REPORT TO

THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

INEFFECTIVE PROGRAM PLANNING AND
UNECONOMICAL UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCE RESERVE RECOVERY PROGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, as respectively amended, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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DENNIS R. SHAW
28 Nov 64
(Date)

BY

THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 1964
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BY
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 1964
To the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President pro tempore of the Senate

Enclosed is our report on ineffective program planning
and uneconomical utilization of personnel assigned to the
Air Force Reserve Recovery Program. The Department of De-
fense has not identified any specific portions of the report
requiring security classification, but has stated that the
conclusions reached as to the effectiveness of the defense
and survival force warrant the overall classification of
SECRET.

The report shows that the Air Force established Reserve
Recovery Squadrons at 200 airports in the United States be-
fore ascertaining the needs of the major Air Force commands
which these squadrons were intended to serve. As a result,
over 100 of these squadrons either have been assigned since
their formation in July 1961, or are being considered for
reassignment, to airports that (1) are located in areas of
high vulnerability to enemy attack, have inadequate facili-
ties, or otherwise do not meet the needs of the major using
Air Force commands, (2) are unreasonably long distances from
the home cities of the units, thus reducing the units' capa-
bilities to react quickly during an emergency, or (3) are al-
ready occupied by military units capable of performing the
mission assigned to the recovery squadrons.

Thus, because of ineffective program planning by the Air
Force, more than half the Reserve Recovery Squadrons are of
little value to the using commands in the event of an emer-
gency. Furthermore, unless the Air Force can find some way of
adequately utilizing these squadrons, more than half of some
$30 million appropriated to date for the Recovery Program will
have been largely wasted.

The report shows also that the mission of providing
ground support to aircraft dispersed from their home bases to
less vulnerable airports during periods of increased tension
was assigned to the Reserve Recovery Squadrons, although no
critical need exists for their services at many dispersal sites and there is little assurance that reservists can effectively be used in this type of mission. The unlikelihood of effectively utilizing recovery units during a prehostility period to support dispersal of aircraft and aircrews was brought out during the Cuban crisis in October 1962, when the Air Force commands dispersed their aircraft with only minor assistance from recovery unit personnel, on a volunteer basis.

We found also that the premature establishment of recovery units brought about the development of manning tables that were not based on the actual needs of the major using commands. As a consequence, the manning tables may include positions that are not likely to be necessary during periods of dispersal or recovery. To the extent that unneeded positions are filled or will be filled, the costs of drill pay and other expenses involved in training these personnel are largely wasted.

We brought our findings to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and proposed that he take steps (1) to inactivate unneeded recovery squadrons, (2) to institute a study to ascertain the reasonableness of assigning a dispersal mission to Reserve units, and (3) to have the manning tables of retained squadrons adjusted to include only the minimum types and numbers of personnel necessary at each site to fulfill the needs of the major using commands.

The Department of Defense concurred in general in our proposals and subsequently directed the Air Force to initiate studies similar to those we proposed. The Department indicated, however, that inactivation of unjustified recovery units would not be made until some time after an extensive study of the Reserve Recovery Program missions is completed. Although we concur in general in this procedure, we nevertheless believe that it may unnecessarily prolong the existence of some squadrons which have been recognized for some time as not being usable in the program.
We are therefore recommending that the Secretary of Defense consider for immediate inactivation those Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadrons for which there is no foreseeable need and that further inactivations be made as necessary upon completion of the study being made by the Air Force. Since the Air Force has for more than a year been seeking ways to support retention of improperly located squadrons, we are recommending further that the Secretary of Defense require the Air Force to fully document the need and justification for any new missions proposed for these squadrons.

Also, inasmuch as planning for survival in the event of an enemy attack would concern the Army and Navy as well as the Air Force, and duplicating or overlapping capabilities may develop both within and among the military services, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense request the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the Air Force survival plans in conjunction with the plans of the other military services. This review should include consideration, on a location-by-location basis, of not only the capability of Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadrons to perform their missions, but also whether the existing capability of Air National Guard, Army, Navy, and Marine units at the designated airports can be used to handle the Air Force dispersal and recovery missions.

Copies of the report are being sent to the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air Force.
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REPORT ON THE
INEFFECTIVE PROGRAM PLANNING AND
UNECONOMICAL UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCE RESERVE RECOVERY PROGRAM

The General Accounting Office has made a review of the Air Force Reserve Recovery Program. This review was made pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67). The scope of our review is set forth on page 39. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The conditions discussed in this report have existed since the program was started in July 1961. Our findings and proposals for corrective action were brought to the attention of the Department of Defense, and its comments, included as appendix I, have been given recognition in this report. (UNCLASSIFIED)

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
RESERVE RECOVERY MISSION

Prior to the development in 1960 of a new mission for Air Force reservists, known as the Air Force Reserve Recovery Program, approximately 35 percent of the Air Force reservists in a paid drill status were receiving classroom training on an individual basis under a program often referred to as the "little red schoolhouse." According to the Continental Air Command, which manages the various Reserve programs for the Air Force and, as stated by other Air Force officials, this training program was of limited value both to the Air Force and the individual reservists. During the time that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and (UNCLASSIFIED)
Programs, Department of the Air Force, was attempting to find a better way of utilizing these reservists, the Joint Chiefs of Staff placed a requirement upon the Armed Forces to develop plans for recovery during a post-attack period. The Air Force then conceived the Reserve Recovery Program to satisfy the need for both a new program for its reservists and the new recovery mission assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (UNCLASSIFIED)

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROGRAM

The plans developed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs called for the elimination of the individual training programs and the establishment of 200 recovery squadrons, 82 supervisory groups, and several hundred other support units of various types. In September 1960, seven recovery squadrons and seven recovery groups were activated as a test of the new concept. In April 1961, the Air Force Assistant Vice Chief of Staff authorized the activation of the additional programmed recovery units starting July 1, 1961. He stated that the Air Force had approximately 20,000 drill spaces available within the paid-drill ceilings established by the Department of Defense for initial activation of recovery units at minimum strength. Full manning of the units was estimated to require an additional authorization of 100,000 drill spaces and $60 million to $70 million in funds.

