Reports News from the GAO http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/repandtest.html 2009-11-06T14:32:18+01:00 FeedCreator 1.7.2-ppt 2009-11-06T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-06T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-52?source=ra

In Process

2009-11-06T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-06T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-2?source=ra

In fiscal year 2009, the federal government planned to spend about $71 billion on information technology (IT) investments. To more effectively manage such investments, in 2005 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to implement earned value management (EVM). EVM is a project management approach that, if implemented appropriately, provides objective reports of project status, produces early warning signs of impending schedule delays and cost overruns, and provides unbiased estimates of anticipated costs at completion. GAO was asked to assess selected agencies' EVM policies, determine whether they are adequately using earned value techniques to manage key system acquisitions, and eval- uate selected investments' earned value data to determine their cost and schedule performances. To do so, GAO compared agency policies with best practices, performed case studies, and reviewed documenta- tion from eight agencies and 16 major investments with the highest levels of IT development-related spending in fiscal year 2009. While all eight agencies have established policies requiring the use of EVM on major IT investments, these policies are not fully consistent with best practices. In particular, most lack training requirements for all relevant personnel responsible for investment oversight. Most policies also do not have adequately defined criteria for revising program cost and schedule baselines. Until agencies expand and enforce their EVM policies, it will be difficult for them to gain the full benefits of EVM. GAO's analysis of 16 investments shows that agencies are using EVM to manage their system acquisitions; however, the extent of implementation varies. Specifically, for 13 of the 16 investments, key practices necessary for sound EVM execution had not been implemented. For example, the project schedules for these investments contained issues--such as the improper sequencing of key activities--that undermine the quality of their performance baselines. This inconsistent application of EVM exists in part because of the weaknesses contained in agencies' policies, combined with a lack of enforcement of policies already in place. Until key EVM practices are fully implemented, these investments face an increased risk that managers cannot effectively optimize EVM as a management tool. Furthermore, earned value data trends of these investments indicate that most are currently experiencing shortfalls against cost and schedule targets. The total life-cycle costs of these programs have increased by about $2 billion. Based on GAO's analysis of current performance trends, 11 programs will likely incur cost overruns that will total about $1 billion at contract completion--in particular, 2 of these programs account for about 80 percent of this projection. As such, GAO estimates the total cost overrun to be about $3 billion at program completion (see figure). However, with timely and effective management action, it is possible to reverse negative trends so that the projected cost overruns may be reduced.

2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-178R?source=ra

In March 2009, out of concern that the overall security situation in Afghanistan had not improved after more than 7 years of U.S. and international efforts, the administration completed a 60-day strategic review of U.S. policy and the security environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Based on this review, and recognizing the vital U.S. interest in addressing security threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration announced a strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating these extremists and eliminating their safe havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Subsequently, in August 2009, the United States issued an integrated civilian-military campaign plan for support to Afghanistan. The strategy and campaign plan call for, among other things, the execution of an integrated counterinsurgency mission and continued efforts to build the capacity of military and civilian elements of the Afghan government to lead counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and provide internal security for the Afghan people. Accordingly, the focus for U.S. forces in Afghanistan will be to (1) secure Afghanistan from insurgent and terrorist threats and (2) rapidly train Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to lead military and law enforcement operations. Afghanistan's security situation has deteriorated significantly since 2005, affecting all aspects of U.S. and allied reconstruction operations. As we reported in April 2009, the rise in enemy-initiated attacks on civilians and on U.S., Afghan, and coalition security forces has resulted from various factors, including a resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, a thriving illicit drug trade, and threats emanating from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. Since 2005, attacks on civilians, as well as on Afghan and coalition forces, have increased every year. The most recent data available, as of August 2009, showed the highest rate of enemy-initiated attacks since Afghanistan's security situation began to deteriorate. Overall, nearly 13,000 attacks were recorded between January and August 2009--more than two and a half times the number experienced during the same period last year and more than five times the approximately 2,400 attacks reported in all of 2005. Violence has generally been concentrated in the eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan where U.S. forces operate, with insurgents making increasing use of improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks, and attacks targeting infrastructure and development projects. As figure 1 illustrates, the pattern of attacks is seasonal, generally peaking from June through September each year. Although never reaching the highest level of attacks in Iraq, the number of attacks in Afghanistan surpassed those in Iraq for the first time in July 2008 and has continued to exceed levels in Iraq in recent months. Developing a self-reliant Afghanistan is a key end-state goal articulated in the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan, which notes that achieving such an outcome will enable the United States to withdraw combat forces and make a sustained commitment to Afghan political and economic development. While U.S. and international development projects in Afghanistan have made some progress, the deterioration of security has impeded efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country. In particular, U.S. officials have cited poor security as having caused delays, disruptions, and even abandonment of certain reconstruction projects, while also hampering management and oversight of such efforts. For instance, the administration's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan has identified the need for more security in order for civilian personnel and contractors to do their work in Afghanistan. Similarly, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. forces in Afghanistan testified in his June 2009 confirmation hearing that improving security was a prerequisite for the development of local governance and economic growth in Afghanistan. As of November 2009, there were reportedly about 67,000 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan--an increase of more than 90 percent from the force level of 35,000 we previously reported as of February 2009. According to DOD, by the end of 2009 U.S. troop levels will rise further to about 68,000. Additionally, as of October 2009, there were reportedly about 36,000 non-U.S. military personnel in ISAF--an increase from the reported February 2009 force level of about 32,000. Furthermore, as of September 2009, DOD reported 95,000 Afghan National Army personnel assigned to the ANSF. According to DOD, the ANSF will reach its authorized end-strength of 230,000 army and police personnel by October 2010.

2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-92R?source=ra

We have performed the procedures described in this letter, which we agreed to perform and with which the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation concurred, solely to assist the Inspector General's office in ascertaining whether the net excise tax revenue distributed to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF) for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009, is supported by the underlying records. As agreed with the Inspector General's office, we evaluated fiscal year 2009 activity affecting excise tax distributions to the AATF. The Inspector General is responsible for the adequacy of these agreed-upon procedures to meet your objectives, and we make no representation in that respect. The procedures we agreed to perform were related to (1) transactions that represent the underlying basis of amounts distributed from the general fund to the AATF during fiscal year 2009, (2) the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) quarterly AATF receipt certifications during fiscal year 2009, (3) the Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service adjustments to AATF excise tax distributions during fiscal year 2009, (4) the Department of the Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis's (OTA) process for estimating excise tax amounts to be distributed to the AATF for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009, (5) adjustments to the AATF for tax on kerosene used in aviation during fiscal year 2009, and (6) the amount of net excise taxes distributed to the AATF during fiscal year 2009.

2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-93R?source=ra

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has performed the procedures to which we agreed upon to perform and with which you concurred, solely to assist your office in ascertaining whether the net excise tax revenue distributed to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2009, is supported by the underlying records. GAO evaluated fiscal year 2009 activity affecting excise tax distributions to the HTF. GAO conducted the engagement in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards, which incorporate certain financial audit and attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). Based on a compilation of Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) quarterly certifications, Department of the Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis's (OTA) estimations, and adjustments, the amount of net excise taxes distributed to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) in fiscal year 2009 was $34,943,799,000.

