This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-913R 
entitled 'DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to 
Evolve' which was released on August 22, 2006. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

August 22, 2006: 

Congressional Committees: 

Subject: DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve: 

In 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most 
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the 
end of the Korean War. Soon thereafter, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
issued a report titled Strengthening U.S. Global Defense 
Posture.[Footnote 1] This report defined the key tenets of the 
integrated global presence and basing strategy, which outlines troop 
and basing adjustments overseas. Although the strategy is intended to 
make the overseas posture of the United States more flexible and 
efficient, it will require new facilities costing billions of dollars, 
some of the cost to be borne by the United States and some by other 
nations. 

As plans for overseas basing began to emerge, the Senate Appropriations 
Committee expressed concern about the use of military construction 
funds for projects at overseas bases that may soon be obsolete or 
closed because of changes being considered by DOD and the military 
services. Accordingly, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 
2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD[Footnote 2] 
to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans for changing 
infrastructure requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the 
overseas regional commands.[Footnote 3] DOD was required to provide a 
baseline report on these plans with yearly updates on their status and 
their implementation along with annual military construction budget 
submissions through 2008. Subsequently, the House conference report 
accompanying the 2004 military construction appropriation bill also 
directed the department to prepare comprehensive master plans with 
yearly updates through fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 4] The Senate report 
directed the master plans to identify precise facility requirements and 
the status of properties being returned to host nations. Additionally, 
the Senate report stated that the plans should identify funding 
requirements as well as the division of funding responsibilities 
between the United States and host nations. The Senate report also 
directed us to monitor the master plans developed and implemented for 
the overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense 
committees with assessment reports each year. 

This is our third report that responds to the reporting requirements 
contained in the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction 
appropriation bill report. Our prior work[Footnote 5] found that 
although DOD's overseas master plans provided a more complete picture 
of future overseas defense infrastructure and funding requirements than 
was available in other DOD documents, opportunities existed for the 
plans to provide more complete, clear, and consistent information and 
to present a more definitive picture of future requirements. For this 
report, we assessed the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) most 
recent guidance[Footnote 6] to overseas regional commands and its use 
in developing the overseas master plans DOD submitted to Congress on 
April 27, 2006.[Footnote 7] This report discusses the extent to which 
the 2006[Footnote 8] overseas master plans (1) complied with reporting 
requirements and provided information in a complete, clear, and 
consistent manner; (2) reflected how U.S. overseas defense basing 
strategies and requirements have changed since last year; and (3) 
reflected the challenges DOD faces in the implementation of the plans. 

To address our objectives, we met with OSD officials to discuss the 
level of guidance available to the commands to facilitate consistent 
preparation of overseas master plans, and we analyzed whether the 
guidance meets the requirements for information contained in 
congressional mandates and as suggested by GAO. We also visited 
overseas regional commands--the Pacific Command (PACOM), including U.S. 
Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces Japan; European Command (EUCOM); 
and Central Command (CENTCOM)--to see selected installations and 
military construction projects firsthand and to discuss OSD's guidance 
and the various factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure 
requirements and costs overseas.[Footnote 9] Once the master plans were 
issued, we reviewed them to determine how the plans have changed since 
last year and the extent to which they complied with the reporting 
requirements. We assessed whether the plans provided information in a 
complete, clear, and consistent manner, and we discussed with OSD and 
command officials whether improvements in the guidance and reporting 
were needed. 

We conducted our review from September 2005 through July 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See 
enclosure I for more information on our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

The 2006 master plans generally exceeded the reporting requirements 
established by Congress and--by addressing most of our recommendations 
for improving the plans from last year--they are more complete, clear, 
and consistent than last year's plans, although limitations exist in 
the information provided on fiscal year 2007 funding required for 
individual military construction projects. Whereas last year none of 
the regional commands fully identified their precise facility 
requirements and costs as specified in the reporting mandate, all of 
the commands provided precise facility requirements for fiscal years 
2007 through 2011 in their master plans. However, the plans submitted 
to Congress did not provide estimated costs for individual military 
construction projects for fiscal year 2007 as specified by OSD guidance 
because of, according to a senior OSD official, the difficulty of 
including the cost estimates that had not yet been finalized during 
DOD's budget process. Consequently, the master plans must be matched 
with the fiscal year 2007 military construction budget request to 
obtain a complete picture of the precise facility and cost requirements 
for fiscal year 2007. Although not required, we believe the plans could 
be more complete and useful to decision makers if they also explained, 
where applicable, how each implementation is being or has the potential 
to be affected by other defense plans and activities that are likely to 
affect future facility and funding requirements in a region. In 2005, 
the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facilities Structure of 
the United States[Footnote 10] recommended that the entire effort of 
overseas basing be integrated into one overarching design that is 
coordinated and synchronized with all ongoing initiatives. Although 
overseas command officials told us that their plans were coordinated 
with other defense plans and activities, only PACOM's plan explained 
how its implementation could be affected by another activity--a 
potential decrease in host nation support when the Government of Japan 
provides resources to help fund the relocation of approximately 8,000 
U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. EUCOM and CENTCOM plans did not 
address other relevant and related plans and activities.[Footnote 11] 
For example, EUCOM's master plan did not explain the potential impact 
of base realignment and closure implementation on the movement of 
troops from Germany to bases in the United States. This omission is due 
primarily to OSD guidance that stipulated the plans were to address 
overseas locations and to exclude the 50 states and U.S. territories. 
Without explanations of the linkage between the overseas master plans 
with other defense plans and activities, it is difficult to determine 
their impact on U.S. defense infrastructure and funding requirements 
overseas. 

