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United States General Accounting Office: 


Before the Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. 
Wednesday, July 17, 2002: 

Homeland Security: 

Critical Design and Implementation Issues: 

Statement of David Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 


Mr. Chairman and Members of the Select Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Select Committee
today to discuss one of the most important issues of our time, the
reorganization of government agencies and the reorientation of their
missions to improve our nation’s ability to better protect our 
homeland. It is important to recognize that this transition to a more 
effective homeland security approach is part of a larger transformation 
effort that our government must make to address emerging security, 
economic, demographic, scientific, technological, fiscal and other 
challenges of the 21st century and to meet the expectations of the 
American people for timely, quality and cost-effective public services. 

In the months since the horrible events of September 11th, the President
and the Congress have responded with important and aggressive actions to
protect the nation, including creating an Office of Homeland Security
(OHS), passing new laws such as the USA Patriot Act and an initial
emergency supplemental spending bill, establishing a new agency to
improve transportation security, and working with unprecedented
collaboration with federal, state, and local governments, private sector
entities, non-governmental organizations, and other countries to prevent
future terrorist acts and to bring to justice those individuals 
responsible for such terrible acts. 

More recently, the Congress and the President have sought to remedy 
longstanding issues and concerns in the government’s homeland security
functions by proposing greater consolidation and coordination of various
agencies and activities. On June 6th, the President announced a 
proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and on 
June 18th he transmitted draft legislation to the Congress for its 
consideration. Both the House and the Senate have worked diligently on 
these issues and this Select Committee is now deliberating on a variety 
of proposals and issues raised by House committees and subcommittees. 

In my testimony today, I will focus on two major issues that we believe 
the Congress should consider creating a new cabinet department 
principally dedicated to homeland security: (1) the national strategy 
and criteria needed to guide any reorganization of homeland security 
activities and to help evaluate which agencies and missions should be 
included in or left out of the new DHS; and (2) key issues related to 
the successful implementation of, and transition to, a new department, 
including leadership, cost and phasing, and other management 
challenges. Our testimony is based largely on our previous and ongoing 
work on national preparedness issues, [Footnote 1] as well as a review 
of the proposed legislation. 

In response to global challenges the government faces in the coming 
years, we have a unique opportunity to create an extremely effective 
and performance-based organization that can strengthen the nation’s 
ability to protect its borders and citizens against terrorism. There is 
likely to be considerable benefit over time from restructuring some of 
the homeland security functions, including reducing risk and improving 
the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of these consolidated 
agencies and programs. Sorting out those programs and agencies that 
would most benefit from consolidation versus those in which dual 
missions must be balanced in order to achieve a more effective fit in 
DHS is a difficult but critical task. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
challenges that the new department faces will clearly require 
substantial time and effort, and will take institutional continuity and 
additional resources to make it fully effective. Numerous complicated 
issues will need to be resolved in the short term, including a 
harmonization of the communication systems, information technology
systems, human capital systems, the physical location of people and 
other assets, and many other factors. Implementation of the new 
department will be an extremely complex task and will ultimately take 
years to achieve. Given the magnitude of the endeavor, not everything 
can be achieved at the same time and a deliberate phasing of some 
operations will be necessary. As a result, it will be important for the 
new department to focus on: articulating a clear overarching mission 
and core values; establishing a short list of initial critical 
priorities; assuring effective communication and information systems; 
and developing an overall implementation plan for the new national 
strategy and related reorganization. Further, effective performance and 
risk management systems must be established, and work must be completed 
on threat and vulnerability assessments. 

Homeland Security Strategy, Criteria and Reorganization: 

Congress, in its deliberations on creating a new department, should pay
special attention to strategy, criteria and priorities for 
reorganization critical to the nation’s efforts to protect the nation 
from terrorism. 

Homeland Security Strategy: 

In recent testimony before the Congress, GAO urged that the proposal for
establishing DHS should not be considered a substitute for, nor should 
it supplant, the timely issuance of a national homeland security 
strategy. [Footnote 2] Based on our prior work, GAO believes that the 
consolidation of some homeland security functions makes sense and will, 
if properly organized and implemented, over time lead to more 
efficient, effective, and coordinated programs; better intelligence 
sharing; and a more robust protection of our people, borders, and 
critical infrastructure. At the same time, the proposed cabinet 
department, even with its multiple missions, will still be just one of 
many players with important roles and responsibilities for ensuring 
homeland security. At the federal level, homeland security missions 
will require the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Marshals Service, the 
Department of Defense (DOD), and a myriad of other agencies. In 
addition, state and local governments, including law enforcement and 
first responder personnel, and the private sector also have critical 
roles to play. 

If anything, the multiplicity of players only reinforces the 
recommendations that GAO has made in the past regarding the urgent need
for a comprehensive threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment and a
national homeland security strategy that can provide direction and 
utility at all levels of government and across all sectors of the 
country. [Footnote 3] 