2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-167R?source=ra

The Army has three government-owned and operated manufacturing arsenals that it considers vital to the Department of Defense's (DOD) industrial base because they provide products or services that are either unavailable from private industry or ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources in case of national defense contingencies or other emergencies. These three arsenals are Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois; and Watervliet Arsenal, New York. Pine Bluff's core mission is the production of conventional ammunition and other types of munitions. Rock Island's core mission is weapons manufacturing, and the arsenal is home to the Army's only remaining foundry. Watervliet is the Army's only cannon maker and also produces other armaments and mortars. Historically, the Army's arsenals have generally had vacant or underutilized space. For many years the Army has not provided the capital investment needed to keep pace with modern manufacturing requirements and retain core skills in the arsenal workforce. Additionally, the arsenals have generally had lower workloads during peacetime, but since the onset of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan they have experienced a surge in workloads to provide vital manufacturing capabilities, such as producing armor kits to harden Army personnel vehicles after it was found that the Army's existing vehicles were susceptible to improvised explosive devices. During the defense drawdown of the 1990s, the manufacturing arsenals were struggling from a diminishing and fluctuating workload, high product costs, significant reductions in force, and a fear that their core skills were being lost. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 authorized the Arsenal Support Program Initiative (ASPI), as a demonstration program designed to help maintain the viability of the Army's manufacturing arsenals. The ASPI authority sets forth 11 purposes for the program, including utilizing and employing the arsenals' skilled manufacturing workforce by commercial firms; encouraging private commercial use of underutilized government facilities; reducing the government's cost of ownership and the cost of products produced at the arsenals; and fostering cooperation between the Army, state and local governments, and private companies in the development and joint use of the Army's arsenals. The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed us to review the ASPI program and report to the defense authorization committees. Our objective for this review was to determine the extent to which the Army has addressed the intended purposes set forth in the ASPI authorizing legislation. Additionally, in response to congressional interest, we have provided information that discusses other available authorities that the Army uses or could use to improve the viability of its manufacturing arsenals. In response to direction by the conferees to conduct a business case analysis that examines the cost, return on investment, and economic impact of the ASPI program, the Congressional Budget Office expects to submit its report later this year. Accordingly, our review did not address those aspects of the ASPI program. Although the Army's three manufacturing arsenals have secured tenants that collectively address all but one of the purposes of the ASPI authority, the arsenals have had limited success in attracting ASPI tenants that enhance their core manufacturing missions and related workforce skills. According to the Army, 44 tenants had been secured under the ASPI program through the end of July 2009 (27 at Rock Island, 16 at Watervliet, and 1 at Pine Bluff), and each tenant addressed at least 1 of the 11 ASPI purposes. However, the Army has determined that, of the 44 tenants, only 4 are engaged in activities that have helped to strengthen the arsenals' core manufacturing capabilities or related workforce skills. ASPI site managers are generating operating revenue in the form of rent paid by ASPI tenants and have been more successful in securing commercial tenants needing administrative office space, which tends to be more profitable than leasing manufacturing space. Nonetheless, while ASPI tenants are generating revenue for the arsenals, program and site managers have generally been free to implement the program using a variety of approaches that may not be significantly contributing to the core manufacturing missions of the arsenals because the Army Materiel Command has provided them with only limited guidance. Given the discretion afforded by the ASPI authority--which does not prioritize its 11 purposes or require that all 11 purposes be addressed--the Army has missed an opportunity to ensure that program execution is aligned with its own priorities because Army guidance does not specify which of the authority's 11 purposes the Army considers to be its highest priorities. Further, the guidance does not incorporate the priorities identified in the conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which encouraged the Army to recruit more tenants that enhance the arsenals' core missions and workforce skills. Additionally, the Army has not developed a strategy that describes the methods it plans to use to achieve its highest priorities and has not established performance goals and measures for the ASPI program. Our prior work has emphasized that performance goals should be measurable and results-oriented. Although the Army has adopted the 11 ASPI purposes as its broad goals for the program, these goals can not be easily quantified. Similarly, while the Army has developed some metrics to assess the program, existing metrics measure only the number of ASPI contracts secured and cost savings or cost avoidance to the Army, rather than the extent to which the program is making progress toward achieving the broad goals represented by the purposes established in the ASPI authority. Without clearly defined priorities, performance goals, and measures, the Army may be unable to respond to congressional direction or ensure that its own interests are being addressed. Further, the arsenals could be at risk of diminished core manufacturing capabilities that are considered vital to the national defense, and thus these skills and capabilities may not be readily available when needed. We are making three recommendations to improve the Army's execution of the ASPI program to help ensure that it addresses the broad goals of both congressional conferees and the Army by distinguishing its highest priorities among the ASPI purposes and establishing a strategy that includes measurable goals and performance measures to monitor progress the Army has made toward addressing the ASPI purposes.

2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-222T?source=ra

Since 2001, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has been working to develop a modern Electronic Records Archive (ERA) system, a major information system that is intended to preserve and provide access to massive volumes of all types and formats of electronic records. The system is being developed incrementally over several years, with the first two pieces providing an initial set of functions and additional capabilities to be added in future increments. NARA plans to deploy full system functionality by 2012 at an estimated life-cycle cost of about $550 million. NARA originally planned to complete the first segment of ERA in September 2007. However, software and contracting problems led the agency and its contractor Lockheed Martin to revise the development approach. The revised plan called for parallel development of two different increments: a "base" ERA system with limited functionality and an Executive Office of the President (EOP) system to support the ingestion and search of records from the outgoing Bush Administration. GAO was asked to summarize NARA's progress in developing the ERA system and the ongoing risks the agency faces in completing it. In preparing this testimony, GAO relied on its prior work and conducted a preliminary review of NARA's fiscal year 2010 ERA expenditure plan. NARA has completed two of five planned increments of ERA, but has experienced schedule delays and cost overruns, and several functions planned for the system's initial release were deferred. Although NARA initially planned for the system to be capable of ingesting federal and presidential records in September 2007, the two system increments to support those records did not achieve initial operating capability until June 2008 and December 2008, respectively. In addition, NARA reportedly spent about $80 million on the base increment, compared to its planned cost of about $60 million. Finally, a number of functions originally planned for the base increment were deferred to later increments, including the ability to delete records and to ingest redacted records. In fiscal year 2010, NARA plans to complete the third increment, which is to include new systems for Congressional records and public access, and begin work on the fourth. GAO's previous work on ERA identified significant risks to the program and recommended actions to mitigate them. Specifically, GAO reported that NARA's plans for ERA lacked sufficient detail to, for example, clearly show what functions had been delivered to date or were to be included in future increments and at what cost. Second, NARA had been inconsistent in its use of earned value management (EVM), a project management approach that can provide objective reports of project status and early warning signs of cost and schedule overruns. Specifically, GAO found that NARA fully employed only 5 of 13 best practices for cost estimation that address EVM. Further, NARA lacked a contingency plan for ERA to ensure system continuity in the event that normal operations were disrupted. For example, NARA did not have a fully functional backup and restore process for the ERA system, a key component of contingency planning for system availability. To help mitigate these risks, GAO recommended that NARA: (1) include details in future ERA expenditure plans on the functions and costs of completed and planned increments; (2) strengthen its earned value management process following best practices; and (3) develop and implement a system contingency plan for ERA. NARA reported in its most recent expenditure plan that it had taken actions to address these recommendations.