In accordance with this authorization, the Office of the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces activated on July 1, 1961, the units needed to reach the total of 200 squadrons and 82 groups. A small number of other types of support units called for by the original recovery plan were also activated. At the time of activation, the sole mission of the squadrons was to (UNCLASSIFIED)
provide minimum essential ground support during a post-attack period for recovery at civilian airports of aircraft and aircrews unable to land at their home bases. Subsequently, as reported by the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces to the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Committee on Appropriations, in May 1962, the mission of the squadrons was expanded to provide support to aircraft and aircrews dispersed from their home bases during prehostility periods of increased tension. The Assistant Chief of Staff commented that the Air Force believed this to be a stronger requirement for the units. In addition to these specific missions, the squadrons have been given a general mission of aiding in the regrouping and evacuation of Air Force residual resources after an enemy attack, often referred to as "reconstitution." The groups provide command and staff supervision over the recovery squadrons. (UNCLASSIFIED)

At June 30, 1962, the recovery squadrons and groups had a total complement of 18,114 reservists, representing about 32 percent of the total paid-drill strength of the Air Force Reserve. The majority of the reservists assigned to recovery units were transferred from the individual training programs. (UNCLASSIFIED)

The estimated direct costs of the Recovery Program for fiscal years 1962 and 1963 were about $11 million each year. The United States budget for 1964 included $10.8 million for this purpose. These amounts do not include any of the very substantial indirect expenses incurred by the Air Force in support of the Recovery Program, such as the pay and allowances of active duty military personnel assigned to the Continental Air Command. (UNCLASSIFIED)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSITION ON THE PROGRAM

The approval by the Secretary of Defense of $10.8 million in the 1964 budget is a continuation of his actions in prior years to
maintain the Recovery Program at a reduced level. In November 1961, the Secretary had approved holding the program to $11 million for fiscal years 1962 and 1963. The Secretary's approval was based on a memorandum from his staff concerning the extent of support to be included in the 1963 budget for the Recovery Program. This memorandum stated that staff analyses had concluded that there were no valid military requirements for the program and that the proposed program had been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. The memorandum stated further that:

"These programs have been organized and implemented by the Air Force under the general authority of DOD Instruction 1215.6, which authorizes the Secretary of each Military Department to divide reserve components into training categories, determine appropriate pay groups, and establish criteria for training which will meet the particular needs of the Service concerned. When this Directive was originally issued in 1956 it was presumed that the overall strength ceilings established by Manpower Programs would be an adequate control and that there would be few major revisions in the force structure. Actually, however, there have been major reorganizations accomplished within existing ceilings and many of these have been implemented without prior review by the Department. These have become known only by accident in some cases, particularly where budget changes were not involved. Since the Service Secretaries have been authorized to establish new force structures and activate elements at widely dispersed geographical locations, a subsequent DOD decision to disapprove a particular program and deactivate the elements may generate widespread protest and political storms. In this particular case, for example, Recovery or Base Support units have been activated at more than 200 locations throughout the country and about 23,000 reservists have been reassigned to the new program."

The memorandum was concluded with seven possible alternative decisions that could be made by the Secretary of Defense, ranging from complete elimination of the program to its expansion to the level
proposed by the Air Force. The Secretary's decision to continue the program in 1963 at the 1962 level was considered to be provisional in nature, depending upon further justification by the Air Force.

The approval of the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1964 provides a total manning level of 17,045 reservists for the Recovery Program. In reaching the decision to limit the program to this level, the Secretary considered an evaluation of the program submitted by his staff. This evaluation stated among other things, that:

"While the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] have indicated that recovery and reconstitution of military forces is a proper military mission, no information is available to indicate that studies have been completed which prove that the use of Reserve forces is the best or most economical way to accomplish that mission. Both the active forces and FAA [Federal Aviation Agency] possess important resources which should be carefully evaluated and fully utilized before a reserve program is established."

The evaluation also criticized the location of recovery squadrons, the distribution of reservists, and the equipment conditions. It suggested that, before approving requested increases in the program, the Air Force should be required to redistribute and utilize fully the personnel spaces allocated to nonessential squadrons.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The recovery units are a command responsibility of the Continental Air Command (CONAC), Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. CONAC functions through a headquarters staff, 6 Reserve region headquarters, and 16 Reserve sector headquarters. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, Headquarters, United States Air Force (UNCLASSIFIED)
(USAF), also has responsibility for the control and direction of all Reserve Forces on behalf of the Chief of Staff. A list of principal officials of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force responsible for the administration of activities described in this report is included as appendix II.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MANY RESERVE RECOVERY SQUADRONS ARE IMPROPERLY LOCATED

Although the Air Force assured the Congress, when it requested appropriations for the Reserve Recovery Program, that airports selected for recovery of aircraft would be compatible with usability and needs, 129 of the 200 Reserve Recovery Squadrons have been located, since their formation, at airports that do not meet the needs of the major using Air Force commands or at airports that already had military units capable of performing the mission of the Reserve units. This condition resulted principally because the recovery airports were selected near the home area of reservists who were readily available for assignment to recovery squadrons, without consulting the major Air Force commands which the Reserve squadrons were intended to serve during an emergency.

Once established in local communities, Reserve units are difficult to disband or relocate, and the mere existence of recovery squadrons has strongly influenced the Air Force to seek ways of using their services in order to justify their retention. The Air Force has had under continuous study plans to reassign many of the recovery units improperly located. On the basis of reassignment plans being considered at the time of our review, however, as many as 125 squadrons will still be improperly located or will be located at airports already having the needed military capability. Thus, as a result of ineffective program planning by the Air Force, more than half the Reserve Recovery Squadrons are of little value to the using commands in the event of an emergency. Furthermore, unless the Air Force can find some way of adequately utilizing these squadrons, more than half of some $30 million appropriated to date for the Recovery Program will have been largely wasted.
The following table summarizes the number of squadrons either improperly located or unneeded and includes 35 squadrons which fall into both categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment since inception of reassignment program</th>
<th>Planned reassignment (note a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of squadrons improperly located or unneeded based on:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Squadrons assigned to airports not selected by major commands</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Squadrons assigned to airports acceptable to major commands, but located unreasonably long distances from home sites of reservists</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total squadrons improperly located 109 82

3. Squadrons assigned to airports acceptable to major commands, that are already occupied by military units 20 78

4. Less squadrons included in both categories 2 and 3 -35

Total squadrons improperly located or unneeded 129 125

*aBased upon plans being considered by Headquarters, United States Air Force, in July 1963.

The details of our findings concerning these improperly located and unneeded squadrons are contained in separate sections of this report, which follow.
Many squadrons are located at airports which do not meet the needs of the Air Force using commands.

Although recovery squadrons are intended to handle the dispersal, recovery, and regrouping of aircraft of the major commands, 109 of the 200 squadrons have since formation been improperly located to adequately serve this purpose. The Air Force has been trying to develop new sites for these units, which will meet the needs of the using commands. However, our review of plans still being considered by the Air Force in July 1963 indicates that 82 of the 200 units either will still be unusable for the purposes for which intended because they are assigned to airports not selected by the major commands or are of doubtful use because they are located unreasonably long distances from their planned recovery sites. (SECRET)