We are pleased that the Administration has just released the national
homeland security strategy and GAO stands ready to work with the
Congress and the Administration to ensure that a sound and strong 
strategy can be effectively implemented to protect the country against 
terrorism. Although GAO has not had time to thoroughly analyze the 
strategy yet, we previously suggested that certain key elements be 
incorporated in the homeland security strategy. [Footnote 4] We have 
indicated that a national homeland security strategy should: 1) clearly 
define and establish the need for homeland security and its operational 
components, 2) clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of 
federal, state, and local entities and build a framework for 
partnerships for coordination, communication, and collaboration, and 3) 
create specific expectations for performance and accountability, 
including establishing goals and performance indicators. In addition, 
GAO has said the national strategy development and implementation 
should include 1) a regular update of a national-level threat and risk 
assessment effort, 2) formulate realistic budget and resource plans
to eliminate gaps, avoid duplicate effort, avoid “hitchhiker” spending, 
and protect against federal funds being used to substitute for funding 
that would have occurred anyway, 3) coordinate the strategy for 
combating terrorism with efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to 
computer-based attacks, 4) coordinate agency implementation by 
reviewing agency and interagency programs to accomplish the national 
strategy, and 5) carefully choose the most appropriate policy tools of 
government to best implement the national strategy and achieve national 

Based on our preliminary review, some of these elements have been
addressed in the national strategy. In the past, the absence of a broad-
based homeland security definition or the ad hoc creation of a 
definition by individual government departments suggest that a 
consistent and transparent definition be applied to help create a more 
integrated approach and unified purpose. The President’s national 
homeland security strategy does provide for a proposed definition of 
homeland security, which should help the government to more effectively 
administer, fund and coordinate activities both inside and outside a 
new department and to ensure that all parties are focused on the same 
goals and objectives, results and outcomes. It is critically important 
that the Congress and the Administration agree on a definition since it 
serves as the foundation for a number of key organizational, 
operational and funding decisions. 

Finally, I would also note that, in the past, we have suggested that a 
central focal point such as OHS be established statutorily in order to 
coordinate and oversee homeland security policy within a national 
framework. [Footnote 5] Today, we re-emphasize the need for OHS to be 
established statutorily in order to effectively coordinate activities 
beyond the scope of the proposed DHS and to assure reasonable 
congressional oversight. 

Need for Criteria and Reorganization: 

Often it has taken years for the consolidated functions in new 
departments to effectively build on their combined strengths, and it is 
not uncommon for these structures to remain as management challenges 
for decades. It is instructive to note that the 1947 legislation 
creating DOD was further changed by the Congress in 1949, 1953, 1958, 
and 1986 in order to improve the department’s structural effectiveness. 
Despite these and other changes made by DOD, GAO has consistently 
reported over the years that the department -- more than 50 years after 
the reorganization -- continues to face a number of serious management 
challenges. In fact, DOD has 8 of 24 government wide high-risk areas 
based on GAO’s latest list, including the governmentwide high-risk 
areas of human capital and computer security. [Footnote 6] This note of 
caution is not intended to dissuade the Congress from seeking logical 
and important consolidations in government agencies and programs in 
order to improve homeland security missions. Rather, it is meant to 
suggest that reorganizations of government agencies frequently encounter
start-up problems and unanticipated consequences that result from the
consolidations are unlikely to fully overcome obstacles and challenges, 
and may require additional modifications in the future to effectively 
achieve our collective goals for defending the country against 
terrorism. [Footnote 7] 

The Congress faces a challenging and complex job in its consideration of
DHS. On the one hand, there exists a certain urgency to move rapidly in
order to remedy known problems relating to intelligence and information
sharing and leveraging like activities that have in the past and even 
today prevent the United States from exercising as strong a homeland 
defense as emerging and potential threats warrant. Simultaneously, that 
same urgency of purpose would suggest that the Congress be extremely 
careful and deliberate in how it creates a new department for defending 
the country against terrorism. The urge to “do it quickly” must be 
balanced by an equal need to “do it right.” This is necessary to ensure 
a consensus on identified problems and needs, and to be sure that the 
solutions our government legislates and implements can effectively 
remedy the problems we face in a timely manner. It is clear that fixing 
the wrong problems, or even worse, fixing the right problems poorly, 
could cause more harm than good in our efforts to defend our country 
against terrorism. 

GAO has previously recommended that reorganizations should emphasize
an integrated approach; that reorganization plans should be designed to
achieve specific, identifiable goals; and that careful attention to
fundamental public sector management practices and principles, such as
strong financial, technology, and human capital management, are 
critical to the successful implementation of government 
reorganizations. [Footnote 8] Similarly, GAO has also suggested that 
reorganizations may be warranted based on the significance of the 
problems requiring resolution, as well as the extent and level of 
coordination and interaction necessary with other entities in order to 
resolve problems or achieve overall objectives. [Footnote 9] 

GAO, based on its own work as well as a review of other applicable 
studies of approaches to the organization and structure of entities, 
has concluded that the Congress should consider utilizing specific 
criteria as a guide to creating and implementing the new department. 
Specifically, GAO has developed a framework that will help the Congress 
and the Administration create and implement a strong and effective new 
cabinet department by establishing criteria to be considered for 
constructing the department itself, determining which agencies should 
be included and excluded, and leveraging numerous key management and 
policy elements that, after completion of the revised organizational 
structure, will be critical to the department’s success. Figure 1 
depicts the proposed framework: 

Figure 1: Organization and Accountability Criteria for the Department 
of Homeland Security: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a listing of the Organization and Accountability 
Criteria for the Department of Homeland Security, as follows: 

Organization and Accountability Criteria For the Department of Homeland 

The New Department: 
* Definition; 
* Statutory Basis; 
* Clear Mission; 
* Performance-based Organization. 

Agency Transition: Inclusion/Exclusion: 
* Mission Relevancy; 
* Similar Goals and Objectives; 
* Leverage Effectiveness; 
* Gains Through Consolidation; 
* Integrated Information Sharing/Coordination; 
* Compatible Cultures; 
* Impact on Excluded Agencies. 