2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-191T?source=ra

The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial condition and outlook deteriorated significantly during fiscal year 2009. USPS was not able to cut costs fast enough to offset declining mail volume and revenues resulting from the economic downturn and changing mail use. Facing an unprecedented cash shortfall, USPS stated that it would have insufficient cash on hand to make its mandated $5.4 billion payment to prefund postal retiree health benefits that was due by the end of the fiscal year. In July, 2009, GAO added USPS's financial condition to the list of high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch to achieve broad-based transformation. GAO stated that USPS urgently needs to restructure to address its current and long-term financial viability. GAO also stated that USPS needs to use its flexibility to generate revenue through new or enhanced products. This testimony will (1) update USPS's financial condition and outlook, (2) describe changes made by the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) of 2006 that provided USPS with greater flexibility to generate revenues, (3) outline USPS's revenue-generation actions and results using this flexibility, and (4) discuss options for USPS to generate increased revenues in the future. This testimony is based on GAO's past and ongoing work. USPS's financial condition for fiscal year 2009 and its financial outlook continue to be challenging: (1) In fiscal year 2009, mail volume declined about 28 billion pieces, or about 14 percent, from the prior fiscal year, when volume was about 203 billion pieces; revenue declined from about $75 billion to about $68 billion. (2) A looming cash shortfall necessitated last-minute congressional action to reduce USPS's mandated payments to prefund retiree health benefits by $4 billion. In the absence of congressional action, USPS was on track to lose about $7 billion. (3) USPS debt increased at the end of fiscal year 2009 by the annual statutory limit of $3 billion, bringing outstanding debt to $10.2 billion. At this rate, USPS will reach its total $15 billion statutory debt limit in fiscal year 2011. (4) USPS projects annual deficits over $7 billion in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and continuing large cash shortfalls. PAEA and implementing regulations gave USPS more flexibility to set prices, test new postal products, and retain earnings. USPS has broad latitude to set rates that take effect unless the Postal Regulatory Commission finds the rates would violate legal requirements, such as a price cap that generally limits rate increases for most mail to the rate of inflation. Except for annual rate increases, USPS revenue-generation actions since PAEA was enacted have generally achieved limited results compared to USPS's deficits. To its credit, USPS has taken actions to use its pricing flexibility to address the pressing need for additional revenue. These actions generated some revenues, although their positive impacts were overwhelmed by the recession--with its cutbacks in consumer spending and corporate advertising--and ongoing diversion of mail to electronic alternatives. Looking forward, USPS has opportunities to continue pursuing the flexibilities provided by PAEA to help generate additional revenue from postal products and services. However, results will continue to be constrained by the economic climate and by changing use of the mail. Mail volume has typically returned after past recessions, but much of the recent volume decline may not return. Increasing postal rates may provide a short-term revenue boost but would risk depressing mail volume and revenues in the long-term, in part by accelerating diversion of mail to electronic alternatives. USPS has asked Congress to change the restrictions established by PAEA so that it could offer new nonpostal products and services such as banking and insurance. Allowing USPS to compete more broadly with the private sector could lose money, and fair competition issues would need to be considered. Thus, in addition to its revenue-generation initiatives, USPS will need to continue making significant reductions in its workforce and network costs. When we recently added USPS's financial condition to our high-risk list, we said that restructuring will require USPS to align its costs with revenues, generate sufficient earnings to finance capital investment, and manage its debt.

2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-05T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-172R?source=ra

The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment at strategic locations around the world to enable it to field combat-ready forces in days, rather than the weeks it would take if equipment had to be moved from the United States to the locations of conflicts. These prepositioned materiel and equipment sets have played an important role in supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a toll on the condition and readiness of military equipment. Over the last few years, we have identified a number of ongoing and long-term challenges regarding DOD's prepositioned stocks. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 added an annual reporting requirement to Title 10 of the United States Code that directs DOD to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the status of prepositioned materiel and equipment as of the end of each fiscal year, no later than the date of the submission of the President's annual budget request. For this report, our objective was to determine what additional information in future DOD reports on the status of its prepositioned materiel and equipment could further inform congressional defense committees on these issues. We examined GAO and DOD reports on the services' prepositioned stock programs, reviewed relevant DOD and service policies, and met with DOD and service officials to determine whether additional information could further inform Congress on the status of prepositioned materiel and equipment. Although DOD addressed the six required reporting elements in its annual report, DOD's future reports to Congress on the status of its prepositioned materiel and equipment would benefit from additional information in three areas. Specifically, future reports would be enhanced by additional information on the amount of spare parts the Army maintains in its prepositioned stocks; the materiel condition of the Air Force's material and equipment needed to establish bases; and information on the services' progress to replenish their individual prepositioned sets, such as level of fill and readiness rates, and changes in those sets from the previous year. First, while DOD's report addressed the level of fill for spare parts as required by the mandate, we found that the Army had additional data on spare parts that were not included in DOD's report. First, while DOD's report addressed the level of fill for spare parts as required by the mandate, we found that the Army had additional data on spare parts that were not included in DOD's report. Third, DOD's future reports to Congress on the status of its prepositioned materiel and equipment would benefit from information on the services' progress to replenish their individual prepositioned sets, such as level of fill and readiness rates, and changes in those sets from the previous year.

2009-11-02T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-02T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-187?source=ra

This statement discusses ongoing efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to track information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reliable, meaningful data on contractors and the services they provide are necessary to inform agency decisions on when and how to effectively use contractors, provide support services to contractors, and ensure that contractors are properly managed and overseen. The importance of such data is heightened by the unprecedented reliance on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan and the evolving U.S. presence in the two countries. The statement focuses on (1) how information on contractor personnel and contracts can assist agencies in managing and overseeing their use of contractors and (2) the status of DOD, State, and USAID's efforts to track statutorily-required information on contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as our recent recommendations to address the shortcomings we identified in their efforts. This statement is drawn from our October 2009 report on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was mandated by section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for FY2008), and a related April 2009 testimony. Our prior work was prepared in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The need for information on contracts and contractor personnel to inform decisions and oversee contractors is critical given DOD, State, and USAID's extensive reliance on contractors to support and carry out their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The agencies' lack of complete and accurate information on contractors supporting contingency operations may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce unnecessary risk, as illustrated in the following examples: (1) Limited visibility over contractors obscures how extensively agencies rely on contractors to support operations and help carry out missions; (2) Without incorporating information on contractors into planning efforts, agencies risk making uninformed programmatic decisions; (3) A lack of accurate financial information on contracts impedes agencies' ability to create realistic budgets; (4) Lack of insight into the contract services being performed increases the risk of paying for duplicative services; and (5) Costs can increase due to a lack of visibility over where contractors are deployed and what government support they are entitled to. DOD, State, and USAID have made progress in implementing the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT). However, as we reported last month, DOD, State, and USAID's on-going implementation of SPOT currently falls short of providing agencies with information that would help facilitate oversight and inform decision making, as well as fulfill statutory requirements.