The 2006 master plans reflected changes in overseas basing strategies 
and requirements that occurred since last year. It was apparent that 
OSD and the regional commands worked to incorporate key changes 
associated with the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas basing 
strategies into the plans before they were provided to Congress. For 
example, EUCOM added requirements for facilities in Romania and 
Bulgaria to its master plan based on agreements with those countries to 
allow DOD use of their facilities, and CENTCOM removed infrastructure 
requirements from its master plan that were planned for Uzbekistan 
after its government requested that U.S. forces leave. In some 
instances, basing decisions were made after the plans were prepared-- 
such as the realignment at Keflavik, Iceland, and La Maddelena, Italy-
-but OSD and the regional commands updated the plans to reflect those 
decisions before the plans were submitted to Congress. Even with these 
efforts to update the plans as changes occurred and decisions were 
made, the evolution of U.S. overseas military basing strategies and 
requirements continues. Changes occurring after the most recent plans 
were submitted to Congress will have to be reflected in next year's 
plans, and OSD and the regional commands could be faced with more 
changes in the future. 

This year, the master plans provided a much better description of the 
challenges DOD faces in implementing the master plans. For example, all 
of the plans addressed the uncertainties associated with host nations 
and recent agreements, and generally dealt with environmental concerns 
and training limitations, where they existed. An exception involves the 
fact that PACOM's plan did not describe the limitations on training in 
South Korea and Japan. If these training limitations are not addressed, 
senior command officials told us, they could cause the United States to 
either train in other locations or to downsize or relocate. As a result 
of this omission, PACOM's plan does not provide decisionmakers a 
complete picture of the challenges that could affect its implementation 
and potential changes in infrastructure and funding requirements needed 
to address training limitations in the Pacific region. 

We are making two recommendations to improve future master plans for 
changing defense infrastructure overseas. Specifically, we are 
recommending that OSD (1) revise its guidance to require overseas 
commands to explain how other relevant and related defense plans and 
activities affect implementation of their master plans in terms of 
infrastructure and funding requirements and (2) ensure that PACOM 
explains how it plans to address existing training limitations and the 
potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. In 
written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with 
our recommendations and indicated that it would address these issues in 
a risk assessment framework in future master plans. We discuss DOD's 
comments in detail later in this report. 

Background: 

Military construction appropriations fund the planning, design, 
construction, alteration, and improvement of military facilities 
worldwide. As of fiscal year 2005, DOD reportedly had 3,376 
installations total, with 737 installations located overseas.[Footnote 
12] Operational control of the U.S. combat forces and installations is 
assigned to the nation's five geographic, unified overseas regional 
commands, which are responsible for the security environment as 
directed by the national security strategy and the national military 
strategy. Composed of forces from two or more services, PACOM, EUCOM, 
and CENTCOM span numerous countries and even continents and encompass 
areas with economically, politically, and socially diverse regions, as 
shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM Geographic Areas of 
Responsibility:  

[See PDF for Image]

Source: GAO. 

Note: Special Operations Command does not have a specific geographic 
area of responsibility because it is a functional overseas regional 
command with lead responsibility for waging war on terrorism. The 
command also provides special operations forces to support the overseas 
regional commanders' security plans and is a tenant unit on bases and 
funds special operations forces-specific items--such as hangars for 
aircraft--out of military construction appropriations, and uses 
operation and maintenance appropriations for support items, such as 
special operations-specific computers. 

[End of Figure] 

The United States has a large portion of its military personnel 
deployed abroad at any given time; however, this number varies with the 
frequency and types of military operations and deployment demands. 
Currently, just more than 119,000 troops are regularly stationed in 
Europe. Most of these are U.S. Army forces (62,600) stationed mainly in 
Germany, with smaller numbers elsewhere in Europe and some in Africa. 
Nearly 100,000 military personnel are located in East Asia, divided 
between Japan, South Korea, and on the waters of the Pacific. 
Additionally, the ongoing global war on terrorism has resulted in the 
deployment of much larger numbers of forces in theaters of operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation to develop a 
defense strategy and force structure capable of meeting changing global 
threats. As part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining 
overseas basing requirements to allow for greater U.S. military 
flexibility to combat conventional and asymmetric threats worldwide. 
U.S. military presence overseas has been converting from a posture 
established on familiar terrain to counter a known threat to one that 
is intended to be capable of projecting forces from strategic locations 
into relatively unknown areas in an uncertain threat environment. In 
September 2001, DOD issued a Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which 
addressed, among other issues, reorienting the U.S. military global 
posture. The report called for developing a permanent basing system 
that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of 
the world as well as providing temporary access to facilities in 
foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to train and operate in the 
absence of permanent ranges and bases. 

In August 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most 
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the 
end of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to close bases no 
longer needed to meet Cold War threats, as well as bring home many U.S. 
forces while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in 
strategic locations around the world. The Integrated Global Presence 
and Basing Strategy is the culmination of various DOD studies, 
including the overseas basing and requirements study, the overseas 
presence study, and the U.S. global posture study. The military 
construction appropriation request for fiscal year 2007 included 
approximately $16.7 billion for military construction and family 
housing, of which nearly $1.3 billion (7.6 percent) is designated for 
specific overseas locations, mostly comprising enduring installations, 
and not for new and emerging requirements outside existing basing 
structures.[Footnote 13] 

Congressional Requirement for Detailed Comprehensive Master Plans: 

In previous years, the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee had expressed concern that the overseas basing 
structure had not been updated to reflect the new realities of the post-
Cold War world. The Committee had also expressed concern about the use 
of military construction budget authority for projects at bases that 
may soon be obsolete because of changes being considered in overseas 
presence and basing. Consequently, in Senate Report 108-82, the Senate 
Appropriations Committee directed DOD to prepare detailed, 
comprehensive master plans for the changing infrastructure requirements 
for U.S. military facilities in each of its overseas regional commands. 
Subsequently, the House conference report accompanying the 2004 
military construction appropriation bill also directed the department 
to submit comprehensive master plans. According to the Senate report, 
at a minimum, the plans are to identify precise facility requirements 
and the status of properties being returned to host nations. In 
addition, the report stated that the plans should identify funding 
requirements and the division of funding responsibilities between the 
United States and cognizant host nations. The Senate report also 
directed DOD to provide congressional defense committees a report on 
the status and implementation of those plans with each yearly military 
construction budget submission through fiscal year 2008. The first 
report was due with the fiscal year 2006 military construction budget 
submission and is to be updated each succeeding year to reflect changes 
to the plans involving specific construction projects being added, 
canceled, or modified, or funding for those projects being redirected 
to other needs, and justification for such changes.[Footnote 14] The 
Senate report also directed GAO to monitor the comprehensive master 
plans being developed and implemented for the overseas regional 
commands and to provide the congressional defense committees with a 
report each year giving an assessment of the status of the plans. 