Cultural Transformation: Implementation and Success Factors: 
* Strategic Planning; 
* Organizational Alignment; 
* Communications; 
* Building Partnerships; 
* Performance Management; 
* Human Capital Strategy; 
* Information Management and Technology; 
* Knowledge Management; 
* Financial Management; 
* Acquisition Management; 
* Risk Management; 
* Change Management. 

[End of figure] 

With respect to criteria that the Congress should consider for 
constructing the department itself, the following questions about the 
overall purpose and structure of the organization should be evaluated: 

* Definition: Is there a clear and consistently applied definition of
homeland security that will be used as a basis for organizing and
managing the new department? 

* Statutory Basis: Are the authorities of the new department clear and
complete in how they articulate roles and responsibilities and do they
sufficiently describe the department’s relationship with other parties? 

* Clear Mission: What will the primary missions of the new DHS be and
how will it define success? 

* Performance-based Organization: Does the new department have the 
structure (e.g., Chief Operating Officer (COO), etc.) and statutory 
authorities (e.g., human capital, sourcing) necessary to meet 
performance expectations, be held accountable for results, and leverage
effective management approaches for achieving its mission on a national 

Congress should also consider several very specific criteria in its
evaluation of whether individual agencies or programs should be included
or excluded from the proposed department. Those criteria include the

* Mission Relevancy: Is homeland security a major part of the agency or
program mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program? 

* Similar Goals and Objectives: Does the agency or program being 
considered for the new department share primary goals and objectives
with the other agencies or programs being consolidated? 

* Leverage Effectiveness: Does the agency or program being considered 
for the new department create synergy and help to leverage the 
effectiveness of other agencies and programs or the new department as a 
whole? In other words, is the whole greater than the sum of the parts? 

* Gains Through Consolidation: Does the agency or program being 
considered for the new department improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of homeland security missions through eliminating 
duplications and overlaps, closing gaps, and aligning or merging
common roles and responsibilities? 

* Integrated Information Sharing/Coordination: Does the agency or 
program being considered for the new department contribute to or 
leverage the ability of the new department to enhance the sharing of
critical information or otherwise improve the coordination of missions
and activities related to homeland security? 

* Compatible Cultures: Can the organizational culture of the agency or
program being considered for the new department effectively meld with 
the other entities that will be consolidated? Field structures and
approaches to achieving missions vary considerably between agencies. 

* Impact on Excluded Agencies: What is the impact on departments losing 
components to DHS? What is the impact on agencies with homeland 
security missions left out of DHS? 

In addition to the above criteria that the Congress should consider 
when evaluating what to include and exclude from the proposed DHS, 
there are certain critical success factors the new department should 
emphasize in its initial implementation phase. Over the years, GAO has 
made observations and recommendations about many of these success 
factors, based on effective management of people, technology, 
financial, and other issues, especially in its biannual Performance and 
Accountability Series on major government departments. [Footnote 10] 
These factors include the following: 

* Strategic Planning: Leading results-oriented organizations focus on
the process of strategic planning that includes involvement of
stakeholders, assessment of internal and external environments, and an
alignment of activities, core processes and resources to support
mission-related outcomes. 

* Organizational Alignment: The organization of the new department 
should be aligned to be consistent with the goals and objectives
established in the strategic plan. 

* Communications: Effective communication strategies are key to any
major consolidation or transformation effort. 

* Building Partnerships: One of the key challenges of this new 
department will be the development and maintenance of homeland security 
partners at all levels of the government and the private sector, both 
in the United States and overseas. 

* Performance Management: An effective performance management system 
fosters institutional, unit and individual accountability. 

* Human Capital Strategy: The new department must ensure that its 
homeland security missions are not adversely impacted by the 
government’s pending human capital crisis, and that it can recruit, 
retain, and reward a talented and motivated workforce, which has 
required core competencies, to achieve its mission and objectives. The
people factor is a critical element in any major consolidation or

* Information Management and Technology: The new department should 
leverage state-of-the art enabling technology to enhance its ability to 
transform capabilities and capacities to share and act upon timely, 
quality information about terrorist threats. 

* Knowledge Management: The new department must ensure it makes maximum 
use of the collective body of knowledge that will be brought together 
in the consolidation. 

* Financial Management: The new department has a stewardship obligation 
to prevent fraud, waste and abuse; to use tax dollars appropriately; 
and to ensure financial accountability to the President, the Congress, 
and the American people. 

* Acquisition Management: Anticipated as one of the largest federal 
departments, the proposed DHS will potentially have some of the most 
extensive acquisition government needs. Early attention to strong 
systems and controls for acquisition and related business processes will
be critical both to ensuring success and maintaining integrity and 

* Risk Management: The new department must be able to maintain and
enhance current states of homeland security readiness while 
transitioning and transforming itself into a more effective and 
efficient structural unit. The proposed DHS will also need to 
immediately improve the government’s overall ability to perform risk 
management activities that can help to prevent, defend against, and 
respond to terrorist acts. 

* Change Management: Assembling a new organization out of separate
pieces and reorienting all of its processes and assets to deliver the
desired results while managing related risks will take an organized,
systematic approach to change. The new department will require both an 
executive and operational capability to encourage and manage change. 