2009-11-02T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-02T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-179?source=ra

The United States and the Government of Iraq have signed a Security Agreement calling for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. Predicated on that agreement and U.S. Presidential guidance, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) has issued a plan for the reduction of forces to 50,000 U.S. troops by August 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal of forces by the end of 2011. The drawdown from Iraq includes the withdrawal of approximately 128,700 U.S. troops, over 115,000 contractor personnel, the closure or transfer of 295 bases, and the retrograde of over 3.3 million pieces of equipment. Today's statement will focus on (1) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has planned for the drawdown in accordance with timelines set by the Security Agreement and presidential directive; and (2) factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown in accordance with established timelines. This statement is based on GAO's review and analysis of DOD and MNF-I plans, and on interviews GAO staff members conducted with DOD officials in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq. It also draws from GAO's extensive body of issued work on Iraq and drawdown-related issues. While DOD's primary focus remains on executing combat missions and supporting the warfighters in Iraq, several DOD organizations have issued coordinated plans for the execution of the drawdown within designated time frames. In support of these plans, processes have been established to monitor, coordinate, and facilitate the retrograde of equipment from Iraq. DOD's organizations have reported that their efforts to reduce personnel, retrograde equipment, and close bases have thus far exceeded targets; since May 2009, for example, DOD reports that the number of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq has been reduced by 5,300, and another 4,000 are expected to be drawn down in October. However, many more personnel, equipment items, and bases remain to be drawn down. For U.S. forces, contractor personnel, selected vehicles, and bases, the graphic below depicts drawdown progress since May 2009, as well as what remains to be drawn down by August 31, 2010 and December 31, 2011, respectively. Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq, however, may be complicated by crucial challenges that, if left unattended, may hinder MNF-I's ability to meet the time frames set by the President, the Security Agreement, and MNF-I's phased drawdown plan. First, DOD has yet to fully determine its future needs for contracted services. Second, the potential costs and other concerns of transitioning key contracts may outweigh potential benefits. Third, DOD lacks sufficient numbers of contract oversight personnel. Fourth, key decisions about the disposition of some equipment have yet to be made. Fifth, there are longstanding incompatibility issues among the information technology systems that may undermine the equipment retrograde process. And sixth, DOD lacks precise visibility over its inventory of some equipment and shipping containers. While much has been done to facilitate the drawdown effort, the efficient execution of the drawdown will depend on DOD's ability to mitigate these challenges. We will continue to assess DOD's progress in executing the drawdown from Iraq and plan to issue a report.

2009-11-02T00:00:00+01:00 2009-11-02T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-151?source=ra

The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) provided $81.1 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) aid to the U.S. auto industry, including $62 billion in restructuring loans to Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler) and General Motors Company (GM). In return, Treasury received 9.85 percent equity in Chrysler, 60.8 percent equity and $2.1 billion in preferred stock in GM, and $13.8 billion in debt obligations between the two companies. As part of Government Accountability Office's (GAO) statutory responsibilities for providing oversight of TARP, this report addresses (1) steps Chrysler and GM have taken since December 2008 to reorganize, (2) Treasury's oversight of its financial interest in the companies, and (3) considerations for Treasury in monitoring and selling its equity in the companies. GAO reviewed documents on the auto companies' restructuring and spoke with officials at Treasury, Chrysler, and GM, and individuals with expertise in finance and the auto industry. Chrysler and GM have made changes since December 2008 to address key challenges to achieving viability, but the ultimate effect of these changes remains to be seen. The companies have eliminated a substantial amount of their long-term debt, reduced the number of brands and models of vehicles they sell, rationalized their dealership networks, and lowered production costs and capacities by reducing the number of factories and employees. It is difficult to fully assess the impact of these changes because of the short amount of time that has passed since reorganization and the low level of new vehicle sales. Moreover, Chrysler and GM are revaluing their assets and liabilities based on their reorganizations in 2009 and expect to prepare financial statements based on this effort in the coming months. Treasury does not plan to be involved in the day-to-day management of Chrysler and GM, but it plans to monitor the companies' performance. Treasury developed several principles to guide its role as a shareholder, including the commitment that although Treasury reserves the right to set up-front conditions to protect taxpayers and promote financial stability, Treasury will oversee its financial interests in a hands-off, commercial manner. The conditions that Treasury set for the companies include requiring that a portion of their vehicles be manufactured in the United States and that they report to Treasury on the use of the TARP funding provided. Treasury officials told us that they are also requiring that Chrysler and GM submit financial information on a regular basis and that they plan to meet with the companies' top management on a regular basis to discuss the companies' financial condition. Treasury should make certain that its current approach for monitoring and selling its equity in Chrysler and GM fully addresses all important considerations financial and industry experts identified. For example, Treasury initially hired or consulted with a number of individuals with experience in investment banking or equity analysis to help assess Chrysler's and GM's financial condition and develop financing packages for the companies. Many of these individuals have recently left as the restructuring phase of Treasury's work has been completed. Treasury will need to ensure these staff and any staff that depart in the future are replaced as needed with similarly qualified personnel. Also, Treasury does not currently contract with or employ outside firms with specialty expertise for its work with the auto industry but may need to do so in the future, to make sure sufficient expertise is available to oversee the government's significant financial interests in Chrysler and GM. In addition, although Treasury officials told us they are considering all options for divesting the government's ownership interests, including an initial public offering or private sale, they have focused primarily on a series of public offerings for GM and have not identified criteria for determining the optimal time and method to sell. Regardless of the option pursued, however, Treasury is unlikely to recover the entirety of its investment in Chrysler or GM, given that the companies' values would have to grow substantially above what they have been in the past.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-107R?source=ra

The Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act (the act) extended the federal age standard for pilots of large commercial aircraft from 60 to 65 years of age. The act also requires us to report--no later than 24 months after its enactment--on the effect, if any, of this change on aviation safety. This report responds to that requirement. Our review of FAA's accident and incident data and NTSB's accident data from December 2007, when the act was enacted, through September 2009 showed that no accidents or incidents6 resulted from the health conditions of pilots 60 years or older. However, for a more definitive assessment, a longer period of time would be required to collect data for similar groups--both pilots 60 years or older and younger pilots-- to determine if the act's change in the age standard for commercial pilots has any effect on aviation safety. Such a study is not yet feasible because the act is too recent for flight records to be available for a sufficient number of pilots 60 years or older.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-7?source=ra

The Department of Labor (DOL) Black Lung Benefits Program provides medical and income assistance to coal miners who suffer total disability or death due to lung disease caused by coal dust. To provide insight into DOL's administration of the Black Lung Benefits Program, GAO is reporting on (1) how long it takes to process and resolve black lung benefits claims; (2) at what rate and for what reasons black lung claims and appeals are denied by DOL; and (3) what barriers, if any, confront miners or their survivors in pursuing their claims. GAO collected and analyzed black lung claims and appeals data and interviewed officials at relevant federal agencies, national organizations, and selected local organizations at two sites. In fiscal year 2008, DOL issued decisions on claims in less than 1 year on average at each stage of adjudication, yet according to officials and experts, the appeals and remands (claims sent back to the prior stage of review for further consideration or development) that follow decisions can keep claims in the system for years. Although DOL does not track how long all claims remain in the claims and appeals process, we examined 763 miner claims filed between 2001 and 2008 that were ultimately awarded benefits by mine companies. We found that mine companies agreed to pay benefits for about 73 percent of these claims within 3 years from the date of the initial claim, roughly 24 percent of claims in 3 to 6 years, and the remaining 4 percent in 6 to 8 years. The program also contains financial incentives for both miners and mining companies to keep claims in the appeals process. For example, some miners may extend the appeals process to maintain their payment of interim benefits. Factors that add additional time to the appeals process also include allowing time for claimants to find legal representation and waiting until there are sufficient cases in rural areas before sending a judge to hold a hearing. In 2008, most claims (87 percent) were initially denied. Few claimants areable to prove they meet all of the program's eligibility requirements, and for certain cases, required conditions are difficult to prove. For example, some miners--those with a history of smoking--develop lung disease associated with long-term exposure to coal mine dust but which frequently cannot be detected by X-ray. Though current science does not allow a medical distinction between lung disease caused by smoking and by coal mine dust, regulations require that claimants establish that their lung disease is significantly related to or substantially aggravated by coal dust. In such cases, judges told us they rely heavily on nonclinical evidence, such as physician credentials, length of depositions, and level of sophistication of evidence presented by claimants and mine operators to determine claimant eligibility. According to some DOL administrative law judges, mining company doctors are usually better credentialed and produce lengthier and more sophisticated medical reports and evaluations. GAO found that coal miners face a number of challenges pursuing federal black lung claims, including finding legal representation and developing sound medical evidence to support their claims. DOL officials identified miners' lack of resources, the low probability of success, and high litigation costs for their cases as factors that contribute to the difficulties miners face in finding legal representatives. Miners also encounter challenges in developing sound medical evidence. DOL administrative law judges said medical evidence prepared by DOL-approved doctors for claimants does not always provide sound or thorough evidentiary support for their claims. Further, various practices of medical testing, a key measure of black lung-related disability, may contribute to inaccurate disability test readings.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-85R?source=ra

