GAO Reports: Transportation Security

This page lists the most recent reports and testimonies related to transportation security issued since October 2000 organized in three categories: aviation security, maritime security, and surface transportation security.

Surface Transportation Security

 http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/surface.html Sun, 22 Nov 2009 16:05:43 -0500 GAO http://www.gao.gov/images/title_object.jpg GAO logo http://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs, June 24, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09678.pdf Terrorist incidents worldwide have highlighted the need for securing mass transit and passenger rail systems. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal entity responsible for securing these systems. GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent to which federal and industry stakeholders have assessed risks to these systems since 2004, and how TSA has used this information to inform its security strategy; (2) key actions federal and industry stakeholders have taken since 2004 and the extent to which federal actions are consistent with TSA's security strategy, and the challenges TSA faces in implementing them; and (3) TSA's reported status in implementing 9/11 Commission Act provisions for mass transit and passenger rail security. GAO reviewed documents including TSA's mass transit and passenger rail strategic plan, and interviewed federal officials and industry stakeholders from 30 systems and Amtrak--representing 75 percent of U.S. mass transit and passenger rail ridership. Since 2004, federal and industry stakeholders have conducted assessments of individual elements of risk--threat, vulnerability and consequence--for mass transit and passenger rail systems and this information has informed TSA's security strategy; however, TSA has not combined information from these three elements to conduct a risk assessment of these transportation systems. By completing a risk assessment, TSA would have reasonable assurance that it is directing its resources toward the highest priority needs. Further, while TSA's mass transit and passenger rail security strategy contains some information, such as goals and objectives, that is consistent with GAO's prior work on characteristics of a successful national strategy, it could be strengthened by including performance measures to help TSA track progress in securing these systems, among other things. Federal and industry stakeholders have taken several key actions to strengthen the security of mass transit and passenger rail systems since 2004, and while federal actions have been generally consistent with TSA's security strategy, TSA faces coordination challenges, and opportunities exist to strengthen some programs. TSA has deployed surface inspectors to assess industry security programs and worked with DHS to develop security technologies, among other actions. Mass transit and passenger rail systems, including Amtrak, also reported taking actions to increase security, such as implementing passenger and baggage screening programs. Although TSA has taken steps to enhance its efforts, it can further strengthen security programs by, for example, expanding its efforts to obtain and share security technology information with industry. By improving information sharing with industry, TSA can help to ensure that its and industry's limited resources are used more productively to secure mass transit and passenger rail systems. As of March 2009, TSA reported implementing some of the 9/11 Commission Act provisions related to securing mass transit and passenger rail such as developing a strategy for securing transportation, but had missed deadlines, for example, for issuing new regulatory requirements for mass-transit and passenger-rail employee security training. In addition, TSA's progress reports that track its implementation of 9/11 Act provisions lack milestones to guide this effort as called for by project management best practices. Additionally, in some cases, TSA progress reports identify challenges to meeting 9/11 Act provisions, but these reports do not include a plan for addressing these challenges. Until TSA develops a plan with milestones, it will be difficult for TSA to provide reasonable assurance that the act's provisions are being implemented and that a plan is in place for overcoming challenges that arise. Additionally, officials from almost half of the mass transit and passenger rail systems GAO visited reported concerns with the potential costs and the feasibility of implementing pending employee security training requirements. Wed, 24 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk, but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant Oversight Can Be Strengthened, June 8, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09491.pdf From fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has allocated about $755 million dollars to transit agencies through its Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) to protect transit systems and the public from terrorist attacks. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which (1) TSGP funds are allocated and awarded based on risk; (2) DHS has allocated, awarded, and distributed TSGP grants in accordance with statutory deadlines and leading practices for collaborating agencies; and (3) DHS has evaluated the effectiveness of the TSGP and its investments. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the TSGP risk model, fund allocation methodology and program documents, such as TSGP guidance, and interviewed DHS and transit officials, among other steps. DHS has used a risk analysis model to allocate TSGP funding and award grants to higher-risk transit agencies, although transit agency officials have expressed concerns about changes that have occurred since the TSGP's inception, such as revised priorities. The TSGP risk model includes all three elements of risk--threat, vulnerability, and consequence--but can be strengthened by measuring variations in vulnerability. DHS has held vulnerability constant, which limits the model's overall ability to assess risk and more precisely allocate funds. Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) allocated about 90 percent of funding to the highest-risk agencies, lower-risk agency awards were based on other factors in addition to risk. In addition, TSA has revised the TSGP's approach, methodology and funding priorities each year since 2006. These changes have raised predictability and flexibility concerns among transit agencies because they make engaging in long-term planning difficult. DHS met the statutory timeline requirements for allocating and awarding grants, but the two agencies that manage the TSGP--TSA and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--lack defined roles and responsibilities, and only 3 percent of the funds awarded for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 have been spent as of February 2009. There is no documentation articulating the roles and responsibilities of the agencies, and grant information has not been passed between the two agencies which affected TSA's ability to share grant status information with transit agencies. DHS met statutory deadlines for releasing grant guidance and acting upon applications, but management and resource issues have resulted in delays in approving projects and making funds available, including (1) lengthy project negotiations between transit agencies and TSA; (2) a backlog of required environmental reviews; and (3) a reported lack of personnel to conduct required reviews. As a result, according to FEMA records, as of February 2009, transit agencies have spent about $21 million of the $755 million that has been awarded for fiscal years 2006 through 2008. This spending rate is, in part, caused by agencies receiving authorization to spend grant dollars late in the grant period. Despite concerns over delays, FEMA has not communicated time frames for providing funding. In April 2004, GAO reported that timely grant awards are imperative to provide intended benefits. DHS has reported taking some actions to address delays, including shortening project approval times and hiring staff, but the effectiveness of these efforts is unknown. Although FEMA has taken initial efforts to develop measures to assess the effectiveness of its grant programs, TSA and FEMA lack a plan and related milestones for developing measures specifically for the TSGP, and thus DHS does not have the capability to measure the effectiveness of the program or its investments. Without such a plan, it will be difficult for TSA and FEMA to provide reasonable assurance that measures are being developed to assess the effectiveness of the program as intended. While FEMA is responsible for the financial controls and audits of the TSGP, it does not have a mechanism to systematically collect data and track grant projects throughout the grant process. As a result, FEMA cannot assess whether awards are timely or funds are being used effectively to reduce risk and increase transit system security Mon, 08 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored, April 21, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09243.pdf An attack on the U.S. freight rail system could be catastrophic because rail cars carrying highly toxic materials often traverse densely populated urban areas. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the federal entity primarily responsible for securing freight rail. GAO was asked to assess the status of efforts to secure this system. This report discusses (1) stakeholder efforts to assess risks to the freight rail system and TSA's development of a risk-based security strategy; (2) actions stakeholders have taken to secure the system since 2001, TSA's efforts to monitor and assess their effectiveness, and any challenges to implementing future actions; and (3) the extent to which stakeholders have coordinated efforts. GAO reviewed documents, including TSA's freight rail strategic plan; conducted site visits to seven U.S. cities with significant rail operations involving hazardous materials; and interviewed federal and industry officials. Federal and industry stakeholders have completed a range of actions to assess risks to freight rail since September 2001, and TSA has developed a security strategy; however, TSA's efforts have primarily focused on one threat, and its strategy does not fully address federal guidance or key characteristics of a successful national strategy. Specifically, TSA's efforts to assess vulnerabilities and potential consequences to freight rail have focused almost exclusively on rail shipments of certain highly toxic materials, in part, because of concerns about their security in transit and limited resources. However, other federal and industry assessments have identified additional potential security threats, including risks to critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. Although many stakeholders agreed with TSA's initial strategy, going forward TSA has agreed that including other identified threats in its freight rail security strategy is important, and reported that it is reconsidering its strategy to incorporate other threats. Additionally, in 2004, GAO reported that successful national strategies should identify performance measures with targets, among other elements. TSA's security strategy could be strengthened by including targets for three of its four performance measures and revising its approach for the other measure to ensure greater consistency in how performance results are quantified. Federal and industry stakeholders have also taken a range of actions to secure freight rail, many of which have focused on securing certain toxic material rail shipments and have been implemented by industry voluntarily; however, TSA lacks a mechanism to monitor security actions and evaluate their effectiveness, and new requirements could pose challenges for future security efforts. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for controls to be designed to ensure ongoing monitoring. While the freight rail industry has taken actions to better secure shipments and key infrastructure, TSA has limited ability to assess the impacts of these actions because it lacks a mechanism to systematically track them and evaluate their effectiveness. Having such information could strengthen TSA's efforts to efficiently target its resources to where actions have not been effective. New, mandatory security planning and procedural requirements will also necessitate additional federal and industry efforts and resources, and may pose some implementation challenges for both federal and industry stakeholders. Federal and industry stakeholders have also taken a number of steps to coordinate their freight rail security efforts; however, federal coordination can be enhanced by more fully leveraging the resources of all relevant federal agencies. GAO previously identified a number of leading practices for effective coordination that could help TSA strengthen coordination with federal and private sector stakeholders. Tue, 21 Apr 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Highway Infrastructure: Federal Efforts to Strengthen Security Should Be Better Coordinated and Targeted on the Nation's Most Critical Highway Infrastructure, January 30, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0957.pdf The nation's highway transportation system is vast and open--vehicles and their operators can move freely and with almost no restrictions. Securing the U.S. highway infrastructure system is a responsibility shared by federal, state and local government, and the private sector. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has primary responsibility for ensuring the security of the sector. GAO was asked to assess the progress DHS has made in securing the nation's highway infrastructure. This report addresses the extent to which federal entities have conducted and coordinated risk assessments; DHS has developed a risk-based strategy; and stakeholders, such as state and local transportation entities, have taken voluntary actions to secure highway infrastructure -- and the degree to which DHS has monitored such actions. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed risk assessment results and TSA's documented security strategy, and conducted interviews with highway stakeholders. Federal entities have several efforts underway to assess threat, vulnerability, and consequence--the three elements of risk--for highway infrastructure; however, these efforts have not been systematically coordinated among key federal partners and the results are not routinely shared. Several component agencies and offices within DHS and the Department of Transportation (DOT) are conducting individual risk assessment efforts of highway infrastructure vulnerabilities, and collectively have completed assessments of most of the critical highway assets identified in 2007. However, key DHS entities reported that they were not coordinating these activities or sharing the results. According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, TSA is responsible for coordinating risk assessment programs. Establishing mechanisms to enhance coordination of risk assessments among key federal partners could strengthen and validate assessments and leverage limited federal resources. DHS, through TSA, has developed and implemented a strategy to guide highway infrastructure security efforts, but the strategy is not informed by available risk assessments and lacks some key characteristics GAO has identified for effective national strategies. In May 2007, TSA issued the Highway Modal Annex, which is intended to serve as the principal strategy for implementing key programs for securing highway infrastructure. While its completion was an important first step to guide protection efforts, GAO identified a number of limitations that may influence its effectiveness. For example, the Annex is not fully based on available risk information, although DHS's Transportation Systems -Sector Plan and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan call for risk information to be used to guide all protection efforts. Lacking such information, DHS cannot provide reasonable assurance that its current strategy is effectively addressing security gaps, prioritizing investments based on risk, and targeting resources toward security measures that will have the greatest impact. GAO also identified a number of additional characteristics of effective national strategies that were missing or incomplete in the current Highway Modal Annex. Federal entities, along with other highway sector stakeholders, have taken a variety of actions to mitigate risks to highway infrastructure; however, DHS, through TSA, lacks a mechanism to determine the extent to which voluntary security measures have been employed to protect critical assets. Specifically, highway stakeholders have developed publications and training, conducted research and development activities, and implemented specific voluntary protective measures for infrastructure assets, such as fencing and cameras. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to monitor protective measures implemented for critical highway infrastructure assets, although TSA is tasked with evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of federal initiatives to secure surface transportation modes. Without such a monitoring mechanism, TSA cannot determine the level of security preparedness of the nation's critical highway infrastructure. Fri, 30 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 TSA's Explosives Detection Canine Program: Status of Increasing Number of Explosives Detection Canine Teams, July 31, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08933r.pdf This report formally transmits the attached briefing in response to section 1307 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The act requires the Comptroller General to report on the utilization of explosives detection canine teams to strengthen security and the capacity of the national explosives detection canine team program, which is administered by the Transportation Security Administration. Thu, 31 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Surface Transportation Programs: Proposals Highlight Key Issues and Challenges in Restructuring the Programs, July 29, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08843r.pdf The nation's economic vitality and the quality of life of its citizens depend significantly on the availability, dependability, and security of its surface transportation network. Our nation has built a vast surface transportation system of roads, railways, ports, and transit systems that facilitate commerce and improve our quality of life. The flow of people and goods is enormous: The nation moved about 5 trillion ton miles of freight and 5 trillion passenger miles of people in 2004. In total, about 4 million miles of roads, 117,000 miles of rail, 600,000 bridges, 19,000 airports, 11,000 miles of transit lines, and 500 train stations make up the surface transportation network. For the past several decades, demand has outpaced the capacity of the surface transportation system, and population growth, technological change, and the increased globalization of the economy will further strain the system. For example, according to the Transportation Research Board, an expected population growth of 100 million people could double the demand for passenger travel. Moreover, this population growth will be concentrated in certain regions and states, intensifying the demand for transportation in these areas. Likewise, freight traffic is projected to grow substantially, putting additional strain on ports, highways, and railroads. Furthermore, as we have recently reported, federal surface transportation programs are not effectively addressing key challenges, such as congestion, or ensuring that transportation dollars are well spent, because federal goals and roles are unclear, many programs lack links to needs or performance, and the programs often do not employ the best tools and approaches. As a result, we and others have called for a fundamental reexamination and refocusing of the nation's surface transportation policies--and we have recommended that Congress consider restructuring these programs so that they (1) have goals with direct links to an identified national interest and role, (2) make grantees more accountable through more performance-based links between funding and program outcomes, (3) use tools and approaches that emphasize the return on federal investment, and (4) address the current imbalance between federal surface transportation revenues and spending. Although reexamining and reshaping surface transportation programs is a challenging endeavor, it provides an opportunity to address both current and emerging needs by eliminating outdated or ineffective programs, more sharply defining the federal role in relation to state and local roles, and modernizing those programs and policies that remain relevant. Stakeholders we interviewed agree that the current federal approach to surface transportation is not working and called for reform and a new direction to effectively address a wide range of challenges facing the nation's surface transportation network. Although the stakeholders we interviewed have different policy agendas and represent different constituencies, some of their key issues for restructuring and funding surface transportation programs overlapped. In reviewing the seven restructuring proposals, we identified the following common themes: (1)defining a federal role in freight and goods movement given the regional benefits provided by freight corridors and the importance of interstate commerce; (2) linking transportation policy and funding to the environment and energy sectors given transportation's contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and concerns about energy security; (3) promoting better management of existing assets through more efficient use of existing infrastructure or asset management strategies; (4) incorporating performance and accountability into transportation programs to ensure projects that receive funding result in commensurate public benefits; and (5) using multiple funding sources to ensure the long-term sustainability of the programs. Tue, 29 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation and Surface Transportation Security Programs, but More Work Remains, May 13, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08487t.pdf Since its inception, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has focused much of its efforts on aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. More recently, TSA has taken actions to secure the nation's surface transportation modes. TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004, and for surface transportation security activities, about $175 million since fiscal year 2005. This testimony focuses on TSA's efforts to secure the commercial aviation system-- through passenger screening, air cargo, and watch-list matching programs--and the nation's surface transportation modes. It also addresses challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from February 2004 through April 2008 including selected updates obtained in February through April 2008. DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's transportation system, including actions to address many recommendations made by GAO. With respect to aviation security, TSA has focused its efforts on, among other things, more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce--formerly known as screeners; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; strengthening domestic air cargo security; and developing a government operated watch-list matching program, known as Secure Flight. For example, in response to GAO's recommendation, TSA developed a plan to periodically review assumptions in its Staffing Allocation Model, and took steps to strengthen its evaluation of proposed procedural changes. TSA has also explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to better detect explosives and other threats, and has taken steps to strengthen air cargo security, including conducting compliance inspections of air carriers. Finally, TSA has instilled more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight's systems development, including preparing key documentation and strengthening privacy protections. With regard to surface transportation security, TSA has, among other things, taken steps to develop a strategic approach for securing mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicles, and highways; established security standards for certain transportation modes; and conducted threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly related to passenger and freight rail. While these efforts should be commended, GAO has identified several areas that should be addressed to further strengthen transportation security. For example, TSA has made limited progress in developing and deploying checkpoint technologies due to planning and management challenges. In addition, TSA has not revised screening exemptions for air cargo transported into the United States that may leave the air cargo system unacceptably vulnerable. GAO further identified that TSA experienced some program management challenges in the development of Secure Flight, including developing cost and schedule estimates consistent with best practices; fully implementing the program's risk management plan; developing a comprehensive testing strategy; and ensuring that information security requirements are fully implemented. In addition, DHS and TSA lack performance measures to fully evaluate the effectiveness of current processes for passengers who apply for redress due to inconveniences experienced during the check-in and screening process. GAO recently made recommendations to address these issues. Additionally, although TSA has recently taken actions in a number of areas to help secure surface modes of transportation, particularly passenger and freight rail, the agency has not fully defined its role with respect to securing other transportation modes, such as commercial vehicles and highway infrastructure. We are continuing to assess TSA's efforts to secure surface modes of transportation as part of our ongoing work and will report on our results later this year. Tue, 13 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Emergency Transit Assistance: Federal Funding for Recent Disasters, and Options for the Future, February 15, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08243.pdf Major disasters can disrupt transit operations, destroy vehicles and facilities, and impede the ability of people to reach essential relief and medical services and return to their homes and jobs. GAO determined (1) the federal role in assisting transit agencies after a major disaster; (2) the amounts, sources, and uses of federal disaster assistance for transit since 1998; (3) the factors that affected the timeliness and effectiveness of transit assistance after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes; and (4) additional options for providing assistance to transit after a major disaster. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed DOT and FEMA data; and interviewed officials with FEMA, DOT, state and local agencies, and others. The federal government provides transit services and assists transit agencies after a major disaster, primarily through two federal agencies--the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration (FTA). FEMA is authorized to provide emergency transportation services under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). FTA administers federal support for transit but does not have a specific ongoing program or funding to help restore transit after disasters. FEMA and FTA have provided approximately $5.0 billion in disaster assistance to fund transit services and assist transit agencies since 1998, primarily through supplemental appropriations. The agencies provided nearly $4.7 billion to New York City after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, primarily to rebuild destroyed transit infrastructure, and another $232 million after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, largely to provide transit services for displaced populations. FEMA and FTA have also provided at least $51 million for other disasters since 1998. FEMA's database for its Public Assistance program does not have the capability to sort transit projects from other projects. GAO took steps to identify this funding, but the information presented should be considered minimum amounts. Additional funds may have been dedicated for transit purposes. GAO believes the magnitude of uncertainty is small compared with the $5.0 billion in assistance for transit. After the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA and FTA faced challenges that impeded both the timeliness and effectiveness of their assistance to transit. Although the Stafford Act authorizes federal assistance to meet emergency needs, neither FEMA nor FTA had mechanisms to provide transit funding immediately after the disasters. FEMA also lacked guidance on the types of transit services it would fund and criteria for determining the duration of funding. As a result, funding approvals after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes took from 1 month to as long as 4 months, and FEMA ended funding even though transit agencies in Louisiana and Mississippi believed that they had continuing needs. Additional options exist--at the state, local, and federal levels--for providing assistance to transit after a major disaster. At the state and local levels, mutual aid agreements between states and others can direct needed resources to transit agencies following a disaster. Existing programs and temporary authorities that Congress had provided to DOT also suggest options, including giving FTA permanent authority to allow transit agencies to use existing grant funds for disaster recovery. As another option, Congress could establish an emergency relief program for FTA, similar to the DOT program for highways, or expand the scope of the highway program to include transit. Such a program could include "quick release"--a mechanism used to approve and release emergency highway funds within 1 to 2 days. Each of these options has advantages, such as expedited release and better targeting of funds, and consequences, such as potentially increased costs to the federal government. Fri, 15 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Transmission Lines: Issues Associated with High-Voltage Direct-Current Transmission Lines along Transportation Rights of Way, February 1, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08347r.pdf Electricity is central to the national economy and the daily lives of many Americans, powering homes, businesses, and industries. Today, an extensive system consisting of more than 150,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines works to provide reliable electricity service and transport electricity from power plants to consumers. Federal and state entities share responsibility for regulating the electricity system. On the federal level, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates interstate transmission of electricity and wholesale rates, among other regulatory activities. State public utility commissions are generally responsible for regulating retail electricity sales and, in some cases, planning for new power plants and transmission lines. However, as studies have shown, growth in electricity demand has strained the nation's transmission system, resulting in less flexibility to respond to system problems and an increased risk of potential blackouts. These issues have led some to suggest that new lines or other investments in the transmission system may be required to increase capacity and accommodate growing electricity demand. Several companies have recently introduced proposals to build new high-voltage direct-current (HVDC) transmission lines. Some of these proposed lines would follow active transportation rights of way, such as railroads, highways, and pipelines. Some stakeholders have raised concerns about the potential economic, safety, and security issues related to collocating new HVDC transmission lines along transportation rights of way, particularly for nearby residents and consumers of electric power. Given these issues, Congress included a provision in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requiring us to assess the siting of HVDC transmission lines along active railroad and other transportation rights of way and report to appropriate congressional committees. In response to this requirement and after discussions with the committees, we examined (1) the role of the federal government in siting HVDC electric transmission lines along active transportation rights of way, (2) advantages and disadvantages of adding transmission lines and using HVDC technology, and (3) benefits and risks associated with the siting of HVDC electric transmission lines along active transportation rights of way. Historically, the federal government has had a limited role in siting transmission lines. It has generally only made siting decisions on federal lands. State governments, through public utility commissions and other agencies, traditionally approve transmission line siting. However, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 expanded the federal government's role. Specifically, under certain circumstances, FERC now has the authority to approve and issue siting permits for new transmission lines in areas designated by the Department of Energy as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETC). However, some stakeholders have expressed concerns about FERC's expanded authority in the national corridors, including how the state siting process will be affected and whether states and the public will be involved in FERC's proceedings. FERC officials told us they expect the review of a transmission line proposal in the national corridors would have little impact on the states' existing process. FERC officials also told us that to the extent FERC receives applications, they expect to consider information from the state siting process as part of their federal proceeding and that states and the public will have opportunities to participate in and comment on the federal siting process. Currently, federal statutes as well as federal and state guidance encourage the collocation of new transmission lines along existing transportation and other rights of way. We identified potential advantages and disadvantages to adding transmission lines and using HVDC technology. According to studies we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed, adding transmission lines offers potential advantages, including (1) decreased congestion and improved reliability of the electricity system by providing access to additional sources of generation and additional paths for electricity, (2) lower costs for consumers at the end of the line where electricity is received, (3) better utilization of existing power plants and more competitive local wholesale electricity markets, (4) facilitated development of new electricity sources location outside population centers, and (5) facilitated development of renewable energy sources. Stakeholders and studies also identified potential disadvantages of adding transmission lines, including (1) diminished economic or aesthetic values of the land if lines are built above ground, (2) raised electricity prices in areas from where the electricity is being taken, and (3) reduced incentives to identify alternatives that decrease demand (e.g., energy conservation). With respect to the potential advantages of using HVDC over HVAC technology, studies we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed indicated that HVDC lines generally (1) cost less than HVAC over long distances and (2) allow operators of transmission systems to have more control over the direction and the amount of power flowing over HVDC lines. Potential disadvantages of using HVDC over HVAC technology include (1) higher costs for short-distance lines due to the cost of equipment needed to convert DC into AC electricity used by residents and (2) the lack of electricity benefits to consumers living along these lines--unless converter stations are installed at intermediate locations--because such lines are generally not connected to local electricity lines. Fri, 01 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's Oil Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, July 18, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071107t.pdf Rebuilding Iraq's oil sector is crucial to rebuilding Iraq's economy. For example, oil export revenues account for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of government revenues. This testimony addresses (1) the U.S. goals for Iraq's oil sector and progress in achieving these goals, (2) key challenges the U.S. government faces in helping Iraq restore its oil sector, and (3) efforts to enact and implement hydrocarbon legislation. This statement is based on our May 2007 report and updated data, where appropriate. Despite 4 years of effort and $2.7 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, Iraqi oil output has consistently fallen below U.S. program goals. In addition, the State Department's data on Iraq's oil production may be overstated since data from the U.S. Department of Energy show lower production levels--between 100,000 and 300,000 barrels less per day. Inadequate metering, re-injection, corruption, theft, and sabotage account for the discrepancy, which amounts to about $1.8 to $5.5 billion per year. Comprehensive metering of Iraq's oil production has been a long-standing problem and continuing need. Poor security, corruption, and funding constraints continue to impede reconstruction of Iraq's oil sector. The deteriorating security environment places workers and infrastructure at risk while protection efforts have been insufficient. Widespread corruption and smuggling reduce oil revenues. Moreover, Iraq's needs are significant and future funding for the oil sector is uncertain as nearly 80 percent of U.S. funds for the oil sector have been spent. Iraq's contribution has been minimal with the government spending less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion it approved for oil reconstruction projects in 2006. Iraq has yet to enact and implement hydrocarbon legislation that defines the distribution of oil revenues and the rights of foreign investors. Until this legislation is enacted and implemented, it will be difficult for Iraq to attract the billions of dollars in foreign investment it needs to modernize the sector. As of July 13, 2007, Iraq's cabinet has approved only one of four separate but interrelated pieces of legislation--a framework that establishes the structure, management, and oversight. Another part is in draft and two others are not yet drafted. Poor security, corruption, and the lack of national unity will likely impede the implementation of this legislation. Wed, 18 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors, May 15, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07677.pdf Since 2003, the United States has provided several billion dollars in reconstruction funds to help rebuild Iraq oil and electricity sectors, which are crucial to rebuilding Iraq's economy. For example, oil export revenues account for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of government revenues. The U.S. rebuilding program was predicated on three key assumptions: a permissive security environment, the ability to restore Iraq's essential services to prewar levels, and funding from Iraq and international donors. This report addresses (1) the funding made available to rebuild Iraq's oil and electricity sectors, (2) the U.S. goals for these sectors and progress in achieving these goals, and (3) the key challenges the U.S. government faces in these efforts. Billions have been provided to rebuild Iraq's oil and electricity sectors, but Iraq's future needs are significant and sources of funding uncertain. From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, the United States spent about $5.1 billion to rebuild the oil and electricity sectors. The United States also spent an additional $3.8 billion in Iraqi funds on these sectors. However, Iraq will need billions of additional dollars to rebuild these sectors. The Iraqi government and donors represent important sources of potential funding. However, the oil and electricity ministries have encountered difficulties spending capital improvement budgets because of weaknesses in budgeting and procurement practices and major security challenges. Moreover, Iraq has not made full use of potential international contributions. It is also unclear what additional financial commitments, if any, will be provided to Iraq's oil and electricity sectors as part of a new international compact. Despite 4 years of effort and the substantial resources expended, production in both sectors has consistently fallen below U.S. program goals. In addition, State's estimate of Iraq's oil production levels may be overstated due to inadequate metering that does not allow precise measurement of crude oil production. The Iraqi government projects that it will be able to meet the demand for electricity in 2009. However, these projections assume that the Ministry of Electricity will be assured of the stable supply of the fuel needed for electricity generation, which has been lacking due to poor coordination between the oil and electricity ministries. A variety of security, corruption, legal, and planning challenges have impeded U.S. and Iraqi efforts to restore Iraq's oil and electricity sectors. The challenging security environment and insufficient protection efforts have continued to place workers and infrastructure at risk. Corruption, smuggling, and other illicit activities result in revenue losses and low cost recovery. Furthermore, the Iraqi government has difficulty attracting foreign investment because, according to the World Bank, it lacks an adequate legal framework, including comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would govern distribution of future oil revenues and granting of exploration rights. Finally, although the oil and electricity sectors are mutually dependent, the Iraqi government lacks integrated planning for these sectors, which has led to inefficient management of the country's resources. Tue, 15 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Federal Transit Benefits Program: Ineffective Controls Result in Fraud and Abuse by Federal Workers, April 24, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07724t.pdf Under the federal transit benefits program, federal employees receive transit benefits (e.g., Metrocheks) to encourage them to commute to work via public transportation. Based on information provided by the Department of Transportation, as of July 2006, the National Capital Region had 120,000 participants claiming roughly $140 million in benefits. Recently, inspectors general (IG) of various agencies have found numerous prior instances of fraud, waste, and abuse in this federal program. Based on both the significance of these IG findings and the amount of federal money spent on transit benefits, GAO was asked to (1) investigate allegations that federal employees in the National Capital Region are involved in fraud and abuse related to the transit benefits program, (2) identify the potential causes of any fraud or abuse that is detected, and (3) estimate the magnitude of fraud and abuse in the National Capital Region in 2006. To address these objectives, GAO identified federal employees selling their transit benefits on the Internet and obtained