Homeland Security Reorganization and Missions: 

The President’s proposal for the new department indicates that DHS, in
addition to its homeland security responsibilities, will also be 
responsible for carrying out all other functions of the agencies and 
programs that are transferred to it. In fact, quite a number of the 
agencies proposed to be transferred to DHS have multiple functions. 
Agencies or programs that balance multiple missions present the 
Congress with significant issues that must be evaluated in order to 
determine how best to achieve all of the goals and objectives for which 
the entity was created. While we have not found any missions that would 
appear to be in fundamental conflict with the department’s primary 
mission of homeland security, as presented in the President’s proposal, 
the Congress will need to consider whether many of the non-homeland 
security missions of those agencies transferred to DHS will receive 
adequate funding, attention, visibility, and support when subsumed into 
a department that will be under tremendous pressure to succeed in its 
primary mission. As important and vital as the homeland security 
mission is to our nation’s future, the other non-homeland security 
missions transferred to DHS for the most part are not small or trivial
responsibilities. Rather, they represent extremely important functions
executed by the federal government that, absent sufficient attention, 
could have serious implications for their effective delivery and 
consequences for sectors of our economy, health and safety, research 
programs and other significant government functions. Some of these 
responsibilities include: 

* maritime safety and drug interdiction by the Coast Guard; 

* collection of commercial tariffs by the Customs Service; 

* public health research by the Department of Health and Human 

* advanced energy and environmental research by the Lawrence Livermore 
and Environmental Measurements labs; 

* responding to floods and other natural disasters by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and; 

* authority over processing visas by the State Department’s consular

These examples reveal that many non-homeland security missions could be
integrated into a cabinet department overwhelmingly dedicated to 
protecting the nation from terrorism. Congress may wish to consider 
whether the new department, as proposed, will dedicate sufficient 
management capacity and accountability to ensure the execution of 
nonhomeland security missions, as well as consider potential 
alternatives to the current framework for handling these important 
functions. One alternative might be to create a special accountability 
track that ensures that non-homeland security functions are well 
supported and executed in DHS, including milestones for monitoring 
performance. Conversely, the Congress might separate out some of these 
functions. In doing so, the Congress will still need to hold agencies 
accountable for the homeland security missions that are not 
incorporated in the new department. In making these decisions, Congress 
should consider the criteria presented earlier in my testimony, 
especially those related to agency transitions, such as mission 
relevancy, similar goals and objectives, leveraging effectiveness, and 
creating gains through consolidation. There are clearly advantages and
disadvantages to all of the decisions about placing agencies or programs
with multiple missions in DHS and Congress must carefully weigh
numerous important factors related to performance and accountability in
crafting the legislation. 

For example, we have indicated in recent testimony that DHS could serve 
to improve biomedical research and development coordination because of
the current fragmented state of disparate activities. Yet, we remain 
concerned that the proposed transfer of control and priority setting for
research from the organizations where the research would be conducted
could be disruptive to dual purpose programs, which have important
synergies for public health programs that need to be maintained. 
[Footnote 11] Similarly, we have testified that the President’s 
proposal, in tasking the new department with developing national policy 
for and coordinating the federal government’s research and development 
efforts for responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear weapons threats, also transfers some of the civilian research 
programs of the Department of Energy. [Footnote 12] Again, there may be 
implications for research synergy. 

Congress may also craft compromises that strengthen homeland security
while reducing concerns of program disruption or unanticipated 
consequences. One such example is seen in recent deliberations about the
appropriate location for visa processing. Congressional debate has
focused on two of our criteria, mission relevancy and gains through
consolidation. The visa function attempts to facilitate legitimate 
travel while at the same time denying entry to the United States of 
certain individuals, including potential terrorists. Some have argued 
that the mission of the visa function is primarily related to homeland 
security and that therefore the function should be located within the 
proposed department. Others have advocated that the Department of State 
(State) should retain the visa function because they believe that there 
would be no gains from consolidation. They point out that State has an 
established field structure and that it may be impractical to create a 
similar field structure in the proposed department. The compromise 
position of several committees has been to transfer responsibility for 
visa policy to the proposed department, while retaining the cadre of 
overseas visa officers within State. 

As part of these deliberations, the Congress should consider not only 
the mission and role that agencies fulfill today, but the mission and 
role that they should fulfill in the coming years. Thus, while it may 
be accurate that large portions of the missions engaged in by the Coast 
Guard or FEMA today do not relate primarily to homeland security, it is 
wholly appropriate for Congress to determine whether the future 
missions of such agencies should focus principally on homeland 
security. Such decisions, of course, would require the Congress to 
determine the best approach for carrying out a range of the 
government’s missions and operations, in order to see that non-homeland 
security activities of these departments are still achieved. In fact, 
given the key trends identified in GAO’s recent strategic plan for 
supporting the Congress and our long range fiscal challenges, it is 
appropriate to ask three key questions: (1) what should the federal
government do in the 21st century? (2) how should the federal government
do business in the 21st century? and (3) who should do the federal
government’s business in the 21st century? These questions are relevant 
for DHS and every other federal agency and activity. 

As the proposal to create DHS demonstrates, the terrorist events of 
last fall have provided an impetus for the government to look at the 
larger picture of how it provides homeland security and how it can best 
accomplish associated missions. Yet, even for those agencies that are 
not being integrated into DHS, there remains a very real need and 
possibly a unique opportunity to rethink approaches and priorities to 
enable them to better target their resources to address our most urgent 
needs. In some cases, the new emphasis on homeland security has 
prompted attention to longstanding problems that have suddenly become 
more pressing. For example, we’ve mentioned in previous testimony the 
overlapping and duplicative food safety programs in the federal 
government. [Footnote 13] While such overlap and duplication has been 
responsible for poor coordination and inefficient allocation of 
resources, these issues assume a new, and potentially more foreboding, 
meaning after September 11th given the threat from bio-terrorism. In 
another example, we have recommended combining the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Domestic Preparedness with FEMA to improve 
coordination. [Footnote 14] A consolidated approach to many of these 
issues can facilitate a concerted and effective response to new threats 
and mission performance. 