The Recovery Program was started on September 1, 1960, by the formation of seven squadrons and seven supervisory groups to test the recovery concept. These test units were planned to obtain information during a 9-month period for use in establishing additional units. On March 1, 1961, the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces testified before the House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, in support of the requested funds for the Air Force Reserves for fiscal year 1962. In response to an inquiry as to selection of sites for the 200 squadrons, the Assistant Chief of Staff stated that the sites were being selected, would be approved by Headquarters, United States Air Force, and would be compatible with usability and needs. On July 1, 1961, following these hearings, the remaining 193 squadrons were activated by the Air Force. (UNCLASSIFIED)
Our visits to the major commands that would be using the services of these squadrons during an emergency disclosed that they were not consulted as to the airports where the squadrons should be located. In fact, it was not until October 1961, about 4 months after the activation of all 200 squadrons, that the Continental Air Command first briefed the Strategic Air Command, the Tactical Air Command, and other commands concerning the existence and purposes of the Recovery Program. In December 1961, the commands were formally directed by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force to revise their plans for survival, recovery, and reconstitution and to make full use of the Reserve recovery units. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Each of the commands subsequently submitted requirements for dispersal, recovery, and regroup bases to Headquarters, USAF. These plans were reviewed by Headquarters, USAF, and the first tentative consolidated listing of bases was prepared in May 1962, almost a year after the 200 recovery squadrons were formed. The listing of bases selected by the commands included only about 80 of the 200 airports that had previously been assigned to the recovery squadrons by Headquarters, USAF. Thereafter, each command was provided with the consolidated listing and was requested to review its stated requirements for nonmilitary installations and submit any corrections, additions, or deletions to USAF. Subsequently, USAF analyzed the needs as reported by the commands. One of the stated objectives of this analysis was to determine whether better utilization of the recovery units was possible. After this analysis, USAF forwarded to the commands in August 1962 a new consolidated list of proposed dispersal, recovery, and regroup bases. This listing incorporated the latest statement of base locations required by the commands and, in addition, proposed changes to (SECRET)
command selections based upon the analysis made at USAF. The proposed changes included 24 airports, not previously selected by the major commands, which were already assigned to recovery squadrons. USAF again requested the commands to examine the proposals and submit their concurrence or alternative recommendations. The commands were informed that, if they were not in agreement with the changes proposed by USAF, they were to submit reasons for nonconciliation. The major commands subsequently accepted a majority of the changes proposed by USAF.

In September 1962, USAF requested additional drill spaces and funds for this program from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In reviewing this request, OSD utilized a listing submitted by USAF which showed the latest proposed dispersal, recovery, and regroup bases and the planned utilization of recovery squadrons at these bases. We compared the locations of proposed bases in this listing, and subsequent minor changes thereto, with the existing locations of recovery units and airports originally assigned to them. We found that 109 squadrons had been assigned, since their inception, to sites not subsequently selected by the major commands for purposes of dispersal, recovery, or regroup.

The records we reviewed did not show specifically why so many of the sites established without benefit of consultation with the major using commands had not subsequently been selected by these commands to meet their requirements. We found, however, that many of the sites had runways that did not meet the minimum requirements of the using commands. Others were located in large metropolitan areas or were near large military installations generally thought to be vulnerable to enemy attack. For example, at the time of our review the major commands had not requested any sites in or near (UNCLASSIFIED)
New York City because of its vulnerability to enemy attack. However, at the present time there are six recovery squadrons in this general area.

Following are some specific examples of recovery squadrons that were improperly located, that have been in training since July 1961, and that are unlikely to be utilized because their assigned airports have not been selected by the major commands.

9215th Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadron--Washington, D.C.

This squadron has an authorized strength of 22 officers and 156 airmen, and had 19 officers and 93 airmen assigned at the time of our review in July 1962. The Washington National Airport, less than 3 miles from the Pentagon, was designated as the unit's recovery site upon activation. Although it had office space at the airport for a time, the Air Force has been unable to obtain permission from the Federal Aviation Agency to utilize airport facilities for training or emergency recovery operations. In May 1962 the squadron obtained office and training space at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. However, Bolling Air Force Base has not been designated as a recovery site and is not suitable for training purposes, because aircraft other than helicopters are not allowed access.

9501st Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadron--Moline, Illinois

This squadron has an authorized strength of 15 officers and 83 airmen and, at the time of our review in July 1962, had 13 officers and 39 airmen assigned. CONAC designated the Quad-City Airport as the unit's recovery site, and the unit has been in training there since July 1961. We were informed by a squadron officer that the airport does not have an adequate supply of jet fuel of the type required by military aircraft.

9636th Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadron--Santa Rosa, California

This squadron has an authorized strength of 26 officers and 210 airmen and, at the time of our review in August 1962, had 22 officers and only 27 airmen assigned. The squadron started training at its assigned recovery site, Sonoma County Airport, in August 1961. The airport was rejected by the
major commands because its longest runway is only 5,000 feet and there are limited storage facilities for fuel.

Of the 109 improperly located squadrons, 69 were being considered at the time of our review for reassignment to so-called "nearby" locations acceptable to major commands. The remaining 40 squadrons are located at airports that have not been selected by the major commands. Many of these squadrons have been located since their formation in areas of high vulnerability to enemy attack and at airports with inadequate facilities, and they still remain on drill status even though the Air Force has known for some time that they are not expected to be utilized during an emergency for the purposes for which they were formed. The Department of Defense became aware of the continued existence of the 40 units as early as September 1962 and suggested in November 1962 that the Air Force determine whether these units should be eliminated. No action has been taken by the Air Force to date to inactivate the 40 squadrons.

Of the 69 squadrons being considered by the Air Force for reassignment to so-called "nearby" locations, we found that 42 were actually long distances from their proposed locations. Specifically, 24 of the "nearby" locations are 50 to 100 miles from the home cities of the units, 15 sites are 100 to 200 miles away, and 3 sites are more than 200 miles away. The original Air Force concept for the Recovery Program did not envision the assignment of personnel residing more than 50 miles from the training locations. Instead, it was planned that the units would be manned by reservists living in the local or adjacent communities, in order that these reservists would be immediately available in the event of an emergency. Also, the initial planning guidance stipulated that the units themselves should be organized adjacent to nonmilitary
airports. The initial assignments of recovery squadrons were generally in accord with this guidance.

In accordance with the "ready now" concept necessary to the accomplishment of the Air Force wartime mission, Air Force regulations require that at least 65 percent of a unit's Reserve personnel be in readiness status within 2 hours after an order to report to active duty. With respect to the mission of recovery squadrons, the Air Force has stated that "reaction time must be the principal factor in dispersal and recovery operations." We recognize that reaction time is dependent upon several factors in addition to distance, such as travel conditions in different geographic areas, civilian occupations of the reservists, and specific requirements of the missions assigned to each unit. We believe, however, that units required to travel more than 50 miles to their assigned recovery sites cannot reasonably be considered to possess quick reaction capability and, consequently, that their mission capability would be diluted.

