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
**Report To The Chairman,  
Committee On Foreign Relations  
United States Senate**

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**Status Of The Department Of State's  
Security Enhancement Program**

In fiscal year 1980 the State Department initiated the Security Enhancement Program in response to acts of mob violence against U.S. diplomatic personnel at overseas posts. In 1982 GAO reviewed the program and found that inadequate planning, coordination, and property management caused delays in completing physical improvements at selected posts.

This report provides information on the current status of the program including the number of posts completed, actions taken by the State Department to strengthen program management, and problems that continue to delay implementation of security improvements.



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September 14, 1984

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UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
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NATIONAL SECURITY AND  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

B-216362

The Honorable Charles H. Percy  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations  
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In your letter of April 5, 1984, you requested that we update our September 1982 report, Improvements Needed in Providing Security at Overseas Posts (GAO/ID-82-61) to determine 1) if the program deficiencies identified previously have been corrected and 2) if any further program deficiencies have developed which need to be corrected.

As agreed with your office, this report describes the status of the State Department's Security Enhancement Program (SEP) which was established to deter terrorist acts against U.S. diplomatic personnel at overseas posts. We are continuing our evaluation of SEP and other security programs and will report fully on these matters in the future. Appendix I includes information on the SEP as of July 1984, including its direction, funding, and improvements made. Appendix II includes a follow-up of the recommendations made in our 1982 report.

Status of SEP

SEP is only one of many sources of funds available to improve security measures at overseas posts. The Department estimates that the fiscal year 1985 budget contains \$122 million for security of which \$25 million, or 20 percent, is for SEP. Security enhancement funds have been used for a variety of security-related activities, including establishing public access controls, upgrading post communications centers, procuring residential security locks, and minor construction.

In 1979 the Department envisioned upgrading about 125 of the most seriously threatened posts over a 5-year period (fiscal years 1980-1984). Subsequently, 69 posts were dropped because of rising costs, limited funding, the closing of several posts, and a reevaluation of the long-term threat of mob violence. In addition, the Department added six posts not included on the original list. As a result of these changes, SEP in May 1984 included 62 posts scheduled to be completed within 7 years (1980-1986). The status of these 62 posts as of July 1984 was as follows:

- Ten posts had been completed.
- Forty-five posts had major projects to complete.
- Three posts had minor projects to complete.
- Four posts had been dropped due to funding constraints.

Through fiscal year 1984 \$110.6 million has been appropriated for SEP. Most of the funds have been used for these 62 posts; however, funds have been used for a wide range of security-related activities at 140 posts.

Since 1982, the scope of individual SEP projects has been reduced and the emphasis changed. The initial projects called for extensive rework, including adding space to existing buildings, installing sophisticated access denial systems, and securing areas. These upgrades, however, were costly, complex, and difficult to implement. Program guidelines now limit security enhancement projects to existing structures and do not allow new construction or the enlargement of existing space.

The Special Programs and Liaison staff was created to plan and manage the SEP. However, authority for carrying out improved security measures is dispersed among numerous organizations within the Department, including the Offices of Security, Foreign Buildings, Communications, and Operations, the Office for Combatting Terrorism, and the posts. Department officials told us that the fragmentation of responsibilities within the Department complicates the administration of the SEP and contributes to delays in implementing the program. They also told us a number of other factors contribute to delays, and at the posts we visited, we found the following factors delayed the projects:

- difficulties in completing architectural and engineering drawings,
- disagreements over the details of security improvements, and
- unavailability of forced entry doors and shatter resistant windows, when the program began.

#### Status of Previous GAO Recommendations

Our review indicates that the Department has taken steps to correct some problems noted in our 1982 report. For example, at that time we reported that posts had not always identified officials to receive program equipment, and shipments were made without notifying the posts in advance. At the posts we visited during our current work, we found that notifications are now

regularly sent, officers had been identified to receive shipments, and these officers are generally satisfied with the notification procedures.

The SEP will be phased out in fiscal year 1986. Although funding appears adequate to complete the program, some of the posts will not be completed until fiscal year 1987. The Department plans to transfer the responsibility for overseeing completion of the remaining posts from the liaison staff to another group; however, as of September 11, 1984, a final decision had not been made.