Similarly, we have conducted a number of reviews of State’s visa 
function over the years and, based on our work, we believe that there 
are a number of areas in which the visa function can be strengthened. 
For example, the U.S. government needs to ensure that there are 
sufficient staff at overseas posts with the right training and 
experience to make good decisions about who should and who should not 
receive a visa. In addition, we are currently looking at ways that the 
visa function can be strengthened as a screen against potential 
terrorists and we expect to make recommendations later this fiscal 
year. These recommendations will apply regardless of decisions about 
the respective roles of the State Department and the proposed 
Department of Homeland Security regarding visa functions. 

Homeland Security Implementation and Transition Issues: 

The ultimate effectiveness of the new department will be dependent on
successfully addressing implementation and transition issues. Picking 
the right leadership for these critical positions in the new department 
will be crucial to its success. If you don’t have the right leadership 
team in key policy, operational and management positions, the 
department will be at risk. In addition providing the new department 
with some reasoned and reasonable human capital, management and budget 
flexibilities combined with appropriate safeguards to protect the 
Congress’ constitutional authorities and to prevent abuse can also help 
contribute to a successful transition. Both the Congress and the 
Executive Branch have critical roles to play in achieving desired 
outcomes for the American people. 

Key Success Factors, Leadership and Accountability: 

Among the most important elements for effectively implementing the new
cabinet department will be close adherence to the key success factors.
Strategic planning, building partnerships, human capital strategies,
financial management and other critical factors will make the difference
between a department that can quickly rise to the challenge of its 
mission and one that might otherwise become mired in major problems and
obstacles that hamper efforts to protect the nation from terrorism. 

The quality and continuity of the new department’s leadership is 
critical to building and sustaining the long-term effectiveness of DHS 
and homeland security goals and objectives. The experiences of 
organizations that have undertaken transformational change efforts 
along the lines that will be necessary for the new department to be 
fully effective suggest that this process can take up to 5 to 10 years 
to provide meaningful and sustainable results. Given the scope and 
nature of challenges facing the new department, the critical question 
is how can we ensure that the essential transformation and management 
issues receive the sustained, top-level attention that they require. 
The nation can ill-afford to have the secretary or deputy secretary 
being side-tracked by administrative and operational details -- the 
mission of the department requires their undivided attention. 

As a result, it is important for the Congress to give serious 
consideration to creating a deputy secretary for management/chief 
operating officer (COO) position within the department to provide the 
sustained management attention essential for addressing key 
infrastructure and stewardship issues while helping to facilitate the 
transition and transformation process. Recent legislative language 
adopted by the House Committee on Government Reform suggests elevating 
the undersecretary for management to a deputy secretary, equivalent to 
the deputy position provided for in the Administration’s proposal. We 
believe that is an important first step to ensuring that transformation 
and management issues receive the top-level attention they require. 
Raising the organizational profile of transformation and management 
issues is important to ensure that the individual has the authority 
needed to successfully lead department-wide initiatives. We are not 
convinced that an under secretary for management, on par with the other 
under secretaries, would necessarily have sufficient authority. 

To provide further leadership and accountability for management,
Congress may wish to consider several points: 

* First, Congress should consider making the deputy secretary for 
management/COO a term appointment of up to 7 years, subject to Senate 
confirmation. A term appointment would provide continuity that spans 
the tenure of the political leadership and thereby help to ensure that 
long-term stewardship issues are addressed and change management 
initiatives are successfully completed. 

* Second, to further clarify accountability, the COO should be subject 
to a clearly defined, results-oriented performance contract with 
appropriate incentive, reward and accountability mechanisms. The COO 
would be selected without regard to political affiliation based on (1)
demonstrated leadership skills in managing large and complex 
organizations, and (2) experience achieving results in connection with
“good government” responsibilities and initiatives. Requiring that both
the performance contract and the subsequent performance evaluation be 
made available to the Congress would provide additional accountability 
and transparency. 

In addition to providing top-level leadership and accountability, the
department will need to develop employee performance management
systems that can serve as a key tool for aligning institutional, unit, 
and employee performance; achieving results; accelerating change; 
managing the organization on a day-to-day basis; and facilitating 
communication throughout the year so that discussions about individual 
and organizational performance are integrated and ongoing. [Footnote 
15] A cascading set of results-oriented performance agreements is one 
mechanism in a performance management system that creates a “line of 
sight” showing how individual employees can contribute to overall 
organizational goals. [Footnote 16] Further accountability can be 
achieved by ensuring that all relevant management laws are applied to 
the new department (e.g, Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), 
Chief Financial Officers Act, Clinger-Cohen Act, etc.). These laws 
provide a foundation for the management structure of the new department 
and a basis for ensuring appropriate transparency and accountability. 