Further, CONAC has stated that a dynamic community relations program is essential to promote the cooperation and willingness of Government agencies, civilian agencies, and individuals to provide needed equipment and supplies and to develop with the communities mutual responsibility for accomplishment of the squadrons' missions. The establishment of such harmonious relations evidently would require frequent contact between members of the Reserve squadrons and leaders of the communities where their planned recovery airports are located. Consequently, we believe that it will be extremely difficult for units located long distances from their assigned recovery sites to obtain the local community support considered by the Air Force to be vital to the program.
The records we examined at USAF did not clearly show why recovery squadrons were set up at various locations across the United States without first consulting with the major using commands and conducting surveys of the airports and their facilities. However, on the basis of information available to us and discussions with responsible Air Force officials, it appears that the major underlying factor was an urgent desire to assign reservists, who were then in individual training programs considered to be of little value, to a program that would provide them with a more meaningful mission. (See p. 1.) The Air Force had been trying for some time to rejuvenate its program for reservists and, when the Recovery Program concept was developed, it appears that the Air Force rushed into the program to solve its Reserve problems. Although the original plans of the Air Force for the Recovery Program indicated that it would be desirable to locate units in small towns and outside probable target areas, reservists assigned to the individual training programs in these areas were apparently not always available in sufficient numbers to assure satisfactory manning of the new units at the outset. Also, in some areas where reservists were available in sufficient numbers, the civilian airport facilities were inadequate. Consequently, the desire to assign as many of the reservists as possible to a new program seems to have been a basic consideration in establishing the airport locations of the 200 recovery units. Further evidence of this is the fact that the airport locations were not selected by the commands that would use the services of the Reserve squadrons during an emergency, but instead by components within the Air Force whose sole function was management of Reserve Forces.
Many squadrons are located at airfields already having needed military capability for aircraft dispersal and recovery mission.

Of the 200 Reserve Recovery Squadrons, 20 have been located since their formation at airfields already occupied by military units capable of performing the assigned mission of the Reserve units. Also, 58 other squadrons, located at sites not selected by the major using commands, were being considered at the time of our review for reassignment to new sites already occupied by military units. Thus, a total of 78 recovery squadrons would be located at sites already having the needed military capability for aircraft recovery and dispersal.

Thirty-nine of these 78 Reserve Recovery Squadrons are presently located or are planned to be located at airports where Air National Guard units are in training. These guard units are manned in part by a large number of full-time civilian personnel, called air technicians, many of whom are also reservists and fill military positions in the National Guard units. The air technicians are specialists in various fields, including aircraft maintenance, communications, and supply. It would seem, therefore, that air technicians have the necessary skills required to fulfill the major mission of recovery squadrons, which is to provide emergency support for dispersed or recovered aircraft and aircrews. Emergency support may consist of refueling and decontamination of aircraft, organizational maintenance, security, and billeting and feeding of crewmen.

For example, a number of National Guard units are located at a civilian airport selected by the Strategic Air Command for dispersal of aircraft. The National Guard units have more than 850 personnel assigned, of whom about 160 are full-time air technicians.
These units are expected to remain at their present location during an emergency. Thus, it would appear that there is adequate capability at this location to meet the needs of the Air Force commands in an emergency. However, a recovery squadron with 178 personnel authorized and 83 on hand is also assigned to the airport.

Similar conditions exist for most of the 38 other recovery squadrons collocated or planned to be collocated with Air National Guard units. Plans we reviewed showed that 19 of these squadrons were being considered for assignment to Air National Guard locations where the National Guard units are committed to the Tactical Air Command. We were informed by an official in Air National Guard Headquarters that, although these National Guard units may be expected to redeploy to overseas bases during wartime, they would generally be at their home bases during a period of dispersal and during the initial period of a conflict when the need for aircraft recovery would be more probable. In the event that some of these units were redeployed overseas during peacetime, and therefore would not be available for dispersal and recovery operations at their home bases, it might be necessary to either temporarily revise dispersal and recovery plans or to augment the limited number of caretaker personnel that would remain at the bases.

In July 1962, representatives of the National Guard Bureau discussed with CONAC representatives the possible participation of Air National Guard units in the dispersal and recovery mission. Some joint exercises with recovery squadrons were performed, but it was not until March 1963 that a decision was reached concerning the extent to which National Guard units would help carry out this mission during an emergency. In the meantime, during the Cuban crisis
in October 1962, National Guard units provided the necessary ground support for dispersed aircraft at 24 airports, even though they had not been specifically trained for this mission. Recovery squadrons were located near 13 of these airports, but only one gave any support to the dispersed aircraft and crews. For example, the ground handling of eight B-47 aircraft dispersed to Bradley Field, Connecticut, by the Strategic Air Command was performed entirely by Air National Guard personnel, although a recovery squadron was located about 45 miles away. The Chief of Air Staff, Connecticut Air National Guard, reported that the National Guard gave "space, supplies, transportation, personnel, security, chaplain services, crash protection, administrative, medical, maintenance, supply and operational assistance, provided liaison with local merchants, motels and restaurants."

Notwithstanding the significant contribution made by Air National Guard units during the Cuban crisis, CONAC requested USAF in February 1963 to give recovery units sole responsibility for supporting the dispersal and recovery plans of major commands at airports where the recovery units were collocated with the Air National Guard. This request was granted by USAF on March 28, 1963, with a proviso that no duplication or overlapping capabilities be developed.

Thirty-nine additional recovery squadrons, at the time of our review, were either located or planned for relocation to Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine airbases even though in setting up the military requirement Reserve recovery units were intended to perform their mission only at nonmilitary airfields. Two of these squadrons have been assigned to military air bases since inception of the Recovery Program. The remaining 37 squadrons are assigned to
civilian airports that have not been selected by the major using commands and, according to plans we reviewed, were scheduled to be reassigned to military air bases. However, it would seem that recovery squadrons should not be required at military air bases because ground support for aircraft dispersal, recovery, and regrouping could be provided by the large complements of civilians and active duty military personnel already on hand.

Conclusions

The Air Force did not employ effective management techniques in developing and filling requirements for the Reserve Recovery Program. Initially, the needs of the major commands for services that could be provided by recovery squadrons should have been ascertained, and the Reserve units should then have been established at locations where they could fill these needs. Instead, the Air Force formed the squadrons at locations where reservists were readily available without ascertaining the needs of the major commands. As a result, about two thirds of the recovery squadrons are either (1) assigned to sites that are unsuitable to the major commands, or (2) located at long distances from acceptable sites, and therefore unlikely to be able to react quickly during an emergency or to establish adequate community relations, or (3) assigned or planned to be assigned to airports already occupied by Air National Guard units or active duty Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps organizations.

In view of the skills maintained by air technicians who are on full-time duty, and the extensive support furnished by them during the Cuban crisis, it seems to us that Air National Guard units already at bases needed by the major commands should be able to provide the necessary support required by the dispersal and recovery mission. Similarly, the assignment of recovery squadrons to
military air bases that possess large complements of full-time civilian and military personnel seems unnecessary.

If a unit is located in a community where it is unlikely to be utilized, it conceivably could be moved to another location during a period of emergency. However, because of the time factor it is quite likely that the unit would not be utilized. We believe that the establishment of units in locations where there is little probability that they will be utilized during an emergency results in a waste of funds for drill pay and other expenses involved in training. Further, because Reserve units are difficult to relocate or disband once they have been established in a community, the premature existence of recovery squadrons may result in devising missions to support their retention, which are not valid military requirements, or in expending funds which might be used to satisfy more valid requirements.
Agency comments and action

In reporting our findings to the Secretary of Defense, we proposed that he take steps to have inactivated those Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadrons that are based at airports that (1) are not acceptable to the major using commands for aircraft dispersal and recovery purposes, (2) are not within reasonable distances from the reservists' home communities, and (3) are occupied by military units capable of performing aircraft dispersal and recovery missions.