Within the department, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics has been tasked with responding to this 
legislative requirement. In turn, the Under Secretary assigned the 
overseas regional commands responsibility for preparing detailed, 
comprehensive master plans for their areas of responsibility. 

Prior GAO Work: 

In our prior work,[Footnote 15] we found that while DOD's completion of 
overseas master plans provided a more complete picture of future 
facility and funding requirements for changing U.S. defense 
infrastructure overseas than is available in other DOD reports, 
documents, and annual budget requests, opportunities existed to improve 
the guidance and term definitions to help overseas regional commands 
provide more complete, clear, and consistent information and present a 
more definitive picture of infrastructure and funding requirements, 
particularly for new locations, in the future. We found limitations in 
information that could be provided because of three key factors: 
ongoing negotiations with host nations, continuing evolution of U.S. 
overseas basing strategy, and differences commands had in 
interpretation of OSD guidance. In addition, addressing the extent to 
which residual value issues could affect U.S. funding requirements was 
an open and continuing recommendation from our prior report. 
Additionally, we reported that without more complete, clear, and 
consistent reporting of various items--host nation agreements and 
funding levels, including special bilateral agreements; U.S. funding 
levels and sources in addition to military construction funds; 
environmental remediation and restoration issues; population levels; 
and facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. 
territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific--across future 
master plans, users do not have the best data available to facilitate 
their annual review and oversight. Also, we reported that without the 
detailed reporting of individual construction projects as EUCOM did in 
its plan and the anticipated strategic end state of the command's 
overseas basing infrastructure as of 2010 as CENTCOM did in its plan, 
Congress and other users would not have the best available and 
consistent data on which to track progress and changes from year to 
year and between commands. In many of these instances, providing 
supplementary narrative explanation of the assumptions used or reasons 
data were omitted could improve the usefulness of the comprehensive 
master plans. 

2006 Master Plans Exceeded Most Reporting Requirements and Are More 
Complete, Clear, and Consistent Than Last Year's Plans: 

While prior overseas master plans generally exceeded the reporting 
requirements established by Congress, OSD has further improved the 
plans by issuing guidance in 2005 to require overseas regional commands 
to provide additional information and address most of our prior 
recommendations. As a result, the 2006 plans are not only more 
complete, clear, and consistent than last year's plans, they are also 
more refined, focusing first on the mission and then on the 
infrastructure requirements needed to support the mission. However, the 
plans do not provide cost estimates for individual military 
construction projects planned for fiscal year 2007 and generally do not 
explain how their implementation is being or has the potential to be 
affected by other relevant and related defense plans and activities. 

OSD 2005 Guidance Helped to Further Improve the Overseas Master Plans: 

To improve the overseas master plans and address some of our prior 
recommendations, OSD provided additional guidance on October 5, 2005, 
to the regional commands in preparing this year's plans.[Footnote 16] 
Among other things, the guidance specifically required the overseas 
regional commands to: 

* explain any significant variances in population levels and usage of 
terminology related to the three base categories--main operating bases, 
forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations; 

* address the desired strategic end state of overseas basing 
infrastructure using an "as of" date within the range of 2011 and 2015 
(OSD provided the commands the discretion in choosing an end date 
between 2011 and 2015); 

* report host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal 
year 2007 and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2008 through 
2011; 

* report U.S. funding sources, including precise facility requirements 
and costs for fiscal year 2007, facility requirements and total funding 
for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, and a single, rolled-up figure for 
sustainment funding; and: 

* report environmental remediation issues per DOD Instruction 
4715.8.[Footnote 17] 

OSD 2005 guidance did not address our prior recommendations to require 
that PACOM provide information on facility requirements and funding 
levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in 
the Pacific and on residual value issues. In comments on our 2005 
report, DOD stated that Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific were 
no different from other U.S. facilities within the continental United 
States and that it was inappropriate to include them in the overseas 
master plans. However, considering the upcoming move of approximately 
8,000 U.S Marines from Okinawa to Guam, we continue to believe that the 
inclusion of Guam, Hawaii, U.S. territories, and other insular areas 
will provide a more complete picture of PACOM's infrastructure 
requirements and associated costs in the Pacific. The omission of these 
locations from PACOM's plan provides Congress and other users an 
incomplete picture of the changing U.S. military presence in the 
Pacific and only a portion of the infrastructure and funding 
requirements associated with these changes. Also, as we reported last 
year, residual value was excluded from OSD's guidance because it is 
based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host nations, 
which is limited for most categories of military facilities and is 
often reduced by actual or anticipated environmental remediation costs. 
Consequently, according to a senior DOD official, residual value cannot 
be readily predicted and therefore should not be assumed in the master 
plans. However, since these issues vary by host nation and may not be 
clear to all users of the plans, we continue to believe OSD should 
require commands, at a minimum, to explain the issues with obtaining 
residual value from each host nation and report the implications for 
U.S. funding requirements. 

This Year's Plans Are More Complete, Clear, and Consistent: 

The 2006 master plans are not only more complete, clear, and consistent 
than last year's plans, they are also more refined, focusing first on 
the mission and then on the infrastructure requirements needed to 
support the mission. For example, see the following: 

* Base categories. Whereas last year there appeared to be differences 
in interpretation and usage of terminology related to forward operating 
sites and cooperative security locations, this year all of the commands 
categorized their installations into applicable base categories of main 
operating base, cooperative security location, and forward operating 
sites, which provided users a clearer picture of the infrastructure 
plans and requirements at these sites. The commands also supplemented 
the information on base categories with detailed data on the 
installations' capabilities, overall mission, population, and types of 
equipment and facilities located at each site. 