In performing our review we visited five overseas posts. We also interviewed officials and reviewed records of the Department of State, United States Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C. Our review, which was conducted during May 1984 to August 1984, was made in accordance with generally accepted government audit standards.

As requested by your office, we did not obtain official agency comments. However, we discussed the contents of this report with agency officials and included their comments where appropriate.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 5 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties.

Sincerely yours,



Frank C. Conahan  
Director



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### ABBREVIATIONS

GAO	General Accounting Office
SEP	Security Enhancement Program



STATUS OF THE SECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM

Over the past 10 to 15 years, attacks on U.S. citizens and property internationally have increased significantly. For example, in 1968 there were 71 such attacks, and in 1982, there were 401 attacks. Since the 1968 assassination of the U.S. ambassador in Guatemala, the State Department has sought greater protection for personnel, property, and information at foreign posts.

Prior to 1979, attacks by small groups of highly trained terrorists were the main threat to Americans. The Department reacted to this type of attack by focusing on constructing public access controls and devising internal defense plans to delay or deny a small group of terrorists access to our facilities. From 1974 to 1979, the Department spent more than \$123 million on security measures at overseas posts.

After the mob attacks in Pakistan, Iran and Libya, the Department concluded that the overseas security program was not sufficient to deter large-scale raids against our diplomatic installations. As a result, the Security Enhancement Program (SEP) was initiated in 1980 to upgrade the security posture of designated overseas posts. The main thrust of the program has been to establish, at those posts considered most threatened by the possibility of mob attack, an environment that will provide the greatest degree of safety and security to mission personnel, U.S. government property, and national security information. The Department defines the SEP goals as follows:

- Improve threat analysis capability and internal defense planning.
- Expand the public access control concept into a more comprehensive "three-tier" defensive system, consisting of an outer perimeter, main buildings, and safehavens.
- Develop and acquire non-lethal access-denial systems to be employed against mobs.
- Make structural improvements to provide a more secure environment.
- Provide for improved storage, retrieval, and destruction of classified and sensitive material.
- Provide for secure communication links to the Department of State.

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

To carry out SEP, the Bureau of Administration created the Special Programs and Liaison staff in October 1980 to administer and coordinate the program.

Posts included in the SEP undergo a comprehensive security survey, and specific improvements are recommended. The liaison staff is responsible for approving all funding for SEP projects and monitoring progress at each post.

Although the Special Programs and Liaison staff was created to manage SEP, the responsibility for carrying out recommendations lie with a number of offices within the Department. The principal offices are within the Bureau of Administration and include

- the Office of Security, which provides physical and technical security to personnel in overseas missions, safeguards national security information, and assesses the threat to overseas posts;
- the Office of Communications, which develops and implements secure communication facilities, safeguards classified transmissions, buys and maintains communications equipment, and provides communications services for the Department and other government agencies; and
- the Office of Foreign Buildings, which constructs new facilities, improves structural security, and approves contracts for overseas construction services.

Additionally, the Office for Combatting Terrorism, under the Under Secretary for Management, provides personnel for responding to overseas terrorist incidents and formulates security policy and guidelines. The Office is also responsible for coordinating government-wide antiterrorist activities.

SECURITY FUNDING AND  
STATUS OF SEP PROJECTS

The State Department originally estimated in 1979 that it needed \$192 million to upgrade about 125 of the most seriously threatened Foreign Service posts during the 5-year life of SEP, at a rate of 25 posts each year. Five years later the program had been reduced both in funding and number of posts. In its fiscal year 1985 budget justification, the Department planned to spend \$145 million to upgrade security at 62 posts over 7 years.

### Security funding

SEP is only one of many sources of funds available to improve security measures at overseas posts. The Department estimates its fiscal year 1985 budget contains \$122 million for security of which \$25 million, or 20 percent, is for SEP. This is an estimate of total security funding since the Department's accounting system does not separately identify or account for all security funds. For example, significant security funding is absorbed in new construction projects. In addition, other agencies' budgets for security are not included in this estimate.

### SEP funding

Through fiscal year 1984, \$110.6 million has been appropriated for SEP. These funds have been used for a wide range of security-related activities at 140 posts. Most of the funding has been committed to projects that received comprehensive surveys and required significant upgrades. However, some posts received less than \$1,000 to procure minor equipment.

