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Open Recommendations (13 total)

Facial Recognition Services: Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Should Take Actions to Implement Training, and Policies for Civil Liberties

GAO-23-105607
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of the FBI should clarify the status of its training requirement for staff using Clearview AI to FBI's AI Ethics Council and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit. (Recommendation 2)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Facial Recognition Services: Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Should Take Actions to Implement Training, and Policies for Civil Liberties

GAO-23-105607
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of the FBI should implement a training requirement for staff using facial recognition services to support criminal investigations. (Recommendation 3)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Capitol Attack: Federal Agencies Identified Some Threats, but Did Not Fully Process and Share Information Prior to January 6, 2021 [Reissued with revisions on Jul. 21, 2023]

GAO-23-106625
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of the FBI should assess the extent to which and why personnel did not process information related to the events of January 6 according to policy. (Recommendation 1)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
In February 2023, we reported that the FBI did not process all relevant threat-related information related to the events of January 6. To help address this issue, we recommended that the FBI assess the extent to which personnel did not process information. The FBI noted that it looks forward to providing updates on its progress as it works toward addressing the recommendation.

Capitol Attack: Federal Agencies Identified Some Threats, but Did Not Fully Process and Share Information Prior to January 6, 2021 [Reissued with revisions on Jul. 21, 2023]

GAO-23-106625
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of the FBI should, following its assessment, implement a plan to address any internal control deficiencies identified to ensure personnel consistently follow policies for processing information. (Recommendation 2)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
In February 2023, we reported that the FBI did not process all relevant threat-related information related to the events of January 6. To help address this issue, we recommended that the FBI implement a plan to address any internal control deficiencies identifies as a result of the assessment. The FBI noted that it looks forward to providing updates on its progress as it works toward addressing the recommendation.

Domestic Terrorism: Further Actions Needed to Strengthen FBI and DHS Collaboration to Counter Threats

GAO-23-104720
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3 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of the FBI should, in collaboration with the DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, assess existing formal agreements to determine if they fully articulate a joint process for working together to counter domestic terrorism threats and sharing relevant domestic terrorism-related information and update and revise accordingly. (Recommendation 5)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of the FBI should, in coordination with the DHS Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, report domestic terrorism incident data from both agencies in response to the annual update requirement in the NDAA for fiscal year 2020. (Recommendation 1)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information..
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of the FBI should, in collaboration with the DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, implement a process to periodically evaluate the effectiveness of collaborative practices to identify and counter domestic terrorism threats. (Recommendation 3)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Export Controls: Enforcement Agencies Should Better Leverage Information to Target Efforts Involving U.S. Universities

GAO-22-105727
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of FBI should ensure that the appropriate offices assess which, if any, additional risk factors should be considered in identifying universities at greater risk for sensitive technology transfers, including unauthorized deemed exports. (Recommendation 7)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
The FBI concurred with the recommendation. In its initial response to the recommendation, FBI said it was planning to develop a data-driven prioritization system using several risk factors to rank universities at greater risk for sensitive technology transfers. However, in September 2022 and February 2023 FBI stated that it provides reports of strategic interest to Academia Coordinators in the field so that they are better able to prioritize engagement with universities in their field office's area of operations. At this time, it is unclear how FBI assessed which risk factors should be considered or how the reports FBI is providing to Academic Coordinators address these risk factors. We will continue to monitor FBI's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Export Controls: Enforcement Agencies Should Better Leverage Information to Target Efforts Involving U.S. Universities

GAO-22-105727
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of FBI should ensure that the appropriate offices implement a mechanism to periodically assess the relevance and sufficiency of risk factors considered in identifying at-risk universities to address new or evolving threats to U.S. university research, including threats pertaining to sensitive technology transfers and unauthorized deemed exports. (Recommendation 8)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
The FBI concurred with the recommendation. In September 2022 and February 2023, FBI shared information about the additional reports it is providing to Academic Coordinators to help inform university outreach priorities. However, it is not clear if FBI has developed a mechanism to periodically assess the relevance and sufficiency of risk factors considered in identifying at-risk universities to address new or evolving threats to U.S. university research. We will continue to monitor FBI's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Law Enforcement: DOJ Can Improve Publication of Use of Force Data and Oversight of Excessive Force Allegations

GAO-22-104456
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director of the FBI should begin to assess potential alternative data collection strategies for the National Use-of-Force Data Collection. (Recommendation 2)
Open

 Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
DOJ concurred with this recommendation. In June 2022, DOJ reported that the FBI National Use-of-Force Data Collection had achieved the 60 percent participation threshold, which allows the collection to continue under the Office of Management and Budget's Terms of Clearance. Once DOJ provides documentation supporting its efforts, we will evaluate the extent to which DOJ has addressed the intent of the recommendation.
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