This page lists the most recent reports and testimonies related to immigration issued since October 2006

Selected reports and testimonies related to immigration issued prior to October 2006 http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/immigration2.html Sun, 22 Nov 2009 21:31:38 -0500 GAO http://www.gao.gov/images/title_object.jpg http://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1013.pdf The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program stores and processes biometric and biographic information to, among other things, control and monitor the entry and exit of foreign visitors. Currently, an entry capability is operating at almost 300 U.S. ports of entry, but an exit capability is not. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has previously reported on limitations in DHS's efforts to plan and execute its efforts to deliver US-VISIT exit, and made recommendations to improve these areas. GAO was asked to determine (1) the status of DHS's efforts to deliver a comprehensive exit solution and (2) to what extent DHS is applying an integrated approach to managing its comprehensive exit solution. To accomplish this, GAO assessed US-VISIT exit project plans, schedules, and other management documentation against relevant criteria, and it observed exit pilots. DHS has established a Comprehensive Exit project within its US-VISIT program that consists of six components that are at varying stages of completion. To DHS's credit, the US-VISIT program office has established integrated project management plans for, and has adopted an integrated approach to, interacting with and involving stakeholders in its Comprehensive Exit project. However, it has not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution. Rather, it is relying on several separate and distinct schedules to manage individual components and the US-VISIT prime contractor's work that supports these components. Moreover, neither of the two component schedules that GAO reviewed are reliable because they have not been derived in accordance with relevant guidance. Specifically, both the Air Exit Pilots schedule and the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot schedule only fully meet one of nine key schedule estimating practices, and either partially, minimally, or do not meet the remaining eight. In contrast, the prime contractor's schedule is largely reliable, as it fully or substantially meets all nine practices. Without a master schedule for the Comprehensive Exit project that is integrated and derived in accordance with relevant guidance, DHS cannot reliably commit to when and how the work will be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution to its almost 300 ports of entry, and it cannot adequately monitor and manage its progress toward this end. Thu, 19 Nov 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d091013t.pdf This testimony discusses the implementation of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program--a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of SBI to help address this challenge. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) supports this initiative by providing agents and officers to patrol the borders, secure the ports of entry, and enforce immigration laws. In addition, CBP's SBI program is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure--fencing, roads, and lighting--along the southwest border to deter smugglers and aliens attempting illegal entry. Since fiscal year 2005, SBI has received funding amounting to over $3.7 billion. Approximately $1.1 billion has been allocated to SBInet and $2.4 billion to tactical infrastructure. SBInet surveillance technologies are to include sensors, cameras, and radars. The command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) technologies are to include software and hardware to produce a Common Operating Picture (COP)--a uniform presentation of activities within specific areas along the border. SBInet technology is to be initially deployed in two geographic areas --designated as Tucson-1 and Ajo-1--within the Tucson sector. In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract for SBInet development to the Boeing Company for 3 years, with three additional 1-year options. As of July 8, 2009, CBP had awarded 13 task orders to Boeing for a total amount of approximately $1.1 billion. In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, DHS planned to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing and 300 miles of vehicle fencing by December 31, 2008. Pedestrian fencing is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing the border and vehicle fencing consists of physical barriers meant to stop the entry of vehicles. In September 2008, DHS revised its goal, committing instead to having 661 miles either built, under construction, or under contract by December 31, 2008, but did not set a goal for the number of miles it planned to build by December 31, 2008. Although some tactical infrastructure exists in all the southwest border sectors, most of what has been built through the SBI program is located in the San Diego, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley sectors. This testimony is based on a report we are publicly releasing today that is the fourth in a series of interim reports on SBI implementation. testimony will discuss the following key issues in our report: (1) the extent to which CBP has implemented the SBInet technology program and the impact of any delays that have occurred, and (2) the extent to which CBP has deployed the SBI tactical infrastructure program and assessed its results. Our full report also provides a status of SBI program office staffing and the progress the office reports in achieving its human capital goals. SBInet technology capabilities have not yet been deployed and delays require the Border Patrol to rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than using newer technology planned to overcome the existing technology's limitations. As a result of the delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology that has limitations, such as performance shortfalls and maintenance issues. For example, on the southwest border, the Border Patrol relies on existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers that have intermittent problems, including signal loss. The Border Patrol has procured and delivered some new technology to fill gaps or augment existing equipment. However, incorporating SBInet technology as soon as it is operationally available should better position CBP to identify and implement operational changes needed for securing the border. Thu, 17 Sep 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09896.pdf Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS, U.S. Custom and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure--fencing, roads, and lighting. GAO was asked to provide periodic updates on the status of the program. This report addresses (1) the extent to which CBP has implemented SBInet and the impact of delays that have occurred, and (2) the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed its results. To do this work, GAO reviewed program schedules, status reports, and previous GAO work; interviewed DHS and CBP officials, among others; and visited three SBI sites where initial technology or fencing had been deployed at the time of GAO's review. SBInet technology capabilities have not yet been deployed and delays require Border Patrol, a CBP component, to rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than using newer technology planned to overcome the existing technology's limitations. Flaws found in testing and concerns about the impact of placing towers and access roads in environmentally sensitive locations caused delays. As of September 2006, SBInet technology deployment for the southwest border was planned to be complete by early fiscal year 2009. When last reported in February 2009, the completion date had slipped to 2016. As a result of such delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology that has limitations, such as performance shortfalls and maintenance issues. For example, on the southwest border, Border Patrol relies on existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers that have intermittent problems, including signal loss. Border Patrol has procured and delivered some new technology to fill gaps or augment existing equipment. However, incorporating SBInet technology as soon as it is operationally available should better position CBP to identify and implement operational changes needed for securing the border. Tactical infrastructure deployments are almost complete, but their impact on border security has not been measured. As of June 2009, CBP had completed 633 of the 661 miles of fencing it committed to deploy along the southwest border. However, delays continue due mainly to challenges in acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners. While fencing costs increased over the course of construction, because all construction contracts have been awarded, costs are less likely to change. CBP plans to use $110 million in fiscal year 2009 funds to build 10 more miles of fencing, and fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funds for supporting infrastructure. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.4 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. CBP measures miles of tactical infrastructure constructed and has completed analyses intended to show where fencing is more appropriate than other alternatives, such as more personnel, but these analyses were based primarily on the judgment of senior Border Patrol agents. Leading practices suggest that a program evaluation would complement those efforts. Until CBP determines the contribution of tactical infrastructure to border security, it is not positioned to address the impact of this investment. Wed, 09 Sep 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09824.pdf The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), operates checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur. As part of a three-tiered strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal aliens, Border Patrol agents at checkpoints screen vehicles for illegal aliens and contraband. GAO was asked to assess (1) checkpoint performance and factors affecting performance, (2) checkpoint performance measures, (3) community impacts considered in checkpoint placement and design, and (4) the impact of checkpoint operations on nearby communities. GAO work included a review of Border Patrol data and guidance; visits to checkpoints and communities in five Border Patrol sectors across four southwest border states, selected on the basis of size, type, and volume, among other factors; and discussions with community members and Border Patrol officials in headquarters and field locations. Checkpoints have contributed to the Border Patrol's ability to seize illegal drugs, apprehend illegal aliens, and screen potential terrorists; however, several factors have impeded higher levels of performance. Checkpoint contributions included over one-third of the Border Patrol's total drug seizures, according to Border Patrol data. Despite these and other contributions, Border Patrol officials said that additional staff, canine teams, and inspection technology were needed to increase checkpoint effectiveness. Border Patrol officials said they plan to increase these resources. The Border Patrol established three performance measures to report the results of checkpoint operations, and while they provide some insight into checkpoint activity, they do not indicate if checkpoints are operating efficiently and effectively. In addition, GAO found that a lack of management oversight and unclear checkpoint data collection guidance resulted in the overstatement of checkpoint performance results in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 agency performance reports, as well as inconsistent data collection practices at checkpoints. These factors hindered management's ability to monitor the need for program improvement. Internal control standards require that agencies accurately record and report data necessary to demonstrate agency performance, and that they provide proper oversight of these activities. The Border Patrol generally followed its guidelines for considering community safety and convenience in four recent checkpoint placement and design decisions, including the proposed permanent checkpoint on Interstate 19 in Arizona. Current and projected traffic volume was a key factor in the design of the proposed Interstate 19 checkpoint, but was not considered when determining the number of inspection lanes for three recently completed checkpoints in Texas due to a lack of guidance. Having explicit guidance on using current and projected traffic volumes could help ensure that future checkpoints are appropriately sized. Individuals GAO contacted who live near checkpoints generally supported their operations but expressed concerns regarding property damage that occurs when illegal aliens and smugglers circumvent checkpoints to avoid apprehension. The Border Patrol is not yet using performance measures it has developed to examine the extent that checkpoint operations affect quality of life in surrounding communities. The Border Patrol uses patrols and technology to detect and respond to circumventions, but officials said that other priorities sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum number of agents on checkpoint circumvention routes. The Border Patrol has not documented the number of agents needed to address circumventions at the proposed I-19 checkpoint. Given the concerns of nearby residents regarding circumventions, conducting a workforce planning needs assessment at the checkpoint design stage could help ensure that resources needed for addressing such activity are planned for and deployed. Mon, 31 Aug 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09813t.pdf This testimony provides GAO's perspective on the issues associated with textile transshipment. It is particularly important in the current economic environment that the United States does everything it can to ensure that U.S. laws regarding the entry of illegal goods are fully enforced at the U.S. borders. Effective monitoring of textile and apparel imports are also important because duties on textile and apparel products account for a significant share of U.S. duty collections. However, this enforcement takes place in the challenging and busy environment of U.S. ports of entry - - in fiscal year 2008, there were nearly 29 million trade entries processed at more than 300 ports of entry throughout the United States. This testimony will summarize key findings from our prior reports on (1) U.S. government efforts to enforce laws related to imports of textiles and other goods, including transshipment, and (2) the revenue implications of these efforts, as well as discuss the recommendations we made to improve those efforts. GAO's last report on the subject of textile transshipment was published in 2004 and there have been many changes in world trade and in customs enforcement since that time. However, we have consulted with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) since that report was issued on the status of their response to the GAO recommendations to improve that system. In addition, we have completed additional studies on customs enforcement issues, which provide important insights into the challenges CBP faces as it addresses textile transshipment. One of those reports covered the in-bond system, which was a key subject in the 2004 report on textiles, and a second is on CBP's ability to maintain an emphasis on revenue such as duties collected from textile and apparel imports. In addition, we have also completed numerous studies on intellectual property enforcement by CBP and other U.S. agencies, and there is considerable overlap between those efforts and textile enforcement efforts. Our prior reports identified three key challenges to effectively addressing textile transshipment. First, in 2004 we found that CBP's Textile Production Verification Team reports were not always finalized and provided to CBP ports, other agencies, or foreign governments for follow-up in a timely manner. CBP adopted our recommendation to improve the timeliness of this follow-up. We also found that information from overseas Customs Attache' offices and cooperative efforts by foreign governments can provide important information for port inspections. Since the time of our report, CBP has increased the number of attaches in foreign ports to 20 in 2009. In addition, ICE has also increased its overseas personnel to over 50 in 2009. The in-bond program creates the risk that importers can circumvent trade rules, including those applying to textile imports. To facilitate trade, the U.S. customs system allows imported cargo intended for either U.S. or foreign markets to move from one U.S. port to another without being assessed duties or quotas and without officially entering U.S. commerce. This cargo--referred to as an in-bond shipment, requires a responsible party to be covered by a CBP-approved bond and to agree to comply with applicable regulations. Some CBP port officials have estimated that in-bond shipments represent from 30 percent to 60 percent of goods received at their ports. In our original report on textile transshipment and in a later review, we found that CBP's ability to assess and manage the risks of the in-bond cargo system was impaired by both (1) the limited information it collected on in-bond cargo and (2) the limited analysis it performed on available information. CBP was not able to tell us, for example, the extent of the system's use, what products are shipped in-bond, or what shipments are expected for entry (and thus expected revenue collection from applicable trade duties) at inland ports. In reviewing the in-bond system, we also found that CBP had failed to perform basic analyses of available information. CBP was not able to tell us, for example, the extent of the system's use, what products are shipped in-bond, or what shipments are expected for entry (and thus expected revenue collection from applicable trade duties) at inland ports. Despite prior audit recommendations, important management weaknesses persisted in CBP's tracking of in-bond cargo, with the result that CBP still does not know whether in-bond cargo shipments of greatest security or revenue interest are in fact entered into U.S. commerce or exported as required. In particular, CBP continued to have high numbers of open in-bond transactions with uncertain disposition. In addition to needed improvements on specific programs, we also found that CBP had to find a way to better balance security and important trade functions such as revenue collection. Although CBP's priority mission relates to homeland security, it collected more than $34 billion in fiscal year 2008, making it the second largest revenue generator for the federal government. Because of the high concentration of duties collected on textiles and apparel--four percent of U.S. imports generate approximately 40 percent of U.S. duties collected--any efforts to focus on revenue functions would likely generate improved oversight of textile and apparel imports. Our previous findings suggest that Congress' concerns about the potential effects of moving customs revenue functions into DHS, whose priority mission is homeland security, were warranted. We found that this shift in mission contributed to reduced focus and resources devoted to customs revenue functions. Specifically, the number of staff in most customs revenue positions declined since the creation of DHS, despite a legislative mandate that they should not. In addition, the number of Auditors in the Office of Inspector General dedicated to customs issues has declined as the office's resources were focused in other areas. Thu, 18 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09542r.pdf The U.S. Border Patrol, a component within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is responsible for patrolling 8,000 miles of the land and coastal borders of the United States to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. To strengthen control of the U.S. borders, CBP increased the number of Border Patrol agents from about 12,300 in September 2006 to 18,875 in April 2009, an unprecedented 53 percent increase in about 2.5 years. The Border Patrol plans to add additional agents during the remaining months of fiscal year 2009, increasing its onboard strength to about 19,700 agents by the end of September 2009. To support the President's yearly budget request for funding for additional Border Patrol agents, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) first identifies a list of cost items associated with the recruiting, hiring, training, equipping, and deploying of a new Border Patrol agent. These cost items include, for example, recruiting functions: background checks and medical exams to determine an applicant's fitness for the Border Patrol; salary and benefits; training at the Border Patrol's training academy in Artesia, NM; and equipment such as night-vision goggles, mobile radios, and uniforms. All of these cost items are then added together to arrive at what CBP refers to as the Position Cost Model (PCM), the incremental dollar amount needed to recruit, hire, train, equip, and deploy one additional Border Patrol agent. CBP then multiplies the PCM amount by the number of additional Border Patrol agents CBP expects to hire in a particular fiscal year to estimate the funding needed for these additional agents. This budget estimate is then incorporated into the President's overall budget request for CBP. In total, the PCM used to support the President's 2009 budget request for additional Border Patrol agents contained 93 individual cost items totaling $159,642; that is, CBP estimated it would need $159,642 for each additional agent hired in fiscal year 2009 (see enc. I for a list of all 93 cost items). As a result, for fiscal year 2009 the President requested an additional $362.5 million over the Border Patrol's fiscal year 2008 funding level to increase the Border Patrol agent workforce by 2,200 agents. Of this amount, $351.2 million was generated by the PCM estimate ($159,642 x 2,200) and the remaining $11.3 million was for additional support staff, vehicles, and equipment not included in the PCM estimate. The accuracy of estimates for the individual cost items that constitute the PCM is crucial to CBP developing a reliable budget request for new agents. To assist the Congress in reviewing the Border Patrol's funding for new agents, you asked that we assess the reliability of the estimates generated by the PCM. In prior work we identified best practices for agencies to use in developing cost estimates, which are to be comprehensive (e.g., they are reasonably complete, cover pertinent costs in sufficient detail, and ensure that key cost items are neither omitted nor double-counted), accurate (e.g., calculations are correct; there are few, if any, minor mistakes; estimates are not overly conservative or optimistic; and are adjusted properly for inflation), and well-documented (e.g., all calculations are provided, the assumptions are justified, and supporting sources of data are provided). We have also issued standards for internal control in the federal government that outline requirements for effective management control over program operations. This report addresses the extent to which CBP used best practices and internal controls when developing the PCM cost estimates for the President's fiscal year 2009 CBP budget request. CBP's PCM for the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request was comprehensive and met cost estimating best practice guidelines for developing 16 of the 28 cost items, but did not meet best practice guidelines for developing 12 other cost items, and CBP also did not provide program guidance as required by internal control standards. Specifically, consistent with cost estimating best practices, the fiscal year 2009 PCM was comprehensive in that it reasonably complete, covering 93 pertinent cost items related to recruiting, hiring, training, equipping, and deploying a new Border Patrol agent, and contained both large and small dollar cost items. In addition, the PCM contained cost items both directly related to the hiring of a new agent, such as the agent's salary, and indirectly related, such as the additional rent and utility costs associated with hiring new agents. For 16 of the 28 cost items (which accounted for 49 percent of the total fiscal year 2009 PCM dollar amount), CBP used relevant historical cost data, applied approved ratios and inflation factors to help ensure that specific cost item estimates were accurate and retained appropriate documentation, consistent with best practices. We validated the PCM cost estimate for these 16 items using the documentation and formulas CBP provided, arriving at the same amount or within $20 of the PCM amount. However, for 12 of the 28 cost items, CBP did not meet one or more best practices or follow internal control standards. Best practices state that cost estimates are considered valid if they are well documented so they can be easily replicated or updated and can be traced to original sources through auditing. Similarly, internal control standards require that all transactions and other significant events be clearly documented and the documentation should be readily available for examination. However, we could not replicate the fiscal year 2009 PCM estimate based upon the documentation CBP provided for four of the cost items, CBP could not provide documentation for five other cost items, and CBP did not use relevant cost data that would have provided a more precise cost estimate, document the assumptions used, or apply inflation factors for three cost items. As a result, we could not determine the reliability of these 12 cost items, which accounted for 43 percent ($152 million) of CBP's $351.2 million budget estimate for recruiting, hiring, training, equipping, and deploying an additional 2,200 Border Patrol agents in fiscal year 2009. These deficiencies occurred, in part, because CBP did not provide detailed guidance to CBP offices involved in developing PCM cost item estimates on, for example, who is responsible for developing the various cost items, how PCM estimates are to be calculated, and what documentation requirements are to be applied. CBP's Office of Budget Formulation recognizes that additional rigor needs to be incorporated into the estimating process to improve the reliability of the PCM estimate. Standards for internal control require that agencies document policies and procedures for enforcing management directives, such as developing the PCM, and best practices state that agencies should provide guidance on how cost items are to be calculated and supported. With such guidance, CBP could strengthen its position to help ensure that management's directives for the PCM development process are carried out as intended and consistently result in a reliable cost estimate. Mon, 15 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09426t.pdf This testimony discusses our work on factors that will affect the potential economic impact of implementing the legislation applying U.S. immigration law to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). Although subject to most U.S. laws, the CNMI has administered its own immigration system since 1978, under the terms of its 1976 Covenant with the United States. The CNMI has applied this flexibility to admit substantial numbers of foreign workers through a permit program for non-U.S. citizens (noncitizens) entering the CNMI. In 2005, these workers represented a majority of the CNMI labor force and outnumbered U.S. citizens in most industries, including garment manufacturing and tourism, which have been central to the CNMI's economy. The CNMI also has admitted tourists under its own entry permit and entry permit waiver programs and has provided various types of admission to foreign investors. As we have reported previously, the CNMI faces serious economic challenges, including the decline of garment manufacturing and fluctuations in tourism. The recent immigration legislation amends the U.S.-CNMI Covenant to establish federal control of CNMI immigration and includes several provisions affecting foreign workers and investors in the CNMI during a transition period that ends in 2014. The Secretary of Homeland Security decided to delay the start of the transition period for 180 days, from June 1, 2009, to November 28, 2009, as allowed under the law in consultation with the Secretaries of the Interior, Labor, and State, the Attorney General, and the CNMI Governor. Unless otherwise noted, "transition period" refers to the period beginning November 28, 2009, and ending on December 31, 2014. During the transition period, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Interior, Labor, and State, as well as the Attorney General, are responsible for establishing, administering, and enforcing a transition program to regulate immigration in the CNMI. This program will provide foreign workers temporary permits to work in the CNMI (CNMI-only work permits); the number of these permits must be reduced to zero by the end of the transition period or the end of any extensions of the CNMI-only work permit program. The legislation also establishes a joint visa waiver program by adding the CNMI to an existing visa waiver program for Guam visitors. The legislation's stated intent is to ensure effective border control procedures and protect national and homeland security, while minimizing the potential adverse economic and fiscal effects of phasing out the CNMI's own foreign worker permit program and while maximizing the CNMI's potential for economic and business growth. The potential impact of the legislation's implementation on the CNMI's labor market, and therefore on its economy, will largely depend on decisions that the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Labor (DOL) make in implementing the CNMI-only work permit program. DHS will decide on the number of permits to allocate each year, the distribution of the permits, their terms and conditions, and the permit fees; DOL will decide whether and when to extend the CNMI-only permit program past 2014. The interaction of the rate and timing with which DHS reduces the available number of permits and the timing of any DOL extensions of the program will significantly impact the availability of foreign workers; however, we reported in August 2008 that federal agencies had not yet identified an interagency process to coordinate these decisions. Although modest reductions in CNMI-only permits for foreign workers would cause minimal impact, any substantial and rapid decline in the availability of CNMI-only work permits would have a negative effect on the economy, given foreign workers' prominence in key CNMI industries. However, because key federal sources of labor market data do not cover the CNMI, the agencies may have difficulty obtaining the data needed to make decisions. At the same time, the decline in the garment industry, challenges to the tourism industry, and the scheduled increases in the minimum wage may reduce demand for foreign workers, lessening any potential adverse impact of the legislation on the CNMI's economy. Any impact of the legislation on the CNMI's tourism sector will depend largely on DHS decisions about the countries to be included in the joint CNMI-Guam visa waiver program. The legislation's impact will be minimal for tourists from countries included in the joint visa waiver program. However, increases in costs and time associated with obtaining visitor visas, likely for countries not included in the joint program, could influence tourists from those countries to choose destinations other than the CNMI. At present, most CNMI tourists are from Japan and South Korea, both of which will probably be included in the joint visa waiver program because they currently are included in the Guam visa waiver program. China and Russia are currently not included in the Guam visa waiver program and are excluded under a DHS interim final rule for the joint visa waiver program; they are therefore most likely to be affected by the legislation. They account, respectively, for about 10 percent and less than 1 percent of CNMI tourist arrivals but are nevertheless considered important markets. If China and Russia are not included in the joint visa waiver program, tourists from these countries will face increased visa fees, more time-consuming procedures, and uncertainties related to possible visa refusal. The legislation's potential impact on CNMI foreign investment will depend, in part, on key DHS decisions regarding foreign investor entry permits; however, lack of data makes it difficult to assess the likely impact of these decisions and may hamper federal decisions. In implementing the legislation, DHS will decide whether to grant holders of several types of CNMI foreign investor permits "grandfathered" status as U.S. nonimmigrant treaty investors during the transition period. DHS also will decide how long the grandfathered status will be valid. Although available CNMI data suggest that DHS's decision regarding the application of grandfathered status will partly determine the impact of the legislation, critical data--showing, for instance, current overall foreign investment and amounts associated with each type of permit--are not available. This lack of critical data makes it difficult to estimate the legislation's likely impact and limits DHS's ability to make informed decisions regarding the grandfathered status. Tue, 19 May 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09375.pdf Federal law restricts noncitizens' access to public benefits, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Further, when noncitizens who legally reside in this country through sponsorship of a family member apply for these benefits, they are subject to sponsor deeming, which requires benefit agencies to combine noncitizens' incomes with those of their sponsors to determine eligibility. Sponsors are also financially liable for benefits paid to the noncitizen, and benefit agencies must seek repayment for these costs. GAO was asked to analyze (1) what is known about the size of the noncitizen population potentially affected by the sponsor deeming requirements for TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI; (2) to what extent have agencies implemented sponsor deeming; (3) to what extent have agencies implemented sponsor repayment. To address these, GAO analyzed federal data, surveyed states, and interviewed federal, state, and local officials. The number of sponsored noncitizens potentially affected by sponsor deeming is unknown; however, federal restrictions on their eligibility for TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI, as well as other factors, likely limit the number affected. The most recent data available suggest that 11 percent (473,000) of sponsored noncitizens applied for TANF, Medicaid, or SNAP during the course of 2007, and less than 1 percent (29,000) applied for SSI. In addition to federal restrictions, benefit agency officials reported that applicants' reluctance or inability to obtain sponsor income information further reduces instances of deeming. Nationwide, most benefit administering agencies have established sponsor deeming policies for TANF, SNAP, and SSI. However, agencies in 20 states have not done so for Medicaid, due in part to the lack of federal guidance for Medicaid on this requirement. Yet, even among administering agencies that have established policies, many expressed the desire for more federal guidance on various aspects of deeming. For example, over 60 percent of state officials reported that additional clarification on applying an exception to deeming when noncitizen applicants are indigent would be useful. Local officials also reported difficulties accessing information from the Department of Homeland Security needed to determine whether an applicant is sponsored--an essential part of the deeming process. Few agencies have taken steps to implement sponsor repayment of TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI, due in part to inconsistent federal guidance. While law requires that agencies administratively pursue repayment, federal regulations and guidance suggest it is optional. In total, only two states have pursued sponsor repayment. Benefit agency officials reported that several factors discourage pursuit of repayment. Specifically, they reported that the process involves high relative costs since noncitizens who receive benefits after deeming only qualify because both they and their sponsors have very low incomes. Officials also reported that local staff who pursue repayment for these benefits sometimes have competing priorities. Tue, 19 May 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09274r.pdf This letter formally transmits the summary of an oral briefing we gave in response to a mandate in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, and subsequent agency comments. This mandate required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to prepare an expenditure plan that satisfied 12 specified conditions, and for the plan to be submitted to and approved by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees before the agency could obligate $400 million of the approximately $775 million appropriated for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) fencing, infrastructure, and technology. In response to this requirement, DHS submitted a plan on March 4, 2009, titled "U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Secure Border Initiative Border Security, Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology (BSFIT) Fiscal Year 2009 Expenditure Plan." As required by the act, we reviewed the plan and on March 12 and March 13, 2009, briefed staff of the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees, respectively, on the analysis of whether the plan satisfied the 12 specified legislative conditions. In summary, we found that the expenditure plan did not fully satisfy all of the conditions set out by law. Specifically, three of the conditions were satisfied and nine were partially satisfied. Based on the results of our review, we are not making any recommendations for congressional consideration or agency action. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS stated that it disagreed with our assessment of partially satisfied for three legislative conditions. Specifically, DHS said that we had not considered additional information not included in the plan that it provided that would support an assessment of these legislative conditions as satisfied. Because the legislative requirement required that the expenditure plan (emphasis added) contain information to address the legislative conditions, we limited our assessment to the information in the expenditure plan. Nevertheless, the additional information program officials provided during the course of our review added context, but would not have changed our assessments of these legislative conditions. In response to DHS's comments, we clarified our definitions of satisfied, partially satisfied and not satisfied to make it clear that we relied only on the expenditure plan in making our assessments. Thu, 30 Apr 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0963.pdf Given the global context of the war on drugs--coupled with growing recognition since September 11, 2001 (9/11), of the nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism--the mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and efforts to forge effective interagency partnerships and coordination are increasingly important. GAO was asked to examine, in the context of the post-9/11 environment, DEA's (1) priorities, (2) interagency partnerships and coordination mechanisms, and (3) strategic plan and performance measures. GAO reviewed DEA policy, planning, and budget documents and visited 7 of DEA's 21 domestic field offices and 3 of its 7 regional offices abroad-- sites selected to reflect diverse drug-trafficking threats, among other factors. GAO also contacted other relevant federal agencies-- including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--and various state and local partner agencies. Since 9/11, while continuing its primary mission of enforcing U.S. controlled substances laws, DEA has supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts by prioritizing narcoterrorism cases--drug-trafficking cases linked to terrorism-- and by implementing other policies and actions, such as collecting terrorismrelated intelligence from confidential informants and foreign partners. Also, DEA is using a new enforcement authority to pursue and arrest narcoterrorists--even those who operate outside the United States. Because most of the nation's illegal drug supply is distributed by Mexican drug organizations, DEA's partnerships and coordination with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies that have border-related missions-ICE and CBP--are important. However, an outdated interagency agreement-and long-standing disputes involving ICE's drug enforcement role and DEA's oversight of that role--have led to conflicts and the potential for duplicative investigative efforts. Another interagency agreement, predating CBP's formation under DHS, has led to operational inefficiencies, as reflected in a bifurcated process for handling illegal drugs seized at the nation's borders. That is, drugs seized by CBP between ports of entry are to be referred to DEA, but drugs seized at ports of entry are to be referred to ICE. According to CBP, an updated agreement that specifies a standardized process would be more efficient and less confusing. Further, in conducting the war on drugs, an important interagency coordination mechanism is the Special Operations Division, a DEA-led intelligence center that targets the command and control capabilities of major drug-trafficking organizations. Another coordination mechanism is the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center, which collects and analyzes drug-trafficking and related financial information and disseminates investigative leads. However, ICE is providing limited information to the Special Operations Division and is not participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center. As a result, according to DEA, these coordination entities are not as effective as they could be. Resolution of these interagency issues necessitates involvement by both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, given that their respective departments' component agencies have been unable to reach mutually acceptable agreements. Notably, because of links between drug trafficking and terrorism, DEA has established new partnerships with the Department of Defense (DOD), especially in Afghanistan, where they share intelligence and DOD provides airlift and other support for DEA operations. DEA's strategic plan has not been updated since 2003; also, DEA's annual performance plans do not provide results-focused measures for assessing the agency's post-9/11 activities, such as counterterrorism efforts. A current and comprehensive strategic planning and performance measurement framework would help to ensure accountability by providing crucial information to DEA's senior leadership for making management decisions and to the Congress and the administration for assessing program effectiveness. In February 2009, DOJ reported that it was reviewing DEA's updated strategic plan. Fri, 20 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09381t.pdf This testimony discusses the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) management of the 287(g) program. Recent reports indicate that the total population of unauthorized aliens residing in the United States is about 12 million. Some of these aliens have committed one or more crimes, although the exact number of aliens that have committed crimes is unknown. Some crimes are serious and pose a threat to the security and safety of communities. ICE does not have the agents or the detention space that would be required to address all criminal activity committed by unauthorized aliens. Thus, state and local law enforcement officers play a critical role in protecting our homeland because, during the course of their daily duties, they may encounter foreign-national criminals and immigration violators who pose a threat to national security or public safety. On September 30, 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act was enacted and added section 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act. This section authorizes the federal government to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, and to train selected state and local officers to perform certain functions of an immigration officer--under the supervision of ICE officers--including searching selected federal databases and conducting interviews to assist in the identification of those individuals in the country illegally. The first such agreement under the statute was signed in 2002, and as of February 2009, 67 state and local agencies were participating in this program. The testimony today is based on our January 30, 2009, report regarding the program including selected updates made in February 2009. Like the report, this statement addresses (1) the extent to which Immigration and Customs Enforcement has designed controls to govern 287(g) program implementation and (2) how program resources are being used and the activities, benefits, and concerns reported by participating agencies. To do this work, we interviewed officials from both ICE and participating agencies regarding program implementation, resources, and results. We also reviewed memorandums of agreement (MOA) between ICE and the 29 law enforcement agencies participating in the program as of September 1, 2007, that are intended to outline the activities, resources, authorities, and reports expected of each agency. We also compared the controls ICE designed to govern implementation of the 287(g) program with criteria in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), and the Project Management Institute's Standard for Program Management. More detailed information on our scope and methodology appears in the January 30, 2009 report. In February 2009, we also obtained updated information from ICE regarding the number of law enforcement agencies participating in the 287(g) program as well as the number of additional law enforcement agencies being considered for participation in the program. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In summary, ICE has designed some management controls, such as MOAs with participating agencies and background checks of officers applying to participate in the program, to govern 287(g) program implementation. However, the program lacks other key internal controls. Specifically, program objectives have not been documented in any program-related materials, guidance on how and when to use program authority is inconsistent, guidance on how ICE officials are to supervise officers from participating agencies has not been developed, data that participating agencies are to track and report to ICE has not been defined, and performance measures to track and evaluate progress toward meeting program objectives have not been developed. Taken together, the lack of internal controls makes it difficult for ICE to ensure that the program is operating as intended. ICE and participating agencies used program resources mainly for personnel, training, and equipment, and participating agencies reported activities and benefits, such as a reduction in crime and the removal of repeat offenders. However, officials from more than half of the 29 state and local law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported concerns members of their communities expressed about the use of 287(g) authority for minor violations and/or about racial profiling. We made several recommendations to strengthen internal controls for the 287(g) program to help ensure that the program operates as intended. DHS concurred with our recommendations and reported plans and steps taken to address them. Wed, 04 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09401t.pdf Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was created in March 2003 as part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, the average daily population of detainees in ICE custody increased by about 40 percent, with the most growth occurring since fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 2007, ICE held over 311,000 detainees at more than 500 detention facilities. Most of these were Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) facilities--state and local jails under contract with ICE to hold detainees. Some ICE detainees received health care services from IGSA staff, IGSA contractors, or community medical providers, and other ICE detainees received health care provided or arranged by the Division of Immigration Health Services (DIHS). DIHS is mainly composed of contract employees and officers from the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) Commissioned Corps--a uniformed service of public health professionals who are part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and who provide services in different settings, including ICE detention facilities. In light of questions about the health care provided to detainees in ICE custody, Congress requested information about ICE's organizational structure and its health care resources for detainees. Our report provides (1) a description of ICE's organizational structure for providing health care services to detainees, which includes our review of the relevant agreements between DHS and HHS regarding DIHS; (2) information about ICE's annual spending and staffing resources devoted to the provision of health care for detainees, and the number of services provided; and (3) an assessment of whether ICE's mortality rate can be compared with the mortality rates of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)--two entities that are responsible for holding certain persons, such as criminals. In summary, we found that ICE's organizational structure for providing health care to detainees is not uniform across facilities. In fiscal year 2007, 21 DIHS-staffed facilities provided or arranged for health care for about 53 percent of the average daily population of detainees, while 508 IGSA facilities provided or arranged for health care for the remaining detainees--about 47 percent of the population. Before October 1, 2007, DHS and HHS maintained annual interagency agreements through which DIHS--a component of HHS's Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)--provided health care for ICE detainees. As of that date, the last annual interagency agreement was terminated, and DIHS no longer is a component of HRSA. DHS officials told us that this termination--along with a 2007 Memorandum of Agreement between HHS and DHS that placed PHS officers on detail to DHS on an open-ended basis and that allowed for additional PHS officers to be detailed to DHS in the future--affected 565 direct health care providers and administrative staff. According to DHS officials, ICE now has a component known as DIHS which provides health care services to detainees. We also found that although ICE's health care data are not complete, the available data on health care spending, staffing, and services provided generally showed growth in all three areas. For instance, from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, reported expenditures for medical claims and program operations increased by 47 percent, while the average daily population of detainees increased by about 40 percent. However, ICE facilities do not use standardized record keeping, and are not required to routinely report data to DHS on the health care services provided to detainees. Furthermore, data were not available on the detainee health expenditures that are incurred by IGSAs. In addition, we determined that ICE's mortality rate cannot be directly compared with BOP's or USMS's mortality rate. This is due to differences in the three agencies' health care goals and scopes of services, as well as to demographic differences among the ICE, BOP, and USMS detainee populations. Based on our work, we have identified a number of issues that may merit further assessment in the $2 million external study that ICE was directed to fund. These include: (1) ICE's ability to access detainee population data that measure unique individuals in ICE custody, rather than the average number of beds used; (2) Reporting relationships between DIHS and ICE; (3) IGSA reporting requirements--including the frequency of reporting on health care services provided to detainees and the format in which health records are maintained; (4) ICE's ability to routinely ensure the transfer of medical records when detainees are transferred between facilities; (5) ICE's ability to identify and report the detainee health care costs incurred by IGSAs; and (6) ICE's ability to identify and report medical claims expenditures by facility type--such as for all IGSAs. Tue, 03 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09308r.pdf Recent events have drawn attention to the health care provided to detainees held by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2007, ICE reported that 69 detainees died while in ICE custody, and during 2008, national news organizations investigated and published reports of the circumstances surrounding several detainee deaths. Other reports have also outlined concerns about the health care provided to detainees. For example, in 2007, the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found problems with adherence to ICE's medical standards at two ICE facilities it reviewed where detainee deaths had occurred. Additionally, members of Congress, the media, and advocacy groups have raised questions about the health care provided to detainees in ICE custody. An explanatory statement accompanying the fiscal year 2009 DHS appropriations act directed ICE to fund an independent, comprehensive review of the medical care provided to persons detained by DHS and identified $2 million for that purpose. ICE was created in March 2003 as part of DHS. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, the average daily population of detainees in ICE custody increased by about 40 percent, with the most growth occurring since fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 2007, ICE held over 311,000 detainees at more than 500 detention facilities. Most of these were Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) facilities--state and local jails under contract with ICE to hold detainees. Some ICE detainees received health care services from IGSA staff, IGSA contractors, or community medical providers, and other ICE detainees received health care provided or arranged by the Division of Immigration Health Services (DIHS). DIHS is mainly comprised of contract employees and officers from the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) Commissioned Corps--a uniformed service of public health professionals who are part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and who provide services in different settings, including ICE detention facilities. In light of questions about the health care provided to detainees in ICE custody, Congress requested information about ICE's organizational structure and its health care resources for detainees. This report provides (1) a description of ICE's organizational structure for providing health care services to detainees, which includes our review of the relevant agreements between DHS and HHS regarding DIHS; (2) information about ICE's annual spending and staffing resources devoted to the provision of health care for detainees, and the number of services provided; and (3) an assessment of whether ICE's mortality rate can be compared with the mortality rates of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)--two entities that are responsible for holding certain persons, such as criminals. ICE's organizational structure for providing health care to detainees is not uniform across facilities. In fiscal year 2007, 21 DIHS-staffed facilities provided or arranged for health care for about 53 percent of the average daily population of detainees, while 508 IGSA facilities provided or arranged for health care for the remaining detainees--about 47 percent of the population. In addition, recent agreements with HHS reassigned medical personnel to DHS. DHS officials told us that a total of 565 direct health care providers and administrative staff were affected by these agreements. Although ICE's health care data are not complete, the available data on health care spending, staffing, and services provided generally showed growth in all three areas. For instance, from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, reported expenditures for medical claims and program operations increased by 47 percent, while the average daily population of detainees increased by about 40 percent. ICE's mortality rate cannot be directly compared with BOP's or USMS's mortality rate. This is due to differences in the three agencies' health care goals and scopes of services, as well as to demographic differences among the ICE, BOP, and USMS detainee populations. Mon, 23 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, authorizes the federal government to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies to train officers to assist in identifying those individuals who are in the country illegally. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for supervising state and local officers under this program. GAO was asked to review this program. This report reviews (1) the extent to which ICE has designed controls to govern 287(g) program implementation; and (2) how program resources are being used and the activities, benefits, and concerns reported by participating agencies. GAO reviewed memorandums of agreement (MOA) between ICE and the 29 program participants as of September 1, 2007. GAO compared controls ICE designed to govern the 287(g) program with criteria in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. GAO interviewed officials from both ICE and participating agencies on program implementation, resources, and results. ICE has designed some management controls to govern 287(g) program implementation, such as MOAs and background checks of state and local officers, but the program lacks other controls, which makes it difficult for ICE to ensure that the program is operating as intended. First, the program lacks documented program objectives to help ensure that participants work toward a consistent purpose. ICE officials stated that the objective of the program is to address serious crime, such as narcotics smuggling committed by removable aliens; however, ICE has not documented this objective in program materials. As a result, of 29 program participants reviewed by GAO, 4 used 287(g) authority to process individuals for minor crimes, such as speeding, contrary to the objective of the program. Second, ICE has not described the nature and extent of its supervision over participating agencies' implementation of the program, which has led to wide variation in the perception of the nature and extent of supervisory responsibility among ICE field officials and officials from the participating agencies. ICE is statutorily required to supervise agencies participating in the 287(g) program, and internal control standards require an agency's organizational structure to clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility. Defining the nature and extent of the agency's supervision over this large and growing program would strengthen ICE's assurance that management's directives are being carried out. Finally, while ICE states in its MOAs that participating agencies are responsible for tracking and reporting data to ICE, in 20 of 29 MOAs GAO reviewed, ICE did not define what data should be tracked or how it should be collected and reported. Communicating to participating agencies what data is to be collected and how it should be gathered and reported would help ensure that ICE management has the information needed to determine whether the program is achieving its objective. ICE and program participants use resources for personnel, training, and equipment, and participants report activities, benefits, and concerns regarding the program. In fiscal years 2006-2008, ICE received about $60 million to train, supervise, and equip program participants. As of October 2008, ICE reported enrolling 67 agencies and training 951 state and local law enforcement officers. According to data provided by ICE for 25 of the 29 program participants reviewed by GAO, during fiscal year 2008, about 43,000 aliens had been arrested pursuant to the program, and of those, ICE detained about 34,000. About 41 percent of those detained were placed in removal proceedings, and an additional 44 percent agreed to be voluntarily removed. The remaining 15 percent of those detained by ICE were given a humanitarian release, sent to federal or state prison, or released due to the minor nature of their crime and federal detention space limitations. Program participants report a reduction in crime, the removal of repeat offenders, and other public safety benefits. However, over half of the 29 agencies GAO contacted reported concerns from community members that use of program authority would lead to racial profiling and intimidation by law enforcement officials. Fri, 30 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09244r.pdf Much of the United States' 6,000 miles of international borders with Canada and Mexico remains vulnerable to illegal entry of aliens, criminals, and cargo. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehends hundreds of thousands of people and seizes large volumes of cargo entering the country illegally each year; however, several hundreds of thousands of individuals and an unknown volume of contraband also enter the United States illegally and undetected. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the agency responsible for securing the nation's borders along and between ports of entry. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. CBP's SBI program office is responsible for managing the SBI program and for developing a comprehensive border protection system. This system has two main components: SBInet, which employs radars, sensors, and cameras to detect, identify, and classify the threat level associated with an illegal entry into the United States between the ports of entry, and SBI tactical infrastructure (TI), fencing, roads, and lighting intended to enhance U.S. Border Patrol agents' ability to respond to the area of the illegal entry and bring the situation to a law enforcement resolution (i.e., arrest). The current focus of the SBI program is on the southwest border areas between ports of entry that CBP has designated as having the highest need for enhanced border security because of serious vulnerabilities. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, required DHS to complete construction by December 31, 2008, of either 370 miles or other mileage determined by the Secretary, of reinforced fencing along the southwest border wherever the Secretary determines it would be most practical and effective in deterring smugglers and aliens attempting illegal entry. DHS set a goal to complete approximately 670 miles of fencing by December 31, 2008. In September 2008, we testified that SBI fencing project costs were increasing and land acquisition issues posed a challenge to DHS in meeting its goal to have about 670 miles of fencing completed by December 31, 2008. Also in September 2008, DHS revised its goal such that it planned to have these miles either built, under construction, or under contract by December 31, 2008. In December 2008, DHS reported that it planned to complete all but one of the fence projects by March 2009. As directed by the Explanatory Statement accompanying the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, we examined the costs of constructing fencing along the southern border of the United States. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What were the construction costs of primary pedestrian and vehicle fencing miles completed under the SBI program as of September 30, 2007, and October 31, 2008? (2) What were the construction costs of secondary pedestrian fencing completed along existing primary fencing as of October 31, 2008? (3) If appropriated SBI funds from fiscal years 2007 and 2008 that were allocated for SBInet had been used to construct fencing, how many additional miles of pedestrian or vehicle fencing could have been constructed? CBP had completed about 73 miles of primary SBI fencing costing approximately $198 million as of September 30, 2007, and about 215 miles of fencing costing about $625 million as of October 31, 2008. Seventy-one of the miles completed as of September 30, 2007, were pedestrian fencing completed at costs ranging from $400,000 to $4.8 million per mile and averaging $2.8 million per mile. CBP had also finished about 2 miles of vehicle fencing at a cost of $2.8 million. Pedestrian fencing accounted for 140 of the miles that CBP had completed as of October 31, 2008, with costs ranging from $400,000 to $15.1 million per mile for an average of $3.9 million per mile. Seventy-five of the miles were vehicle fencing and costs ranged from $200,000 to $1.8 million per mile, averaging $1.0 million per mile. The per mile costs to build the fencing varied considerably because of the type of fencing, topography, materials used, land acquisition costs, and labor costs, among other things. As of October 31, 2008, CBP reported that approximately 32 miles of secondary fence existed along the southwest border and about 18 of those miles had an average construction cost of $2 million per mile. CBP officials said that they do not have cost information for the remaining miles because they were constructed by the International Boundary and Water Commission. In addition, CBP had obligated $58 million of fiscal year 2008 funding on a 3.5-mile secondary fencing project in the San Diego sector that is scheduled to be completed in calendar year 2009. If the approximately $393 million in appropriated SBI funds from fiscal years 2007 and 2008 that were allocated for SBInet had been used to construct fencing, depending on the operational needs of the Border Patrol and a number of assumptions that were discussed above, we estimate that CBP could have built about 73 miles of additional pedestrian fencing or about 232 miles of additional vehicle fencing. Alternatively, depending on the operational needs of the Border Patrol, CBP could have constructed a mix of additional pedestrian and vehicle fencing. For example, if the additional funding had been divided equally between pedestrian and vehicle fencing in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, CBP could have constructed 36 miles of pedestrian and 116 miles of vehicle fencing. However, these estimates are approximate, and depending on actual costs at the time, more or less fencing could have been built, particularly taking into account the complexities of fence construction, specifically, increased material costs, a short supply of labor, and a compressed schedule to complete fence construction projects. Thu, 29 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0970.pdf The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is responsible for granting or denying immigration benefits to individuals. USCIS charges fees for the millions of immigration applications it receives each year to fund the cost of processing and adjudicating them. In February 2007, USCIS completed a study to determine the full costs of its operations and the level at which application fees should be set to recover those costs. USCIS's new fee schedule increased application fees by a weighted average of 86 percent. Almost 96 percent of USCIS's fiscal year 2008 budget of $2.6 billion was expected to have come from fees. GAO was asked to review the methodology USCIS used in its fee review and controls in place over collection and use of fees. In this report, GAO addresses the consistency of the methodology with federal accounting standards and principles and other guidance, including whether key assumptions and methods were sufficiently justified and documented. The report also addresses internal controls USCIS has in place over the collection and use of fees. In 2007, USCIS completed a fee review in which USCIS estimated the costs of its immigration application processing and adjudication services and, in accordance with management's objective, set the fees at a level to recover those costs. The methodology USCIS used in its review, however, did not consistently adhere to federal accounting standards and principles and other guidance. While federal accounting standards allow flexibility for agencies to develop managerial cost accounting practices that are suited to their needs, they also provide certain specific guidance based on sound cost accounting concepts. USCIS's methodology, for example, did not include the costs paid by other federal entities on behalf of USCIS. Federal standards and guidance also call for documentation that is sufficient to allow an understanding of and provide justification for the cost assignment processes and data used. USCIS did not adequately document the detailed processes used or sufficiently justify assumptions used in allocating costs to various activities on a prorated basis. As a result, USCIS could not show that its methods provided a reasonable distribution of the costs to the various types of applications. For instance, USCIS allocated $732 million of overhead costs (or 31 percent of total costs)--including information technology operations and maintenance--to offices based on the number of staff full-time equivalents (FTE) in each office. However, USCIS's documentation did not sufficiently justify (1) why cost allocation was used instead of other possible methods or (2) why it did not include about 6,100 contract workers and used only approximately 7,900 FTEs of the total federal FTEs of about 10,400 as the basis for allocation. USCIS also did not adequately justify the equal assignment of activity costs representing 51 percent of total costs to each application type. While such pro rata assignment of costs may be a reasonable method in some circumstances, USCIS did not document its justification for the assumptions made when deciding which costs to allocate on a prorated basis and how those costs should be allocated. Because of these inconsistencies with federal accounting standards and principles and other guidance, USCIS cannot support the reasonableness of cost assignments to the various application types. USCIS has implemented accountability mechanisms to track the use of both regular application fees as well as premium processing fees intended for specific projects. USCIS plans to use its premium processing fee collections to fund its transformation program to make long-term improvements to its business processes and technology. Through its monitoring of fee collection procedures, USCIS has identified some weaknesses at one of its service centers. It has taken actions to strengthen service center controls in the short term, and it is moving all fee receipt functions and the application processing done in preparation for adjudication to lockbox facilities to further strengthen control over collections. Fri, 23 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09180.pdf U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced an increase to its immigration and naturalization application fees by an average of 86 percent, effective July 2007, contributing to a surge in application volume that challenged the agency's pre-adjudicative operations. In July 2007, the incoming application volume increased an unprecedented 100 percent over the prior month and the processing of 1.47 million applications was delayed. GAO was asked to review USCIS's current fee design and compare it to the principles in GAO's user-fee design guide and USCIS's management of operations affected by the new fees, specifically in projecting application volumes and contracting for application processing services. To do so, GAO reviewed legislation and agency documentation; compared the fee design to GAO's principles of effective user-fee design (equity, efficiency, revenue adequacy, and administrative burden); visited processing centers; and interviewed agency officials at these locations and in headquarters. USCIS's 2007 fee design reflects choices and trade-offs consistent with several of GAO's four user-fee design dimensions--efficiency, equity, revenue adequacy, and administrative burden. For example, in three areas the fee design reflects policy choices related to equity and administrative burden considerations: (1) the structure of fee exemptions and waivers, (2) limitations on certain fee increases for a population deemed unlikely to be able to pay, and (3) decisions about how costs were assigned among users. However, USCIS did not conduct the analyses necessary to fully inform congressional decision-making or internal deliberations on some key areas, such as the cost of activities funded by fees whose rates are set in statute. Notably, the $1,000 fee for USCIS's premium-processing service for employment-based applications, which was the fifth largest single generator of funds for USCIS in fiscal year 2007, will be used for business process and technology improvements. As such, the additional costs of premium processing services are funded by nonpremium processing fee-paying applicants, raising equity concerns. Since USCIS has not identified the total costs of these services, the actual dollar amount being subsidized is unknown. The new fee design also does not allow for an appropriate "reserve" or carryover balance, to ensure the continuity of operations and cover fixed costs in the event of a decrease in applications, nor does it consider the costs associated with certain fee collection operations. According to USCIS's schedule, if the next review identifies a needed fee adjustment, it would occur in September 2009. However, USCIS did not provide documentation that would allow us to determine whether the 2009 fee review would address identified shortcomings in the 2007 fee review or whether the remaining time frames for key milestones, such as refining data and the proposed rulemaking schedule, are reasonable. Absent timely reviews, it is more likely that fees and costs will become misaligned, leading to costly challenges. Projections of USCIS application volume have historically been developed and used as budget tools but do not effectively inform workload management efforts. Specifically, the projections do not identify monthly variations in application volume, despite variations that regularly exceed 20 percent and the serious operational challenges associated with application surges. USCIS's contractors do not receive workload projection information, despite requirements that processing centers shall maintain the capacity to accommodate "spikes" in receipt volumes that are anticipated at least 45 to 90 calendar days in advance. Further, USCIS projection documents do not consistently record critical information such as factors that drive application volume, inhibiting analysis that could improve projections over time. Service-center contractors process USCIS mail and are paid according to a fixed unit price per piece. Contractors count up to 90 percent of incoming mail, but USCIS has not developed an agencywide standard operating procedure for validating the contractors' counts. As a result, USCIS is limited in its ability to verify that USCIS is receiving the service that it is paying for. Fri, 23 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0996.