The significant upgrades generally involve constructing public access controls at building entrances, improving communications facilities and equipment to secure communications, and other upgrades to permit more rapid destruction of classified material should the need arise. In addition to the access and communications improvements, other major upgrades include the construction of perimeter walls and safehavens and the installation of bullet- and shatter-resistant windows.

### Other security funds

In addition to the SEP, the Department has other funds for security. In particular, the Offices of Security and Foreign Buildings fund security activities as do regional bureaus and posts. For example, when the car-bombing of the American Embassy in Kuwait occurred in December 1983, the Department advised all overseas posts to install vehicular countermeasures. Although the Department indicated that funding could be provided, it requested posts to use their own funds, if possible. Four of the five posts we visited had used their own funds while the fifth post requested and received SEP funding. The Department informed us that 36 posts were provided SEP funds for construction/installation of vehicle barriers.

Other agencies with overseas missions also provide funding for security of their personnel and property. For example, the United States Agency for International Development had an overseas security budget for fiscal years 1981, 1982, and 1983 of about \$1.6 million, \$1.4 million, and \$1 million, respectively.

The United States Information Agency, while not having an overseas security budget, receives security funds through the State Department. For example, in fiscal year 1982 about 2.4 percent of the Department's \$49 million Security Supplemental Appropriation was designated for use by the United States Information Agency. We also found indications that about \$300,000 of the United States Information Agency Director's reserve fund was used to fund guards and residence security (alarms, grillwork, safehavens) in fiscal years 1983 and 1984.

#### Status of SEP projects

According to Department records, 62 posts were included in the SEP as of May 1984. All work was scheduled to be completed by fiscal year 1987. Our analysis of the status of these posts showed that as of July 1984

- ten posts had been completed,
- forty-five posts had major projects to complete,
- three posts had minor projects to complete, and
- four posts had been dropped due to funding constraints.

In addition to these 62 posts, other posts have received some measure of enhanced security funded from SEP, such as the provision of armored vehicles and minor construction modifications.

We also found that some communications projects were not being completed as originally planned because of limited funds. In April 1984, the liaison staff allocated \$12 million to complete the communications projects, \$20 million less than needed. As a result, 23 of the 62 posts have had communications projects deferred. The Office of Communications plans to include funding for these projects in fiscal years 1986-1988 budgets.

#### SEP ACTION PLAN

Security enhancement under the SEP involves several steps, including

- selecting posts based on established criteria;
- surveying posts by specialists to determine what needs to be upgraded, resulting in specific recommendations; and
- implementing the survey recommendations.

Criteria for post selection

The Department continually assesses the security threat to each foreign post and publishes a quarterly list of all posts by category of threat--high, medium, and low. This is an ongoing process by which posts are evaluated as to their terrorist, mob violence, and criminal threat environments.

The Department initially used this list to identify 125 posts to be included in the SEP. Subsequently, the number of posts included in SEP was reduced because of rising costs, the closing of several posts, and a reevaluation of the long-term threat of mob violence. As of July 1984, the SEP included the 62 posts of which 15 were designated as high threat, 43 as medium threat and 4 as low threat. We were told that the threat list was constantly changing, and that some of the posts currently considered low or medium risk remain in the program because of ongoing SEP work begun when the post was designated at a higher threat level.

SIXTY-TWO SECURITY ENHANCEMENT POSTS

Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates	Khartoum, Sudan
Accra, Ghana	Kingston, Jamaica
Alexandria, Egypt	Kinshasa, Zaire
Algiers, Algeria	Kuwait, Kuwait
Amman, Jordan	Lagos, Nigeria
Ankara, Turkey	La Paz, Bolivia
Baghdad, Iraq	Lima, Peru
Bangkok, Thailand	Lubumbashi, Zaire
Bogota, Colombia	Lusaka, Zambia
Bombay, India	Madras, India
Cairo, Egypt	Managua, Nicaragua
Calcutta, India	Manama, Bahrain
Caracas, Venezuela	Manila, Philippines
Casablanca, Morocco	Maputo, Mozambique
Chiang Mai, Thailand	Maseru, Lesotho
Damascus, Syria	Monrovia, Liberia
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania	Muscat, Oman
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia	Nicosia, Cyprus
Dacca, Bangladesh	Nouakchott, Mauritania
Doha, Qatar	Oran, Algeria
Dubai, United Arab Emirates	Paramaribo, Suriname
Freetown, Sierra Leone	Peshawar, Pakistan
Georgetown, Guyana	Rabat, Morocco
Guatemala, Guatemala	Sanaa, Yemen Arab Republics
Havana, Cuba	San Jose, Costa Rica
Islamabad, Pakistan	San Salvador, El Salvador
Istanbul, Turkey	Songkhla, Thailand
Izmir, Turkey	Tangier, Morocco
Jerusalem, Israel	Tegucigalpa, Honduras
Kaduna, Nigeria	Tunis, Tunisia
Karachi, Pakistan	Victoria, Seychelles