The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred in this proposal, but stated that inactivations of unjustified recovery units would not be made until the total Reserve Recovery Program had been resolved. This will not be done until some time after an extensive study of the Reserve Recovery Program missions is completed. DOD further stated that inactivations would include those units where it is indicated that travel time is not compatible with response requirements and that our findings had already brought about the reevaluation of some assignments along these lines. In addition, subsequent to the time of our review, the Air Force changed its policy so that recovery units will no longer be assigned to active Air Force installations to provide aircraft dispersal and recovery support, except in those individual cases where such support can be justified.

Specific points on which DOD did not agree with our report, and our evaluation, follow.

1. In connection with the third step of our proposal above, DOD said that it is not generally feasible to rely on Air National Guard, Army, Navy, and Marine units to support the major Air Force commands in their dispersal and recovery operations. DOD explained that:
"Under the situations which would occasion the employment of the reserve recovery units, other tenant units at these airports would be fully committed to their primary mission and could not detract from that mission to support dispersal and recovery operations of other commands. As you can appreciate, such a dilution of their capability might result in limitations on their primary operational role and could have a major impact on our defense capabilities."

In order to evaluate the above comment, we requested appropriate DOD and USAF personnel to furnish some evidence supporting their position. We found that the DOD comment was not based upon a location-by-location analysis of the capability of Air National Guard, Army, Navy, and Marine units to absorb the dispersal and recovery support missions, but that it merely represented a general belief that units in existence for specific purposes could not ordinarily absorb additional missions. Although this reasoning may have merit in theory, it seems to us that the Air Force should factually determine the feasibility of utilizing military units already assigned to recovery and dispersal sites. For example, ground support elements of many Air National Guard, Army, Navy, and Marine units may not have urgent missions to perform during a pre-hostility period and could very likely absorb any dispersal mission which might occur at that time.

Also, with regard to the recovery and regroup missions, the major impact would fall shortly after the beginning of a conflict and it would seem that some of the Air National Guard, Army, Navy, and Marine units would be able to absorb these missions. The wartime missions of many of the National Guard units, for example, do not require performance until a considerable time has elapsed after the
initiation of hostilities. Although these units could be expected during the intervening period to be preparing themselves for their wartime missions, it is entirely possible that they would be able to absorb the additional workload caused by the relatively few aircraft that might be reasonably expected to land at their bases.

Although the DOD comments would seem to eliminate from consideration any transfers of responsibility for the dispersal, recovery, and regroup missions, we noted that subsequent to these comments DOD placed a requirement upon the Air Force to provide an evaluation of the potential of active and Reserve units at or within a reasonable distance of the airports assigned to the recovery units to support these missions. Further, the Air Force directive in March 1963, which assigned prime responsibility to recovery units for supporting the major air commands at locations where they are collocated with Air National Guard units, recognized the possibility that the recovery units might duplicate capabilities of the National Guard units. Consequently, this directive provided that at these bases no duplication or overlapping capabilities would be developed. It would appear, therefore, that, although not given the prime responsibility, the Air National Guard units will be required to play a large role in the dispersal and recovery support missions simply because they generally have the necessary types of personnel and equipment to accomplish these missions. If the accomplishment of the dispersal and recovery support missions will be dependent to an appreciable extent upon the availability of Air National Guard equipment and personnel, we believe that at these bases it would be more effective to also give the National Guard units the responsibility for carrying out the missions. It seems inadvisable to have an Air National Guard unit and a recovery squadron on the same base, each with its own command echelon, and both expected to
cooperate in an emergency in the accomplishment of a joint mission. We believe that this would only contribute to the confusion that might normally be expected in an emergency and that it might conceivably result in the failure to accomplish an important mission. Furthermore, assignment of the dispersal and recovery support mission to the National Guard units already stationed at the airports should result in reduced administrative and training costs.

2. DOD stated that:

"Although it is recognized that in many instances airports to which units were assigned were not those selected by major using commands, the Air Force advises us that this apparent conflict is not such in fact."

DOD went on to explain the system by which Air Force Headquarters and the major commands have been selecting airports to meet their needs, and how it became necessary at times for the major commands to approve alternative airports when more than one command had selected the same airport.

We recognize that the selection of sites by the major commands has been a "give and take" procedure, as described by DOD and that the commands have in some instances accepted sites other than their first choices. However, as shown on page 10, about 120 of the airports at which recovery squadrons were located had not been selected by any of the major commands, as their first choices. After the coordination at the Headquarters, USAF, level of the individual command selections and after acceptance by the commands in some instances of sites other than their first choices, the number of squadrons improperly located was reduced at the time of our review to 109. Consequently, the DOD comment is misleading and in no way explains our finding that 109 of the squadrons have been assigned since their formation in 1961 to airports that have not been selected by the major commands they were intended to serve.
Shortly after commenting on our proposals, DOD requested the Secretary of the Air Force for a detailed justification of each recovery unit proposed for the USAF Reserve Recovery Program in fiscal years 1964 and 1965. The requested justification requires a consideration of all the factors commented upon in this report and should result in the inactivation and reassignment of a large number of units. The study instituted by the Air Force to provide this detailed justification was originally scheduled for completion in November 1963, but has now been rescheduled for completion at a later date. While we generally concur in DOD's view that inactivation of units should await completion of this study, we believe that this may unnecessarily prolong the existence of some squadrons which have been recognized for some time as not being usable in the program.

For example, studies made by the Air Force starting in May 1962 have consistently shown an inability to relocate certain units to sites acceptable to the major commands and DOD has been on notice of this problem for over a year. (See p. 13.) However, no action has been taken by the Air Force to inactivate any of these squadrons.

**Recommendations**

We recommend, therefore, that the Secretary of Defense consider for immediate inactivation those Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadrons for which there is no foreseeable need and that further inactivations be made as necessary upon completion of the study being made by the Air Force. Since the Air Force has for more than a year been seeking ways to support retention of improperly located squadrons, we recommend further that the Secretary of Defense require the Air Force to fully document the need and justification for any new missions proposed for these squadrons.
Also, inasmuch as planning for survival in the event of an enemy attack would concern the Army and Navy, as well as the Air Force, and duplicating or overlapping capabilities may develop both within and among the military services, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense request the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the Air Force survival plans in conjunction with the plans of the other military services. This review should include consideration, on a location-by-location basis, of not only the capability of Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadrons to perform their missions, but also whether the existing capability of Air National Guard, Army, Navy, and Marine units at the designated airports can be used to handle the Air Force dispersal and recovery missions.
A ground support mission for aircraft dispersed from their home bases to less vulnerable airports during periods of increased tension has been assigned to the Reserve Recovery Squadrons, although no critical need exists for their services at many dispersal sites and there is little assurance that reservists can effectively be used in this type of mission. At many of the sites designated by Air Force commands for dispersal of aircraft, military units already exist having a capability to perform the ground support mission. Further, if given sufficient warning before an enemy attack, major Air Force commands dispersing aircraft plan to send their own personnel to provide ground support. On the other hand, if only a very short period of warning time exists, present legislation is not designed to permit instant mobilization of Reserve Forces, and it is not reasonable to expect civilian reservists to report for active duty at a moment's notice. The unlikelihood of effectively utilizing recovery units during a prehostility period was brought out at the time of the Cuban crisis in October 1962, when Air Force commands dispersed their aircraft with only minor assistance from recovery unit personnel on a volunteer basis.