additional data from these sellers' employing agencies to determine whether more widespread problems existed. GAO also obtained the policies and procedures governing the transit benefits program at each of the employing agencies. After investigating just 3 days of sales, GAO confirmed that at least 20 federal employees were fraudulently selling their Metrocheks on eBay. Most of the employees GAO interviewed admitted to falsifying their transit benefit applications and fraudulently selling their benefits. One GS-14 Department of the Treasury employee drove to work, parked for free in agency-provided parking, and was still able to collect $105 per month in Metrocheks--most of which he sold on eBay. Posing as buyers, GAO investigators also purchased Metrocheks from 3 federal employees fraudulently selling their benefits on Craigslist, a popular community Web site. GAO investigations revealed additional examples of federal employees inflating their transportation expenses on their transit benefit applications. Many of them admitted to intentionally falsifying their benefit applications to receive excess benefits. For example, a GS-11 Department of Transportation employee admitted to claiming the maximum allowable benefit of $105 per month when his actual commuting cost was only $54. Weaknesses in the design of program controls at the Departments of Commerce, Transportation, State, Homeland Security, Defense, and Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Patent and Trademark Office, and the U.S. Coast Guard can be associated with the fraudulent and abusive activity we identified. Although GAO did not conduct a comprehensive review of each agency's controls, the results from investigations illustrate flaws in the design of the controls. For example, GAO identified four employees who continued to receive transit benefits even though they were on extended absences from work, but none of the agencies had written policies requiring adjustment of benefits because of leave or travel. Using limited transit benefit records, we found that the possible magnitude of potentially fraudulent transit benefit payments during 2006 in the National Capital Region was more than $17 million. This order of magnitude is based on employees at Commerce, Transportation, Homeland Security, Defense, Treasury, IRS, and the Coast Guard who made false statements by requesting benefits they were not entitled to. Given the number of agencies not covered by our analysis, it is likely that this amount is significantly understated. Tue, 24 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, March 7, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07583t.pdf The four rail attacks in Europe and Asia since 2004, including the most recent in India, highlight the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack and demonstrate the need for greater focus on securing these systems. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 passenger rail security report and selected recent program updates. Specifically, it addressees (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk assessments for securing all modes of transportation, including passenger rail, and (2) the actions that federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system. The DHS Office of Grants and Training (OGT) and TSA have begun to assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. However, GAO reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of passenger rail. GAO found that, until TSA does so, it may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. GAO also reported that DHS had begun, but not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across critical sectors. Since that time, TSA has reported taking additional steps to assess the risks to the passenger rail system. However, as of March 2, 2007, TSA has not issued the required Transportation Sector Specific Plan and supporting plans for passenger rail and other surface transportation modes, based on risk assessments. Until TSA does so, it lacks a clearly communicated strategy with goals and objectives for securing the transportation sector, including passenger rail. After September 11, DOT initiated efforts to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA has also taken actions to strengthen rail security, including issuing security directives, testing security technologies, and issuing a proposed rule for passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices. OGT has also acted to help improve passenger rail security by, for example, providing funding for security enhancements to rail transit agencies and Amtrak through various grant programs. DHS and DOT have taken steps to better coordinate their respective rail security roles and responsibilities. In particular, DHS and DOT updated their memorandum of understanding to clarify their respective security roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. Wed, 07 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Performance and Accountability: Transportation Challenges Facing Congress and the Department of Transportation, March 6, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07545t.pdf A safe, efficient, and convenient transportation system is integral to the health of our economy and quality of life. Our nation's vast transportation system of airways, railways, roads, pipelines, transit, and waterways has served this need, yet it is under considerable strain from (1) increasing congestion, (2) the large costs to maintain and improve it, and (3) the human cost of over 44,000 people killed and over 2.5 million injured each year in transportation-related accidents. The Department of Transportation implements national transportation policy and administers most federal transportation programs. For fiscal year 2008, the department has requested $67 billion to carry out these and other activities. While the department carries out some activities directly, such as employing about 15,000 air traffic controllers to make certain that planes stay a safe distance apart, it does not have direct control over the vast majority of activities that it funds, such as local decisions on the priority and placement of airports, public transit, and roads. In other cases, such as railways and pipelines, the infrastructure is owned and operated by industry. This statement presents GAO's views on major transportation challenges facing Congress and the department. It is based on GAO products, including recommendations made, and the products of others. Financing mechanisms for the nation's transportation system are under stress. Our nation's transportation infrastructure is threatened by increasing demand for transportation services, and revenue from traditional funding mechanisms for the nation's highway and aviation systems may be unable to keep pace at current tax rates. In addition, freight traffic is projected to grow substantially, but current planning and financing mechanisms impede public strategies to address needs. Our nation's mobility is threatened because the nation's infrastructure is under great strain. Congestion across modes (e.g., aviation, highways, and rail) is expected to worsen. However, funding by mode and the lack of performance-related goals result in little assurance that funds are being channeled to the most critical mobility concerns and that intermodal approaches can be integrated into the transportation system. Improvements in transportation safety are needed to reduce the number of deaths and injuries from transportation accidents--about 95 percent of which occur on our nation's roads. Increases in congestion across modes as a result of population and economic growth could cause deterioration in transportation safety despite departmental and state efforts to reduce accidents. The transition from the current air traffic control system to a broader and modernized system will be one of the department's most complex undertakings. In previous years, FAA has faced systemic management and acquisition problems that led us to designate its air traffic control modernization program as high risk. While the agency has made significant progress in recent years, a key challenge going forward will be to institutionalize these improvements and to continually improve. In addition, the department and the transportation sector face persistent human capital challenges due to an impending shortage of skilled people to meet changing transportation needs. Furthermore, despite recent improvements in financial management, the department received a qualified opinion on its 2006 financial statements. Finally, the department is working to clarify its role in transportation security and emergency preparedness and response. Tue, 06 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, February 13, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07459t.pdf The 2005 London subway bombings and 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack and demonstrated the need for greater focus on securing these systems. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 passenger rail security report and selected program updates obtained in January 2007. Specifically, it addressees (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk assessments for securing all modes of transportation, including passenger rail; (2) the actions that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and other federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system, improve federal coordination, and develop industry partnerships; and (3) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented to enhance security. The DHS Office of Grants and Training and TSA have begun to assess the risks facing the passenger rail system. However, we reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of passenger rail. We found that, until TSA does so, the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. We also reported that DHS had begun, but not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across critical sectors. Since that time, TSA has reported taking additional steps to assess the risks to the passenger rail system. However, TSA has not yet issued the required Transportation Sector Specific Plan and supporting plans for passenger rail and other surface transportation modes, based on risk assessments. Until TSA does so, the agency lacks a clearly communicated strategy with goals and objectives for securing the transportation sector, including passenger rail. After September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) initiated efforts to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA has also taken actions to strengthen rail security, including issuing security directives, testing security technologies, and issuing a proposed rule for passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices. TSA has also taken steps to strengthen coordination with DOT and develop partnerships with industry stakeholders. DHS and DOT have updated their memorandum of understanding to clarify their respective security roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. TSA also established an Office of Transportation Sector Network Management and offices for each transportation mode to develop security policies and work to strengthen industry partnerships for passenger rail and other surface modes. U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased the use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign passenger rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further examination. TSA has also reported taking steps to identify foreign best practices for rail security and working to develop a clearinghouse of security technologies. Tue, 13 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, February 6, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07442t.pdf The 2005 London subway bombings and 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack and demonstrated the need for greater focus on securing these systems. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 passenger rail security report and selected program updates obtained in January 2007. Specifically, it addressees (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk assessment for securing all modes of transportation, including passenger rail; (2) the actions that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and other federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system, improve federal coordination, and develop industry partnerships; and (3) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented to enhance security. The DHS Office of Grants and Training and TSA have begun to assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. However, we reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of passenger rail assets. We found that, until TSA does so, the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. We also reported that DHS had begun, but not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across various critical sectors. Since that time, TSA has reported taking additional steps to assess the risks to the passenger rail system. However, TSA has not yet issued the required Transportation Sector Specific Plan and supporting plans that address passenger rail and other surface transportation modes, based on a risk assessment. Until TSA does so, the agency lacks a clear strategy with goals and objectives for securing the overall transportation sector, including passenger rail. After September 11, DOT initiated efforts to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA has also taken actions to strengthen rail security, including issuing security directives, testing security technologies, developing security training, and issuing a proposed rule for passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices. TSA has also taken steps to better coordinate with DOT and develop partnerships with industry stakeholders. DHS and DOT have updated their memorandum of understanding to clarify their respective security-related roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. TSA also established an Office of Transportation Sector Network Management and offices for each mode of transportation to develop security policies and work to strengthen partnerships with industry stakeholders for passenger rail and other surface modes. U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased the use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign passenger rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further examination. TSA has reported taking steps to identify foreign best practices for rail security. Tue, 06 