Request for Increased Human Capital and Management Flexibilities: 

The President’s proposal includes a set of human capital and management
flexibilities for the new department. GAO believes that its reasonable 
for certain flexibilities to be granted to the new department in such 
areas as human capital, provided that they are accompanied by adequate
transparency and accountability safeguards designed to prevent abuse.
Human capital and management flexibility will help the new department to
reorganize, realign and transform itself to achieve its important 
missions. Appropriate safeguards can help to prevent abuse of federal 
employees and provide adequate monitoring mechanisms to gauge 
performance. For instance, the Congress may wish to provide the new 
department with “early out” and “buy out” authority in order to help 
quickly realign the component entities and provide for future 
flexibility. DHS might consider new scientific and technical personnel 
tracks to encourage recruitment, retention and rewarding of individuals 
with critical knowledge, or Congress may wish to provide the new 
department with some limited term appointment authority. These and 
other suggested flexibilities for DHS should be viewed in the context 
of how similar flexibilities have been exercised by other agencies with 
similar missions, such as the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), the DOD, the FBI, and the CIA. Congress should also note that, 
as GAO has indicated in the past, agencies are already accorded in law 
significant flexibilities, especially with respect to human capital 
issues, but for a variety of reasons they do not always take advantage 
of them. [Footnote 17] DHS should use the these existing flexibilities 
and be given others in areas where Congress has done so with other 
agencies (e.g., TSA, Internal Revenue Service, DOD). 

In requesting human capital flexibilities, questions have been raised 
about whether they would result in eroding merit principles, veterans’
preferences, whistleblower protections, collective bargaining and other
basic civil service provisions. Recent testimony to the Congress by
Governor Ridge has clarified the Administration’s commitment to these
provisions. [Footnote 18] The final legislation should clearly reflect 
the applicability of these tenets to the new department. 

Other flexibilities, such as ones for acquisitions and contracting, are
included in the President’s proposal. Careful analysis is needed to
determine the need for additional flexibilities. Congress may want to
consider not expressly providing certain flexibilities in the initial
legislation, but rather providing a mechanism for expedited 
consideration of flexibilities should the new department request them 
in the future. For example, the Congress might wish to agree on rules 
specifying procedures for consideration of proposed changes, time 
limits on debate, or requirements that any amendments to future 
legislation be strictly related to DHS. This would not be the blanket 
grant of authority envisioned in the original Freedom to Manage 
proposal, but it would permit both the executive branch and the 
Congress to feel confident that proposed changes would receive timely 

Request for Increased Budget Flexibility: 

The Administration has suggested that it needs a special grant of budget
flexibility for the Department of Homeland Security. GAO believes that
Congress should be careful to distinguish between those flexibilities 
that will solely enhance the operations of DHS and those that might
simultaneously raise other concerns, including concerns about the
constitutional responsibilities and prerogatives of the legislative 
branch. For instance, the President’s proposal permits the Secretary to 
allocate funds as he sees fit, without regard to the original purpose 
of the appropriations. Moreover, there must be a system to identify 
homeland security funds across the wide range of existing budget 
accounts and program activities. This is necessary not only for the 
budget resolution and appropriations process, but also for tracking 
budget execution and for accountability to Congress. 

The Congress, through its appropriations subcommittees, has proven quite
adept at creating and granting the kind of flexibility it sees as 
appropriate to any given agency. Congress gives agencies flexibility 
over the timing of spending by varying the period of fund availability: 
agencies may receive one-year, multi-year and no-year [permanent] 
funds. Congress has granted agencies varying degrees of transfer or 
reprogramming authority. These flexibilities are generally provided as 
part of the appropriations process and consider the balance between 
accountability and flexibility to ensure that Congress is a partner in 
the spending of taxpayer funds. Over the longer term the creation of 
the new Department may also be an opportune time to review the account 
structure of the Department’s component entities. Should the 
orientation of budget accounts be shifted toward the strategic goals 
defined in plans? Such a reorientation might facilitate the process of 
linking resource allocation to results consistent with GPRA. Efforts 
designed to rationalize the number of budget accounts within the new 
department can serve to provide flexibility while ensuring 

DHS Transition Issues: 

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security will be one of the
largest reorganizations ever undertaken and the difficulty of this task
should not be underestimated. Under the President’s proposal, 22 
existing agencies and programs and 170,000 people would be integrated 
into the new department in order to strengthen the country’s defense 
against terrorism. With an estimated budget authority of the component 
parts of the new department of $37.45 billion, successfully 
transitioning the government in an endeavor of this scale will take 
considerable time and money. [Footnote 19] Careful and thorough 
planning will be critical to the successful creation of the new 
department. While national needs suggest a rapid reorganization of 
homeland security functions, the transition of agencies and programs 
into the new department is likely to take time to achieve. At the same 
time, the need for speed to get the new department up and running must 
be balanced with the need to maintain readiness for new and existing 
threats during the transition period. Moreover, the organizational 
transition of the various components will simply be the starting point 
– as implementation challenges beyond the first year should be expected 
in building a fully integrated department. As I stated earlier, it 
could take 5 to 10 years to fully implement this reorganization in an 
effective and sustainable manner. 

A comprehensive transition plan needs to be developed. The transition 
plan should establish a time table for the orderly migration of each 
component agency or program to the new department, identify key 
objectives to be achieved during the first year following the transfer, 
and describe the strategy for achieving an orderly transition and 
sustaining mission performance. More detailed implementation plans also 
will be necessary to address business system, processes, and resource 
issues. The President has taken an important first step by establishing 
a transition office within the Office of Management and Budget. 

Congress has an important oversight role to play in helping to ensure 
the effective implementation of the new department. In addition to the
transition plans, Congress should consider requiring DHS to submit 
regular progress reports on implementation from the department and 
should also conduct periodic oversight hearings to assess progress and 
performance. In this regard, GAO stands ready to assist the Congress in 
conducting its oversight role. 