Prior to the time the Reserve Recovery Program was established, the major Air Force commands had recognized that during periods of imminent attack it might be necessary to disperse aircraft from their home bases to less vulnerable military and civilian airports. To meet this requirement, the commands, such as Air Defense Command (ADC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), and the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), had developed dispersal plans that provided not only for the dispersal of aircraft and aircrews but also for the support personnel that would be required at the dispersal sites.
When the Reserve Recovery Program was established, its sole mission was to provide minimum essential ground support during a post-attack period for recovery at civilian airports of aircraft and aircrews unable to land at their home bases. Notwithstanding that the major Air Force commands already had plans to handle the dispersal of their aircraft, the USAF subsequently expanded the mission of the recovery squadrons to provide support to aircraft and aircrews dispersed from their home bases during prehostility periods of increased tension. In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Committee on Appropriations, in May 1962 the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces stated that "*** in addition to reconstitution and recovery of aircraft after a strike on this Nation, the program has been enlarged to include what we in the Air Force believe to be even a stronger requirement for these same units, and that is protective measures for our combatant forces upon the receipt of strategic warnings; in other words to disperse and take care of the dispersal of a few aircraft at several dispersal sites to minimize the damage in the event this country is made the subject of an attack." (UNCLASSIFIED)

The major commands have revised their dispersal plans since the establishment of the recovery squadrons, but they still show an intent to disperse their own support personnel, given sufficient warning time. This restricts the need for recovery squadrons in a dispersal phase to those periods when the time between a warning of imminent attack and the actual attack is very short. If the recovery squadrons are to be of value during such a dispersal period, they should be able to react quickly upon notice of possible attack. To do so, the recovery squadrons should be appropriately located near nonmilitary airports where their services would be
required. However, we found at the time of our review that, of the 230 airports to which the Air Force commands were planning to disperse aircraft during an emergency, only 116 were planned to be served by the 200 recovery squadrons. Further, at 72 of these sites, the services of recovery squadrons are either not needed because other military units capable of handling the dispersal mission are located there, or not feasible because the squadrons are located 50 to 250 miles from the dispersal sites and, therefore, cannot be expected to have a quick reaction time. The following table summarizes the number of dispersal sites and the need for recovery squadrons at these sites.

1. Dispersal airports selected by Air Force commands 230

| Less dispersal airports not assigned or planned to be assigned to recovery squadrons | 114 |
| Dispersal airports assigned or planned to be assigned to recovery squadrons | 116 |

2. Dispersal airports at which services of recovery squadrons are not needed or not feasible because:

| Dispersal airports occupied by military units capable of handling dispersal mission | 64a |
| Dispersal airports unreasonably long distances from home sites of recovery squadrons | 36 |

| Less dispersal airports included in both categories | 28 | 72 |

3. Dispersal airports where services of recovery squadrons might be utilized 44

aIncludes 14 dispersal airports where ADC plans to station its own personnel full time to provide ground support for permanently dispersed ADC aircraft.
UNCLASSIFIED

A factor in evaluating the recovery squadrons' mission for the remaining 44 dispersal sites, as well as all other sites, is the extent of reliance to be placed upon the units by the dispersing commands. As noted previously, the major Air Force commands have for several years had formal plans to disperse aircraft from their home bases during emergency periods. Although the plans included civilian airports, their execution did not depend in any way upon reservists. These plans have been revised several times since the formation of the recovery squadrons, but the revisions in effect at the time of our review for three of the commands showed that the commands still intended to disperse their own personnel to handle support functions at each dispersal site. Although plans of the commands generally acknowledge the existence of recovery squadrons and provide that they be utilized to the extent possible, it is apparent that reliance is not being placed on them to accomplish the dispersal mission.

During the Cuban crisis in October 1962, when both SAC and ADC had an extensive dispersal of aircraft, very little dispersal support was provided by recovery units. Although legal authority existed at that time to call recovery units to active duty, this was not done. Some Reserve personnel in recovery units volunteered their services during this period of crisis and were placed on active duty for short periods of time. However, attempts to carry out a dispersal supporting mission by recovery units were made at only three dispersal sites. At one of these three locations the recovery unit did not receive notice of the dispersal until after the first aircraft had landed and, owing to the lack of specialized personnel and equipment, it was unable to fill the complete needs of the dispersed aircraft and crews. At the two remaining
locations where recovery units assisted in dispersal operations, most of the assistance, or more than 95 percent of the total man-days expended at all three locations, was spent at one site.

Although recovery units were located at or near other airports to which SAC and ADC dispersed aircraft, they either were not asked to provide, or did not provide, support services. At one location a recovery unit offered to provide support, but it was turned down by the commander of the dispersed organization. Reserve personnel from other recovery squadrons and groups accepted short tours of active duty at 12 other locations and for the most part augmented active duty military staffs. It would seem that the activities of recovery units during the Cuban crisis, instead of presenting conclusive evidence of the workability of the program, actually brought to light serious questions concerning basic concepts.

A basic concept involved, other than the need for Reserve units to perform the dispersal support mission, is the capability of reservists to respond during a prewartime period of dispersal and the probability of their doing so. Although it is impossible to predict the capability of reservists to respond in sufficient time and in sufficient numbers to satisfy the dispersal requirements under varying conditions, we believe that the national security requires complete assurance that the dispersal mission can be accomplished at those sites where dependence is being placed on the recovery squadrons. We understand that during the Cuban crisis considerable difficulty was encountered in finding personnel who would volunteer and could be freed from their normal civilian functions. The need for volunteers developed because recovery units were not called to active duty. As discussed below, this condition could conceivably exist in any prehostility dispersal period.
Permanent legislation (10 U.S.C. 672 and 673) provides that members of the Ready Reserve can be called to active duty in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress, or in time of national emergency declared by the President. This permanent legislation was augmented by a joint resolution (Public Law 87-736, 87th Congress, S. J. Res. 224, October 3, 1962) which provided that until February 28, 1963, the President could order up to 150,000 Ready Reservists to active duty for not more than 12 months. The temporary legislation did not require the declaration of an emergency but, like the permanent legislation, required action by the President.

