting programs. The Defense Department and the services perform or contract for evaluations independently. The Department of Defense has not given the services an overall plan specifying programs to evaluate and methods to use. As a result, programs GAO examined had not been evaluated; received limited, inconclusive evaluation; or were evaluated by more than one service. (See pp. 37 to 44.)

The Department of Defense has been precluded from making many interservice comparisons in its evaluations because the information received from the services was not uniform, parallel data was difficult to obtain, program costs were not always compiled, and recruiting boundaries are not uniform. (See pp. 37 to 44.)

To help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of recruiting, GAO recommends among other things that the Secretary of Defense:

--Remove the examining stations from operational control of the recruiting organizations.

--Eliminate those factors precluding the examining stations from independently monitoring quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment.

--Adjust staffing levels between the examining stations and recruiting services to give the examining stations the resources to perform quality control and monitoring functions.
--Insure that the examining stations assess reliability of revised workload standards.

--Insure that the recruiting services change the system of monthend enlistment quotas; establish common boundaries and a common entrance examination; and adhere to timetables to standardize enlistment paperwork and eliminate double processing of personnel who delay entry into the service.

--Adjust recruiting force levels.

--Establish uniform procedures to monitor recruiting results and assess recruiting force needs.

Department of Defense officials' responses to GAO's recommendations are as follow:

--The examining stations will be removed from operational control of the recruiting organizations in July 1976.

--Elimination of those factors precluding the examining stations from independently monitoring quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment. However, final decisions on enlistment should be left up to the services.

--Staffing levels will not be adjusted. (See p. 24.)

--An industrial management survey will evaluate the examining stations' capacities and precise workload.

--Agreed to change the system of monthend enlistment quotas.

--Many actions, including the reorganization of the examining stations management structure, were considered necessary before pursuing the issue of compatible boundaries. Mental testing for the examining stations was centralized January 1, 1976.
-- Elimination of double processing of personnel under the delayed-entry program has not been completely resolved.

-- The Defense Department does not agree that recruiter force levels need to be adjusted. (See p. 36.)

Recruiter assistants are effective in helping the services meet special recruiting objectives or seasonal differences.

While agreeing with Defense's actions, GAO believes that the Department of Defense and the services need to determine the optimum mix of recruiter force and recruiter aides. As far as GAO could tell, neither the Defense Department nor the services know what the optimum mix is.
DIGEST

To support the military services' intensified recruiting efforts for the all-volunteer force, expenditures for advertising increased over the past 4 years from about $7 million annually to $96.1 million.

Several factors have influenced the services' recruiting success: advertising increased, recruiting forces were expanded and improved, salaries were raised, and bonuses were added. Questions of whether less advertising would produce less recruits and whether a different approach might produce more for less were unanswered. The total number of potential recruits was not expanded, although the advertising campaigns were greatly expanded from 1970 through 1974.

When the services conduct large advertising programs they may be only competing with each other for the same potential recruit. GAO's review found considerable evidence of uncontrolled, duplicative, or inconsistent practices that offer considerable potential for reducing cost and increasing advertising programs' effectiveness. (See pp. 12 to 22.)

Each of the services has been left on its own as to how the money should be spent. Research has shown that the things that attract youth are common in all services; i.e., pay, educational benefits, training opportunities, travel, and the advertising of the services, with occasional exceptions, of a particular service as perceived by young people appears to be the single most influential factor in their enlistment decision. (See p. 41.)
An analysis of studies done for and by the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense showed that attitudes toward the military had changed little in a 4-year period. (See p. 32.)

Although no one really knows how much free time is being received, most people agree that paid radio and TV will cost the services a large part of the free time now being received. (See p. 10.)

Recruiting research for the all-volunteer force has lacked central direction and control. Much research done was duplicative while, at the same time, needed research was not being accomplished.

The Joint Advertising Directors of Research appeared to have recognized this problem early in 1974. Their recommendations went largely unheeded, until recently when the Office of the Secretary of Defense recognized the problem and began actions to make improvements. (See p. 32.)

GAO's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense include the following:

--Defense and the four services should undertake research programs that have potential for greatly improving the advertising program.

--The Department of Defense should identify additional research that is common to the entire recruiting effort.

--Some mechanism should be established so that research performed by the services in common areas is not duplicative and is made available to those have use for it.

--The services and Defense should begin to experiment with various advertising approaches such as: (1) Defense military service advertising, (2) four
service advertising, and (3) controlled test advertising to determine the effect of various media such as direct mail and magazine advertising.

--Before pursuing any type of paid broadcast advertising, the services should determine how much public service announcement time is now being obtained, how effective this media is, and how much of this time could be lost if the services went to paid broadcasting.

--Defense should examine the policy of using all response type media, especially the more costly popup cards considering the number of leads that can be traced to enlistments.

GAO also found that all advertising costs relating to the overall military recruiting campaign are not fully disclosed and reported by the services consistently. Without such information, program managers are not in a position to carry out their responsibilities in formulating effective plans and making sound decisions. (See p. 57.)

The Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs issues instructions and guidelines to the services for reporting advertising costs that will be helpful to management.

Defense agreed with most of GAO's recommendations. It stated that it had begun efforts to improve Defense's ability to measure advertising effectiveness which included controlled experimentation in the enlistment market.

In addition, a consolidated market research program has been developed to improve DOD's market and advertising research capability and eliminate market research redundancy within the Department.

The Congress reduced Defenses' military advertising budget request for fiscal year 1976 by about 35 percent.
DIGEST

The draft was to end. Fewer men were expected to join the services. Equal Rights Amendment requirements were expected.

This was the milieu in 1972 when the Department of Defense started recruiting more women and using them in as many jobs as possible within combat limitations, including those previously restricted to men. (See p. 1 and 2.)