* End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a strategic 
end state date for overseas basing infrastructure using an "as of" date 
within a range between 2011 and 2015, which provided users a more 
complete and clearer basis for tracking progress in meeting the 
commands' infrastructure objectives for their areas of responsibility. 
Last year, only CENTCOM reported an anticipated strategic end state 
date of 2010 for its basing infrastructure. 

* Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands reported 
host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2007 
and at the aggregate level for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, which 
provided users a better basis to determine the extent to which reported 
host nation funding levels are realistic or complete. Also, PACOM 
identified host nation funding for its bilateral agreements in South 
Korea, such as the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan relocation 
plan.[Footnote 18] While PACOM did not include host nation estimates 
for projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, it 
clearly explained the ongoing nature of bilateral agreements with the 
Government of Japan and reported that host nation contributions related 
to realignments in Okinawa will be reflected in future master plans 
once bilateral agreements are finalized. EUCOM provided information for 
two bilateral agreements, as well as information on North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization contributions. CENTCOM also provided host nation 
estimates and explained that discussions with various countries about 
host nation funding were ongoing. Last year, none of the commands 
provided complete data for host nation funding levels and PACOM's 
schedule of host nation funding did not fully incorporate projects and 
funding levels initiated through special bilateral agreements with host 
nations. 

* Facility requirements and costs. Whereas last year only one of the 
regional commands fully identified its precise facility requirements 
and costs as specified in the reporting mandate, this year all of the 
commands provided facility requirements for fiscal years 2007 through 
2011[Footnote 19] and estimated facility sustainment costs for fiscal 
year 2007. However, although specified in OSD guidance, the master 
plans provided to Congress did not provide cost estimates for 
individual military construction projects planned for fiscal year 2007. 
According to a senior OSD official responsible for overseeing the 
development of the plans, reconciling the estimated costs while the 
budget proposal was evolving proved to be too difficult to capture each 
project's estimated costs in the master plans. Accordingly, the master 
plans must be matched with the fiscal year 2007 military construction 
budget request to obtain a complete picture of the precise facility and 
cost requirements for fiscal year 2007. 

* Environmental remediation issues. This year, EUCOM and PACOM 
addressed the extent of their environmental issues, while CENTCOM did 
not indicate to what extent it may be confronted with environmental 
issues. For example, EUCOM reported that there were no environmental 
remediation projects per DOD Instruction 4715.8 programmed for fiscal 
years 2007 through 2011. PACOM also reported that there were no 
environmental restoration issues in Japan and noted that USFK was in 
the process of coordinating with the Government of South Korea on 
remediation of vacated U.S. bases.[Footnote 20] While CENTCOM's master 
plan did not mention any environmental issues, a senior command 
official said there were no environmental issues to report. Last year, 
none of the regional commands identified environmental remediation and 
restoration requirements or issues in their master plans, which made it 
difficult for users to compare and comprehend how environment-related 
activities and costs have varied, and how these costs may affect 
planned U.S. funding levels. 

The 2006 plans are also more refined, focusing first on the mission and 
then on the infrastructure requirements needed to support the mission. 
For example, in CENTCOM's master plan, the descriptions of each forward 
operating site focus first on the mission and then on requirements by 
providing the type of mission the site has (such as providing 
logistical support), the unit that it could host, and its role in the 
region (such as supporting the war against terrorism or strengthening 
capabilities for rapid and flexible response in the Central Asian 
states), as well as identifying the requirements for equipment and 
facilities to support the mission at the site. All of the plans provide 
similar information for their main operating bases, cooperative 
security locations, and forward operating sites. 

Limited Explanation of the Impacts of Other Defense Plans and 
Activities: 

Despite improvements to the plans since last year, the 2006 master 
plans do not always explain how their implementation could be affected 
by other relevant and related defense plans and activities because 
there is not a requirement for them to do so. In 2005, the Commission 
on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States 
recommended that the entire effort of overseas basing be integrated 
into one overarching design that is coordinated and synchronized with 
all ongoing initiatives. Further, in a statement to the House Armed 
Services Committee on June 20, 2006, the Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
for Installations and Environment, and the Vice Director of Strategic 
Plans and Policies stated that one of the key themes the department 
uses to guide its thinking on force posture changes is to act both 
within and across regions. According to these officials, global force 
management allows the department to adapt to increasingly global 
challenges, relationships, and capability needs by establishing cross- 
regional priorities. 

Overseas regional command officials told us that generally, the 
development of their 2006 master plans were coordinated with other DOD 
plans and activities. However, only PACOM's plan gave some indication 
of how its implementation could be affected by another activity--the 
potential decrease in traditional Japanese funding which could be used 
to help pay for the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam, as discussed 
above. EUCOM's master plan did not explain the potential impact of 
implementing base realignment and closure recommendations on the 
movement of troops from Germany to bases in the United States. EUCOM 
and Army officials told us that any delay in the implementation of base 
realignment and closure recommendations would cause them to delay the 
movement of Army service members and their families if facilities were 
not available at receiving installations in the United States. This 
would delay the closings of Army installations in Europe and increase 
costs to operate those installations while they remain open. However, 
EUCOM's master plan did not address this matter. Also, while CENTCOM 
officials emphasized that infrastructure requirements in their master 
plan directly supported and responded to ongoing operations in Iraq, 
CENTCOM's master plan only made general references to operations in 
Iraq and did not fully explain the potential impact of such operations 
on other installations and facility requirements outside of Iraq in its 
area of responsibility. 