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, January 18, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07225t.pdf The July 2005 London subway bombings and July 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India dramatically revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems worldwide to terrorist attack and demonstrated the need for increased focus on the security of these systems. This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on passenger rail security (GAO-05-851) and selected program updates obtained in January 2007 provides information on (1) how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system; (2) actions TSA and other federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of U.S. rail systems; and (3) rail security practices implemented by domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators. The DHS Office of Grants and Training has conducted risk assessments of passenger rail systems to identify and protect rail assets that are vulnerable to attack, such as stations and bridges. TSA has also begun to conduct risk assessments of passenger rail assets. While TSA has begun to establish a methodology for analyzing and characterizing risks, as of January 2007, the agency has not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of the U.S. passenger rail system. Until TSA does so, the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. DHS has also begun developing a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across different transportation sectors. However, until this framework is finalized, it may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. After September 11, 2001, the Department of Transportation initiated a number of efforts to improve passenger rail security. After its creation, TSA also took a number of actions, including issuing rail security directives, testing rail security technologies, developing training tools for rail workers, and issuing a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. DHS and DOT also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that delineated the two departments' respective roles and responsibilities for promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of people and goods throughout the transportation system. TSA has recently completed specific agreements with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to further delineate security-related roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased the use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign passenger rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further examination. TSA has reported taking steps to identify foreign best practices for rail security. Thu, 18 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety Oversight Program, July 26, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06821.pdf The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In this report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the program's impact; and (3) challenges facing the program. We also provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To do our work we surveyed state oversight agencies and transit agencies covered by FTA's program. FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for developing a program standard that transit agencies must meet and reviewing the performance of the transit agencies against that standard. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a top priority. FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could result in duplication of effort. Wed, 26 Jul 2006 00:00:00 -0400 Rail Transit: Observations on FTA's State Safety Oversight Program, July 19, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06997t.pdf The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure, carrying millions of people daily. Unlike most transportation modes, safety and security oversight of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In addition, in 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, giving the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority for security over all transportation modes, including rail transit. This testimony is based on ongoing work for this subcommittee's committee--the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I describe (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the impact of the program on rail safety and security; and (3) challenges facing the program. I also provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To address these issues, we reviewed program documents and interviewed stakeholders including officials from FTA, TSA, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the American Public Transportation Association. We also surveyed state oversight and transit agencies covered by FTA's program, interviewing 24 of the 25 oversight agencies and 37 of 42 transit agencies across the country. FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for overseeing transit agencies, including reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, the TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a top priority. FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could result in duplication of effort. Wed, 19 Jul 2006 00:00:00 -0400 Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts, March 29, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06557t.pdf The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system dramatically revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to terrorist attacks and demonstrated the need for an increased focus on security for these systems. This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on passenger rail security (GAO-05-851), provides information on (1) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign rail transit operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance security; (2) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) funding of rail transit security and use of risk management in funding decisions; and (3) the steps DHS and DOT have taken to improve coordination on rail transit security matters. As part of its 2005 report, GAO contacted 32 U.S. rail transit operators and 13 passenger rail operators in seven European and Asian countries. Domestic and foreign rail transit operators GAO contacted have taken similar actions to help secure their systems, including implementing customer awareness programs, increasing the number and visibility of their security personnel, and upgrading security technology. Also, both domestic and foreign operators have used risk assessments to guide security-related activities and spending. However, GAO also observed security practices that were used by certain foreign passenger rail operators, but were not employed in the United States at the time of GAO's review. For example, some foreign rail operators use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats or randomly screen passengers. Centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies, such as chemical sensors, and best practices are also maintained in some foreign countries. While introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, the practices may nevertheless warrant further examination. Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit security grants. DHS's Office of Grants and Training is the primary source of security funding for passenger rail systems, providing over $320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for fiscal years 2003 to 2006. The Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger rail by requiring, for example, that operators complete a risk assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant. As we have noted in previous reports, using assessments of risk to target resources to the highest priority is especially critical given the competition for resources within the rail transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the other modes of transportation. DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) also helps fund rail transit security efforts by providing financial assistance to transit agencies and requiring that they spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds on security improvements. To improve coordination on transportation security matters, including rail transit security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in September 2004. DHS and DOT also signed a transit security annex to the MOU in September 2005 that delineates specific security-related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for transit issues. In GAO's view, these actions are positive steps forward in addressing the coordination problems GAO previously identified. For instance, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with TSA's May 2004 security directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Effective coordination between DHS and DOT will continue to be important as both departments move forward with existing programs and new security initiatives. Wed, 29 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500 Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, October 20, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06181t.pdf The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system dramatically highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to terrorist attacks, and the need for an increased focus on security for these systems. This testimony provides information on how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), have assessed risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system using risk management principles; actions federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of U.S. rail systems; and rail security practices implemented by domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators and differences among these practices. Within DHS, ODP has completed numerous risk assessments of passenger rail systems around the country, and TSA has begun to conduct risk assessments as well as establish a methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize risks that have been identified. Until TSA completes these efforts, however, the agency will not be able to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investment decisions. At the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other sectors. Until this framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security conducted by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration, such as providing security training to passenger rail operators, TSA issued emergency security directives in 2004 to domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid and piloted a test of explosive detection technology for use in passenger rail systems. However, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with the security directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken a range of actions to help secure their systems. Most, for example, had implemented customer awareness programs to encourage passengers to report suspicious activities, increased the number and visibility of their security personnel, upgraded security technology, and improved rail system design to enhance security. We also observed security practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their governments not currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the United States. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or utilize covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats, and some foreign governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies. While introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they may nevertheless warrant further examination. Thu, 20 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, September 9, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05851.pdf The U.S. passenger rail system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure, carrying more than 11 million passengers each weekday. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) share responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of rail systems. In this report, GAO addressed (1) DHS actions to assess the risks to the U.S. passenger rail system in the context of prevailing risk management principles, (2) federal actions taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system, and (3) security practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented. Within DHS, the Office for Domestic Preparedness has completed 7 risk assessments of passenger rail systems around the country, with 12 more under way. TSA has begun to conduct risk assessments and to establish a methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize risks that have been identified but has not yet completed either effort or set timelines for doing so. TSA will not be able to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investment decisions until these efforts are completed. At the department level, DHS has begun developing, but has not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other sectors. Until this framework is finalized and shared with stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks across different sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. The Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration within DOT have ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security. In addition, in 2004, TSA issued emergency security directives to domestic rail operators after terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid, Spain, and piloted a test of explosive detection technology for use in passenger rail systems. However, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with the directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. In September 2004, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding to improve coordination between the two agencies, and they are developing agreements to address specific rail security issues. Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have taken a range of actions to help secure their systems. We also observed security practices among certain foreign passenger rail systems or their governments that are not currently used by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, and which could be considered for use in the United States. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers, and some foreign governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies and best practices. Fri, 09 Sep 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia's Cano Limon-Covenas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain, September 6, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05971.pdf Oil is one of Colombia's principal exports. The Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline transports almost 20 percent of Colombia's oil production. The pipeline originates in the Department of Arauca in northeast Colombia. It carries oil nearly 500 miles to the Caribbean port of Covenas. The pipeline has been a principal infrastructure target for terrorist attacks by Colombia's insurgent groups. During 2001, attacks on the pipeline cost the Colombian government an estimated $500 million in lost revenues for the year. The United States agreed to assist Colombia in protecting the first 110 miles of the pipeline where most of the attacks were occurring. We examined how the U.S. funding and resources provided to Colombia have been used, and what challenges remain in securing the pipeline. Since fiscal year 2002, the United States has provided about $99 million in equipment and training to the Colombian Army to minimize terrorist attacks along the first 110 miles of the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, mostly in the Arauca department. U.S. Special Forces have provided training and equipment to about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers. However, the delivery of 10 helicopters purchased for the program was delayed--arriving mid 2005. Without the helicopters, the Colombian Army's ability to respond rapidly to pipeline attacks has been limited. Additionally, some equipment, such as night vision goggles, has not arrived due to the long lead-time required to obtain these items because of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the delays in equipment deliveries, the number of attacks on the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline has declined and security in the area has improved. In addition, the Colombian Army and Colombian National Police have improved relations with the civilian population and new oil exploration is occurring in the area due to the improved security. However, challenges to securing the pipeline remain. More attacks are occurring on the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline outside the 110-mile long area originally addressed. Most of the Colombian Army stationed in these other areas has not received U.S. training. In addition, the insurgents have attacked the electrical grid system that provides energy to the Cano Limon oilfield. Without electricity, oil cannot be pumped. Because the U.S. funds provided for the program will be depleted by the end of September 2005, sustainability of the progress made is uncertain. Colombia cannot fully operate and maintain the helicopters provided without continued U.S. support; and due to U.S. commitments in other parts of the world, U.S. Special Forces will be reducing personnel in Colombia, which will limit future training. Tue, 06 Sep 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Mass Transit: Preliminary Views on Options for Additional Fiscal Oversight of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, July 28, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05922t.pdf In recent years, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) has faced serious financial and budgetary problems as well as continuing challenges related to the safety and reliability of its transit services. At the same time, ridership is at an all-time high, and WMATA continues to provide critical services and considerable benefits to the Washington region and to the federal government. This statement discusses (1) WMATA's responsibilities for serving the interests of the federal government, including the agency's role in transporting federal employees and visitors to the nation's capital and in supporting homeland security for the Washington metropolitan region; (2) the current funding challenges facing WMATA and the options proposed to address these challenges; (3) preliminary information on some of the entities that currently provide oversight of WMATA and the focus of their recent reviews; and (4) some considerations and options in instituting spending safeguards and oversight of any additional federal assistance provided to WMATA, should Congress decide to provide such assistance. GAO discussed this testimony with WMATA and FTA officials, who provided comments and additional information that GAO incorporated as appropriate. WMATA transports a substantial share of the federal workforce and provides an important means of transportation to special events that occur in Washington, D.C., as the nation's capital. WMATA's Metro Transit Police assists federal law enforcement agencies by providing expertise in civil disturbance management and explosives detection and by training first responders in emergency management techniques specific to transit environments. WMATA's Metrorail and Metrobus are the preferred means of transportation in an emergency scenario requiring evacuation, and both the regional and the District of Columbia emergency transportation plans rely heavily on them. A regional funding panel estimated WMATA's budgetary shortfall at $2.4 billion for fiscal years 2006 through 2015 if WMATA were to fund many of the projects in its 10-year capital improvement plan. This shortfall may be even greater because the panel's shortfall calculation did not include the costs of providing specialized transportation for persons with disabilities, as required under the Americans with Disabilities Act. To deal with WMATA's funding shortfall, the regional panel concluded that the region needs to develop a dedicated source of revenue for WMATA (e.g., local sales tax) and that the federal government needs to provide significant contributions because of the benefits it receives from WMATA. However, given the large federal budget deficit and competing claims on federal resources, GAO believes WMATA may also need to reexamine its own spending priorities. As part of its ongoing work on WMATA's oversight entities, GAO found that WMATA is subject to oversight from multiple entities that, since 2003, have issued hundreds of reports--which vary in scope--on a broad range of topics. These entities include WMATA's Auditor General, an independent external auditor, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and industry peer review panels. The entities have made recommendations to WMATA, which WMATA has generally implemented or plans to implement. As part of its ongoing work, GAO plans to analyze these reviews in more detail to determine if they comprehensively identify and address WMATA's overall management and operational challenges. GAO's ongoing work will also cover other FTA reviews and safety reviews of WMATA's operations. Congress, the administration, and GAO have long recognized the benefits of having spending safeguards and management oversight for entities that receive federal funding. If Congress decides to provide WMATA with additional federal funding, there needs to be reasonable assurance that the funds will be spent effectively. We identified several options for additional oversight that could be incorporated into legislation that provides additional federal funding to WMATA, including having WMATA officials periodically report to Congress on how the funding is being spent; specifying the types of projects for which federal funds could be used; and requiring that any additional federal funding be subject to FTA's oversight programs. Thu, 28 Jul 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize Resources, February 15, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05357t.pdf Critical transportation systems crisscross the nation and extend beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day, making them both attractive targets to terrorists and difficult to secure. Securing these systems is further complicated by the need to balance security with the expeditious flow of people and goods through these systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) faces the daunting challenge of determining how to allocate its finite resources to manage risks while addressing threats and enhancing security across all transportation modes. To assist the Congress and TSA in focusing resources on the areas of greatest need, we were asked to describe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA efforts in managing risks and allocating resources across aviation and surface transportation modes, and in integrating screening, credentialing, and research and development (R&D) efforts to achieve efficiencies. TSA has undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen transportation security, particularly in aviation, and its efforts should be commended. For example, since September 11, 2001, TSA has installed explosive detection systems at most of the nation's commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for explosives; expanded screener training and developed performance measures and indicators for the screening systems; and evaluated the security of airport perimeters and access controls and provided funding for security equipment. While these efforts are commendable, we found that TSA has not consistently implemented a risk management approach or conducted the systematic analysis needed to inform its decision-making processes and to prioritize security improvements. Our work has shown that a risk management approach can help inform decision makers in allocating finite resources to the areas of greatest need. For example, we found that since initially deploying equipment to screen checked baggage for explosive at airports in response to congressional mandates, TSA has not conducted the systematic planning needed to optimize the deployment and integration of this equipment. Limited analysis of nine airports showed that the integration of this equipment in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems--rather than continuing to maintain the equipment in a stand-alone mode--could result in significant savings for the federal government. We also found that TSA's efforts to implement a comprehensive risk management approach for its air cargo and rail security programs are ongoing. The President's fiscal year 2006 budget request proposes two key DHS organizational changes designed to leverage resources and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of various screening, credentialing, and R&D programs. While we applaud DHS's efforts, it will be important for DHS to address several program challenges as the integration moves forward because restructuring alone will not resolve all existing challenges or ensure the successful integration and achievement of DHS's goals. These challenges including developing regulations identifying eligibility requirements for the Transportation Workers Identification Credential, establishing goals with measurable objectives in research and development strategic plans, and using risk assessments to select and prioritize research and development efforts. Tue, 15 Feb 2005 00:00:00 -0500 Maritime Security Fleet: Many Factors Determine Impact of Potential Limits on Food Aid Shipments, September 13, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041065.pdf Food aid cargo must generally be carried on U.S.-flag ships under requirements set by the cargo preference program. Two groups of carriers compete for this cargo: (1) those that participate in the Maritime Security Program and receive an annual government subsidy--generally liners operating on scheduled routes and (2) those that do not--generally carriers operating on a charter basis. Congress directed GAO to study (1) how the cargo preference and Maritime Security programs are designed and who participates;(2) the nature and extent of MSF and non-MSF carrier participation and competition in the food aid program; and (3) how a tonnage limitation on bagged preference cargo for MSF vessels could affect MSF, other U.S.-flag ships, the cargo preference food aid program, and the ports servicing these ships. The cargo preference program and the Maritime Security Program provide incentives to retain privately owned U.S.-flag ships and their U.S. citizen mariners for commercial and national defense purposes. The cargo preference program is open to all U.S.-flagged vessels, while the Maritime Security Fleet (MSF) subsidy is only available to certain militarily useful vessels. Of the 47 ships currently in the MSF, 37 have participated in cargo preference food aid shipments. MSF and non-MSF carriers compete for food aid shipped as bagged cargo, which averaged 33 percent of food aid shipments by tonnage from fiscal years 1999 to 2003. There is no competition for bulk food aid shipments because MSF carriers do not carry bulk cargo. Changes in food aid spending have contributed to a shift from bulk to bagged cargo and increased reliance on bagged cargo by some non-MSF carriers. From 1999 to 2003, MSF carriers shipped about 45 percent and non-MSF carriers 55 percent of bagged food aid cargo. Competition between MSF and non-MSF carriers for bagged food aid is affected by certain cargo preference requirements. Establishing a tonnage limitation on MSF vessels would likely reduce their share of food aid shipments, but the extent would depend on factors such as the level of the limit and the options MSF carriers have in responding to it. We examined three proposed limits and found that the percentage of food aid voyages carrying more than the proposed limit rises from 3 percent with a limit of 7,500 tons to 19 percent above 2,500 tons, according to fiscal year 2001 to 2003 data. The actual impact on MSF carriers will be smaller if they are able to (1) carry some food aid up to the limit, (2) replace some food aid above the limit with other cargo, and/or (3) elect to carry food aid even without the subsidy. Food aid agencies are concerned about the impacts of a tonnage limit, including increased delays in providing food aid, administrative burdens, and higher shipping costs. Major ports would generally experience a limited overall impact of a tonnage limitation, but specific food aid terminals could be affected. Mon, 13 Sep 2004 00:00:00 -0400 Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain, March 23, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04598t.pdf Passenger and freight rail services are important links in the nation's transportation system. Terrorist attacks on passenger and/or freight rail services have the potential to cause widespread injury, loss of life, and economic disruption. The recent terrorist attack in Spain illustrates that rail systems, like all modes of transportation, are targets for attacks. GAO was asked to summarize the results of its recent reports on transportation security that examined (1) challenges in securing passenger and freight rail systems, (2) actions rail stakeholders have taken to enhance passenger and freight rail systems, and (3) future actions that could further enhance rail security. Securing the passenger and freight rail systems are fraught with challenges. Some of these challenges are common to passenger and freight rail systems, such as the funding of security improvements, the interconnectivity of the rail system, and the number of stakeholders involved in rail security. Other challenges are unique to the type of rail system. For example, the open access and high ridership of mass transit systems make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. Similarly, freight railroads transport millions of tons of hazardous materials each year across the United States, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these shipments to terrorist attack. Passenger and freight rail stakeholders have taken a number of steps to improve the security of the nation's rail system since September 11, 2001. Although security received attention before September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of transportation security for passenger and rail providers. Consequently, passenger and freight rail providers have implemented new security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing activities, including performing risk assessments, conducting emergency drills, and developing security plans. The federal government has also acted to enhance rail security. For example, the Federal Transit Administration has provided grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other things. Implementation of risk management principles and improved coordination could help enhance rail security. Using risk management principles can help guide federal programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of highest priority. In addition, improved coordination among federal entities could help enhance security efforts across all modes, including passenger and freight rail systems. We reported in June 2003 that the roles and responsibilities of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) in transportation security, including rail security, have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities work to enhance security. Tue, 23 Mar 2004 00:00:00 -0500 Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning and Financing Limitations, December 19, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04165.pdf The strong productivity gains in the U.S. economy have hinged in part on transportation networks working more efficiently. The nation's ports, which handle 95 percent of overseas freight tonnage, are a key link in this network, and efficient intermodal links between ship, rail, and highways are vital to continued productivity gains. GAO was asked to address (1) the challenges to freight mobility, (2) the limitations key stakeholders have encountered in addressing these challenges, and (3) strategies that may aid decision makers in enhancing freight mobility. GAO's work was based on a synthesis of previous studies and a review of conditions at 10 ports and surrounding areas that handle almost two-thirds of all containers moving in and out of the country. The major challenges to freight mobility share a common theme--congestion. National studies point to such problems as overcrowded highways and freight-specific "chokepoints" that stifle effective intermodal transfer of cargoes. All 10 ports GAO studied faced similar congestionrelated problems. For example, many of the ports are in dense urban areas, limiting the ability to expand rail yards, roadways, and other infrastructure. Increased port security measures may exacerbate congestion if new controls drastically slow the movement of goods. Stakeholders encounter two main limitations in addressing freight mobility challenges. The first relates to the limited visibility that freight projects receive in the process for planning and prioritizing how transportation dollars should be spent. The planning process often lacks a comprehensive evaluation approach, such as a cost-benefit framework that might result in the implementation of freight improvements to better ensure that systemwide, multimodal solutions are considered and adopted where appropriate. The second relates to limitations of federal funding programs, which tend to dedicate funds to a single mode of transportation or a nonfreight purpose. Two strategies may help address these limitations. One is to ensure that transportation planning cuts across modes and individual jurisdictions, includes coordination with freight stakeholders representing an intermodal perspective, and includes sound analytical approaches and meaningful data needed to compare the benefits of freight and passenger projects. The second is to develop a multifaceted funding approach that includes improved access of freight projects to existing funding sources and support for programs that emphasize better use of existing infrastructure. If integrated in these strategies, three principles could better assure that the freight infrastructure system provides the level of capacity and performance that makes the greatest contribution to the nation's economic well-being. These principles include promoting efficiency by embracing a "user pay" approach, establishing performance measures, and aligning incentives for planning agencies to adopt best practices. Fri, 19 Dec 2003 00:00:00 -0500 Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security Efforts, September 9, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031154t.pdf The economic well being of the United States is dependent on the expeditious flow of people and goods through the transportation system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats to and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. TSA was recently transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the challenges in securing the transportation system and the federal role and actions in transportation security. Securing the nation's transportation system is fraught with challenges. The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure. Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels and thousands of private sector companies. Further exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has weakened the transportation industry's financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take the collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and future transportation challenges. Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting aviation security deadlines during its first year of existence and DOT launched a variety of security initiatives to enhance the other modes of transportation. For example, the Federal Transit Administration provided grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the largest transit agencies, among other things. TSA has recently focused more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation. DOT is also continuing their security efforts. However, the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system have not been clearly defined, which creates the potential for overlap, duplication, and confusion as both entities move forward with their security efforts. Tue, 09 Sep 2003 00:00:00 -0400 Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments, May 1, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03502.pdf The events of September 11, 2001, increased attention on efforts to assess the vulnerabilities of the nation's transportation infrastructure and develop needed improvements in security. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) had already begun research in this area in June 2001. The goals of RSPA's Transportation Infrastructure Assurance program are to identify, and develop ways to mitigate the impact of, threats to the nation's transportation infrastructure. DOT's Office of Intelligence and Security is responsible for defining the requirements for transportation infrastructure protection, ensuring that vulnerability assessments of transportation infrastructure are conducted, and taking action to mitigate those vulnerabilities. The House Committee on Appropriations asked GAO to determine (1) the status and anticipated results of the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) program, and (2) the extent to which RSPA and the Office of Intelligence and Security have coordinated their activities in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed and implementing the vulnerability assessments for the program. DOT and RSPA officials reviewed a draft of the report, agreed with its contents, and provided technical clarifications that we incorporated. The Transportation Infrastructure Assessment program is scheduled to end in December 2003 after the completion of four transportation vulnerability assessments. Congress appropriated $1 million in each of the fiscal years from 2001 through 2003 to RSPA for the program. RSPA plans to disseminate reports, conduct workshops, and post information on the Internet to inform decision-makers in the transportation community about the results. Prior to March 2003, RSPA did not fully coordinate their activities with the Office of Intelligence and Security in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed, or in implementing the assessments for the program. We discussed this problem with officials from both offices who agreed that closer coordination would be beneficial, particularly to discuss options for addressing the challenges facing program researchers in conducting the program's vulnerability assessments. In March 2003, officials from both offices began regular meetings to facilitate this coordination. Thu, 01 May 2003 00:00:00 -0400 Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed, April 30, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03435.pdf In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have been raised that the nation's shipments of hazardous materials by rail may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials are shipped yearly across the United States. Serious incidents involving these materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury. GAO was asked to examine recent steps taken by industry and government to improve the safety and security of these shipments and steps taken by local jurisdictions to prepare to respond to hazardous material rail incidents. After the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, industry and government took steps to improve the safety and security of hazardous material rail transportation. The railroad and chemical industries assessed their facilities' exposure to attack and developed a security plan to address their risks. The Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security Administration has begun to address non-aviation security by starting development of an overall intermodal transportation system security plan, but has not yet developed specific plans to address the security of individual surface transportation modes, including rail. Such a plan is needed to determine the adequacy of security measures already in place to protect rail shipments and identify security gaps. Officials from local jurisdictions that GAO visited, as well as other government and private sector experts, identified several unresolved issues pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous materials by rail. These include the need for measures to better safeguard hazardous materials temporarily stored in rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate destination and the advisability of requiring companies to notify local communities on the type and quantities of such materials stored or passing through their communities. While no standardized tool exists to gauge local preparedness, officials from nine of the ten cities that GAO visited said that they are generally prepared to respond to hazardous materials incidents. By the end of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security plans to determine the response capabilities of the nation by developing an assessment tool for use by states in performing assessments of their local communities' emergency response capabilities. Wed, 30 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0400 Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges, April 1, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03616t.pdf This testimony responds to the request of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States for information on GAO's work in transportation security. It addresses (1) transportation security before September 2001; (2) what the federal government has done since September 11th to strengthen transportation security, particularly aviation, mass transit, and port security; and (3) what long-term institutional challenges face the federal agencies responsible for transportation security. The testimony is based on a body of work that GAO has performed over the years. Before September 2001, GAO's work in transportation security focused largely on aviation security, which was then the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration, within the Department of Transportation. This work often demonstrated the existence of significant, long-standing vulnerabilities in aviation security. Among these vulnerabilities were airport screeners' inadequate detection of threats when screening passengers and their carry-on bags prior to their boarding aircraft; the absence of any requirement to screen checked baggage on domestic flights; inadequate controls for limiting access to secure areas at airports; and inadequate security for air traffic control computer systems and facilities. Since September 2001, securing the nation's transportation systems from terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. The Congress and the administration have reorganized the federal agencies responsible for transportation security, transferring them to the new Department of Homeland Security, and the agencies are attempting to enhance security without unduly inhibiting the movement of goods and people. The Transportation Security Administration, which was created in November 2001 and has assumed overall responsibility for transportation security, has made considerable progress in addressing aviation security challenges. By the end of December 2002, the agency had hired and deployed a workforce of over 60,000, including passenger and baggage screeners and federal air marshals, and was screening about 90 percent of all checked baggage for explosives. In addition, local mass transit agencies