Increased cost must also be considered with regard to the President’s
proposal. It is likely that over time consolidation of functions within 
DHS may reduce costs below what otherwise would have been the case if 
these functions continued to operate separately. This, however, is 
unlikely to happen quickly. Moreover, we should expect that any 
reorganization would incur start up costs as well as require some 
funding for redundant activities to maintain continuity of effort 
during the transition period. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has 
estimated that the costs of implementing the new department would be 
about $3 billion over the next five years with an annual estimate of 
$150 million in FY2003 and $225 million thereafter. However, there are 
other transition costs that CBO acknowledges are not included in their 
estimates beyond the cost to hire, house, and equip key personnel. The 
CBO estimate assumes continuation of the existing multi-pay and 
retirement systems--however unlikely-- and does not address the 
potential need to cross-train existing personnel. Although the purchase 
of new computer equipment, supplies and compatible information 
management systems are included, no estimates are provided for the cost 
to correct existing computer system deficiencies nor the resources to 
support some system redundancy for a period of time. Finally, CBO did 
not attempt to price the relocation of personnel to a central location. 

The Administration has argued that CBO’s estimates are inflated. In 
fact, CBO estimates that 1 percent of the total annual spending will be 
for administrative costs, but that a proportionate share of the costs to
currently administer these agencies will be transferred. Depending on 
the decision to co-locate personnel and the flexibilities ultimately 
provided to the Administration in legislation--in particular a broad 
grant of transfer authority and the ability to staff through non-
reimbursable agreements with other agencies-- these estimates may well 
change. More important than a precise cost estimate of the transition, 
however, is the recognition that there will be short-term transition 
costs and that these costs need to be made transparent. To fully 
recognize the transition costs, in fact, Congress should consider 
appropriating for them separately. 

In summary, I have discussed the reorganization of homeland security
functions and some critical factors for success. However, the single 
most important element of a successful reorganization is the sustained
commitment of top leaders to modern, effective and credible human 
capital strategies and to setting clear goals and appropriate 
accountability mechanisms. Top leadership involvement and clear lines 
of accountability for making management improvements are critical to 
overcoming an organization’s natural resistance to change, marshalling 
the resources needed to improve management, and building and maintaining
organization-wide commitment to new ways of doing business. 
Organizational cultures will not be transformed, and new visions and 
ways of doing business will not take root without strong and sustained
leadership. Strong and visionary leadership will be vital to creating a
unified, focused organization, as opposed to a group of separate units
under a single roof. Modern human capital strategies, including 
implementing a credible, effective and equitable performance management
system that links institutional, unit, team and individual performance
measurement and reward systems to the department’s strategic plan, core
values and desired outcomes will be critical to success. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my written testimony. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that you or members of the Select Committee
may have at this time. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Homeland Security Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve 
Coordination but Transforming Control of Public Health Programs Raises 
Concerns (GAO-02-954T, July 16, 2002). 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical R&D 
Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts (GAO-02-924T, July
9, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (GAO-
02-927T, July 9, 2002) 

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships Will 
Be Critical to Success (GAO-02-899T, July 1, 2002). 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May 
Complicate Priority Setting (GAO-02-893T, June 28, 2002). 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination But May 
Complicate Public Health Priority Setting (GAO-02-883T, June 25, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But 
Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success (GAO-02-886T, June 25, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 
Uncertainty Remains (GAO-02-610, June 7, 2002). 

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and 
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy (GAO-
02-811T, June 7, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Responsibility And Accountability For Achieving 
National Goals (GAO-02-627T, April 11, 2002). 

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private
Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (GAO-02-621T, April 11, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought 
(GAO-02-490T, March 12, 2002). 

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long-Term National Needs (GAO-02-160T, November 7, 2001). 

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness 
Efforts (GAO-02-208T, October 31, 2001). 

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal
Preparedness (GAO-02-145T, October 15, 2001). 

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach (GAO-02-
150T, October 12, 2001). 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues (GAO-
01-1158T, September 21, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development 
of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness (GAO-02-
550T, April 2, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National 
Preparedness Strategy (GAO-02-549T, March 28, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to 
Enhance State and Local Preparedness (GAO-02-548T, March 25, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National 
Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness (GAO-02-547T, March
22, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance 
State and Local Preparedness (GAO-02-473T, March 1, 2002). 

Combating Terrorism: Considerations For Investing Resources in Chemical 
and Biological Preparedness (GAO-01-162T, October 17, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations 
(GAO-01-822, September 20, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism 
Program Implementation and Management (GAO-01-909, September 19, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s 
Council on Domestic Preparedness (GAO-01-555T, May 9, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal 
Response (GAO-01-660T, April 24, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and 
National Strategy (GAO-01-556T, March 27, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating 
Preparedness and Response (GAO-01-15, March 20, 2001). 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 
Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-
14, November 30, 2000). 

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs 
(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, April 6, 2000). 

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000). 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and 
Biological Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50, October 20, 1999). 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments 
of Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, September 7, 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/T-
NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999). 

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment 
and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999). 

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear 
(GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). 

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism 
Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999). 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat 
Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, March 11, 1999). 

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness 
Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998). 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic 
Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, October 2, 1998). 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize 
and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, April 9, 1998). 

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires 
Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, December 1, 1997). 

Public Health: 

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in 
Public Health Protection (GAO-02-235T, November 15, 2001). 

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness (GAO-02-141T,
October 10, 2001). 

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness (GAO-02-
149T, October 10, 2001). 

Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure Safe
Food (GAO-02-47T, October 10, 2001). 