### Security enhancement surveys

The first step in the security enhancement process is to conduct a comprehensive survey of the posts' security posture by a team of specialists with expertise in construction, communications, and security. Each survey team is headed by a Special Programs and Liaison staff team leader and includes specialists from the Offices of Security, Communications, and Foreign Buildings. In addition, the survey teams generally include an architect and/or structural engineer, and may include representatives from the regional bureaus and other agencies.

Once the survey team completes its assessment, the liaison staff seeks to reach a consensus among all interested offices, agencies, and bureaus on the details of the plan. The team leader is responsible for completing a final report that includes specific recommendations and identifies who should be tasked to implement them. It is expected that comprehensive surveys and reports will be completed by the end of fiscal year 1984 for 54 of the 62 posts on the July 1984 SEP list. Four posts were surveyed, but the Department did not issue a report, and four posts have not been surveyed and no report will be issued.

According to the liaison staff, the initial surveys conducted in 1980-1981 were not well organized, included too many team members, and contained too much detail, which caused delays in completing the final survey reports. The Special Programs and Liaison staff initiated 17 surveys between 1980-1981, and completed them in an average of 6.3 months. The 27 surveys completed since 1981 have taken an average of 4.8 months to complete. The remaining 10 surveys had not been completed as of July 1984.

Liaison staff officials informed us that since 1982 the scope of the individual SEP projects has been reduced and the emphasis changed. The initial projects called for extensive rework including adding space to existing buildings, installing sophisticated access-denial systems, and securing areas throughout the post. These upgrades, however, were costly, complex, and difficult to implement. SEP guidelines now limit security enhancement recommendations to existing structures and do not allow new construction or the enlargement of existing space.

For example, the initial SEP standards required safehavens that would resist forced entry from mob attack for up to 12 hours. These safehavens were to be constructed or renovated using independent power and cooling systems. It was subsequently determined, however, that the 12-hour standard was technically not feasible because available doors could prevent forced entry for only about 1 hour. Thus, the standard was

changed from 12 hours to 1 hour. The change eliminated the need for independent power and cooling systems since it is assumed that the personnel temporarily in the safehaven would be evacuated quickly, and thus the possibility of losing power and cooling does not pose a significant danger.

Delays in implementing  
survey recommendations

A number of problems have contributed to delays in implementing recommendations. We were told these have included

- delays in completing architectural and engineering drawings,
- disagreements over the details of security improvements, and
- unavailability of forced entry doors and shatter resistant windows, when the program began.

Once the survey report is issued, architectural and engineering drawings must be completed before a contractor is selected and major construction can begin. At one post we visited, the survey report was completed in June 1981, yet completed public access control drawings were not submitted to the post until April 1984 and the post was still awaiting plans for the communications upgrade 2 years after the report was issued. At another post, the survey was completed in May 1981 and public access control plans were issued in March 1983. Communications plans were scheduled to be issued in August 1984.

One of the posts visited was originally surveyed in September 1980. The plan included recommendations for the construction of seven safehavens and two access control projects for the chancery and embassy annex. The Department later determined this project was too extensive and would cost \$8 million to complete. In August 1982 a new plan was agreed to, reducing the scope to only one access control project for the chancery and no safehavens. In July 1984 the post was in the process of selecting a contractor to construct the access control project--4 years after the original survey and 2 years after the revision.

At this same post, some of the survey recommendations which could be done locally have been completed. In addition, this post received SEP funding for the installation of vehicular countermeasures following the Kuwait bombing. The funds were to be used to add steel pipe and accessories along the perimeter fence to prevent vehicular bombings. The post procured these materials as planned. In addition, the post used some of these

funds to construct a decorative vehicle barrier, which had not been approved by the liaison staff. As a result of this additional expense, the post did not have the funds to install the steel pipe and accessories. The post was negotiating with the Department to determine who would fund the remaining construction work.

