GAO Reports: Transportation Security

This page lists the most recent reports and testimonies related to transportation security issued since October 2000 organized in three categories: aviation security, maritime security, and surface transportation security.

Maritime Security

http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/maritime.html Sun, 22 Nov 2009 21:34:42 -0500 GAO http://www.gao.gov/images/title_object.jpg GAO logo http://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Recent Testing Raises Issues About the Potential Effectiveness of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, November 17, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10252t.pdf The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in the nation's defenses against such threats. DHS has sponsored testing to develop new monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors, to replace radiation detection equipment being used at ports of entry. DNDO expects that ASPs may offer improvements over current-generation portal monitors, particularly the potential to identify as well as detect radioactive material and thereby to reduce both the risk of missed threats and the rate of innocent alarms, which DNDO considers to be key limitations of radiation detection equipment currently used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at U.S. ports of entry. However, ASPs cost significantly more than current generation portal monitors. Due to concerns about ASPs' cost and performance, Congress has required that the Secretary of Homeland Security certify that ASPs provide a significant increase in operational effectiveness before obligating funds for full-scale ASP procurement. In May 2009, GAO issued a report (GAO-09-655) on the status of the ongoing ASP testing round. This testimony (1) discusses the principal findings and recommendations from GAO's May report on ASP testing and (2) updates those findings based on information from DNDO and CBP officials on the results of testing conducted since the report's issuance. DHS, DNDO, and CBP's oral comments on GAO's new findings were included as appropriate. GAO's May 2009 report on ASP testing found that DHS increased the rigor in comparison with previous tests and thereby added credibility to the test results. However, GAO's report also questioned whether the benefits of the ASPs justify its high cost. In particular, the DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness require only a marginal improvement in the detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear materials, which DNDO considers a key limitation of current-generation portal monitors. The marginal improvement required of ASPs is particularly notable given that DNDO has not completed efforts to fine-tune current-generation equipment to provide greater sensitivity. Moreover, the test results showed that ASPs performed better than current-generation portal monitors in detection of such materials concealed by light shielding approximating the threat guidance for setting detection thresholds, but that differences in sensitivity were less notable when shielding was slightly below or above that level. Finally, DNDO had not yet updated its cost-benefit analysis to take into account the results of ASP testing and did not plan to complete computer simulations that could provide additional insight into ASP capabilities and limitations prior to certification even though test delays have allowed more time to conduct the simulations. DNDO officials believed the other tests were sufficient for ASPs to demonstrate a significant increase in operational effectiveness. GAO recommended that DHS assess ASPs against the full potential of current-generation equipment and revise the program schedule to allow time to conduct computer simulations and to uncover and resolve problems with ASPs before full-scale deployment. DHS agreed to a phased deployment that should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with the other recommendations, which GAO believes remain valid. The results of DNDO's most recent round of field testing raise continuing issues. In July 2009, DNDO resumed the field testing of ASPs that it initiated in January 2009 but suspended because of serious performance problems. However, the July tests also revealed critical performance deficiencies. For example, the ASP had a high number of false positive alarms for the detection of certain nuclear materials. According to CBP, these false alarms are very disruptive in a port environment because any alarm for this type of nuclear material causes CBP to take enhanced security precautions. To address these false alarms, DNDO plans to modify the ASP to make these monitors less sensitive to these nuclear materials and thereby diminishing the ASPs' capability. As GAO reported earlier this year, previous testing results demonstrated that the ASPs represented a marginal improvement in detecting these materials. By reducing the sensitivity to nuclear materials even further, it is uncertain exactly what improvement in detecting these materials the ASPs are providing or whether DNDO might be able to achieve a similar level of performance as the modified ASPs by improving the current-generation portal monitors that are already in place. In addition, the July 2009 testing also identified a critical equipment failure, including an alert malfunction, which DNDO is taking steps to resolve for future testing. Tue, 17 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Aviation Security: A National Strategy and Other Actions Would Strengthen TSA's Efforts to Secure Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, September 30, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09399.pdf Incidents of airport workers using access privileges to smuggle weapons through secured airport areas and onto planes have heightened concerns regarding commercial airport security. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), along with airports, is responsible for security at TSA-regulated airports. To guide risk assessment and protection of critical infrastructure, including airports, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). GAO was asked to examine the extent to which, for airport perimeters and access controls, TSA (1) assessed risk consistent with the NIPP; (2) implemented protective programs, and evaluated its worker screening pilots; and (3) established a strategy to guide decision making. GAO examined TSA documents related to risk assessment activities, airport security programs, and worker screening pilots; visited nine airports of varying size; and interviewed TSA, airport, and association officials. Although TSA has implemented activities to assess risks to airport perimeters and access controls, such as a commercial aviation threat assessment, it has not conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the nation's approximately 450 commercial airports or any consequence assessments. As a result, TSA has not completed a comprehensive risk assessment combining threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments as required by the NIPP. While TSA officials said they intend to conduct a consequence assessment and additional vulnerability assessments, TSA could not provide further details, such as milestones for their completion. Conducting a comprehensive risk assessment and establishing milestones for its completion would provide additional assurance that intended actions will be implemented, provide critical information to enhance TSA's understanding of risks to airports, and help ensure resources are allocated to the highest security priorities. Since 2004, TSA has taken steps to strengthen airport security and implement new programs; however, while TSA conducted a pilot program to test worker screening methods, clear conclusions could not be drawn because of significant design limitations and TSA did not document key aspects of the pilot. TSA has taken steps to enhance airport security by, among other things, expanding its requirements for conducting worker background checks and implementing a worker screening program. In fiscal year 2008 TSA pilot tested various methods to screen airport workers to compare the benefits, costs, and impacts of 100 percent worker screening and random worker screening. TSA designed and implemented the pilot in coordination with the Homeland Security Institute (HSI), a federally funded research and development center. However, because of significant limitations in the design and evaluation of the pilot, such as the limited number of participating airports--7 out of about 450--it is unclear which method is more cost-effective. TSA and HSI also did not document key aspects of the pilot's design, methodology, and evaluation, such as a data analysis plan, limiting the usefulness of these efforts. A well-developed and well-documented evaluation plan can help ensure that pilots generate needed performance information to make effective decisions. While TSA has completed these pilots, developing an evaluation plan for future pilots could help ensure that they are designed and implemented to provide management and Congress with necessary information for decision making. TSA's efforts to enhance the security of the nation's airports have not been guided by a unifying national strategy that identifies key elements, such as goals, priorities, performance measures, and required resources. For example, while TSA's various airport security efforts are implemented by federal and local airport officials, TSA officials said that they have not identified or estimated costs to airport operators for implementing security requirements. GAO has found that national strategies that identify these key elements strengthen decision making and accountability; in addition, developing a strategy with these elements could help ensure that TSA prioritizes its activities and uses resources efficiently to achieve intended outcomes. Wed, 30 Sep 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from DHS Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, June 25, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09804t.pdf The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for addressing the threat of nuclear smuggling. Radiation detection portal monitors are key elements in the nation's defenses against such threats. DHS has sponsored testing to develop new monitors, known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors, to replace radiation detection equipment being used at ports of entry. DNDO expects that ASPs may offer improvements over current-generation portal monitors, particularly the potential to identify as well as detect radioactive material and thereby to reduce both the risk of missed threats and the rate of innocent alarms, which DNDO considers to be key limitations of radiation detection equipment currently used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at U.S. ports of entry. However, ASPs cost significantly more than current generation portal monitors. Due to concerns about ASPs' cost and performance, Congress has required that the Secretary of Homeland Security certify that ASPs provide a significant increase in operational effectiveness before obligating funds for full-scale ASP procurement. This testimony addresses (1) GAO findings on DNDO's latest round of ASP testing, and (2) lessons from ASP testing that can be applied to other DHS technology investments. These findings are based on GAO's May 2009 report GAO-09-655 and other related reports. GAO's report on the latest round of ASP testing found that DHS increased the rigor in comparison with previous tests and thereby added credibility to the test results. However, GAO's report also questioned whether the benefits of the ASPs justify the high cost. In particular, the DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness require only a marginal improvement in the detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear materials, which DNDO considers a key limitation of current-generation portal monitors. The marginal improvement required of ASPs is particularly notable given that DNDO has not completed efforts to fine-tune current-generation equipment to provide greater sensitivity. Moreover, the preliminary test results show that ASPs performed better than current-generation portal monitors in detection of such materials concealed by light shielding approximating the threat guidance for setting detection thresholds, but that differences in sensitivity were less notable when shielding was slightly below or above that level. Finally, DNDO has not yet updated its cost-benefit analysis to take into account the results of the latest round of ASP testing and does not plan to complete computer simulations that could provide additional insight into ASP capabilities and limitations prior to certification even though test delays have allowed more time to conduct the simulations. DNDO officials believe the other tests are sufficient for ASPs to demonstrate a significant increase in operational effectiveness. GAO recommended that DHS assess ASPs against the full potential of current-generation equipment and revise the program schedule to allow time to conduct computer simulations and to uncover and resolve problems with ASPs before full-scale deployment. DHS agreed to a phased deployment that should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with the other recommendations, which GAO believes remain valid. The challenges DNDO has faced in developing and testing ASPs illustrate the importance of following best practices for investments in complex homeland security acquisitions and for testing of new technologies. GAO recently found that many major DHS investments, including DNDO's ASP program, had not met the department's requirements for basic acquisition documents necessary to inform the investment review process, which has adopted many acquisition best practices. As a result, DHS had not consistently provided the oversight needed to identify and address cost, schedule, and performance problems in its major investments. A primary lesson to be learned regarding testing is that the push to replace existing equipment with the new portal monitors led to an ASP testing program that until recently lacked the necessary rigor. Even for the most recent round of testing, DNDO's schedule consistently underestimated the time required to conduct tests and resolve problems uncovered during testing. In contrast, GAO has previously found that testing programs designed to validate a product's performance against increasing standards for different stages in product development are a best practice for acquisition strategies for new technologies. Aspects that improved the latest round of ASP testing could also, if properly implemented, provide rigor to DHS's testing of other advanced technologies. Thu, 25 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Coast Guard: Administrative Law Judge Program Contains Elements Designed to Foster Judges' Independence and Mariner Protections Assessed Are Being Followed, June 12, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09489.pdf The United States Coast Guard's Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) program is designed to, among other things, promote safety at sea while protecting mariners' rights and is composed of judges whose duties include presiding over cases involving mariners' credentials. If a mariner does not meet certain requirements related to safety and security at sea, Coast Guard investigative officers are to serve the mariner with a complaint that lists the allegation(s) and initiate proceedings that can result in the mariner's credential being suspended or revoked. GAO was asked to review elements of the ALJ program and this report addresses (1) the extent to which the ALJ program contains elements designed to foster the decisional independence of ALJs, (2) the extent to which the ALJ program includes protections for mariners and whether complaints and decisions include elements required by program regulations, and (3) the outcome of mariner suspension and revocation cases in recent years. To conduct this study, GAO analyzed the laws, regulations, and policies governing the ALJ program. GAO also reviewed all suspension and revocation cases opened and closed from November 10, 2005, through September 30, 2008, to determine outcomes, and further reviewed a representative sample of these cases to determine whether complaints and decisions included the required elements. GAO supplemented these case reviews with interviews of Coast Guard ALJ program officials. The Coast Guard's ALJ program contains elements designed to foster the decisional independence of its judges by following Office of Personnel Management regulations governing the ALJs' hiring and employment. These regulations are designed to ensure that the ALJs are not subject to undue influence from Coast Guard officials. For example, personnel actions against a judge, such as the removal of an ALJ, may only be taken through an independent agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Coast Guard's ALJ program contains protections for mariners--such as the right to a hearing and representation--and complaints filed by the Coast Guard and decisions issued by ALJs that we reviewed generally included the required elements. In particular, GAO reviewed cases opened and closed from November 10, 2005, through September 30, 2008, and determined that (1) regulations governing complaints, which are intended to notify mariners of the allegations against them; and (2) regulations requiring ALJs' decisions to contain certain elements, such as finding of fact, were being followed. Based on GAO's review of the 1,675 suspension and revocation cases opened and closed from November 10, 2005, through September 30, 2008, the majority (62 percent) resulted in settlement agreements; for example, a mariner may give up his or her credential while completing safety training. In these cases, the outcomes were determined through negotiations between the mariners and the Coast Guard. In contrast, 3 percent of the cases resulted in a hearing before an ALJ that ended with a decision and order--a decision presents the ALJ's findings, while an order states the sanction, if any, imposed on the mariner. The remaining 36 percent of cases had a variety of outcomes. The disposition of all cases reviewed is shown below. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Coast Guard generally concurred with the findings and believes that the report is both complete and accurate. Fri, 12 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of the New Technology, May 21, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09655.pdf The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is testing new advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation detection monitors. DNDO expects ASPs to reduce both the risk of missed threats and the rate of innocent alarms, which DNDO considers to be key limitations of radiation detection equipment currently used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at U.S. ports of entry. Congress has required that the Secretary of DHS certify that ASPs provide a significant increase in operational effectiveness before obligating funds for full-scale procurement. GAO was asked to review (1) the degree to which DHS's criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness address the limitations of existing radiation detection equipment, (2) the rigor of ASP testing and preliminary test results, and (3) the ASP test schedule. GAO reviewed the DHS criteria, analyzed test plans, and interviewed DHS officials. The DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness require a minimal improvement in the detection of threats and a large reduction in innocent alarms. Specifically, the criteria require a marginal improvement in the detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear materials, considered to be a key limitation of current-generation portal monitors. The criteria require improved performance over the current detection threshold, which for certain nuclear materials is based on the equipment's limited sensitivity to anything more than lightly shielded materials, but do not specify a level of shielding that smugglers could realistically use. In addition, DNDO has not completed efforts to improve current-generation portal monitors' performance. As a result, the criteria do not take the current equipment's full potential into account. With regard to innocent alarms, the other key limitation of current equipment, meeting the criteria could result in hundreds fewer innocent alarms per day, thereby reducing CBP's workload and delays to commerce. DHS increased the rigor of ASP testing in comparison with previous tests. For example, DNDO mitigated the potential for bias in performance testing (a concern GAO raised about prior testing) by stipulating that there would be no ASP contractor involvement in test execution. Such improvements added credibility to the test results. However, the testing still had limitations, such as a limited set of scenarios used in performance testing to conceal test objects from detection. Moreover, the preliminary results are mixed. The results show that the new portal monitors have a limited ability to detect certain nuclear materials at anything more than light shielding levels: ASPs performed better than current-generation portal monitors in detection of such materials concealed by light shielding approximating the threat guidance for setting detection thresholds, but differences in sensitivity were less notable when shielding was slightly below or above that level. Testing also uncovered multiple problems in ASPs meeting the requirements for successful integration into operations at ports of entry. CBP officials anticipate that, if ASPs are certified, new problems will appear during the first few years of deployment in the field. While DNDO's schedule underestimated the time needed for ASP testing, test delays have allowed more time for review and analysis of results. DNDO's original schedule anticipated completion in September 2008. Problems uncovered during testing of ASPs' readiness to be integrated into operations at U.S. ports of entry caused the greatest delays to this schedule. DHS's most recent schedule anticipated a decision on ASP certification as early as May 2009, but DHS recently suspended field validation due to ASP performance problems and has not updated its schedule for testing and certification. In any case, DNDO does not plan to complete computer simulations that could provide additional insight into ASP capabilities and limitations prior to certification even though delays have allowed more time to conduct the simulations. DNDO officials believe the other tests are sufficient for ASPs to demonstrate a significant increase in operational effectiveness. Thu, 21 May 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Northern Border Security: DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities, November 25, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0993.pdf Covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water from Washington to Maine, the U.S.-Canadian border is the longest undefended border in the world. Various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies share responsibility for northern border security, primarily U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in collaboration with other federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian entities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act of 2007 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress that addresses the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and provides recommendations and required resources to address them. The act also required GAO to review and comment on this report. In response to this mandate, GAO examined (1) the extent to which the DHS report to Congress is responsive to the legislative requirements and (2) actions that may be necessary to address northern border vulnerabilities in addition to the actions addressed in the report. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DHS plans, reports, and other documents, and interviewed DHS officials. The DHS February 2008 report to Congress is not fully responsive to legislative requirements in providing information for improving northern border security. In particular, DHS provided a listing of northern border vulnerabilities and initiatives to address them, but did not include recommendations and additional resources that are needed to protect the northern border. DHS officials provided several reasons for the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information, including the fact that the component agencies' priorities for action and resources are reflected in the existing budget process, and that they had nothing further to recommend or request through this report. However, budget documents do not reflect the resources needed over time to achieve control of the northern border. The lack of this information makes it difficult for Congress to consider future actions and resources needed. DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. DHS is currently developing strategic plans that are intended to provide overall direction in addressing vulnerabilities in northern border security. DHS is also developing a risk-management process to assist in prioritizing efforts and resources that will provide greatest benefit to national security. DHS officials have said that the success of various pilot projects, such as DHS's testing of new technology, will likely change the level and mix of resources needed to protect the northern border. In the meantime, DHS could take action to reduce vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past evaluations. DHS has implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to improve border security, but 39 recommendations are yet to be fully addressed. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within the last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving use of air and marine assets, improving screening processes at the ports of entry, and deploying nuclear detection equipment--which DHS and other agencies generally agreed to take action to implement--have remained open for at least 1 year and, in some cases, over 3 years. GAO believes these outstanding recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented. Tue, 25 Nov 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Various Issues Led to the Termination of the United States-Canada Shared Border Management Pilot Project, September 4, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081038r.pdf In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, balancing the need to secure U.S. borders while maintaining the flow of legitimate cross-border travel and commerce has taken on an added importance. The United States and Canada share a border that extends nearly 4,000 miles, and one of the world's largest trading relationships. Each year, approximately 70 million travelers and 35 million vehicles cross the border from Canada into the United States, according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Given the volume of cross-border travel and trade between the United States and Canada, border congestion and the resulting wait times have a substantial economic impact on both nations. Furthermore, according to an analysis by DHS, the heightened emphasis on border security following the 2001 terrorist attacks has lengthened processing time for travelers and cargo crossing into the United States. Recognizing the need to improve both border security and border-crossing efficiency, the United States and Canada have cooperated on various cross-border management initiatives intended to increase the flow of legitimate travel across the border while maintaining security. For example, to facilitate the travel of low-risk prescreened individuals across the northern border, the United States and Canada jointly operate the NEXUS program. The NEXUS program allows registered border residents and frequent cross-border travelers identified as low-risk individuals access to dedicated lanes and expedited processing with minimal inspection. The United States and Canada also coordinate on border law enforcement programs such as the Integrated Border Enforcement Team Program (IBET), which is a bi-national, multi-agency law enforcement initiative that (1) provides, where necessary, support to national security investigations associated to the Canada/United States border and (2) investigates illegal cross-border activities. A key collaborative effort to improve security and relieve congestion at the ports of entry across the northern border is to move customs and immigration inspection activities away from the border--a concept known as "land preclearance" or "shared border management." In December 2004, the United States and Canada announced that the two governments had agreed to move forward with a land preclearance pilot project at the Buffalo, New York-Fort Erie, Ontario Peace Bridge and at one other border crossing site along the northern border, which had not yet been determined. The land preclearance pilot project flowed from the 2001 Smart Border Declaration and its associated action plan, which was meant to enhance the security along the northern border while facilitating information sharing and the legitimate flow of people and goods, and securing infrastructure. The preclearance pilot at the Peace Bridge would involve the relocation of all U.S. border inspection operations for both commercial and passenger traffic from the U.S. side of the border in Buffalo, New York, to the Canadian side of the border in Fort Erie, Ontario. From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in negotiations to implement land preclearance at the Buffalo-Fort Erie Peace Bridge ports of entry. However, in April 2007, these negotiations were officially terminated by DHS. Section 566 of the 2008 DHS Appropriations Act mandates that we conduct a study on DHS's use of shared border management to secure the borders of the United States. In accordance with the mandate and discussions with Committee staff, this report addresses the following questions: (1) What negotiations have been conducted by the Department of Homeland Security regarding the shared border management pilot project? (2) What issues led to the termination of shared border management negotiations? From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in negotiations to implement a land preclearance pilot project (also referred to as "shared border management"), which would have relocated the U.S. border inspection facility from the Buffalo, New York, side of the Peace Bridge to the Fort Erie, Ontario, side. All CBP inspections and operations would then take place before travelers and cargo entered the United States. The Peace Bridge site was selected for the pilot because it is one of the busiest commercial crossings between the United States and Canada, yet the existing border infrastructure at the Peace Bridge contributes to a number of security and border crossing inefficiencies, according to DHS. Specifically, DHS had concluded that the U.S. inspection facility, which is located near the center of downtown Buffalo, is outdated, undersized, and lacks the modern amenities a port of its size should have to operate efficiently and securely. The facility is located on 17 acres of land, as opposed to the 80 acres that CBP recommends for a large port of entry. DHS has reported that additional inspection space is needed to address these infrastructure issues, but there is no easily available land adjacent to the facility in Buffalo. On the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge in Fort Erie, there are approximately 70 acres of land available on which the U.S. inspection facility could have been co-located with Canadian inspection facilities. In April 2007, DHS officially terminated negotiations with Canada because a mutually acceptable framework for United States-Canada shared border management could not be reached. Officials from both countries agreed that negotiations were conducted in good faith, and the two governments were able to reach accommodations on several key issues raised during the negotiations, such as the approval of all of the authorities Canada sought for its U.S.-based preclearance area, and the arming of CBP officers at the preclearance site on Canadian soil. However, certain issues pertaining to each country's sovereignty and the law enforcement authorities of U.S. CBP officers operating on Canadian soil could not be resolved. These issues included concerns over arrest authority; the right of individuals to withdraw an application to enter the United States while at the land preclearance site in Canada; mutually agreeable fingerprinting processes; how information collected by U.S. officials at the land preclearance site would be shared; and concerns that future interpretations of the Canadian Charter could adversely impact U.S. authorities at the preclearance site. Thu, 04 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain, August 15, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08538.pdf Oceangoing cargo containers play a vital role in global trade but can also pose a risk of terrorist exploitation. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), oversees security of the supply chain--the flow of goods from manufacturer to retailer. CBP anticipates that adoption of uniform, international customs security standards could eventually lead to a system of mutual recognition whereby the customs security-related practices and programs taken by one customs administration are recognized and accepted by another administration. In response to congressional requesters, GAO determined (1) actions CBP has taken to develop and implement international supply chain security standards, (2) actions CBP has taken with international partners to achieve mutual recognition of customs security practices, and (3) issues CBP and foreign customs administrations anticipate in implementing 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound container cargo. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed CBP documents on supply chain security programs and international cooperation initiatives and met with CBP officials and foreign customs officials from various trading partner nations. Also, GAO drew upon its related reports and testimony on supply chain security issued earlier this year--GAO-08-187 (Jan. 25), GAO-08-240 (Apr. 25), and GAO-08-533T (June 12). DHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated where appropriate. To develop and implement international supply chain security standards, CBP has taken a lead role in working with foreign customs administrations and the World Customs Organization (WCO). Through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), CBP places staff at foreign seaports to work with host nation customs officials to identify high-risk container cargo bound for the United States, and through the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), CBP forms voluntary partnerships to enhance security measures with international businesses involved in oceangoing trade with the United States. In collaboration with 11 other members of the WCO, CBP developed the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework), which is based in part on the core concepts of the CSI and C-TPAT programs and provides standards for collaboration among customs administrations and entities participating in the supply chain. The SAFE Framework was adopted by the 173 WCO member customs administrations in June 2005; and as of July 2008 154 had signed letters of intent to implement the standards. CBP has actively engaged with international partners to define and achieve mutual recognition of customs security practices. Broadly, for example, CBP contributed to development of the SAFE Framework, which calls for a system of mutual recognition. More specifically, in June 2007, CBP signed a mutual recognition arrangement with New Zealand--the first such arrangement in the world--to recognize each other's customs-to-business partnership programs. Furthermore, in June of this year, CBP signed mutual recognition agreements with Jordan and Canada. By early 2009, CBP anticipates obtaining a mutual recognition agreement with the European Commission, which represents the 27 member nations of the European Union. CBP actively engages in the implementation of international customs security standards, however recent law, such as The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) requiring that 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo be scanned at foreign seaports--using a nonintrusive inspection process involving equipment such as X-rays and radiation detection equipment--may affect worldwide adoption of international supply chain security standards. CBP and some foreign partners have stated that unless additional resources are made available, 100 percent scanning could not be met. Given limited resources, CBP and European custom administration officials said that 100 percent scanning may provide a lower level of security if customs officers are diverted from focusing on high-risk container cargo. Under the current risk-management system, for example, the scanned images of high-risk containers are to be reviewed in a very detailed manner. However, according to WCO and industry officials, if all containers are to be scanned, the reviews may not be as thorough. Further, a European customs administration reported that 100 percent scanning could have a negative impact on the flow of commerce and also would affect trade with developing countries disproportionately. Fri, 15 Aug 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan Shows Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and DHS Accountability, June 26, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08739r.pdf In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Elements of SBI are carried out by several organizations within DHS. One component is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program office, which is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system using people; technology, known as SBInet; and tactical infrastructure (TI)--pedestrian and vehicle fencing; roads; and lighting. Initially, the focus of SBI is on the U.S. southwest border areas, between the ports of entry, that CBP has designated as most in need of enhanced border security because of serious vulnerabilities. In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the Boeing Company for 3 years, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime contractor, Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and sustaining selected SBInet technology and tactical infrastructure projects, and for providing supply chain management for selected tactical infrastructure projects. For fiscal years 2005 through 2008, Congress appropriated more than $2.7 billion for the SBI program. For fiscal year 2009, the President's budget includes a request for an additional $775 million for SBI. The Fiscal Year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act required DHS to submit to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees an expenditure plan for the department's efforts to establish a security barrier along the borders of the United States, including pedestrian and vehicle fencing as well as other forms of tactical infrastructure and technology. This plan was to address 15 legislative conditions and was submitted to Congress on March 31, 2008. As required by the act, we reviewed the plan and on April 7 and April 10, 2008, briefed staff of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees, respectively, on our results. The SBI fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan, including related documentation and program officials' statements, satisfied seven legislative conditions, partially satisfied seven legislative conditions, and did not satisfy one legislative condition. The SBI expenditure plan is intended to provide Congress with the information needed to effectively oversee the program and hold DHS accountable for program results. Satisfying the conditions is important since the Fiscal Year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act required an expenditure plan that satisfies the 15 conditions summarized above to be submitted to and approved by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees before the agency could obligate $650 million of the approximately $1.2 billion appropriated for CBP fencing, infrastructure and technology. Satisfying the conditions is also important to minimize the program's exposure to cost, schedule, and performance risks. The fiscal year 2008 plan states that it addresses our February 2007 recommendation that the plan include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual program activities. However, based on our review, while the 2008 plan is more detailed than the 2007 plan, it does not provide detailed justification for all planned SBI expenditures, nor does it permit progress against program commitments to be adequately measured and disclosed. In addition, the 2008 plan does not clearly demonstrate how specific CBP SBI activities link with the DHS Secure Border Strategy and further the objectives of DHS's overall border strategy, nor does it provide Congress with reasonable assurance that funding is used for the highest priority requirements. Thu, 26 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented, June 20, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08672.pdf The safety and economic security of the United States depends on the secure use of the world's seaports and waterways. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13, also referred to as National Security Presidential Directive-41) directs the coordination of U.S. maritime security policy through the creation of a National Strategy for Maritime Security and supporting implementation plans. GAO was asked to evaluate this strategy and its eight supporting plans. This report discusses: (1) the extent to which the strategy and its supporting plans contain desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) the reported status of the implementation of these plans. To conduct this work, GAO evaluated the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans against the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in February 2004, reviewed HSPD-13 and supporting plans, and reviewed documents on the status of the plans' implementation. Of the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in 2004, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting implementation plans address four and partially address the remaining two. Documents provided by the Maritime Security Working Group--an interagency body responsible for monitoring and assessing the implementation of the maritime strategy--indicate that the implementation status of the eight supporting plans varies. For example, as of November 2007, implementation of one plan had been completed, while another has reached the assessment phase (e.g., lessons learned and best practices), and a third has reached the execution phase (e.g., exercises and operations). The other five plans remain primarily in the planning phase. The working group is monitoring the implementation of 76 actions across the plans, and reported 6 of these are completed and 70 are ongoing. Fri, 20 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials, June 19, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08598.pdf Concerns have grown that terrorists could use radioactive materials and sealed sources (materials sealed in a capsule) to build a "dirty bomb"-- a device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. In 2003, GAO found weaknesses in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) radioactive materials licensing process and made recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO assesses (1) the progress NRC has made in implementing the 2003 recommendations, (2) other steps NRC has taken to improve its ability to track radioactive materials, (3) Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) ability to detect radioactive materials at land ports of entry, and (4) CBP's ability to verify that such materials are appropriately licensed prior to entering the United States. To perform this work, GAO assessed documents and interviewed NRC and CBP officials in headquarters and in several field locations. NRC has implemented three of the six recommendations in GAO's 2003 report on the security of radioactive sources. It has worked with the 35 states to which it ceded primary authority to regulate radioactive materials and sources and others to (1) identify sealed sources of greatest concern, (2) enhance requirements to secure radioactive sources, and (3) ensure security requirements are implemented. In contrast, NRC has made limited progress toward implementing recommendations to (1) modify its process for issuing licenses to ensure that radioactive materials cannot be purchased by those with no legitimate need for them, (2) determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of malicious use of such materials, and (3) examine whether certain radioactive sources should be subject to more stringent regulations. Beyond acting on GAO's recommendations, NRC has also taken four steps to improve its ability to monitor and track radioactive materials. First, NRC created an interim national database to monitor the licensed sealed sources containing materials that pose the greatest risk of being used in a dirty bomb. Second, NRC is developing a National Source Tracking System to replace the interim database and provide more comprehensive, frequently updated information on potentially dangerous sources. However, this system has been delayed by 18 months and is not expected to be fully operational until January 2009. Third, NRC is also developing a Web-based licensing system that will include more comprehensive information on all sources and materials that require NRC or state approval to possess. Finally, NRC is developing a license verification system that will draw information from the other new systems to enable officials and vendors to verify that those seeking to bring these radioactive materials into the country or purchase them are licensed to do so. However, these systems are more than 3 years behind schedule and may not include the licensing information, initially at least, on radioactive materials regulated by agreement states--which represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for such materials. The delays in the deployment and full development of these systems are especially consequential because NRC has identified their deployment as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials. While CBP has a comprehensive system in place to detect radioactive materials entering the United States at land borders, some equipment that is used to protect CBP officers is in short supply. Specifically, vehicles, cargo, and people entering the United States at most ports of entry along the Canadian and Mexican borders are scanned for radioactive materials with radiation detection equipment capable of detecting very small amounts of radiation. However we found that personal radiation detectors are not available to all officers who need them. Moreover, while CBP has systems in place to verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials licenses, it has not effectively communicated to officers at the borders when they must contact officials to verify the license for a given sealed source. Consequently, some CPB officers are not following current guidance, and some potentially dangerous radioactive materials have entered the country without license verification. Thu, 19 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers, June 12, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08533t.pdf U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for preventing weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States in cargo containers that are shipped from more than 700 foreign seaports. The Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act calls for testing the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) requires scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers by 2012. To fulfill these requirements, CBP created the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and has initiated a pilot program at seven seaports. This testimony discusses challenges related to the SFI pilot program and implementation of the requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from July 2003 through April 2008 and ongoing work. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed reports from CBP and international partners on SFI and other container security programs, and interviewed CBP and foreign customs officials. GAO identified challenges in nine areas that are related to the continuation of the SFI pilot program and the longer-term 100 percent scanning requirement: (1) Workforce planning: The SFI pilot program could generate an increased quantity of scan data. Therefore, more CBP officers will be required to review and analyze data for participating seaports. (2) Host nation examination practices: The SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts require DHS to develop standards for the scanning systems, but CBP lacks information on host nation equipment and practices. (3) Measuring performance: CBP has had difficulties defining performance measures for its container security programs; therefore, it will be difficult to assess if 100 percent scanning achieves increased security. (4) Resource responsibilities: Neither the SAFE Port Act nor the 9/11 Act specifies whether the United States would bear the costs of implementing 100 percent scanning. (5) Logistics: Space constraints can require seaports to place scanning equipment miles from where cargo containers are stored, and some containers are only available for scanning for a short period of time and may be difficult to access. (6) Technology and infrastructure: Environmental conditions can damage equipment and cause delays, and infrastructure capacity and equipment compatibility have presented difficulties in the SFI pilot program. (7) Use and ownership of data: Legislation specifies that scan data should be available to CBP officials, but the data are often generated and collected by foreign seaports and, in some cases, will require international agreements for transfer to CBP officials. (8) Consistency with risk management: International partners state that 100 percent scanning is inconsistent with accepted risk management principles and diverts resources away from other security threats. (9) Reciprocity and trade concerns: Foreign governments could call for reciprocity of 100 percent scanning, requiring the United States to scan cargo containers, and some view this requirement as a barrier to trade. Thu, 12 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007, May 16, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08757.pdf From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of GAO's work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, GAO's work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent systemic weaknesses. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but has included the response in this report. GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry, undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia). In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driver's license, but the officer said, "That's fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of entry with little chance of being detected. In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO's activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the assessed locations. Fri, 16 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices, April 25, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08240.pdf U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for ensuring the security of cargo containers shipped into the United States. To strike a balance between security and commerce, CBP oversees the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT program. As part of this program, CBP aims to secure the supply chain--the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers--through partnerships with international trade companies. Member companies agree to allow CBP to validate their security practices and, in exchange, they are awarded benefits, such as reduced scrutiny of their cargo. In 2005, GAO reviewed the C-TPAT program and noted operational challenges. For this report, GAO was asked to assess the progress CBP has made since 2005 in (1) improving its benefit award policies for C-TPAT members, (2) addressing challenges in validating members' security practices, and (3) addressing management and staffing challenges. To perform this work, GAO analyzed a nonprobability sample of completed validations; reviewed annual, human capital, and strategic plans; and held discussions with CBP officials. CBP has strengthened its policies for granting benefits to importers, C-TPAT's largest member sector, and is working to improve its policies for members in other trade sectors. For example, starting in March 2005, CBP began requiring members in 9 out of the 10 trade sectors to meet minimum security criteria and it plans to finalize criteria for the tenth trade sector by mid-2008. CBP has also introduced a process that awards benefits for C-TPAT importers on a three-tiered basis, depending on validation of their security practices. CBP officials told us that they interpret the benefit tiering provisions of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 to apply mainly to importers. Nevertheless, CBP considered implementing tiered benefits for these other trade sectors, but it has not been able to identify additional benefits to offer nonimporters in a tiered structure. CBP has taken steps to improve the security validation process, but still faces challenges in verifying that C-TPAT members' security practices meet minimum criteria. CBP has sought to strengthen the validation process by providing appropriate guidance and developing a portable, electronic instrument to help ensure that validation information is consistently collected, documented, and uniformly applied to decisions regarding the awarding of benefits to C-TPAT members. However, the usefulness of the instrument is limited due to its default "no" responses. Specifically, if a response is marked "no," it is unclear whether a security specialist, who has the discretion to answer or not answer individual questions, intentionally answered the question or if the response was an automatic default. This factor limits the ability of CBP to validate security practices at member companies. CBP has taken actions to address C-TPAT management and staffing challenges, such as implementing a human capital plan, a records management system, and performance measures. While these actions have addressed a number of challenges, others remain. In particular, CBP's records management system does not include interim processing dates--such as the date that security specialists send companies the 30-day validation notification letter--to enable management or others to determine CBP's compliance with program requirements. Further, although CBP has developed performance measures for facilitating the flow of commerce, it has not developed performance measures to assess the effectiveness of C-TPAT's efforts to improve supply chain security. Fri, 25 Apr 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent Performance, and Related Challenges, March 6, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08494t.pdf The U.S. Coast Guard, a multi-mission maritime military service within the Department of Homeland Security, has requested more than $9 billion for fiscal year 2009 to address its responsibilities for homeland security missions (such as undocumented migrant interdiction) and non-homeland security missions (such as environmental protection). Integral to conducting its missions, is the Deepwater program--a 25-year, $24 billion effort to upgrade or replace vessels and aircraft. This testimony discusses: budget request and trends, and performance statistics, challenges in balancing operations across multiple missions, and Deepwater affordability, management, and its impact on operations. GAO's comments are based on products issued from 1997 to 2008. This testimony also discusses on-going work related to patrol boat operations. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed relevant officials. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 budget request is approximately 7 percent higher than its fiscal year 2008 enacted budget, generally because of proposed increases in both operating expenses and acquisition, construction, and improvements funding. The Coast Guard expects to meet its performance goals for 6 of its 11 mission areas for fiscal year 2007, similar to the performance it reported for fiscal year 2006. The Coast Guard also continues to develop additional measures to better understand the links between resources expended and results achieved. The Coast Guard continues to face challenges balancing its various missions with its finite resources and has had difficulties funding and executing both its homeland security and non-homeland security missions. GAO's work has shown that the Coast Guard's homeland security requirements continue to increase and that it has been unable to keep up with these rising security demands. For example, the Coast Guard is not meeting its requirements for providing vessel escorts and conducting security patrols. The Coast Guard is also facing additional requirements to conduct more inspections of maritime facilities and provide security at a growing number of facilities that import hazardous cargos. The Deepwater acquisition program continues to be a source of challenges and progress for the Coast Guard. In terms of affordability, the magnitude of Deepwater funding--representing about 11 percent of the agency's proposed fiscal year 2009 budget--presents a long-term challenge. In terms of management, the Coast Guard has made changes to improve program management by moving away from reliance on a system integrator, increasing government monitoring of program outcomes and competitively purchasing selected assets. In terms of operations, delays in the procurement of new patrol boats have increased resource requirements to maintain older legacy patrol boats and keep them operating. Thu, 06 Mar 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border Security Programs and Operations, but Challenges Remain, March 6, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08542t.pdf Since September 11, 2001, the need to secure U.S. borders has increased in importance and attracted greater public and Congressional attention. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent billions of dollars to prevent the illegal entry of individuals and contraband between ports of entry--government-designated locations where DHS inspects persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted into the country. Yet, while DHS apprehends hundreds of thousands of such individuals each year, several hundreds of thousands more enter the country illegally and undetected. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, is the lead federal agency in charge of securing our nation's borders. This testimony summarizes GAO's work on DHS's efforts on selected border security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting travelers at U.S. ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals attempting to enter the country illegally between ports of entry, and (3) screening of international travelers before they arrive in the United States and challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's observations are based on products issued from May 2006 through February 2008. In prior reports, GAO has recommended various actions to DHS to, among other things, help address weaknesses in the traveler inspection programs and processes, and challenges in training officers to inspect travelers and documents. DHS has generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken various actions to address them. CBP has taken actions to improve traveler inspections at U.S. ports of entry, but challenges remain. First, CBP has stressed the importance of effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in interviewing travelers. Yet, weaknesses in travel inspection procedures and lack of physical infrastructure and staff have hampered CBP's ability to inspect travelers thoroughly and detect fraudulent documents. Second, CBP is implementing an initiative requiring citizens of the United States, Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to present certain identification documents when entering the United States. As of December 2007, actions taken to meet the initiative's requirements include selecting technology to be used at land ports of entry and developing plans to train officers to use it. Finally, DHS has developed a program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the country. As of October 2007, the agency has invested more than $1.5 billion on the program over 4 years and biometrically-enabled entry capabilities now operate at more than 300 ports of entry. However, though allocating about $250 million since 2003 to exit-related efforts, DHS has not yet detailed how it will verify when travelers exit the country. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing immigration of individuals who enter the United States illegally and undetected between ports of entry. One component of this program, which DHS accepted as complete in February 2008, was an effort to secure 28 miles along the southwest border using, among other means, improved cameras and radars. DHS plans to apply the lessons learned to future projects. Another program component, 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence, has not yet been completed and DHS will be challenged to do so by its December 2008 deadline due to various factors, such as acquiring rights to border lands. Additionally, DHS is unable to estimate the total cost of this component because various factors are not yet known such as the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed. Finally, CBP has experienced unprecedented growth in the number of its Border Patrol agents. While initial training at the academy is being provided, Border Patrol officials expressed concerns about the agency's ability to provide sufficient field training. To screen international travelers before they arrive in the United States, the federal government has implemented new policies and programs, including enhancing visa security and providing counterterrorism training to overseas consular officials. As GAO previously recommended, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by a program that allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United States without a visa for certain durations and purposes. Regarding the prescreening of international passengers bound for the United States, CBP has a pilot program that provides additional scrutiny of passengers and their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their departure. CBP has reported several successes through the pilot but has not yet determined whether to make the program permanent. Thu, 06 Mar 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Management Initiatives and Key Homeland Security Missions, March 5, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08531t.pdf The Deepwater Program is intended to replace or modernize 15 major classes of Coast Guard assets--including vessels, aircraft, and communications systems. At the program's start, the Coast Guard chose to use a system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems, to design, build, deploy, and support Deepwater in a system-of-systems approach. In a series of reports, we have noted the risks inherent in this approach. With the Deepwater program under way, the Coast Guard's priorities and focus shifted after September 11 toward homeland security missions, such as protecting the nation's ports and waterways. The 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act and the 2006 SAFE Port Act required a wide range of security improvements. GAO is monitoring the acquisition of Deepwater and the Coast Guard's ability to carry out its numerous missions. This testimony addresses: (1) changes the Coast Guard is making as it assumes a larger role in managing the Deepwater Program and (2) challenges the Coast Guard is facing in carrying out its various missions. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed key documents, such as Deepwater acquisition program baselines, human capital plans, and Coast Guard budget and performance documents. For information on which GAO has not previously reported, GAO obtained Coast Guard views. The Coast Guard generally concurred with the information. With a recognition that too much control had been ceded to the system integrator under the Deepwater Program, the Coast Guard began this past year to shift the way it is managing the acquisition. Significant changes pertain to: (1) increasing government management of the program as part of the Coast Guard's reorganized Acquisition Directorate; (2) acquiring Deepwater assets individually as opposed to through a system-of-systems approach; (3) improving information to analyze and evaluate progress; and (4) developing an acquisition workforce with the requisite contracting and program management skills. Many of these initiatives are just getting under way and, while they are positive steps, the extent of their impact remains to be seen. The Coast Guard will likely continue to face challenges balancing its various missions within its resources for both the short and long term. For several years, we have noted that the Coast Guard has had difficulties fully funding and executing both homeland security missions and its non-homeland security missions. GAO's recent and ongoing work has shown that the Coast Guard's requirements continue to increase in such homeland security areas as providing vessel escorts, conducting security patrols of critical infrastructure, and completing inspections of maritime facilities here and abroad. In several cases, the Coast Guard has not been able to keep up with these security demands, in that it is not meeting its own requirements for vessel escorts and other security activities at some ports. In addition, there are indications that the Coast Guard's requirements are also increasing for selected non-homeland security missions. Since 2001, we have reviewed the Deepwater Program and have informed Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard of the risks and uncertainties inherent with such a large acquisition. In March 2004, we made a series of recommendations to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has taken actions on many of them. Three recommendations remain open, as the actions have not yet been sufficient to allow us to close them. In past work on Coast Guard missions, GAO made recommendations related to strategic plans, human capital, performance measures, and program operations. Wed, 05 Mar 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Homeland Security: Strategic Solution for US-VISIT Program Needs to Be Better Defined, Justified, and Coordinated, February 29, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08361.pdf The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program's goals are to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the privacy of visitors. It is to use biometric and biographic information to control and monitor the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of foreign visitors. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether DHS has defined and economically justified a strategic solution for meeting US-VISIT goals; (2) the biometric technology options DHS has considered and the basis for the selected options; and (3) DHS's efforts to define, manage, and coordinate the relationships between US-VISIT and other immigration and border management programs. To accomplish this, GAO assessed key program documentation against relevant criteria and examined available biometric research. DHS has partially defined a strategic solution for meeting US-VISIT's goals. In particular, the US-VISIT program office has defined and begun to develop a key capability known as "Unique Identity," which is to establish a single identity for all individuals who interact with any immigration and border management organization by capturing the individual's biometrics, including 10 fingerprints and a digital image, at the earliest possible interaction. However, the program office has yet to define and economically justify a comprehensive strategic solution for controlling and monitoring the exit of foreign visitors, which is critical to accomplishing the program's goals. Further, the department did not economically justify its ongoing investment in Unique Identity in a timely fashion. Specifically, the program office did not justify its investment until about 14 months after selecting and pursuing an alternative solution and obligating about $65 million. The absence of a fully defined strategic solution and timely economic justification hinders informed decision making about the best course of action for accomplishing strategic program goals and inhibits the ability to measure performance and promote accountability. DHS considered various biometric technologies, including fingerprints, facial, and iris technologies, and continues to use fingerprints as its foundational biometric technology. The focus on fingerprint technology is appropriate, given the opportunity to leverage existing DHS and Federal Bureau of Investigation identification systems and databases and to establish a single identity mechanism for all immigration and border management programs. In addition, research into fingerprints and other forms of biometric identification, such as facial recognition and iris scanning, show that fingerprints continue to be the most accurate biometric for identification purposes. DHS is taking a range of evolving actions, primarily at the department level, to coordinate relationships among US-VISIT and other immigration and border management programs. Thus far, this evolution has yet to progress to the point of reflecting the full scope of key practices that GAO has previously identified as essential to enhancing and sustaining collaborative efforts that span multiple organizations. To its credit, the department has defined common outcomes through its strategic plan and enterprise architecture and has taken steps to implement other collaboration practices, such as leveraging resources across its screening programs and developing screening performance indicators. However, the US-VISIT program office has yet to fully define its relationships with other immigration and border management programs. As a result, the department is at increased risk of introducing the inefficiencies and reduced effectiveness that result from suboptimizing how these programs collectively support its immigration and border management goals and objectives. Fri, 29 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Federal User Fees: Substantive Reviews Needed to Align Port-Related Fees with the Programs They Support, February 22, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08321.pdf America's port infrastructure is vital to U.S. foreign trade and a bulwark for national security. One way the federal government funds port-related programs is to levy user fees. GAO was asked to examine (1) what is known about the way selected fees assessed on air and sea port users are set, collected, used, and reviewed and (2) the effects of these attributes on program operations. GAO examined the Harbor Maintenance Fee (HMF), the Merchandise Processing Fee (MPF), and the Customs, Immigration, and Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) user fees assessed on air and cruise passengers and commercial vessels using criteria that have often been used to assess user fees and taxes--equity, efficiency, revenue adequacy, and administrative burden. The port-related fees GAO examined vary in how they are set, collected, used, and reviewed, creating misalignments between the fees and corresponding services, as well as administrative and oversight challenges. Although the customs, immigration, and AQI inspections have largely been consolidated under U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the corresponding fees remain separate and distinct and differ in how the rates are set and adjusted, the portion of costs they recover, and on whom the fees are levied. For example, overtime charges are handled differently for each type of inspection, creating confusion about the circumstances under which overtime must be paid, at what rate, and for which services. Certain collection methods increase administrative costs and reduce compliance. For example, quarterly remittance delays availability of funds and failure to charge interest and penalties on certain late payments is costly and discourages compliance. Further, lack of coordination between CBP and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers inhibits oversight of certain HMF payments. All of the fees GAO reviewed suffer from some misalignment--for example, with their respective costs or activities--which affects how the fees are used. For example, since 2003, HMF collections have far exceeded funds appropriated for harbor maintenance, resulting in a large and growing surplus in the trust fund. Also, not all MPF and customs inspection activities are reimbursable and not all reimbursable activities are inspection related. Finally, agency user fee reviews are not always comprehensive. For example, CBP's review of the MPF does not detail program costs, project collections, or provide enough information to determine if the amount, structure, or authorized uses of the fee should be updated. Further, limited opportunities for substantive communication with HMF stakeholders hamper their understanding of the fee. Fri, 22 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's Staffing, Practices, and Data, February 14, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0812.pdf To help secure the nation's ports against a terrorist attack, federal regulations have required cargo and other maritime facilities to have security plans in place since July 2004. U.S Coast Guard (USCG) guidance calls for an annual inspection to ensure that plans are being followed. Federal law enacted in October 2006 required such facilities to be inspected two times a year--one of which is to be conducted unannounced. The USCG plans to conduct one announced inspection and the other as a less comprehensive unannounced "spot check." GAO examined the extent to which the USCG (1) has met inspection requirements and found facilities to be complying with their plans, (2) has determined the availability of trained personnel to meet current and future facility inspection requirements, and (3) has assessed the effectiveness of its facility inspection program and ensured that program compliance data collected and reported are reliable. GAO analyzed USCG compliance data, interviewed inspectors and other stakeholders in 7 of 35 USCG sectors of varying size, geographic location, and type of waterway. We could not determine the extent to which the USCG has met inspection requirements because its compliance database does not identify all regulated facilities to establish how many should have been inspected. While the USCG estimates there are about 3,200 facilities requiring inspection, their records indicate 2,126 annual inspections were conducted in 2006. Headquarters officials said field units reported that all required facility inspections were conducted. However, officials also said some inspections may not have been recorded, or were delayed by staff being diverted for natural disasters. The USCG identified deficiencies in about one-third of inspections, mainly for problems with access controls or missing documentation. Over 80 percent of deficiencies identified by the USCG were resolved by facility operators without the USCG applying formal enforcement actions. Although USCG officials believe they have enough trained inspectors to conduct current and future inspections, two additional factors could affect the USCG's estimates of the number of inspectors needed. First, facility inspectors balance security inspections with other competing duties, such as safety or pollution checks, and giving priority to security inspections could affect these other duties, inspectors said. Second, new guidance for spot checks calls for these checks to be more detailed--and perhaps more time-consuming--than some USCG units conducted in the past. For example, the guidance now requires an on-site visit, whereas some units had allowed the check to be a drive-by observation. The effect of the new guidance on resource requirements in these units is unknown. The USCG has not assessed the effectiveness of its facility inspection program. Headquarters guidance gives considerable discretion to local USCG units in deciding how to conduct facility inspections--for example, deciding whether a fine is warranted. The USCG has little or no information, however, on which approaches work better than others and is therefore limited in being able to make informed decisions in guiding the program. Flaws in USCG's database, including missing, duplicate, and inconsistent information, complicate the USCG's ability to conduct such analyses or provide other information for making management decisions. Thu, 14 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed, January 25, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08187.pdf Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) aims to identify and examine high-risk U.S.-bound cargo at foreign seaports. GAO reported in 2003 and 2005 that CSI helped to enhance homeland security, and recommended actions to strengthen the program. This report updates information and assesses how CBP has (1) contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI operations, and (3) evaluated CSI operations. To address these issues, GAO interviewed CBP officials and reviewed CSI evaluations and performance measures. GAO also visited selected U.S. and CSI seaports, and met with U.S. and foreign government officials. By collaborating on the development of the Department of Homeland Security's Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, and by revising the CSI strategic plan as GAO recommended, CBP has contributed to the overall U.S. strategic planning efforts related to enhancing the security for the overseas supply chain. Also, CBP reached its targets of operating CSI in 58 foreign seaports, and thereby having 86 percent of all U.S.-bound cargo containers pass through CSI seaports in fiscal year 2007--representing a steady increase in these measures of CSI performance. To strengthen CSI operations, CBP has sought to address human capital challenges and previous GAO recommendations by increasing CSI staffing levels closer to those called for in its staffing model and revising its human capital plan. However, challenges remain because CBP continues to rely, in part, on a temporary workforce; has not determined how to optimize its staffing resources; and reports difficulties in identifying sufficient numbers of qualified staff. In addition, CBP has enhanced relationships with host governments participating in CSI. However, hurdles to cooperation remain at some seaports, such as restrictions on CSI teams witnessing examinations. CBP improved its evaluation of CSI team performance at seaports, but limitations remain in the evaluation process that affect the accuracy and completeness of data collected. CBP has not set minimum technical criteria for equipment or systematically collected information on the equipment, people, and processes involved in CSI host government examinations of high-risk, U.S-bound container cargo. Also, CBP has not developed general guidelines to use in assessing the reliability of these examinations. Thus, CBP potentially lacks information to ensure that host government examinations can detect and identify weapons of mass destruction, which is important because containers are typically not reexamined in the United States if already examined at a CSI seaport. CBP refined overall CSI performance measures, but has not fully developed performance measures and annual targets for core CSI functions, such as the examination of high-risk containers before they are placed on vessels bound for the United States. These weaknesses in CBP's data collection and performance measures potentially limit the information available on overall CSI effectiveness. Fri, 25 Jan 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Observations on Implementing the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, December 20, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08274r.pdf Securing the nation's borders has taken on added importance since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For years, millions of citizens of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda could enter the United States from certain parts of the Western Hemisphere using a wide variety of documents, including a driver's license issued by a state motor vehicle administration or a birth certificate, or in some cases for U.S. and Canadian citizens, without showing any documents. In the heightened national security environment following September 11, we have previously reported that documents like driver's licenses and birth certificates can easily be obtained, altered, or counterfeited and used by terrorists to travel into and out of the country. To help provide better assurance that border officials have the tools and resources to establish that people are who they say they are, as called for in the 9/11 Commission report, section 7209 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to develop and implement a plan that requires a passport or other document or combination of documents that the Secretary of Homeland Security deems sufficient to show identity and citizenship for U.S. citizens and citizens of Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico when entering the United States from certain countries in North, Central, or South America. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) and the Department of State's (State) effort to specify acceptable documents and implement document requirements at 326 air, land, and sea ports of entry is called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). DHS is required by law to implement WHTI document requirements at the land and sea ports of entry on the earlier of two dates: June 1, 2009, or 3 months after DHS and State certify that certain implementation requirements have been met. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component within DHS, is the lead agency in charge of inspecting travelers seeking to enter the United States at air, land, and sea ports of entry. CBP has created a WHTI program office within CBP's Office of Field Operations to manage efforts to propose acceptable documents, implement document requirements, and oversee technological upgrades. In fiscal year 2008, DHS requested about $252 million for WHTI implementation, including approximately $166 million for related technological upgrades--to develop new software and to deploy that software and new hardware at 13 of the highest-volume U.S. land ports of entry. According to DHS, implementation of the WHTI document requirements and related technological upgrades will support its strategic goal of facilitating legitimate trade and travel while enforcing all U.S. trade, immigration, drug, consumer protection, intellectual property, and agricultural laws and regulations at the borders. According to DHS, the technological upgrades are designed to improve customer service by avoiding a more time-intensive and intrusive inspection process that would result from meeting WHTI document requirements without this technology. In May 2006, we reported our observations on steps taken and challenges faced by DHS and State in implementing WHTI in five main areas: (1) proceeding through the rulemaking process, (2) making a decision about what documents individuals will need when they enter the United States, (3) carrying out a cost-benefit study, (4) resolving technical and programmatic issues, and (5) managing implementation of the program. This report provides updated information in those five areas. Since May 2006, DHS and State have taken important actions toward implementing WHTI document requirements. We reported in May 2006 that DHS and State had not made decisions about what documents would be acceptable, had not begun the rule-making process to finalize those decisions, and were in the early stages of studying costs and benefits. In addition, DHS and State needed to choose a technology to use with the new passport card--which State is developing specifically for WHTI. DHS also faced an array of implementation challenges, including training staff and informing the public. Since our 2006 work, DHS and State have taken the following actions in the five main areas: Proceeding through the Rule-Making Process--(1) DHS and State finalized the rulemaking process for document requirements at air ports of entry. The agencies also published a notice of proposed rule making for document requirements at land and sea ports of entry and anticipate finalizing the requirements in late fall 2007; (2)Deciding on Acceptable Documents--By publishing a final rule for document requirements at air ports of entry, DHS and State have established acceptable documents for air travelers. The notice of proposed rule making for land and sea proposes acceptable documents. DHS plans to implement document requirements at land and sea ports of entry as early as summer 2008. Performing a Cost-Benefit Study--(3) DHS has performed a cost-benefit study as required by the rule-making process. Data limitations prevented DHS from quantifying the precise effect that WHTI will have on wait times--a substantial source of uncertainty in its analysis. DHS plans to do baseline studies at selected ports before WHTI implementation so that it can compare the effects of WHTI document requirements on wait times after the requirements are implemented; (4) Resolving Technical and Programmatic Issues. DHS and State have selected technology to be used with the passport card. To support the card and other documents that use the same technology, DHS is planning technological upgrades at land ports of entry. These upgrades are intended to help reduce traveler wait times and more effectively verify identity and citizenship. DHS has outlined a general strategy for the upgrades at the 39 highest volume land ports, beginning in January 2008 and continuing over roughly the next 2 years; and (5} Managing Implementation. DHS has developed general strategies for implementing WHTI--including staffing and training. According to DHS officials, they also plan to work with a contractor on a public relations campaign to communicate clear and timely information about document requirements. In addition, State has approved contracting with a public relations firm to assist with educating the public, particularly border resident communities about the new passport card and the requirements of WHTI in general. As DHS moves toward calendar year 2008, it faces challenges deploying technology and staffing and training officers to use it. In the absence of a fiscal year 2008 appropriation, funding for the contract has been uncertain. According to DHS officials, they are exploring options for funding a contract award, using available funds, if an appropriation is not immediately forthcoming. However, DHS has not yet determined when and to what extent funds will be available. As of December 2007, lacking certainty about how it will fund the contract award and when it will publish the final rule, DHS could not provide a specific date by which it will select a contractor and begin devising specific milestones and deadlines for the testing and deployment of new hardware. Thu, 20 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers, December 10, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08141.pdf U. S. energy needs rest heavily on ship-based imports. Tankers bring 55 percent of the nation's crude oil supply, as well as liquefied gases and refined products like jet fuel. This supply chain is potentially vulnerable in many places here and abroad, as borne out by several successful overseas attacks on ships and facilities. GAO's review addressed (1) the types of threats to tankers and the potential consequences of a successful attack, (2) measures taken to protect tankers and challenges federal agencies face in making these actions effective, and (3) plans in place for responding to a successful attack and potential challenges stakeholders face in responding. GAO's review spanned several foreign and domestic ports, and multiple steps to analyze data and gather opinions from agencies and stakeholders. The supply chain faces three main types of threats--suicide attacks such as explosive-laden boats, "standoff" attacks with weapons launched from a distance, and armed assaults. Highly combustible commodities such as liquefied gases have the potential to catch fire or, in a more unlikely scenario, explode, posing a threat to public safety. Attacks could also have environmental consequences, and attacks that disrupt the supply chain could have a severe economic impact. Much is occurring, internationally and domestically, to protect tankers and facilities, but significant challenges remain. Overseas, despite international agreements calling for certain protective steps, substantial disparities exist in implementation. The United States faces limitations in helping to increase compliance, as well as limitations in ensuring safe passage on vulnerable transport routes. Domestically, units of the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, report insufficient resources to meet its own self imposed security standards, such as escorting ships carrying liquefied natural gas. Some units' workloads are likely to grow as new liquefied natural gas facilities are added. Coast Guard headquarters has not developed plans for shifting resources among units. Multiple attack response plans are in place to address an attack, but stakeholders face three main challenges in making them work. First, plans for responding to a spill and to a terrorist threat are generally separate from each other, and ports have rarely exercised these plans simultaneously to see if they work effectively together. Second, ports generally lack plans for dealing with economic issues, such as prioritizing the movement of vessels after a port reopens. The President's maritime security strategy calls for such plans. Third, some ports report difficulty in securing response resources to carry out planned actions. Federal port security grants have generally been directed at preventing attacks, not responding to them, but a more comprehensive risk-based approach is being developed. Decisions about the need for more response capabilities are hindered, however, by a lack of performance measures tying resource needs to effectiveness in response. Mon, 10 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry, November 5, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08219.pdf U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the country while also facilitating the cross-border movement of millions of travelers. CBP carries out this responsibility at 326 air, sea, and land ports of entry. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined CBP traveler inspection efforts, the progress made and the challenges that remain in staffing and training at ports of entry, and the progress CBP has made in developing strategic plans and performance measures for its traveler inspection program. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only report GAO issued on October 5, 2007. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed and analyzed CBP data and documents related to inspections, staffing, and training, interviewed managers and officers, observed inspections at eight major air and land ports of entry, and tested inspection controls at eight small land ports of entry. Information the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deemed sensitive has been redacted. CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators, but weaknesses in its operations increase the potential that terrorists and inadmissible travelers could enter the country. In fiscal year 2006, CBP turned away over 200,000 inadmissible aliens and interdicted other violators. Although CBP's goal is to interdict all violators, CBP estimated that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators entered the country though ports of entry in fiscal year 2006. Weaknesses in 2006 inspection procedures, such as not verifying the nationality and admissibility of each traveler, contribute to failed inspections. Although CBP took actions to address these weaknesses, subsequent follow up work conducted by GAO months after CBP's actions found that weaknesses such as those described above still existed. In July 2007, CBP issued detailed procedures for conducting inspections including requiring field office managers to assess compliance with these procedures. However, CBP has not established an internal control to ensure field office managers share their assessments with CBP headquarters to help ensure that the new procedures are consistently implemented across all ports of entry and reduce the risk of failed traveler inspections. CBP developed a staffing model that estimates it needs up to several thousand more staff. Field office managers said that staffing shortages affected their ability to carry out anti-terrorism programs and created other vulnerabilities in the inspections process. CBP recognizes that officer attrition has impaired its ability to attain budgeted staffing levels and is in the process of developing a strategy to help curb attrition. CBP has made progress in developing training programs, yet it does not measure the extent to which it provides training to all who need it and whether new officers demonstrate proficiency in required skills. CPB issued a strategic plan for operations at its ports of entry and has collected performance data that can be used to measure its progress in achieving its strategic goals. However, current performance measures do not gauge CBP effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, a key strategic goal. Mon, 05 Nov 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges Remain, October 31, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08133t.pdf The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to help ensure that only workers who are not known to pose a terrorist threat are allowed to enter secure areas of the nation's transportation facilities. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2006 report on the TWIC program, and interviews with TSA and maritime industry officials conducted in September and October 2007 to obtain updates on the TWIC program. Specifically, this testimony addresses (1) the progress TSA has made since September 2006 in implementing the TWIC program and addressing GAO recommendations; and (2) some of the remaining challenges that TSA and the maritime industry must overcome to ensure the successful implementation of the program. Since GAO reported on TWIC in September 2006, TSA has made progress in implementing the program. Although GAO has not yet independently assessed the effectiveness of these efforts, TSA has taken actions to address legislative requirements to implement and test the program as well as address GAO's recommendations related to conducting additional systems testing, strengthening contractor oversight, and improving coordination with stakeholders. Specifically, TSA has issued a rule in January 2007 that sets forth the requirements for enrolling maritime workers in the TWIC program and issuing cards to these workers, and awarded a $70 million dollar contract to begin enrolling workers; reported conducting performance testing of the technologies that will be used to enroll workers in the TWIC program to ensure that they work effectively before implementation; begun planning a pilot program to test TWIC access control technologies at 5 maritime locations in accordance with the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act; begun enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards at the port of Wilmington, Delaware on October 16, 2007, and plans to do so at 11 additional ports by November 2007; added additional staff with program and contract management expertise to help oversee the TWIC enrollment contract; and stated that they have taken actions to improve communication and coordination with maritime stakeholders. As TSA moves forward with TWIC, it and maritime industry stakeholders will be faced with addressing the following key challenges that can affect the programs' successful implementation. TSA and its contractor will need to transition from testing of the TWIC program to successful implementation of the program on a larger scale covering 770,000 workers at about 3,200 maritime facilities and 5,300 vessels. TSA and its contractor will need to educate workers on new TWIC requirements, ensure that enrollments begin in a timely manner, and efficiently process background checks, appeals, and waivers. TSA and industry stakeholders will need to ensure that TWIC access control technologies work effectively in the maritime environment, and balance new security requirements while facilitating maritime commerce. Wed, 31 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later, October 30, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08126t.pdf Because the safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part on the security of its 361 seaports, the United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act), modified existing legislation and created and codified new programs related to maritime security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have key maritime security responsibilities. This testimony synthesizes the results of GAO's completed work and preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work related to the SAFE Port Act pertaining to (1) overall port security, (2) security at individual facilities, and (3) cargo container security. To perform this work GAO visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security plans, and post-exercise reports; and interviewed officials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors. Federal agencies have improved overall port security efforts by establishing committees to share information with local port stakeholders, taking steps to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port activities, conducting operations such as harbor patrols and vessel escorts, writing port-level plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, testing such plans through exercises, and assessing the security at foreign ports. However, these agencies face resource constraints and other challenges trying to meet the SAFE Port Act's requirements to expand these activities. For example, the Coast Guard faces budget constraints in trying to expand its current command centers and include other agencies at the centers. Similarly, private facilities and federal agencies have taken action to improve security at about 3,000 individual facilities by writing facility-specific security plans, inspecting facilities to determine compliance with their plans, and developing special identification cards for workers to help prevent terrorists from getting access to secure areas. Federal agencies face challenges trying to meet the act's requirements to expand the scope or speed the implementation of such activities. For example, the Transportation Security Administration missed the act's deadline to implement the identification card program at 10 selected ports because of delays in testing equipment and procedures. Federal programs related to the security of cargo containers have also improved as agencies are enhancing systems to identify high-risk cargo, expanding partnerships with other countries to screen containers before they depart for the United States, and working with international organizations to develop a global framework for container security. Federal agencies face challenges implementing container security aspects of the SAFE Port Act and other legislation. For example, Customs and Border Protection must test and implement a new program to scan 100 percent of all incoming containers overseas--a departure from its existing risk-based programs. Tue, 30 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: One Year Later: A Progress Report on the SAFE Port Act, October 16, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08171t.pdf Because the safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part on the security of its 361 seaports, the United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act), modified existing legislation and created and codified new programs related to maritime security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security Agency, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have key maritime security responsibilities. This testimony synthesizes the results of GAO's completed work and preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work related to the SAFE Port Act pertaining to (1) overall port security, (2) security at individual facilities, and (3) cargo container security. To perform this work GAO visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security plans, and post-exercise reports; and interviewed officials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors. Federal agencies have improved overall port security efforts by establishing committees to share information with local port stakeholders, taking steps to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port activities, conducting operations such as harbor patrols and vessel escorts, writing port-level plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, testing such plans through exercises, and assessing the security at foreign ports. However, these agencies face resource constraints and other challenges trying to meet the SAFE Port Act's requirements to expand these activities. For example, the Coast Guard faces budget constraints in trying to expand its current command centers and include other agencies at the centers. Similarly, private facilities and federal agencies have taken action to improve security at about 3,000 individual facilities by writing facility-specific security plans, inspecting facilities to ensure they are complying with their plans, and developing special identification cards for workers to prevent terrorists from getting access to secure areas. Federal agencies face challenges trying to meet the act's requirements to expand the scope or speed the implementation of such activities. For example, the Transportation Security Agency missed the act's July 2007 deadline to implement the identification card program at 10 selected ports because of delays in testing equipment and procedures. Federal programs related to the security of cargo containers have also improved as agencies are enhancing systems to identify high-risk cargo, expanding partnerships with other countries to screen containers before they depart for the United States, and working with international organizations to develop a global framework for container security. Federal agencies face challenges implementing container security aspects of the SAFE Port Act and other legislation. For example, Customs and Border Protection must test and implement a new program to screen 100 percent of all incoming containers overseas--a departure from its existing risk-based programs. Tue, 16 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation's Seaports, October 4, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0886t.pdf Because the safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part on the security of its 361 seaports, the United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act), modified existing legislation and created and codified new programs related to maritime security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its U.S Coast Guard, Transportation Security Agency, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have key maritime security responsibilities. This testimony synthesizes the results of GAO's completed work and preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work pertaining to overall port security, security at individual facilities, and cargo container security. To perform this work GAO visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security plans, and post-exercise reports; and interviewed officials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors. Federal agencies have improved overall port security efforts by establishing committees to share information with local port stakeholders, and taking steps to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port activities, conducting operations such as harbor patrols and vessel escorts, writing port-level plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, testing such plans through exercises, and assessing the security at foreign ports. However, these agencies face resource constraints and other challenges trying to meet the SAFE Port Act's requirements to expand these activities. For example, the Coast Guard faces budget constraints in trying to expand its current command centers and include other agencies at the centers. Similarly, private facilities and federal agencies have taken action to improve the security at approximately 3,000 individual facilities by writing facility-specific security plans, and inspecting facilities to make sure they are complying with their plans, and developing special identification cards for workers to prevent terrorist from getting access to secure areas. Again, federal agencies face challenges trying to meet the act's requirements to expand the scope or speed the implementation of such activities. For example, the Transportation Security Agency missed the act's July 2007 deadline to implement the identification card program at 10 selected ports because of delays in testing equipment and procedures. Federal programs related to the security of cargo containers have also improved as agencies are enhancing systems to identify high-risk cargo, expanding partnerships with other countries to screen containers before they depart for the United States, and working with international organizations to develop a global framework for container security. Federal agencies face challenges implementing container security aspects of the SAFE Port Act and other legislation. For example, Customs and Border Protection must test and implement a new program to screen 100 percent of all incoming containers overseas--a departure from its existing risk-based programs. Thu, 04 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations, September 27, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07884t.pdf The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit border vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a serious security risk, especially if they were to bring radioactive material or other contraband with them. Although Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken steps to secure the 170 ports of entry on the northern and southern U.S. borders, Congress is concerned that unmanned and unmonitored areas between these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In unmanned locations, CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial drones, and other technology to monitor for illegal border activity. In unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place and must rely on alert citizens or other information sources to meet its obligation to protect the border. Today's testimony will address what GAO investigators found during a limited security assessment of seven border areas that were unmanned, unmonitored, or both--four at the U.S.-Canada border and three at the U.S.-Mexico border. In three of the four locations on the U.S.-Canada border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented GAO investigators from attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point in Mexico. On the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads close to the border that CBP did not appear to man or monitor. In some of these locations, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross without being challenged by law enforcement, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. In one location on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate GAO investigators. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. On the southern border, investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence on a state road, including unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, GAO identified federally managed lands that were adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or did not have an observable law enforcement presence, which contrasted sharply with GAO observations on the state road. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting federal lands adjacent to the border, CBP officials told GAO that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights. Thu, 27 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin, June 29, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07804r.pdf Referred to as our "third border," the Caribbean Basin has significant maritime links with the United States. Given these links and the region's proximity, the United States is particularly interested in ensuring that the ports in the Caribbean Basin--through which goods bound for this country's ports and cruise ships carrying its citizens must travel--are secure. Section 233 (c) of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) requires GAO to report on various security-related aspects of Caribbean Basin ports. Our specific objectives were to identify and describe the (1) threats and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin related to port security, (2) actions that foreign governments and local stakeholders have taken in the Caribbean Basin to implement international port security requirements and the challenges that remain, (3) activities reported to be under way by U.S. government agencies to enhance port security in the Caribbean Basin, and (4) potential economic impacts of port security and terrorist attacks in the Caribbean Basin. Between March 29 and April 13, 2007, we briefed Congress on the results of our work to address these objectives. This report summarizes the information provided during those discussions. We conducted our work from October 2006 through June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. While intelligence sources report that no specific, credible terrorist threats to maritime security exist in the Caribbean Basin, the officials we spoke to indicated that there are a number of security concerns that could affect port security in the region. Caribbean ports contain a variety of facilities such as cargo facilities, cruise ship terminals, and facilities that handle petroleum products and liquefied natural gas. Additionally, several Caribbean ports are among the top cruise ship destinations in the world. Given the volume and value of this maritime trade, the facilities and infrastructure of the maritime transportation system may be attractive targets for a terrorist attack. Our prior work on maritime security issues has revealed that the three most likely modes of attack in the port environment are a suicide attack using an explosive-laden vehicle or vessel, a standoff attack using small arms or rockets, and the traditional armed assault. Beyond the types of facilities and modes of attack to be considered, officials we spoke to identified a number of overarching security concerns that relate to the Caribbean Basin as a whole. Among these concerns are (1) the level of corruption that exists in some Caribbean nations to undermine the rule of law in these countries, (2) organized gang activity occurring in proximity to or within port facilities, and (3) the geographic proximity of many Caribbean countries, which has made them transit countries for cocaine and heroin destined for U.S. markets. Other security concerns in the Caribbean Basin mentioned by U.S. agency officials include stowaways, illegal migration, and the growing influence of Islamic radical groups and other foreign terrorist organizations. Fri, 29 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: Opportunities Exist to Further Clarify the Consequences of a Liquefied Natural Gas Tanker Spill, May 7, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07840t.pdf Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a supercooled liquid form of natural gas. U.S. LNG imports are projected to increase to about 17 percent of natural gas supplies by 2030, from about 3 percent today. To meet this increase, energy companies have submitted 32 applications for new terminals. If a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker caused a spill, potential hazards, such as fire, asphyxiation, and explosions, could result. The Department of Energy (DOE) recently funded a study to conduct small- and large-scale experiments to refine and validate models that calculate how heat from large LNG fires would affect the public. This testimony is based on GAO's report, Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification (GAO-07-316). To prepare this report, GAO examined the results of six recent studies on the effects of an LNG spill and convened a panel of 19 experts to identify areas of agreement on the consequences of a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker. The six studies GAO reviewed examining the potential effect of a fire resulting from an LNG spill produced varying results; some studies also examined other potential hazards of a large LNG spill and reached consistent conclusions on explosions. Specifically, the studies' conclusions about the distance at which 30 seconds of exposure to the heat (heat hazard) could burn people ranged from less than 1/3 of a mile to about 1-1/4 miles. Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) conducted one of the studies and concluded, based on its analysis of multiple attack scenarios, that a good estimate of the heat hazard distance would be about 1 mile. Federal agencies use this conclusion to assess proposals for new LNG import terminals. The variations among the studies occurred because, with no data on large spills from actual events, researchers had to make numerous modeling assumptions to scale up the existing experimental data for large LNG spills. Three studies considered LNG vapor explosions and concluded that such explosions are unlikely unless the vapors were in a confined space. Only the Sandia study examined the potential for the sequential failure of multiple tanks on the LNG vessel (cascading failure) and concluded that only three of the five tanks in a typical tanker would potentially be affected, and that such failure would increase the duration of the LNG fire. GAO's expert panel generally agreed on the public safety impact of an LNG spill caused by a terrorist attack, disagreed on specific conclusions of the Sandia study, and suggested future research priorities. Experts agreed that the most likely public safety impact of an LNG spill is the heat impact of a fire and that explosions are not likely to occur unless LNG vapors are in confined spaces. However, the experts did not all agree with the heat hazard and cascading failure conclusions reached by the Sandia study. Finally, they suggested priorities to guide future research aimed at clarifying uncertainties about heat impact distances and cascading failure. DOE's recently funded study involving large-scale LNG fire experiments addresses only some of the research priorities the expert panel identified. Mon, 07 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act, April 26, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07754t.pdf The United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. The safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the secure use of the world's waterways and ports. In an effort to further the progress made through the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) was passed and became effective in October 2006. This testimony, which is based on past GAO work, synthesizes the results of this work as it pertains to the following: (1) overall port security, (2) facility security at U.S. ports, (3) the international supply chain and cargo container security, and (4) customs revenue collection efforts. With the Coast Guard generally implementing earlier port security requirements, the SAFE Port Act called for changes to several ongoing programs. For example, it called for interagency operational centers at high-risk ports within 3 years. Three centers currently operate, but agency coordination will pose a challenge. Also, the act established a port security exercise program, but more exercises could challenge stakeholders' ability to maintain coordination and quickly report results. Additionally, an expansion of foreign port security assessments may be challenged by greater workloads and the need for additional staff. Many port facility security requirements are being implemented, but not always on schedule. While the Coast Guard has approved, and verified through inspection, facility security plans, the SAFE Port Act requires inspections more often and some without notice. The Coast Guard will be challenged by the number of trained inspectors it needs. Worker credentialing programs were also modified by the act. One such program has seen substantial delays in the past, but is receiving more support. Efforts to avoid duplication in these programs will be challenged by the need for extensive coordination within and among federal departments. The SAFE Port Act codified existing major container security programs and also added guidance for these programs. It also required programs to test new technologies or combine existing technologies for scanning containers. While more container security activity is occurring overseas, challenges remain in the continued implementation of these efforts. These challenges include the inability to directly test the security measures used by different companies in their supply chains, particularly overseas. Since its formation, the Department of Homeland Security has faced challenges in maintaining its customs revenue functions. For example, the Department failed to maintain the legislatively mandated staffing levels, lacks a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it has a sufficient number of skilled staff to effectively perform customs revenue functions, and does not publicly report on its performance of customs revenue functions, which would help ensure accountability. Thu, 26 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0400 International Trade: Persistent Weaknesses in the In-Bond Cargo System Impede Customs and Border Protection's Ability to Address Revenue, Trade, and Security Concerns, April 17, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07561.pdf The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) must strive to balance its competing goals of facilitating trade, providing port security, and collecting trade revenues. CBP's in-bond system, which allows goods to transit the United States without formally entering U.S. commerce, must also balance these goals. In response to concerns that previously identified weaknesses in the in-bond system have not been remedied, GAO examined (1) the purpose of the in-bond system and the extent of its use (2) CBP efforts to ensure that revenues are collected and trade concerns are minimized, and (3) CBP efforts to ensure that security-related inspections are properly targeted. GAO examined audit reports and agency documents, interviewed officials at CBP headquarters and at 10 CBP port offices. GAO also discussed the in-bond system with trade groups impacted by the in-bond system. The in-bond system is designed to facilitate the flow of trade; however, CBP does not know the extent of the in-bond system's use as a result of lax oversight. The system allows cargo to be transported from the arrival port, without appraisal or payment of duties, to another U.S. port for official entry into U.S. commerce or for exportation. Although the in-bond system is estimated to be widely used, CBP cannot assess the extent of program use because it collects little information on in-bond shipments and performs limited analysis of data that it does collect. Despite numerous program reviews and audits that identified problems in CBP's management of the in-bond system, weaknesses persist and continue to impede CBP's ability to ensure proper collection of trade revenue and management of trade risks. The major weakness is that CBP does not adequately monitor and track in-bond goods. In particular, it does not consistently reconcile in-bond documents issued at the arrival port with documents at the destination port to ensure that the cargo is either officially entered with appropriate duties or quotas applied, or is in fact exported. CBP records show that many in-bond cargo shipments remained unreconciled, or "open," with one port reporting that 77 percent of its in-bond transactions were open. Also, in-bond regulations provide unusual flexibility for the trade community, but create challenges for CBP in tracking movements. Finally, some CBP ports do not consistently perform in-bond compliance reviews which could identify weaknesses and possible solutions. The limited information available on in-bond cargo also impedes CBP efforts to manage security risks and ensure proper targeting of inspections. In-bond goods transit the United States with a security score based on manifest information and do not use more accurate and detailed entry type information to re-score until and unless the cargo enters U.S. commerce. As a result, some higher risk cargo may not be identified for inspection, and scarce inspection resources may be used for some lower risk cargo. Tue, 17 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges Remain, April 12, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07681t.pdf The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to ensure that only workers that do not pose a terrorist threat are allowed to enter secure areas of the nation's transportation facilities. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's December 2004 and September 2006 reports on the TWIC program and interviews with TSA and port officials conducted in March and April 2007 to obtain updates on the TWIC program. Specifically, this testimony addresses (1) the progress TSA has made since September 2006 in implementing the TWIC program; and (2) some of the remaining challenges that TSA and the maritime industry must overcome to ensure the successful implementation of the TWIC program. Since we issued our report on the TWIC program in September 2006, TSA has made progress toward implementing the TWIC program and addressing several of the problems that we previously identified regarding contract oversight and planning and coordination with stakeholders. Specifically, TSA has issued a TWIC rule that sets forth the requirements for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards to workers in the maritime sector; awarded a $70 million dollar contract for enrolling workers in the TWIC program; developed a schedule for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards at ports and conducting a pilot program to test TWIC access control technologies; added additional staff with program and contract management expertise to help oversee the TWIC enrollment contract; and developed plans to improve communication and coordination with maritime stakeholders, including plans for conducting public outreach and education efforts. TSA and maritime industry stakeholders still face several challenges to ensuring that the TWIC program can be implemented successfully: (1) TSA and its enrollment contractor need to transition from limited testing of the TWIC program to successful implementation of the program on a much larger scale covering 770,000 workers at about 3,500 maritime facilities and 5,300 vessels. (2) TSA and its enrollment contractor will need to educate workers on the new TWIC requirements, ensure that enrollments begin in a timely manner, and process numerous background checks, appeals, and waivers. (3) TSA and industry stakeholders will need to ensure that TWIC access control technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment, be compatible with TWIC cards that will be issued, and balance security with the flow of maritime commerce. As TSA works to implement the TWIC program and begin enrolling workers, it will be important that the agency establish clear and reasonable time frames and ensure that all aspects of the TWIC program, including the TWIC access control technologies, are fully tested in the maritime environment. Thu, 12 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery, March 28, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07412.pdf U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than 2 billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually. Since Sept. 11, 2001, much of the national focus on ports' preparedness has been on preventing potential acts of terror, the 2005 hurricane season renewed focus on how to protect ports from a diversity of threats, including natural disasters. This report was prepared under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine (1) challenges port authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under way to address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port authorities plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed various port stakeholders from 17 major U.S. ports. Ports, particularly those impacted by the 2005 hurricane season, experienced many different kinds of challenges during recent natural disasters. Of the 17 U.S. ports that GAO reviewed, port officials identified communications, personnel, and interagency coordination as their biggest challenges. Many port authorities have taken steps to address these challenges. Individually, ports have created redundancy in communications systems and other backup equipment and updated their emergency plans. Collectively, the American Association of Port Authorities developed a best practices manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts, as well as lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Even ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent disasters, but are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats, have responded to lessons learned by other ports. Additionally, federal maritime agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have increased their coordination and communication with ports to strengthen ports' ability to recover from future natural disasters and to build stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources for port recovery efforts. Most port authorities GAO reviewed conduct planning for natural disasters separately from planning for homeland security threats. Unlike security efforts, natural disaster planning is not subject to the same type of specific federal requirements and, therefore, varies from port to port. As a result of this divided approach, GAO found a wide variance in ports' natural disaster planning efforts including: (1) the level of participation in disaster forums, and (2) the level of information sharing among port stakeholders In the absence of appropriate forums and information sharing opportunities among ports, some ports GAO contacted were limited in their understanding of federal resources available for predisaster mitigation and postdisaster recovery. Other ports have begun using existing forums, such as their federally mandated Area Maritime Security Committee, to coordinate disaster planning efforts. Port and industry experts, as well as recent federal actions, are now encouraging an all-hazards approach to disaster planning and recovery. That is, disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the threats faced by the port, both natural (such as hurricanes) and man-made (such as terror events), be considered together. The Department of Homeland Security, which through the Coast Guard oversees the Area Maritime Security Committees, provides an example of how to incorporate a wider scope of activity for ports across the country. Additionally, the Maritime Administration should develop a communication strategy to inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts. Wed, 28 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Liquefied Natural Gas Spill Need Clarification, March 21, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07633t.pdf Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a supercooled liquid form of natural gas. U.S. LNG imports are projected to increase to about 17 percent of natural gas supplies by 2030, from about 3 percent today. To meet this increase, energy companies have submitted 32 applications for new terminals. If a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker caused a spill, potential hazards, such as fire, asphyxiation, and explosions, could result. The Department of Energy (DOE) recently funded a study to conduct small- and large-scale experiments to refine and validate models that calculate how heat from large LNG fires would affect the public. This testimony is based on GAO's recently released report, Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification (GAO-07-316). To prepare this report, GAO examined the results of six recent unclassified studies on the effects of an LNG spill and convened a panel of 19 experts to identify areas of agreement on the consequences of a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker. The six studies GAO reviewed examining the potential effect of a fire resulting from an LNG spill produced varying results; some studies also examined other potential hazards of a large LNG spill and reached consistent conclusions on explosions. Specifically, the studies' conclusions about the distance at which 30 seconds of exposure to the heat (heat hazard) could burn people ranged from less than 1/3 of a mile to about 1-1/4 miles. Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) conducted one of the studies and concluded, based on its analysis of multiple attack scenarios, that a good estimate of the heat hazard distance would be about 1 mile. Federal agencies use this conclusion to assess proposals for new LNG import terminals. The variations among the studies occurred because, with no data on large spills from actual events, researchers had to make numerous modeling assumptions to scale up the existing experimental data for large LNG spills. Three of the studies also examined other potential hazards of an LNG spill, including LNG vapor explosions and sequential failure of multiple tanks on the LNG vessel (cascading failure). All three studies considered LNG vapor explosions unlikely unless the vapors were in a confined space. Finally, the Sandia study examined the potential for cascading tank failure and concluded that only three of the five tanks in a typical tanker would potentially be affected, and that such failure would increase the duration of the LNG fire. GAO's panel of experts generally agreed on the public safety impact of an LNG spill caused by a terrorist attack, disagreed on specific conclusions of the Sandia study, and suggested future research priorities. Experts agreed that the most likely public safety impact of an LNG spill is the heat impact of a fire and that explosions are not likely to occur unless LNG vapors are in confined spaces. However, the experts did not all agree with the heat hazard and cascading failure conclusions reached by the Sandia study. Finally, they suggested priorities to guide future research aimed at clarifying uncertainties about heat impact distances and cascading failure. DOE's recently funded study involving large-scale LNG fire experiments addresses only some of the research priorities the expert panel identified. Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal Investments, February 7, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07386t.pdf Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the federal government has provided DHS with more than $130 billion in budget authority to make investments in homeland security. However, as GAO has reported, this federal financial assistance has not been guided by a clear risk-based strategic plan that fully applies risk management principles. This testimony discusses the extent to which DHS has taken steps to apply risk management principles to target federal funding for homeland security investments (1) in making grant allocations, (2) in funding transportation and port security enhancements, (3) in other DHS mission areas, and (4) at a strategic level across DHS. This testimony summarizes previous GAO work in these areas. Risk management, a strategy for helping policymakers make decisions about assessing risk, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty, has been endorsed by Congress, the President, and the Secretary of DHS as a way to strengthen the nation against possible terrorist attacks. DHS has used risk management principles to invest millions of dollars at the state and local level as part of its Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants. For fiscal year 2006, DHS adopted a risk management approach to determine which UASI areas were eligible for funding. For the fiscal year 2007 grant process, DHS made substantial changes to its 2006 risk assessment model, simplifying its structure, reducing the number of variables considered, and incorporating the intelligence community's assessment of threats in candidate urban areas. The fiscal year 2007 model considers most areas of the country equally vulnerable to attack; its analysis focuses on the expected impact and consequences of successful attacks occurring in specific areas. DHS and the components of DHS responsible for transportation and port security have taken steps to apply risk management principles with varying degrees of progress. The Transportation Security Administration has not completed a methodology for assessing risk, and until the overall risk to the entire transportation sector is identified, it will be difficult to determine where and how to target limited resources to achieve the greatest security gains. The progress of each of DHS's three components responsible for port security varies according to organizational maturity and the complexity of its risk management task. The Coast Guard, created in 1915, was the most advanced in implementing a risk-based approach. Meanwhile, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (responsible for grants) and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (responsible for all sectors of the nation's critical infrastructure) were brought to or established with DHS in 2003 and lagged behind the Coast Guard in applying risk management to port security. Other DHS mission areas GAO has assessed include border security, immigration enforcement, immigration services, critical infrastructure protection, and science and technology; the extent to which a risk management approach has been implemented in each area varies. While DHS has called for using risk-based approaches to prioritize its resource investments, and for developing plans and allocating resources in a way that balances security and freedom, DHS has not comprehensively implemented a risk management approach--a difficult task. However, adoption of a comprehensive risk management framework is essential for DHS to assess risk by determining which elements of risk should be addressed in what ways within available resources. Wed, 07 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Homeland Security: Agriculture Specialists' Views of Their Work Experiences After Transfer to DHS, November 14, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07209r.pdf The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred responsibility for certain port inspections from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to the newly created Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Specifically, the act transferred the responsibility for inspecting passengers, baggage, cargo, and mail entering the country in airplanes, ships, trucks, and railcars for prohibited agricultural materials that may serve as carriers of foreign pests and diseases. USDA estimates that these biological invaders cost the American economy tens of billions of dollars annually in lower crop values, eradication programs, and emergency payments to farmers. Beginning in March 2003, more than 1,800 agriculture specialists who had formerly reported to USDA became CBP employees, as CBP incorporated the protection of U.S. agriculture into its primary antiterrorism mission. In addition to protecting U.S. agriculture, CBP's mission is to detect and prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States, interdict illegal drugs and other contraband, and apprehend individuals who are attempting to enter the United States illegally. Responding to congressional concerns that the transfer of agricultural inspections to CBP could shift the focus away from agriculture to CBP's other mission priorities, GAO reported in May 2006 on the coordination of USDA and DHS to ensure that U.S. agriculture is protected from accidentally or intentionally introduced pests and disease. In preparing this report, we surveyed a representative sample of CBP's agriculture specialists on their work experiences before and after the transfer and included the responses to the survey's 31 multiple-choice questions in the report. The survey also asked two open-ended questions: (1) What is going well with respect to your work as an agriculture specialist? and (2) What would you like to see changed or improved with respect to your work as an agriculture specialist? Congress asked us to analyze the content of the narrative responses to the open-ended questions contained in the survey. Specifically, Congress asked us to identify the common themes in the narrative responses and determine the percentage of agriculture specialists giving answers consistent with each theme. We provided Congressional staff with a formal briefing on our findings on October 17, 2006. This report summarizes the results of that briefing, including the five most common themes for each question. In summary, the narrative responses to the open-ended questions suggest morale issues among CBP agriculture specialists. Respondents typically provided more examples or went into greater detail in answering our question on what needs to be changed or improved. This question generated a total of 185 pages of comments--roughly 4 times more than that generated by the responses to our question on what is going well. Further, "Nothing is going well" was the second most frequent response to the question on what is going well. In addition, the narratives generally corroborate the responses to the relevant multiple-choice questions