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program known as U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on certain foreign nationals who travel to and from the United States. By congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine if the plan satisfies the twelve legislative conditions and (2) provide observations about the plan and management of the program. To accomplish this, GAO assessed the plan and related DHS certification letters against each aspect of each legislative condition and assessed program documentation against federal guidelines and industry standards. The fiscal year 2008 US-VISIT expenditure plan does not fully satisfy any of the eleven conditions required of DHS by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, either because the plan does not address key aspects of the condition or because what it does address is not adequately supported or is otherwise not reflective of known program weaknesses. More specifically, of the eleven conditions, the plan partially satisfies eight. For example, while the plan includes a listing of GAO recommendations, it does not provide milestones for addressing these recommendations, as required by the act. Further, although the plan includes a certification by the DHS Chief Procurement Officer that the program has been reviewed and approved in accordance with the department's investment management process, and that this process fulfills all capital planning and investment control requirements and reviews established by the Office of Management and Budget, the certification is based on information that pertains to the fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan and fiscal year 2009 budget submission, rather than to the fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan. Moreover, even though the plan provides an accounting of operations and maintenance and program management costs, the plan does not separately identify the program's contractor services costs, as required by the act. With regard to the remaining three legislative conditions, the plan does not satisfy any of them. For example, the plan does not include a certification by the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer that the program's human capital needs are being strategically and proactively managed and that the program has sufficient human capital capacity to execute the expenditure plan. Further, the plan does not include a detailed schedule for implementing an exit capability or a certification that a biometric exit capability is not possible within 5 years. The twelfth legislative condition was satisfied by our review of the expenditure plan. Beyond the expenditure plan, GAO observed that other program planning and execution limitations and weaknesses also confront DHS in its quest to deliver US-VISIT capabilities and value in a timely and cost-effective manner. Concerning DHS's proposed biometric air and sea exit solution, for example, the reliability of the cost estimates used to justify the proposed solution is not clear, the proposed solution would provide less security and privacy than other alternatives, and public comments on the proposed solution raise additional concerns, including the impact the solution would have on the industry's efforts to improve passenger processing and travel. Moreover, the program's risk management database shows that key risks are not being managed. Finally, frequent rebaselining of one of the program's task orders has minimized the significance of schedule variances. Collectively, this means that additional management improvements are needed to effectively define, justify, and deliver a US-VISIT system solution that meets program goals, reflects stakeholder input, minimizes exposure to risk, and provides Congress with the means by which to oversee program execution. Until these steps are taken, US-VISIT program performance, transparency, and accountability will suffer. Fri, 12 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0955.pdf Since September 11, 2001, a concern has been that terrorists or their supporters would seek to immigrate to the United States (i.e., seek lawful permanent residency (LPR)). The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) conducts background checks and the FBI conducts name checks for those applying for LPR. GAO was asked to review USCIS's processes for screening individuals applying for LPR. GAO assessed: (1) what available data show about the extent to which national security concerns were discovered during USCIS background checks for LPR applications, (2) what issues USCIS has encountered in its background check processes and what actions have been taken to resolve those issues, and (3) the extent to which USCIS has addressed fraud vulnerabilities in its adjudication procedures for LPR. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed USCIS background check and adjudication procedures, USCIS data on adjudications, and its assessments of fraud in applications for LPR, and interviewed USCIS and FBI officials. Available data show that of the approximately 917,000 applications for LPR USCIS received from January 1, 2006, through May 31, 2007, 516 (0.05 percent) were referred to USCIS's Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) for national security concerns. According to FDNS, the cases referred to it involved individuals on a watch list which included names of known and suspected terrorists, or posed other national security concerns such as individuals who associated with suspected terrorists or engaged in espionage. While USCIS's application case management system was not designed to capture and routinely generate detailed statistics on those posing national security concerns, FDNS has developed a separate system to capture such data. USCIS had encountered delays in obtaining the results of FBI name checks--FBI checks of its investigative files--for LPR applicants and others, and had issues regarding the usefulness of these results, but USCIS and the FBI have taken a number of actions that have improved these checks. The FBI dedicated more staff to process name checks, and USCIS provided additional funding and training to FBI staff. As a result, the number of pending name checks has decreased 90 percent, from 329,000 in May 2007 to 32,000 as of September 30, 2008. The FBI plans on being able to complete all name checks within 90 days of receipt by June 2009. USCIS has taken some actions to address vulnerabilities identified in one of its assessments of fraud, called Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessments (BFCA), but has yet to complete actions to address vulnerabilities identified in four other BFCAs. To conduct BFCAs, FDNS selected a sample of petitions to determine the extent of fraud and identify any systemic vulnerabilities in USCIS's adjudications processes. Internal control standards call for agency managers to promptly evaluate findings from audits and reviews, determine proper actions to take, and complete them within established time frames. Although FDNS completed all of these assessments between June 2006 and September 2007, USCIS has not established time frames for evaluating these findings and implementing any necessary corrective actions. Until USCIS takes corrective actions, vulnerabilities identified by these BFCAs will persist, increasing the risk that ineligible individuals will obtain LPR status. Lack of verification of the evidence submitted with petitions is one of the major vulnerabilities identified in these BFCAs. For example, FDNS staff found that individuals claiming to be married were not, employers did not exist, and aliens did not have the education or skills they claimed. USCIS procedures give its staff discretion on deciding whether to verify evidence submitted with petitions. The BFCAs have shown that adjudicators following these procedures have approved fraudulent petitions. Verifying all petitioner-submitted evidence is impossible. Procedures that require verifying certain evidence under certain circumstances would help adjudicators better detect fraud and help USCIS maintain the balance between fraud detection and USCIS's customer service and production-related objectives. Fri, 05 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0993.pdf Covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water from Washington to Maine, the U.S.-Canadian border is the longest undefended border in the world. Various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies share responsibility for northern border security, primarily U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in collaboration with other federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian entities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act of 2007 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to Congress that addresses the vulnerabilities along the northern border, and provides recommendations and required resources to address them. The act also required GAO to review and comment on this report. In response to this mandate, GAO examined (1) the extent to which the DHS report to Congress is responsive to the legislative requirements and (2) actions that may be necessary to address northern border vulnerabilities in addition to the actions addressed in the report. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DHS plans, reports, and other documents, and interviewed DHS officials. The DHS February 2008 report to Congress is not fully responsive to legislative requirements in providing information for improving northern border security. In particular, DHS provided a listing of northern border vulnerabilities and initiatives to address them, but did not include recommendations and additional resources that are needed to protect the northern border. DHS officials provided several reasons for the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information, including the fact that the component agencies' priorities for action and resources are reflected in the existing budget process, and that they had nothing further to recommend or request through this report. However, budget documents do not reflect the resources needed over time to achieve control of the northern border. The lack of this information makes it difficult for Congress to consider future actions and resources needed. DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. DHS is currently developing strategic plans that are intended to provide overall direction in addressing vulnerabilities in northern border security. DHS is also developing a risk-management process to assist in prioritizing efforts and resources that will provide greatest benefit to national security. DHS officials have said that the success of various pilot projects, such as DHS's testing of new technology, will likely change the level and mix of resources needed to protect the northern border. In the meantime, DHS could take action to reduce vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past evaluations. DHS has implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to improve border security, but 39 recommendations are yet to be fully addressed. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within the last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving use of air and marine assets, improving screening processes at the ports of entry, and deploying nuclear detection equipment--which DHS and other agencies generally agreed to take action to implement--have remained open for at least 1 year and, in some cases, over 3 years. GAO believes these outstanding recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented. Tue, 25 Nov 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0958.pdf In spring 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and state and local health officials worked together to interdict two individuals with drug-resistant infectious tuberculosis (TB) from crossing U.S. borders and direct them to treatment. Concerns arose that HHS's and DHS's responses to the incidents were delayed and ineffective. GAO was asked to examine (1) the factors that affected HHS's and DHS's responses to the incidents, (2) the extent to which HHS and DHS made changes to response procedures as a result of the incidents, and (3) HHS's and DHS's efforts to assess the effectiveness of changes made as a result of the incidents. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials about the procedures in place at the time of the incidents and changes made since. Various factors--a lack of comprehensive procedures for information sharing and coordination and border inspection shortfalls--hindered the federal response to the two TB incidents. GAO's past work and federal internal control standards call for collaborative communication and coordination across agencies; communication flowing down, across, and up agencies to help managers carry out their internal control responsibilities; and effective leadership, capabilities, and accountability to ensure effective preparedness and response to hazardous situations. HHS and DHS finalized a memorandum of understanding in October 2005 intended to promote communication and coordination in response to public health incidents, but they had not fully developed operational procedures to share information and coordinate their efforts. Thus, HHS and DHS lost time locating or identifying the individuals to interdict them at the U.S. border. Also, HHS lacked procedures to coordinate with state and local health officials to determine when to use federal isolation and quarantine authorities, which further contributed to the delay in the federal response to one of the incidents. Finally, DHS had deficiencies in its process for inspecting individuals at the border, which caused delays in locating the individuals with TB. HHS and DHS have subsequently implemented procedures and tools intended to address deficiencies identified by the incidents, consistent with GAO's past work and internal control standards, but the departments could take additional steps to enhance their ability to respond to future TB incidents. Since the 2007 incidents, HHS and DHS have developed formal procedures for HHS to request DHS's assistance, and DHS has (1) developed a watch list for airlines to identify individuals with TB and other infectious diseases who are to be stopped from traveling and (2) revised its border inspection process to include a requirement that individuals with TB identified by HHS be subject to further inspection. DHS has also enhanced its process for creating public health alerts based on some variations of biographic information (e.g., name, date of birth, or travel document information), but has not explored the benefits of creating these alerts based on other variations, which impeded DHS's ability to interdict one of the individuals at the border. In addition, HHS has not yet completed efforts to provide information on changes in procedures to state and local health officials, who typically originate requests for assistance, to help mitigate delays in accessing federal assistance. HHS and DHS identified additional actions that need to be taken to further strengthen their response, but have not developed plans for completing them. HHS and DHS have activities under way to assess the effectiveness of the new procedures and tools, including performance monitoring and cross-agency meetings to discuss and revise the new procedures and tools based on actual experiences. HHS and DHS have coordinated on more than 70 requests for assistance since the 2007 incidents through February 2008; officials said they view each incident as a test of the efficacy of their responses. Tue, 14 Oct 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf Each year, tens of thousands of people who have been persecuted or fear persecution in their home countries apply for asylum in the United States. Immigration judges (IJ) from the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) decide whether to grant or deny asylum to aliens in removal proceedings. Those denied asylum may appeal their case to EOIR's Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). GAO was asked to assess the variability of IJ rulings, and the effects of policy changes related to appeals and claims. This report addresses: (1) factors affecting variability in asylum outcomes; (2) EOIR actions to assist applicants and IJs; (3) effects associated with procedural changes at the BIA; and (4) effects of the requirement that asylum seekers apply within 1 year of entering the country. GAO analyzed DOJ asylum data for fiscal years 1995 through mid-2007, visited 5 immigration courts in 3 cities, including those with 3 of the top 4 asylum caseloads; observed asylum hearings; and interviewed key officials. Results of the visits provided additional information but were not projectable. In the 19 immigration courts that handled almost 90 percent of asylum cases from October 1994 through April 2007, nine factors affected variability in asylum outcomes: (1) filed affirmatively (originally with DHS at his/her own initiative) or defensively (with DOJ, if in removal proceedings); (2) applicant's nationality; (3) time period of the asylum decision; (4) representation; (5) applied within 1 year of entry to the United States; (6) claimed dependents on the application; (7) had ever been detained (defensive cases only); (8) gender of the immigration judge and (9) length of experience as an immigration judge. After statistically controlling for these factors, disparities across immigration courts and judges existed. For example, affirmative applicants in San Francisco were still 12 times more likely than those in Atlanta to be granted asylum. Further, in 14 of 19 immigration courts for affirmative cases, and 13 of 19 for defensive cases, applicants were at least 4 times more likely to be granted asylum if their cases were decided by the judge with the highest versus the lowest likelihood of granting asylum in that court. EOIR expanded its programs designed to assist applicants with obtaining representation and has attempted to improve the capabilities of some IJs. EOIR has conducted two grant rate studies and was using information on IJs with unusually high or low grant rates, together with other indicators of IJ performance, to identify IJs who might benefit from additional training and supervision. However, EOIR lacked the expertise to statistically control for factors that could affect asylum outcomes, and this limited the completeness, accuracy, and usefulness of grant rate information. Without such information, to be used in conjunction with other performance indicators, EOIR's ability to identify IJs who may need additional training and supervision was hindered. EOIR assigned some IJ supervisors to field locations to improve oversight of immigration courts, but EOIR has not determined how many supervisors it needs to effectively supervise IJs and has not provided supervisors with guidance on how to carry out their supervisory role. Following streamlining (procedural changes) at the BIA in March 2002, BIA's appeals backlog decreased, as did the number of decisions favoring asylum seekers. Such decisions were more than 50 percent lower in the 4 years after streamlining compared to 4 years prior. The authority to affirm the IJ's' decisions without writing an opinion was used in 44 percent of BIA's asylum decisions. In June 2008, EOIR proposed regulatory changes to the streamlining rules, but it is too soon to tell how they will affect appeals outcomes. Data limitations prevented GAO from determining the (1) effect of the 1-year rule on fraudulent applications and denials and (2) resources adjudicators have spent addressing related issues. EOIR lacked measures of fraud, data on whether the 1-year rule was the basis for asylum denials, and records of time spent addressing such issues. Congress would need to direct EOIR to develop a cost-effective method of collecting data to determine the effect of the rule. Thu, 25 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08935.pdf Each year, tens of thousands of noncitizens apply in the United States for asylum, which provides refuge to those who have been persecuted or fear persecution. Asylum officers (AO) in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and immigration judges (IJ) in the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) assess applicants' credibility and eligibility. GAO was asked to evaluate aspects of the asylum system. This report addresses the extent to which quality assurance mechanisms have been designed to ensure adjudications' integrity, how key factors affect AOs' adjudications, and what key factors affect IJs' adjudications. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed agency documents, policies, and procedures; surveyed all AOs, supervisory AOs, and IJs; and visited three of the eight Asylum Offices. These offices varied in size and percentage of cases granted asylum. Results of these visits provided additional information but were not projectable. USCIS and EOIR have designed quality assurance mechanisms to help ensure the integrity of asylum adjudications, but some can be improved. While 75 percent of AO survey respondents reported that basic training prepared them at least moderately well to adjudicate cases, they also reported that despite weekly training, they needed additional training to help them detect fraud, conduct security checks, and assess the credibility of asylum seekers. The Asylum Division does not consistently solicit AOs' and supervisory AOs' input on a range of their training needs. Without this, the Asylum Division lacks key information for making training decisions. The Asylum Division has designed a quality review framework to ensure the quality and consistency of asylum decisions. Although supervisors review all cases and headquarters reviews certain cases, other local quality assurance reviews rarely took place in three of the eight Asylum Offices primarily due to competing priorities. By fully implementing its quality review framework, the Asylum Division would better identify deficiencies, examine their root causes, and take action. The majority of IJ survey respondents reported that training enhanced their ability to adjudicate asylum cases, although the majority also reported having additional training needs. EOIR expanded its training program in 2006, particularly for newly hired IJs, and annually solicits IJs' views on their training needs. Asylum officers reported challenges in identifying fraud and assessing applicants' credibility, as well as time constraints, as key factors affecting their adjudications. The majority of AO survey respondents reported it moderately or very difficult to identify various types of fraud, despite mechanisms designed to help identify fraud and assess credibility. Further, assistance from other federal entities to AOs in assessing the authenticity of asylum claims has been hindered in part by resource limitations and competing priorities. With respect to time constraints, 65 percent of AOs and 73 percent of supervisory AOs reported that AOs have insufficient time to thoroughly adjudicate cases--that is, in a manner consistent with procedures and training--while management's views were mixed. The Asylum Division set a productivity standard equating to 4 hours per case in 1999 without empirical data. Without empirical data on the time it takes to thoroughly adjudicate a case, the Asylum Division is not best positioned to know if its productivity standard reflects the time AOs need for thorough adjudications. Verifying fraud, assessing credibility, and time constraints are also key factors affecting IJs' adjudications. IJ survey respondents cited verifying fraud (88 percent) and assessing credibility (81 percent) as a moderately or very challenging aspect of asylum adjudications. Responding to 2006 Attorney General reforms, EOIR implemented a program to which IJs can refer instances of suspected fraud and receive information to aid in fraud detection. Eighty-two percent of IJs reported time limitations as moderately or very challenging aspects of their adjudications. EOIR has detailed IJs to courts with high caseloads and plans to hire additional staff, but it is too soon to know the extent to which additional staff will alleviate IJs' time challenges. Thu, 25 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081170r.pdf The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is responsible for granting or denying applications or petitions of foreign nationals seeking to become citizens of the United States or to study, work, or live in this country. In order to process the millions of applications and petitions that USCIS receives each year, USCIS uses contractors to perform various support services including SI International, Inc. and Stanley Associates for mail operations, fee collection, data collection, and file operations at its four service centers, in California, Nebraska, Vermont, and Texas. The contracts with these two firms are expiring, and USCIS has the option to extend the contracts for one year beginning in December 2008. We understand that USCIS may be planning to propose possible contract changes for the option year. Based on our ongoing work on USCIS user fees, we believe that improvements could be made to these contracts before the options to extend the contracts are exercised. The purpose of this report is to summarize our initial observations on performance standards and financial deductions to assist USCIS in obtaining the most value and highest level of performance from its contracts and contractors. In our forthcoming report we will address contract management issues. The service center contracts generally require that fees that accompany applications be deposited within 24 hours. The contracts provide for financial deductions for noncompliance. The contractors are expected to maintain the capability to accommodate surges in volume of receipts of up to 20 percent above the daily average receipt volume for the previous 20 business days, known as the rolling daily average; receipts in excess of 120-percent are not held to the 24-hour deposit standard and may be processed on the next business day without financial deduction. The contractor was responsible for meeting the 24-hour deposit standard for 6,098, plus 20 percent (1,220)--7,318 applications in total. The 24-hour timeliness standard did not apply for the additional 1,205 applications above the 120-percent threshold. Our analysis of USCIS's servicewide daily application receipts indicates that application volume regularly and predictably meets or exceeds this threshold. Specifically, application volume met or exceeded the surge threshold an average of nearly 65 percent, and as much as 74 percent of the Mondays or days after a holiday from January 1 through August 6, 2008. These surges were often large--at times more than 170 percent of the rolling daily average. Despite the known pattern of increased receipts on Mondays and the days after a holiday, the application surge threshold remains the same. As a result, the service centers regularly have large numbers--as many as 5,000 a day at a single center--of application fees averaging $438 each that are not deposited within 24 hours of receipt with no financial deduction assessed against the contractor. The 24-hour deposit requirement is consistent with Chapter 8000 of the Treasury Financial Manual. When fees are not deposited in accordance with this standard, additional control processes must be employed to secure inventory, such as tracking mechanisms and a secure and locked storage area for all unprocessed fees. USCIS levies financial deductions on its service center contractors when they do not meet certain performance standards associated with data and fee collection, but the effectiveness of these standards is limited by the lack of a tiered financial deduction system. Four of the five financial deductions are applied at the same rate regardless of the magnitude by which the contractor fails to meet performance standards. Two of the five financial deductions are applied at the same rate regardless of the number of times the contractor fails to meet the standards. USCIS may levy a financial deduction of $15,000 if a contractor fails to meet any of the data collection standards in a given month. However, this deduction is not modified based on the magnitude by which a contractor fails to meet the performance standards. For example, the contracts establish that a $15,000 financial deduction is to be levied if more than six labels are prepared or affixed incorrectly, but the contracts do not provide for any difference in the financial deduction whether the number of incorrectly prepared or affixed labels is a small or large number. This is also true for the two percentage-based data collection standards. Thu, 25 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081142t.pdf The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a visa, has many benefits, but also has risks. In 2006, GAO found the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needed to improve efforts to assess and mitigate these risks. In August 2007, Congress passed the 9/11 Act, which provides DHS the authority to consider expanding the program to countries whose short-term business and tourism visa refusal rates were between 3 and 10 percent in the prior fiscal year, if certain conditions are met. This testimony discusses GAO's recent report on the Visa Waiver Program. Specifically, it examines DHS's process for expanding the Visa Waiver Program and evaluates the extent to which DHS is assessing and mitigating program risks. GAO reviewed relevant laws and procedures; and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and in U.S. embassies in eight aspiring and three Visa Waiver Program countries. The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a transparent process. DHS did not follow its own November 2007 standard operating procedures, which set forth key milestones to be met before countries are admitted into the program. As a result, Departments of State (State) and Justice and U.S. embassy officials stated that DHS created confusion among interagency partners and aspiring program countries. U.S. embassy officials in several aspiring countries told us it had been difficult to explain the expansion process to foreign counterparts and manage their expectations. State officials said it was difficult to explain to countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal rates below 10 percent that have signaled interest in joining the program (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) why DHS is not negotiating with them, given that DHS is negotiating with several countries that had refusal rates above 10 percent (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia). Despite this confusion, DHS achieved some security enhancements during the expansion negotiations, including agreements with several aspiring countries on lost and stolen passport reporting. DHS, State, and Justice agreed that a more transparent process is needed to guide future program expansion. DHS has not fully developed tools to assess and mitigate risks in the Visa Waiver Program. To designate new program countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent, DHS must make two certifications. First, DHS must certify that it can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals who exit from U.S. airports. In February 2008, we testified that DHS's plan to meet this provision will not help mitigate program risks because it does not account for data on those who remain in the country beyond their authorized period of stay (overstays). DHS has not yet finalized its methodology for meeting this provision. Second, DHS must certify that the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for screening visa waiver travelers in advance of their travel is "fully operational." While DHS has not announced when it plans to make this certification, it anticipates ESTA authorizations will be required for all visa waiver travelers after January 12, 2009. DHS determined that the law permits it to expand the program to countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent after it makes these two certifications, and after the countries have met the required conditions, but before ESTA is mandatory for all Visa Waiver Program. For DHS to maintain its authority to admit certain countries into the program, it must incorporate biometric indicators (such as fingerprints) into the air exit system by July 1, 2009. However, DHS is unlikely to meet this timeline due to several unresolved issues. In addition, DHS does not fully consider countries' overstay rates when assessing illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. Finally, DHS has implemented many recommendations from GAO's 2006 report, including screening U.S.