At another post, we were told that headquarters and post personnel disagreed over the two main areas of the project--the location of the safehaven and the design of the main lobby area. The disagreement delayed implementation for more than a year while the differences were being resolved. At this same post a unique problem was encountered. Asbestos was discovered in the roof of the building after the survey was completed. This further delayed implementation of the project for more than a year because the asbestos had to be removed before construction could begin. The project has recently been completed.

At a third post, an error was discovered in the architectural drawings which delayed the project. The construction of the public access control was also delayed because the post had not received the required ballistic materials. The regional security officer believes that limited availability of these materials has contributed to this delay.

FOLLOW-UP ON PRIOR  
GAO RECOMMENDATIONS

Our September 1982 report contained recommendations for improving the planning, coordination, and implementation of the Security Enhancement Program. The Department responded in December 1982 to our recommendations in letters to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Operations. Our follow-up work indicates that the Department has implemented or is in the process of implementing our recommendations. The following sections summarize the major recommendations contained in our report, the Department's response, and the status of implementation.

A SINGLE, COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY  
SYSTEM COULD HELP POSTS BETTER CONTROL  
SECURITY ENHANCEMENT MATERIAL

GAO recommendation

We recommended that the Secretary of State require the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration to develop a single inventory and tracking system which would allow program managers to identify all material going to each post and to use this capability to notify the posts of the specific nature and quantity of material sent and any changes in shipments.

Department's response

The Department stated that a working group had been established, including representatives from the security enhancement program staff and the Office of Information Systems, to develop and implement an automated inventory and tracking system for program material shipments. It expected the prototype system to be tested in early 1983.

Current status

As of September 5, 1984, an inventory and tracking system still had not been implemented. The system as planned would incorporate information generated by the Department's operating offices into a single system, which would enable the Special Programs and Liaison staff to account for all equipment and material going to security enhancement posts. Another feature of the system would be to automatically generate telegraphic notifications to posts of equipment and materials being shipped and to track the shipment status until the post acknowledged receipt.

Although the system design was completed by April 1983, the Department encountered a number of delays, including finding a

private contractor to convert data into a usable format. The contractor, hired in January 1984, was given a September 1, 1984, deadline to complete the project. According to the Special Programs and Liaison staff, the contractor met this deadline. The system design has been tested, and the liaison staff expect the system to be in place by October 31, 1984.

POSTS SHOULD HAVE A RECEIVING  
OFFICER FOR SEP SHIPMENTS OF  
EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

GAO recommendation

We recommended that the Secretary of State require the Chief of Mission or a designee, at each post, to assign one official to be responsible for receiving, recording, and storing all material received for the security enhancement project, as well as to inventory all items received and inform Washington of any discrepancies.

Department response

The Department stated that a telegram was sent to all security enhancement posts requesting the Chief of Mission to designate a receiving officer to assume responsibility for all material shipments and inventories. Because each project is uniquely designed to fit the local security situation and environment, it noted that these positions would be filled by project managers, regional security officers, post security officers, and other administrative personnel, as appropriate.

Current status

In November 1982, the Department sent the telegram to SEP posts requesting them to designate a receiving officer for program materials. The telegram required the receiving officer to record the receipt of shipment and maintain an inventory of all program materials and equipment at post.

The liaison staff could not provide us with a list of posts which responded to this telegram. However, at the posts visited, we found that receiving officers had been designated.

The receiving officials were generally satisfied with the notification of shipment procedures. According to the communications coordinator, shipping and notification problems sometimes still occur but are not unique to the security enhancement program.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATE AND OTHER  
AGENCIES REGARDING SECURITY NEEDS AND  
AUTHORITY OVER SECURITY FOR AGENCIES  
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY COMPOUND  
NEED TO BE RESOLVED

GAO recommendation

We recommended that the Secretary of State require the Assistant Secretary for Administration to direct efforts to resolve the differences between the State Department and other agencies concerning the needs of SEP at overseas posts and the ultimate authority over security for the agencies' offices located outside the U.S. Embassy or Consulate.