On December 22, 2008, a breach in a surface impoundment (or storage pond) dike at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Kingston Fossil Plant in Tennessee resulted in the release of 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash--also referred to as coal combustion residue (CCR)--into the nearby Emory River. The spill covered more than 300 acres and made 3 homes uninhabitable; it damaged 23 other homes, plus roads, rail lines, and utilities. TVA estimated the cleanup will cost between $933 million and $1.2 billion and take 2 to 3 years to complete. In light of the spill in Kingston, Congress asked us to identify: (1) the number of surface impoundments for storing CCR in the United States and their location; (2) problems, if any, with the storage of coal ash, and how those problems are being addressed; and (3) the type of federal oversight that exists for CCR and what, if any, issues need to be resolved. We briefed your staffs on October 1, 2009, and September 28, 2009, respectively, on the results of this work. This report summarizes and transmits that briefing. The full briefing is reprinted in the enclosure. Our review found the following: (1) The exact number of surface impoundments at utility coal fired power plants is not known. However, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently undertaking an effort to identify the number and location of all surface impoundments in the United States and, as of September 14, 2009, had identified over 580 surface impoundments nationwide. (2) Problems that have been identified with the storage of coal ash include potential structural defects and other risks of collapse of the surface impoundment, such as at TVA Kingston Facility; health and environmental risks from CCR storage due to potential leaching of contaminants into surface or groundwater from unlined or failed liners at surface impoundments, landfills, or sand and gravel pits; and potential risks from the discharge of wastewater containing CCR into surface waters from surface impoundments. EPA is currently analyzing the structural hazards and environmental risks associated with surface impoundments. (3) EPA does not directly regulate CCR disposal in surface impoundments or landfills to prevent releases or a catastrophic spill, and states have a variety of regulatory controls on surface impoundments. EPA is developing proposed regulations but, as part of this effort, needs to address issues of federal and state roles for control and enforcement.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-22?source=ra

The federal government is the nation's largest energy consumer. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) establishes high-performance federal building requirements that include reducing energy use and managing storm water runoff. The Department of Energy (DOE), General Services Administration (GSA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are implementing and, in turn, helping other agencies to implement EISA requirements. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provides funding that some agencies can use to carry out EISA high-performance federal building requirements. This report, required by EISA, addresses (1) what implementing agencies are doing to direct and assist other agencies in meeting key EISA high-performance federal building requirements, (2) how implementing agencies are planning to use Recovery Act funds to meet key requirements, and (3) what challenges implementing and other agencies might face. To do this, GAO reviewed legal materials, guidance, draft energy data, and other documents and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders. DOE and GSA generally agreed with the report's findings and conclusions and provided written comments. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with the report and provided technical comments. EPA did not provide comments. Agency comments were incorporated as appropriate. Implementing agencies--DOE, GSA, OMB, and EPA--are taking steps to meet key EISA high-performance federal building requirements and, in so doing, are assisting and providing direction for other federal agencies toward this end. DOE, for example, has issued guidance for agencies to carry out EISA energy and water management activities and is developing regulations for agencies to reduce the use of energy generated from fossil fuels and to identify a green building certification system for federal buildings--all EISA requirements. However, as DOE officials noted, EISA does not require a certification system to ensure that agencies meet all EISA high-performance federal building requirements, and these systems are not designed to do so. GSA, which acts as the leasing agent for most federal agencies, is incorporating into its federal leases EISA requirements for leasing space with a recent ENERGY STAR label--an energy use rating system--and has established an Office of Federal High-Performance Green Buildings. OMB is incorporating information on agencies' progress in implementing EISA requirements into scorecards it uses to rate agencies' energy and water management. EPA is developing guidance to assist agencies in meeting EISA requirements for managing storm water runoff. Two implementing agencies--GSA and DOE--are planning to use Recovery Act funds to meet key EISA high-performance federal building requirements. GSA received a $4 million Recovery Act appropriation to fund its Office of Federal High-Performance Green Buildings and plans to use this funding to hire staff and carry out the office's functions. In addition, GSA received a far larger amount--$4.5 billion--in Recovery Act funding to convert some GSA facilities to high-performance green buildings. DOE plans to use about $73 million in Recovery Act funding to collect and manage energy usage data, provide technical assistance, and fund building energy efficiency research. OMB did not receive Recovery Act funds, and while EPA did, the funds were directed for purposes other than implementing EISA high-performance federal building requirements. Agencies will likely face challenges meeting EISA requirements for (1) increasing energy efficiency and conservation, (2) decreasing and eventually eliminating the use of energy generated from fossil fuels, (3) conducting federal energy and water management activities, and (4) leasing ENERGY STAR rated space. In addition, long-term funding and capital budgeting issues--specifically, requirements for recognizing capital costs up front in the federal budget--present overarching challenges for agencies in meeting all EISA high-performance federal building requirements. According to officials from agencies and stakeholder organizations and GAO's prior work, effective energy management practices, such as ensuring accurate data are collected and monitored, can help agencies address some of these challenges.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-64?source=ra

The Department of Homeland Security, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), awards grants to fire departments and other organizations for equipment, staffing, and other needs. As of July 2009, FEMA had received about 25,000 and 22,000 applications for its fiscal years 2007 and 2008 fire grant programs, respectively, and had awarded more than 5,000 grants in both years. GAO was congressionally directed to review the application and award process for these grants. This report addresses the (1) extent to which FEMA has met statutory and program requirements for distributing the grant funds; (2) actions FEMA has taken to provide assistance to grant applicants and involve the fire service community in the grant process; and (3) extent to which FEMA has ensured that its grant process is accessible, clear, and consistent with requirements, including its grant guidance. GAO analyzed relevant laws and interviewed 36 randomly selected grant applicants to obtain their views, but the results are not generalizable. FEMA met seven of eight statutory requirements and two of three FEMA established program requirements for distributing fiscal years 2007 and 2008 grant funds. (GAO used fiscal year 2007 data for two requirements because not all fiscal year 2008 funds had been awarded by July 2009.) For example, FEMA met the statutory requirement that volunteer and combination fire departments (which have both paid and volunteer firefighters) collectively receive at least a minimum of 55 percent of fiscal year 2008 grant funds, and also met the program requirement that volunteer departments receive at least 22 percent. GAO was unable to determine whether FEMA met the statutory requirement that at least 3.5 percent of fiscal year 2008 grant funds be awarded for EMS. FEMA reported that its system is not designed to separately track grants awarded to fire departments for EMS purposes and, therefore, it could not determine if it met this requirement. FEMA reported that while it conducted research to determine that it met this requirement for 1 year, doing so was laborious. Establishing procedures to track awards for EMS purposes would allow FEMA to readily determine if it met statutory requirements. FEMA assists grant applicants by sponsoring workshops and involves representatives of the fire service community in establishing criteria and reviewing applications. Each year, FEMA convenes leaders of nine major fire service organizations to conduct a criteria development meeting to develop the program's criteria and funding priorities. FEMA's peer review process--in which members of the fire service organizations assess grant applications--also helps ensure that the fire service community is involved in the grant process. FEMA officials stated that they strive to provide an even chance for as many fire departments and other organizations as possible to serve on peer review panels. They also stated that they are considering conducting outreach efforts to expand peer review participation, such as announcing opportunities to serve on an upcoming peer review panel at workshops. FEMA has taken actions to ensure that its fire grants award process is accessible and clear to grant applicants--28 of 36 applicants GAO interviewed found the guidance to be clear--but GAO also identified inconsistencies between the stated grant application priorities and the application questions and scoring values. For example, the fiscal year 2008 guidance for the grant that funds the recruitment and retention of firefighters states that continuity--maintaining recruitment and retention efforts beyond the life of the grant--was a priority for grant awards. However, no grant application question addressed this priority and the scoring values did not include it. Thus, it is difficult for FEMA to ensure that grant funds are awarded in accordance with the agency's funding priorities. Further, four of the nine major fire service organizations voiced concerns about feedback FEMA provided to rejected applicants, and 22 of the 36 applicants stated that the feedback was helpful to little or no extent. FEMA officials stated that they could strengthen efforts to improve feedback. Providing specific feedback to rejected applicants could help FEMA strengthen future grant application processes.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-84?source=ra