have assessed vulnerabilities, increased training for emergency preparedness, and conducted emergency drills. The Coast Guard has also performed initial risk assessments of ports, established new security guidelines, and initiated a comprehensive assessment of security conditions at 55 U.S. ports. The Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have actions under way to strengthen port security. Nevertheless, air cargo shipments, general aviation airports, and mass transit systems remain vulnerable to attack, and an effective port security environment may be many years away. The Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security face long-term transportation security challenges that include (1) developing a comprehensive transportation risk management approach; (2) ensuring that transportation security funding needs are identified and prioritized and that costs are controlled; (3) establishing effective coordination among the many public and private entities responsible for transportation security; (4) ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels; and (5) implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and security equipment. We have issued reports and made recommendations that address many of these challenges, and in response some actions are under way. Tue, 01 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0500 Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, December 20, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03344.pdf U.S. air carriers transport billions of tons of cargo each year in both passenger planes and all-cargo planes. Typically, about one-half of the hull of each passenger aircraft is filled with cargo. As a result, any vulnerabilities in the air cargo security system potentially threaten the entire air transport system. GAO agreed to determine the security vulnerabilities that have been identified in the air cargo system, the status of key recommendations that have been made since 1990 to improve air cargo security, and ways in which air cargo security can be improved in the near-and long-term. Numerous government and industry studies have identified vulnerabilities in the air cargo system. These vulnerabilities occur in the security procedures of some air carriers and freight forwarders and in possible tampering with freight at various handoffs that occur from the point when cargo leaves a shipper to the point when it is loaded onto an aircraft. As a result, any weaknesses in this program could create security risks. FAA or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which now has responsibility for ensuring air cargo security, has implemented a number of key recommendations and mandates to improve air cargo security made since 1990 by numerous government organizations. For example, FAA and the air cargo industry developed security training guides for air carriers and ground personnel who handle air cargo. However, a few recommendations by those groups, such as conducting research and operational tests of technology to screen cargo for explosives, are ongoing and not yet completed by TSA, or have not been implemented. Federal reports, industry groups, and security experts have identified operational and technological measures that have the potential to improve air cargo security in the near-term. Examples of the measures include checking the identity of individuals making cargo deliveries and implementing a computerized cargo profiling system. In addition, long-term improvements, such as developing a comprehensive cargo-security plan, have been recommended by the above sources, but not implemented by TSA. Each potential improvement measure, however, needs to be weighed against other issues, such as costs and the effects on the flow of cargo. Without a comprehensive plan that incorporates a risk management approach and sets deadlines and performance targets, TSA and other federal decisionmakers cannot know whether resources are being deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible in implementing measures to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack. Fri, 20 Dec 2002 00:00:00 -0500 Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges, December 13, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03263.pdf About one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked. In light of the history of terrorism against mass transit and the terrorist attacks on September 11, GAO was asked to examine challenges in securing transit systems, steps transit agencies have taken to improve safety and security, and the federal role in transit safety and security. To address these objectives, GAO visited 10 transit agencies and surveyed a representative sample of transit agencies, among other things. Transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their systems since September 11, such as conducting vulnerability assessments, revising emergency plans, and training employees. Formidable challenges, however, remain in securing transit systems. Obtaining sufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit systems as safe and secure as possible, according to GAO survey results and interviews with transit agency officials. Funding security improvements is problematic because of high security costs, competing budget priorities, tight budget environments, and a provision precluding transit agencies that serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. In addition to funding challenges, certain characteristics of transit agencies make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. For example, the high ridership and open access of some transit systems makes them attractive for terrorists but also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors, impractical. Moreover, because all levels of the government and the private sector are involved in transit decisions, coordination among all the stakeholders can pose challenges. While transit agencies are pursuing security improvements, the federal government's role in transit security is expanding. For example, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) launched a multipart security initiative and increased funding of its safety and security activities after September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gave the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsibility for the security of all transportation modes, including transit. TSA anticipates issuing national standards for transit security. As the federal government's role expands, goals, performance indicators, and funding criteria need to be established to ensure accountability and results for the government's efforts. Fri, 13 Dec 2002 00:00:00 -0500 Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, September 18, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d021075t.pdf Over a year has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, realigned national priorities. Although most of the early attention following the attacks focused on airport security, emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown. Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies provide transit services, and each workday, 14 million Americans ride on some form of transit. Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems secure. Certain characteristics make them both vulnerable and difficult to secure. The high ridership of some transit agencies makes them attractive targets for terrorists but also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors, impractical. Another challenge is funding identified security enhancements. Despite the formidable challenges in securing transit systems, transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their systems. Transit agencies visited by GAO were implementing strategies to improve both safety and security prior to September 11; however, the events of September 11 elevated the importance of security-related activity. Many agencies assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional training on emergency preparedness, revised emergency plans, and conducted multiple emergency drills. The federal government's role in transit security is evolving. Although the Federal Transit Administration has limited authority to oversee and regulate transit security, it launched a multipart security initiative and increased funding for its safety and security activities since September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation and gave it responsibility for transit security; however, TSA has yet to assume full responsibility for the security of any transportation mode other than aviation. Wed, 18 Sep 2002 00:00:00 -0400 Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and an Infrastructure Investment Framework, September 9, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d021090t.pdf This testimony discusses challenges in defining the federal role with respect to freight transportation issues. There are concerns that the projected increases in freight tonnage for all transportation modes will place pressures on the marine, aviation, and highway transportation systems. As a result, there is growing awareness of the need to view various transportation modes, and freight movement in particular, from an integrated standpoint, particularly for the purposes of developing and implementing a federal investment strategy and considering alternative funding approaches. The federal approach for funding the marine transportation system relies heavily on general revenues, although the approach for funding the aviation and highway systems relies almost exclusively on collections from users of the systems. During fiscal years 1999 through 2001, customs duties on imported goods transported through the transportation systems averaged $15 billion each year for the marine transportation system, $4 billion each year for the aviation system, and $900 million each year for the highway system. Customs duties are taxes on the value of imported goods and have traditionally been viewed as revenues to be used for the support of the general activities of the federal government. Diverse industry stakeholders believe that substantial new investments in the maritime infrastructure may be required from public and private sources because of an aging infrastructure, changes in the shipping industry, and increased concerns about security. A systematic framework would be helpful to decision makers as they consider the federal government's purpose and role in providing funding for the system and as they develop a sound investment approach to guide federal participation. In examining federal investment approaches across many national activities, GAO has identified four key components of such a framework--establishing national goals, defining the federal role, determining appropriate funding tools, and evaluating performance--which could potentially be applied to all transportation systems. Mon, 09 Sep 2002 00:00:00 -0400 Pipeline Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and Communication Needed, August 26, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02785.pdf The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is implementing a new approach to overseeing the safety of a 2.2-million-mile network of pipelines in the United States that transports potentially dangerous materials, including hazardous liquids, such as oil and natural gas. OPS has to complete several important steps to implement its integrity management approach within an ambitious, self-imposed schedule. The agency began applying this new regulatory approach to hazardous liquid pipelines in 2000 by issuing final rules requiring operators of these pipelines to develop integrity management programs. While implementing its integrity management approach, OPS must also perform ongoing oversight duties, such as inspecting the construction of new pipelines and investigating pipeline incidents. In addition to meeting its ambitious schedule, OPS faces a number of other challenges in implementing this new regulatory approach. These challenges include (1) enforcing the integrity management requirements consistently and effectively, (2) ensuring that natural gas transmission pipeline operators use assessment methods appropriately, (3) establishing an inspection interval for natural gas transmission pipelines, (4) measuring and reporting on the effectiveness of the approach, and (5) developing and implementing an approach for overseeing pipeline security. OPS's efforts to identify the resources and expertise needed to implement its integrity management approach are hampered by the lack of an up-to-date assessment of current and future staffing and training needs and an examination of the workforce's deployment across the organization--essential elements of a "workforce plan." Mon, 26 Aug 2002 00:00:00 -0400 Mass Transit: Many Management Successes at WMATA, but Capital Planning Could Be Enhanced, July 3, 2001 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01744.pdf In recent years, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) public transit system has experienced problems with the safety and reliability of its transit services, including equipment breakdowns, delays in scheduled service, unprecedented crowding on trains, and some accidents and tunnel fires. At the same time, WMATA's ridership is at an all time high and WMATA managers expect the number of passengers to double during the next 25 years. This report reviews (1) the challenges WMATA faces in operating and maintaining its Metrorail system; (2) efforts WMATA has made to establish and monitor safety and security within its transit system; and (3) the extent to which WMATA follows established best practices in planning, selecting, and budgeting for its capital investments. GAO found that WMATA is addressing significant challenges brought about by the agency's aging equipment and infrastructure and its ever-increasing ridership. WMATA has established programs to identify, evaluate, and minimize safety and security risks throughout its rail and bus systems. WMATA has also adopted several best capital practices used by leading public and private sector organizations, but it could benefit by establishing a more formal, disciplined framework for its capital decision-making process. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see Mass Transit: WMATA Is Addressing Many Challenges, but Capital Planning Could Be Improved, by JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues, before the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, House Committee on Government Reform. GAO-01-1161T, Sept. 21 (17 pages). Tue, 03 Jul 2001 00:00:00 -0400