These omissions were due primarily to OSD guidance that stipulates the 
plans are to address overseas locations only. OSD guidance does not 
require regional commands to take into consideration facilities' 
requirements and plans in the 50 states, U.S. territories, or at 
locations where U.S. troops are deployed temporarily and funded outside 
of traditional military construction appropriations, such as is the 
case in Iraq. Without such explanations and linkage, it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which the master plans are coordinated and 
synchronized with other defense plans and activities and the impacts 
these other activities have on the master plans in terms of 
infrastructure and funding requirements. 

2006 Master Plans Reflected Recent Changes in Overseas Basing 
Strategies and Requirements: 

OSD and the regional commands incorporated key changes associated with 
the continuing evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and 
requirements into this year's master plans before they were provided to 
Congress. Even with these efforts, changes occurring after the 2006 
plans were submitted to Congress will have to be reflected in next 
year's plans, and it is likely that the department could face more 
changes in the future. 

While the plans are driven by periodic changes in U.S. overseas basing 
strategies and requirements, OSD and the regional commands incorporated 
these key changes into the 2006 master plans before they were provided 
to Congress. As a part of DOD's efforts to establish a U.S. presence in 
Eastern Europe through a network of forward operating sites and 
cooperative security locations, the United States signed individual 
agreements with the governments of Romania and of Bulgaria in December 
2005 and April 2006, respectively, which will allow DOD access to their 
facilities and training sites. In both instances, EUCOM's master plan 
provided significant details, such as the mission, planned 
capabilities, equipment and aircraft, population, and in some instances 
the funding requirements to transition the camp into full operating 
capacity, based on the results of these recent agreements. In addition, 
CENTCOM removed infrastructure requirements that were planned for 
Uzbekistan from its master plan. In late 2005, following the United 
States' criticism of human rights abuses, the Uzbekistan government 
requested that all U.S. government forces withdraw from Karshi-Khanabad 
air base. According to senior CENTCOM officials, these forces were 
relocated to other locations in its area of responsibility, which 
affected infrastructure and funding requirements at the receiving 
locations. 

In some instances, basing decisions were made after the plans were 
prepared, but OSD and the regional commands updated the plans to 
reflect those decisions before the plans were submitted to Congress. 
For example, after the EUCOM plan was prepared, the department decided 
to realign the Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland, and the Naval 
Support Activity La Maddelena, Italy--for both of which EUCOM had 
included infrastructure and funding requirements in its plan. 
Historically, these installations existed to meet Cold War security 
threats. However, because of the realities of the new century's 
security environment, DOD determined that the capabilities provided by 
these installations were no longer required. While this effort helped 
to provide Congress with the most current available data at the time, 
it also contributed to DOD providing Congress copies of this year's 
master plans nearly 2 months after its fiscal year 2007 military 
construction budget submission, instead of simultaneously as specified 
in the House conference report and Senate report accompanying the 
fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bills. 

Even with these efforts to update the plans as changes occurred and 
decisions were made, the evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing 
strategies and requirements continues. U.S. overseas defense basing 
strategies and requirements continue to evolve simultaneously with the 
implementation of associated plans and activities encompassed in the 
integrated global basing strategy, base realignment and closure, Army's 
modularity plans, and war on terrorism. In the 2006 master plans, OSD 
recognizes that further changes will result as it continues to 
implement the global defense posture decisions. For example, it 
anticipates that the department will return about 30 percent of its 
current overseas sites (22 percent of its overseas assets in terms of 
plant replacement value) to host nations over the next 10 years. 
Accordingly, OSD and the regional commands will be faced with more 
changes in the future, and it remains difficult for such changes to be 
included in the master plans and for DOD to provide a definitive 
picture of infrastructure and funding requirements. Changes occurring 
after the most recent plans were submitted to Congress will have to be 
reflected in next year's plans. 

2006 Master Plans Addressed Several Challenges, but PACOM's Plan Did 
Not Mention Training Limitations: 

As noted, the 2006 master plans addressed a number of challenges that 
DOD faces in the implementation of the master plans--such as 
uncertainties with host nation relations and environmental concerns-- 
but PACOM's plan did not address training limitations in South Korea 
and Japan. In our prior reports, we explained how some of these 
challenges could have a significant impact on infrastructure and 
funding requirements and, because the prior plans did not always 
describe such challenges and their potential effects, that Congress 
lacked a complete picture it needed to evaluate the annual military 
construction funding request. This year, the plans provided a much 
better description of challenges and the potential impacts on 
implementation. 

This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Host Nation 
Relations: 

All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of 
recent negotiations and agreements with host nations in their 2006 
master plans. Last year, we found that none of the commands fully 
explained the status or challenges for finalizing host nation 
agreements and recommended that the commands briefly explain the status 
of negotiations with host nations to provide more complete and clearer 
plans. These agreements depend largely on the political environment and 
economic conditions in host nations and can affect the extent of host 
nation support--access to facilities or funding--to U.S. forces. 
Accordingly, the resulting agreements may increase or decrease U.S.- 
funded costs for future infrastructure changes. This year, we found the 
following: 

* PACOM's master plan provided substantial information describing the 
results of the Defense Policy Review Initiative[Footnote 21] with the 
Government of Japan, such as the transfer of a carrier air wing, 
collocation of United States and Japanese air command and control at 
Yokota Air Base, and the reduction of U.S. forces on Okinawa. In 
addition, USFK provided details on significant past and current 
realignment efforts, including the Government of South Korea's approval 
of the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan relocation plan and 
coordination on the transfer of U.S.-vacated bases. 

* EUCOM's master plan provided specific information on efforts to 
consolidate missions because of limitations on training and military 
activities, in addition to identifying a possible closure of a main 
operating base in its area of responsibility. 

* CENTCOM's master plan discussed efforts to solicit host nation 
contributions and the amount of coordination and support that is needed 
from DOD, the State Department, and Congress. The plan also reflected 
the results of agreements with host nations, which have established 
cooperative security locations and forward operating sites in strategic 
areas of the world such as North Africa and Central Asia. 