A provision of law (10 U.S.C. 672(e)) requires that a reasonable time be allowed a reservist to report for active duty after being alerted and that this period should be at least 30 days unless the Secretary concerned determines that the military requirements do not allow it. This pertains to any call-up, whether made under the provisions of either permanent or temporary legislation. The Secretary of the Air Force has determined that Ready Reservists will generally not be given a 30-day notice prior to entry on active duty. He has established that 65 percent of a unit's necessary personnel are expected to be in a readiness status within 2 hours after notification of an order to active duty and that the units will have full possessed capability within 24 hours.

According to the Air Force, dispersal of aircraft is normally a prehostility requirement. During such periods, a declaration of emergency probably would not have been made and a call-up by the President under the authority of temporary legislation, if in effect, is conjectural. This was true during the Cuban crisis when recovery units were not called. Without the benefit of a
call-up of reservists as provided in legislation, the Air Force must depend entirely upon volunteers.

**Conclusion**

The Air Force has stated that the dispersal mission represents a strong requirement for recovery squadrons. However, because of improper locations and the presence of other military units capable of performing this mission, we believe that only about 20 percent of the recovery squadrons would be needed for this mission. Further, there is some doubt that these few squadrons would be utilized because, given sufficient notice of a possible attack, the major Air Force commands intend to disperse their own personnel to provide ground support. If the warning time is very short, making the dispersal of the commands' personnel impossible, it may also be impossible to mobilize the recovery squadrons in sufficient time. Present laws do not provide assurance that reservists could be called to active duty or expected to respond immediately during a prehostility period of increased tension, and dependence upon volunteers at such a critical time is not reasonable.

**Agency comments and action**

In reporting our findings to the Secretary of Defense, we proposed that he have a study made of the reasonableness of assigning a dispersal mission to Reserve units. We stated that this study should consider among other things the importance of this mission, the availability of regular military personnel to do the job, and whether reservists can reasonably be expected to perform the mission adequately.

We further proposed that, if this study shows a continued need for the assignment of the mission to Reserve Recovery Squadrons, the Secretary of Defense should request legislation to provide a
permanent legal basis for calling reservists to involuntary active duty during periods of increased tension and before an emergency has been declared by the President or the Congress.

In commenting on these proposals, the Department of Defense stated that it was directing the Secretary of the Air Force in coordination with the other military departments to conduct a study regarding the assignment of the dispersal mission and was further directing that this study be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for appraisal and comment prior to submission to the Secretary of Defense. The Department also stated that, inasmuch as our proposal to request legislation applied equally to reserve capabilities committed to several other missions having a short response time, the Secretary of the Air Force was being directed to conduct a study in coordination with the other military departments to determine the advisability of requesting such legislative action. This study is also to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and recommendation. The Department of Defense said we would be informed of the outcome of these studies upon their completion.
MANNING TABLES NOT BASED ON NEEDS OF MAJOR USING COMMANDS

The manning tables for Reserve Recovery Squadrons were developed without first determining the actual needs of the major using commands. As a consequence, they may include positions that are not likely to be necessary during periods of dispersal or recovery. To the extent that unneeded positions are filled or will be filled, the costs of drill pay and other expenses involved in training these personnel are largely wasted.

Headquarters, USAF, has authorized three sizes of recovery squadrons, depending upon the type of airfield to which assigned:

| Airfield with no facilities | 26  | 210  | 236 |
| Airfield with limited facilities | 22  | 156  | 178 |
| Airfield with complete facilities | 15  | 83   | 98  |

Each size of squadron has a standard manning table, showing in detail the types, numbers, and grades of authorized personnel. According to Air Force officials who assisted in preparing these manning tables, the major commands, which would use the services provided by recovery squadrons, were not consulted. Also, at the time of our visits to the major commands in August 1962, more than a year after the squadrons were formed, we found no indication that they had ever been asked for their views as to the numbers and types of personnel needed in recovery units to handle their aircraft.

The Military Air Transport Service had suggested that the manning tables be increased to provide for certain functions peculiar to MATS; but, to our knowledge, MATS had not been asked for and had not volunteered an evaluation of positions already included in the manning documents. Officials at some of the major commands we
visited were not familiar with the positions authorized by manning documents, but suggested that they would be satisfied with a small nucleus of personnel who had some knowledge of local conditions. These persons would not be required to possess highly technical skills, but would act as a labor pool to perform various housekeeping and other tasks required by the commanders of dispersed or recovered aircraft. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For example, a Continental Air Command document stated that the Tactical Air Command would require no more than 15 to 25 persons to handle its aircraft at dispersal sites. Recovery squadrons are presently located at 21 airports that, according to the plans we reviewed, would be utilized solely for the dispersal of TAC aircraft, personnel, and equipment; and 14 additional squadrons were being considered for reassignment to such bases. These 35 squadrons had a total of 5,916 authorized personnel and about 2,300 assigned personnel, whereas no more than 875 apparently would be required to carry out their mission.

In our reviews at the squadrons and in discussions with higher echelons of command, we found substantial evidence of excessive manpower authorizations. However, the squadrons and higher echelons have been plagued, since the formation of the squadrons with uncertainty as to their mission. Because they have not been given information as to the types and numbers of aircraft the squadrons could be expected to handle in an emergency, they have been unable to fully determine their manpower needs. In reply to a CONAC request in March 1962, each squadron and group submitted its views as to positions required in its unit on the basis of assumptions as to missions to be performed. CONAC summarized the replies and concluded that the authorized positions in the 200 squadrons could be reduced by about 3,500. (UNCLASSIFIED)
We understand that, on the basis of this survey, CONAC has recommended to USAF that the manning tables be flexible, the authorized manpower of each unit being based on its peculiar needs. Also, in December 1962 a draft of an agreement for reorganizing recovery units was forwarded by CONAC to the major using commands for comment. This draft suggested that the commander of each organizational unit of the Air Force using command should collaborate with the recovery unit commander in his locality in establishing the types and numbers of recovery personnel necessary to satisfy the needs of his unit. We were informed by Air Force officials that the USAF does not plan any action regarding unit manning documents until the units have received their permanent location and mission assignments.

We believe that the actions now being considered by CONAC to establish realistic manning documents are actions that should have been taken prior to the initial formation of recovery squadrons. However, such actions presuppose the existence of valid missions, requirements, and locations of recovery units which, as mentioned in other sections of this report, have still not been determined. In the absence of such information, we are unable to estimate the extent to which current manning documents provide for excessive manpower authorization.