in the survey. For example, related to the specialists' perception that the agriculture safety mission has been compromised, 59 percent of experienced specialists indicated that they are doing either somewhat or many fewer inspections since the transfer, and 60 percent indicated that they are doing somewhat or many fewer interceptions. Similarly, related to working relationships, 64 percent of these specialists indicated that they do not believe that CBP management respects their work. Tue, 14 Nov 2006 00:00:00 -0500 Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving, July 10, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06933t.pdf Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important tool in federal efforts to secure the nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. The Coast Guard has established area maritime security committees--forums that involve federal and nonfederal officials who identify and address risks in a port. The Coast Guard and other agencies have sought to further enhance information sharing and port security operations by establishing interagency operational centers--command centers that tie together the efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. This testimony is a summary and update to our April 2005 report, Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394. It discusses the impact the committees and interagency operational centers have had on improving information sharing and identifies any barriers that have hindered information sharing. Area maritime security committees provide a structure that has improved information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the newly formed committees were an improvement over previous information-sharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. GAO's ongoing work indicates that these committees continue to be useful forums for information sharing. Interagency operational centers also allow for even greater information sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and sensors. The Coast Guard has developed its own centers--called sector command centers--at 35 port locations to monitor information and to support its operations planned for the future. As of today, the relationship between the interagency operational centers and the sector command centers remains to be determined. In April 2005 the major barrier hindering information sharing was the lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. In April 2005, Coast Guard issued guidance to field offices that clarified their role in obtaining clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. In addition, the Coast Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of data to monitor application trends. As of June 2006, guidance was put in place and according to the Coast Guard, was responsible for an increase in security clearance applications under consideration by the Coast Guard. Specifically, as of June 2006, 188 out of 467 nonfederal members of area maritime security committees with a need to know received some type of security clearance. This is an improvement from February 2005, when no security clearances were issued to 359 nonfederal members of area maritime security committees members with a need to know security information. Mon, 10 Jul 2006 00:00:00 -0400 Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System, March 30, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06591t.pdf U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Automated Targeting System (ATS)--a computerized model that CBP officers use as a decision support tool to help them target oceangoing cargo containers for inspection--is part of CBP's layered approach to securing oceangoing cargo. GAO reported in February 2004 on challenges CBP faced in targeting oceangoing cargo containers for inspection and testified before Congress in March 2004 about the findings in that report. The report and testimony outlined recommendations aimed at (1) better incorporating recognized modeling practices into CBP's targeting strategy, (2) periodically adjusting the targeting strategy to respond to findings that occur during the course of its operation, and (3) improving implementation of the targeting strategy. This statement for the record discusses preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work related to ATS and GAO's 2004 recommendations addressing the following questions: (1) What controls does CBP have in place to provide reasonable assurance that ATS is effective at targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of smuggled weapons of mass destruction? (2) How does CBP systematically analyze security inspection results and incorporate them into ATS? and (3) What steps has CBP taken to better implement the rest of its targeting strategy at the seaports? CBP has not yet put key controls in place to provide reasonable assurance that ATS is effective at targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction. To provide assurance that ATS targets the highest-risk cargo containers as intended, CBP is (1) working to develop and implement performance measures related to the targeting of cargo containers, (2) planning to compare the results of its random inspections with its ATS inspection results, (3) working to develop and implement a testing and simulation environment, and (4) addressing recommendations contained in a 2005 peer review of ATS. CBP expects to begin using performance measures in June 2006 and enter the final phase of software development for its testing and simulation environment at the same time. However, to date, none of these four initiatives has been fully implemented. Thus, CBP does not yet have key internal controls in place to be reasonably confident that ATS is providing the best information to allocate resources for targeting and inspecting containers that are the highest risk and not overlook inspecting containers that pose a threat to the nation. CBP does not yet have a comprehensive, integrated system in place to analyze security inspection results and incorporate them into ATS. CBP currently adjusts ATS based on intelligence information it receives and has initiated a process to track suggestions submitted by CBP targeting officers at the seaports for modifying ATS. However, CBP has not yet implemented plans to refine ATS based on findings from routine security inspections. Without a more comprehensive feedback system, CBP is limited in refining ATS, a fact that could hinder the overall effectiveness of the targeting strategy. CBP has taken steps to improve implementation of the targeting strategy at the seaports. It has implemented a testing and certification process for its officers who complete the Sea Cargo Targeting Course that should provide better assurance of effective targeting practices. CBP has also made a good faith effort to address longshoremen's safety concerns regarding radiation emitted by nonintrusive inspection equipment by taking actions such as working with longshoremen's unions and other maritime organization to develop public radiation tests on the nonintrusive inspection equipment. Nevertheless, CBP has not been able to persuade one longshoremen's union to permit changes in the procedure for staging containers to increase inspection efficiency at some West Coast seaports where the union's members work. Thu, 30 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain, March 22, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06389.pdf Preventing radioactive material from being smuggled into the United States is a key national security objective. To help address this threat, in October 2002, DHS began deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. This report reviews recent progress DHS has made (1) deploying radiation detection equipment, (2) using radiation detection equipment, (3) improving the capabilities and testing of this equipment, and (4) increasing cooperation between DHS and other federal agencies in conducting radiation detection programs. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry, but the agency's program goals are unrealistic and the program cost estimate is uncertain. As of December 2005, DHS had deployed 670 portal monitors and over 19,000 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment. However, the deployment of portal monitors has fallen behind schedule, making DHS's goal of deploying 3,034 by September 2009 unlikely. In particular, two factors have contributed to the schedule delay. First, DHS provides the Congress with information on portal monitor acquisitions and deployments before releasing any funds. However, DHS's lengthy review process has caused delays in providing such information to the Congress. Second, difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement of portal monitors and how to most efficiently screen rail cars have delayed deployments at seaports. Regarding the uncertainty of the program's cost estimate, DHS would like to deploy advanced technology portals that will likely cost significantly more than the currently deployed portals, but tests have not yet shown that these portals are demonstrably more effective than the current portals. Consequently, it is not clear that the benefits of the new portals would be worth any increased cost to the program. Also, our analysis of the program's costs indicates that DHS may incur a $342 million cost overrun. DHS has improved in using detection equipment and in following the agency's inspection procedures since 2003, but we identified two potential issues in Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspection procedures. First, although radiological materials being transported into the United States are generally required to have a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license, regulations do not require that the license accompany the shipment. Further, CBP officers do not have access to data that could be used to verify that shippers have acquired the necessary documentation. Second, CBP inspection procedures do not require officers to open containers and inspect them, although under some circumstances, doing so could improve security. In addition, DHS has sponsored research, development, and testing activities to address the inherent limitations of currently fielded equipment. However, much work remains to achieve consistently better detection capabilities. DHS seems to have made progress in coordinating with other agencies to conduct radiation detection programs; however, because the DHS office created to achieve the coordination is less than 1 year old, its working relationships with other agencies are in their early stages of development and implementation. In the future, this office plans to develop a "global architecture" to integrate several agencies' radiation detection efforts, including several international programs. Wed, 22 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500 Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, December 15, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0691.pdf Congress and the President have called for various homeland security efforts to be based on risk management--a systematic process for assessing threats and taking appropriate steps to deal with them. GAO examined how three Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components were carrying out this charge: the Coast Guard, which has overall responsibility for security in the nation's ports; the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which awards grants for port security projects; and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), which has responsibility for developing ways to assess risks across all types of critical infrastructure. GAO's work focused on identifying the progress each DHS component has made on risk management and the challenges each faces in moving further. The three DHS components GAO studied varied considerably in their progress in developing a sound risk management framework for homeland security responsibilities. The varied progress reflects, among other things, each component's organizational maturity and the complexity of its task. The Coast Guard, which is furthest along, is the component of longest standing, being created in 1915, while IAIP came into being with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. IAIP, which has made the least progress, is not only a new component but also has the most complex task--addressing not just ports but all types of infrastructure. The Coast Guard and ODP have a relatively robust methodology in place for assessing risks at ports; IAIP is still developing its methodology and has had several setbacks in completing the task. All three components, however, have much left to do. In particular, each component is limited in its ability to compare and prioritize risks. The Coast Guard and ODP can do so within a port but not between ports; IAIP has not demonstrated that it can do so either within or between all infrastructure sectors. Each component faces many challenges in making further progress. Success will depend partly on continuing to improve various technical and management processes that are part of risk management. For example, obtaining better quality data from intelligence agencies would help DHS components estimate the relative likelihood of various types of threats--a key element of assessing risks. In the longer term, progress will depend increasingly on how well risk management is coordinated across agencies, because current approaches in many ways are neither consistent nor comparable. Also, weaving risk-based data into the annual budget cycle of program review will be important. Supplying the necessary guidance and coordination is what the Department of Homeland Security was set up to do and, as the Secretary of Homeland Security has stated, what it now needs increasingly to address. This is a key issue for the department as it seeks to identify relative risks and take appropriate actions related to the nation's homeland security activities. Thu, 15 Dec 2005 00:00:00 -0500 Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS Allocate Resources to Highest Priorities, June 29, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05824t.pdf Previous GAO work has outlined the nation's growing fiscal imbalance and called for a fundamental reexamination of the base of the federal government. The significant resources directed to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) indicate that a robust homeland security program is viewed as critical to the protection and prosperity of Americans. This testimony addresses the need for a fundamental reexamination of the base of government, the role that performance budgeting tools can play in helping inform agency activities, and DHS's use of performance budgeting and risk management concepts. It also includes examples from GAO work on homeland security issues that highlight DHS attempts to define an acceptable and achievable level of risk. The nation faces a long-term fiscal imbalance, and the role of the federal government is being reshaped by many forces, such as evolving defense and homeland security policies and new organizational and institutional arrangements for carrying out public activities. Given these circumstances, there is a critical need for the federal government to reexamine the base of its programs, policies, functions, and activities. A periodic reexamination of major federal spending and tax policies offers the prospect for the American government to eliminate outmoded operations and better align its operations with the demands of a changing world. The management and performance reforms enacted by Congress in the past 15 years have provided new tools to support this kind of reexamination. However, these new tools must be implemented by agencies and used by the Congress in its decision making in order to be effective. Performance budgeting can help policymakers address important questions about whether and how programs contribute to their stated goals. It can help enhance the government's capacity to assess competing claims for federal dollars by arming decision makers with better information on the results of individual programs, as well as on various federal policies and programs addressing common goals. Performance budgeting, however, cannot provide answers to every resource question--particularly where allocation is a function of competing values and interests that depend on factors other than program performance. Congress and the President have agreed on DHS's mission, and DHS has established strategic objectives for achieving its mission. However, DHS's strategic plan does not detail the associated resources necessary to carry out its mission and achieve its strategic goals. DHS has called for using risk-based approaches to prioritize its resource investments regarding critical infrastructure, and for developing plans and allocating resources in a way that balance security and freedom. It must carefully weigh the benefit of homeland security endeavors and allocate resources where the benefit of reducing risk is worth the additional cost. A comprehensive risk management framework--which includes an assessment of risk through threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments--should be applied to guide these decisions. DHS has not completed a comprehensive national threat and risk assessment. However, some components of DHS have taken initial steps to apply elements of risk management to its operations and decision making. For example, the Coast Guard has taken actions to assess and mitigate vulnerabilities in order to enhance maritime security, and the Transportation Security Administration has conducted vulnerability assessments at selected general aviation airports. Congress and agencies have a shared responsibility for ensuring that performance budgeting and risk management approaches are both useful and used. Wed, 29 Jun 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, May 17, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05448t.pdf More than 3 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns remain over the security of U.S. seaports and waterways. Seaports and waterways are vulnerable given their size, easy accessibility by water and land, large numbers of potential targets, and close proximity to urban areas. Seaports are also a critical link in the international supply chain, which has its own potential vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to transport a weapon of mass destruction to the United States. Federal agencies such as the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection and other seaport stakeholders such as state and local law enforcement officials as well as owners and operators of facilities and vessels have taken actions to try to mitigate these vulnerabilities and enhance maritime security. This testimony, which is based on previously completed GAO work, reports on (1) the types of actions taken by the federal government and other stakeholders to address maritime security, (2) the main challenges that GAO observed in taking these actions, and (3) what tools and approaches may be useful in planning future actions to enhance maritime security. Federal agencies and local stakeholders have taken many actions to secure seaports. For example, federal agencies have stepped up vessel monitoring, cargo and container inspection, and security patrol activities. Port stakeholders in the private sector and in state and local government have taken such actions as conducting security assessments of infrastructure and vessels and implementing security plans. These actions provide three types of protections: identifying and reducing vulnerabilities of seaports, securing the cargo moving through seaports, and developing an informed view of maritime activities through intelligence, information-sharing, and new technologies to identify and respond to threats. Due in large part to the urgency with which these actions were implemented, challenges have been encountered in implementing them. While some challenges may be resolved with time, others are more difficult to resolve and could hinder the actions' effectiveness. The main challenges GAO has identified include failure to develop necessary planning components to carry out the programs; difficulty in coordinating the activities of federal agencies and port stakeholders to implement programs; and difficulty in maintaining the financial support to continue implementation of security enhancements. As intensified homeland security efforts continue, assessing their contribution to security and their sustainability over time will become more important. Assessing the progress made in securing seaports is difficult, as these efforts lack clear goals defining what they are to achieve and measures that track progress toward these goals. As Congress and the nation consider how much security is enough, more attention will likely be needed to define these goals and measures. Doing so is important because no amount of money can totally protect seaports from attack by a determined enemy. These realities suggest that the future focus in applying resources and efforts needs to incorporate an approach to assess critical infrastructure, determine what is most at risk, and apply measures designed to make cost effective use of resources and funding. Tue, 17 May 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts, April 26, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05557.pdf In January 2002, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) initiated the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to address the threat that terrorists might use maritime cargo containers to ship weapons of mass destruction. Under CSI, CBP is to target and inspect high-risk cargo shipments at foreign seaports before they leave for destinations in the United States. In July 2003, GAO reported that CSI had management challenges that limited its effectiveness. Given these challenges and in light of plans to expand the program, GAO examined selected aspects of the program's operation, including the (1) factors that affect CBP's ability to target shipments at foreign seaports, (2) extent to which high-risk containers have actually been inspected overseas, and (3) extent to which CBP formulated and documented strategies for achieving the program's goals. Some of the positive factors that have affected CBP's ability to target shipments overseas are improved information sharing between U.S. and foreign customs staff and a heightened level of bilateral cooperation and international awareness of the need to secure the whole global shipping system. Although the program aims to target all U.S.-bound shipments from CSI ports, it has been unable to do so because of staffing imbalances. CBP has developed a staffing model to determine staffing needs but has been unable to fully staff some ports because of diplomatic considerations (e.g., the need for host government permission) and practical considerations (e.g., workspace constraints). As a result, 35 percent of these shipments were not targeted and were therefore not subject to inspection overseas. In addition, the staffing model's reliance on placing staff at CSI ports rather than considering whether some of the targeting functions could be performed in the United States limits the program's operational efficiency and effectiveness. CBP has not established minimum technical requirements for the detection capability of nonintrusive inspection and radiation detection equipment used as part of CSI. Ports participating in CSI use various types of nonintrusive inspection equipment to inspect containers, and the detection and identification capabilities of such equipment can vary. In addition, technologies to detect other weapons of mass destruction have limitations. Given these conditions, CBP has limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying terrorist weapons of mass destruction. A lthough CBP has made some improvements in the management of CSI, we found that further refinements to the bureau's management tools are needed to help achieve program objectives. In July 2003, we recommended that CBP develop a strategic plan and performance measures, including outcome-oriented measures, for CSI. CBP developed a strategic plan for CSI in February 2004 that contains three of the six key elements required for agency strategic plans, and CBP officials told us they continue to develop the other three elements. While it appears that the bureau's efforts in this area meet the intent of our prior recommendation to develop a strategic plan for CSI, we will continue to monitor progress in this area. CBP has also made progress in the development of outcome-oriented performance measures, particularly for the program objective of increasing information sharing and collaboration among CSI and host country personnel. However, CBP continues to face challenges in developing performance measures to assess the effectiveness of CSI targeting and inspection activities. Therefore, it is difficult to assess progress made in CSI operations over time, and it is difficult to compare CSI operations across ports. Tue, 26 Apr 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, April 15, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05394.pdf Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important tool in federal efforts to secure the nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. The Coast Guard has established area maritime security committees--forums that involve federal and nonfederal officials who identify and address risks in a port. The Coast Guard and other agencies have sought to further enhance information sharing and port security operations by establishing interagency operational centers--command centers that tie together the efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. GAO was asked to review the efforts to see what impact the committees and interagency operational centers have had on improving information sharing and to identify any barriers that have hindered information sharing. Area maritime security committees provide a structure that improves information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the newly formed committees were an improvement over previous information sharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. The three interagency operational centers established to date allow for even greater information sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and sensors. The Coast Guard is planning to develop its own centers--called sector command centers--at up to 40 additional port locations to monitor information and to support its operations. The relationship between the interagency operational centers and the planned expansion of sector command centers remains to be determined. The major barrier hindering information sharing has been the lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. By February 2005--or 4 months after the Coast Guard developed a list of 359 committee members who needed a security clearance--28 of the 359 members had submitted the necessary paperwork for a security clearance. Coast Guard field officials did not clearly understand that they were responsible for contacting nonfederal officials about the clearance process. To deal with this, in early April 2005, the Coast Guard issued guidance to field offices that clarified their role. In addition, the Coast Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of data to monitor application trends. Developing such procedures would aid in identifying deficiencies in the future. As the Coast Guard proceeds with its program, another way to improve the submission of paperwork involves educating nonfederal officials about the clearance process. Fri, 15 Apr 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request, March 17, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05364t.pdf The Coast Guard's budget has steadily increased in recent years, reflecting the agency's need to address heightened homeland security responsibilities while also addressing traditional programs such as rescuing mariners in distress and protecting important fishing grounds. The fiscal year 2006 budget request, which totals $8.1 billion, reflects an increase of $570 million over the previous year. GAO has conducted reviews of many of the Coast Guard's programs in recent years, and this testimony synthesizes the results of these reviews as they pertain to three priority areas in the Coast Guard's budget: (1) implementing a maritime strategy for homeland security, (2) enhancing performance across missions, and (3) recapitalizing the Coast Guard, especially the Deepwater program--an acquisition that involves replacing or upgrading cutters and aircraft that are capable of performing missions far out at sea. GAO's observations are aimed at highlighting potential areas for ongoing congressional attention. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 charged the Coast Guard with many maritime homeland security responsibilities, such as assessing port vulnerabilities and ensuring that vessels and port facilities have adequate security plans, and the Coast Guard has worked hard to meet these requirements. GAO's reviews of these efforts have disclosed some areas for attention as well, such as developing ways to ensure that security plans are carried out with vigilance. The Coast Guard has taken steps to deal with some of these areas, but opportunities for improvement remain. The Coast Guard has three efforts under way that hold promise for enhancing mission performance but also merit ongoing attention. One is a new coastal communication system. The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $101 million to move the system forward. A successful system would help almost all Coast Guard missions, but to develop it the Coast Guard must build more than 300 towers along the nation's coasts, some of them in environmentally sensitive areas. The second effort involves restructuring the Coast Guard's field units--tying resources and command authority closer together. This effort represents a major organizational change, and as such, it may be challenging to implement successfully. The third effort, enhancing readiness at the Coast Guard's stations for search and rescue and other missions, remains a work in process. The Deepwater program, which would receive $966 million under the budget request, appears to merit the most ongoing attention. GAO reviews of this program have shown that the Coast Guard clearly needs new or upgraded assets, but the Coast Guard's contracting approach carries a number of inherent risks that, left unaddressed, could lead to spiraling costs and slipped schedules. The Coast Guard is taking some action in this regard, but GAO continues to regard this approach as carrying substantial risk. Some expansion of cost and slippage in schedule has already occurred. Thu, 17 Mar 2005 00:00:00 -0500 Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and Management Concerns Remain, January 31, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05161.pdf For years, the Coast Guard has conducted search and rescue operations from its network of stations along the nation's coasts and waterways. In 2001, reviews of station operations found that station readiness--the ability to execute mission requirements in keeping with standards--was in decline. The Coast Guard began addressing these issues, only to see its efforts complicated by expanded post-September 11, 2001, homeland security responsibilities at many stations. GAO reviewed the impact of changing missions on station needs, the progress made in addressing station readiness needs, and the extent to which plans are in place for addressing any remaining needs. The Coast Guard does not yet know the extent to which station readiness needs have been affected by post-September 11 changes in mission priorities, although increases in homeland security operations have clearly affected activities and presumably affected readiness needs as well. Following the attacks, stations in and near ports received the bulk of port security duties, creating substantial increases in workloads. The Coast Guard is still in the process of defining long-term activity levels for homeland security and has yet to convert the homeland security mission into specific station readiness requirements. Until it does so, the impact of these new duties on readiness needs cannot be determined. The Coast Guard says it will revise readiness requirements after security activity levels have been finalized. Increased staffing, more training, new boats, more personal protection equipment (such as life vests), and other changes have helped mitigate many long-standing station readiness concerns. However, stations have been unable to meet current Coast Guard standards and goals in the areas of staffing and boats, an indication that stations are still significantly short of desired readiness levels in these areas. Also, because Coast Guard funding practices for personal protection equipment have not changed, stations may have insufficient funding for such equipment in the future. The Coast Guard does not have an adequate plan in place for addressing remaining readiness needs. The Coast Guard's strategic plan for these stations has not been updated to reflect increased security responsibilities, and the agency lacks specific planned actions and milestones. Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable annual goals that would allow the agency and others to track stations' progress. Mon, 31 Jan 2005 00:00:00 -0500 Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, January 14, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05170.pdf Seaports are a critical vulnerability in the nation's defense against terrorism. They are potential entry points for bombs or other devices smuggled into cargo ships and ports' often-sprawling nature presents many potential targets for attack. To assess the response procedures that would be implemented in an attack or security incident, officials conduct port-specific exercises. Many federal, state, and local agencies may potentially be involved. The Coast Guard has primary responsibility for coordinating these exercises and analyzing the results. GAO examined (1) the emerging framework for coordinating entities involved in security responses, (2) legal and operational issues emerging from exercises conducted to date, and (3) Coast Guard management of reports analyzing exercises. GAO reviewed reports on 82 exercises from fiscal year 2004 and observed 4 exercises as they were being conducted. The framework under which federal agencies would manage a port-terrorism incident is still evolving. The primary guidance for response, the National Response Plan, is in the final stages of approval, and the National Incident Management System, the structure for multiagency coordination, is still being put in place. As a result, it is too early to determine how well the complete framework will function in an actual incident. GAO's review of fiscal year 2004 terrorism-related reports and exercises identified relatively few legal issues, and none of these issues produced recommendations for statutory changes. Most issues have instead been operational in nature and have surfaced in nearly every exercise. They are of four main types: difficulties in sharing or accessing information, inadequate coordination of resources, difficulties in coordinating effectively in a command and control environment, and lack of knowledge about who has jurisdictional or decision-making authority. Reports on the exercises often do not meet the Coast Guard's standards for timeliness or completeness. Sixty-one percent of the reports were not submitted within 60 days of completing the exercise--the Coast Guard standard. The Coast Guard has implemented a new system for tracking the reports, but after a year of use, timeliness remains a concern. The Coast Guard has requirements for what the reports should contain, but 18 percent of the reports did not meet the requirement to assess each objective of the exercise. The Coast Guard has cited several planned actions that may allow for improving completeness. These actions are still in development, and it is too early to determine how much they will help. Fri, 14 Jan 2005 00:00:00 -0500 Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, December 10, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05106.pdf As part of a multilayered effort to strengthen port security, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 calls for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue a worker identification card that uses biological metrics, such as fingerprints, to control access to secure areas of ports or ships. Charged with the responsibility for developing this card, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within DHS, initially planned to issue a Transportation Worker Identification Credential in August 2004 to about 6 million maritime workers. GAO assessed what factors limited TSA's ability to meet its August 2004 target date for issuing cards and what challenges remain for TSA to implement the card. Three main factors, all of which resulted in delays for testing a prototype of the maritime worker identification card system, caused the agency to miss its initial August 2004 target date for issuing the cards: (1) officials had difficulty obtaining timely approval to proceed with the prototype test from DHS, (2) extra time was required to identify data to be collected for a cost-benefit analysis, and (3) additional work to assess card technologies was required. DHS has not determined when it may begin issuing cards. In the future, TSA will face difficult challenges as it moves forward with developing and operating the card program, for example, developing regulations that identify eligibility requirements for the card. An additional challenge--and one that holds potential to adversely affect the entire program--is that TSA does not yet have a comprehensive plan in place for managing the project. Failure to develop such a plan places the card program at higher risk of cost overruns, missed deadlines, and underperformance. Following established, industry best practices for project planning and management could help TSA address these challenges. Best practices suggest managers develop a comprehensive project plan and other, detailed component plans. However, while TSA has initiated some project planning, the agency lacks an approved comprehensive project plan to govern the life of the project and has not yet developed other, detailed component plans for risk mitigation or the cost-benefit and alternatives analyses. Fri, 10 Dec 2004 00:00:00 -0500 Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective Port Security Assessment Program, September 30, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041062.pdf Created in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Port Security Assessment Program was designed to evaluate security at the nation's 55 most economically and militarily strategic ports. Implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, the program focuses on identifying vulnerabilities, suggesting approaches to minimize them, and making the information available to those responsible for developing and implementing portwide security plans. The program has been under way for more than 2 years and has undergone several sets of changes, including the addition of a geographic information system (GIS). GAO was asked to discuss why and how the program changed and assess the Coast Guard's approach for implementing the program in its current form. Changes in the Port Security Assessment Program reflect attempts to deal with two main developments since the program's inception: evolving assessment needs at the ports and missteps in how the initial assessments were carried out. The program was designed as a comprehensive assessment of each port and its critical assets, such as passenger terminals, factories, cargo facilities, and bridges. However, the need for comprehensive assessments was diminished when many owners and operators of these critical assets began conducting their own assessments to comply with new regulatory requirements or apply for security grants. The program's assessments also proved more expensive than expected, and a GAO review conducted at the time found shortcomings in their quality and usefulness. The current program's assessments are more targeted in scope and nature, including the opportunity for local Coast Guard officials to request reviews of specific assets they do not know enough about. To help local authorities with security planning and response, the Coast Guard decided to incorporate a GIS. A GIS is a computer mapping system designed to have many information "layers" that can be easily updated and retrieved. The Coast Guard expects to complete the assessments at the 55 ports by February 2005, but no timeline exists for making the GIS component operational. Although the revised program holds promise, the implementation approach is at increased risk because the Coast Guard is not taking sufficient steps in the planning process. Contrary to best practices for technology systems development, the GIS is being developed without sufficient up-front work to identify how the system will be expected to perform. Both the GIS component and the program as a whole also lack a project plan detailing tasks, schedules, and costs. In other federal agencies, GAO has identified similar projects that failed when such steps were not followed. The initial response of local Coast Guard officials to the new, targeted assessments is generally positive. However, the assessments could be of greater benefit if functional requirements for the GIS were more clearly defined, so the Coast Guard could use the assessments to address gaps in security knowledge. Thu, 30 Sep 2004 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security Fleet: Many Factors Determine Impact of Potential Limits on Food Aid Shipments, September 13, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041065.pdf Food aid cargo must generally be carried on U.S.-flag ships under requirements set by the cargo preference program. Two groups of carriers compete for this cargo: (1) those that participate in the Maritime Security Program and receive an annual government subsidy--generally liners operating on scheduled routes and (2) those that do not--generally carriers operating on a charter basis. Congress directed GAO to study (1) how the cargo preference and Maritime Security programs are designed and who participates;(2) the nature and extent of MSF and non-MSF carrier participation and competition in the food aid program; and (3) how a tonnage limitation on bagged preference cargo for MSF vessels could affect MSF, other U.S.-flag ships, the cargo preference food aid program, and the ports servicing these ships. The cargo preference program and the Maritime Security Program provide incentives to retain privately owned U.S.-flag ships and their U.S. citizen mariners for commercial and national defense purposes. The cargo preference program is open to all U.S.-flagged vessels, while the Maritime Security Fleet (MSF) subsidy is only available to certain militarily useful vessels. Of the 47 ships currently in the MSF, 37 have participated in cargo preference food aid shipments. MSF and non-MSF carriers compete for food aid shipped as bagged cargo, which averaged 33 percent of food aid shipments by tonnage from fiscal years 1999 to 2003. There is no competition for bulk food aid shipments because MSF carriers do not carry bulk cargo. Changes in food aid spending have contributed to a shift from bulk to bagged cargo and increased reliance on bagged cargo by some non-MSF carriers. From 1999 to 2003, MSF carriers shipped about 45 percent and non-MSF carriers 55 percent of bagged food aid cargo. Competition between MSF and non-MSF carriers for bagged food aid is affected by certain cargo preference requirements. Establishing a tonnage limitation on MSF vessels would likely reduce their share of food aid shipments, but the extent would depend on factors such as the level of the limit and the options MSF carriers have in responding to it. We examined three proposed limits and found that the percentage of food aid voyages carrying more than the proposed limit rises from 3 percent with a limit of 7,500 tons to 19 percent above 2,500 tons, according to fiscal year 2001 to 2003 data. The actual impact on MSF carriers will be smaller if they are able to (1) carry some food aid up to the limit, (2) replace some food aid above the limit with other cargo, and/or (3) elect to carry food aid even without the subsidy. Food aid agencies are concerned about the impacts of a tonnage limit, including increased delays in providing food aid, administrative burdens, and higher shipping costs. Major ports would generally experience a limited overall impact of a tonnage limitation, but specific food aid terminals could be affected. Mon, 13 Sep 2004 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System, July 23, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04868.pdf As part of international efforts to ensure maritime safety and security--and to carry out its mandates under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002--the U.S. Coast Guard is developing an automatic identification system (AIS) that should enable it to monitor ships traveling to and through U.S. waters. For AIS to operate nationwide, ships need equipment to transmit and receive AIS signals, and the Coast Guard needs shore stations and designated radio frequencies to keep track of the ships' identities and movements. Yet unresolved frequency issues between the Coast Guard and a private company, MariTEL, have come before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). GAO reviewed federal agencies' progress in developing AIS nationwide and identified certain challenges and opportunities in completing the work. Because the Coast Guard is in the early stages of progress toward nationwide AIS development, the total cost and completion time are uncertain. The Coast Guard has taken advantage of opportunities to bring AIS into service quickly in 10 areas where vessel-monitoring technology already exists, and it is simultaneously defining and planning for full nationwide coverage. The Coast Guard has only preliminary cost estimates for a nationwide system, because geographic and other factors will affect installation at different locations. The Coast Guard estimates that planning and testing will be completed, and a request for proposals from potential contractors issued, between December 2004 and February 2005. The Coast Guard faces both challenges and potential opportunities in its development of a nationwide AIS. Nationwide development depends in part on how FCC resolves a continuing dispute between federal agencies and MariTEL over issues including who should have access to the internationally designated AIS frequencies and for what uses. To help protect its licensed rights to certain frequencies, MariTEL generally seeks either sole control over the international standard AIS frequencies or shared control with ships and the federal government. The federal government seeks a resolution that will reserve the internationally designated frequencies for AIS use by government and nongovernment entities. FCC expects to respond in summer 2004. This response--and whether it leads to any additional actions on the part of the interested parties--could affect the overall cost and pace of nationwide AIS development. Depending on FCC's response, one factor that offers an opportunity to reduce federal costs is that some local port entities are willing to assume the expense and responsibility for AIS construction if they can use AIS data, along with the Coast Guard, for their own purposes. Fri, 23 Jul 2004 00:00:00 -0400 Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, June 30, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04838.pdf The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, as implemented by the Coast Guard, calls for owners and operators of about 3,150 port facilities (such as shipping terminals or factories with hazardous materials) and about 9,200 vessels (such as cargo ships, ferries, and tugs and barges) to develop and implement security plans by July 1, 2004. The Coast Guard intends to conduct on-site compliance inspections of all facilities by January 1, 2005, and all vessels by July 1, 2005, to ensure plans are adequately implemented. The Coast Guard estimated the act's security improvements would cost $7.3 billion over 10 years--most of it borne by facility and vessel owners and operators. GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress towards developing, reviewing, and approving plans by July 1, 2004, (2) the Coast Guard's monitoring and oversight strategy for ensuring that plans are implemented, and (3) the accuracy of the Coast Guard's cost estimate. Owners and operators have made progress in developing security plans for their port facilities and vessels. However, the extent to which the Coast Guard will have reviewed and approved the approximately 12,300 individual plans by July 1, 2004, varies considerably. About 5,900 plans were being developed under an option allowing owners and operators to self-certify that they would develop and implement plans by July 1, using industry-developed, Coast Guard-approved standards and templates. These individual plans will not be reviewed before July 1 unless owners or operators choose to submit them for review. The remaining 6,400 plans went through a review process established by the Coast Guard. Every plan required revisions, some of which were significant. As of June 2004--1 month before the deadline for implementation--more than half of the 6,400 plans were still in process. The Coast Guard took steps to speed up the process and to allow facilities and vessels to continue operating with less than full plan approval after July 1, as long as the Coast Guard was satisfied with their progress. The Coast Guard's strategy for monitoring and overseeing security plan implementation will face numerous challenges. Whether the Coast Guard will be able to conduct timely on-site compliance inspections of all facilities and vessels is uncertain because questions remain about whether the Coast Guard will have enough inspectors; a training program sufficient to overcome major differences in experience levels; and adequate guidance to help inspectors conduct thorough, consistent reviews. Another challenge is to ensure inspections reflect assessments of the normal course of business at facilities and aboard vessels. The accuracy of the Coast Guard's $7.3 billion estimate for implementing security improvements is likewise uncertain. The estimate, while a goodfaith effort on the Coast Guard's part, is based on limited data and on assumptions that are subject to error. The estimate should be viewed more as a rough indicator than a precise measure of costs. Wed, 30 Jun 2004 00:00:00 -0400 Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005 and Beyond, April 7, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04636t.pdf As the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security within the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard is facing extraordinary, heightened responsibilities to protect America's ports, waterways, and waterside facilities from terrorist attacks. At the same time, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other programs important to the nation's interests, such as conducting search and rescue and protecting important fishing grounds. Its expanded responsibilities come at a time when budget resources are increasingly constrained, making prioritization among competing agencies and programs an even more critical factor in congressional decision-making. This testimony specifically addresses (1) the most recent trends in both resource usage and performance results for the Coast Guard's homeland security and non-homeland security programs; (2) challenges the agency faces as it proceeds with its Deepwater acquisition program to replace or modernize its key legacy cutters and aircraft; and (3) an overview of the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Coast Guard, focusing on several areas of particular congressional interest. Resource usage for Coast Guard assets--its cutters, boats, and aircraft-- was up almost 40 percent from the pre-September 11th baseline. Homeland security programs, such as the ports, waterways, and coastal security program, have been more likely to see increases in usage, while nonhomeland security programs, such as living marine resources, remain below pre-September 11th levels. Although resource usage changed substantially for many of these programs, performance results generally improved or remained largely the same. The stable or improved performance results were attributed mainly to operational efficiencies (e.g., improved technology, improved tactics, stronger partnerships, and improved intelligence). However, the Coast Guard has limited data and no systematic approach to explain or account for the effects of these factors. Without such an approach and supporting data to link its resources and performance results, the agency may be missing further opportunities to increase productivity and efficiency to ensure best use of its funds. Some of the Coast Guard's legacy Deepwater cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft are increasingly unreliable and costly to maintain, and timely and effective implementation of the agency's ongoing Deepwater acquisition program to modernize these assets is crucial in order to reverse this trend. However, the Coast Guard faces serious challenges to keep the Deepwater program on schedule and within planned budget estimates. We estimate that to return the program to its original 20-year completion schedule will cost about $2.2 billion more than the Coast Guard estimated when the program was implemented in 2002. Also, available program funding, which has been less than the Coast Guard planned, may have to be used, in part, to address critical maintenance needs of the legacy assets, diverting funds otherwise intended for future Deepwater replacements and upgrades. Moreover, recent GAO work raised serious concerns about the management and oversight of the program, including the quality of the Coast Guard's assessment of the program contractor's performance and the uncertainty as to whether the Coast Guard would be able to effectively control costs. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request of about $7.5 billion for the Coast Guard represents about an 8 percent increase over last year. It includes $5.2 billion in operating expenses and $943 million for its capital acquisition budget. Most of the new initiatives outlined in its operating expense budget are targeted for homeland security initiatives, including $102 million for implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Aside from the new initiatives, two other efforts in the budget request may require further attention. The Coast Guard's multi-mission stations are still experiencing a heavy workload for station personnel because of increased homeland security responsibilities. Also, the Coast Guard's Rescue 21 program, which will replace the Coast Guard's current antiquated communication system, faces possible delays because of software system development problems. Wed, 07 Apr 2004 00:00:00 -0400 Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection, March 31, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04557t.pdf After the attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns intensified that terrorists would attempt to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. One possible method is to use one of the 7 million cargo containers that arrive at our seaports each year. Addressing the potential threat posed by the movement of oceangoing cargo containers falls to the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Since CBP cannot inspect all arriving cargo containers, it uses a targeting strategy, including an Automated Targeting System. This system targets containers for inspection based on perceived level of risk. In this testimony, GAO summarizes its work on (1) whether the development of CBP's targeting strategy is consistent with recognized key risk management and modeling practices and (2) how well the strategy has been implemented at selected seaports. CBP has taken steps to address the terrorism risks posed by oceangoing cargo containers, but its strategy neither incorporates all key elements of a risk management framework nor is it entirely consistent with recognized modeling practices. Actions CBP has taken included refining the Automated Targeting System to target cargo containers that are a high risk for terrorism, or other smuggling, for physical inspection. CBP has also implemented national targeting training and sought to improve the quality and timeliness of manifest information, which is one of the inputs for its Automated Targeting System. However, regarding risk management, CPB has not performed a comprehensive set of assessments vital for determining the level of risk for oceangoing cargo containers and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that risk. Regarding recognized modeling practices, CBP has not subjected the Automated Targeting System to adequate external peer review or testing. It has also not fully implemented a process to randomly examine containers in order to test the targeting strategy. Without incorporating all key elements of a risk management framework and recognized modeling practices, CBP cannot be reasonably sure that its targeting strategy provides the best method to protect against weapons of mass destruction entering the United States at its seaports. GAO's visits to selected seaports found that the implementation of CBP's targeting strategy faces a number of challenges. Although port officials said that inspectors were able to inspect all containers designated by the Automated Targeting System as high-risk, GAO's requests for documentation raised concerns about the adequacy of CBP's data to document these inspections. CBP lacks an adequate mechanism to test or certify the competence of students who participate in their national targeting training. Additionally, CBP has not been able to fully address longshoremen's safety concerns related to inspection equipment. Addressing these concerns is important to ensure that cargo inspections are conducted safely and efficiently. Challenges to both the development and the implementation of CBP's targeting strategy, if not addressed, may limit the effectiveness of targeting as a tool to help ensure homeland security. Wed, 31 Mar 2004 00:00:00 -0500 Maritime Law Exemption: Exemption Provides Limited Competitive Advantage, but Barriers to Further Entry under U.S. Flag Remain, February 27, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04421.pdf No large U.S.-flagged cruise ships (ships registered in the U.S. that are U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, and U.S. crewed) are in operation. Foreignflagged vessels cruising to foreign ports serve most of the U.S. demand for cruises. However, Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) recently obtained an exemption from U.S. maritime law to operate three foreign-built ships under the U.S. flag in Hawaii. Cruise lines and others have raised concerns over the advantage the exemption might confer to NCL, since foreign-flagged competitors are unable to offer the same itineraries due to the Passenger Vessel Services Act (PVSA), which prevents foreign vessels from transporting passengers solely between U.S. ports. Concerns have also been raised over the effect this exemption might have on future attempts to grow the U.S.-flag cruise vessel fleet, since potential U.S.-flag competitors would need to build ships in the United States, presumably at higher cost. GAO was asked to (1) review the original intent of the PVSA and rulings and decisions regarding it, (2) determine if the exemption will affect the implementation of the PVSA or other maritime laws, (3) assess the potential effects of the exemption on competition and entry into the U.S. domestic cruise market, and (4) assess the potential economic effects of granting other cruise lines similar exemptions. The Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation generally agreed with the findings in this report. The original intent of the PVSA, enacted in 1886, was to protect the U.S. maritime industry from foreign competition by penalizing foreign vessels that transport passengers solely between U.S. ports. However, several rulings and decisions interpreting the PVSA have allowed itineraries for foreign cruise vessels between U.S. ports that were previously restricted. For example, voyages by foreign vessels between two U.S. ports that include a distant foreign port, and round trip voyages from U.S. ports that include a nearby foreign port and other U.S. ports, do not violate the PVSA. NCL's exemption will likely have little impact on how the PVSA or other maritime laws are administered or interpreted because it is specific to three NCL vessels and cannot be applied to any other vessels in any other areas. The exemption effectively gives NCL a monopoly on interisland Hawaiian cruises--providing consumers with itineraries that were previously unavailable. However, NCL will likely have little power to raise prices on these itineraries because of competition from other vacation options. Because NCL is able to operate foreign-built ships in Hawaii, the exemption provides an additional obstacle for any potential U.S.-flag competitor to enter that market, since that competitor would need to build the ship in the United States at a higher cost. However, independent of the exemption, there were and still are other substantial obstacles for any potential U.S.-flag cruise vessel due to the higher capital and operating costs (e.g., labor costs) associated with the U.S. flag, as compared with existing foreign-flag cruise vessels offering itineraries through a foreign port. Granting additional exemptions to ease entry into the domestic trade could lead to benefits for port cities, U.S. seamen, and consumers; however, it is unclear how many cruise lines would choose to enter even if they were permitted to operate foreign-built ships under the U.S. flag, because of the higher operating costs associated with a U.S.-flag carrier operating in domestic itineraries and because of uncertain market conditions. Fri, 27 Feb 2004 00:00:00 -0500 Freight Transportation: Strategies Needed to Address Planning and Financing Limitations, December 19, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04165.pdf The strong productivity gains in the U.S. economy have hinged in part on transportation networks working more efficiently. The nation's ports, which handle 95 percent of overseas freight tonnage, are a key link in this network, and efficient intermodal links between ship, rail, and highways are vital to continued productivity gains. GAO was asked to address (1) the challenges to freight mobility, (2) the limitations key stakeholders have encountered in addressing these challenges, and (3) strategies that may aid decision makers in enhancing freight mobility. GAO's work was based on a synthesis of previous studies and a review of conditions at 10 ports and surrounding areas that handle almost two-thirds of all containers moving in and out of the country. The major challenges to freight mobility share a common theme--congestion. National studies point to such problems as overcrowded highways and freight-specific "chokepoints" that stifle effective intermodal transfer of cargoes. All 10 ports GAO studied faced similar congestionrelated problems. For example, many of the ports are in dense urban areas, limiting the ability to expand rail yards, roadways, and other infrastructure. Increased port security measures may exacerbate congestion if new controls drastically slow the movement of goods. Stakeholders encounter two main limitations in addressing freight mobility challenges. The first relates to the limited visibility that freight projects receive in the process for planning and prioritizing how transportation dollars should be spent. The planning process often lacks a comprehensive evaluation approach, such as a cost-benefit framework that might result in the implementation of freight improvements to better ensure that systemwide, multimodal solutions are considered and adopted where appropriate. The second relates to limitations of federal funding programs, which tend to dedicate funds to a single mode of transportation or a nonfreight purpose. Two strategies may help address these limitations. One is to ensure that transportation planning cuts across modes and individual jurisdictions, includes coordination with freight stakeholders representing an intermodal perspective, and includes sound analytical approaches and meaningful data needed to compare the benefits of freight and passenger projects. The second is to develop a multifaceted funding approach that includes improved access of freight projects to existing funding sources and support for programs that emphasize better use of existing infrastructure. If integrated in these strategies, three principles could better assure that the freight infrastructure system provides the level of capacity and performance that makes the greatest contribution to the nation's economic well-being. These principles include promoting efficiency by embracing a "user pay" approach, establishing performance measures, and aligning incentives for planning agencies to adopt best practices. Fri, 19 Dec 2003 00:00:00 -0500 Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security, December 12, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04315r.pdf This letter responds to a Congressional request that we provide answers to questions relating to our September 9, 2003, testimony on transportation security. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) plan does not explicitly address the adequacy of the current immigration, customs, and air marshal workforces to address concurrent high threats to border, ground, and aviation security. Rather, the plan provides for temporarily enhancing the air marshal workforce to respond to high threats to aviation. Specifically, according to Secretary Ridge, cross-training immigration and customs officers in air marshal tactics would give DHS greater flexibility to adjust its law enforcement resources according to varying threats and provide a surge capacity during periods of high threats to aviation. The immigration and customs officers would not be used as air marshals during every high-threat period; they would be used as such only when there was a high risk to aviation. New air marshals are currently being hired and provided basic training at the rate of about one class per month, a rate sufficient to offset attrition and maintain the current number of air marshals. According to the Federal Air Marshals Service, there is no surge in hiring or training forecasted because the goal for hiring air marshals set by the Secretary of Transportation after September 11, 2001, was met in July 2002, as planned. Effective maritime security requires the ability to put preventive systems, controls, and infrastructure in place. According to transportation security experts and state and local government and industry representatives we contacted, funding is the most pressing challenge to accomplishing this task. While some security improvements are inexpensive, most require substantial funding. Additionally, given the large number of assets to protect, the sum of even relatively less expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. According to Coast Guard estimates, the cost of implementing the new International Maritime Organization security code and the security provisions in the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 will be approximately $1.5 billion for the first year and $7.4 billion over the succeeding decade. These costs are substantial sums, but it is not clear at this point how the costs will be paid. Fri, 12 Dec 2003 00:00:00 -0500 Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain, September 9, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031155t.pdf After the events of September 11, 2001, concerns were raised over the security of U.S. ports and waterways. In response to the concerns over port security, Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act in November 2002. The act created a broad range of programs to improve the security conditions at the ports and along American waterways, such as identifying and tracking vessels, assessing security preparedness, and limiting access to sensitive areas. A number of executive agencies were delegated responsibilities to implement these programs and other provisions of the act. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation asked GAO to conduct a review of the status of the agencies' efforts to implement the security requirements of the act. This testimony reflects GAO's preliminary findings; much of GAO's work in the area is still under way. Agencies responsible for implementing the security provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act have made progress in meeting their requirements. Thus far, GAO has obtained information about 43 of 46 specific action areas, and efforts are under way in 42 of them. For example, the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security agency with lead responsibility for most of the assignments, has published six interim rules covering responsibilities ranging from security of port facilities to vessel identification systems. Two other agencies within the new department--the Transportation Security Administration and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection--have actions under way in such areas as establishing an identification system for millions of port workers and setting information requirements for cargo. The Maritime Administration, a Department of Transportation agency, has already completed or is well into implementing such responsibilities as developing training for security personnel. While much has been accomplished, GAO's review found five areas of concern. Three relate primarily to security issues: (1) only a limited number of ports covered by vessel identification system; (2) questions about the scope and quality of port security assessments; and (3) concerns related to approving security plans for foreign vessels. Two relate primarily to organizational and operational matters: (1) potential duplication of maritime intelligence efforts; and (2) inconsistency with Port Security Grant Program requirements. Tue, 09 Sep 2003 00:00:00 -0400 Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments, May 1, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03502.pdf The events of September 11, 2001, increased attention on efforts to assess the vulnerabilities of the nation's transportation infrastructure and develop needed improvements in security. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) had already begun research in this area in June 2001. The goals of RSPA's Transportation Infrastructure Assurance program are to identify, and develop ways to mitigate the impact of, threats to the nation's transportation infrastructure. DOT's Office of Intelligence and Security is responsible for defining the requirements for transportation infrastructure protection, ensuring that vulnerability assessments of transportation infrastructure are conducted, and taking action to mitigate those vulnerabilities. The House Committee on Appropriations asked GAO to determine (1) the status and anticipated results of the Transportation Infrastructure Assurance (TIA) program, and (2) the extent to which RSPA and the Office of Intelligence and Security have coordinated their activities in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed and implementing the vulnerability assessments for the program. DOT and RSPA officials reviewed a draft of the report, agreed with its contents, and provided technical clarifications that we incorporated. The Transportation Infrastructure Assessment program is scheduled to end in December 2003 after the completion of four transportation vulnerability assessments. Congress appropriated $1 million in each of the fiscal years from 2001 through 2003 to RSPA for the program. RSPA plans to disseminate reports, conduct workshops, and post information on the Internet to inform decision-makers in the transportation community about the results. Prior to March 2003, RSPA did not fully coordinate their activities with the Office of Intelligence and Security in selecting the vulnerabilities to be assessed, or in implementing the assessments for the program. We discussed this problem with officials from both offices who agreed that closer coordination would be beneficial, particularly to discuss options for addressing the challenges facing program researchers in conducting the program's vulnerability assessments. In March 2003, officials from both offices began regular meetings to facilitate this coordination. Thu, 01 May 2003 00:00:00 -0400 Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term Challenges, April 1, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03616t.pdf This testimony responds to the request of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States for information on GAO's work in transportation security. It addresses (1) transportation security before September 2001; (2) what the federal government has done since September 11th to strengthen transportation security, particularly aviation, mass transit, and port security; and (3) what long-term institutional challenges face the federal agencies responsible for transportation security. The testimony is based on a body of work that GAO has performed over the years. Before September 2001, GAO's work in transportation security focused largely on aviation security, which was then the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration, within the Department of Transportation. This work often demonstrated the existence of significant, long-standing vulnerabilities in aviation security. Among these vulnerabilities were airport screeners' inadequate detection of threats when screening passengers and their carry-on bags prior to their boarding aircraft; the absence of any requirement to screen checked baggage on domestic flights; inadequate controls for limiting access to secure areas at airports; and inadequate security for air traffic control computer systems and facilities. Since September 2001, securing the nation's transportation systems from terrorist attacks has assumed great urgency. The Congress and the administration have reorganized the federal agencies responsible for transportation security, transferring them to the new Department of Homeland Security, and the agencies are attempting to enhance security without unduly inhibiting the movement of goods and people. The Transportation Security Administration, which was created in November 2001 and has assumed overall responsibility for transportation security, has made considerable progress in addressing aviation security challenges. By the end of December 2002, the agency had hired and deployed a workforce of over 60,000, including passenger and baggage screeners and federal air marshals, and was screening about 90 percent of all checked baggage for explosives. In addition, local mass transit agencies have assessed vulnerabilities, increased training for emergency preparedness, and conducted emergency drills. The Coast Guard has also performed initial risk assessments of ports, established new security guidelines, and initiated a comprehensive assessment of security conditions at 55 U.S. ports. The Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have actions under way to strengthen port security. Nevertheless, air cargo shipments, general aviation airports, and mass transit systems remain vulnerable to attack, and an effective port security environment may be many years away. The Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security face long-term transportation security challenges that include (1) developing a comprehensive transportation risk management approach; (2) ensuring that transportation security funding needs are identified and prioritized and that costs are controlled; (3) establishing effective coordination among the many public and private entities responsible for transportation security; (4) ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels; and (5) implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers, and security equipment. We have issued reports and made recommendations that address many of these challenges, and in response some actions are under way. Tue, 01 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0500 Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports, October 22, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0315.pdf The October 12, 2000, attack against the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden illustrated the danger of unconventional threats to U.S. ships in seaports. The September 11, 2001, attacks further heightened the need for a significant change in conventional antiterrorist thinking, particularly regarding threats to the U.S. homeland. The new security paradigm assumes that all U.S. forces, be they abroad or at home, are vulnerable to attack, and that even those infrastructures traditionally considered of little interest to terrorists, such as commercial seaports in the continental United States, are now commonly recognized as highly vulnerable to potential terrorist attack. Of the more than 300 seaports in the United States, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Transportation have designated 17 as "strategic," because in the event of a large-scale military deployment, DOD would need to transport more than 95 percent of all equipment and supplies needed for military operations by sea. If the strategic ports were attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained, but DOD could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its overburdened airlift capabilities. The security environment at strategic seaports remains uncertain because comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical port infrastructure and functions have not been completed, and no effective mechanism exists to coordinate and disseminate threat information at the seaports. GAO identified two significant weaknesses in DOD's force protection process for deployments through domestic seaports. First, DOD lacks a central authority responsible for overseeing force protection measures of DOD organizations that move forces from domestic installations through U.S. seaports. Second, during some phases of a deployment, DOD transfers custody of its military equipment to non-DOD entities, including foreign-owned ships crewed by non-U.S. citizens. Tue, 22 Oct 2002 00:00:00 -0400 Marine Transportation: Federal Financing and an Infrastructure Investment Framework, September 9, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d021090t.pdf This testimony discusses challenges in defining the federal role with respect to freight transportation issues. There are concerns that the projected increases in freight tonnage for all transportation modes will place pressures on the marine, aviation, and highway transportation systems. As a result, there is growing awareness of the need to view various transportation modes, and freight movement in particular, from an integrated standpoint, particularly for the purposes of developing and implementing a federal investment strategy and considering alternative funding approaches. The federal approach for funding the marine transportation system relies heavily on general revenues, although the approach for funding the aviation and highway systems relies almost exclusively on collections from users of the systems. During fiscal years 1999 through 2001, customs duties on imported goods transported through the transportation systems averaged $15 billion each year for the marine transportation system, $4 billion each year for the aviation system, and $900 million each year for the highway system. Customs duties are taxes on the value of imported goods and have traditionally been viewed as revenues to be used for the support of the general activities of the federal government. Diverse industry stakeholders believe that substantial new investments in the maritime infrastructure may be required from public and private sources because of an aging infrastructure, changes in the shipping industry, and increased concerns about security. A systematic framework would be helpful to decision makers as they consider the federal government's purpose and role in providing funding for the system and as they develop a sound investment approach to guide federal participation. In examining federal investment approaches across many national activities, GAO has identified four key components of such a framework--establishing national goals, defining the federal role, determining appropriate funding tools, and evaluating performance--which could potentially be applied to all transportation systems. Mon, 09 Sep 2002 00:00:00 -0400 Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful, August 5, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02993t.pdf Although most of the attention following the September 11 terrorist attacks focused on airport security, an increasing emphasis has since been placed on ports. Ports are inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of their size, generally open accessibility by water and land, metropolitan area location, the amount of material being transported through ports, and the ready transportation links to many locations within the country's borders. Since September 11, federal, state, and local authorities, and private sector stake holders have addressed vulnerabilities in the security of the nation's ports. The Coast Guard has acted as a focal point for assessing and addressing security concerns, anticipating many of the requirements that Congress and the administration are contemplating or have already put into place. Although the proposal to consolidate the federal agencies responsible for border security may offer some long-term benefits, overcoming three challenges will be key to successfully enhancing security at the nation's ports: standards, funding, and collaboration. Mon, 05 Aug 2002 00:00:00 -0400 National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy, June 7, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02811t.pdf Federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector, are taking steps to strengthen the safety and security of the American people, including actions to strengthen border and port security, airport security, health and food security and to protect critical infrastructure. There are date, information-sharing, and technology challenges facing the country in developing and implementing a national preparedness strategy. The nature of the terrorist threat makes it difficult to identify and differentiate information that can provide an early indication of a terrorist threat from the mass of data available to those in positions of authority. Further, the nation faces considerable cultural, legal, and technical barriers in effectively collecting and sharing information. Many technologies key to addressing threats are not yet available, and many existing technologies have not effectively been adapted for the threats the country now faces. The real challenge, however, is not just to find the right solutions to each of these problems but to weave solutions together in an integrated and intelligent fashion. Fri, 07 Jun 2002 00:00:00 -0400