This Year's Plans Provided Better Descriptions of Environmental Issues: 

As discussed, EUCOM and PACOM addressed the extent of their 
environmental issues in their 2006 master plans, while CENTCOM gave no 
indication concerning environmental issues in its master plan. Last 
year, none of the regional commands identified environmental 
remediation and restoration issues in their master plans. This year, 
EUCOM reported that there were no environmental restoration and 
remediation projects programmed for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. 
PACOM reported that U.S. Forces Japan had no environmental restoration 
and remediation requirements and that USFK was coordinating with the 
Government of South Korea on remediation of vacated U.S. bases. 
Although CENTCOM did not report any environmental issues, a senior 
CENTCOM official said there were no environmental issues in the 
command's area of responsibility. 

PACOM's 2006 Plan Did Not Describe Training Limitations: 

While the 2006 master plans generally addressed the other challenges 
that DOD faces in the implementation of the master plans, Congress 
still does not have a complete picture of the challenges that DOD faces 
in implementing the master plans, which could affect their 
implementation because PACOM's plan did not describe the challenges DOD 
faces in addressing training limitations in South Korea and Japan. 
Senior command officials told us that training limitations could cause 
the United States to pursue alternatives, such as either to train in 
other locations or to downsize or relocate, which could affect funding 
and facility requirements included in overseas basing plans. Further, 
we reported last year that similar challenges could have a significant 
impact on funding requirements but that the plans did not always 
describe the status and the potential impact of such challenges on 
future basing plans and funding requirements. This year, EUCOM's master 
plan addressed known training limitations in its region by identifying 
a specific instance in which a realignment action was not successful in 
part because of training limitations, and explaining that EUCOM was in 
the process of exploring further options to meet its requirements. 
CENTCOM officials told us that their focus was on ongoing operations 
and that training was not an issue in its region. 

While PACOM's master plan provided extensive details on other 
challenges, it did not describe the challenges the command faces in 
addressing training limitations in South Korea and Japan, although 
senior officials told us that these limitations could cause the United 
States to pursue alternatives, such as to either train in other 
locations or to downsize or relocate, which could affect overseas 
basing plans. Specifically, we found that PACOM master plan did not 
address the following: 

* The Seventh Air Force in South Korea may be unable to maintain combat 
capability in the long term due to lack of adequate air-to-surface 
ranges, according to senior Air Force and USFK officials. For decades, 
the Government of South Korea has attempted to relocate the Koon-Ni 
range, which had served as the primary air-to-ground range for the 
Seventh Air Force. Last year the air and ground range management of the 
Koon-Ni training range was transferred to the Government of South 
Korea, which closed the range in August 2005. While there is an 
agreement with the Government of South Korea to train at other ranges, 
according to senior Air Force and USFK officials, the other ranges do 
not provide electronic scoring capabilities necessary to meet the Air 
Force's air-to-surface training requirements. As a result, the Air 
Force has been using ranges in Japan and Alaska to meet its training 
requirements, which results in additional transportation costs to the 
U.S. government. While South Korea has agreed to upgrade its ranges, 
senior Air Force officials said that the Seventh Air Force will be able 
to maintain its combat capability only in the short term if the issue 
is not addressed. 

* The Eighth Army in South Korea needs rail links or high-speed roads 
to facilitate transportation of troops and equipment between Camp 
Humphreys, which is located south of Seoul, to major training areas 
located in the northern part of the country, according to senior USFK 
officials. While this is not a significant problem at this time, it 
remains a necessity to complete a successful realignment of U.S. forces 
in South Korea. According to senior USFK officials, a vital component 
of the training capability in South Korea depends upon having access to 
a rail head or a high-speed road that can deliver troops and equipment 
from Camp Humphreys to major training areas in the northern part of 
South Korea. 

* There are limited combat arms training ranges and facilities in 
Japan, according to senior U.S. Forces Japan and Pacific Air Forces 
officials. These officials said that even though they have received 
increased range time at Japanese training facilities, training 
opportunities still remain insufficient in Japan to meet their training 
requirements. 

As discussed above, the Air Force in South Korea may be unable to 
maintain combat capability in the future because of a lack of access to 
modernized air-to-surface ranges, insufficient opportunities to meet 
training requirements in Japan, and the need of the Army in South Korea 
for rail links or high-speed roads to facilitate transportation of 
troops and equipment between Camp Humphreys to the major training areas 
in the northern part of South Korea. While these training issues were 
readily identified by USFK, U.S. Forces Japan, and PACOM officials, 
none of these issues were recognized as a challenge in PACOM's master 
plan. We believe that identifying these issues would provide Congress 
an awareness of potential challenges to training U.S. forces in Japan 
and South Korea, which are likely to affect facility requirements and 
funding in these countries. 

Conclusions: 

U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements continue to 
evolve simultaneously with the implementation of associated plans and 
activities encompassed in the integrated global basing strategy, base 
realignment and closure, Army's modularity plans, and the war on 
terrorism, and it remains difficult for such changes to be included in 
the master plans and for DOD to provide a definitive picture of 
infrastructure and funding requirements. To the department's credit, 
this year's overseas master plans provide more complete, clear, and 
consistent information than last year's plans. Still, until overseas 
regional commands link their master plans with other relevant and 
related defense plans and activities, including those involving base 
realignment and closure implementation and Iraq operations, and until 
PACOM addresses training limitations in its master plan, Congress and 
other users will lack complete information on the magnitude of U.S. 
defense infrastructure and funding requirements overseas. 