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness (GAO-02-129T, October 5,

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities (GAO-01-
915, September 28, 2001). 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and 
Inventory Management Are Needed (GAO-01-667, September 28, 2001). 

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness 
(GAO/HEHS-00-180, September 11, 2000). 

Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and
Biological Attacks (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, September 7, 1999). 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should 
Follow Results Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-159, August 16, 1999). 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public 
Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, March 16, 1999). 

Aviation Security: 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 
Screening Security Operations (GAO-01-1171T, September 25, 2001). 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 
Assigning Screening Responsibilities (GAO-01-1165T, September 21, 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 
Aviation Security (GAO-01-1166T, September 20, 2001). 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 
Security at the Nation's Airports (GAO-01-1162T, September 20, 2001). 

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners' 
Performance (RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000). 

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener
Performance Problems (T-RCED-00-125, March 16, 2000). 

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-term Attention Is
Needed (T-RCED-98-190, May 14, 1998). 

Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices 
(RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997). 

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection 
Devices (RCED-97-119R, April 24, 1997). 

Aviation Security: Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities 
(TRCED/NSIAD-96-262, September 19, 1996). 

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (T-RCED/NSIAD-
96-251, September 11, 1996). 

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security (TRCED/
NSIAD-96-237, August 1, 1996). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security 
Challenges Need to Be Addressed (GAO-02-918T, July 9, 2002). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 
Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer-
Based Attacks (GAO-01-1168T, September 26, 2001). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Protecting
Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning Capabilities (GAO-
01-1132T, September 12, 2001). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities (GAO-01-1005T, July 25, 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities (GAO-01-769T, May 22, 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
National Capabilities (GAO-01-323, April 25, 2001). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a 
Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination (GAO/T-
AIMD-00-268, July 26, 2000). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber 
Security Information Act of 2000 (GAO/T-AIMD-00-229, June 22, 2000). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information 
Systems Protection (GAO/AIMD-00-90R, February 11, 2000). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for
Information Systems Protection (GAO/T-AIMD-00-72, February 1, 2000). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to 
Assure Security of Federal Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-00-7, October 6, 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on
Year 2000 Experiences (GAO/AIMD-00-1, October 1, 1999). 

Disaster Assistance: 

Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration 
Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures (GAO-01-837, August 31,

FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies
(GAO-01-850, August 13, 2001). 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes 
and Addressing Major Management Challenges (GAO-01-832, July 9, 2001). 

Budget and Management Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal 
Agencies (GAO-01-1084SP, August 2001). 

Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management Issues 
Vary Widely Across Agencies (GAO-01-592, May 2001). 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks
(GAO-01-159SP, November 2000). 

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission 
Fragmentation and Program Overlap (GAO/AIMD-97-156, August 29, 1997). 

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal
Missions and Approaches (GAO/T-AIMD-95-161, June 7, 1995). 

Government Reorganization: Issues and Principals (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-
166, May 17, 1995). 


FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad Transformation 
Needed (GAO-02-865T, June 21, 2002). 

Environmental Protection: Observations on Elevating the Environmental 
Protection Agency to Cabinet Status (GAO-02-552T, March 21, 2002). 

Implementation: The Missing Link in Planning Reorganizations (GAOGGD-
81-57, March 20, 1981). 

Grant Design: 

Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and 
Performance Information (GAO/GGD-98-137, June 22, 1998). 

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go
Further (GAO/AIMD-97-7, December 18, 1996). 

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions (GAO/AIMD-
95-226, September 1, 1995). 


Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive 
Transformational Change (GAO-02-940T, July 15, 2002). 

Managing for Results: Building on the Momentum for Strategic Human
Capital Reform (GAO-02-528T, March 18, 2002). 

A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management (GAO-02-373SP, March
15, 2002). 

High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO-01-263, January 2001). 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective (GAO-01-241, January 2001). 

[End of section] 


[1] See “Related GAO Products” at the end of this testimony. 

[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Proposal for 
Cabinet Agency Has Merit But Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success, 
GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002). 

[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected 
Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: 
September 20, 2001). 

[4] GAO-02-886T. 

[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Responsibility 
and Accountability for Achieving National Goals, GAO-02-627T 
(Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002). 

[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-
263 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001). 

[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Implementation: The Missing Link in 
Planning Reorganizations, GAO-GGD-81-57 (Washington, D.C.: March 20, 

[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Government Reorganization: Issues 
and Principles, GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1995). 

[9] Environmental Protection: Observations on Elevating the EPA to 
Cabinet Status, March 21, 2002 (GAO-02-552T). 

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and 
Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-01-241 (Washington, 
D.C.: January 2001). 

[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: New Department 
Could Improve Biomedical R&D Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose 
Efforts, GAO-02-924T (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002). 

[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Title III of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, GAO-02-927T (Washington, D.C.: July 
9, 2002). 

[13] Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure 
Safe Food, October 10, 2001 (GAO-02-47T). 

[14] GAO-01-822. 

[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Key Principles From 
Nine Private Sector Organizations, GAO/GGD-00-28 (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 31, 2000). 

[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Emerging 
Benefits From Selected Agencies’ Use of Performance Agreements, GAO-01-
115 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2000). 

[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing For Results: Using 
Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive Transformational Change, 
GAO-02-940T (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002). 

[18] Statement of Governor Tom Ridge on the Department of Homeland 
Security to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, July 15, 

[19] The President’s proposal entitled The Department of Homeland 
Security, President George W. Bush, June 2002. 

[End of section] 

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