-bound travelers against Interpol's lost and stolen passport database, but has not fully implemented others. Implementing the remaining recommendations is important as DHS moves to expand both the program and the department's oversight responsibilities. Wed, 24 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08967.pdf The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a visa, has many benefits, but it also has risks. In 2006, GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needed to improve efforts to assess and mitigate these risks. In August 2007, Congress passed the 9/11 Act, which provides DHS with the authority to consider expanding the program to countries whose short-term business and tourism visa refusal rates were between 3 and 10 percent in the prior fiscal year. Countries must also meet certain conditions, and DHS must complete actions to enhance the program's security. GAO has examined DHS's process for expanding the Visa Waiver Program and evaluated the extent to which DHS is assessing and mitigating program risks. GAO reviewed relevant laws and procedures and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and in U.S. embassies in eight aspiring and three Visa Waiver Program countries. The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a transparent process. DHS did not follow its own November 2007 standard operating procedures, which set forth key milestones to be met before countries are admitted into the program. As a result, Departments of State (State) and Justice and U.S. embassy officials stated that DHS created confusion among interagency partners and aspiring program countries. U.S. embassy officials in several aspiring countries told us it had been difficult to explain the expansion process to foreign counterparts and manage their expectations. State officials said it was also difficult to explain to countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal rates below 10 percent that have signaled interest in joining the program (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) why DHS is not negotiating with them, given that DHS is negotiating with several countries that had refusal rates above 10 percent (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia). Despite this confusion, DHS achieved some security enhancements during the expansion negotiations, including agreements with several aspiring countries on lost and stolen passport reporting. DHS, State, and Justice agreed that a more transparent process is needed to guide future program expansion. DHS has not fully developed tools to assess and mitigate risks in the Visa Waiver Program. To designate new program countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent, DHS must first make two certifications. First, DHS must certify that it can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals who exit from U.S. airports. In February 2008, we testified that DHS's plan to meet this provision will not help mitigate program risks because it does not account for data on those who remain in the country beyond their authorized period of stay (overstays). DHS has not yet finalized its methodology for meeting this provision. Second, DHS must certify that the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for screening visa waiver travelers in advance of their travel is "fully operational." While DHS has not announced when it plans to make this certification, it anticipates ESTA authorizations will be required for all visa waiver travelers after January 12, 2009. DHS determined that the law permits it to expand the program to countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent after it makes these two certifications, and after the countries have met the required conditions, but before ESTA is mandatory for all Visa Waiver Program travelers. For DHS to maintain its authority to admit certain countries into the program, it must incorporate biometric indicators (such as fingerprints) into the air exit system by July 1, 2009. However, DHS is unlikely to meet this timeline due to several unresolved issues.In addition, DHS does not fully consider countries' overstay rates when assessing illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. Finally, DHS has implemented many recommendations from GAO's 2006 report, including screening U.S.-bound travelers against Interpol's lost and stolen passport database, but has not fully implemented others. Implementing the remaining recommendations is important as DHS moves to expand both the program and the department's oversight responsibilities. Mon, 15 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081148t.pdf The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the nation's borders through, among other things, new technology, increased staffing, and new fencing and barriers. The technology component of SBI, which is known as SBInet, involves the acquisition, development, integration, and deployment of surveillance systems and command, control, communications, and intelligence technologies. GAO was asked to testify on its draft report, which assesses DHS's efforts to (1) define the scope, timing, and life cycle management approach for planned SBInet capabilities and (2) manage SBInet requirements and testing activities. In preparing the draft report, GAO reviewed key program documentation, including guidance, plans, and requirements and testing documentation; interviewed program officials; analyzed a random probability sample of system requirements; and observed operations of the initial SBInet project. Important aspects of SBInet remain ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities will be delivered and when, where, and how they will be delivered. For example, the scope and timing of planned SBInet deployments and capabilities have continued to be delayed without becoming more specific. Further, the program office does not have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the execution of the program, and the nature and timing of planned activities has continued to change. This schedule-related risk is exacerbated by the continuous change in, and the absence of a clear definition of, the approach that is being used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet. SBInet requirements have not been effectively defined and managed. While the program office recently issued guidance that is consistent with recognized leading practices, this guidance was not finalized until February 2008, and thus was not used in performing a number of important requirements-related activities. In the absence of this guidance, the program's efforts have been mixed. For example, while the program has taken steps to include users in developing high-level requirements, several requirements definition and management limitations exist. These include a lack of proper alignment (i.e., traceability) among the different levels of requirements, as evidenced by GAO's analysis of a random probability sample of requirements, which revealed large percentages that were not traceable backward to higher level requirements, or forward to more detailed system design specifications and verification methods. SBInet testing has also not been effectively managed. While a test management strategy was drafted in May 2008, it has not been finalized and approved, and it does not contain, among other things, a high-level master schedule of SBInet test activities, metrics for measuring testing progress, and a clear definition of testing roles and responsibilities. Further, the program office has not tested the individual system components to be deployed to the initial deployment locations, even though the contractor initiated testing of these components with other system components and subsystems in June 2008. In light of these circumstances, our soon to be issued report contains eight recommendations to the department aimed at reassessing its approach to and plans for the program, including its associated exposure to cost, schedule and performance risks, and disclosing these risks and alternative courses of action to DHS and congressional decision makers. The recommendations also provide for correcting the weaknesses surrounding the program's unclear and constantly changing commitments and its life cycle management approach and processes, as well as implementing key requirements development and management and testing practices. Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081141t.pdf In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program, which is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of surveillance and communication technologies known as SBInet (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones), and tactical infrastructure (e.g., fencing). The House Committee on Homeland Security and its Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight asked GAO to monitor DHS progress in implementing CBP's SBI program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) technology deployment; (2) infrastructure deployment; and (3) how the CBP SBI program office has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on prior and new work, including analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, and status reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS and Department of the Interior officials and contractors, and visits to sites on the southwest border where SBI deployment is under way. GAO performed the work from March to September 2008. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings. SBInet technology deployments continue to experience delays and, as a result, Border Patrol agents have to rely upon existing limited technological capabilities to help achieve control of the border. SBI program officials had originally planned to deploy SBInet technology across the southwest border by the end of 2008, but in February 2008 this date had slipped to 2011. In July 2008, officials reported that two initial projects that had been scheduled to be completed by the end of calendar year 2008 would be finished sometime in 2009. SBInet program uncertainties, such as not fully defined program expectations, changes to timelines, and confusion over the need to obtain environmental permits contribute to ongoing delays of SBInet technology deployments. Due to the delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology that predates SBInet, and in the Tucson, Arizona, area they are using capabilities from SBInet's prototype system despite previously reported performance shortfalls. Further delays of SBInet technology deployments may hinder the Border Patrol's efforts to secure the border. The deployment of fencing is ongoing, but costs are increasing, the life-cycle cost is not yet known, and meeting DHS's statutorily required goal to have 670 miles of fencing in place by December 31, 2008, will be challenging. As of August 22, 2008, the SBI program office reported that it had constructed a total of 341 miles of fencing, and program officials stated that they plan to meet the December 2008 deadline. However, project costs are increasing and various factors pose challenges to meeting this deadline, such as a short supply of labor and land acquisition issues. According to program officials, as of August 2008, fencing costs averaged $7.5 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $2.8 million per mile for vehicle fencing, up from estimates in February 2008 of $4 million and $2 million per mile, respectively. Furthermore, the life-cycle cost is not yet known, in part because of increasing construction costs and because the program office has yet to determine maintenance costs and locations for fencing projects beyond December 2008. In addition, land acquisition issues present a challenge to completing fence construction. As of September 2008, the SBI program office was reevaluating its staffing goal and continued to take actions to implement its human capital plan. In February 2008, we reported that the SBI program office had established a staffing goal of 470 employees for fiscal year 2008. As of August 1, 2008, the SBI program office reported having 129 government staff and 164 contractor support staff for a total of 293 employees. Program officials stated that a reorganization of the SBI program office and SBInet project delays have resulted in fewer staffing needs and that they plan to continue to evaluate these needs. The SBI program office also continued to take steps to implement its human capital plan. For example, recruitment efforts are under way to fill open positions. However, the SBI program office is in the process of drafting or has drafted documents, such as the Succession Management Plan, that have yet to be approved or put into action. Wed, 10 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081038r.pdf In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, balancing the need to secure U.S. borders while maintaining the flow of legitimate cross-border travel and commerce has taken on an added importance. The United States and Canada share a border that extends nearly 4,000 miles, and one of the world's largest trading relationships. Each year, approximately 70 million travelers and 35 million vehicles cross the border from Canada into the United States, according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Given the volume of cross-border travel and trade between the United States and Canada, border congestion and the resulting wait times have a substantial economic impact on both nations. Furthermore, according to an analysis by DHS, the heightened emphasis on border security following the 2001 terrorist attacks has lengthened processing time for travelers and cargo crossing into the United States. Recognizing the need to improve both border security and border-crossing efficiency, the United States and Canada have cooperated on various cross-border management initiatives intended to increase the flow of legitimate travel across the border while maintaining security. For example, to facilitate the travel of low-risk prescreened individuals across the northern border, the United States and Canada jointly operate the NEXUS program. The NEXUS program allows registered border residents and frequent cross-border travelers identified as low-risk individuals access to dedicated lanes and expedited processing with minimal inspection. The United States and Canada also coordinate on border law enforcement programs such as the Integrated Border Enforcement Team Program (IBET), which is a bi-national, multi-agency law enforcement initiative that (1) provides, where necessary, support to national security investigations associated to the Canada/United States border and (2) investigates illegal cross-border activities. A key collaborative effort to improve security and relieve congestion at the ports of entry across the northern border is to move customs and immigration inspection activities away from the border--a concept known as "land preclearance" or "shared border management." In December 2004, the United States and Canada announced that the two governments had agreed to move forward with a land preclearance pilot project at the Buffalo, New York-Fort Erie, Ontario Peace Bridge and at one other border crossing site along the northern border, which had not yet been determined. The land preclearance pilot project flowed from the 2001 Smart Border Declaration and its associated action plan, which was meant to enhance the security along the northern border while facilitating information sharing and the legitimate flow of people and goods, and securing infrastructure. The preclearance pilot at the Peace Bridge would involve the relocation of all U.S. border inspection operations for both commercial and passenger traffic from the U.S. side of the border in Buffalo, New York, to the Canadian side of the border in Fort Erie, Ontario. From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in negotiations to implement land preclearance at the Buffalo-Fort Erie Peace Bridge ports of entry. However, in April 2007, these negotiations were officially terminated by DHS. Section 566 of the 2008 DHS Appropriations Act mandates that we conduct a study on DHS's use of shared border management to secure the borders of the United States. In accordance with the mandate and discussions with Committee staff, this report addresses the following questions: (1) What negotiations have been conducted by the Department of Homeland Security regarding the shared border management pilot project? (2) What issues led to the termination of shared border management negotiations? From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in negotiations to implement a land preclearance pilot project (also referred to as "shared border management"), which would have relocated the U.S. border inspection facility from the Buffalo, New York, side of the Peace Bridge to the Fort Erie, Ontario, side. All CBP inspections and operations would then take place before travelers and cargo entered the United States. The Peace Bridge site was selected for the pilot because it is one of the busiest commercial crossings between the United States and Canada, yet the existing border infrastructure at the Peace Bridge contributes to a number of security and border crossing inefficiencies, according to DHS. Specifically, DHS had concluded that the U.S. inspection facility, which is located near the center of downtown Buffalo, is outdated, undersized, and lacks the modern amenities a port of its size should have to operate efficiently and securely. The facility is located on 17 acres of land, as opposed to the 80 acres that CBP recommends for a large port of entry. DHS has reported that additional inspection space is needed to address these infrastructure issues, but there is no easily available land adjacent to the facility in Buffalo. On the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge in Fort Erie, there are approximately 70 acres of land available on which the U.S. inspection facility could have been co-located with Canadian inspection facilities. In April 2007, DHS officially terminated negotiations with Canada because a mutually acceptable framework for United States-Canada shared border management could not be reached. Officials from both countries agreed that negotiations were conducted in good faith, and the two governments were able to reach accommodations on several key issues raised during the negotiations, such as the approval of all of the authorities Canada sought for its U.S.-based preclearance area, and the arming of CBP officers at the preclearance site on Canadian soil. However, certain issues pertaining to each country's sovereignty and the law enforcement authorities of U.S. CBP officers operating on Canadian soil could not be resolved. These issues included concerns over arrest authority; the right of individuals to withdraw an application to enter the United States while at the land preclearance site in Canada; mutually agreeable fingerprinting processes; how information collected by U.S. officials at the land preclearance site would be shared; and concerns that future interpretations of the Canadian Charter could adversely impact U.S. authorities at the preclearance site. Thu, 04 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08862.pdf The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005 (IMBRA) was enacted to address issues of domestic violence and abuse against noncitizens (beneficiaries) married or engaged to U.S. citizens (petitioners) who have petitioned for them to immigrate to the U.S., including those who met through an international marriage broker (IMB). IMBRA mandated that GAO study the act's impact on the visa process for noncitizen spouses and fiance(e)s. This report addresses the extent to which the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Department of State (DOS); and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have implemented IMBRA, and the extent to which USCIS and DOS have collected and maintained data for this GAO report as required by IMBRA. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the act and related legislation, analyzed IMBRA implementation guidance and available data on applications filed, and interviewed officials at USCIS, DOS, and DOJ. USCIS, DOS, and DOJ have implemented two of seven key IMBRA requirements identified by GAO, but five key provisions intended to provide beneficiaries with information about the petitioners seeking to bring them to the United States have yet to be completed. First, although IMBRA requires DOS to mail a copy of the approved petition to each beneficiary, the agency is not currently fulfilling this requirement. Second, IMBRA limits the number of petitions a person may file for a noncitizen fiance(e) unless USCIS grants a waiver of the filing limits. However, USCIS officials told GAO that they do not check all petitioners against records to determine if a petitioner has previously filed a fiance(e) petition. USCIS adjudicators are required to check the record if the petitioner self-attests that he or she has previously filed a petition. By limiting its checks to those petitioners who acknowledge prior filings, USCIS increases the risk that it will approve more fiance(e) petitions than allowed under IMBRA. Third, IMBRA mandates that after two approved petitions, upon filing of a third petition within 10 years of the first, USCIS is to notify both the petitioner and beneficiary of previously approved petitions filed by the petitioner. USCIS officials told GAO that they no longer try to notify beneficiaries because of the difficulty in obtaining accurate overseas mailing addresses. Thus, beneficiaries are left without all required information for making a decision about the person petitioning on his or her behalf. USCIS officials told GAO that they plan to ask DOS to notify beneficiaries during their visa interview with a DOS consular officer. Fourth, the requirement to provide beneficiaries with a pamphlet that discusses the visa application process and available resources if the beneficiary encounters domestic violence or abuse is not being met. USCIS has drafted the pamphlet, but has not established time frames for finalizing the pamphlet. Until the pamphlet is finalized, translated, and distributed, USCIS increases the risk that beneficiaries are not being made aware of their rights or the resources that are available should they encounter domestic violence. Lastly, IMBRA establishes federal criminal and civil penalties for IMBs who violate its provisions. Although DOJ has drafted IMBRA-related regulations regarding how civil penalties would be administered, these regulations cannot be finalized until DOJ, USCIS, and DOS decide which agencies will be responsible for investigating, referring, and prosecuting potential IMBRA violations. Until the agencies resolve these issues and establish an enforcement framework, it will be difficult for IMBRA violators to be penalized. USCIS is collecting and maintaining some of the data for this report as required by IMBRA; however, most of the data are not in a summary or reportable form and other required data have not been collected. For example, GAO could not determine the extent to which petitioners with a criminal history or history of violence have filed petitions because USCIS does not capture this data electronically. USCIS officials told GAO that they are considering modifying their data management system to collect data that is currently not being collected. However, no decisions have been made. Fri, 08 Aug 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08791.pdf The United States enacted legislation in May 2008 applying federal immigration law to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) subject to a transition period. The CNMI is subject to most U.S. laws but has administered its own immigration system, including admitting foreign workers, tourists, and foreign investors. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Interior, Labor, and State, and the Attorney General, has the responsibility to establish a transition program. GAO was asked to review how the legislation's implementation may affect the CNMI economy, in particular the CNMI's (1) labor market, including foreign workers; (2) tourism sector; and (3) foreign investment. This report is based on GAO's March 2008 report (GAO-08-466) and analysis of data on the CNMI's labor market, tourism sector, and foreign investment. The potential impact on the CNMI's labor market of the recent legislation applying U.S. immigration law will largely depend on decisions that the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Labor (DOL) make in implementing a required permit program for foreign workers. The interaction of DHS and DOL decisions about, respectively, the number of permits to allocate annually and whether and when to extend the permit program past 2014 will significantly affect employers' access to foreign workers. However, federal agencies have not yet identified an interagency process to coordinate such decisions. Further, the agencies may have difficulty obtaining relevant data on the CNMI labor market. Given foreign workers' prominence in key CNMI industries, any substantial and rapid decline in permits for foreign workers would have a negative effect on the CNMI economy. However, federal agencies may reduce permits more modestly, resulting in minimal effects on the economy. At the same time, continuing declines in the garment industry, challenges to the tourism industry, and the scheduled increases in the minimum wage may reduce demand for foreign workers, lessening any potential adverse impact of the legislation on the economy. Although the legislation and the CNMI government have stated goals of preparing CNMI residents to replace foreign workers, factors such as the limited number of available CNMI residents may impede these efforts' effectiveness. Any impact of the recent legislation on the CNMI's tourism sector will depend largely on federal regulations specifying the countries to be included in a joint CNMI-Guam visa waiver program required by the legislation. For countries likely to be included in this program, such as Japan and South Korea, the impact is likely to be minimal. For countries that may not be part of the joint visa waiver program, possibly including China and Russia, applying for a visa from U.S. embassies or consulates will likely be more costly and more time-consuming than obtaining a visitor entry permit under CNMI immigration law. To the extent that any increase in the cost and time required to obtain a visa discourages tourists from visiting the CNMI, the legislation could negatively affect CNMI tourism. The recent legislation's impact on CNMI foreign investment will depend in part on DHS decisions regarding the application of U.S. nonimmigrant treaty investor status--"grandfathering"--for investors with CNMI foreign investor entry permits. However, lack of data on foreign investment in the CNMI makes it difficult to assess the likely impact of these decisions and may hamper DHS's ability to make informed decisions. Because long-term business entry permits account for a large proportion of CNMI foreign investor entry permits, more CNMI foreign investors will be grandfathered if DHS applies the status to these permit holders. Any impact on foreign investment in the CNMI will likely affect the labor market and tourism sector, and any impact on the labor market or tourism sector may also affect foreign investment. Mon, 04 Aug 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081006.pdf In fiscal year 2007, the U.S. Mission in Mexico (Mission Mexico) processed 1.5 million of the 8 million nonimmigrant visas (NIV) that the Department of State (State) handled worldwide. This workload is expected to increase dramatically in the coming years as millions of NIV Border Crossing Cards issued in Mexico during fiscal years 1998 to 2002 expire and need to be renewed. Consulates will also face increased workloads due to implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which will require U.S. citizens to carry passports, or other approved documentation, when traveling between the United States and Mexico, including by land. GAO was asked to review State's (1) estimates of the workload for consulates in Mexico through 2012 and (2) efforts to help ensure consulates keep pace with expected workload increases. GAO analyzed State's workload forecasts and forecast methodology, interviewed State officials, and visited five posts in Mexico. According to State forecasts, Mission Mexico's NIV demand will likely peak at slightly less than 3 million applications in fiscal year 2011, almost twice the number in fiscal year 2007. Though State acknowledges there are uncertainties regarding the number of Border Crossing Card holders who will renew their cards and the number of first-time NIV applicants, the forecasts provide a reasonable basis for planning for the anticipated surge in NIV demand. In addition to its increase in NIV workload, Mission Mexico will be facing increases in its passport workload due to the implementation of WHTI. The magnitude of the increase in passport workload is more difficult to forecast than for NIVs because there is a great deal of uncertainty as to how many U.S. citizens live in Mexico and the number of these citizens likely to apply for a passport. Mission Mexico has already seen a significant increase in its passport workload as U.S. citizens living in Mexico have begun to apply for passports in response to the new documentary requirements. State forecasts that passport workload will peak in fiscal year 2009 with WHTI's anticipated implementation at land ports of entry. State is taking steps to help ensure U.S. consulates in Mexico keep pace with anticipated demand for NIVs and U.S. passports, including adding interviewing windows to several high-demand posts and planning to hire about 100 temporary adjudicating officers. Consular officials at several posts generally agreed these efforts to expand resources should be adequate for Mission Mexico to keep pace with expected workload increases, and GAO's analysis indicates the mission will generally have enough interviewing windows during the surge. Several posts will rely on additional temporary adjudicators to keep pace with increased demand. State is confident it has an adequate pool of potential applicants. Mission Mexico may also gain additional capacity from a pilot program, under way at two posts, outsourcing a portion of the NIV application process to off-site facilities. State has said it intends to evaluate the pilot program but has not indicated if its evaluation plans include an assessment of risks related to fraud and security. Thu, 31 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08931t.pdf The U.S. Mission in Mexico is the Department of State's largest consular operation. In fiscal year 2007, it processed 1.5 million of the 8 million nonimmigrant visas (NIV) State handled worldwide. The U.S. Mission in Mexico also provided services, including passport processing and emergency assistance, to 20,000 American citizens in fiscal year 2007. This already significant consular workload is expected to increase dramatically in the coming years as millions of NIV Border Crossing Cards issued in Mexico between fiscal years 1998 and 2002 expire and need to be renewed. In addition, the implementation of new travel requirements under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) will, for the first time, require U.S. citizens to carry passports, or other approved documentation, when traveling between the United States and Mexico. This testimony addresses (1) State's estimates of the workload for consulates in Mexico through 2012 resulting from, in particular, new travel requirements and the reissue of Border Crossing Cards; and (2) the actions State has taken to ensure consulates in Mexico keep pace with projected workload increases through 2012. This testimony is based on work currently in process that involves analyzing State's workload forecasts and forecast methodology, interviewing State officials, and visiting five posts in Mexico. GAO discussed this testimony with State officials, who agreed with GAO's findings. According to State forecasts, as of April 2008, the U.S. Mission in Mexico's (Mission Mexico) NIV demand will peak at slightly over 3 million applications in fiscal year 2011, about twice the number from fiscal year 2007. State acknowledges there are uncertainties regarding the number of Border Crossing Card holders who will renew their cards and the number of first time NIV applicants, which may affect the accuracy of its forecasts. State will be revising the forecasts on a periodic basis as new data become available. In addition to its increase in NIV workload, Mission Mexico will also be facing increases in its passport workload due to the implementation of WHTI. The exact magnitude of the increase in passport workload is more difficult to forecast than for NIVs, because there is not the same historical precedent. There is also a great deal of uncertainty as to how many U.S. citizens actually live in Mexico or the number of these citizens likely to apply for a passport. In anticipation of this surge in demand for NIVs and U.S. passports, State is taking steps to ensure consulates in Mexico keep pace, including adding consular interview windows to several high-demand posts and planning to hire about 100 temporary adjudicating officers. Consular officials GAO met with at several posts in Mexico generally agreed that these efforts to expand resources should be adequate for Mission Mexico to keep pace with expected workload increases, and GAO's analysis indicates the mission will generally have enough interviewing windows during the surge. Several posts will rely on the addition of temporary adjudicators to keep pace with increased NIV demand and would face backlogs if these slots cannot be filled or if the temporary staff are not as productive as expected. However, State is confident that it has an adequate pool of potential applicants. Mission Mexico may also gain additional capacity from a pilot program, currently under way at two posts, that outsources a portion of the NIV application process to off-site facilities; however, the pilot was implemented too recently to assess its potential impact on productivity, fraud, or security. Wed, 25 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08878t.pdf In the years following September, 11, 2001, the United States experienced its first drop in the number of international students coming to the United States in over 30 years. The United States tightened its immigration policy during this time, which may have made it more difficult for foreign nationals, including international students, to apply for a visa and, subsequently may have fueled the perception that the United States is unwelcoming. While enrollment numbers have started to rebound, they have not returned to pre-September 11 levels. This testimony is based on ongoing and published GAO work. It includes themes from a June 2007 testimony on challenges in attracting international students. It also includes ongoing work to review other countries' efforts to attract and fund international students. The U.S. federal government seeks to improve global attitudes towards America through a variety of diplomatic means, including funding study for international students inside the United States. Such study, which is funded primarily through the U.S. Department of State (State), is aimed at fostering a sense of common interests and values between Americans and people throughout the world. However, this funding is one component of a larger effort to attract international students, with funding for the vast majority of students coming primarily from sources other than the federal government. GAO identified the following about the efforts of the U.S. Department of State and other countries we are reviewing as part of ongoing work with respect to funding study for international students: (1) State funds a small number of programs having a public diplomacy focus, which bring a small number of international students to the United States for undergraduate study. Specifically, State funded eight programs for 321 undergraduate students in fiscal year 2007. Combined funding for these programs totaled approximately $11.7 million. These programs allow undergraduate students the opportunity to study in both 2-year and 4-year institutions, with some leading to a degree. While State's programs target students from all regions in the world, participants typically come from only a few countries in Europe and South/Central Asia. (2) As part of our ongoing work, GAO has been reviewing other countries' governments' efforts to attract and fund international students. International comparative analysis is complicated by different countries' national objectives and funding structures. The countries we are reviewing employ various strategies to attract diverse international student populations but also fund and administer programs in different ways. We will be learning more about these other countries' efforts as we continue our work. We expect to issue a report on our findings in early 2009. Thu, 19 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08533t.pdf U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for preventing weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States in cargo containers that are shipped from more than 700 foreign seaports. The Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act calls for testing the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) requires scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers by 2012. To fulfill these requirements, CBP created the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and has initiated a pilot program at seven seaports. This testimony discusses challenges related to the SFI pilot program and implementation of the requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from July 2003 through April 2008 and ongoing work. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed reports from CBP and international partners on SFI and other container security programs, and interviewed CBP and foreign customs officials. GAO identified challenges in nine areas that are related to the continuation of the SFI pilot program and the longer-term 100 percent scanning requirement: (1) Workforce planning: The SFI pilot program could generate an increased quantity of scan data. Therefore, more CBP officers will be required to review and analyze data for participating seaports. (2) Host nation examination practices: The SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts require DHS to develop standards for the scanning systems, but CBP lacks information on host nation equipment and practices. (3) Measuring performance: CBP has had difficulties defining performance measures for its container security programs; therefore, it will be difficult to assess if 100 percent scanning achieves increased security. (4) Resource responsibilities: Neither the SAFE Port Act nor the 9/11 Act specifies whether the United States would bear the costs of implementing 100 percent scanning. (5) Logistics: Space constraints can require seaports to place scanning equipment miles from where cargo containers are stored, and some containers are only available for scanning for a short period of time and may be difficult to access. (6) Technology and infrastructure: Environmental conditions can damage equipment and cause delays, and infrastructure capacity and equipment compatibility have presented difficulties in the SFI pilot program. (7) Use and ownership of data: Legislation specifies that scan data should be available to CBP officials, but the data are often generated and collected by foreign seaports and, in some cases, will require international agreements for transfer to CBP officials. (8) Consistency with risk management: International partners state that 100 percent scanning is inconsistent with accepted risk management principles and diverts resources away from other security threats. (9) Reciprocity and trade concerns: Foreign governments could call for reciprocity of 100 percent scanning, requiring the United States to scan cargo containers, and some view this requirement as a barrier to trade. Thu, 12 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08869t.pdf In fiscal year 2007, Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained over 311,000 aliens, with an average daily population of over 30,000 and an average length of stay of about 37 days in one of approximately 300 facilities. The care and treatment of aliens while in detention is a significant challenge to ICE, as concerns continue to be raised by members of Congress and advocacy groups about the treatment of the growing number of aliens while in ICE's custody. This testimony focuses on (1) the extent to which 23 facilities complied with medical care standards, (2) deficiencies found during ICE's annual compliance inspection reviews, and (3) the types of complaints filed by alien detainees about detention conditions. This testimony is based on GAO's July 2007 report evaluating, among other things, the extent to which 23 facilities complied with aspects of eight of ICE's 38 National Detention Standards. This report did not address quality of care issues. At the time of its visits, GAO observed instances of noncompliance with ICE's medical care standards at 3 of the 23 facilities visited. These instances related to staff not administering a mandatory 14-day physical exam to approximately 260 detainees, not administering medical screenings immediately upon admission, and first aid kits not being available as required. However, these instances did not show a pervasive or persistent pattern of noncompliance across all 23 facilities. Officials at some facilities told GAO that meeting the specialized medical and mental health needs of detainees had been challenging, citing difficulties they had experienced in obtaining ICE approval for outside nonroutine medical and mental health care. On the other hand, GAO observed instances where detainees were receiving specialized care at the facilities visited. At the time of its study, GAO reviewed the most recently available ICE annual inspection reports for 20 of the 23 detention facilities that it visited; these reports showed that ICE reviewers had identified a total of 59 instances of noncompliance with National Detention Standards, 4 of which involved medical care. One facility had sick call request forms that were available only in English whereas the population was largely Spanish speaking. Another did not maintain alien medical records on-site. One facility's staff failed to obtain informed consent from the detainee when prescribing psychiatric medication. Finally, another facility did not have medical staff on-site to screen detainees arriving after 5 p.m. and did not have a properly locked medical cabinet. GAO did not determine whether these instances of noncompliance were subsequently corrected as required. The types of grievances at the facilities GAO visited typically included the lack of timely response to requests for medical treatment, missing property, high commissary prices, poor food quality and insufficient food quantity, high telephone costs, problems with telephones, and questions concerning detention case management issues. ICE's detainee grievance standard states that facilities shall establish and implement procedures for informal and formal resolution of detainee grievances. Four of the 23 facilities GAO visited did not comply with all aspects of ICE's detainee grievance standards. For example, one facility did not properly log all grievances that GAO found in their facility files. Detainee complaints may also be filed with several governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The primary way for detainees to file complaints is to contact the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). About 11 percent of detainee complaints to the OIG between 2005 and 2006 involved medical treatment issues. However, we found that the OIG complaint hotline 1-800 number was blocked or otherwise restricted at 12 of the facilities we tested. OIG investigates the most serious complaints and refers the remainder to other DHS components. GAO could not determine the number of cases referred to ICE's Detention Removal Office and concluded that ICE's detainee complaint database was not sufficiently reliable. Wed, 04 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08757.pdf From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of GAO's work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, GAO's work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent systemic weaknesses. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but has included the response in this report. GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry, undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia). In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driver's license, but the officer said, "That's fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of entry with little chance of being detected. In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO's activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the assessed locations. Fri, 16 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08240.pdf U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for ensuring the security of cargo containers shipped into the United States. To strike a balance between security and commerce, CBP oversees the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT program. As part of this program, CBP aims to secure the supply chain--the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailers--through partnerships with international trade companies. Member companies agree to allow CBP to validate their security practices and, in exchange, they are awarded benefits, such as reduced scrutiny of their cargo. In 2005, GAO reviewed the C-TPAT program and noted operational challenges. For this report, GAO was asked to assess the progress CBP has made since 2005 in (1) improving its benefit award policies for C-TPAT members, (2) addressing challenges in validating members' security practices, and (3) addressing management and staffing challenges. To perform this work, GAO analyzed a nonprobability sample of completed validations; reviewed annual, human capital, and strategic plans; and held discussions with CBP officials. CBP has strengthened its policies for granting benefits to importers, C-TPAT's largest member sector, and is working to improve its policies for members in other trade sectors. For example, starting in March 2005, CBP began requiring members in 9 out of the 10 trade sectors to meet minimum security criteria and it plans to finalize criteria for the tenth trade sector by mid-2008. CBP has also introduced a process that awards benefits for C-TPAT importers on a three-tiered basis, depending on validation of their security practices. CBP officials told us that they interpret the benefit tiering provisions of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 to apply mainly to importers. Nevertheless, CBP considered implementing tiered benefits for these other trade sectors, but it has not been able to identify additional benefits to offer nonimporters in a tiered structure. CBP has taken steps to improve the security validation process, but still faces challenges in verifying that C-TPAT members' security practices meet minimum criteria. CBP has sought to strengthen the validation process by providing appropriate guidance and developing a portable, electronic instrument to help ensure that validation information is consistently collected, documented, and uniformly applied to decisions regarding the awarding of benefits to C-TPAT members. However, the usefulness of the instrument is limited due to its default "no" responses. Specifically, if a response is marked "no," it is unclear whether a security specialist, who has the discretion to answer or not answer individual questions, intentionally answered the question or if the response was an automatic default. This factor limits the ability of CBP to validate security practices at member companies. CBP has taken actions to address C-TPAT management and staffing challenges, such as implementing a human capital plan, a records management system, and performance measures. While these actions have addressed a number of challenges, others remain. In particular, CBP's records management system does not include interim processing dates--such as the date that security specialists send companies the 30-day validation notification letter--to enable management or others to determine CBP's compliance with program requirements. Further, although CBP has developed performance measures for facilitating the flow of commerce, it has not developed performance measures to assess the effectiveness of C-TPAT's efforts to improve supply chain security. Fri, 25 Apr 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08466.pdf The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) is subject to most U.S. laws but, under the terms of its 1976 covenant with the United States, administers its own immigration system. It has applied this flexibility to admit substantial numbers of foreign workers, in addition to admitting tourists and foreign investors. The covenant grants Congress the right to apply federal immigration law to the CNMI. On December 11, 2007, the House of Representatives passed legislation applying U.S. immigration law to the CNMI; as of report issuance, this legislation was pending in the Senate. If passed, it will amend the covenant and will apply federal immigration law to the CNMI 1 year after the legislation's enactment, subject to a transition period that begins 1 year after enactment but may be delayed 180 days. GAO was asked to review key provisions of the pending legislation, current U.S. immigration law, and current CNMI immigration law, particularly regarding (1) foreign workers, (2) tourists, and (3) foreign investors. The Departments of Homeland Security and the Interior generally agreed with the findings in this report, and the Department of Labor provided no comments. The CNMI government disagreed with some key findings related to GAO's interpretation of the legislation. GAO continues to interpret the legislation as stated in this report. The pending legislation applies U.S. immigration law to the CNMI and provides federal agencies some flexibility in preserving the CNMI's access to workers, tourists, and foreign investors as it transitions to a federal system. However, without implementing regulations, key details remain unknown. During the transition period, foreign workers may be admitted to the CNMI through exemptions from caps that restrict the number of U.S. visas for nonimmigrant workers. Workers not otherwise eligible under federal law may be admitted through a CNMI-only permit program, which may be extended indefinitely for up to 5 years at a time. Current workers who do not obtain U.S. immigration status may continue to live and work in the CNMI for a limited time. During and after the transition period, CNMI employers also can petition for nonimmigrant and employment-based permanent immigration status for workers under the same procedures as other U.S. employers. However, access to foreign workers in low-skill jobs will be limited after the end of the transition period in 2013 or 2014 and after any extensions of the CNMI-only permit program, because the demand for certain U.S. nonimmigrant worker visas recently has exceeded the supply and because no nonimmigrant visas are available for workers in continuous low-skill positions. While fees for the CNMI-only work permit will be determined by federal regulations and are unknown, the current fees for U.S. foreign worker permits that would apply after the end of the transition period and any extensions range higher than the CNMI's current foreign worker permit fees. The pending legislation establishes a joint visa waiver program by adding the CNMI to an existing Guam visa waiver program. The program exempts tourism and business visitors from certain countries to the CNMI and Guam from the standard U.S. visa documentation requirements. Citizens of countries not included in the CNMI-Guam or other U.S. visa waiver programs may apply for U.S. visitor visas, which require in-person applications and higher fees than the CNMI currently assesses. Changes in tourists' access to the CNMI will depend on the countries included in the CNMI-Guam visa waiver program. Until the joint program's implementing regulations are established, GAO cannot determine whether the program will be more or less restrictive than the current CNMI and Guam waiver programs. After federal immigration law applies, new CNMI foreign investors must meet federal law's more stringent investment requirements to obtain immigrant investor status, which allows investors to petition for U.S. permanent resident status that is currently unavailable in the CNMI. New investors also could apply for nonimmigrant treaty investor status. In addition, the pending legislation allows current CNMI foreign investors to convert to CNMI-only nonimmigrant treaty investors during the transition period. Fri, 28 Mar 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08542t.pdf Since September 11, 2001, the need to secure U.S. borders has increased in importance and attracted greater public and Congressional attention. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent billions of dollars to prevent the illegal entry of individuals and contraband between ports of entry--government-designated locations where DHS inspects persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted into the country. Yet, while DHS apprehends hundreds of thousands of such individuals each year, several hundreds of thousands more enter the country illegally and undetected. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, is the lead federal agency in charge of securing our nation's borders. This testimony summarizes GAO's work on DHS's efforts on selected border security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting travelers at U.S. ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals attempting to enter the country illegally between ports of entry, and (3) screening of international travelers before they arrive in the United States and challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's observations are based on products issued from May 2006 through February 2008. In prior reports, GAO has recommended various actions to DHS to, among other things, help address weaknesses in the traveler inspection programs and processes, and challenges in training officers to inspect travelers and documents. DHS has generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken various actions to address them. CBP has taken actions to improve traveler inspections at U.S. ports of entry, but challenges remain. First, CBP has stressed the importance of effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in interviewing travelers. Yet, weaknesses in travel inspection procedures and lack of physical infrastructure and staff have hampered CBP's ability to inspect travelers thoroughly and detect fraudulent documents. Second, CBP is implementing an initiative requiring citizens of the United States, Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to present certain identification documents when entering the United States. As of December 2007, actions taken to meet the initiative's requirements include selecting technology to be used at land ports of entry and developing plans to train officers to use it. Finally, DHS has developed a program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the country. As of October 2007, the agency has invested more than $1.5 billion on the program over 4 years and biometrically-enabled entry capabilities now operate at more than 300 ports of entry. However, though allocating about $250 million since 2003 to exit-related efforts, DHS has not yet detailed how it will verify when travelers exit the country. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing immigration of individuals who enter the United States illegally and undetected between ports of entry. One component of this program, which DHS accepted as complete in February 2008, was an effort to secure 28 miles along the southwest border using, among other means, improved cameras and radars. DHS plans to apply the lessons learned to future projects. Another program component, 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence, has not yet been completed and DHS will be challenged to do so by its December 2008 deadline due to various factors, such as acquiring rights to border lands. Additionally, DHS is unable to estimate the total cost of this component because various factors are not yet known such as the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed. Finally, CBP has experienced unprecedented growth in the number of its Border Patrol agents. While initial training at the academy is being provided, Border Patrol officials expressed concerns about the agency's ability to provide sufficient field training. To screen international travelers before they arrive in the United States, the federal government has implemented new policies and programs, including enhancing visa security and providing counterterrorism training to overseas consular officials. As GAO previously recommended, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by a program that allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United States without a visa for certain durations and purposes. Regarding the prescreening of international passengers bound for the United States, CBP has a pilot program that provides additional scrutiny of passengers and their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their departure. CBP has reported several successes through the pilot but has not yet determined whether to make the program permanent. Thu, 06 Mar 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08361.pdf The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program's goals are to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the privacy of visitors. It is to use biometric and biographic information to control and monitor the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of foreign visitors. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether DHS has defined and economically justified a strategic solution for meeting US-VISIT goals; (2) the biometric technology options DHS has considered and the basis for the selected options; and (3) DHS's efforts to define, manage, and coordinate the relationships between US-VISIT and other immigration and border management programs. To accomplish this, GAO assessed key program documentation against relevant criteria and examined available biometric research. DHS has partially defined a strategic solution for meeting US-VISIT's goals. In particular, the US-VISIT program office has defined and begun to develop a key capability known as "Unique Identity," which is to establish a single identity for all individuals who interact with any immigration and border management organization by capturing the individual's biometrics, including 10 fingerprints and a digital image, at the earliest possible interaction. However, the program office has yet to define and economically justify a comprehensive strategic solution for controlling and monitoring the exit of foreign visitors, which is critical to accomplishing the program's goals. Further, the department did not economically justify its ongoing investment in Unique Identity in a timely fashion. Specifically, the program office did not justify its investment until about 14 months after selecting and pursuing an alternative solution and obligating about $65 million. The absence of a fully defined strategic solution and timely economic justification hinders informed decision making about the best course of action for accomplishing strategic program goals and inhibits the ability to measure performance and promote accountability. DHS considered various biometric technologies, including fingerprints, facial, and iris technologies, and continues to use fingerprints as its foundational biometric technology. The focus on fingerprint technology is appropriate, given the opportunity to leverage existing DHS and Federal Bureau of Investigation identification systems and databases and to establish a single identity mechanism for all immigration and border management programs. In addition, research into fingerprints and other forms of biometric identification, such as facial recognition and iris scanning, show that fingerprints continue to be the most accurate biometric for identification purposes. DHS is taking a range of evolving actions, primarily at the department level, to coordinate relationships among US-VISIT and other immigration and border management programs. Thus far, this evolution has yet to progress to the point of reflecting the full scope of key practices that GAO has previously identified as essential to enhancing and sustaining collaborative efforts that span multiple organizations. To its credit, the department has defined common outcomes through its strategic plan and enterprise architecture and has taken steps to implement other collaboration practices, such as leveraging resources across its screening programs and developing screening performance indicators. However, the US-VISIT program office has yet to fully define its relationships with other immigration and border management programs. As a result, the department is at increased risk of introducing the inefficiencies and reduced effectiveness that result from suboptimizing how these programs collectively support its immigration and border management goals and objectives. Fri, 29 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08458t.pdf The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a visa, has many benefits, yet also presents security, law enforcement, and illegal immigration risks. In August 2007, Congress passed legislation that provides the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the authority to expand the program to additional countries whose nationals' applications for short-term business and tourism visas were refused between 3 and 10 percent of the time in the prior fiscal year. Countries must also meet certain conditions, and DHS must first complete and certify a number of required actions aimed at enhancing the security of the program. This testimony will focus on one of these required actions--namely, that a system be in place that can verify the departure of 97 percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports (referred to as an air exit system). Our observations are based on our review of relevant legislation, regulations and agency operating procedures, and prior GAO reports on the Visa Waiver Program and immigrant and visitor entry and exit tracking systems, as well as on discussions with federal agency officials. In commenting on a draft of this statement, DHS emphasized that it had not finalized its plan for certifying the "97 percent" requirement, but that the department believes the current plan would meet the legislative requirement. The Department of State also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. On December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records of foreign nationals departing the country, as reported by airlines, to the department's existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration status changes, or prior departures from the United States. Using this formula, DHS stated that it can attain a match rate above 97 percent, based on August 2007 data, to certify compliance with the legislative air exit system requirement. DHS told us that it believes this methodology would meet the statutory requirement. On February 21, 2008, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on the methodology the department would use to certify compliance. Nevertheless, the department confirmed that the basic structure of its methodology would not change, and that it would use departure records as the starting point. There are several limitations with this methodology. For example, DHS's methodology does not begin with arrival records and determine if these foreign nationals stayed in the United States beyond their authorized periods of admission (referred to as overstays). Therefore, this methodology will not inform overall and country-specific overstay rates--key factors in determining illegal immigration risks of the Visa Waiver Program. Although most long-term overstays are likely motivated by economic opportunities, a few overstays have been identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related activity, including some of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In addition, DHS's current methodology does not address the accuracy of airlines' transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are weaknesses in the departure data. For example, there may be some visitors who did not leave the country by air even though they were recorded on airlines' manifest data as having departed. The inability of the U.S. government to track the status of visitors in the country, to identify those who overstay their authorized period of visit, and to use this data to compute overstay rates have been longstanding weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. DHS's plan to meet the "97 percent" requirement in the visa waiver expansion legislation will not address these weaknesses. Thu, 28 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08508t.pdf In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program, which is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security infrastructure (e.g., fencing) and surveillance and communication technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones). GAO was asked to monitor DHS progress in implementing CBP's SBI program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) technology implementation; (2) the extent to which Border Patrol agents have been trained and are using SBI technology; (3) infrastructure implementation; and (4) how the CBP SBI program office has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, status, and reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors, and visits to sites in the southwest border where SBI deployment is under way. GAO performed the work from November 2007 through February 2008. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings. On February 22, 2008, DHS announced final acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million project to secure 28 miles along the southwest border, and is now gathering lessons learned to use in future technology development. The scope of the project, as described in the task order DHS issued to Boeing--the prime contractor DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and sustain systems of technology across the U.S. borders--was to provide a system with the capabilities required to control 28 miles of border in Arizona. CBP officials responsible for the program said that although Project 28 will not be replicated, they have learned lessons from their experience that they plan to integrate into future technology development. CBP has extended its timeline and approach for future projects and does not expect all of the first phase of its next technology project to be completed before the end of calendar year 2011. Border Patrol agents began using Project 28 technologies in December 2007, and as of January 2008, 312 agents in the area had received updated training. According to Border Patrol agents, while Project 28 is not an optimal system to support their operations, it has provided greater technological capabilities than did their previous equipment. Not all of the Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector have been trained on Project 28 because the system will be replaced with newer technologies. Deployment of fencing along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting CBP's goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence in place by December 31, 2008, will be challenging and total costs are not yet known. As of February 21, 2008, the SBI program office reported that it had constructed 168 miles of pedestrian fence and 135 miles of vehicle fence. CBP officials reported that meeting deadlines has been difficult because of various factors including difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. Moreover, CBP officials are unable to estimate the total cost of pedestrian and vehicle fencing because they do not yet know the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed, the materials to be used, and the cost to acquire the land. As CBP moves forward with construction, it is making modifications based on lessons learned from previous efforts. For example, CBP plans to buy construction items, such as steel, in bulk; use approved fence designs; and contract out the maintenance and repair. CBP's SBI program office established a staffing goal of 470 employees for fiscal year 2008, made progress toward meeting this goal and published its human capital plan in December 2007; however, it is in the early stages of implementing the plan. As of February 1, 2008, the office reported having a total of 305 employees. SBI program officials said that they believe they will be able to meet their staffing goal of 470 staff by the end of the fiscal year. In December 2007, the SBI office published the first version of its Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and is now in the early implementation phase. The plan outlines seven main goals for the office and activities to accomplish those goals, which align with federal government best practices. Wed, 27 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08282.pdf The Immigration and Nationality Act requires that most visitors and immigrants to the United States obtain a visa. Aliens unable to obtain a visa, and with a compelling humanitarian need, may apply to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be granted humanitarian parole. This permits an alien to enter the United States on a temporary basis. Parole responsibility rests with DHS's Humanitarian Assistance Branch (HAB), which was transferred to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in August 2007. In response to congressional requesters, GAO examined (1) the characteristics of those who applied for humanitarian parole since October 1, 2001, and (2) internal controls HAB designed to adjudicate applications along with the extent to which HAB adhered to them. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed HAB documents and data, such as its protocols and database of all parole applications since October 1, 2001; interviewed HAB officials about adjudication processes; and interviewed attorneys who had helped individuals file for parole. The 8,748 humanitarian parole applications that HAB adjudicated from October 1, 2001, through June 30, 2007, displayed various characteristics--54 percent of the applicants were female and 46 percent, male; 45 percent of the applicants came from 11 countries, with the largest number from Mexico. Sixty-four percent of the requests for humanitarian parole were for family reunification or medical emergency. Persons under age 18 had a 35 percent grant rate--higher than the rate for applicants over 18 and consistent with the stated purposes of humanitarian parole. Seventy-six percent of applications were denied; 24 percent were granted. Among multiple reasons cited for denial by adjudicators in a projectible sample of cases we analyzed, an estimated 57 percent of applicants had not exhausted other avenues of immigration available to them before applying for humanitarian parole, as generally is required. Data analysis revealed few differences in parole denial rates with regard to gender or, with two exceptions, country of residence. While denial recommendation rates for individual adjudicators varied, HAB officials stated that this is expected because the facts and circumstances of cases vary and adjudicators have different backgrounds and experiences that might affect their reviews of an application. HAB has designed internal controls to help ensure that requests for humanitarian parole are decided in accordance with applicable guidelines; these controls have been functioning as intended. Specifically, HAB has, among other controls, clear and detailed written policies and procedures, including a requirement that every application be reviewed by two adjudicators and that if they disagree, a third is to make a "tie-breaking" recommendation. A final decision is then made by the HAB Branch Chief or a designee, but if the Branch Chief decides to override the adjudicators' recommendations, the case is first discussed with higher-level officials. A computerized data system also records key information in every case. While HAB's controls are generally effective, three areas can be strengthened. First, following a transfer of HAB to USCIS, HAB may no longer have a sufficient number of permanent staff to ensure it continues to follow policies and procedures, since two adjudicators are insufficient to provide independent reviews of requests for reconsideration--HAB guidance recommends that such requests be reviewed by two additional adjudicators not previously involved. Second, HAB does not have a formal training program for new staff who may be detailed to help process applications. Such training is essential to ensure that criteria for granting and denying parole are applied consistently and fairly by the adjudicators. Third, USCIS's Web site has limited information about the circumstances under which a person may apply for humanitarian parole. More information and clearer instructions could reduce the number of applications from those who had not taken the steps generally required before applying for humanitarian parole, such as exhausting other available avenues for entry into the United States. Wed, 06 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08329t.pdf U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the country while also facilitating the cross-border movement of millions of travelers. CBP carries out this responsibility at 326 air, sea, and land ports of entry. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined CBP traveler inspection efforts, the progress made, and the challenges that remain in staffing and training at ports of entry, and the progress CBP has made in developing strategic plans and performance measures for its traveler inspection program. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed and analyzed CBP data and documents related to inspections, staffing, and training, interviewed managers and officers, observed inspections at eight major air and land ports of entry, and tested inspection controls at eight small land ports of entry. GAO's testimony is based on a report GAO issued November 5, 2007. CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators, but weaknesses in its operations increase the potential that terrorists and inadmissible travelers could enter the country. In fiscal year 2006, CBP turned away over 200,000 inadmissible aliens and interdicted other violators. Although CBP's goal is to interdict all violators, CBP estimated that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators entered the country though ports of entry in fiscal year 2006. Weaknesses in 2006 inspection procedures, such as not verifying the citizenship and admissibility of each traveler, contribute to failed inspections. Although CBP took actions to address these weaknesses, subsequent follow-up work conducted by GAO months after CBP's actions found that weaknesses such as those described above still existed. In July 2007, CBP issued detailed procedures for conducting inspections including requiring field office managers to assess compliance with these procedures. However, CBP has not established an internal control to ensure field office managers share their assessments with CBP headquarters to help ensure that the new procedures are consistently implemented across all ports of entry and reduce the risk of failed traveler inspections. CBP developed a staffing model that estimates it needs up to several thousand more staff. Field office managers said that staffing shortages affected their ability to carry out anti-terrorism programs and created other vulnerabilities in the inspections process. CBP recognizes that officer attrition has impaired its ability to attain budgeted staffing levels and is in the process of developing a strategy to help curb attrition. CBP has made progress in developing training programs; however, it does not measure the extent to which it provides training to all who need it and whether new officers demonstrate proficiency in required skills. CBP issued a strategic plan for operations at its ports of entry and has collected performance data that can be used to measure its progress in achieving its strategic goals. However, current performance measures do not gauge CBP effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, a key strategic goal. Thu, 03 Jan 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08274r.pdf Securing the nation's borders has taken on added importance since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For years, millions of citizens of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda could enter the United States from certain parts of the Western Hemisphere using a wide variety of documents, including a driver's license issued by a state motor vehicle administration or a birth certificate, or in some cases for U.S. and Canadian citizens, without showing any documents. In the heightened national security environment following September 11, we have previously reported that documents like driver's licenses and birth certificates can easily be obtained, altered, or counterfeited and used by terrorists to travel into and out of the country. To help provide better assurance that border officials have the tools and resources to establish that people are who they say they are, as called for in the 9/11 Commission report, section 7209 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to develop and implement a plan that requires a passport or other document or combination of documents that the Secretary of Homeland Security deems sufficient to show identity and citizenship for U.S. citizens and citizens of Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico when entering the United States from certain countries in North, Central, or South America. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) and the Department of State's (State) effort to specify acceptable documents and implement document requirements at 326 air, land, and sea ports of entry is called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). DHS is required by law to implement WHTI document requirements at the land and sea ports of entry on the earlier of two dates: June 1, 2009, or 3 months after DHS and State certify that certain implementation requirements have been met. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component within DHS, is the lead agency in charge of inspecting travelers seeking to enter the United States at air, land, and sea ports of entry. CBP has created a WHTI program office within CBP's Office of Field Operations to manage efforts to propose acceptable documents, implement document requirements, and oversee technological upgrades. In fiscal year 2008, DHS requested about $252 million for WHTI implementation, including approximately $166 million for related technological upgrades--to develop new software and to deploy that software and new hardware at 13 of the highest-volume U.S. land ports of entry. According to DHS, implementation of the WHTI document requirements and related technological upgrades will support its strategic goal of facilitating legitimate trade and travel while enforcing all U.S. trade, immigration, drug, consumer protection, intellectual property, and agricultural laws and regulations at the borders. According to DHS, the technological upgrades are designed to improve customer service by avoiding a more time-intensive and intrusive inspection process that would result from meeting WHTI document requirements without this technology. In May 2006, we reported our observations on steps taken and challenges faced by DHS and State in implementing WHTI in five main areas: (1) proceeding through the rulemaking process, (2) making a decision about what documents individuals will need when they enter the United States, (3) carrying out a cost-benefit study, (4) resolving technical and programmatic issues, and (5) managing implementation of the program. This report provides updated information in those five areas. Since May 2006, DHS and State have taken important actions toward implementing WHTI document requirements. We reported in May 2006 that DHS and State had not made decisions about what documents would be acceptable, had not begun the rule-making process to finalize those decisions, and were in the early stages of studying costs and benefits. In addition, DHS and State needed to choose a technology to use with the new passport card--which State is developing specifically for WHTI. DHS also faced an array of implementation challenges, including training staff and informing the public. Since our 2006 work, DHS and State have taken the following actions in the five main areas: Proceeding through the Rule-Making Process--(1) DHS and State finalized the rulemaking process for document requirements at air ports of entry. The agencies also published a notice of proposed rule making for document requirements at land and sea ports of entry and anticipate finalizing the requirements in late fall 2007; (2)Deciding on Acceptable Documents--By publishing a final rule for document requirements at air ports of entry, DHS and State have established acceptable documents for air travelers. The notice of proposed rule making for land and sea proposes acceptable documents. DHS plans to implement document requirements at land and sea ports of entry as early as summer 2008. Performing a Cost-Benefit Study--(3) DHS has performed a cost-benefit study as required by the rule-making process. Data limitations prevented DHS from quantifying the precise effect that WHTI will have on wait times--a substantial source of uncertainty in its analysis. DHS plans to do baseline studies at selected ports before WHTI implementation so that it can compare the effects of WHTI document requirements on wait times after the requirements are implemented; (4) Resolving Technical and Programmatic Issues. DHS and State have selected technology to be used with the passport card. To support the card and other documents that use the same technology, DHS is planning technological upgrades at land ports of entry. These upgrades are intended to help reduce traveler wait times and more effectively verify identity and citizenship. DHS has outlined a general strategy for the upgrades at the 39 highest volume land ports, beginning in January 2008 and continuing over roughly the next 2 years; and (5} Managing Implementation. DHS has developed general strategies for implementing WHTI--including staffing and training. According to DHS officials, they also plan to work with a contractor on a public relations campaign to communicate clear and timely information about document requirements. In addition, State has approved contracting with a public relations firm to assist with educating the public, particularly border resident communities about the new passport card and the requirements of WHTI in general. As DHS moves toward calendar year 2008, it faces challenges deploying technology and staffing and training officers to use it. In the absence of a fiscal year 2008 appropriation, funding for the contract has been uncertain. According to DHS officials, they are exploring options for funding a contract award, using available funds, if an appropriation is not immediately forthcoming. However, DHS has not yet determined when and to what extent funds will be available. As of December 2007, lacking certainty about how it will fund the contract award and when it will publish the final rule, DHS could not provide a specific date by which it will select a contractor and begin devising specific milestones and deadlines for the testing and deployment of new hardware. Thu, 20 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08267r.pdf This report responds to certain requirements of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 that authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. Section 902 (k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every 6 months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the number of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. Reports are to be provided until all applications have been finally adjudicated. This is our seventeenth report. Through September 30, 2007, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, had received a total of 41,370 HRIFA applications and had approved 18,886 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) had 2,098 applications filed and had approved 827 of them. Through September 30, 2007, USCIS data showed that it had received 41,370 HRIFA applications at its Nebraska Service Center, all of which had been entered into CLAIMS. Through September 30, 2007, USCIS had approved 18,886 applications for adjustment of status under HRIFA. Through September 30, 2007, EOIR data from ANSIR showed that 2,098 HRIFA applications had been filed with EOIR, of which 827 had been approved for adjustment of status. Fri, 16 Nov 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08131t.pdf In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is SBInet--the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) program responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security infrastructure (e.g., fencing), and surveillance and communication technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones). The House Committee on Homeland Security asked GAO to monitor DHS progress in implementing the SBInet program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) SBInet technology implementation; (2) SBInet infrastructure implementation; (3) the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating procedures; and (4) how the CBP SBI Program Management Office (PMO) has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, status, and reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors, and visits to sites in the southwest border where SBInet deployment is underway. GAO performed the work from April 2007 through October 2007. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings. DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28--the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned schedule. The SBInet contractor delivered the components (i.e., radars, sensors and cameras) to the Project 28 site in Tucson, Arizona on schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months after it was to become operational--at which point Border Patrol agents were to begin using SBInet technology to support their activities. According to DHS, the delays are primarily due to software integration problems. In September 2007, DHS officials said that the Project 28 contractor was making progress in correcting the problems, but DHS was unable to specify a date when the system would be operational. Due to the slippage in completing Project 28, DHS is revising the SBInet implementation schedule for follow-on technology projects, but still plans to deploy technology along 387 miles of the southwest border by December 31, 2008. DHS is also taking steps to strengthen its contract management for Project 28. SBInet infrastructure deployment along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting CBP's goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. CBP met its intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007 and the average cost per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates that deployment costs for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus far. In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure construction labor costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department of Defense military personnel. However, CBP officials report that they plan to use commercial labor for future fencing projects. The additional cost of commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases in contract costs suggest future deployment could be more costly than planned. DHS officials also reported other challenging factors they will continue to face for infrastructure deployment, including community resistance, environmental considerations, and difficulties in acquiring rights to land along the border. The impact of SBInet on CBP's workforce needs and operating procedures remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not fully identified or deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required to meet mission needs to change from current projections, but until the system is fully deployed, the direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. For the Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, Border Patrol officials are developing a plan on how to integrate SBInet into their operating procedures. The SBI PMO tripled in size during fiscal year 2007, but fell short of its staffing goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns that staffing shortfalls could affect the agency's capacity to provide adequate contractor oversight. In addition, the SBInet PMO has not yet completed long-term human capital planning. Wed, 24 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0867.pdf Officers with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) investigate violations of immigration laws and identify aliens who are removable from the United States. ICE officers exercise discretion to achieve its operational goals of removing any aliens subject to removal while prioritizing those who pose a threat to national security or public safety and safeguarding aliens' rights in the removal process. The General Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to examine how ICE ensures that discretion is used in the most fair, reasoned, and efficient manner possible. GAO reviewed (1) when and how ICE officers and attorneys exercise discretion and what internal controls ICE has designed to (2) guide decision making and (3) oversee and monitor officers' decisions. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed ICE manuals, memorandums, and removal data, interviewed ICE officials, and visited 21 of 75 ICE field offices. ICE officers exercise discretion throughout the alien apprehension and removal process, but primarily during the initial phases of the process when deciding to initiate removals, apprehend aliens, issue removal documents, and detain aliens. Officers GAO interviewed at ICE field offices said that ICE policies and procedures limit their discretion when encountering the targets of their investigations--typically criminal or fugitive aliens, but that they can exercise more discretion for other aliens they encounter. Officers also said that they consider humanitarian circumstances, such as sole caregiver responsibilities or medical reasons, when making these decisions. Attorneys, who generally enter later in the process, and officers told GAO that once removal proceedings have begun, discretion is limited to specific circumstances, such as if the alien is awaiting approval of lawful permanent resident status. Consistent with internal control standards, ICE has begun to update and enhance training curricula to better support officer decision making. However, ICE has not taken steps to ensure that written guidance designed to promote the appropriate exercise of discretion during alien apprehension and removal is comprehensive and up to date and has not established time frames for updating guidance. For example, field operational manuals have not been updated to provide information about the appropriate exercise of discretion in light of a recent expansion of ICE worksite enforcement and fugitive operations, in which officers are more likely to encounter aliens with humanitarian issues or who are not targets of investigations. Also, ICE does not have a mechanism to ensure the timely dissemination of legal developments to help ensure that officers make decisions in line with the most recent interpretations of immigration law. As a result, ICE officers are at risk of taking actions that do not support operational objectives and making removal decisions that do not reflect the most recent legal developments. Consistent with internal control standards, ICE relies on supervisory reviews to ensure that officers exercise appropriate discretion and has instituted an inspection program designed to ensure that field offices comply with established policies and procedures. However, ICE lacks other controls to help monitor performance across the 75 field offices responsible for making apprehension and removal decisions. A comprehensive mechanism for reviewing officers' decision making could provide ICE with meaningful information to analyze trends to identify areas that may need corrective action and to identify best practices. ICE officials acknowledged they do not collect the data necessary for such a mechanism and said doing so may be costly. Without assessing costs and alternatives, ICE is not in a position to select an approach that will help identify best practices and areas needing corrective action. Mon, 15 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07884t.pdf The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit border vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a serious security risk, especially if they were to bring radioactive material or other contraband with them. Although Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken steps to secure the 170 ports of entry on the northern and southern U.S. borders, Congress is concerned that unmanned and unmonitored areas between these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In unmanned locations, CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial drones, and other technology to monitor for illegal border activity. In unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place and must rely on alert citizens or other information sources to meet its obligation to protect the border. Today's testimony will address what GAO investigators found during a limited security assessment of seven border areas that were unmanned, unmonitored, or both--four at the U.S.-Canada border and three at the U.S.-Mexico border. In three of the four locations on the U.S.-Canada border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented GAO investigators from attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point in Mexico. On the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads close to the border that CBP did not appear to man or monitor. In some of these locations, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross without being challenged by law enforcement, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. In one location on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate GAO investigators. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. On the southern border, investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence on a state road, including unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, GAO identified federally managed lands that were adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or did not have an observable law enforcement presence, which contrasted sharply with GAO observations on the state road. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting federal lands adjacent to the border, CBP officials told GAO that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights. Thu, 27 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071131.pdf International air passengers arriving in the United States are subject to an inspection to ensure they possess legal entry and immigration documents and do not bring in contraband, such as illegal drugs, counterfeit goods, or harmful pests and prohibited agriculture products. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the customs, immigration, and agriculture inspections activities were integrated into one program led by DHS's office of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). However, the three fees--whose collections totaled about $1 billion in fiscal year 2006--linked to these inspections remain statutorily distinct and are coadministered by CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), both within DHS, and the Department of Agriculture's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). GAO was asked to examine how the fees are set, collected, and distributed, and the benefits and challenges of this process to agencies and stakeholders, including implications of consolidating these fees under the authority of DHS. The process of setting, collecting, and distributing separate, dissimilar fees creates challenges for agencies and stakeholders. Although air passenger inspections were integrated within CBP, the fees supporting these inspections were created and are still governed by separate, dissimilar authorizing legislation. Two fee amounts are set in statute and one is set by regulation; all are collected by the airlines, deposited into three separate accounts and distributed among the agencies. As a result, the fees are administered and overseen by a complicated network of executive branch agencies and congressional committees, creating a series of challenges. For example, neither CBP nor ICE know whether the fees collected are recovering the full cost of the immigration inspection activities or whether the fees are properly divided between them, because ICE does not have finalized cost calculations for its inspection-related activities. In addition, certain passengers are exempt from some fees but not others, making it difficult for agencies to administer the fees. Further, although airports and airlines play an important role in facilitating inspections and the process of collecting and remitting the fees, opportunities for two-way communication are fragmented and limited, reducing stakeholder buy-in and acceptance of the fees and contributing to confusion about how the three fees work and what activities they may fund. Other challenges are due to the statutory structure of the individual passenger inspection fees. For example, the customs inspection fees are available for limited purposes: not all reimbursable activities may be associated with inspections, and not all inspection activities are reimbursable. However, CBP officials said even if the customs fees were spent on inspection-related activities, they still would only recover about 72 percent of costs in fiscal year 2006. Therefore, customs inspection-related activities are mainly funded by appropriations from general revenues. Further, without auditing each airline, CBP cannot independently verify the amount owed by airlines, partly because airlines are required to remit the fees based on ticket sales rather than passengers transported. CBP said it is developing a legislative proposal that would address these and other challenges by requiring airlines to remit based on passengers transported, but airline industry stakeholders said this change would complicate their collection process and create substantial transition costs. Although a number of options for addressing these fees have been raised, regardless of whether these fees are consolidated in whole, in part, or not at all, certain problems specific to the individual fees can and should be resolved first, and in a manner consistent with principles of effective user fee design, on which GAO has previously reported. Moreover, although partly or fully consolidating the fees under DHS's authority could provide opportunities to address some of the many challenges identified in this report, consolidation in-and-of-itself will not solve all of the problems we have identified. Mon, 24 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071174.pdf Diversity visas provide an immigration opportunity to aliens from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States. Diversity visa applicants must apply online, be selected by lottery, be interviewed, and be determined to be eligible before obtaining a diversity visa. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which the Diversity Visa Program (DV program) is diversifying the U.S. immigrant pool, (2) areas of the DV program that are vulnerable to fraud, (3) whether there are security implications associated with these vulnerabilities, and (4) what steps the Department of State (State) has taken to address the vulnerabilities. We reviewed laws, regulations, and other documentation, and interviewed numerous State officials both at headquarters and in the field. The DV program is contributing to the diversity of U.S. immigrants; more than 500,000 aliens from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States have become legal permanent residents through the program. Little is known about diversity immigrants once they enter the United States, such as whether they contribute to further diversity by petitioning for family members to immigrate. The DV program is vulnerable to fraud committed by and against DV applicants, but State has not compiled comprehensive data on detected and suspected fraudulent activity. At 5 of the posts we reviewed, consular officers reported that the majority of DV applicants, lacking access to a computer or internet savvy, use "visa agents" to enter the lottery. Some agents take advantage of DV applicants: visa agents in Bangladesh have intercepted applicants' program documents and charged ransoms of up to $20,000 or coerced applicants into sham DV marriages. Consular officers at 6 of the 11 posts we reviewed reported that widespread use of fake documents, such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, and passports, presented challenges when verifying the identities of applicants and dependents. Difficulty in verifying identities has security implications because State's security checks rely heavily on name-based databases. In 2003, State's Inspector General raised concerns that aliens from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism can apply for diversity visas. Nearly 9,800 persons from these countries have obtained permanent residency in the United States through the program. We found no documented evidence that DV immigrants from these, or other, countries posed a terrorist or other threat. However, experts familiar with immigration fraud believe that some individuals, including terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent means to enter or remain in the United States. This places a premium on mitigating fraud risks. Despite taking steps to strengthen the DV program, State does not have a strategy to address the pervasive fraud reported by some posts. State believes that some legislative changes could mitigate fraud risks, but it has not made formal proposals for change and has not compiled data on program outcomes and fraud trends which would help decision makers consider whether legislative changes are needed. Fri, 21 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071065.