In creating the Valles Caldera National Preserve from a unique parcel of land in north-central New Mexico, and by creating the Valles Caldera Trust as a wholly owned government corporation to manage the preserve, the Valles Caldera Preservation Act of 2000 established a 20-year public-private experiment to operate the preserve without continued federal funding. The Trust is charged with achieving a number of goals, including becoming financially self-sustaining by the end of fiscal year 2015. This report, GAO's second and last mandated by the Preservation Act, examines (1) the Trust's progress since 2000; (2) the extent to which the Trust has fulfilled certain of its obligations as a government corporation; and (3) the challenges the Trust faces to achieve the Preservation Act's goals. GAO analyzed documents, financial records, and other Trust information and interviewed current and former members of the Trust's Board and staff, as well as representatives of local interest groups and stakeholders. The Trust has taken steps to establish and implement a number of programs and activities to achieve the goals of the Preservation Act. It has rehabilitated roads, buildings, fences, and other infrastructure; created a science program; experimented with a variety of grazing options; taken steps to manage its forests; expanded recreational opportunities; and taken its first steps toward becoming financially self-sustaining. Nevertheless, it is at least 5 years behind the schedule it set for itself in 2004. According to Trust officials, a number of factors--including high turnover among Board members and key staff and cultural and natural resources and infrastructure that were not as healthy or robust as originally believed--have delayed its progress. Through fiscal year 2009, the Trust had yet to develop and put in place several key elements of an effective management control program for a government corporation. Specifically, the Trust lacked a strategic plan and annual performance plans, and it had not systematically monitored or reported on its progress--elements called for by the Government Performance and Results Act and recommended by GAO in its first report in 2005. The Trust's financial management has also been weak. Consequently, it has been difficult for Congress and the public to understand the Trust's goals and objectives, annual plans and performance, or progress. According to current Trust officials, becoming financially self-sustaining, particularly by the end of fiscal year 2015 when federal appropriations are due to expire, is the Trust's biggest challenge. Most of the Trust's other challenges follow from this one, including identifying, developing, or expanding revenue-generating activities that would enable the Trust to raise sufficient funds; obtaining funds for major capital investments; and addressing a number of legal constraints--such as its authority to enter into long-term leases or acquire property--which potentially limit its ability to attract long-term businesses that could generate revenues. Nevertheless, the Trust is continuing to explore opportunities for becoming financially self-sustaining.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-55?source=ra

The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to spend more than $50 billion to develop and procure eight major space systems. Typically, the systems have two main components: satellites and ground control systems. Some also have a third component--user terminals--that can allow access from remote locations. If the delivery of these three components is not synchronized, there can be delays in providing full capabilities to the warfighter, and satellites on orbit can remain underutilized for years. Given preliminary indication of uncoordinated deployment, GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which satellite, ground control, and user terminal deployments are aligned; (2) the reasons deployments have not always been well coordinated; (3) actions being taken to enhance coordination; and (4) whether enhancements to ground systems could optimize the government's investment. To accomplish this, GAO analyzed plans for all major DOD satellite acquisitions and interviewed key officials. Satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals in most of DOD's major space system acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter. Of the eight major space system acquisitions we studied, three systems anticipated that their satellites will be launched well before their associated ground control systems are fully capable of operating on-orbit capabilities. Furthermore, for five of the eight major space systems GAO reviewed, user terminals were to become operational after their associated satellites reach initial capability--in some cases, years after. When the deployments of satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals are not well synchronized, problems arise that can affect both the warfighter and the space systems themselves. When capabilities are delayed because of lack of alignment between satellite and ground control systems or user terminals, the warfighter may develop short-term solutions, often at diminished capability and added cost. In addition, according to DOD testing officials, when the deployment of space system components is not properly timed, components may be ready for system testing at different times. This means that the space system may not be tested as a whole, connected system. DOD has inherent challenges in aligning its satellite and ground control systems. However, long-standing acquisition problems, a tendency to shift funds from ground control system development to satellite development when satellite development problems arise and the underestimation of software complexity on several major space systems have exacerbated the problem. The primary cause for user terminals not being well synchronized with their associated space systems is that user terminal development programs are typically managed by different military acquisition organizations than those managing the satellites and ground control systems. DOD does have several efforts in place to help achieve better synchronization. The Air Force has also made some attempts to improve acquisition management and increase oversight of contractors by separating the acquisition of satellites and their ground control systems. However, the outcomes of these efforts are still pending. Moreover, there is a lack of guidance needed to help plan for and coordinate the development of satellite and ground systems and a lack of transparency into costs for ground control systems and user terminals. DOD representatives in the satellite acquisition community agree that opportunities exist for DOD to transition to a more common type of architecture for satellite ground control systems in order to achieve additional efficiencies, capabilities, and a higher degree of information sharing among space systems, ultimately resulting in increased capability to the warfighter. All of the officials GAO spoke with agreed that ground control systems can be developed to provide data and information to other systems, and expect the same in return, to potentially enhance the flow and timeliness of information and better exploit satellite capabilities.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-183T?source=ra

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), whose reauthorization is the subject of today's hearing, plays a vital role in advancing transportation safety by investigating accidents, determining their causes, issuing safety recommendations, and conducting safety studies. To support the agency's mission, NTSB's Training Center provides training to NTSB investigators and others. From 2006 through 2008, GAO made 21 recommendations to NTSB that address management, information technology (IT), accident investigation criteria, safety studies, and Training Center use. This testimony addresses NTSB's progress in implementing recommendations that it (1) follow leading management practices, (2) conduct aspects of its accident investigations and safety studies more efficiently, and (3) increase the use of its Training Center. This testimony is based on GAO's assessment from July 2009 to October 2009 of plans and procedures NTSB developed to address these recommendations. NTSB provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. NTSB hasfully implemented or made significant progress in adopting leading management practices in all areas in which GAO made prior recommendations. For example, as GAO recommended in 2006, NTSB issued agencywide plans for human capital management and IT management, as well as a strategic plan. In 2008, GAO identified opportunities for improvement in those plans, and NTSB has since issued revised human capital and IT plans and drafted a revised agencywide strategic plan and a new strategic training plan. NTBS has taken steps to improve its diversity management. However, the percentages of NTSB's fiscal year 2008 workforce that were women and minorities were lower than those of the federal government. In addition, no members of a minority group are part of NTSB's 15-member career Senior Executive Service. Since GAO's 2008 report, NTSB has continued to improve information security by installing encryption software on agency laptops and appropriately restricting users' access privileges. NTSB has obligated money to implement a full cost accounting system consistent with a prior GAO recommendation, but NTSB officials said that the system will not be implemented until late in fiscal year 2010. In 2008, GAO reported that NTSB had made significant progress in articulating risk-based criteria for selecting which accidents to investigate. Specifically, NTSB had established such criteria for identifying which rail, pipeline, hazardous materials, and aviation accidents to investigate at the scene. Since then, NTSB has adopted the remaining highway and marine criteria, and NTSB is streamlining and increasing it use of technology in closing-out recommendations. NTSB has three safety studies in progress and would like to broaden the term "safety studies" to include not only its current studies of multiple accidents, but also the research it does for other smaller safety-related reports and data inquiries. NTSB has continued to increase the use of its Training Center--from 10 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 80 percent in fiscal year 2009. As a result, revenues have increased and the center's overall deficit has declined from about $3.9 million in fiscal year 2005 to about $1.9 million in fiscal year 2009.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-09-921?source=ra