By December 1974, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps had opened essentially all noncombat jobs to women. However, women were assigned to only 44 percent of the opened jobs in the Marine Corps; 63 percent, in the Army; 70 percent, in the Air Force; 72 percent, in the Navy. Most women were assigned to administrative or medical jobs. (See pp. 4 to 8.)

This was primarily because:

--Recruiters failed to tell women about occupational options.

--Many women preferred administrative or medical jobs.

--Combat requirements, including specific overseas assignments restricted to men (restricting most or all jobs to men.) (See pp. 9 and 10.)

Some women were assigned to jobs with requirements that kept them from working effectively. This included aircraft and vehicle maintenance or work on combat vehicles. No standards had been established for measuring women's strength, stamina, and other abilities. (See pp. 14 to 25.)
The Air Force has recognized this problem and has started to develop standards for use in assigning both men and women to jobs. (See pp. 18 to 20.)

The services have a unique opportunity to evaluate the extent to which women are interested in, and can perform, jobs traditionally restricted to men. To do this, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense have the services:

--Reevaluate all jobs to identify those that can really be opened to women, considering jobs that (1) must be restricted to men because all authorized positions are required by combat units or the rotation base and (2) primarily involve combat vessels.

--Develop physical and other standards for jobs where either is a factor in effective performance.

--Develop standards for measuring the strength, stamina, and other requirements for jobs where such attributes are factors in effective performance.

--Tell women about the jobs for which they qualify and encourage them to select those previously restricted to men.

--Require women to meet the same training and performance requirements as men in the jobs assigned.

Department of Defense officials agree with these recommendations and agree that the opportunities for women in the military should be newly evaluated. The Department of Defense has formed a study group to address these issues and will keep GAO informed on the group's progress.
DIGEST

Over the past 18 months, the Marine Corps has announced a series of changes to correct problems in its recruiting and recruit training. In July 1976, the Marine Corps placed the Recruit Training Depot commanders in charge of recruiting as well as training men and women with no prior service. (See p. 3.)

Since 1974 an increasingly larger percentage of high school graduates have been recruited by the Marine Corps. (See p. 4.)

The Marine Corps, through research, has attempted to identify individual attributes which indicate whether a person can successfully complete recruit training and the first enlistment. In the past little had been done to determine how the military environment affected recruit success and attrition. (See p. 6.)

During the 6 months following the announcement on April 1, 1976, of changes to the recruit-training program, GAO did not find any positive trends which could be attributed solely to those changes. However, it may be too early for effects of the changes to be measured in such trends. (See p. 9.)

Recruit-training procedures, administrative duties, and noninstructional time are not clearly and measurably related to training objectives. The San Diego Recruit Depot in scheduling training did not follow the program of instruction directed by headquarters and increased the training days from 77 to 79 as a result of a misunderstanding, which has since been corrected. The time recruits spend at the training depots can be greatly reduced. Unnecessary, excessive, or delayed training should be eliminated. (See p. 13.)
Alternatives other than sending recruits to special platoons for more instruction or rehabilitation should be considered. Marine Corps officials have questioned the need for the special platoons and in some cases disbanded these platoons. The other services do not use correctional custody and medical rehabilitation platoons in their recruit-training programs. (See p. 17.)

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to:

--Redirect much of the focus of its research to examine in depth the effects of the military and, more specifically, the recruit-training environment on attrition. (See p. 8.)

--Establish a recruit-training program more fully based on measurable training objectives and require the content and training procedures to relate to those objectives. Unnecessary content should be eliminated and the program shortened accordingly.

--Require periodic inspections to make sure that actual training conforms to the prescribed program.

--Start processing recruits without delay and start platoons into training immediately after processing.

--Reevaluate the need for continuing each of the special training platoons. (See p. 20.)

The Marine Corps generally agrees with GAO's recommendations. However, the Marine Corps did not agree that recruit-training procedures are not clearly and measurably related to training objectives.

The Marine Corps is taking the following actions:

--Two studies have been started to examine the relationship between attrition and organizational/environmental factors.
--During biennial visits, the Inspector General's investigation teams and assigned training officers will give special attention to the problems noted in this report.

--Ways are being studied to reduce the time between the recruits' arrival and their first training day.

--Marine Corps Headquarters is reviewing a recently completed study of effectiveness of the special training branches at Parris Island. Also, the recruit management information system is now providing data useful in determining true costs and value of the special training branch.
APPENDIX IX

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

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<tr>
<th>Tenure of office</th>
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<tr>
<td>Harold Brown</td>
<td>Jan. 1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Nov. 1975</td>
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<td>James R. Schlesinger</td>
<td>July 1973</td>
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<td>Elliot L. Richardson</td>
<td>Jan. 1973</td>
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<td><strong>DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles W. Duncan, Jr.</td>
<td>Jan. 1977</td>
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<td><strong>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>David P. Taylor (acting)</td>
<td>Feb. 1977</td>
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<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.</td>
<td>Jan. 1977</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norman R. Augustine (acting)</td>
<td>July 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Howard H. Callaway</td>
<td>May 1973</td>
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<td><strong>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul D. Phillips (acting)</td>
<td>Feb. 1977</td>
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<td><strong>CHIEF OF STAFF:</strong></td>
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# APPENDIX IX

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<td><strong>SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:</strong></td>
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<td>W. Graham Clayton, Jr.</td>
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<td><strong>ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joseph T. McCullen, Jr.</td>
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<td>James E. Johnson</td>
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<td><strong>CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:</strong></td>
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<td>Adm. James L. Holloway III</td>
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<td><strong>COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS:</strong></td>
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<td>Gen. Louis H. Wilson</td>
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<td>Thomas C. Reed</td>
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<td>James P. Goode (acting)</td>
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