Agency comments and action

In reporting our findings to the Secretary of Defense, we proposed that he have the manning tables of the Reserve Recovery Squadrons adjusted to include only the minimum types and numbers of personnel necessary at each site to fulfill the needs of the major using commands.
The Department of Defense, in commenting on this proposal, agreed that manning tables should be based on the capabilities required at a given location, but stated that it would not be feasible to attempt a determination of the actual manning authorizations until the airfield assignments of these units had been finalized. In this connection, we noted that DOD's request for detailed justification of each recovery unit to be included in the USAF Reserve Recovery Program for fiscal years 1964 and 1965, transmitted to the Secretary of the Air Force shortly after commenting on our report, requires a consideration of manpower requirements.
SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed the development of program concepts and requirements, the establishment of Reserve recovery units, and the assignment of units to recovery airports. The review was made at Headquarters, United States Air Force; at Headquarters, Continental Air Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; and at 8 Air Force Reserve Recovery Groups and 31 Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadrons at widely spread locations throughout the United States. The groups and squadrons reviewed represented about 15 percent of the paid drill strength of the Air Force Reserve Recovery Program. We also made brief visits to the Headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, the Air Defense Command, the Tactical Air Command, and the Military Air Transport Service.
Dear Mr. Rubin:

This is in response to your letters of April 4 and June 6, requesting comments on the preliminary draft report on the ineffective program planning and uneconomical utilization of personnel assigned to the Air Force Reserve Recovery Program. The draft report has been reviewed by the Department of the Air Force and this office, and the following comments are submitted to the specific recommendations made in the draft report.

1. GAO Recommendation. The Secretary of Defense take immediate steps to have inactivated those Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadrons that are based at airports that (a) are not acceptable to the major using commands for aircraft dispersal and recovery purposes, (b) are not within reasonable distances from the reservists' home communities, and (c) are occupied by military units capable of performing aircraft dispersal and recovery missions.

The Department concurs in this recommendation except for the degree of immediacy with which inactivation of any unjustified reserve recovery units would take place. As you may know, the Air Force is currently conducting an extensive study of the Reserve Recovery Program missions, in coordination with the development of the USAF Survival, Recovery and Reconstitution Plan. This study is currently scheduled for completion on 1 November 1963. For this reason it might be premature and uneconomical to direct inactivation prior to resolution of the total program as a result of the current study. With reference to the specific points raised in this recommendation the following comments are made:

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GAO footnote
This study was subsequently re-scheduled for completion in January 1964.
a. Although it is recognized that in many instances airports to which units were assigned were not those selected by major using commands, the Air Force advises us that this apparent conflict is not such in fact. The Air Force advises that commands were requested to select airports but that in view of the fact that such unilateral selections resulted in some instances in more than one command selecting the same airport, it has been necessary to allocate alternative airports in some of these instances. The Air Force states that to their knowledge the present assignment of alternative airports to the initial selections of major commands does meet with the approval of these commands and is incorporated in their plans in response to the study referred to above. The study should point out any exceptions that do exist and where these cannot be resolved your recommendations will be effected.

b. The matter of reasonable distance from home communities to airports cannot be resolved solely in terms of miles to be traveled but must consider travel time and response requirements for the particular mission assigned. As you will note in the attachment, your findings have already initiated the re-evaluation of some assignments along these lines. Where it is indicated that travel time is not compatible with response requirements, inactivations will be effected.

c. With possibly a few exceptions, unless an airport is supported by an active Air Force base group, it is not considered feasible to rely on any other tenant units to perform the dispersal and recovery missions. Under the situations which would occasion the employment of the reserve recovery units, other tenant units at these airports would be fully committed to their primary mission and could not detract from that mission to support dispersal and recovery operations of other commands. As you can appreciate, such a dilution of their capability might result in limitations on their primary operational role and could have a major impact on our defense capabilities.

2. GAO Recommendation. The Secretary of Defense have the manning tables of the Reserve Recovery Squadrons adjusted to include only the minimum types and number of personnel necessary at each site to fulfill the needs of the major using commands.
As discussed in connection with Recommendation I., above, it would appear preferable again to key this action to the receipt of the current Air Force study, since this report will influence assignment of units to major using commands and may occasion relocation of unit assignments to airfields. Inasmuch as manning tables should reflect the capabilities required at a given location, it would not be feasible to attempt a determination of the actual manning authorizations until the airfield assignments of these units has been finalized.

3. GAO Recommendation. The Secretary of Defense institute a study to ascertain the reasonableness of assigning a dispersal mission to Reserve units. This study should consider among other things the importance of this mission, the availability of regular military personnel to do the job and whether reservists can reasonably be expected to perform the mission adequately.

The Department is directing the Secretary of the Air Force in coordination with the other military departments to conduct a study regarding the assignment of the dispersal mission and is further directing that this study be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for appraisal and comment prior to submission to the Secretary of Defense.

4. GAO Recommendation. The Secretary of Defense request legislation to provide a permanent legal basis for calling reservists to involuntary active duty during periods of increased tension and before an emergency has been declared by the President or the Congress, if this study shows a continued need for the assignment of the mission to Reserve Recovery Squadrons.

Inasmuch as this recommendation applies equally to reserve capabilities committed to several other missions with a short response time, the Secretary of the Air Force is being directed to conduct a study in coordination with the other military departments to determine the advisability of requesting such legislative action. This study will also be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comment and recommendation.
With reference to the security classification, the Department of the Air Force advises us that although some of the individual paragraphs, when used alone, are not of a nature that require security classification, it is considered that the over-all classification of Secret should be assigned to the report. The total effect of these paragraphs and the conclusions reached as to the effectiveness of the defense and survival capabilities warrant the over-all classification of Secret.

The Department of Defense appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report and the information which you have provided.

You will be advised of the results of the studies referred to above upon their completion.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

JAMES F. HOLLINGSWORTH
Colonel, U. S. Army
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Reserve Affairs)

Mr. Harold H. Rubin
Associate Director
Defense Accounting and Audit Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington 25, D. C.

Footnotes

In response to a second GAO request for declassification of the report, DOD rated in November 1963 that the classification of Secret was still required. However, DOD agreed that the letter of transmittal to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate could be declassified.

The enclosure, consisting of more than 100 pages, is not considered necessary to understanding of DOD's comments, and has not been included in the appendix.
APPENDIX II

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

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<td>Robert S. McNamara</td>
<td>Jan. 1961</td>
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<td>Roswell L. Gilpatric</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norman S. Paul</td>
<td>Aug. 1962</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS):</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. James F. Hollingsworth</td>
<td>Jan. 1963</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DIRECTOR OF RESERVE AFFAIRS AND READINESS PLANS (position abolished January 1963):</strong></td>
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Eugene M. Zuckert</td>
<td>Jan. 1961</td>
<td>Present</td>
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APPENDIX II

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (continued)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Official</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF THE AIR</td>
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<td>FORCE (MANPOWER, PERSONNEL AND RESERVE FORCES):</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benjamin W. Fridge</td>
<td>June 1961 Present</td>
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<td>CHIEF OF STAFF:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen. Curtis E. Le May</td>
<td>June 1961 Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen. Thomas D. White</td>
<td>July 1957 June 1961</td>
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<td>ICE CHIEF OF STAFF:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen. William F. McKee</td>
<td>July 1962 Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Curtis E. Le May</td>
<td>July 1957 June 1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF:</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS AND OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(formerly Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs):</td>
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PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (continued)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (continued)

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS (formerly Deputy Chief of Staff Operations):


ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESERVE FORCES:


DEPUTY FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESERVE FORCES (position abolished January 1963):


COMMANDER, CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND:


VICE COMMANDER, CONTINENTAL AIR COMMAND:


{UNCLASSIFIED}