Federal agencies obligate billions of dollars annually using cost-reimbursement contracts. This type of contract involves high risk for the government because of the potential for cost escalation and because the government pays a contractor's costs of performance regardless of whether the work is completed. As such, cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable only when the cost of the work to be done cannot be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use fixed-price contracts. Agencies may use this contract type only if certain conditions are met. At your request, GAO assessed (1) the extent of agencies' obligations under these contracts, (2) the rationales for using this contract type, (3) determinations that contractors' accounting systems are adequate for determining costs applicable to the contracts, and (4) procedures for monitoring contractor cost controls. GAO analyzed federal procurement data and contract files and interviewed contracting and other government officials. The complete picture of the government's use of cost-reimbursement contracts is unclear. From fiscal years 2003 through 2008 federal obligations under cost-reimbursement contracts were reported to have increased $16 billion, to $136 billion, which represented a decrease in the total percentage of federal obligations over the 6-year period, from 34 percent to 26 percent. However, the overall downward trend is misleading. A significant increase has been reported for obligations using the "combination" contract type, a category that based on GAO's analysis of 2008 data, includes many contracts with cost-reimbursement obligations that are not recorded as such. According to OFPP, a decision was recently made to eliminate the use of "combination" as a Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation contract type, effective for all new contract awards starting in fiscal year 2010. In addition, GAO found billions of dollars for which the contract type had been coded as "missing" in fiscal year 2008. Agencies' rationales for using cost-reimbursement contracts were difficult to determine because contracting officers frequently did not document--even in acquisition plans--why they chose to use this contract type. The current requirement for such documentation is minimal, but recent legislation (not yet implemented in the Federal Acquisition Regulation) requires that acquisition plans address the rationale. Of the 92 contracts and orders GAO reviewed, about 30 percent did not include any documentation. The supporting documentation GAO did find generally did not explain why a cost-reimbursement contract for the specific requirement was selected. GAO also found little evidence that agency officials are analyzing contracts' pricing history and requirements to determine if they can transition to a contract type with firmer pricing, even though experience may provide a basis for doing so. Of the 92 contracts and orders GAO reviewed, about half had any evidence that, at least within 4 years before contract award, contractors' accounting systems had been deemed adequate to determine costs applicable to the contract. Twenty contract files had no evidence that the contractors' accounting systems were determined adequate and 20 other contract files contained determinations that had been made either many years before award or after the contract was awarded. Inadequate accounting systems, or accounting systems that had not been deemed adequate for many years, may result in the government making improper payments to contractors. GAO found a range of procedures for monitoring contractor cost controls at the agencies in its review. Procedures at the civilian agencies generally call for program officials to review contractor invoices. At the Department of Defense, cost surveillance depends on contractor-reported earned value management data, supplemented with audits for the purpose of testing whether invoiced costs are allowable. GAO's prior work has raised concerns about the effectiveness of these audits.

2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-30T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-09-976?source=ra

According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), $23 billion in unpaid individual income tax debt existed in 2001, its most recent estimate. The notice phase is the first of IRS's three-phase process to collect unpaid debt. IRS annually sends notices to millions of individual taxpayers about billions of dollars of unpaid tax debt. Congress and others have questioned IRS's collection process's effectiveness. As requested, GAO is reporting on (1) how well IRS has established objectives, performance measures, and responsibility for reviewing notice-phase performance, and (2) how well IRS's business rules for sending notices to individuals help assure that the collection notice phase is achieving desired results at the lowest costs. To address these objectives, GAO compared the evidence obtained from IRS documents and responsible IRS collection officials to applicable guidance for internal control standards. Although the notice phase is a key part of IRS's approach and strategy for resolving billions of dollars of individuals' unpaid tax debt, IRS lacks certain internal controls to assure that notices to individuals are achieving the most benefits--such as debt collected or unpaid debt cases otherwise resolved-- with the resources being used. Management controls like clearly defined objectives, performance measures, and clear responsibility for reviewing program performance help provide reasonable assurance that the objectives of an agency are being achieved effectively and efficiently. However, IRS has no documented objectives for the notice phase and no performance measures to indicate how well the phase is performing in resolving debt cases or achieving other potential desired results. Further, IRS has not established responsibility for reviewing the performance of the complete notice phase. IRS lacks documentation for and evaluations of its business rules for notices to individuals to assure that the collection notice phase is achieving desired results. According to IRS officials, to make the best use of collection resources, IRS uses its business rules to--based on certain dollar thresholds and individual tax debt case characteristics--vary the number and types of notices sent to taxpayers and determine whether unresolved cases will be sent for further collection action or further action will be deferred. However, as shown in the table, in almost all cases, for the five business rules that IRS identified as affecting the most taxpayers, IRS did not have information on the date the rules were established, the rationale for the rule, or data supporting the rationale. IRS collection officials also lacked documentation describing the business rules and how they operate. Further, even though IRS officials estimated that the business rules had been established for years, IRS had documentation for an evaluation of only one of the five business rules. Without relevant evaluations IRS lacks assurance that the notice phase achieves desired collection results at the least cost.

2009-10-29T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-29T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-29?source=ra

Federal student aid is intended to play an integral part in fulfilling the promise of greater academic access and success for less affluent students. However, many experts have expressed concern about the length and complexity of the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and the statutory need analysis formula used to determine aid eligibility. The Higher Education Opportunity Act required GAO to form a study group to examine options and implications in simplifying the financial aid process. The study group focused on (1) identifying ways to shorten the FAFSA and make it less burdensome to complete, (2) identifying changes to the statutory need analysis formula that would reduce the amount of financial information required by the FAFSA without causing significant redistribution of federal and state student aid, and (3) determining how any changes to the FAFSA and the statutory need analysis formula could be implemented. To address these questions we convened an expert panel on May 7, 2009, and conducted additional interviews with experts. This summary captures the ideas and themes that emerged at the panel and during interviews. It does not necessarily represent the views of GAO or of the organizations whose representatives participated in the study group. Study group participants said using federal income tax data that the government already collects and revising the form could shorten the application process, making it easier on students and their families. Many participants proposed that relevant federal income tax data be directly transferred to the appropriate answer fields on each applicant's online FAFSA, an approach that the Department of Education (Education) plans to pilot for some applicants in January 2010. Such a change could decrease the amount and complexity of some of the financial questions on the application. In addition, many participants proposed changes to the design and contents of the form to clarify and streamline the application. Education has recently taken steps to shorten and reorganize the online form and has plans for further improvements. Participants said changing the federal formula to reduce required financial information would ease applicants' burden, but such a shift would likely result in some change in the distribution of aid. Many study group participants supported changing the need analysis formula to rely solely on a family's income and number of tax exemptions to determine aid eligibility. These changes would greatly reduce the number of complicated financial questions on the FAFSA. However, reducing the amount of financial information collected could change the distribution of federal, state, and institutional aid, prompting some concern about this approach. Education's recent legislative proposal to limit the formula to financial information available through tax forms would eliminate 26 financial questions, including those on assets. Participants said technology and public outreach efforts could improve the federal student aid application process, but successful implementation of changes hinges on the ability of federal and state agencies to address several challenges. While it is feasible to electronically transfer tax data directly from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to the FAFSA by using income data one year older than what is currently required, participants expressed some concern about the potential implications of such a change. Specifically, using older tax data might result in increased aid eligibility for some applicants whose data may not reflect their current economic needs. In addition, it may be more difficult for applicants who do not file taxes to provide sufficient documentation of their income from two years earlier. Education and the IRS have begun developing a plan to allow some applicants to electronically access their tax data when they apply for aid online. However, because taxpayers can submit their data as late as April 15, these data will not be available in time to accommodate most aid applicants. Many participants also called for linking state aid Web sites to the online federal application to mitigate the potential effects of federal formula changes on state aid. Education plans to offer this option to states in January 2010. In addition, participants said that efforts to simplify the application process should be accompanied by a public outreach strategy aimed at increasing knowledge of the availability of federal student aid. Education plans to undertake a public outreach campaign beginning in fall 2009.

2009-10-29T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-29T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-210T?source=ra

In June 2007, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had made little progress in integrating its existing financial management systems and made six recommendations focused on the need for DHS to define a departmentwide strategy and embrace disciplined processes. In June 2007, DHS announced its new financial management systems strategy, called the Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC) program. GAO's testimony provides preliminary analysis of the status of its prior recommendations and whether there were additional issues identified that pose challenges to the successful implementation of the TASC program. GAO reviewed relevant documentation, such as the January 2009 Request for Proposal and its attachments, and interviewed key officials to obtain additional information. GAO provided a draft report that this testimony is based on to DHS on September 29, 2009, for review and comment. After reviewing and considering DHS' comments, GAO plans to finalize and issue the report including providing appropriate recommendations aimed at improving the department's implementation of the TASC program. GAO's preliminary analysis shows that DHS has begun to take actions to implement four of the six recommendations made in the 2007 report; however, none of these recommendations have been fully implemented. GAO recognizes that DHS cannot fully implement some of the recommendations aimed at reducing the risk in accordance with best practices until the contract for TASC is awarded. DHS has taken, but not completed, actions to (1) define its financial management strategy and plan, (2) develop a comprehensive concept of operations, (3) incorporate disciplined processes, and (4) implement key human capital practices and plans for such a systems implementation effort. DHS has not taken the necessary actions on the remaining two recommendations, to standardize business processes across the department, including applicable internal control, and to develop detailed consolidation and migration plans since DHS will not know the information necessary to develop these items until a contractor is selected. While some of the details of the department's standardization of business processes and migration plans depend on the selected new system, DHS would benefit from performing critical activities, such as identifying all of its affected current business processes so that DHS can analyze how closely the proposed system will meet the department's needs. GAO's preliminary analysis during this review also identified two issues that pose challenges to the TASC program--DHS' significant risks related to the reliance on contractors to define and implement the new system and the lack of independence of the contractor hired to perform the verification and validation (V&V) function for TASC. DHS plans to rely on the selected contractor to complete key process documents for TASC such as detailed documentation that governs activities such as requirements management, testing, data conversion, and quality assurance. The extent of DHS' reliance on contractors to define and implement key processes needed by the TASC program, without the necessary oversight mechanisms to ensure that (1) the processes are properly defined and (2) effectively implemented, could result in system efforts plagued with serious performance and management problems. Further, GAO identified that DHS' V&V contractor was not independent with regard to the TASC program. DHS management agreed that the V&V function should be performed by an entity that is technically, managerially, and financially independent of the organization in charge of the system development and/or acquisition it is assessing. Accordingly, DHS officials indicated that they have restructured the contract to address our concerns by changing the organization that is responsible for managing the V&V function.

2009-10-29T00:00:00+01:00 2009-10-29T00:00:00+01:00 http://www.gao.gov/pdfs/GAO-10-46?source=ra

The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that cleaning up known hazards at the over 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS)--sites transferred to other owners before October 1986--will require more than 50 years and cost about $18 billion. This estimate excludes any additional needed cleanup of emerging contaminants--generally, those not yet governed by a health standard. DOD delegated FUDS cleanup responsibility to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). In addition to FUDS, DOD is responsible for cleaning up about 21,500 sites on active bases and 5,400 sites on realigned or closed bases. The House Armed Services Committee directed GAO to examine (1) the extent to which the Corps reevaluates sites to identify emerging contaminants; (2) how DOD allocates cleanup funds; (3) how the Corps prioritizes FUDS for cleanup; and (4) FUDS program overhead costs. GAO analyzed nationwide FUDS property and project data; policies, guidance and budget documents; and interviewed DOD and Corps officials. The Corps has not often re-examined sites after they have been cleaned up to determine whether emerging contaminants are present or need to be addressed. Generally, the Corps reevaluates sites only when requested by states or others, or when reviewing the completed remedy to ensure its continuing protectiveness. Such reviews are required every 5 years for sites where the chosen remedy does not allow for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure. Corps officials said that they had not received many requests to re-examine sites and few FUDS had required 5-year reviews. Reports on the 15 5-year reviews completed as of May 2009 within four Corps divisions indicated that the Corps has not consistently (1) conducted required 5-year reviews on time, (2) conducted reviews when they are not required but may be appropriate, as EPA recommends, and (3) submitted reports on these reviews for technical evaluation, as required by Corps policy. Also, DOD and the Corps lack accurate, complete information on the status of these reviews. Without timely, accurate, and complete reviews, the Corps cannot ensure that remedies continue to protect human health and the environment. DOD proposes funding to clean up defense sites based on the department's environmental restoration goals and obligations are generally proportional to the number of sites in each site category. Funding is directed toward reducing risks to human health and the environment, among other goals. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency each determine the funding requirements to clean up sites based on these goals. The Corps prioritizes individual FUDS for cleanup on the basis of risk and other factors. The Corps assigns each site a risk level, considering such factors as the presence of hazards, the potential for human contact, and the concentrations of contaminants and their potential for migrating, among others. According to DOD officials, sites' risk levels are the single most important criterion in determining cleanup priorities. However, the Corps also takes into account specific FUDS program goals, and other factors--such as regulators' and the public's concerns--that can influence the Corps' decisions about which sites to address first. Consequently, high risk sites are not always addressed before low risk sites. Direct program management and support costs for the FUDS program have decreased slightly in recent years, mostly due to structural changes in the program. The Corps' obligations for FUDS direct program management and support costs have declined from 11.0 percent of total program obligations in fiscal year 2004 to 9.0 percent in fiscal year 2008. In addition, to further reduce certain components of these costs to make more funds available for FUDS cleanup, the Corps reduced the number of employees managing the program and the number of districts responsible for FUDS from 22 to 14. Furthermore, Corps officials told GAO that they have implemented a number of controls--such as assigning tracking codes--to ensure that program management and support funds are spent only on approved items.