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program known as U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on certain foreign nationals who travel to the United States. By congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO reviewed the plan to (1) determine if the plan satisfied these conditions, (2) follow up on certain recommendations related to the program, and (3) provide any other observations. To address the mandate, GAO assessed plans and related documentation against federal guidelines and industry standards and interviewed the appropriate DHS officials. The US-VISIT expenditure plan, including related program documentation and program officials' statements, satisfies or partially satisfies some but not all of the legislative conditions required by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007. For example, the department satisfied the condition that it provide certification that an independent verification and validation agent is currently under contract for the program and partially satisfied the condition that US-VISIT comply with DHS's enterprise architecture. However, the department did not satisfy the conditions that the plan include a comprehensive US-VISIT strategic plan and a complete schedule for biometric exit implementation. DHS partially implemented GAO's oldest open recommendations pertaining to US-VISIT. For example, while the department partially completed the recommendation that it develop and begin implementing a US-VISIT system security plan, the scope of the plan does not extend to all the systems that comprise US-VISIT. In addition, while the expenditure plan provides some information on US-VISIT's cost, schedule, and benefits associated with planned capabilities, the information provided is not sufficiently defined and detailed to address GAO's recommendation and provide a reasonable basis for measuring progress and holding the department accountable for results. GAO identified several additional observations. On the positive side, DHS data show that the US-VISIT prime contract is being executed according to cost and schedule expectations. However, DHS continues to propose disproportionately heavy investment in US-VISIT program management-related activities without adequate justification or full disclosure. Further, DHS continues to propose spending tens of millions of dollars on US-VISIT exit projects that are not well-defined, planned, or justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks. Overall, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan and other available program documentation do not provide a sufficient basis for effective program oversight and accountability. Both the legislative conditions and GAO's open recommendations are aimed at accomplishing both, and thus they need to be addressed quickly and completely. However, despite ample opportunity to do so, DHS has not done so and the reasons why are unclear. Until these recommendations are addressed, GAO does not believe that the program's disproportionate investment in management-related activities represents a prudent and warranted course of action or to expect that the newly launched exit endeavor will produce results different from past results--namely, no operational exit solution despite expenditure plans allocating about a quarter of a billion dollars to various exit activities. Fri, 31 Aug 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07925.pdf As a group, Asian American and Pacific Islanders represent about 5 percent of the U.S. population and hold about 8 percent of the college degrees. To better understand the educational attainment and average incomes of the subgroups that comprise this population, the Committee asked: 1) What are Asian American and Pacific Islander subgroups' educational attainment and household income levels? (2) What challenges, if any, Asian American and Pacific Islander students face in pursuing and completing their post-secondary education? and (3) What federal and institutional resources do institutions with large Asian American and Pacific Islander student enrollment use to address the particular needs of these students? GAO analyzed data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Department of Education (Education) and spoke with officials and Asian American and Pacific Islander students at eight postsecondary institutions. As a group, Asian American and Pacific Islanders have attained high levels of education and income, but differences among Asian American and Pacific Islander subgroups exist. For example, a greater percentage of Asian Indians and Chinese in the United States had college degrees than Vietnamese, Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders and Indochinese--Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong. Asian Indians had the highest and Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders and Indochinese had the lowest average income among employed Asian American and Pacific Islander subgroups. Data limitations, including challenges linking data sources, prevented GAO from fully exploring the reasons for the differences among subgroups. Asian American and Pacific Islander subgroups--while in high school--face a range of challenges that may affect their ability to persist in college. According to GAO's analysis of Education's data, Asian American and Pacific Islander subgroups differ in their levels of academic preparedness, ability to pay for college, and their need to balance academic, employment, and family obligations. The postsecondary institutions that GAO visited used both federal grants and their own resources to address the needs of Asian American and Pacific Islander students. The schools used federal aid to institutions to provide tutoring services and to supplement Pell Grants for selected students. The schools also applied their own funds to provide a range of services, including outreach to high school students, scholarships, tutoring, and financial aid application and tuition assistance. School officials told GAO that they could benefit from learning about programs and strategies other schools might be using to assist high school and college students. Wed, 25 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07870.pdf Intended to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program encompasses the pre-entry, entry, status management, and exit of foreign national travelers who enter and leave the United States at 285 air, sea, and land ports of entry. GAO was asked to determine whether Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented appropriate controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems used to support the US-VISIT program. To do this, GAO examined the controls over the systems operated by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that support the US-VISIT program. The systems supporting the US-VISIT program have significant information security control weaknesses that place sensitive and personally identifiable information at increased risk of unauthorized and possibly undetected disclosure and modification, misuse, and destruction. Weaknesses existed in all control areas and computing device types reviewed. Deficiencies in access controls and other system controls exposed mainframe computer, network infrastructure, servers, and workstations to insider and external threats. For example, CBP did not implement controls to effectively prevent, limit, and detect access to computer networks, systems, and information. To illustrate, it did not (1) adequately identify and authenticate users in systems supporting US-VISIT; (2) sufficiently limit access to US-VISIT information and information systems; (3) ensure that controls adequately protected external and internal network boundaries; (4) effectively implement physical security at several locations; (5) consistently encrypt sensitive data traversing the communication network; and (6) provide adequate logging or user accountability for the mainframe, workstations, or servers. In addition, CBP did not always ensure that responsibilities for systems development and system production were sufficiently segregated and did not consistently maintain secure configurations on the application servers and workstations at a key data center and ports of entry. These weaknesses collectively increase the risk that unauthorized individuals could read, copy, delete, add, and modify sensitive information, including personally identifiable information, and disrupt the operations of the US-VISIT program. They make it possible for intruders, as well as government and contractor employees, to bypass or disable computer access controls and undertake a wide variety of inappropriate or malicious acts. These risks are not confined to US-VISIT information. The CBP mainframe and network resources that support US-VISIT also support other programs and systems. As a result, the vulnerabilities identified in this report could expose the information and information systems of the other programs to the same increased risks. A key reason for these weaknesses is that, although CBP has made important progress in implementing elements of the department's information security program, it did not effectively or fully implement essential program activities. For example, CBP did not fully characterize the risks facing critical systems, update interconnection security agreements in security plans, sufficiently test and evaluate security controls, incorporate required elements in remedial action plans, adequately implement incident detection and handling procedures, and consistently address privacy issues. Until DHS and CBP act to mitigate the weaknesses in CBP systems supporting the US-VISIT program and CBP effectively and fully implements its information security program, limited assurance exists that the US-VISIT program will achieve its goal of enhancing the security of U.S. citizens and its visitors. Fri, 13 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07875.pdf The total number of aliens detained per year by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) increased from about 95,000 in fiscal year 2001 to 283,000 in 2006. The care and treatment of these detained aliens is a significant challenge to ICE. GAO was asked to review ICE's implementation of its detention standards for aliens in its custody. GAO reviewed (1) detention facilities' compliance with ICE's detention standards, (2) ICE's compliance review process, and (3) how detainee complaints regarding conditions of confinement are handled. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed DHS documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 23 detention facilities of varying size, type, and geographic location. GAO's observations at 23 alien detention facilities showed systemic telephone system problems at 16 of 17 facilities that use the pro bono telephone system, but no pattern of noncompliance for other standards GAO reviewed. At facilities that use the ICE detainee pro bono telephone system, GAO encountered significant problems in making connections to consulates, pro bono legal providers, or the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) complaint hotline. Monthly performance data provided by the phone system contractor indicates the rate of successful connections through the detainee pro bono telephone system was never above 74 percent. ICE officials stated there was little oversight of the telephone contract. In June 2007, ICE requested an OIG audit of the contract,stating that the contractor did not comply with the terms and conditions of the contract. Other instances of deficiencies GAO observed varied across facilities visited but did not appear to show a pattern of noncompliance. These deficiencies involved medical care, use of hold rooms, use of force, food service, recreational opportunities, access to legal materials, facility grievance procedures, and overcrowding. ICE annual compliance reviews of detention facilities identified deficiencies similar to those found by GAO. However, insufficient internal controls and weaknesses in ICE's compliance review process resulted in ICE's failure to identify telephone system problems at most facilities GAO visited. ICE's inspection worksheet used by its detention facility reviewers did not require that a reviewer confirm that detainees are able to make successful connections through the detainee pro bono telephone system. Detainee complaints may be filed with several governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Detainee complaints mostly involved legal access, conditions of confinement, property issues, human and civil rights, medical care, and employee misconduct at the facility. The primary way for detainees to file complaints is to contact the OIG. OIG investigates the most serious complaints and refers the remainder to other DHS components. Fri, 06 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071044t.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent and continues to invest hundreds of millions of dollars each year in its U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land ports of entry (POEs). The program uses biometric identifiers (digital finger scans and photographs) to screen people against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. GAO's testimony addresses the status of US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities and DHS's management of past and future exit efforts. In developing its testimony, GAO drew from eight prior reports on US-VISIT as well as ongoing work for the committee. After investing about $1.3 billion over 4 years, DHS has delivered essentially one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically enabled entry capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and land POEs but comparable exit capabilities are not. To the department's credit, operational entry capabilities have reportedly produced results, including more than 1,500 people having adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. However, DHS still does not have the other half of US-VISIT (an operational exit capability) despite the fact that its funding plans have allocated about one-quarter of a billion dollars since 2003 to exit-related efforts. During this time, GAO has continued to cite weaknesses in how DHS is managing US-VISIT in general, and the exit side of US-VISIT in particular, and has made numerous recommendations aimed at better ensuring that the program delivers clearly defined and adequately justified capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. The prospects for successfully delivering an operational exit solution are as uncertain today as they were 4 years ago. The department's latest available documentation indicates that little has changed in how DHS is approaching its definition and justification of future US-VISIT exit efforts. Specifically, DHS has indicated that it intends to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and $20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit capabilities. However, it has not produced either plans or analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest these funds. Rather, it has only described in general terms near-term deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is not possible. Beyond this high-level schedule, no other exit program plans are available that define what will be done by what entities and at what cost. In the absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its exit intentions, it is unlikely that the department's latest efforts to deliver near-term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results different from the past. Therefore, the prospects for having operational exit capabilities continue to be unclear. Moreover, the longer the department goes without exit capabilities, the more its ability to effectively and efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement missions will suffer. Among other things, this means that DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system by identifying and removing those people who have overstayed their original period of admission, which is a stated goal of US-VISIT. Further, DHS immigration and customs enforcement entities will continue to spend limited resources on investigating potential visa violators who have already left the country. Thu, 28 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07997t.pdf In May 2006, the President called for comprehensive immigration reform that included strengthening control of the country's borders by, among other things, adding 6,000 new agents to the U.S. Border Patrol by the end of December 2008. This unprecedented 48 percent increase over 2 years raises concerns about the ability of the Border Patrol's basic training program to train these new agents. This testimony is based on a recent report for the ranking member of this subcommittee on the content, quality, and cost of the Border Patrol's basic training program for new agents and addresses (1) the extent to which the Border Patrol's basic training program exhibits the attributes of an effective training program and the changes to the program since September 11, 2001; (2) the cost to train a new agent and how this compares to the costs of other similar law enforcement basic training programs; and (3) any plans the Border Patrol has developed or considered to improve the efficiency of its basic training program. To address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant documents; observed classroom training and exercises at the Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, New Mexico; assessed the methodologies of training cost estimates; and interviewed Border Patrol officials. The Border Patrol's basic training program exhibits attributes of an effective training program. GAO's training assessment guide suggests the kinds of documentation to look for that indicate that a training program has a particular attribute in place. The Border Patrol's training program included all of the applicable key attributes of an effective training program. The core curriculum used at the Border Patrol Academy has not changed since September 11, but the Border Patrol added new material on responding to terrorism and practical field exercises. Border Patrol officials are confident that the academy can accommodate the large influx of new trainees anticipated over the next 2 years. In fiscal year 2006, the average cost to train a new Border Patrol agent at the academy was about $14,700. While differences in programs make a direct comparison difficult, it appears that the Border Patrol's average cost per trainee at the academy is consistent with that of training programs that cover similar subjects and prepare officers for operations in similar geographic areas. For example, the estimated average cost per trainee for a Bureau of Indian Affairs police officer was about $15,300; an Arizona state police officer, $15,600; and a Texas state trooper, $14,700. The Border Patrol is considering several alternatives to improve the efficiency of basic training delivery at the academy and to return agents to the field more quickly. For example, in October 2007 the Border Patrol plans to implement a proficiency test for Spanish that should allow those who pass the test to shorten their time at the academy by about 30 days. The Border Patrol is also considering what training it can shift from the academy to postacademy training conducted in the field, which could further reduce the amount of time trainees spend at the academy. However, Border Patrol officials have expressed concerns with having a sufficient number of experienced agents available to serve as first-line supervisors and field training officers. The Border Patrol also currently lacks uniform standards and practices for field training, and shifting additional training responsibilities to the field could complicate this situation. Tue, 19 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07924t.pdf The opportunity for employment is one of the most powerful magnets attracting illegal immigration to the United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 established an employment eligibility verification process, but immigration experts state that a more reliable verification system is needed. In 1996, the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, now within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Social Security Administration (SSA) began operating a voluntary pilot program, called the Employment Eligibility Verification (EEV) program, to provide participating employers with a means for electronically verifying employees' work eligibility. Congress is considering various immigration reform proposals, some of which would require all employers to electronically verify the work authorization status of their employees at the time of hire. In this testimony GAO provides observations on the EEV system's capacity, data reliability, ability to detect fraudulent documents and identity theft, and vulnerability to employer fraud as well as challenges to making the program mandatory for all employers. This testimony is based on our previous work regarding the employment eligibility verification process and updated information obtained from DHS and SSA. A mandatory EEV program would substantially increase the number of employers using the system. As of May 2007, about 17,000 employers have registered to use the current voluntary EEV program, about half of which are active users. If participation in EEV were made mandatory, the approximately 5.9 million employers in the United States may be required to participate. Requiring all employers to use EEV would substantially increase the demands on DHS and SSA resources. DHS estimated that increasing the capacity of EEV could cost it $70 million annually for program management and $300 million to $400 million annually for compliance activities and staff. SSA officials estimated that expansion of the EEV program through this fiscal year would cost $5 million to $6 million and noted that the cost of mandatory EEV would be much higher and driven by increased workload of its field office staff that would be responsible for resolving queries that SSA cannot immediately confirm. DHS and SSA are exploring options to reduce delays in the EEV process. The majority of EEV queries entered by employers--about 92 percent--confirm within seconds that the employee is work authorized. About 7 percent of the queries cannot be immediately confirmed by SSA, and about 1 percent cannot be immediately confirmed by DHS. Resolving these nonconfirmations can take several days, or in a few cases even weeks. DHS and SSA are considering options for improving the system's ability to perform additional automated checks to immediately confirm work authorization, which may be important should EEV be mandatory. EEV may help reduce document fraud, but it cannot yet fully address identity fraud issues, for example, when employees present borrowed or stolen genuine documents. The current EEV program is piloting a photograph screening tool, whereby an employer can more easily identify fraudulent documentation. DHS expects to expand the use of this tool to all participating employers by September 2007. Although mandatory EEV and the associated use of the photograph screening tool offer some remedy, limiting the number of acceptable work authorization documents and making them more secure would help to more fully address identity fraud. The EEV program is vulnerable to employer fraud, such as entering the same identity information to authorize multiple workers. EEV is also vulnerable to employer misuse that adversely affects employees, such as employers limiting work assignments or pay while employees are undergoing the verification process. DHS is establishing a new Compliance and Monitoring program to help reduce employer fraud and misuse by, for example, identifying patterns in employer compliance with program requirements. Information suggesting employers' fraud or misuse of the system could be useful to other DHS components in targeting limited worksite enforcement resources and promoting employer compliance with employment laws. Thu, 07 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07796r.pdf This report responds to certain requirements of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 that authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. Section 902 (k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every 6 months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the number of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. Reports are to be provided until all applications have been finally adjudicated. This is GAO's sixteenth report. Through March 31, 2007, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), had received a total of 40,844 HRIFA applications and had approved 17,538 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) had 2,020 applications filed and had approved 797 of them. Details on the categories of the applicants and approvals are provided in this report. Fri, 27 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07540r.pdf The U.S. Border Patrol is responsible for patrolling 8,000 miles of the land and coastal borders of the United States to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Although the Border Patrol apprehends hundreds of thousands of people entering the country illegally each year, several hundreds of thousands more individuals successfully enter the country illegally and undetected each year. In May 2006, the President called for comprehensive immigration reform that included strengthening control of the country's borders by, among other things, adding 6,000 new agents to the Border Patrol by the end of December 2008. This would increase the total number of agents from 12,349 to 18,319, an unprecedented 48 percent increase over the next 2 years. The Border Patrol plans to add these new agents to the southwest border while transferring up to 1,000 experienced agents to the northern border. Concerned about the ability of the Border Patrol's basic training program to accommodate this significant increase in Border Patrol agent trainees, Congress requested that we provide information on the content, quality, and cost of the Border Patrol's basic training program for new agents. This report addresses the following questions: To what extent does the Border Patrol's basic training program for new border patrol agents exhibit the attributes of an effective training program and how has the training program changed since September 11, 2001? How much does it cost to train a new Border Patrol agent? How does the Border Patrol's basic training program and cost compare to those of other similar federal and nonfederal law enforcement basic training programs? What plans, if any, has the Border Patrol developed or considered to improve the efficiency of its basic training program? The Border Patrol's basic training program exhibits attributes of an effective training program. GAO's training assessment guide suggests the kinds of documentation to look for that indicate that a training program has a particular attribute in place, such as incorporating measures of effectiveness into its course designs. The Border Patrol had documentation that its training program had at least 1 key indicator in place for 31 of the 32 attributes of an effective training program. While we determined the presence of indicators of particular attributes, we did not assess the extent to which these attributes contributed to the quality of the training program. In addition, the Border Patrol is pursuing accreditation of its training program from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation organization. Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that as of October 2006, the overall agent-to-supervisor ratios for southwest sectors, where the Border Patrol assigns all new agents, ranged from about 7 to 1 up to 11 to 1. However, given the large numbers of new agents the Border Patrol plans to assign to the southwest border over the next 2 years, along with the planned reassignment of experienced agents from the southwest border to the northern border, it will be a challenge for the agency to achieve the desired 5-to-1 ratio for new agents in all work units in those sectors receiving the largest numbers of new agents. In fiscal year 2006, the average cost to train a new Border Patrol agent at the academy was about $14,700. This cost represents the amounts expended by both the Border Patrol and FLETC. The Border Patrol paid about $6,600 for the trainee's meals and lodging, and a portion of the cost of instructors, and FLETC paid about $8,100 for tuition, a portion of the cost of instructors, and miscellaneous expenses such as support services, supplies, and utilities. The $14,700 cost figure does not include the costs associated with instructors conducting postacademy and field training in the sectors. Given the Border Patrol's unique mission and difficulties making direct comparisons with other federal and nonfederal law enforcement training programs, it appears that the Border Patrol's average cost per trainee at the academy is consistent with that of training programs that cover similar subjects and prepare officers for operations in similar geographic areas. However, differences in the emphasis of some subject areas over others dictated by jurisdiction and mission make a direct comparison difficult. Similarly, the Border Patrol does not provide instruction in investigation techniques while BIA, Arizona, and Texas require 139, 50, and 165 hours of such instruction, respectively. The Border Patrol is considering several alternatives to improve the efficiency of basic training delivery and to return agents to the sectors more quickly. According to Border Patrol officials, this could benefit about half of all trainees, because about half of all recruits already speak Spanish. The Border Patrol also plans to convert postacademy classroom training to computer-based training, allowing agents to complete the 1-day-a-week training at their duty stations rather than having to travel to the sector headquarters for this training. As a result, fewer senior agents will be required to serve as instructors for postacademy training. Finally, the Border Patrol is considering what other training it can shift from the academy to postacademy and field training conducted in the sectors, which could further reduce the amount of time trainees spend at the academy. Fri, 30 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07630t.pdf Advances in information technology make it easier than ever for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies to obtain and process information about citizens and residents in many ways and for many purposes. The demands of the war on terror also drive agencies to extract as much value as possible from the information available to them, adding to the potential for compromising privacy. Recognizing that securing the homeland and protecting the privacy rights of individuals are both important goals, the Congress has asked GAO to perform several reviews of DHS programs and their privacy implications over the past several years. For this hearing, GAO was asked to testify on key privacy challenges facing DHS. To address this issue, GAO identified and summarized issues raised in its previous reports on privacy and assessed recent governmentwide privacy guidance. As it develops and participates in important homeland security activities, DHS faces challenges in ensuring that privacy concerns are addressed early, are reassessed when key programmatic changes are made, and are thoroughly reflected in guidance on emerging technologies and uses of personal data. GAO's reviews of DHS programs have identified cases where these challenges were not fully met. For example, increased use by federal agencies of data mining--the analysis of large amounts of data to uncover hidden patterns and relationships--has been accompanied by uncertainty regarding privacy requirements and oversight of such systems. As described in a recent GAO report, DHS did not assess privacy risks in developing a data mining tool known as ADVISE (Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement), as required by the E-Government Act of 2002. ADVISE is a data mining tool under development intended to help the department analyze large amounts of information. Because privacy had not been assessed and mitigating controls had not been implemented, DHS faced the risk that uses of ADVISE in systems containing personal information could require costly and potentially duplicative retrofitting at a later date to add the needed controls. GAO has also reported on privacy challenges experienced by DHS in reassessing privacy risks when key programmatic changes were made during development of a prescreening program for airline passengers. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been working to develop a computer-assisted passenger prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, to be used to evaluate passengers before they board an aircraft on domestic flights. GAO reported that TSA had not fully disclosed uses of personal information during testing of Secure Flight, as required by the Privacy Act of 1974. To prevent such problems from recurring, TSA officials recently said that they have added privacy experts to Secure Flight's development teams to address privacy considerations on a continuous basis as they arise. Another challenge DHS faces is ensuring that privacy considerations are addressed in the emerging information sharing environment. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the establishment of an environment to facilitate the sharing of terrorism information, as well as the issuance of privacy guidelines for operation in this environment. Recently issued privacy guidelines developed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence provide only a high-level framework for privacy protection. While DHS is only one participant, it has the responsibility to ensure that the information under its control is shared with other organizations in ways that adequately protect privacy. Accordingly, it will be important for the department to clearly establish departmental guidelines so that privacy protections are implemented properly and consistently. Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07632t.pdf This testimony summarizes GAO's work on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program at air, sea, and land ports of entry (POE). US-VISIT is designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land POEs. These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify identities, and record arrival and departure. This testimony addresses DHS's efforts to (1) implement US-VISIT entry capability, (2) implement US-VISIT exit capability, and (3) resolve longstanding management challenges that could impair DHS's ability to effectively implement the US-VISIT program. GAO analyzed DHS and US-VISIT documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders. DHS is operating US-VISIT entry capabilities at most POEs and has begun to work to move from 2 to 10 fingerprint biometric capabilities and expand electronic information sharing with stakeholders. Of particular note is the fact that a US-VISIT biometric-based entry screening capability is operating at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land POEs. While US-VISIT has improved DHS's ability to process visitors and verify identities upon entry, we found that management controls in place to identify and evaluate computer and other operational problems at land POEs were insufficient and inconsistently administered. Although US-VISIT has conducted various exit demonstration projects at a small number of POEs, a biometric exit capability is not currently available. According to program officials, this is due to a number of factors. For example, at this time the only proven technology available for biometric land exit verification would necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use for entry at these POEs, which would create costly staffing demands and infrastructure requirements, and introduce potential trade, commerce, and environmental impacts. Further, a pilot project to examine an alternative technology at land POEs did not produce a viable solution. By statute, DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how it intended to fully implement a comprehensive, biometric entry/exit program, but DHS had not yet reported how it intended to do so, or use nonbiometric solutions. DHS continues to face longstanding US-VISIT management challenges and future uncertainties. For example, DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to strategically fit with other land border security initiatives and mandates and could not ensure that these programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and operate cost effectively. DHS had drafted a strategic plan defining an overall immigration and border management strategy but, as of February 2007, the plan was under review by the Office of Management and Budget. Further, critical acquisition management processes need to be established and followed to ensure that program capabilities and expected mission outcomes are delivered on time and within budget. These processes include effective project planning, requirements management, contract tracking and oversight, test management, and financial management. Until these issues are addressed, the risk of US-VISIT continuing to fall short of expectations is increased. Tue, 20 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07300.pdf The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to respond to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO's previous work identified suspected fraud, waste, and abuse resulting from control weaknesses associated with FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) purchase card program. Congress asked GAO to follow up on this previous work to determine whether potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments continued to be made. GAO testified on the results of our audit and investigative efforts on December 6, 2006. This report summarizes the results of our follow-up work. In our December 6, 2006, testimony, GAO stated that FEMA made tens of millions of dollars of potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments associated with both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These payments include $17 million in rental assistance paid to individuals to whom FEMA had already provided free housing through trailers or apartments. In one case, FEMA provided free housing to 10 individuals in apartments in Plano, Texas, while at the same time it sent these individuals $46,000 to cover out-of-pocket housing expenses. In addition, several of these individuals certified to FEMA that they needed rental assistance. FEMA made nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to thousands of individuals who claimed damages to the same property from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FEMA also made millions in potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments to nonqualified aliens who were not eligible for IHP. For example, FEMA paid at least $3 million to more than 500 ineligible foreign students at four universities in the affected areas. This amount likely understates the total payments to ineligible foreign students because it does not cover all colleges and universities in the area. FEMA also provided potentially improper and/or fraudulent IHP assistance to other ineligible non-U.S. residents, despite having documentation indicating their ineligibility. Finally, FEMA's difficulties in identifying and collecting improper payments further emphasized the importance of implementing an effective fraud, waste, and abuse prevention system. For example, GAO previously estimated improper and potentially fraudulent payments related to the IHP application process to be $1 billion through February 2006. As of November 2006, FEMA identified about $290 million in overpayments and collected about $7 million. Finally, GAO's work on DHS purchase cards showed continuing problems with property accountability, including items GAO investigated that could not be located 1 year after they were purchased. Thu, 15 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07504t.pdf This testimony summarizes GAO's February 2007 report on SBInet, one element of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI). SBInet is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system. By legislative mandate, GAO reviewed SBInet's fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan. This testimony focuses on (1) the extent that the plan provided explicit and measurable commitments relative to schedule and costs, (2) how DHS is following federal acquisition regulations and management best practices, and (3) concurrency in SBInet's schedule. GAO assessed the plan against federal guidelines and industry standards and interviewed program officials. SBInet's December 2006 expenditure plan offered a high-level and partial outline of a large and complex program that forms an integral component of the broader multiyear initiative. However, the SBInet expenditure plan, including related documentation and program officials' statements, lacked specificity on such things as planned activities and milestones, anticipated costs and staffing levels, and expected mission outcomes. This, coupled with the large cost and ambitious time frames, adds risk to the program. Without sufficient and reliable information on program goals, status and results, Congress and DHS are not in the best position to use the plan as a basis for assessing program outcomes, accounting for the use of current and future appropriations, and holding program managers accountable for achieving effective control of the border. As of December 2006, SBInet was using, at least to some extent acquisition best practices, but DHS had not fully established the range of capabilities needed to effectively mitigate risks and to successfully manage the program. To its credit, the SBInet contract was generally competed in accordance with federal requirements. However, the SBInet contract does not fully satisfy the federal regulatory requirement to specify a maximum dollar value or the number of units that may be ordered. We also reported that important management controls provided for in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and best practices were not yet in place, although the program manager stated that he was committed to doing so. Until they are in place, the program is at increased risk of failure. DHS's plan to execute SBInet activities through a series of concurrent task orders introduces additional risk. With multiple related and dependent projects being undertaken simultaneously, SBInet is exposed to possible cost and schedule overruns and performance problems. Without assessing this level of concurrency and how it affects project implementation, SBInet runs the risk of not delivering promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. SBI and SBInet officials told us that they understand the risks inherent in concurrency and are addressing these risks. However, as of December 2006, they had not provided evidence that identified the dependencies among their concurrent activities and that they were proactively managing the associated risk. Tue, 27 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07499t.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is investing billions of dollars in its U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. The program uses biometric identifiers (digital fingerscans and photographs) to screen people against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. The program is also to biometrically confirm the individual's departure. For over 3 years, GAO has reported on US-VISIT capability deployments and shortfalls, as well as fundamental limitations in DHS's efforts to define and justify US-VISIT's future direction and to cost-effectively manage the delivery of program capabilities on time and within budget. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the status of the program's implementation and (2) the program's progress in addressing longstanding management weaknesses. Given where US-VISIT is today and the challenges and uncertainties associated with where it is going, GAO believes that DHS is long overdue in demonstrating that it is pursuing the right US-VISIT solution and that it is managing US-VISIT the right way. After spending almost 4 years and more than $1 billion, DHS has implemented entry capabilities at most ports of entry; however, it has not implemented a biometric exit capability or a suitable alternative. As of December 2006, US-VISIT had deployed and was operating entry capability at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 of 170 land ports of entry. However, the implementation of a biometric land exit capability is currently not feasible, according to program officials, because the only proven technology available would require additional staffing and infrastructure demands, and cause delays with potential impacts on trade and commerce. Also, testing and analysis of a non-biometric solution identified numerous performance and reliability problems, and such an alternative technology does not meet legislative requirements. DHS believes that advances over the next 5 to 10 years will allow solutions that do not require major infrastructure changes, but the prospects for such technology are uncertain. DHS continues to face longstanding US-VISIT management challenges and future uncertainties. For almost 4 years, DHS has continued to pursue US-VISIT without producing the program's operational and technological context. According to program officials, an immigration and border management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to show how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS's organizational mission and to define an overall immigration and border management vision. After almost 2 years, this plan has not yet been approved, but the Acting Director said that it is currently with OMB for approval. At the same time, DHS has launched other major security programs without defining the relationship between US-VISIT and these programs. DHS has yet to economically justify its investment in US-VISIT increments or assess their operational impacts. For over 3 years, we reported that the program did not adequately assess the increment's costs and benefits because the assessments were unclear and insufficient, and the cost estimates upon which they were based did not meet key criteria for reliable cost estimating. GAO further reported that the program had not assessed the impact of the entry and exit capabilities on operations and facilities, in part, because the scope of the evaluations performed were too limited. DHS has not implemented key acquisition and financial management controls. For example, GAO reported that the program had not effectively overseen contract work performed on its behalf by other DHS and non-DHS agencies, and these agencies did not always establish and implement effective contract oversight activities. Without these management controls, there is greater risk that US-VISIT will not produce the right solution, and be managed the right way. Accordingly, GAO has made numerous recommendations to address these management challenges. Fri, 16 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07309.pdf In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program to secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal immigration. One element of SBI is SBInet, the program responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system. By legislative mandate, DHS developed a fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan for SBInet to address nine legislative conditions, including a review by GAO. DHS submitted the plan to the Appropriations Committees on December 4, 2006. To address the mandate, GAO assessed the plan against federal guidelines and industry standards and interviewed appropriate DHS officials. The SBInet expenditure plan, including related documentation and program officials' statements, satisfied four legislative conditions, partially satisfied four legislative conditions, and did not satisfy one legislative condition. Satisfying the legislative conditions is important because the expenditure plan is intended to provide Congress with the information needed to effectively oversee the program and hold DHS accountable for program results. Satisfying the legislative conditions is also important to minimize the program's exposure to cost, schedule, and performance risks. SBInet's December 2006 expenditure plan offered a high-level and partial outline of a large and complex program that forms an integral component of a broader multiyear initiative. However, the plan and related documentation did not include explicit and measurable commitments relative to capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBInet program activities. In addition, the SBInet systems integration contract did not contain a specific number of units that may be ordered or a maximum dollar value as required by Federal Acquisition Regulation. Further, DHS's approach to SBInet introduces additional risk because the program's schedule entails a high level of concurrency among related planned tasks and activities. Thu, 15 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07278.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals who travel to the United States. By congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit for approval an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO was required to determine if the plan satisfied these conditions, follow up on recommendations related to the expenditure plan, and provide any other observations. To address the mandate, GAO assessed plans against federal guidelines and industry standards and interviewed the appropriate DHS officials. The US-VISIT expenditure plan, related program documentation, and program officials' statements satisfied or partially satisfied each of the legislative conditions required by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006. For example, they satisfied the condition that the agency provide certification that an independent verification and validation agent is currently under contract for the program and partially satisfied the condition that US-VISIT comply with DHS's enterprise architecture. DHS also completed or partially completed each of GAO's prior expenditure plan-related recommendations. For example, the department completed recommendations that it provide an expenditure plan to the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security before obligating restricted fiscal year funds and that it identify and disclose management reserve funding in those plans. However, DHS only partially completed recommendations that the plan fully disclose how the US-VISIT acquisition is being managed and that it fully disclose US-VISIT's cost, schedule, capabilities, and benefits. GAO identified several additional areas of concern. First, DHS has not adequately defined and justified its proposed fiscal year 2006 expenditures for pilot and demonstration projects aimed at collecting information on persons exiting the country at air, sea, and land borders. Second, DHS has continued to invest in US-VISIT without a clearly defined operational context that includes explicit relationships with related border security and immigration enforcement initiatives. Third, US-VISIT program management costs have risen sharply, while costs for development have decreased, without any accompanying explanation of the reasons. Overall, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan and other available program documentation do not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to exercise effective oversight of the program and to hold the department accountable for results. For proper oversight and accountability to occur, it is essential that DHS increase US-VISIT program transparency and accountability by justifying planned investments on the basis of adequate definition and disclosure of planned expenditures, timelines, capabilities, and benefits, and by effectively measuring and reporting progress against each. It is also essential for DHS to fully satisfy each of the conditions legislated by Congress, because doing so will minimize the program's exposure to risk. Wed, 14 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07378t.pdf This testimony summarizes a December 2006 GAO report on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program at land ports of entry (POE). US-VISIT is designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land POEs. These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify identities, and record arrival and departure. This testimony addresses DHS's efforts to (1) implement US-VISIT entry capability, (2) implement US-VISIT exit capability, and (3) define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security initiatives. GAO analyzed DHS and US-VISIT documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders. US-VISIT entry capability had been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT's capabilities by, among other things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation could increase processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO's work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered. For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology tested (see photo, below right) did not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and thus cannot ensure that visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS had not yet reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus could not ensure that the program would meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or other documents at land POEs in 2009, is important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility modifications needed to ensure success. Wed, 31 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07375.pdf Five years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, GAO is taking stock of key efforts by the President, Congress, federal agencies, and the 9/11 Commission to strengthen or enhance critical layers of defense in aviation and border security that were directly exploited by the 19 terrorist hijackers. Specifically, the report discusses how: (1) commercial aviation security has been enhanced; (2) visa-related policies and programs have evolved to help screen out potential terrorists; (3) federal border security initiatives have evolved to reduce the likelihood of terrorists entering the country through legal checkpoints; and (4) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies are addressing several major post-9/11 strategic challenges. The report reflects conclusions and recommendations from a body of work issued before and after 9/11 by GAO, the Inspectors General of DHS, State, and Justice, the 9/11 Commission, and others. It is not a comprehensive assessment of all federal initiatives taken or planned in response to 9/11. GAO is not making any new recommendations at this time since over 75 prior recommendations on aviation security, the Visa Waiver Program, and U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), among others, are in the process of being implemented. Continued monitoring by GAO will determine whether further recommendations are warranted. While the nation cannot expect to eliminate all risks of terrorist attack upon commercial aviation, agencies have made progress since 9/11 to reduce aviation-related vulnerabilities and enhance the layers of defense directly exploited by the terrorist hijackers. In general, these efforts have resulted in better airline passenger screening procedures designed to identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists, weapons, and explosives from being allowed onto aircraft. Nevertheless, the nation's commercial aviation system remains a highly visible target for terrorism, as evidenced by recent alleged efforts to bring liquid explosives aboard aircraft. DHS and others need to follow through on outstanding congressional requirements and recommendations by GAO and others to enhance security and coordination of passengers and checked baggage, and improve screening procedures for domestic flights, among other needed improvements. GAO's work indicates that the government has strengthened the nonimmigrant visa process as an antiterrorism tool. New measures added rigor to the process by expanding the name-check system used to screen applicants, requiring in-person interviews for nearly all applicants, and revamping consular officials' training to focus on counterterrorism. Nevertheless, the immigrant visa process may pose potential security risks and we are reviewing this issue. To enhance security and screening at legal checkpoints (air, land, and sea ports) at the nation's borders, agencies are using technology to verify foreign travelers' identities and detect fraudulent travel documents such as passports. However, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by the Visa Waiver Program, whereby travelers from 27 countries need not obtain visas for U.S. travel. For example, GAO recommended that DHS require visa-waiver countries to provide information on lost or stolen passports that terrorists could use to gain entry. We also recommended that DHS provide more information to Congress on how it plans to fully implement US-VISIT--a system for tracking the entry, exit, and length of stay of foreign travelers. While much attention has been focused on mitigating the specific risks of 9/11, other critical assets ranging from passenger rail stations to power plants are also at risk of terrorist attack. Deciding how to address these risks--setting priorities, making trade-offs, allocating resources, and assessing social and economic costs--is essential. Thus, it remains vitally important for DHS to continue to develop and implement a risk-based framework to help target where and how the nation's resources should be invested to strengthen security. The government also faces strategic challenges that potentially affect oversight and execution of new and ongoing homeland security initiatives, and GAO has deemed three challenges in particular--information sharing, risk management, and transforming DHS as a department--as areas needing urgent attention. DHS and the Department of State reviewed a draft of this report and both agencies generally agreed with the information. Both agencies provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. Wed, 24 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07140.pdf Title III of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) designates federal funds to support the education of students with limited English proficiency and provides for formula-based grants to states. This report describes the data the Education Department used to distribute Title III funds and the implications of data measurement issues for the two allowable sources of data-- American Community Survey (ACS) and state assessment data--for allocating funds across states. In addition, the report describes changes in federal funding to support these students under NCLBA and how states and school districts used these funds as well as Education's Title III oversight and support to states. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation on ACS and state data, interviewed federal and state officials, and collected data from 12 states, 11 districts, and 6 schools. Education used ACS data to distribute Title III funds, but measurement issues with both ACS and state data could result in funding differences. Education used ACS data primarily because state data were incomplete. In September, Education officials told us they were developing plans to clarify instructions for state data submissions to address identified inconsistencies. While Education officials expected their efforts to improve the quality of the data, they told us that they had not established criteria or a methodology to determine the relative accuracy of the two data sources. State data represent the number of students with limited English proficiency assessed annually for English proficiency, and ACS data are based in part on responses to subjective English ability questions from a sample of the population. ACS data showed large increases and decreases in numbers of these students from 2003 to 2004 in part due to sample size. ACS data and state counts of students with limited English proficiency for the 12 study states differed. GAO's simulation of the distribution of Title III funds for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 based on these numbers showed that there would be differences in how much funding states would receive. In fiscal year 2006, Congress authorized over $650 million in Title III funding for students with limited English proficiency--an increase of over $200 million since fiscal year 2001 under NCLBA. This increase in funding as well as the change in how funds are distributed--from a primarily discretionary grant program to a formula grant program--contributed to more districts receiving federal funding to support students with limited English proficiency since the enactment of NCLBA. States and school districts used Title III funds to support programs and activities including language instruction and professional development. Education provided oversight and support to states. Officials from 5 of the 12 study states reported overall satisfaction with the support from Education. However, some officials indicated that they needed more guidance in certain areas, such as developing English language proficiency assessments that meet NCLBA's requirements. Education is taking steps to address issues states identified. Thu, 07 Dec 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07252t.pdf Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals. While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to respond to this disaster, GAO's previous work identified significant control weaknesses--specifically in FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) purchase card program--resulting in significant fraud, waste, and abuse. Today's testimony will address whether FEMA provided improper and potentially fraudulent (1) rental assistance payments to registrants at the same time it was providing free housing via trailers and apartments; (2) duplicate assistance payments to individuals who claimed damages to the same property for both hurricanes Katrina and Rita; and (3) IHP payments to non-U.S. residents who did not qualify for IHP. This testimony will also discuss (1) the importance of fraud identification and prevention, and (2) the results of our investigation into property FEMA bought using DHS purchase cards. To address these objectives, GAO data mined and analyzed FEMA records and interviewed city officials, university officials, and foreign students. GAO also traveled to Louisiana and Texas to inspect selected property items and to investigate improper housing payments to individuals living in FEMA-provided housing. FEMA continued to lose tens of millions of dollars through potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These payments include $17 million in rental assistance paid to individuals to whom FEMA had already provided free housing through trailers or apartments. In one case, FEMA provided free housing to 10 individuals in apartments in Plano, Texas, while at the same time it sent these individuals $46,000 to cover out-of-pocket housing expenses. In addition, several of these individuals certified to FEMA that they needed rental assistance. FEMA made nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to thousands of individuals who claimed the damages to the same property from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FEMA also made millions in potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments to nonqualified aliens who were not eligible for IHP. For example, FEMA paid at least $3 million to more than 500 ineligible foreign students at four universities in the affected areas. This amount likely understates the total payments to ineligible foreign students because it does not cover all colleges and universities in the area. FEMA also provided potentially improper and/or fraudulent IHP assistance to other ineligible non-U.S. residents, despite having documentation indicating their ineligibility. Finally, FEMA's difficulties in identifying and collecting improper payments further emphasized the importance of implementing an effective fraud, waste, and abuse prevention system. For example, GAO previously estimated improper and potentially fraudulent payments related to the IHP application process to be $1 billion through February 2006. As of November 2006, FEMA identified about $290 million in improper payments and collected about $7 million. GAO's previous work on the DHS purchase cards also showed significant problems with property accountability. Of 246 items we investigated that FEMA purchased for hurricane relief efforts using DHS's purchase cards, 85 items--or 34 percent--are still missing and presumed lost or stolen. Wed, 06 Dec 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/decisions/majrule/d07250r.pdf GAO reviewed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State's (DOS) new rule on documents required for travelers departing or arriving in the United States at air ports-of-entry from within the Western hemisphere. GAO found that (1) the rule contains the first phase of a joint plan known as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which implements new documentation requirements for certain U.S. citizens and nonimmigrant aliens entering the United States; and (2) DHS and DOS complied with the applicable requirements in promulgating the rule. Wed, 06 Dec 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07248.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea and land ports of entry (POEs). These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify visitors' identities, and record arrival and departure. GAO was asked to review implementation at land POE facilities and in doing so GAO analyzed: (1) efforts to implement US-VISIT entry capability; (2) efforts to implement US-VISIT exit capability; and (3) DHS's efforts to define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security initiatives. GAO reviewed DHS and US-VISIT program documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders. US-VISIT entry capability has been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT's capabilities by, among other things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation could increase processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO's work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered. For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology being tested does not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and cannot ensure that visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS has not yet reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intends to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program, or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus cannot ensure that the program will meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or other documents at the border in 2009, is important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility modifications needed to ensure success. Wed, 06 Dec 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0752.pdf Many U.S. communities face difficulties attracting physicians. To address this problem, states and federal agencies have turned to foreign physicians who have just completed graduate medical education in the United States under J-1 visas. Ordinarily, these physicians must return home after completing their programs, but this requirement can be waived at the request of a state or federal agency if the physician agrees to practice in an underserved area. In 1996, GAO reported that J-1 visa waivers had become a major source of physicians for underserved areas but were not well coordinated with Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) programs for addressing physician shortages. GAO was asked to examine (1) the number of waivers requested by states and federal agencies; (2) waiver physicians' practice specialties, settings, and locations; and (3) the extent to which waiver physicians are accounted for in HHS's efforts to address physician shortages. GAO surveyed states and federal agencies about waivers they requested in fiscal years 2003-2005 and reviewed HHS data. The use of J-1 visa waivers remains a major means of providing physicians to practice in underserved areas of the United States. More than 1,000 waivers were requested in each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005 by states and three federal agencies--the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Delta Regional Authority, and HHS. At the end of fiscal year 2005, the estimated number of physicians practicing in underserved areas through J-1 visa waivers exceeded the number practicing there through the National Health Service Corps (NHSC)--HHS's primary mechanism for addressing physician shortages. In contrast to a decade ago, when federal agencies requested the vast majority of waivers, states have become the primary source of J-1 visa waiver requests, accounting for 90 percent or more of waiver requests in fiscal years 2003 through 2005. States and federal agencies requested waivers for physicians to work in a variety of practice specialties, settings, and locations. In fiscal year 2005, a little less than half of the waiver requests were for physicians to practice exclusively primary care. More than three-quarters of the waiver requests were for physicians to work in hospitals or private practices, and about half were for physicians to practice in rural areas. HHS does not have the information needed to account for waiver physicians in its efforts to address physician shortages. Without such information, when considering where to place NHSC physicians, HHS has no systematic means of knowing if an area's needs are already being met by waiver physicians. Thu, 30 Nov 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07168r.pdf This report responds to certain requirements of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 that authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. Section 902 (k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every 6 months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the number of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. Reports are to be provided until all applications have been finally adjudicated. This is our fifteenth report. Our objectives for this report were to determine (1) the number and categories of applicants who filed applications with USCIS or EOIR and (2) the number and categories of applicants whose applications were approved by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). Through September 30, 2006, USCIS, formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), had received a total of 40,298 HRIFA applications and had approved 16,616 of these applications. EOIR had 1,947 applications filed and had approved 755 of them. Details on the categories of the applicants and approvals are provided in this report. Thu, 09 Nov 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0785.pdf To document the interactions of aliens with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and other government entities, USCIS creates alien files, or A-files. While deemed critical, especially in making citizenship decisions, A-files are sometimes missing during adjudications. In 2002, naturalization was granted to an alien whose A-file was missing and who was later found to be associated with a terrorist organization. GAO focused its review on (1) how often USCIS adjudicates naturalization applications without an A-file and why, (2) the effect that missing A-files can have on the adjudication process, and (3) steps taken to help mitigate the risk of missing A-files. To address these questions, GAO interviewed officials and staff from USCIS and reviewed relevant data, policies, and procedures related to processing naturalization applications and the automated file-tracking system DHS established to track the movement of A-files. A-files were not available to adjudicate naturalization applications in a small percentage of cases. GAO found that of the naturalization applications adjudicated in 2005, about 30,000--or about 4 percent of them--may have been adjudicated without A-files. However, this number may be less because USCIS staff are not required to record whether an A-file was available. USCIS officials said that a major reason A-files were not available for naturalization application adjudications is that staff are not using the automated file-tracking system. USCIS officials suggested that staff might not be using the automated file-tracking system for lack of sufficient training on how to use the system, while local management may not be adequately emphasizing the importance of complying with A-file tracking policies and procedures. Missing A-files can have an impact on the process of adjudicating naturalization applications in several ways. For example, when an A-file is not available at the location indicated in the automated file-tracking system, additional time is spent trying to locate the file, which slows the adjudication process and applicants may wait longer for USCIS to process their application. In addition, missing A-files can hinder USCIS's ability to uncover immigration benefit fraud and limit DHS' ability to take enforcement actions. USCIS has steps in place to help mitigate the risk of adjudicating a naturalization application without an A-file. These steps include verifying the applicant's lawful admission to the United States and conducting extra supervisory reviews to ensure that naturalization processing procedures have been followed. Fri, 27 Oct 2006 00:00:00 -0400