Department response

The Department acknowledged that agencies having offices outside embassies and consulates often require that such facilities have different security standards to enable these agencies to carry out their program objectives.

To deal with this situation, the Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security convened a meeting with his counterparts from other federal agencies, including the United States Agency for International Development, United States Information Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Department of Commerce, on this subject. The following agreements were reached:

- The Department of State has primary responsibility for the security of personnel overseas, and the Department's Office of Security would provide the specialized services needed to carry out this responsibility.
- Future differences between these agencies on security for their separate overseas offices would be forwarded to the Department's Office of Security for coordination and final resolution.
- The Department's Office of Security would host regular meetings of other federal agencies' security directors tenant in overseas posts to brief them on new developments and to resolve policy differences.

Current status

Agency for International Development and United States Information Agency security officials indicated that

coordination with the Department on overseas security matters has improved. One of the problems in the past between the Department and the agencies was one of philosophy between security personnel and program officials. Both agencies' program personnel wanted their overseas facilities to be open to the general public. However, recent terrorist events have made agency program officials aware of the need for more stringent security measures. As other posts became targets of bombings and other terrorist activities, program officials now want more physical security.

While recognizing the need for security, especially in high threat posts, the agencies' security officers whose facilities are located on embassy or consulate grounds indicated that tight security measures have had an adverse impact on carrying out the agencies' missions. However, in each case, the security officers indicated that the respective regional security officers recognize their special needs and are working with them to make some accommodations. Where agencies have facilities separate from the embassy or consulate compounds, the security officers told us that their working relations with the regional security officers were good.

Also, following our 1982 report, the Department established an Overseas Security Policy Group. This group is made up of various agencies' security directors and was formed as an inter-agency working group to address issues affecting overseas security.

MORE TIME NEEDS TO BE DEVOTED TO SEP  
PROJECTS BY POST SECURITY OFFICERS  
AND REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS

GAO recommendation

We recommended that the Secretary of State require that Chiefs of Mission or a designee at high-threat posts have the post security officers and responsible regional security officers devote more attention to post security and the Security Enhancement Program.

Department's response

In its response to this recommendation, the Department noted that regional security officers and post security officers, as well as other administrative personnel assigned to posts, are closely involved with both security enhancement survey team visits and ongoing projects. It stated that due to the sophistication of many of the systems used in these projects, the implementation and construction phases are usually handled by full-time project managers assigned specifically to supervise the project and technical specialists on temporary detail.

Current status

Security responsibilities at each post start with the Chief of Mission, with the assistance of the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Administrative Officer. The regional/post security officer implements the security program.

At the posts visited we found that generally the security officers are actively involved in the security enhancement program and other security matters. For example, all the regional security officers were aware of the status of projects at posts within their jurisdiction.

PLANNING AND COORDINATION  
OF THE SEP NEEDS IMPROVEMENTGAO recommendation

We recommended that the Secretary of State require the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration to take action to ensure improvements are made in the planning and coordination of the SEP.

Department's response

The Department stated that a number of actions had been taken in this area. For example, a senior officer has been designated to monitor progress in high threat posts, additional personnel have been assigned to the program, and communications between Washington and the field have been improved.

Current status

As discussed in this report, the Department has taken some actions to improve the planning and coordination of the SEP. However, delays continue to impede the completion of projects.

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## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

SCOTT COHEN, STAFF DIRECTOR  
 GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

April 5, 1984

The Honorable Charles A. Bowsher  
 Comptroller General  
 General Accounting Office  
 441 G Street, N.W.  
 Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Bowsher:

On September 30, 1982, the General Accounting Office issued a report to the Secretary of State entitled "Improvements Needed in Providing Security At Overseas Posts." That report identified shortcomings in the implementation of the Security Enhancement Program initiated by the Department of State in 1980 as a response to acts of violence against U.S. embassies in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and El Salvador.

Given the increased concerns in the past 18 months about acts of terrorism threatened and committed against our embassies and diplomatic personnel, I believe it is essential that the Security Enhancement Program be managed in the most effective fashion possible. For this reason, I request that the GAO update the September 30, 1982 report to determine: 1) if the program deficiencies identified previously have been corrected; and, 2) if any further program deficiencies have developed which need to be corrected.

Your cooperation in this matter is, as always, greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,



Charles H. Percy  
 Chairman

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