Since we have previously recommended that overseas regional commands 
address residual value issues and that PACOM provide information on 
facility requirements and funding levels for Guam, Hawaii, U.S. 
territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific in our prior 
reports, we are not including them in this report. However, since they 
have not been addressed, we consider them open and therefore the 
department should implement them. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To further enhance future comprehensive master plans and facilitate 
annual review and oversight by Congress and other users, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to (1) revise OSD's guidance to 
require overseas commands to explain how other relevant and related 
defense plans and activities, including those involving base 
realignment and closure implementation and Iraq operations, affect 
implementation of their master plans in terms of infrastructure and 
funding requirements and (2) ensure that PACOM explains how it plans to 
address existing training limitations in its area of responsibility and 
the potential effects of those limitations on infrastructure and 
funding requirements. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Installations and Environment partially concurred with both 
recommendations. In commenting on our recommendations to require 
overseas commands to explain how other relevant and related defense 
plans and activities and existing training limitations affect 
implementation of their master plans, he agreed with our 
recommendations' intent and stated that the department's preference was 
to address these issues in a risk assessment framework. Specifically, 
he stated that future guidance would require overseas commands to 
identify and discuss risks to their plans--such as those that would 
directly affect execution and could result from political, financial, 
base realignment and closure, training, and other issues--as well as 
steps taken to mitigate the risks. We have no basis to question this 
approach and plan to evaluate its effectiveness in our next annual 
review of DOD's overseas master plans. 

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense further stated that nonprogrammed 
and nonvalidated training limitations experienced by service components 
were not appropriate for inclusion and would not be addressed in the 
overseas commands' risk assessment for their master plans. We agree. 
While we are not aware of any nonprogrammed and nonvalidated training 
limitations, our report discusses only those training limitations 
raised by senior command officials during our review. We assume that if 
there is a need to make a distinction between nonvalidated versus 
validated training limitations, OSD and the overseas commands would 
work together to identify those validated limitations that should be 
addressed in their master plans. 

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense's comments are reprinted in 
enclosure II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; 
overseas regional commanders; and the Director, Office of Management 
and Budget. Copies will be made available to others upon request. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on our Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. The GAO staff members who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in enclosure III. 

Signed by: 

Barry W. Holman, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Addressees: 

The Honorable John Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans' Affairs, and 
Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable James T. Walsh: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Chet Edwards: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and: 
Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of Section]

Enclosure I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans 
complied with congressional reporting requirements and provided 
information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner, we compared 
the overseas master plans with the reporting requirements in the 
congressional mandate, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
guidance, which incorporated our prior recommendations. In order to 
identify improvements to the overseas master plan, we compared and 
contrasted the 2005 and 2006 plans. We assessed the quantity and 
quality of one plan's responses for each of the data elements and 
compared them to equivalent responses in the other plans to form 
conclusions as to the completeness, clarity, and consistency of plans. 
We also discussed with Department of Defense (DOD) officials our 
observations and recommendations, specific reporting requirements, and 
whether improvements in the guidance and reporting were needed. To 
determine whether improvements in guidance and reporting were needed, 
we assessed the plans to identify those elements and properties that 
provided information in the most complete, clear, and consistent 
manner. 

To determine the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans 
reflected how U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements 
have changed since last year, we interviewed cognizant officials from 
DOD about the various changes that were identified within the plans. We 
met with officials from OSD and each of the following commands and 
agencies: U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Army Pacific; Commander, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Forces Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; 
U.S. Forces Korea; U.S. Eighth Army; Seventh Air Force; Commander, 
Naval Forces Korea; Army Installation Management Agency Korea Regional 
Office; Army Corps of Engineers Far East District; DOD Education 
Activity; U.S. Forces Korea Status of Forces Agreement Office; U.S. 
Forces Korea Judge Advocate Office; U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan; 
U.S. Air Forces Japan; Commander, Naval Forces Japan; U.S. Marine 
Forces Japan; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; Commander, U.S. 
Naval Forces Europe; Naval Facilities Engineering Command-Japan; Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command-Italy; U.S. Air Force Europe; Army 
Installation Management Agency Europe Regional Office; U.S. Central 
Command; and Special Operations Command. In general, we discussed the 
reporting requirements contained in OSD's guidance, host nation 
agreements and funding levels, U.S. funding levels and sources, 
environmental remediation and restoration issues, property returns to 
host nations, and training requirements. In addition, we compared and 
contrasted the 2005 and 2006 overseas master plans to each other in 
order to identify changes in overseas defense basing strategies and 
requirements. We also analyzed available reports, documents, policies, 
directives, international agreements, guidance, and media articles to 
keep abreast of ongoing changes in overseas defense basing strategies 
and requirements. During our overseas visits, to see firsthand the 
condition of facilities and status of selected construction projects, 
we visited and toured the facilities at Camp Schwab, Camp Hansen, Camp 
Foster, Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma, Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota Air Base, Japan; 
Camp Humphreys, South Korea; Army Garrison Grafenwöhr, Bitburg Annex, 
Spangdahlem Air Base, and Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and Naval Support 
Activity Capodichino (Naples), Italy. 

To determine the extent to which the 2006 master plans reflected the 
challenges DOD faces in the implementation of the plans, we met with 
officials from the aforementioned agencies and discussed challenges 
involving various topics, host nation relations and funding levels, 
U.S. funding levels and sources, environmental remediation and 
restoration issues, property returns to host nations, and training 
limitations. We compared and contrasted the 2005 and 2006 overseas 
master plans to each other to determine the extent to which 
improvements were made in identifying key challenges for each command. 
We also analyzed available reports, documents, policies, directives, 
international agreements, guidance, and media articles pertaining to 
challenges that may affect DOD's implementation of the overseas master 
plans. 

While we met with Special Operations Command officials, its planning 
efforts were not specifically included in the master plans provided in 
response to the congressional mandates and detailed data were not 
available for inclusion in this report. In addition, we did not include 
Southern Command in our analysis because this command has significantly 
fewer facilities overseas than the other regional commands in the 
Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia. 

We conducted our review from September 2005 through July 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of Section] 

Enclosure II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Acquisition Technology And Logistics: 
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

Aug 10 2006: 

Mr. Barry W. Holman: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Holman: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-06-913R, `Defense Infrastructure: DOD'S Overseas 
Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve,' dated July 11, 2006 
(GAO Code 350740). 

Enclosed is the Department's response to the recommendations of the 
draft GAO report. Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments. My 
point of contact for this action is Sherry Holliman, who can be reached 
at (703) 571-9069. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 
for : Philip W. Grone: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment): 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO CODE 350740/GAO-06-913R: 
GAO Draft Report - Dated July 11, 2006: 
GAO Code 350740/GAO-06-913R: 

"Defense Infrastructure: DOD'S Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans 
Continue to Evolve" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) to revise OSD guidance to require overseas commands to 
explain how other relevant and related defense plans and activities, 
including those involving base realignment and closure implementation 
and Iraq operations, affect implementation of their master plans in 
terms of infrastructure and funding requirements. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. DoD concurs with the intent of the 
recommendation but prefers that overseas commands couch the information 
in a risk assessment framework. DoD future guidance will require 
overseas commands to identify and discuss risks to their master plans 
as well as steps taken to mitigate those risks. Such risks would 
directly impact master plan execution and could result from political, 
financial, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAG), training, or other 
issues. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) to ensure that PACOM explains how it plans to address 
existing training limitations in its area of responsibility and the 
potential effects of those limitations on infrastructure and funding 
requirements. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. DoD concurs that validated training 
requirements which are affected by force posture transformation plans 
should be addressed in the master plans. However, it is more germane 
for these issues to be addressed as part of the risk assessment 
discussion (described above) than to be addressed separately. 
Therefore, DoD will advise overseas combatant commands to include 
training issues as part of their risk assessment discussion. Non- 
programmed and non-validated training limitations experienced by 
Service components are not appropriate for inclusion and will not be 
addressed. 

[End of Section] 

Enclosure III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Barry W. Holman, (202) 512-5581: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Mark Little, Assistant Director; 
Nelsie Alcoser; Thom Barger; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane; and Roger 
Tomlinson also made major contributions to this report. 

(350740): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2004). 

[2] In fulfilling this requirement, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense asked the overseas regional commands to prepare comprehensive 
master plans for their areas of responsibility. 

[3] S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003). 

[4] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003). 

[5] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve 
Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure 
Overseas, GAO-05-680R (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005), and Defense 
Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs Overseas 
and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans, GAO-04-609 
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004). 

[6] DOD, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, Update of Overseas Master Plans (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 
2005). OSD also issued guidance in February and October 2004 to aid the 
overseas regional commands in developing their plans last year. 

[7] Last year, OSD provided Congress the overseas master plans along 
with its fiscal year 2006 military construction budget proposal in 
early March 2005. This year's master plans were submitted on April 27, 
2006, later than when the annual budget submissions went to Congress, 
at least in part because of OSD's efforts to incorporate last minute 
changes in basing plans, such as those in Iceland and Italy. OSD made 
the plans available to us on May 2, 2006, which did not provide us 
sufficient time to fully assess the plans or provide a draft report to 
Congress by May 15 as we have done in the past. 

[8] We refer to the plans in the year that they were issued to 
Congress. The content of the plans issued in 2006 covers fiscal years 
2007 through 2011. 

[9] For the purposes of this report, we did not include Southern 
Command in our analysis because this command has significantly fewer 
facilities overseas than the other regional commands in the Pacific, 
Europe, and Central Asia. 

[10] U.S. Congress, Commission on Review of Overseas Military 
Facilities Structure of the United States Final Report (Arlington, Va.: 
Aug. 15, 2005). The commission was established in 2003 by Pub. L. No. 
108-132 § 128 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 111 note) to evaluate 
the current and proposed overseas basing structure for U.S. military 
forces. 

[11] Like last year, CENTCOM's plan excluded any detailed discussion of 
facilities in Iraq since DOD does not consider them permanent bases. 

[12] These numbers do not include U.S. facilities in Iraq. 

[13] In our estimates for military construction and family housing for 
overseas locations, we included U.S. territories and possessions in the 
Pacific, such as Guam and Wake Island. However, we excluded worldwide 
classified and unspecified appropriations from our total because these 
categories may include domestic military construction and family 
housing. 

[14] See footnote 7. 

[15] See footnote 5. 

[16] See footnote 6. 

[17] Department of Defense, Environmental Remediation for DOD 
Activities Overseas, DOD Instruction 4715.8 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 
1998). 

[18] As discussed in our prior report, within the provisions of the 
Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan relocation plan, USFK intends to 
strengthen its overall military effectiveness by consolidating 
installations north of Seoul, including the Yongsan Army Garrison 
located in the Seoul metropolitan area, to two major hubs in the 
central and southern sections of South Korea. USFK expects the 
consolidation and relocation of thousands of soldiers to increase 
readiness, efficiencies, and cost savings; enhance quality of life; 
provide a less intrusive presence; and increase training opportunities. 

[19] CENTCOM also included information on proposed military 
construction projects and estimated costs for fiscal year 2012 in its 
2006 master plan. 

[20] On April 7, 2006, USFK announced a plan for the return of 
facilities and areas that have been vacated by the command to the 
Government of South Korea. USFK's plan includes a number of measures 
designed to address issues identified in joint South Korea and U.S. 
environmental surveys of these vacated facilities and areas. For 
example, the plan calls for the United States to remedy known, 
imminent, and substantial endangerments to human health and safety. The 
United States will also remove underground fuel storage tanks to 
preclude future leaks and initiate a technology process for skimming 
fuel from the groundwater at locations where this contamination was 
found. USFK expects that the plan will accelerate the return of vacated 
facilities and areas to the Government of South Korea and the 
relocation of U.S. forces from Seoul and other locations. 

[21] The Defense Policy Review Initiative, a bilateral agreement 
between the U.S. and Japanese governments, established a framework for 
the future U.S. force structure in Japan. According to DOD, this effort 
assessed the security environment in the region and bilaterally 
determined the required roles, missions, capabilities, and force 
structure. The interim agreement plan was signed in October 2005. 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of 
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order 
GAO Products" heading. 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 

Voice: (202) 512-6000: 

TDD: (202) 512-2537: 

Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov 

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Public Affairs: 

Jeff Nelligan, managing director, 

NelliganJ@gao.gov 

(202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548: