This page lists the most recent reports and testimonies related to immigration issued prior to October 2006 http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/immigration.html Sun, 22 Nov 2009 14:03:25 -0500 GAO http://www.gao.gov/images/title_object.jpg http://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06775.pdf As greater numbers of foreign-born persons enter, live, and work in the United States, policymakers need more information--particularly on the undocumented population, its size, characteristics, costs, and contributions. This report reviews the ongoing development of a potential method for obtaining such information: the "grouped answers" approach. In 1998, GAO devised the approach and recommended further study. In response, the Census Bureau tested respondent acceptance and recently reported results. GAO answers four questions. (1) Is the grouped answers approach acceptable for use in a national survey of the foreign-born? (2) What further research may be needed? (3) How large a survey is needed? (4) Are any ongoing surveys appropriate for inserting a grouped answers question series (to avoid the cost of a new survey)? For this study, GAO consulted an independent statistician and other experts, performed test calculations, obtained documents, and interviewed officials and staff at federal agencies. The Census Bureau and DHS agreed with the main findings of this report. DHS agreed that the National Survey of Drug Use and Health is not an appropriate survey for inserting a grouped answers question series. The grouped answers approach is designed to ask foreign-born respondents about their immigration status in a personal-interview survey. Immigration statuses are grouped in Boxes A, B, and C on two different flash cards--with the undocumented status in Box B. Respondents are asked to pick the box that includes their current status and are told, "If it's in Box B, we don't want to know which specific category applies to you." The grouped answers approach is acceptable to many experts and immigrant advocates--with certain conditions, such as (for some advocates) private sector data collection. Most respondents tested did not object to picking a box. Research is needed to assess issues such as whether respondents pick the correct box. A sizable survey--roughly 6,000 or more respondents--would be needed for 95 percent confidence and a margin of error of (plus or minus) 3 percentage points. The ongoing surveys that GAO identified are not appropriate for collecting data on immigration status. (For example, one survey takes names and Social Security numbers, which might affect acceptance of immigration status questions.) Whether further research or implementation in a new survey would be justified depends on how policymakers weigh the need for such information against potential costs and the uncertainties of future research. Fri, 29 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061055.pdf The opportunity for employment is an important magnet attracting immigrants, including unauthorized immigrants, to countries. The policies and practices used by other countries to manage foreign workers, including actions to limit illegal immigration and to reduce the employment of unauthorized foreign workers, have been shaped by country-specific economic, demographic, and political factors. Immigration reform is a matter of continuing debate in the United States. This report examines selected countries' (1) programs for admitting foreign workers; (2) efforts to limit the employment of unauthorized foreign workers; and (3) programs for providing unauthorized immigrants with an opportunity to obtain legal status, referred to as regularization. To address these objectives, we examined reports from foreign countries, intergovernmental organizations, and research organizations. We also interviewed government officials and experts from 8 countries--Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom--and surveyed 6 other countries. We selected these countries based on their net immigration rate, population size, membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or World Bank classification as high income, range of immigration policies, and geographic location. The countries GAO studied have programs for admitting foreign workers, most of which are focused on recruiting high-skilled or seasonal foreign workers. To recruit foreign workers, some countries use bilateral agreements with other countries. For example, Canada uses bilateral agreements with Mexico and several Caribbean nations to recruit seasonal agricultural workers. Some countries manage foreign worker admissions by various means, such as quotas or points-based systems. However, officials stated that it is difficult to implement a system that responds to changing labor market needs and does not create incentives for employers to hire unauthorized foreign workers. Some countries regulate foreign worker admissions by specifying requirements for participation in a foreign worker program, such as work permit fees. Moreover, foreign worker programs differ in their requirements for workers to return home. Some temporary programs require workers to return upon expiration of work permits, while others allow foreign workers to renew their permits and apply for permanent resident status. The countries GAO studied use a variety of efforts in enforcing laws designed to limit the employment of unauthorized foreign workers. In some of these countries, employers are required to report workers' information to government agencies or to verify workers' authorization status. Among these countries, the employment of unauthorized foreign workers is largely considered one of several illegal labor practices, including failure to pay taxes or social insurance contributions, and government agencies generally focus their enforcement efforts and investigate employers to detect all such practices. Government officials and experts have noted that conducting frequent employer investigations and publicizing those investigations helps deter employers' hiring of unauthorized foreign workers. Countries can penalize unscrupulous employers for employing unauthorized foreign workers, including imposing monetary fines on employers. However, countries have faced difficulties, such as the prevalence of document fraud, in penalizing employers. Some countries have implemented large-scale regularization programs that allow unauthorized immigrants to apply for legal status on either a temporary or a permanent basis. Countries have implemented regularization programs for different reasons, such as to help reduce the size of the underground economy or to facilitate immigrant integration, and governments believe they derive some benefits from implementing these programs, such as increased collection of tax and social insurance contributions. Under these programs, countries require illegal immigrants to meet specified eligibility requirements, such as residency and work requirements, before applying for or receiving legal status. Employers and unauthorized foreign workers have incentives to participate in regularization programs but may not want to because, for example, some employers can save money by employing unauthorized foreign workers from whom they do not pay taxes or social insurance contributions. However, countries have faced difficulties in implementing these programs, such as in ensuring timely review of applications. Moreover, some experts have reported that regularization programs may attract further illegal immigration,while others have concluded that programs' effect on illegal immigration is unclear. Fri, 08 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06807.pdf Questions have been raised about whether parents with limited English proficiency are having difficulty accessing child care and early education programs for their children. Research suggests that quality early care experiences can greatly improve the school readiness of young children. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the participation of these children in programs funded through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and Head Start, (2) the challenges these families face in accessing programs, (3) assistance that selected state and local entities provide to them, and (4) actions taken by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure program access. To obtain this information, GAO analyzed program and national survey data, interviewed officials in 5 states and 11 counties, held 12 focus groups with mothers with limited English proficiency, and interviewed experts and HHS officials. HHS's Child Care Bureau (CCB) did not have information on the total enrollment in CCDF programs of children whose parents had limited English proficiency, but data collected by its Office of Head Start in 2003 showed that about 13 percent of parents whose children were in Head Start reported having limited English proficiency. The most recent (1998) national survey data showed that children of parents with limited English proficiency were less likely than other children to receive financial assistance for child care from a social service or welfare agency or to be in Head Start, after controlling for selected characteristics. Eighty-eight percent of these children were Hispanic, and their results differed from Asian children. Analysis of data from focus groups and site visit interviews held by GAO revealed that mothers with limited English proficiency faced multiple challenges, including lack of awareness of available assistance, language barriers during the application process, and difficulty communicating with English-speaking providers. Some of the challenges that low-income parents with limited English proficiency experienced, such as lack of transportation and shortage of subsidized child care slots, were common to other low-income families. The majority of state and local agencies that we visited offered some oral and written language assistance, such as bilingual staff or translated applications. Agencies in the majority of locations visited also made efforts to increase the supply of providers who could communicate with parents. Officials reported challenges in serving parents with limited English proficiency, such as difficulty hiring qualified bilingual staff. Some officials indicated that additional information on cost-effective strategies to serve this population would facilitate their efforts. HHS issued guidance, translated materials, and provided technical assistance to grantees to help them serve children of parents with limited English proficiency. The Office of Head Start reviewed programs' assessments of their communities' needs and conducted formal monitoring reviews, but could not ensure that review teams consistently assessed grantees' performance on the standards related to language access. CCB reviewed states' plans on the use of CCDF funds generally and investigated specific complaints, but had no mechanism for reviewing how and whether states provide access to CCDF subsidies for eligible children of parents with limited English proficiency. Thu, 17 Aug 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06949.pdf This is the Spanish Language summary of GAO-06-807. Questions have been raised about whether parents with limited English proficiency are having difficulty accessing child care and early education programs for their children. Research suggests that quality early care experiences can greatly improve the school readiness of young children. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the participation of these children in programs funded through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and Head Start, (2) the challenges these families face in accessing programs, (3) assistance that selected state and local entities provide to them, and (4) actions taken by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure program access. To obtain this information, GAO analyzed program and national survey data, interviewed officials in 5 states and 11 counties, held 12 focus groups with mothers with limited English proficiency, and interviewed experts and HHS officials. HHS's Child Care Bureau (CCB) did not have information on the total enrollment in CCDF programs of children whose parents had limited English proficiency, but data collected by its Office of Head Start in 2003 showed that about 13 percent of parents whose children were in Head Start reported having limited English proficiency. The most recent (1998) national survey data showed that children of parents with limited English proficiency were less likely than other children to receive financial assistance for child care from a social service or welfare agency or to be in Head Start, after controlling for selected characteristics. Eighty-eight percent of these children were Hispanic, and their results differed from Asian children. Analysis of data from focus groups and site visit interviews held by GAO revealed that mothers with limited English proficiency faced multiple challenges, including lack of awareness of available assistance, language barriers during the application process, and difficulty communicating with English-speaking providers. Some of the challenges that low-income parents with limited English proficiency experienced, such as lack of transportation and shortage of subsidized child care slots, were common to other low-income families. The majority of state and local agencies that we visited offered some oral and written language assistance, such as bilingual staff or translated applications. Agencies in the majority of locations visited also made efforts to increase the supply of providers who could communicate with parents. Officials reported challenges in serving parents with limited English proficiency, such as difficulty hiring qualified bilingual staff. Some officials indicated that additional information on cost-effective strategies to serve this population would facilitate their efforts. HHS issued guidance, translated materials, and provided technical assistance to grantees to help them serve children of parents with limited English proficiency. The Office of Head Start reviewed programs' assessments of their communities' needs and conducted formal monitoring reviews, but could not ensure that review teams consistently assessed grantees' performance on the standards related to language access. CCB reviewed states' plans on the use of CCDF funds generally and investigated specific complaints, but had no mechanism for reviewing how and whether states provide access to CCDF subsidies for eligible children of parents with limited English proficiency. Thu, 17 Aug 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06952.pdf This is the Vietnamese language summary of GAO-06-807. Questions have been raised about whether parents with limited English proficiency are having difficulty accessing child care and early education programs for their children. Research suggests that quality early care experiences can greatly improve the school readiness of young children. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the participation of these children in programs funded through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and Head Start, (2) the challenges these families face in accessing programs, (3) assistance that selected state and local entities provide to them, and (4) actions taken by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure program access. To obtain this information, GAO analyzed program and national survey data, interviewed officials in 5 states and 11 counties, held 12 focus groups with mothers with limited English proficiency, and interviewed experts and HHS officials. HHS's Child Care Bureau (CCB) did not have information on the total enrollment in CCDF programs of children whose parents had limited English proficiency, but data collected by its Office of Head Start in 2003 showed that about 13 percent of parents whose children were in Head Start reported having limited English proficiency. The most recent (1998) national survey data showed that children of parents with limited English proficiency were less likely than other children to receive financial assistance for child care from a social service or welfare agency or to be in Head Start, after controlling for selected characteristics. Eighty-eight percent of these children were Hispanic, and their results differed from Asian children. Analysis of data from focus groups and site visit interviews held by GAO revealed that mothers with limited English proficiency faced multiple challenges, including lack of awareness of available assistance, language barriers during the application process, and difficulty communicating with English-speaking providers. Some of the challenges that low-income parents with limited English proficiency experienced, such as lack of transportation and shortage of subsidized child care slots, were common to other low-income families. The majority of state and local agencies that we visited offered some oral and written language assistance, such as bilingual staff or translated applications. Agencies in the majority of locations visited also made efforts to increase the supply of providers who could communicate with parents. Officials reported challenges in serving parents with limited English proficiency, such as difficulty hiring qualified bilingual staff. Some officials indicated that additional information on cost-effective strategies to serve this population would facilitate their efforts. HHS issued guidance, translated materials, and provided technical assistance to grantees to help them serve children of parents with limited English proficiency. The Office of Head Start reviewed programs' assessments of their communities' needs and conducted formal monitoring reviews, but could not ensure that review teams consistently assessed grantees' performance on the standards related to language access. CCB reviewed states' plans on the use of CCDF funds generally and investigated specific complaints, but had no mechanism for reviewing how and whether states provide access to CCDF subsidies for eligible children of parents with limited English proficiency. Thu, 17 Aug 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06951.pdf This is the Korean language summary of GAO-06-807. Questions have been raised about whether parents with limited English proficiency are having difficulty accessing child care and early education programs for their children. Research suggests that quality early care experiences can greatly improve the school readiness of young children. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the participation of these children in programs funded through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and Head Start, (2) the challenges these families face in accessing programs, (3) assistance that selected state and local entities provide to them, and (4) actions taken by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure program access. To obtain this information, GAO analyzed program and national survey data, interviewed officials in 5 states and 11 counties, held 12 focus groups with mothers with limited English proficiency, and interviewed experts and HHS officials. HHS's Child Care Bureau (CCB) did not have information on the total enrollment in CCDF programs of children whose parents had limited English proficiency, but data collected by its Office of Head Start in 2003 showed that about 13 percent of parents whose children were in Head Start reported having limited English proficiency. The most recent (1998) national survey data showed that children of parents with limited English proficiency were less likely than other children to receive financial assistance for child care from a social service or welfare agency or to be in Head Start, after controlling for selected characteristics. Eighty-eight percent of these children were Hispanic, and their results differed from Asian children. Analysis of data from focus groups and site visit interviews held by GAO revealed that mothers with limited English proficiency faced multiple challenges, including lack of awareness of available assistance, language barriers during the application process, and difficulty communicating with English-speaking providers. Some of the challenges that low-income parents with limited English proficiency experienced, such as lack of transportation and shortage of subsidized child care slots, were common to other low-income families. The majority of state and local agencies that we visited offered some oral and written language assistance, such as bilingual staff or translated applications. Agencies in the majority of locations visited also made efforts to increase the supply of providers who could communicate with parents. Officials reported challenges in serving parents with limited English proficiency, such as difficulty hiring qualified bilingual staff. Some officials indicated that additional information on cost-effective strategies to serve this population would facilitate their efforts. HHS issued guidance, translated materials, and provided technical assistance to grantees to help them serve children of parents with limited English proficiency. The Office of Head Start reviewed programs' assessments of their communities' needs and conducted formal monitoring reviews, but could not ensure that review teams consistently assessed grantees' performance on the standards related to language access. CCB reviewed states' plans on the use of CCDF funds generally and investigated specific complaints, but had no mechanism for reviewing how and whether states provide access to CCDF subsidies for eligible children of parents with limited English proficiency. Thu, 17 Aug 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06950.pdf This is the Chinese language summary of GAO-06-807. Questions have been raised about whether parents with limited English proficiency are having difficulty accessing child care and early education programs for their children. Research suggests that quality early care experiences can greatly improve the school readiness of young children. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the participation of these children in programs funded through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and Head Start, (2) the challenges these families face in accessing programs, (3) assistance that selected state and local entities provide to them, and (4) actions taken by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to ensure program access. To obtain this information, GAO analyzed program and national survey data, interviewed officials in 5 states and 11 counties, held 12 focus groups with mothers with limited English proficiency, and interviewed experts and HHS officials. HHS's Child Care Bureau (CCB) did not have information on the total enrollment in CCDF programs of children whose parents had limited English proficiency, but data collected by its Office of Head Start in 2003 showed that about 13 percent of parents whose children were in Head Start reported having limited English proficiency. The most recent (1998) national survey data showed that children of parents with limited English proficiency were less likely than other children to receive financial assistance for child care from a social service or welfare agency or to be in Head Start, after controlling for selected characteristics. Eighty-eight percent of these children were Hispanic, and their results differed from Asian children. Analysis of data from focus groups and site visit interviews held by GAO revealed that mothers with limited English proficiency faced multiple challenges, including lack of awareness of available assistance, language barriers during the application process, and difficulty communicating with English-speaking providers. Some of the challenges that low-income parents with limited English proficiency experienced, such as lack of transportation and shortage of subsidized child care slots, were common to other low-income families. The majority of state and local agencies that we visited offered some oral and written language assistance, such as bilingual staff or translated applications. Agencies in the majority of locations visited also made efforts to increase the supply of providers who could communicate with parents. Officials reported challenges in serving parents with limited English proficiency, such as difficulty hiring qualified bilingual staff. Some officials indicated that additional information on cost-effective strategies to serve this population would facilitate their efforts. HHS issued guidance, translated materials, and provided technical assistance to grantees to help them serve children of parents with limited English proficiency. The Office of Head Start reviewed programs' assessments of their communities' needs and conducted formal monitoring reviews, but could not ensure that review teams consistently assessed grantees' performance on the standards related to language access. CCB reviewed states' plans on the use of CCDF funds generally and investigated specific complaints, but had no mechanism for reviewing how and whether states provide access to CCDF subsidies for eligible children of parents with limited English proficiency. Thu, 17 Aug 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06770.pdf Reports in recent years have indicated that increasing numbers of migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally die while crossing the southwest border. The Border Patrol implemented the Border Safety Initiative (BSI) in 1998 with the intention of reducing injuries and preventing deaths among migrants that attempt to cross the border illegally. GAO assessed: (1) Trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics of border-crossing deaths. (2) Differences among the Border Patrol sectors in implementing the BSI methodology. (3) The extent to which existing data allow for an evaluation of the effectiveness of the BSI and other efforts to prevent border-crossing deaths. GAO's analysis of data from the BSI, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), and studies of state vital registries shows consistent trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics of migrant border-crossing deaths that occurred along the southwest border between 1985 and 2005. Since 1995, the number of border-crossing deaths increased and by 2005 had more than doubled. This increase in deaths occurred despite the fact that, according to published estimates, there was not a corresponding increase in the number of illegal entries. Further, GAO's analysis also shows that more than three-fourths of the doubling in deaths along the southwest border since 1995 can be attributed to increases in deaths occurring in the Arizona desert. Differences among the BSI sector coordinators in collecting and recording data on border-crossing deaths may have resulted in the BSI data understating the number of deaths in some regions. Despite these differences, our analysis of the BSI data shows trends that are consistent with trends identified in the NCHS and state vital registry data. However, the Border Patrol needs to continue to improve its methods for collecting data in order to accurately record deaths as changes occur in the locations where migrants attempt to cross the border--and consequently where migrants die. Improved data collection would allow the Border Patrol to continue to use the data for making accurate planning and resource allocation decisions. Comprehensive evaluations of the BSI and other efforts by the Border Patrol to prevent border-crossing deaths are challenged by data and measurement limitations. However, the Border Patrol has not addressed these limitations to sufficiently support its assertions about the effectiveness of some of its efforts to reduce border-crossing deaths. For instance, it has not used multivariate statistical methods to control for the influences of measurable variables that could affect deaths, such as changes in the number of migrants attempting to cross the border. Tue, 15 Aug 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06771.pdf Within the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) is responsible for managing the 53 immigration courts located throughout the United States where over 200 immigration judges adjudicate individual cases involving alleged immigration law violations. This report addresses: (1) in recent years, what has been the trend in immigration courts' caseload; (2) how does OCIJ assign and manage the immigration court caseload; and (3) how does EOIR/OCIJ evaluate the immigration courts' performance? To address these issues, GAO interviewed EOIR officials; reviewed information on caseload trends, caseload management, and court evaluations; and analyzed caseload data, case completion goal data, and OCIJ court evaluation reports. From fiscal years 2000 to 2005, despite an increase in the number of immigration judges, the number of new cases filed in immigration courts outpaced cases completed. During this period, while the number of on-board judges increased about 3 percent, the courts' caseload climbed about 39 percent from about 381,000 cases to about 531,000 cases. The number of completed cases increased about 37 percent while newly filed cases grew about 44 percent. EOIR attributes this growth in part to enhanced border enforcement activities. The courts reduced the number of proceedings awaiting adjudication for more than 4 years, but did not meet their goal to complete all proceedings more than 3 years old by December 31, 2005. OCIJ relies primarily on an automated system to assign cases to immigration judges within a court. To balance the judges' caseload, OCIJ considers the number of newly filed cases and cases awaiting adjudication from prior years, historical data, and the type and complexity of cases. To manage its growing caseload, OCIJ, among other means, details judges from their assigned court to a court in need of assistance and uses available technology such as video conferencing. According to OCIJ, if it recognizes a pattern of sustained need, it recommends that EOIR establish a court in a new location. EOIR evaluates the performance of the immigration courts based on the immigration courts' success in meeting case completion goals. GAO's review of EOIR's quarterly reports on these goals identified a recurring inconsistency between reports as well as other inconsistencies. EOIR explained that these inconsistencies were due to a variety of factors, including the exemption of different categories of cases from the goals in different quarters, delays in data entry, and programming errors in the calculation of the data. Because EOIR has changed its criteria for cases covered by these goals and only maintained the queries for its current reporting process, GAO could not replicate past case completion reports to determine their accuracy. The inconsistencies indicate that EOIR should maintain appropriate documentation to demonstrate the reports' accuracy. Fri, 11 Aug 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06854.pdf The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. In fiscal year 2004, more than 15 million people entered the country under the program. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the risks that aliens would exploit the program to enter the United States became more of a concern. In this report, we (1) describe the Visa Waiver Program's benefits and risks, (2) examine the U.S. government's process for assessing potential risks, and (3) assess actions taken to mitigate these risks. We met with U.S. embassy officials in six program countries, and reviewed relevant laws, procedures, and reports on participating countries. The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits as well as some inherent risks. It facilitates travel for millions of people and eases consular workload, but poses challenges to border inspectors, who, when screening visa waiver travelers, may face language barriers or lack time to conduct in-depth interviews. Furthermore, stolen passports from visa waiver countries are prized travel documents among terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an additional risk. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has intercepted many fraudulent documents at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a stolen or lost passport from a visa waiver country. The U.S. government's process for assessing the risks of the Visa Waiver Program has weaknesses. In 2002, Congress mandated that, every 2 years, DHS review the effect that each country's continued participation in the program has on U.S. law enforcement and security interests, but did not set a reporting deadline. In 2004, DHS established a unit to oversee the program and conduct these reviews. We identified several problems with the 2004 review process, as key stakeholders were not consulted during portions of the process, preparation for the in-country site visits was not consistent, and the final reports were untimely. Furthermore, DHS cannot effectively achieve its mission to monitor and report on ongoing law enforcement and security concerns in visa waiver countries due to insufficient resources. DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the program's risks; however, the U.S. government has faced difficulties in further mitigating these risks. In particular, the department has not established time frames and operating procedures regarding timely stolen passport reporting--a program requirement since 2002. Furthermore, DHS has sought to require the reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the United States and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), but it has not issued clear reporting guidelines to participating countries. While most visa waiver countries participate with Interpol's database, four do not. DHS is not using Interpol's data to its full potential as a border screening tool because DHS does not automatically access the data at primary inspection. Fri, 28 Jul 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06835r.pdf The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa. The program was created to promote the effective use of government resources and to facilitate international travel without jeopardizing U.S. national security. Indeed, in fiscal year 2004, more than 15 million travelers entered the United States under this program. The United States last expanded the Visa Waiver Program's membership in 1999 with the addition of Portugal, Singapore, and Uruguay; in recent years, other countries have expressed a desire to become members. In addition, Members of Congress have recently introduced bills calling for the expansion of the program. In February 2005, President Bush announced that the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State (State) would develop a strategy, or "Road Map Initiative," to clarify to prospective candidates the statutory requirements for designation as a participating country--and work with countries to help them comply with these requirements. In response to a Congressional request, this report describes (1) the process for gaining admission into the Visa Waiver Program and (2) the U.S. government's plans for admitting additional countries into the program. To examine the criteria for expanding the Visa Waiver Program, we reviewed laws establishing the program, agency protocols governing the program, and DHS's Office of Inspector General reports. In addition, we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed DHS and Consular Affairs Bureau officials in Washington, D.C., to determine the status of the President's initiative. DHS is drafting procedures to help guide the process by which additional countries are admitted into the Visa Waiver Program. Until these procedures are finalized, DHS and State have an interim process. Specifically, under this interim process, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may designate any country as being a member of the Visa Wavier Program if that country qualifies under the program's statutory requirements. First, State advises DHS of its intent to nominate a country for inclusion in the program only after State has determined that the country meets key criteria for visa waiver designation. Then, according to DHS, the departments may agree to engage in a pre-nomination consultation process to ensure that all parties are in agreement before State submits its formal nomination. After receiving State's formal nomination, DHS, through an interagency working group, evaluates the effect that the country's designation would have on the law enforcement, security, and immigration interests of the United States. On the basis of the review, the interagency working group submits a recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security, who, in consultation with the Secretary of State, decides whether to admit the country into the program. Separately, on May 1 of each year, State must report, to Congress, those countries that are under consideration for inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program. The U.S. government has taken steps to assist countries seeking membership in the Visa Waiver Program. In February 2005, President Bush announced that the United States would develop bilateral strategies with 13 "Road Map" countries that are seeking admission into the Visa Waiver Program. In particular, DHS and State are working with these countries to make sure they understand the program's statutory requirements, and to agree on steps to help these countries meet the criteria. In 2005, State tasked U.S. embassies in aspiring countries to form working groups with the host governments to discuss the Road Map process. According to DHS, these groups met to develop plans that specify the actions that each country may need to take to be considered for program membership. For example, several countries agreed to launch public affairs campaigns to inform their citizens about the program's requirements. The plans also include actions that the embassies have agreed to take, such as providing technical assistance on statutory requirements. To further clarify the initiative's objectives, in May 2006, DHS and State jointly issued a series of cables to posts in Road Map countries with guidance on the types of issues that should be discussed in the bilateral working groups. As of June 2006, DHS and State have approved frameworks, (or road maps) for seven countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and South Korea. However, according to DHS and State's Consular Affairs Bureau, it is unlikely that many of the new countries will meet the statutory requirements for designation to the program in the near future. State did not submit a report to Congress on May 1, 2006, indicating that it was considering new members, and Consular Affairs Bureau officials stated that they are not actively considering expanding program membership or nominating specific countries for possible visa waiver designation. Fri, 28 Jul 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06814r.pdf To lawfully work in the United States, individuals must provide identification and evidence of work authorization to their employers. Individuals who are not U.S. citizens must have authorization to work from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Yet individuals without these required authorizations can gain employment using fraudulent documents containing fictitious information or information that belongs to someone else or by being hired by an employer who does not follow the law. In prior GAO work on these issues, we have reported that Social Security Administration (SSA) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data can be useful for identity and employment eligibility verification as well as to facilitate more effective worksite enforcement. However, the use of these data has drawbacks since they contain some erroneous information and information about hundreds of thousands or even millions of U.S. citizens and work-authorized aliens. Because the confidentiality of tax data is considered crucial to voluntary taxpayer compliance, IRS is restricted under Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code from sharing taxpayer information with third parties except in very limited circumstances. Currently, IRS is not authorized to share taxpayers' information for worksite enforcement efforts. However, SSA is authorized to provide DHS a specific data file that contains information compiled from employer earnings reports and SSA data. The House and the Senate are considering legislation to reform immigration laws and strengthen enforcement. As part of these deliberations, there are proposals to share earnings data with DHS for worksite enforcement. To better understand how such data could be used, the Subcommittees on Social Security and on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee requested that we assess DHS's use of the data it already receives from SSA and determine what changes or improvements could be made to effectively use earnings data for enforcement. In summary, sharing earnings data has the potential to assist DHS in detecting unauthorized work and enforcing immigration laws. However, DHS has not yet fully determined how it would use earnings data in a program of general worksite enforcement. As policymakers consider providing DHS additional earnings data, they should also consider how DHS would use these data and how DHS would safeguard taxpayer information. To address the subcommittees' request, we describe the earnings data that might be useful to DHS in its worksite enforcement efforts, highlighting both the benefits and the limitations associated with each source of data. Tue, 11 Jul 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06901t.pdf The H-1B visa program assists U.S. employers in temporarily filling certain occupations with highly-skilled foreign workers. There is considerable interest regarding how Labor, along with Homeland Security and Justice, is enforcing the requirements of the program. This testimony summarizes our report, GAO-06-720, that describes how Labor carries out its H-1B program responsibilities and how Labor works with other agencies involved in the H-1B program. While Labor's H-1B authority is limited in scope, it does not use its full authority to oversee employers' compliance with program requirements. Labor's review of employers' applications to hire H-1B workers is timely, but lacks quality assurance controls and may overlook some inaccuracies. From January 2002 through September 2005, Labor electronically reviewed more than 960,000 applications and certified almost all of them. Labor's review of the applications is limited by law to checking for missing information or obvious inaccuracies and does this through automated data checks. However, in our analysis of Labor's data, we found more than 3,000 applications that were certified even though the wage rate on the application was lower than the prevailing wage for that occupation. We also found approximately 1,000 certified applications that contained erroneous employer identification numbers, which raises questions about the validity of the applications. In its enforcement efforts, Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigates complaints made against H-1B employers. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, Labor reported an increase in the number of H-1B complaints and violations, and a corresponding increase in the number of employer penalties. In fiscal year 2000, Labor required employers to pay back wages totaling $1.2 million to 226 H-1B workers; by fiscal year 2005, back wage penalties had increased to $5.2 million for 604 workers. Program changes, such as a higher visa cap in some years, could have been a contributing factor. In April 2006, WHD began randomly investigating willful violators of the program's requirements. Labor uses education as its primary method of promoting compliance with the H-1B program by conducting compliance assistance programs and posting guidance on its web site. Labor, Homeland Security, and Justice all have responsibilities under the H-1B program, but Labor and Homeland Security face challenges sharing information. After Labor certifies an application, USCIS reviews it but cannot easily verify whether employers submitted petitions for more workers than originally requested on the application because USCIS's database cannot match each petition to Labor's application case number. Also, during the process of reviewing petitions, staff may find evidence that employers are not meeting their H-1B obligations. For example, Homeland Security may find that a worker's income on the W-2 is less than the wage quoted on the original application. USCIS may deny the petition if an employer is unable to explain the discrepancy, but it does not have a formal process for reporting the discrepancy to Labor. Moreover, current law precludes WHD from using this information to initiate an investigation of the employer. Labor also shares enforcement responsibilities with Justice, which pursues charges filed by U.S. workers who allege they were displaced by an H-1B worker. From 2000 through 2005, Justice found discriminatory conduct in 6 out of the 97 investigations closed, and assessed a total of $7,200 in penalties. Thu, 22 Jun 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06720.pdf The H-1B visa program assists U.S. employers in temporarily filling certain occupations with highly-skilled foreign workers. There is considerable interest regarding how Labor, along with Homeland Security and Justice, is enforcing the requirements of the program. This report describes: (1) how Labor carries out its H-1B program responsibilities; and (2) how Labor works with other agencies involved in the H-1B program. We interviewed officials and analyzed data from all three agencies. While Labor's H-1B authority is limited in scope, the agency could improve its oversight of employers' compliance with program requirements. Labor's review of employers' applications to hire H-1B workers is timely, but lacks quality assurance controls and may overlook some inaccuracies. From January 2002 through September 2005, Labor electronically reviewed more than 960,000 applications and certified almost all of them. About one-third of the applications were for workers in computer systems analysis and programming occupations. By statute, Labor's review of the applications is limited to searching for missing information or obvious inaccuracies and it does this through automated data checks. However, our analysis of Labor's data found certified applications with inaccurate information that could have been identified by more stringent checks. Although the overall percentage was small, we found 3,229 applications that were certified even though the wage rate on the application was lower than the prevailing wage for that occupation. Additionally, approximately 1,000 certified applications contained erroneous employer identification numbers, which raises questions about the validity of the application. In its enforcement efforts, Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigates complaints made against H-1B employers. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, Labor reported an increase in the number of H-1B complaints and violations, and a corresponding increase in the number of employer penalties. In fiscal year 2000 Labor required employers to pay back wages totaling $1.2 million to 226 H-1B workers; by fiscal year 2005, back wage penalties had increased to $5.2 million for 604 workers. Program changes, such as a higher visa cap in some years, could have been a contributing factor. In April 2006, WHD began the process of randomly investigating willful violators of the program's requirements. Labor, Homeland Security, and Justice all have responsibilities under the H-1B program, but Labor and Homeland Security could better address the challenges they face in sharing information. Homeland Security reviews Labor's certified application but cannot easily verify whether employers submitted petitions for more workers than originally requested on the application because USCIS's database cannot match each petition to Labor's application case number. Also, during the process of reviewing petitions, staff may find evidence that employers are not meeting their H-1B obligations. For example, Homeland Security may find that a worker's income on the W-2 is less than the wage quoted on the original application. Homeland Security may deny the petition if an employer is unable to explain the discrepancy, but it does not have a formal process for reporting the discrepancy to Labor. Additionally, current law precludes the Wage and Hour Division from using this information to initiate an investigation of the employer. Labor also shares enforcement responsibilities with Justice, which pursues charges filed by U.S. workers who allege they were displaced by an H-1B worker. From 2000 through 2005, Justice found discriminatory conduct in 6 out of the 97 investigations closed and assessed $7,200 in penalties. Thu, 22 Jun 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06895t.pdf The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal immigrants to the United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 established an employment eligibility verification process and a sanctions program for fining employers for noncompliance. Few modifications have been made to the verification process and sanctions program since 1986, and immigration experts state that a more reliable verification process and a strengthened worksite enforcement capacity are needed to help deter illegal immigration. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2005 report on the employment verification process and worksite enforcement efforts. In this testimony, GAO provides observations on (1) the current employment verification process and (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) priorities and resources for the worksite enforcement program and the challenges it faces in implementing that program. The current employment verification (Form I-9) process is based on employers' review of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed documents presented by their employees and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting the documents. However, document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) have undermined the employment verification process by making it difficult for employers who want to comply with the process to ensure they hire only authorized workers and easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers with little fear of sanction. In addition, the large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility has hindered employer verification efforts. In 1998, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of DHS, proposed revising the Form I-9 process, particularly to reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, but DHS has not yet finalized the proposal. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which participating employers electronically verify employees' work eligibility, shows promise to enhance the current employment verification process, help reduce document fraud, and assist ICE in better targeting its worksite enforcement efforts. Yet, several weaknesses in the pilot program's implementation, such as its inability to detect identity fraud and DHS delays in entering data into its databases, could adversely affect increased use of the pilot program, if not addressed. The worksite enforcement program has been a relatively low priority under both INS and ICE. Consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused worksite enforcement efforts mainly on detecting and removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally declined. According to ICE, this decline is due to various factors, such as the prevalence of document fraud that makes it difficult to prove employer violations. ICE officials told us that the agency has previously experienced difficulties in proving employer violations and setting and collecting fine amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. In April 2006, ICE announced a new interior enforcement strategy to target employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers by bringing criminal charges against them, and ICE has reported increases in the number of criminal arrests and indictments since fiscal year 2004. However, it is too early to tell what effect, if any, this new strategy will have on enhancing worksite enforcement efforts and identifying unauthorized workers and their employers. Mon, 19 Jun 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06735.pdf In fiscal year 2005, U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents filed about 730,000 petitions with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to sponsor noncitizen family members, including spouses, fiances, and children, to immigrate to the United States. Those doing the sponsoring are called petitioners; those benefiting from the sponsoring are called beneficiaries. If USCIS approves the petition, overseas beneficiaries must also file a visa application with the Department of State to enter the United States. In January 2002, USCIS started to conduct background security checks on all petitioners in addition to the beneficiaries. These background checks revealed that some of the petitioners had convictions for criminal sex offenses; further, some of those criminal sex offenders were filing family-based petitions for children (those under the age of 21). This report addresses the number of convicted sex offenders who filed family-based petitions in fiscal year 2005 based upon a computer match of USCIS data with individuals in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Sex Offender Registry and discusses USCIS's and the Department of State's framework for disclosing a sponsor's criminal sexual background to the beneficiary. DHS, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice reviewed a draft of this report. Only technical comments were provided and have been incorporated into this report. At least 398 convicted sex offenders filed a total of 420 petitions in fiscal year 2005 for spouses, fiances, children, and other relatives. Immigration law does not prohibit convicted sex offenders from petitioning to bring their spouses, fiances, or children into the United States and generally USCIS cannot deny a petition based solely on the fact that the petitioner is a convicted sex offender. The sex offenders were convicted of at least 411 sex-related crimes, including sexual assault and rape, according to data in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Sex Offender Registry. At least 45 convictions involved crimes against children. While most beneficiaries were spouses and fiances, criminal sex offenders petitioned for at least 60 children. According to USCIS and Department of State officials, an exception to the Privacy Act of 1974 gives them authority to disclose a petitioner's criminal sex offender history if there are "compelling circumstances affecting the health and safety" of the beneficiary. For certain noncitizen beneficiaries, disclosure of the petitioner's criminal background information is now mandatory based on new authority granted to USCIS and the Department of State. The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005 (IMBRA) requires disclosure of a U.S. citizen's criminal background information, including sex crimes, to certain prospective immigrants, essentially noncitizen fiances, but some spouses and minor children as well. Mandatory disclosure is not required for beneficiaries not covered by IMBRA, though these beneficiaries may receive information about a petitioner's criminal background on a discretionary basis under the Privacy Act exception. GAO estimates that IMBRA's mandatory disclosure requirement will cover about 20 percent of family-based beneficiaries based on fiscal year 2005 data. On May 3, 2006, USCIS issued interim guidance to its adjudicators on when it may be appropriate to disclose information related to a petitioner's criminal history under the "compelling circumstances" exception to the Privacy Act. USCIS plans to issue separate guidance related to disclosure requirements under IMBRA. Department of State officials said that they are preparing to issue Privacy Act disclosure guidance and are finalizing separate IMBRA disclosure guidance. Wed, 14 Jun 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06751r.pdf After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003, two legacy enforcement agencies--the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service (USCS)--were among the 22 federal agencies brought together within DHS. This transformation in turn merged the legacy INS and USCS investigators into the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Investigations (OI), and legacy INS and USCS inspectors, among others, into Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It has been nearly 3 years since the merger and efforts to integrate thousands of federal employees within ICE and CBP continue. Congress raised questions about ongoing human capital challenges brought about by the integration of legacy enforcement employees within ICE and CBP. In prior work, we have reported on the management and human capital challenges DHS faces as it merges the workforces of legacy agencies, including the need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the new agencies, the difficulty of legacy staff operating from separate locations, and how it decides to allocate investigative resources. This report addresses the following objectives: (1) How many investigative work years were dedicated to immigration enforcement activities for fiscal years 1999 through 2005? (2) What factors does ICE use as the basis for allocating its investigative resources? (3) What assessments do ICE and CBP use as a basis for making decisions on supervisory promotions? (4) Have ICE and CBP supervisory promotions been distributed between legacy INS and USCS staff in proportion to the supervisory staff each legacy agency brought to ICE and CBP? Investigative work years for immigration enforcement were generally declining under INS, but have increased since ICE was formed in 2003. Specifically, investigative work years for immigration enforcement under INS decreased by about 14 percent from fiscal years 1999 through 2002, and increased in fiscal year 2003. From fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2001, INS was having difficulty recruiting and retaining staff and INS experienced about an 8 to 9 percent annual attrition in investigative staff, which in part explains the decrease in work years during the 1999 through 2002 period. The number of investigative work years spent on immigration enforcement investigations rose by 2 percent in fiscal year 2004 and by 16 percent in fiscal year 2005. ICE uses a combination of factors to allocate its investigative resources, including whether an investigation indicates a potential threat to national security, the execution of special programs run out of headquarters divisions and units like Operation Community Shield, which targets violent street gang members, and carry-over legacy activities, such as support for implementation of the national drug control strategy. About half of ICE investigative resources were used for drug, financial (the criminal or civil violation of financial laws enforced by ICE, such as money laundering), and general alien (the varied criminal and administrative cases where the subject's alienage is a requirement of the offense) investigations in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. ICE and CBP supervisory promotion decisions are based on weighted assessments measuring supervisory skills as well as knowledge of investigative and inspectional procedures and laws. Assessments common to ICE and CBP that do not require specialized legacy agency knowledge and are evaluated through testing are Critical Thinking (logic and problem solving), Managerial Writing (written communication), and an In-basket Job Simulation (ability to prioritize and manage). The Job Knowledge Test in ICE measures knowledge of customs and immigration laws and general investigative procedures across the range of ICE investigative activities and is divided into equally weighted sections testing knowledge of smuggling and public safety, financial investigations, investigative services, national security investigations, and general criminal investigations techniques. CBP's Career Experience Inventory measures knowledge of customs and immigration laws and inspectional procedures as well as experience performing supervisory and management functions. We did not verify these assessments or test how well they measure the knowledge and skills they address. For one promotion cycle in ICE, legacy INS staff received about two-thirds of the total supervisory promotions to GS grades 14 and 15. In fiscal year 2004, ICE noncompetitively promoted more than 200 legacy INS GS-13 supervisors to GS-14 to bring about parity with legacy USCS supervisory investigators who were at the GS-14 grade level. Promotions were more proportional to existing on board distributions of legacy supervisory personnel in fiscal year 2005, that is, legacy INS supervisors constituted 34 percent of the GS-14 and -15 supervisors and received 36 percent of the promotions that year. At CBP, the distribution of GS-12 to -15 supervisory promotions for fiscal years 2004 through 2006 was generally proportional to the distribution of legacy staff in those positions at the start of each fiscal year. For example, in fiscal year 2004, legacy INS staff constituted 34 percent of the on board supervisors and received 30 percent of the promotions, while legacy USCS staff constituted 66 percent of the on board supervisors and received 70 percent of the promotions. Tue, 13 Jun 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06404.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a multibillion-dollar program--U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to control and monitor the pre-entry, entry, visa status, and exit of foreign visitors. To deliver system and other program capabilities, the program relies extensively on contractors, some of whom are managed directly by US-VISIT and some by other agencies (including both DHS agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection, and non-DHS agencies, such as the General Services Administration). Because of US-VISIT's heavy reliance on contractors to deliver program capabilities, GAO was asked to determine whether DHS has established and implemented effective controls for managing and overseeing US-VISIT-related contracts. US-VISIT-related contracts have not been effectively managed and overseen. The US-VISIT program office established and implemented certain nonfinancial controls for those contracts that it managed directly, such as verifying that contractor deliverables satisfied established requirements. However, it did not implement effective controls for overseeing its contracts managed by other DHS agencies and by non-DHS agencies. Moreover, effective financial controls were not in place on any contracts that GAO reviewed. The program office did not know the full extent of US-VISIT-related contract actions, and it had not performed key nonfinancial practices associated with understanding contractor performance in meeting the terms of these contracts. This oversight gap was exacerbated by the fact that the other agencies had not always established and implemented effective controls for managing their respective contracts. These other agencies directly managed more than half (56 percent) of the total US-VISIT-related contract obligations reported to GAO. The program office and other agencies did not implement effective financial controls. Without these controls, some agencies were unable to reliably report US-VISIT contracting expenditures. Further, the program office and these other agencies improperly paid and accounted for related invoices, including making duplicate payments and payments for non-US-VISIT services with funds designated for US-VISIT. According to the US-VISIT program official responsible for contract matters, the program office has focused on contracts that it manages directly and decided to rely on the responsible agencies to manage the other contracts. Further, it has decided to use other agencies to properly manage financial matters for their respective contracts, and it also decided to rely on another agency for its own financial management services. Without effective contract management and oversight controls, the program office does not know that required program deliverables and mission results will be produced on time and within budget, and that proper payments are made. Fri, 09 Jun 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06773t.pdf Many U.S. communities face difficulties attracting physicians to meet their health care needs. To address this problem, states and federal agencies have turned to foreign physicians who have just completed their graduate medical education in the United States under J-1 visas. Ordinarily, these physicians are required to return home after completing their education, but this requirement can be waived at the request of a state or federal agency if the physician agrees to practice in, or work at a facility that treats residents of, an underserved area. In 1996, GAO reported that J-1 visa waivers had become a major means of providing physicians for underserved areas, with over 1,300 requested in 1995. Since 2002, each state has been allotted 30 J-1 visa waivers per year, but some states have expressed interest in more. GAO was asked to report on its preliminary findings from ongoing work on (1) the number of J-1 visa waivers requested by states and federal agencies and (2) states' views on the 30-waiver limit and on their willingness to have unused waiver allotments redistributed. Such redistribution would require legislative action. GAO surveyed the 50 states, the District of Columbia, 3 U.S. insular areas--the 54 entities that are considered states for purposes of requesting J-1 visa waivers--and federal agencies about waivers they requested in fiscal years 2003-05. The use of J-1 visa waivers remains a major means of placing physicians in underserved areas of the United States. States and federal agencies reported requesting more than 1,000 waivers in each of the past 3 years. In contrast to a decade ago, states are now the primary source of waiver requests for physicians to practice in underserved areas, accounting for more than 90 percent of such waiver requests in fiscal year 2005. The number of waivers individual states requested that year, however, varied considerably. For example, about one-quarter of the states requested the maximum of 30 waivers, while slightly more than a quarter requested 10 or fewer. Regarding the annual limit on waivers, about 80 percent of the states--including many of those that requested the annual limit or close to it--reported the 30-waiver limit to be adequate for their needs. About 13 percent reported that this limit was less than adequate. Of the 44 states that did not always request the limit, 25 reported that they would be willing to have their unused waiver allotments redistributed, at least under certain circumstances. In contrast, another 14 states reported that they would not be willing to have their unused waiver allotments redistributed. These states cited concerns such as the possibility that physicians seeking waivers would wait until a redistribution period opened and apply to practice in preferred locations in other states. Thu, 18 May 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06196.pdf Continued high levels of unauthorized immigrant workers in the United States have fostered concerns about whether they should be eligible for Social Security benefits. Until recently, the Social Security Administration (SSA) allowed noncitizens to collect benefits, regardless of their work authorization status, provided that they met certain legal presence requirements. However, in March 2004, Congress passed the Social Security Protection Act, which under Section 211, requires that noncitizens assigned a Social Security number (SSN) after 2003 have work authorization from current or past qualifying work to collect benefits. This report describes (1) the steps SSA has taken to implement Section 211 and how effective SSA's policies and procedures are in preventing improper benefit decisions, and (2) how Section 211 has affected the payment of benefits to unauthorized workers. SSA has issued guidance and provided training to assist staff in processing benefit claims under Section 211, but the absence of certain internal controls has allowed some errors to go undetected. SSA issued detailed guidance in August 2004 and subsequently provided staff with training on the law, which some SSA field offices supplemented with additional training. Although SSA's policies and procedures were fairly detailed, GAO found several incorrect claims determinations and a lack of internal review for preventing them. With regard to the provisions of Section 211, GAO found that SSA improperly approved 17 of the 19 claims that involved noncitizen workers who had been issued SSNs after 2003 and who lacked required work authorization. GAO also found that 1 of the 41 claims that SSA disapproved was improper. SSA officials stated that the improper determinations were likely due to staff's unfamiliarity with the new requirements. In addition, GAO found that letters sent to claimants informing them of disapproval decisions did not always contain all required information. Because Section 211 does not apply to noncitizens who were assigned SSNs before 2004, few noncitizens have been affected by the law thus far. Only 41 (less than 1 percent) of the approximately 72,000 noncitizen-related claims SSA disapproved during 2004 and 2005 were due to Section 211. It is likely that the number of disapprovals based on the law will grow as more unauthorized workers file for benefits in coming years. However, opportunities may exist for certain noncitizens who receive their SSNs after 2003 to collect benefits without current work authorization. For example, noncitizens who are issued SSNs under temporary work visas may be able to engage in work not authorized under their visas and subsequently claim benefits based on that work. Although SSA officials told GAO the likelihood of this occurring was low, the SSA Inspector General reported in 2005 that a significant number of temporary visa holders overstayed their visas. Fri, 28 Apr 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06589r.pdf This report responds to certain requirements of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 that authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. Section 902(k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every 6 months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the number of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. Reports are to be provided until all applications have been finally adjudicated. This is our fourteenth report. Through March 31, 2006, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), had received a total of 39,850 HRIFA applications and had approved 15,369 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) had 1,869 applications filed and had approved 709 of them. Fri, 21 Apr 2006 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06375.pdf The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) relies on about 55 million paper-based files to adjudicate applications for immigration status and other benefits. Ensuring the currency and availability of these manual files, referred to as alien files, or A-Files, is a major challenge. To address this challenge, USCIS has initiated efforts, both long and near term, to automate the A-Files. The long-term effort is now being re-examined within the context of a larger USCIS organizational transformation initiative. In the near term, USCIS has begun a digitization program, which it estimates will cost about $190 million over an 8-year period to electronically scan existing paper files and store and share the scanned images. GAO was asked to determine whether USCIS was effectively managing its A-Files automation efforts. USCIS's effectiveness in managing its long-term effort for automating the A-Files cannot yet be determined because the scope, content, and approach for moving from paper-based to paperless A-Files has yet to be defined. Nevertheless, GAO believes that USCIS's recent decision to re-examine prior agency plans for a strategic A-Files automation solution within the context of an agencywide transformation strategy appropriately recognizes the integral support role that information technology plays in organizational and business transformation. GAO also believes that the success of USCIS's organizational transformation depends on other key supporting practices, such as having a comprehensive and integrated transformation plan (goals and schedules) and results-oriented performance measures. With respect to USCIS's near-term A-Files automation effort, known as the Integrated Digitization Document Management Program (IDDMP), effective planning is not occurring. In particular, USCIS has not developed a plan governing how it will manage this program and its contractors, and it has not developed an evaluation plan for its ongoing digitization concept of operations pilot test, even though it has either awarded or plans to award contracts totaling about $20 million for this pilot. In addition, USCIS officials told us they do not yet know which A-Files immigration forms will be scanned. Without a defined scope and adequate planning, this program is at risk of falling short of expectations. Fri, 31 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06210.pdf Remittances are the personal funds that the foreign born send to their home countries. In recent years, estimated remittances have grown dramatically, and policy makers have increased their attention to these flows. Organizations use various methodologies to estimate remittance flows, which result in a range of estimates. In 2004, the Group of Eight (G8) leaders emphasized the need for improved statistical data on remittances. In light of the growing volume of remittances and the differences in estimates, GAO examined (1) the methodology that the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses to develop the official U.S. estimate, (2) methodologies that other countries and multilateral organizations use to estimate remittances, and (3) international efforts to improve the collection and reporting of remittance data. BEA uses a model to estimate remittances from the United States and, although the methodology has some strengths, the accuracy of BEA's estimate is uncertain for several reasons. BEA estimated remittances for 2003 at $28.2 billion; its model used data on the number of foreign-born residents, their income, the proportion of income that is remitted, and other demographic data. The strengths of BEA's methodology are that, in theory, it estimates remittances sent through formal and informal channels. It also is low-cost because it uses existing data on the foreign born. However, BEA's methodology was limited by the quality and timeliness of the data, particularly on the portion of income likely to be remitted. BEA revised its model in 2005 to use new data sources, but the accuracy of its estimates depends on the accuracy of its assumptions regarding the remitting behavior of the foreign born and other factors. Some central banks and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) use different methodologies to provide estimates of remittances from the United States that vary significantly. For example, Mexico's central bank estimates remittances primarily by collecting data from money transmitters. The IDB used a variety of sources, such as surveys of remittance senders and receivers, and information from remittance transfer companies and central banks, to estimate remittances from the United States to Latin America to be $30.6 billion in 2003. We aggregated BEA's data to estimate remittances to this region to be $17.9 billion. BEA is an active participant in recent international efforts to improve remittance statistics. The World Bank and others established a remittances working group in 2005, which delegated tasks to other international groups to (1) clarify the definition of remittances and (2) provide guidance on how to collect and estimate remittances. BEA participated in the first group, which recommended a new definition of remittances. The second group will have its first meeting in June 2006. Tue, 28 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06462t.pdf Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States and reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism while ensuring its mandated customs, immigration, and federal protective enforcement functions are not diminished. The ICE Office of Investigations (OI) supports that mission by investigating customs and immigration violations. This testimony addresses the following key questions that were answered in GAO-06-48SU, a restricted report issued with the same title: (1) What structure and activities has OI adopted to address its mission? (2) In fiscal year 2004 and the first half of fiscal year 2005, how did OI use its investigative resources to achieve its goals? (3) How does OI ensure that its resource use contributes to its ability to prevent the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems? OI's organizational structure and investigative activities reflect those of its legacy agencies--the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service--and include activities to prevent terrorism. OI retained responsibility for enforcing customs and immigration laws, and its field structure was created by relying on the strategic priorities of its legacy agencies to determine the composition and locations of field offices. Senior OI officials said that OI seeks to accomplish its homeland security mission by focusing on cases that seem to have a connection to national security. Data from ICE's case management system indicate that its investigative activities generally relate to legacy missions, with about half of OI resources during fiscal year 2004 and the first half of 2005 used for cases related to drugs, financial crimes, and general alien investigations--investigations unlikely to contain a nexus to national security. Overall, between 10 and 15 percent of investigative resources were used for investigations considered to have a link to national security. OI's current method of tracking these cases captures data about the cases where a nexus to national security is assumed due to the nature of the violation, primarily investigations of munitions control, illegal exports, visa violations, and terrorism. Additionally, the equivalent of about 400 of its 5,600 special agents worked full time to identify incarcerated aliens who were eligible for removal from the United States, a function that does not require the skills and training of criminal investigators. ICE plans to free investigators for more appropriate duties by shifting these functions to other ICE units and to study whether other functions could be shifted to employees in a noninvestigatory job series. To make resource use decisions in pursuit of OI's goal to prevent the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems, OI primarily relies on the judgment of staff in its major field offices, in addition to national programs developed in headquarters that are implemented in multiple field offices. Although GAO found no evidence that OI has failed to investigate any national security-related lead that came to its attention, applying a risk management approach to determine what types of customs and immigration violations represent the greatest risks for exploitation by terrorists and other criminals could provide OI with greater assurance that it is focusing on preventing violations with the greatest potential for harm, while striking a balance among its various objectives. OI has taken some initial steps to introduce principles of risk management into its operations, but has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the customs and immigration systems to determine the greatest risks for exploitation, nor has OI analyzed all relevant data to inform the evaluation of alternatives and allow risk-based resource allocation decisions. OI also lacks outcome-based performance goals that relate to its objective of preventing the exploitation of these systemic vulnerabilities. Finally, OI does not have sufficient systems to help ensure ongoing monitoring and communication of vulnerabilities discovered during its investigations. Tue, 28 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06259.pdf In 2002, GAO reported that immigration benefit fraud was pervasive and significant and the approach to controlling it was fragmented. Experts believe that individuals ineligible for these benefits, including terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent means to enter or remain in the U.S. You asked that GAO evaluate U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's (USCIS) anti-fraud efforts. This report addresses the questions: (1) What do available data and information indicate regarding the nature and extent of fraud? (2) What actions has USCIS taken to improve its ability to detect fraud? (3) What actions does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take to sanction those who commit fraud? Although the full extent of benefit fraud is unknown, available evidence suggests that it is a serious problem. Several high-profile immigration benefit fraud cases shed light on aspects of its nature--particularly that it is accomplished by submitting fraudulent documents and can be facilitated by white collar and other criminals, with the potential for large profits. USCIS staff denied about 20,000 applications for fraud in fiscal year 2005. USCIS has established a focal point for immigration fraud, outlined a fraud control strategy that relies on the use of automation to detect fraud, and is performing risk assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud for certain benefits. However, USCIS has not implemented important aspects of internal control standards established by GAO and fraud control best practices identified by leading audit organizations--particularly a comprehensive risk management approach, a mechanism to ensure ongoing monitoring during the course of normal activities, clear communication regarding how to balance multiple objectives, mechanisms to help ensure that staff have access to key information, and performance goals for fraud prevention. DHS does not have a strategy for sanctioning fraud. Best practices advise that a credible sanctions program, which includes a mechanism for evaluating effectiveness, is an integral part of fraud control. Because most immigration benefit fraud is not prosecuted criminally, the principal means of sanctioning it would be administrative penalties. Although immigration law gives DHS the authority to levy administrative penalties, the component of DHS that administers them does not consider them to be cost-effective and does not routinely impose them. However, DHS has not evaluated the costs and benefits of sanctions, including the value of potential deterrence. Without a credible sanctions program, DHS's efforts to deter fraud may be less effective, when applicants perceive little threat of punishment. Fri, 10 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06253t.pdf In 2004, an estimated 35.7 million foreign-born people resided in the United States, and many legitimately have SSNs. Many of these individuals have Social Security numbers (SSNs) which can have a key role in verifying authorization to work in the United States. However, some foreign-born individuals have been given SSNs inappropriately. Recent legislation, aimed at protecting the SSN and preventing fraud and abuse, changes how the Social Security Administration (SSA) assigns numbers and awards benefits for foreign-born individuals. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security asked GAO to address two questions. First, how does SSA determine who is and is not eligible for an SSN? Second, how does SSA determine who is and is not eligible for Social Security benefits? SSA determines who is eligible for an SSN by verifying certain immigration documents and determining if an individual's card requires a work restriction. Some foreign-born individuals are eligible for one of three kinds of Social Security cards depending in part on their immigration status: (1) regular cards, (2) those valid for work only with authorization from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and (3) those that are not valid for work--non-work cards. As of 2003 SSA had issued slightly more than 7 million non-work cards to people who need them to receive benefits for which they were otherwise entitled. Both SSA's Inspector General and GAO have identified weaknesses in SSA procedures for assigning SSNs and issuing cards, also known as enumeration. For example, working undercover and posing as parents of newborns, GAO investigators were able to obtain Social Security cards by using counterfeit documents. Congress has enacted recent legislation strengthening the SSN enumeration process and documentation requirements. SSA is implementing the law and is improving document verification and now requires third-party verification of noncitizen documents such as birth certificates and visual inspection of documents before issuing an SSN. SSA also continues to strengthen program integrity by, for example, restricting the number of replacement cards. Congress and SSA have also improved laws and procedures designed to strengthen program integrity in the payment of benefits to the foreign-born. Due to provisions of the Social Security Protection Act of 2004, some foreign-born individuals who were not authorized to work will no longer be eligible for benefits. To be entitled to benefits, the law requires noncitizens originally assigned an SSN after 2003 to have a work-authorized SSN. Amendments to the Social Security Act in 1996 require individuals to be lawfully present in the U.S. to receive Social Security benefits, though some noncitizens can receive benefits while living abroad, such as noncitizens who have worked in the U.S. and in a country with which the U.S. has a totalization agreement. SSA's totalization agreements coordinate taxation and public pension benefits. The agreements help eliminate dual taxation and Social Security coverage that multinational employers and employees encounter when workers temporarily reside in a foreign country with its own Social Security program. Successful implementation of these agreements requires the countries involved to carefully coordinate and verify data they exchange. Computer matches with foreign countries, for example, may help protect totalization programs from making payments to ineligible individuals. SSA is exploring options for undertaking such exchanges. Thu, 02 Mar 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06295.pdf In September 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established America's Shield Initiative (ASI)--a program that included a system of sensors, cameras, and databases formerly known as the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS)--to detect, characterize, and deter illegal breaches to the northern and southern U.S. borders. The goals of the ASI program were to address ISIS capability limitations and support the department's antiterrorism mission. In April 2005, department officials told GAO that ISIS was subsumed within ASI. By congressional mandate, GAO reviewed the program to determine (1) the operational needs that ASI was intended to address and DHS's plans for ASI, (2) the steps that DHS had taken to ensure that ASI was aligned with the department's enterprise architecture, and (3) the actions that DHS had taken to establish the capability to effectively manage ASI. In written comments, DHS agreed with a draft of this report, stating that it was factually correct in virtually all aspects. DHS also commented that it has ceased work on ASI and redirected resources to its Secure Border Initiative. It also described program management corrective actions that it plans to implement. The ASI program defined the operational needs it expected ASI to meet, including addressing both known limitations in the ISIS and supporting counterterrorism efforts. The program also developed key planning documents for approval by the DHS Investment Review Board that were intended to meet these needs, including a program management plan, acquisition plan, and preliminary operational requirements document. However, these plans were not approved. The Review Board recently reviewed the ASI program and found, among other things, that it was aligned with the department's enterprise architecture. However, the reviews also determined that the program had not adequately defined its relationships and dependencies with other department programs. Subsequently, the DHS Deputy Secretary directed that the program be reevaluated within the department's broader border and interior enforcement strategy, now referred to as the Secure Border Initiative. The ASI program had not established the people and process capabilities required for effective program management. As of August 2005, it had filled 30 of its 47 program office positions, and it had defined roles and responsibilities for only 3 of them. In addition, while the program had defined and begun implementing a plan to manage program risks, it had not yet defined key acquisition management processes, such as effective project planning, and contract tracking and oversight. As a result, the program risked repeating the inadequate contract management oversight that led to a number of problems in deploying, and operating and maintaining ISIS technology. DHS's decision to reevaluate ASI was justified by the existence of unresolved key issues cited above (addressing its impact on other programs, and establishing people and process capabilities required for effective program management). These issues, if not addressed, would have introduced unnecessary risk. It is important that the department's reevaluation consider all such issues that could affect program success. Wed, 22 Feb 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06458t.pdf To lawfully work in the United States, individuals must have a valid Social Security number (SSN) and, if they are not citizens, authorization to work from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Noncitizens seeking work must provide both an SSN and evidence of work authorization to their employer. Yet individuals without these required authorizations have gained employment with false information. How these instances of unauthorized work can be identified or prevented challenges the federal agencies involved. Congress asked GAO to discuss how federal agencies can better share reported earnings data to identify unauthorized work. Specifically, this testimony addresses two issues: (1) the Social Security data that could help identify unauthorized employment and (2) coordination among certain federal agencies to improve the accuracy and usefulness of such data. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has two types of data that could be useful to reducing unauthorized work--individual Social Security records and earnings reports. Individual Social Security records, which include name, date of birth, and SSN, are used by SSA to provide verification services to employers wishing to assure themselves that the names and SSNs of their workers match SSA's records. SSA also uses Social Security records in a work authorization verification system developed by DHS called the Basic Pilot that offers electronic verification of worker status. These services are voluntary, and none are widely used by employers. SSA's earnings records provide additional information, which could be used as an enforcement tool to identify unauthorized work. Currently, SSA uses such records to produce two relevant files based on earnings records, which are the Nonwork Alien File and the Earnings Suspense File (ESF). The Nonwork Alien File contains earnings information posted to SSNs issued for nonwork purposes, suggesting that these individuals are working without authorization. The ESF contains earnings reports for which SSA is unable to match the name and SSN of the worker, suggesting employer error, SSN misuse, or unauthorized work activity. In addition, we have reported that the ESF, which contained roughly 250 million records as of December 2004, appears to include an increasing number of records associated with probable unauthorized work, but because of statutory constraints, the ESF is not available to DHS as an enforcement tool. Improving the usefulness of SSA data could help identify unauthorized work and ensure that limited enforcement resources are targeted effectively. Ensuring that the most useful data are available requires close coordination among the three federal agencies involved in collecting and using the data--SSA, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and DHS. We have previously recommended that IRS work with DHS and SSA as it considers strengthening its employer wage reporting regulations, as such action could improve the accuracy of reported wage data, and that DHS, with SSA, determine how best to use such wage data to identify potential illegal work activity. Efforts to improve data will only make a difference, however, if agencies work together to improve employer reporting and ensure they can conduct effective worksite enforcement programs. Thu, 16 Feb 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06296.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States. US-VISIT uses these identifiers (digital fingerscans and photographs) to screen persons against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. Visitors are also to confirm their departure by having their visas or passports scanned and undergoing fingerscanning at selected air and sea ports of entry (POE). GAO has made many recommendations to improve the program, all of which DHS has agreed to implement. GAO was asked to report on DHS's progress in responding to 18 of these recommendations. The current status of DHS's implementation of the 18 recommendations is mixed, but progress in critical areas has been slow. DHS has implemented 2 of the recommendations: it defined program staff positions, roles, and responsibilities, and it hired an independent verification and validation contractor. It has also taken steps to implement the other recommendations, partially completing 11 and beginning to implement another 5. In September 2003, GAO reported that the program had not assessed the costs and benefits of Increment 1 (which provides entry capabilities to air and sea POEs) and recommended that the program determine whether proposed increments will produce mission value commensurate with cost. In the latest cost-benefit analysis, dated June 23, 2005, the program identified potential costs and benefits for three alternatives for an air and sea exit solution. However, the analysis does not meet key Office of Management and Budget criteria; for example, it does not include a complete uncertainty analysis, which helps to provide decision makers with perspective on the potential variability of the cost and benefit estimates should circumstances change. GAO reported in May 2004 and February 2005 that system testing was not based on well-defined test plans and recommended that before testing begins, the program develop and approve test plans meeting certain criteria. However, although the latest test plan did cover many required areas (such as the tests to be performed), it did not adequately trace between test cases and the requirements to be verified by testing. Without complete and traceable test plans, the risk is increased that the deployed system will not perform as intended. In May 2004, GAO reported that the program had not assessed its workforce and facility needs for Increment 2B (which extends entry capabilities to the 50 busiest land POEs) and recommended that it do so. Since then, the program evaluated the processing times to issue and process entry/exit forms at 3 of the 50 busiest POEs and concluded that the results showed that no additional staff and only minor facilities modifications were required. However, the scope of the evaluation was limited. Since then, DHS has deployed and implemented Increment 2B capabilities to these 50 POEs, making the collection of predeployment baseline data for these sites impractical. Nonetheless, other alternatives, such as surveying site officials about the increment's impacts, have yet to be explored. Until they are, the program may not be able to accurately project resource needs or make any needed modifications to achieve its goals of minimizing US-VISIT's impact on POE operations, which was the impetus for GAO's recommendation. DHS attributed the pace of progress to competing demands on time and resources. The longer that US-VISIT takes to implement the recommendations, the greater the risk that the program will not meet its stated goals on time and within budget. Tue, 14 Feb 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06318t.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. US-VISIT uses these biometric identifiers (digital fingerscans and photographs) to screen persons against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. Visitors are also to confirm their departure by having their visas or passports scanned and undergoing fingerscanning at selected air and sea ports of entry. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the status of US-VISIT and (2) DHS progress in implementing recommendations that GAO made as part of its prior reviews of US-VISIT annual expenditure plans. The testimony is based on GAO's prior reports as well as ongoing work for the House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO's recommendations are directed at helping the department improve its capabilities to deliver US-VISIT capability and benefit expectations on time and within budget. According to DHS, the recommendations have made US-VISIT a stronger program. The US-VISIT program has met a number of demanding requirements that were mandated in legislation. A pre-entry screening capability is in place in overseas visa issuance offices, and an entry identification capability is operating at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry. This has been accomplished during a period of DHS-wide change, and has resulted in preventing criminal aliens from entering the country and potentially deterring others from even attempting to do so. Nevertheless, DHS has more to do to implement GAO recommendations aimed at better ensuring that US-VISIT is maximizing its potential for success and holding itself accountable for results. DHS has taken steps to address those GAO recommendations intended to ensure that US-VISIT as defined is the "right thing." For example, it is clarifying the strategic context within which US-VISIT is to operate, having drafted a strategic plan to show how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS's mission goals and operations and to provide an overall vision for immigration and border management. However, the plan has yet to be approved, causing its integration with other departmentwide border security initiatives to remain unclear. In addition, the department has analyzed the program's costs, benefits, and risks, but its analyses do not yet demonstrate that the program is producing or will produce mission value commensurate with expected costs and risks. In particular, the department's return-on-investment analyses for exit options do not demonstrate that these solutions will be cost-effective. DHS has also taken steps to address those GAO recommendations aimed at ensuring that the program is executed in the "right way." The department has made good progress in establishing the program's human capital capabilities, which should help ensure that it has sufficient staff with the necessary skills and abilities. This is particularly important in light of the program's more limited progress in establishing capabilities in certain program management process areas, such as test management. For example, a test plan used in a recent system acceptance test did not adequately trace between test cases and the requirements to be verified by testing. Incomplete test plans reduce assurance that systems will perform as intended once they are deployed. DHS also has begun addressing GAO's recommendations to establish accountability for program performance and results, but more needs to be done. For example, DHS's expenditure plans have not described progress against commitments made in previous plans. Unless performance against commitments is measured and disclosed, the ability to manage and oversee the program will suffer. The longer the program proceeds without fully addressing GAO's recommendations, the greater the risk that it will not deliver promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Wed, 25 Jan 2006 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06229r.pdf The Secretary of Treasury, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is required to annually prepare and submit audited financial statements of the U.S. government to the President and Congress. We are required to audit these consolidated financial statements (CFS) and report on the results of our work. An issue meriting concern and close scrutiny that emerged during our fiscal year 2004 CFS audit was the growing number of Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies that restated certain of their financial statements for fiscal year 2003 to correct errors. Errors in financial statements can result from mathematical mistakes, mistakes in the application of accounting principles, or oversight or misuse of facts that existed at the time the financial statements were prepared. Frequent restatements to correct errors can undermine public trust and confidence in both the entity and all responsible parties. Further, when restatements do occur, it is important that financial statements clearly communicate, and readers of the restated financial statements understand, that the financial statements originally issued by management in the previous year and the opinion thereon should no longer be relied on and instead the restated financial statements and related auditor's opinion should be used. Because of the varying nature and circumstances surrounding the restatements, we are issuing a number of separate reports on the matter. This report communicates our observations regarding the National Science Foundation's (NSF) fiscal year 2003 restatements. Going forward, we hope that the lessons learned from the fiscal year 2003 restatements, together with our recommendations, will help (1) NSF avoid the need for restatements to its future financial statements and (2) ensure that NSF's auditor applies appropriate audit procedures in future audits to test for unrecorded and unbilled licensee fees and related internal controls. We reviewed four key areas with respect to the restatements of NSF's fiscal year 2003 financial statements: (1) the nature and cause of the errors that necessitated the restatements, including planned corrective actions by the agency and its auditors; (2) the timing of communicating the material misstatement to users of the financial statements; (3) the extent of transparency exhibited in disclosing the nature and impact of the material misstatement in the financial statements and the reissued auditor's report; and (4) audit issues that contributed to the failure to detect the errors that necessitated the restatements during the audit of the agency's fiscal year 2003 financial statements. Failure to properly record the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fees (H-1B) account funds for fiscal years 1999 through 2003 led to the material misstatement of about $216 million that necessitated the restatements of NSF's originally issued fiscal year 2003 Balance Sheet and Statement of Changes in Net Position. According to the NSF contracted independent public accountant's (IPA) management letter report dated November 4, 2004, NSF's Division of Financial Management (DFM) did not have adequate internal controls to ensure that it provided accurate financial data, which may have contributed to the recording error that necessitated the restatements. NSF's IPA did not discover the error during its audit of NSF's fiscal year 2003 financial statements. In our view, the IPA did not understand that the H-1B account funds are special funds, which are to be accounted for differently than certain other NSF receipts. In addition, we found that the IPA was not aware of the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS) guidance relating to the recording of H-1B account funds. Consequently, the IPA did not design or perform adequate audit procedures to detect the accounting errors. We are making a recommendation to NSF's CFO to address the issues we identified with respect to the H-1B account funds recording error that necessitated the fiscal year 2003 restatements. We are also making a recommendation to NSF's Inspector General to work with the IPA so that audit procedures to detect any future material H-1B account funds recording errors are fully and effectively implemented. In commenting on a draft of this report, the NSF's CFO and Inspector General, in separate letters, offered their views regarding the materiality of the errors and the impact of the errors on Net Position. We have clarified our perspective on both points. The report notes that the recording errors in individual years may not have been material, but that the cumulative effect of the errors on the fiscal year 2003 financial statements was deemed material by NSF's IPA. We also note that Total Net Position was unchanged, but that the two distinct components of net position, were misstated. NSF's Inspector General concurred with our recommendation and stated that her office had instituted procedures to ensure that the IPA designed and performed audit steps to detect any future H-1B account fund recording errors. Thu, 22 Dec 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0620.pdf Long-standing backlogs of immigration benefit applications result in delays for immigrants, their families, and prospective employers who participate in the legal immigration process. In response to a statutory mandate to eliminate the backlog, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) set a goal of September 30, 2006, to eliminate the backlog and adjudicate all applications within 6 months. This report examines (1) the status of the backlog, (2) actions to achieve backlog elimination and prevent future backlogs, (3) the likelihood of eliminating the backlog by the deadline, and (4) USCIS's quality assurance programs to achieve consistency of decisions while eliminating its backlog. By June 2005, USCIS estimated it had reduced its backlog from a peak of 3.8 million cases to about 1.2 million. However, this estimate is not a measure of the number of pending cases older than 6 months--the definition of backlog used by the Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvements Act of 2000. USCIS's current data systems cannot provide precise data on the age of all application types. A proposed technology transformation offers an opportunity to develop a case management system with this capability. USCIS has reduced its backlog mainly by increasing and realigning staff. To prevent future backlogs, USCIS will rely on additional staffing reallocation and technology transformation. However, the technology plan is in the early planning stages, and USCIS has not finalized its estimated cost or identified the gains it could yield. Despite progress, it is unlikely that USCIS will completely eliminate the backlog by the 2006 deadline. While it met fiscal year 2006 targets for half of the 15 backlogged application types, USCIS may have difficulty eliminating its backlog for two complex application types that constitute nearly three-quarters of the backlog. A backlog may also remain in offices where the volume of cases exceeds adjudicator staff capacity. Other factors, such as lengthy background checks, could also hinder USCIS's ability to achieve and maintain its backlog elimination goals. USCIS officials noted that its current plan is premised on current legislation and would be affected by proposed legislative changes that could impose additional demands on the agency. Aside from regular supervisory review, USCIS operates two programs to ensure the quality of its postadjudication decisions, yet neither program provides a systematic and inclusive review of all application types. One program reviews adjudicators' compliance with standard processes for two application types, and the other evaluates compliance with standard processes and the reasonableness of decisions rendered, but only for selected applications processed in four centers. Mon, 21 Nov 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06204.pdf Remittances are personal funds immigrants send to their home countries. The United States is the largest remittance-sending country in the world, with more than $36 billion remitted in 2003, according to the International Monetary Fund. The majority of these remittances are sent to Latin America and the Caribbean and they are a very important source of financial flows to many countries. In 2004, the United States, with other countries, pledged to reduce fees for remittances. Remittance senders in the United States can send funds through entities in the formal financial sector such as money transfer operators, banks, and credit unions or other informal means such as couriers. This report provides information on (1) the methods of transmission available to remittance senders in the formal financial sector and the advantages and disadvantages of each, (2) the costs to send remittances through the formal financial sector, and (3) disclosures remittance providers typically provide to senders. Remittance senders in the United States have a range of methods available including money transfer operators (MTOs), banks, credit unions, and the United States Postal Service. However, most transactions occur through MTOs. These products range from cash-to-cash wire transfers to account-based transfers, stored value cards, and Internet-based transactions. There are a number of reasons remittance senders continue to choose MTOs over other providers, including their extensive networks and customers' familiarity with their products. Banks and credit unions offer some products at lower cost and the advantage of access to other financial services. However, limited banking hours, language barriers, or inconvenient locations may make it difficult for some remittance senders to use these services. Recently, some federal banking agencies have undertaken initiatives to move more remittances through banks and credit unions and bring these senders into the financial mainstream. Research shows that competition in the remittance market has resulted in a drop in the cost of remittances from the United States to Latin America and the Caribbean. The standard costs to a remittance sender are the transfer fee and the foreign exchange conversion fee. The costs vary for different products. For example, on average, most providers we spoke with charge approximately $10 to send $300 to Mexico using the cash-to-cash method, while providers charge less for products such as dual-ATM cards. Disclosures we reviewed from remittance providers included information on the transfer fee, the exchange rate, and the right to a refund. The way this information is presented varies by provider, and a sender may have to do additional work to compare costs across different providers. Some efforts are under way to provide consumers with more aggregate information on the cost of remittances across different providers and products. Thu, 17 Nov 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06122r.pdf This report responds to certain requirements of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 that authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. Section 902(k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every 6 months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to lawful permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the number of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. Reports are to be provided until all applications have been finally adjudicated. This is our thirteenth report. Through September 30, 2005, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), had received a total of 39,524 HRIFA applications and had approved 14,050 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) had 1,792 applications filed and had approved 656 of them. Fri, 21 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06133.pdf U.S. intercountry adoptions nearly tripled from more than 8,000 to more than 22,000 between fiscal years 1994 and 2004. While the Department of State (State) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) manage the process, factors ranging from corruption to inadequate legal frameworks in foreign countries could lead to abuses such as the abduction of children. GAO (1) describes the U.S. intercountry adoption process, (2) assesses the U.S. government's efforts to manage the intercountry adoption process, (3) assesses U.S. efforts to strengthen safeguards and mitigate against the potential for fraudulent adoptions, and (4) describes the Hague Convention (Convention) and the statuses of U.S. and top sending countries' implementation of the Convention. Adoptive parents must meet domestic and foreign government requirements to complete intercountry adoptions. However, factors such as foreign governments' procedures may contribute to varying time frames for adoptions. USCIS and State are the domestic agencies responsible for intercountry adoptions. USCIS and State made efforts to enhance the process by improving interagency coordination and communication with parents and developing additional guidance on adoptions. In addition, USCIS streamlined the intercountry adoption process by eliminating the application and fees for parents to obtain U.S. citizenship certificates for eligible children. While USCIS has taken measures to review the quality of the adoptions process, GAO found that the agency does not have a formal quality assurance program in place where results are summarized and reported to senior agency officials so that an assessment of the quality of the intercountry adoption process can be made over time. Factors in foreign countries' environments may allow for abuses in adoptions. To reduce the likelihood of such abuses, USCIS and State have taken such steps as holding diplomatic discussions with foreign governments and imposing additional U.S. procedural requirements. However, USCIS has not established a formal and systematic process for documenting specific incidents of problems in foreign countries. Such a process would allow for a systematic approach to analyze problematic trends and retain institutional knowledge. The Hague Convention governing intercountry adoptions establishes minimum standards designed to help alleviate some of the risk associated with the adoption process. The United States has signed the Convention and taken several steps toward implementing the Convention; however, key steps remain, including formal ratification of the Convention. Since its creation, 66 countries (which represented about 39 percent of all U.S. intercountry adoptions in fiscal year 2004) have ratified the Convention. Fri, 21 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06106.pdf Exchange programs, which bring over 280,000 foreign visitors to the United States annually, are widely recognized as an effective way to expose citizens of other countries to the American people and culture. Past GAO and the Department of State (State) Office of Inspector General reviews have reported that some exchange visitors have participated in unauthorized activities and cited problems in the management and oversight of the programs. Strong management oversight is needed to ensure that the programs operate as intended and are not abused. This report examines how State manages the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs to ensure that only authorized activities are carried out under the programs and identifies potential risks of the programs and the data available to assess these risks. State has not exerted sufficient management oversight of the Summer Work Travel and the Trainee programs to guard against abuse of the programs and has been slow to address program deficiencies. State attempts to ensure compliance with program regulations through its processes of approving and annually reviewing the organizations that sponsor exchange visitors. These processes, however, are not sufficient to ensure that visitors participate only in authorized activities because the procedures consist primarily of document reviews, and State rarely visits the sponsors or host employers of the exchange visitors to make sure they are following the rules to investigate complaints. Moreover, some sponsors have asserted that the program regulations need updating. Further, State officials believe that the sanctions provided in the regulations are difficult to enforce. State acknowledged that it has been slow to address identified deficiencies and update the regulations, but had indicated that it is beginning to revise the regulations and is establishing a unit to monitor exchange activities. However funding of the unit has not been secured. A number of potential risks are associated with the programs, including that exchange visitors might use it to remain in the United States beyond their authorized time. There is also the potential for the Trainee Program to be misused as an employment program. Further, negative experiences for exchange participants could undermine the purpose of the programs. However, State has little data to measure whether such risks to the program are significant. As a result, State cannot determine if additional management actions are needed to mitigate the risks. Fri, 14 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06100.pdf In 2000, federal agencies estimated they saved at least $900 million annually through data sharing initiatives. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can use data from taxpayers and third parties to better ensure taxpayers meet their obligations. Likewise, Congress has authorized certain agencies access to taxpayer information collected by IRS to better determine benefit eligibility. In July 2004, we reported that data sharing between IRS and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has the potential to improve tax compliance as well as immigration eligibility decisions (GAO-04-972T). For this report, GAO determined (1) the potential benefits of data matching, and (2) the options and associated challenges. Data sharing can help improve (1) tax compliance if businesses applying to sponsor immigrant workers are required to meet tax filing and payment requirements, and (2) the accuracy and timeliness of USCIS's immigration eligibility decisions if it obtained tax data from IRS to help ensure business sponsors meet eligibility criteria. As of December 2003, IRS databases showed 18,942 businesses (5 percent) applying to sponsor immigrant workers had $5.6 billion in unpaid assessments. Of this amount, businesses were not in installment agreements with IRS or otherwise making payments on $3.7 billion. If future business sponsors owe taxes and are required to meet their tax obligations, they would need to make arrangements with the IRS to come into compliance. Although USCIS officials acknowledge that no explicit prohibition exists in immigration laws against conditioning approval of employer applications on their tax compliance, USCIS officials said a statutory change is preferable because they have legal concerns about USCIS's authority to issue such a regulation absent specific authority. IRS data can help USCIS make more accurate eligibility decisions by better identifying businesses that may not have met eligibility criteria due to having unpaid assessments or not filing returns. In our nationwide selection, 67,949 of 413,723 (16 percent) business sponsors were in IRS's nonfiler database at the time of their application. A variety of options is available to IRS and USCIS for establishing and implementing data sharing. An applicant-initiated data-sharing arrangement could be implemented under existing Internal Revenue Code authority through taxpayer consent, whereby taxpayers authorize IRS to disclose their information. USCIS then could verify applicant-provided data by obtaining tax returns or tax transcripts. Treasury guidance suggests a small-scale pilot using consents as a way to make the business case for continued access to taxpayer information. In general, the more that data sharing could be done electronically, the more efficient the data sharing could be. However, achieving electronic data sharing may take longer than paper-based processes due to legal, technological, and cost challenges. Further, if business sponsors need to come into compliance, net tax collections might not increase if collecting their taxes displaces other IRS work. Establishing user fees to cover data-sharing costs could be a way to fund data sharing, but IRS lacks the authority to collect and retain a user fee to cover compliance-related costs associated with data sharing. Tue, 11 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06115.pdf Issuing a U.S. visa to a foreign citizen in exchange for money or something of value is a crime that can facilitate entry into the United States of unqualified persons, including those who may wish to do our country harm. Internal controls make it difficult for an employee to commit visa malfeasance without being detected, but, despite these safeguards, visa malfeasance does occur. GAO examined (1) State's internal controls to prevent nonimmigrant visa malfeasance and if they are being implemented and (2) visa malfeasance cases from 2001-2004 and factors cited by State and the Department of Justice (Justice) that contributed to visa malfeasance and affected investigations and prosecutions. State has a set of internal controls to prevent visa malfeasance and has taken actions to improve them; however, these internal controls are not being fully and consistently implemented by the posts we visited. While State's controls are consistent with accepted control standards, we found noncompliance with required supervisory oversight at 6 of the 11 posts we visited. This included failure to inventory items used to issue visas, review visa decisions, and follow State's procedures when issuing visas for applicants referred by officers within the post. Lack of full compliance with internal controls increases vulnerability to visa malfeasance. State recently established two headquarters entities to monitor post visa operations. While stronger oversight should help strengthen compliance with internal controls, State has not developed automated software to sort and analyze abnormalities in visa issuances that could indicate potential malfeasance. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security substantiated 28 visa malfeasance cases between 2001 and 2004 involving U.S. employees. The suspects were fired, chose to resign, or were arrested. State investigators could not tell us how many opened cases were referred to Justice for possible prosecution because they had not been routinely collecting that information. In fact, their case records did not permit investigators to identify malfeasance trends or consular managers to identify internal control weaknesses needing attention. Justice's Public Integrity Section successfully prosecuted 10 U.S. government employees. State Diplomatic Security and Justice officials noted that their investigations and prosecutions were impeded by constraints on evidence gathering. Additionally, investigators can not obtain U.S. search warrants to search consular officer's offices or residences overseas. Justice and State are discussing the possibility of pursuing legal changes and other means to address these constraints. Thu, 06 Oct 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05813.pdf The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal immigrants to the United States. Immigration experts state that strategies to deter illegal immigration require both a reliable employment eligibility verification process and a worksite enforcement capacity to ensure that employers comply with immigration-related employment laws. This report examines (1) the current employment verification (Form I-9) process and challenges, if any, facing verification; and (2) the priorities and resources of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) worksite enforcement program and any challenges in implementing the program. The current employment verification process is based on employers' review of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed employees' documents and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. However, various studies have shown that document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with the employment verification process to hire only authorized workers and easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility have also hindered verification efforts. In 1997, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued an interim rule on a reduction in the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed a further reduction, but this proposal has not yet been finalized. DHS is currently reviewing the list of acceptable work eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame for completing this review. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which participating employers electronically verify employees' work eligibility, has potential to help enhance the verification process and substantially reduce document fraud. Yet, current weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the program to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its databases, and some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements could, if not addressed, have a significant impact on the program's success. Furthermore, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials stated that the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely verifications if the number of employers using the program significantly increased. Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE, worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent with DHS's mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites to help address those sites' vulnerabilities. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally declined, according to ICE, due to various factors such as document fraud, which makes it difficult to prove employer violations. ICE has not yet developed outcome goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program, which, given limited resources and competing priorities for those resources, may hinder ICE's efforts to determine resources needed for the program. Wed, 31 Aug 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05435.pdf The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), aims to apprehend persons who illegally enter the United States between official ports of entry, including potential terrorists, aliens, and contraband smugglers, thereby deterring or stopping illegal activity. The Patrol operates permanent and tactical (temporary) interior traffic checkpoints on major and secondary U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur, as part of a multi-layer strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal entrants. This report addresses (1) the role of interior checkpoints in the Patrol's strategy; (2) what is known about checkpoint costs and benefits; and (3) how checkpoints are evaluated and what performance measures indicate regarding their effectiveness. The Border Patrol operates 33 permanent traffic checkpoints in 8 of its 9 sectors in the southwest border states, supported by tactical checkpoints. While permanent checkpoints have the advantage of physical infrastructure, tactical ones have the mobility to block routes used to evade permanent ones and to respond to intelligence on illegal activity. A third type of checkpoint operates in the Tucson, Ariz., sector, where the Patrol has been legislatively prohibited from funding construction of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999. This restriction has prevented checkpoint construction. The Patrol also began closing or relocating checkpoints in the sector every 7 days at the instruction of congressional staff in June 2002, and was legislatively required to relocate checkpoints on the same schedule in FY 2003 and 2004, and an average of once every 14 days in FY 2005. Three of six checkpoints in the sector had to close for 7/14 days, as safety considerations made it too hazardous to relocate them. Local law enforcement and business and community leaders we interviewed from communities near interior traffic checkpoints said that benefits resulting from checkpoint operations included reductions in crime and vandalism. Although a few cited traffic delays, most were supportive of checkpoint operations. However, some others were concerned about the impact of the checkpoints on traffic congestion and quality of life in their communities. The Border Patrol does not routinely evaluate the effectiveness of checkpoint operations, or their costs. The Patrol includes limited traditional performance measures in its Performance and Annual Report, such as apprehensions and contraband seized. GAO developed an apprehension per agent work year measure to assess performance. The data suggest that the performance of the Tucson sector interior checkpoints dropped starting in FY 2002, and more in FY 2003, after the Border Patrol began relocating or closing them on a regular basis. Three other sectors we visited that did not have to relocate or close checkpoints experienced no comparable decrease in apprehensions per agent work year during the same time period. Other factors not measured or accounted for might also have contributed to these outcomes, but the Border Patrol's limited measures do not capture or assess them. A broader range of performance measures, when considered with other indicators, could be useful to CBP and the Congress as they consider ways to improve the effectiveness of interior traffic checkpoints and border security efforts. Fri, 22 Jul 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05892t.pdf Globally, alien smuggling generates billions of dollars in illicit revenues annually and poses a threat to the nation's security. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003 has provided an opportunity to use financial investigative techniques to combat alien smugglers by targeting and seizing their monetary assets. For instance, the composition of DHS's largest investigative component--U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--includes the legacy Customs Service, which has extensive experience with money laundering and other financial crimes. Another DHS component, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has primary responsibility for interdictions between ports of entry. In summer 2003, ICE announced that it was developing a national strategy for combating alien smuggling. This testimony is based on GAO's May 2005 report on the implementation status of the strategy and investigative results in terms of convictions and seized assets. As of July 5, 2005, ICE had not finalized its strategy for combating alien smuggling. ICE was adjusting the draft strategy to focus on the southwest border and encompass all aspects of smuggling, aliens as well as drugs and other contraband. In adjusting the strategy, ICE officials stressed the importance of incorporating lessons learned from ongoing follow-the-money approaches such as Operation ICE Storm, a multi-agency task force launched in October 2003 to crack down on migrant smuggling and related violence in Arizona. Also, the strategy's effectiveness depends partly on having clearly defined roles and responsibilities for ICE and CBP, two DHS components that have complementary antismuggling missions. CBP is primarily responsible for interdictions between ports of entry and ICE for investigations that extend to the U.S. interior. In this regard, ICE and CBP signed a memorandum of understanding in November 2004 to address their respective roles and responsibilities, including provisions for sharing information and intelligence. Currently, however, there is no mechanism in place for tracking the number and the results of referrals made by CBP to ICE for investigation. CBP and ICE officials acknowledged that establishing a tracking mechanism could have benefits for both DHS components. Such a mechanism would help ICE ensure that appropriate action is taken on the referrals. Also, CBP could continue to pursue certain leads if ICE--for lack of available resources or other reasons--cannot take action on the referrals. In fiscal year 2004, about 2,400 criminal defendants were convicted in federal district courts under the primary alien-smuggling statute, and ICE reported seizures totaling $7.3 million from its alien-smuggling investigations. For the first 6 months of fiscal year 2005, ICE reported $7.8 million in seizures from alien-smuggling investigations. A concern raised by ICE and the Department of Justice is the lack of adequate statutory civil forfeiture authority for seizing real property, such as "stash" houses where smugglers hide aliens while awaiting payment and travel arrangements to final destinations throughout the nation. However, Justice does not have a legislative proposal on this subject pending before Congress because the department's legislative policy resources have been focused on other priorities. Tue, 12 Jul 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05526.pdf The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) bureau within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides toll-free telephone assistance through call centers to immigrants, their attorneys, and others seeking information about U.S. immigration services and benefits. As the volume of calls increased--from about 13 million calls in fiscal year 2002 to about 21 million calls in fiscal year 2004--questions were raised about USCIS's ability to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the information provided at call centers run by an independent contractor. This report analyzes: (1) the performance measures established by USCIS to monitor and evaluate the performance of contractor-operated call centers; (2) how performance measures were used to evaluate the contractor's performance; and (3) any actions USCIS has taken, or plans to take, to strengthen call center operations. USCIS developed seven performance measures intended to assess the performance and overall quality of responses provided by customer service representatives at contractor-operated call centers. These measures include how quickly calls were answered and the accuracy of information provided. The contract between USCIS and its contractor stipulated that the contractor could earn financial incentive awards if the average monthly performance met or exceeded the standards on a quarterly basis at each of four call centers. Conversely, financial deductions could be made if the standards were not met. USCIS did not finalize the terms regarding how the contractor's actual performance would be calculated, or scored, before awarding the contract. This limited USCIS's ability to exercise performance incentives (positive or negative) because the parties could not reach agreement on performance terms. USCIS suspended the use of financial incentives while the parties negotiated the issue. Agreement was not reached after 16 months, however, USCIS determined that the contractor had failed to meet standards for 4 of the 7 performance measures in the fourth quarter of 2004 and took action to reduce its payments for services. The contractor objected, citing the lack of agreement on the performance measurements and the impact of workload increases, but USCIS disagreed and stated it would reduce payment. In a separate but related matter, USCIS failed to meet contractual, regulatory, and GAO standards pertaining to how the contractor's performance would be documented--especially with respect to any deficiencies. Finally, USCIS exercised its option to extend the call center contract through May 2006, to allow time to solicit and award new call center contracts. USCIS said it intends to finalize performance measurement terms in the new contracts. USCIS used contractor performance data it collected over the course of the contract to identify opportunities to improve customer service and call flow, among other things. Several initiatives were launched as a result. Thu, 30 Jun 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05840t.pdf According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases involved material that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Over the past decade, the United States has become increasingly concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists or countries of concern. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States. This testimony summarizes the results of our previous reports on various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United States and abroad. Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) the different U.S. federal agencies tasked with installing radiation detection equipment both domestically and in other countries, (2) problems with coordination among these agencies and programs, and (3) the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment deployed in the United States and other countries. Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State, and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat nuclear smuggling by providing radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. The first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense program, which has installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in Russia through the end of fiscal year 2004. In 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative to focus on the threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports and to date has completed installations at two ports. Regarding efforts at U.S. points of entry, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with portable radiation detection devices in 1998 and expanded its efforts to include larger-scale radiation detection equipment after September 11, 2001. This program is continuing under DHS, which reported in May 2005 that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at mail facilities, land border crossings, and seaports. A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling is the lack of effective planning and coordination among the responsible agencies. For example, we reported in 2002 that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were duplicative, and coordination among U.S. agencies was not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of effective planning and coordination was that the Department of State had installed less sophisticated equipment in some countries leaving those countries' borders more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than countries where DOE and DOD had deployed equipment. Since the issuance of our report, the agencies involved have made some progress in addressing these issues. Regarding the deployment of equipment in the United States, we reported that DHS had not effectively coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve the radiation detection technology. We found that a number of factors hindered coordination, including competition between DOE national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation detection. The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal. Given the inherent limitations of radiation detection equipment and difficulties in detecting certain materials, it is important that the equipment be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes its usefulness. It is also important to note that the deployment of radiation detection equipment--regardless of how well such equipment works--is not a panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training of border security personnel in the use of radiation detection equipment, and intelligence gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations. Tue, 21 Jun 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05822t.pdf The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal aliens to the United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 established an employment eligibility verification process and a sanctions program for fining employers for noncompliance. Few modifications have been made to the verification process and sanctions program since 1986, and immigration experts state that a more reliable verification process and a strengthened worksite enforcement capacity are needed to help deter illegal immigration. In this testimony, GAO provides preliminary observations from its ongoing assessment of (1) the current employment verification process and (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) priorities and resources for the worksite enforcement program and the challenges it faces in implementing that program. The current employment verification (Form I-9) process is based on employers' review of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed documents presented by their employees and that the documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting the documents. However, document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) have undermined the employment verification process by making it difficult for employers who want to comply with the process to ensure they hire only authorized workers and easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers. In addition, the number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility has hindered employer verifications efforts. In 1998, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), proposed revising the Form I-9 process, particularly to reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, but DHS has not yet finalized the proposal. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which participating employers electronically verify employees' work eligibility, shows promise to enhance the current employment verification process, help reduce document fraud, and assist ICE in better targeting its worksite enforcement efforts. Yet, several current weaknesses in the pilot program's implementation, such as its inability to detect identity fraud and DHS delays in entering data into its databases, could adversely affect increased use of the pilot program, if not addressed. The worksite enforcement program has been a low priority under both INS and ICE. For example, in fiscal year 1999 INS devoted about 9 percent of its total investigative agents' time to worksite enforcement, while in fiscal year 2003 it allocated about 4 percent. ICE officials told us that the agency has experienced difficulties in proving employer violations and setting and collecting fine amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. In addition, INS and then ICE shifted its worksite enforcement focus to critical infrastructure protection after September 11, 2001. Tue, 21 Jun 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05700.pdf The Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated the merging of 22 federal agencies and organizations to create the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whose mission, in part, is to protect our homeland from threats and attacks. DHS relies on a variety of computerized information systems to support its operations. GAO was asked to review DHS's information security program. In response, GAO determined whether DHS had developed, documented, and implemented a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program. DHS has not fully implemented a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program to protect the information and information systems that support its operations and assets. It has developed and documented departmental policies and procedures that could provide a framework for implementing such a program; however, certain departmental components have not yet fully implemented key information security practices and controls. For example, risk assessments--needed to determine what controls are necessary and what level of resources should be expended on them--were incomplete. Elements required for information system security plans--which would provide a full understanding of existing and planned information security requirements--were missing. Testing and evaluation of security controls--which are needed to determine the effectiveness of information security policies and procedures--were incomplete or not performed. Elements required for remedial action plans--which would identify the resources needed to correct or mitigate known information security weaknesses--were missing, as were elements required for continuity of operations plans to restore critical systems in case of unexpected events. In addition, DHS had not yet fully developed a complete and accurate systems inventory. Shortfalls in executing responsibilities for ensuring compliance with the information security program allowed these weaknesses to occur. Although DHS has an organization that is responsible for overseeing the component implementation of key information security practices and controls, its primary means for doing so--an enterprisewide tool--has not been reliable. Until DHS addresses weaknesses with using the tool and implements a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program, its ability to protect its information and information systems will be limited. Fri, 17 Jun 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05305.pdf Globally, alien smuggling generates billions of dollars in illicit revenues annually and poses a threat to the nation's security. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003 has provided an opportunity to use financial investigative techniques to combat alien smugglers by targeting and seizing their monetary assets. For instance, the composition of DHS's largest investigative component--U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--includes the legacy Customs Service, which has extensive experience with money laundering and other financial crimes. Another DHS component, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has primary responsibility for interdictions between ports of entry. In summer 2003, ICE announced that it was developing a national strategy for combating alien smuggling. Among other objectives, GAO determined the implementation status of the strategy and investigative results in terms of convictions and seized assets. As of April 2005, ICE had not finalized its strategy for combating alien smuggling. ICE was adjusting the draft strategy to focus on the southwest border and encompass all aspects of smuggling, aliens as well as drugs and other contraband. In adjusting the strategy, ICE officials stressed the importance of incorporating lessons learned from ongoing follow-the-money approaches such as Operation ICE Storm, a multi-agency task force launched in October 2003 to crack down on migrant smuggling and related violence in Arizona. Also, the strategy's effectiveness depends partly on having clearly defined roles and responsibilities for ICE and CBP, two DHS components that have complementary antismuggling missions. In this regard, ICE and CBP signed a memorandum of understanding in November 2004 to address their respective roles and responsibilities, including provisions for sharing information and intelligence. Currently, however, there is no mechanism in place for tracking the number and the results of referrals made by CBP to ICE for investigation. CBP and ICE officials acknowledged that establishing a tracking mechanism could have benefits for both DHS components. Such a mechanism would help ICE ensure that appropriate action is taken on the referrals. Also, CBP could continue to pursue certain leads if ICE--for lack of available resources or other reasons--cannot take action on the referrals. In fiscal year 2004, about 2,400 criminal defendants were convicted in federal district courts under the primary alien-smuggling statute, and ICE reported seizures totaling $7.3 million from its alien-smuggling investigations. For the first 6 months of fiscal year 2005, ICE reported $7.8 million in seizures from alien-smuggling investigations. A concern raised by ICE and the Department of Justice is the lack of adequate statutory civil forfeiture authority for seizing real property, such as "stash" houses where smugglers hide aliens while awaiting payment and travel arrangements to final destinations throughout the nation. However, Justice does not have a legislative proposal on this subject pending before Congress because the department's legislative policy resources have been focused on other priorities. Fri, 27 May 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05466t.pdf U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has in place two programs to help address the threat posed by terrorists smuggling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States: the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). In July 2003, GAO reported that these programs had management challenges that limited their effectiveness. Given plans to expand both programs, in two recently issued reports GAO examined selected aspects of both programs' operations. This statement is a summary of those publicly available reports. In return for committing to making improvements to the security of their shipments, C-TPAT members receive a range of benefits that may change the risk characterization of their shipments, thereby reducing the probability of extensive inspection. Before providing benefits, CBP reviews the self-reported information contained in applicants' membership agreements and security profiles. Also, CBP assesses the compliance history of importers before granting them benefits. However, CBP grants benefits before members undergo the validation process, which is CBP's method to verify that their security measures are reliable, accurate, and effective. Although CBP's goal was to validate members within 3 years, to date it has validated 11 percent of them. Further, the validation process is not rigorous, as the objectives, scope, and methodology of validations are jointly agreed upon with the member, and CBP has no written guidelines to indicate what scope of effort is adequate for the validation. Also, although CBP has recently moved to a risk-based approach to selecting members for validation, it has not determined the number and types of validations that are needed to manage security risks or the CBP staff required to complete them. Further, CBP has not developed a comprehensive set of performance measures for the program, and key program decisions are not always documented and programmatic information is not updated regularly or accurately. The CSI program is designed to target and inspect high-risk cargo containers at foreign ports before they leave for the United States. It has resulted in improved information sharing between U.S. and foreign customs operations and a heightened level of international awareness regarding securing the global shipping system. Yet, several factors limit CBP's ability to successfully target containers to determine if they are high-risk. One factor is staffing imbalances, caused by political and practical considerations, which impede CBP's targeting efforts at CSI ports. As a result, 35 percent of U.S.-bound shipments from CSI ports were not targeted and not subject to inspection overseas--the key goal of the CSI program. In addition, as of September 11, 2004, 28 percent of the containers referred to host governments for inspection were not inspected overseas for various reasons such as operational limitations. One percent of these referrals were denied by host government officials, generally because they believed the referrals were based on factors not related to security threats. For the 72 percent of referred containers that were inspected overseas, CBP officials told us that no WMD were discovered. However, the nonintrusive inspection equipment used at CSI ports varies in detection capability, and there are no minimum technical requirements for equipment used as part of CSI. As a result, CBP has limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying terrorist WMD in containers. Finally, CBP continues to make refinements to the strategic plan and performance measures needed to help manage the program and achieve program goals. Until these refinements are completed, it will be difficult to assess progress made in CSI operations. Thu, 26 May 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05646r.pdf The former Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated that as of January 2000 the total unauthorized immigrant population residing in the United States was 7 million. This total includes those who entered the United States illegally and those who entered legally but overstayed their authorized period of stay. A more recent study estimated that there were about 10 million illegal aliens living in the United States as of March 2005. The study estimated that nearly 700,000 aliens entered the United States illegally or overstayed their authorized period of stay each year between 2000 and 2004. Some illegal aliens in the United States have been arrested and incarcerated in federal and state prisons and local jails, adding to already overcrowded prisons and jails. On April 7, 2005, we issued a report on criminal aliens that were incarcerated in federal and state prisons and local jails. Our report contained information on the number of criminal aliens incarcerated, their country of citizenship or country of birth, and the cost to incarcerate them. Congress also requested that we provide information on the criminal history of aliens incarcerated in federal and state prisons or local jails who had entered the country illegally. For a population of aliens that entered the country illegally and were incarcerated in federal or state prisons or local jails, this report addresses the following questions: (1) How many times have they been arrested? (2) How many and what type of criminal offenses have they been arrested for? (3) What states were they arrested in? In our population study of 55,322 illegal aliens, we found that they were arrested at least a total of 459,614 times, averaging about 8 arrests per illegal alien. Nearly all had more than 1 arrest. Thirty-eight percent (about 21,000) had between 2 and 5 arrests, 32 percent (about 18,000) had between 6 and 10 arrests, and 26 percent (about 15,000) had 11 or more arrests. Most of the arrests occurred after 1990. They were arrested for a total of about 700,000 criminal offenses, averaging about 13 offenses per illegal alien. One arrest incident may include multiple offenses, a fact that explains why there are nearly one and half times more offenses than arrests. Almost all of these illegal aliens were arrested for more than 1 offense. Slightly more than half of the 55,322 illegal aliens had between 2 and 10 offenses. About 45 percent of all offenses were drug or immigration offenses. About 15 percent were property-related offenses such as burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and property damage. About 12 percent were for violent offenses such as murder, robbery, assault, and sex-related crimes. The balance was for such other offenses as traffic violations, including driving under the influence; fraud--including forgery and counterfeiting; weapons violations; and obstruction of justice. Eighty percent of all arrests occurred in three states--California, Texas, and Arizona. Specifically, about 58 percent of all arrests occurred in California, 14 percent in Texas, and 8 percent in Arizona. Mon, 09 May 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05664t.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility for the immigration programs of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The three DHS bureaus with primary responsibility for immigration functions are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). This testimony focuses on CBP and ICE, which took over the immigration enforcement function. CBP is responsible for functions related to inspections and border patrol, and ICE is responsible for functions related to investigations, intelligence, detention, and removal. The Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, House Committee on the Judiciary, held a hearing to discuss management challenges and potential structural changes. Some research organizations have suggested structural changes to address management challenges, including a merger of CBP and ICE. This testimony addresses the following questions: (1) Have ICE and CBP encountered similar management challenges to those encountered at INS? (2) What factors might be considered in addressing some of the management challenges that exist at ICE and CBP? A number of similar management challenges that had been experienced by INS have continued in the new organizations now responsible for immigration enforcement functions. In 2001, GAO testified that, while restructuring may help address certain management challenges, INS faced significant challenges in assembling the basic systems and processes that any organization needs to accomplish its mission. These include clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, policies and procedures that effectively balance competing priorities, effective internal and external communications and coordination, and automation systems that provide accurate and timely information. In March 2003, the functions of the INS were transferred to the new DHS and placed in the newly-created ICE and CBP. In 2004, we reported that many similar management challenges we found at INS were still in existence in the new bureaus. In evaluating solutions to ICE and CBP management challenges, including potential structural changes, several factors might be considered. The first factor is whether ICE and CBP currently have good management frameworks in place. Such a management framework, among other items, would include a clear mission, a strategic planning process, good organizational alignment, performance measures, and leadership and accountability mechanisms. The second factor is whether ICE and CBP have developed systems and processes to support the management frameworks they may have in place. The third factor is that the management challenges in these two bureaus exist in the larger context of the creation and evolution of DHS. The transformation and integration activities at DHS can take 5-7 years to accomplish, and some management challenges might be resolved in this process. Thu, 05 May 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05481r.pdf This report responds to certain requirements of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 that authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. Section 902(k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every 6 months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the number of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. Reports are to be provided until all applications have been finally adjudicated. This is our twelfth report. Through February 8, 2005, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), had received a total of 39,050 HRIFA applications and had approved 13,045 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) had 1,635 applications filed and had approved 568 of them. Thu, 14 Apr 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05337r.pdf When the United States incarcerates criminal aliens--noncitizens convicted of crimes while in this country legally or illegally--in federal and state prisons and local jails, the federal government bears much of the costs. It pays to incarcerate criminal aliens in federal prisons and reimburses state and local governments for a portion of their costs of incarcerating some, but not all, criminal aliens illegally in the country through the Department of Justice's State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) managed by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). Some state and local governments have expressed concerns about the impact that criminal aliens have on already overcrowded prisons and jails and that the federal government reimburses them for only a portion of their costs of incarcerating criminal aliens. Congress requested that we provide information concerning criminal aliens incarcerated at the federal, state, and local level. For the criminal aliens incarcerated in federal prisons, and for criminal aliens for which state and local governments received reimbursement through SCAAP, this report addresses the following questions: (1) For recent years, how many criminal aliens were incarcerated? (2) What is the country of citizenship or country of birth of these criminal alien inmates? and (3) What are the estimated costs of incarcerating criminal aliens? At the federal level, the number of criminal aliens incarcerated increased from about 42,000 at the end of calendar year 2001 to about 49,000 at the end of calendar year 2004--a 15 percent increase. The percentage of all federal prisoners who are criminal aliens has remained the same over the last 3 years--about 27 percent. The majority of criminal aliens incarcerated at the end of calendar year 2004 were identified as citizens of Mexico. We estimate the federal cost of incarcerating criminal aliens--BOP's cost to incarcerate criminals and reimbursements to state and local governments under SCAAP--totaled approximately $5.8 billion for calendar years 2001 through 2004. BOP's cost to incarcerate criminal aliens rose from about $950 million in 2001 to about $1.2 billion in 2004--a 14 percent increase. Federal reimbursements for incarcerating criminal aliens in state prisons and local jails declined from $550 million in 2001 to $280 million in 2004, in a large part due to a reduction in congressional appropriations. At the state level, the 50 states received reimbursement for incarcerating about 77,000 criminal aliens in fiscal year 2002 and 47 states received reimbursement for incarcerating about 74,000 in fiscal year 2003. For the 5 states incarcerating about 80 percent of these criminal aliens in fiscal year 2003, about 68 percent incarcerated in midyear 2004 reported that the country of citizenship or country of birth as Mexico, the Dominican Republic, or Cuba. We estimate that 4 of these 5 states spent about $1.6 billion to incarcerate criminal aliens reimbursed through SCAAP during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. We estimate that the federal government reimbursed these four states about 25 percent or less of the estimated cost to incarcerate these criminal aliens in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. At the local level, in fiscal year 2002, SCAAP reimbursed about 750 local governments for incarcerating about 138,000 criminal aliens. In fiscal year 2003, SCAAP reimbursed about 700 local governments for about 147,000 criminal aliens, with 5 local jail systems accounting for about 30 percent of these criminal aliens. The 147,000 criminal aliens incarcerated during fiscal year 2003 spent a total of about 8.5 million days in jail. Mexico leads as the country of birth for foreign-born arrestees at these 5 local jails in fiscal year 2003. We estimate that 4 of these 5 local jails spent an estimated $390 million in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to incarcerate criminal aliens and were reimbursed about $73 million through SCAAP. We estimate that the federal government reimbursed these localities about 25 percent or less of the estimated criminal alien incarceration cost in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Thu, 07 Apr 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05256.pdf In 1990, Congress established an investor visa category, referred to as EB-5, whereby immigrants are granted conditional residence and after 2 years, permanent residence status in the United States if they invest in a commercial enterprise that will benefit the U.S. economy and create at least 10 full-time jobs. The Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-156) mandates that GAO provide certain information regarding the EB-5 employment category. In response to the mandate, this report provides information on immigrant participation, including the number of participants, their countries of origin, and the number who sought U.S. citizenship. Also, this report includes information about the types of business established and where they were established. The number of visas granted under the EB-5 category has been a small fraction of the approximately 10,000 allocated annually by the authorizing legislation. According to State Department records, a total of 6,024 visas have been issued to immigrant investors and their dependents since 1992. As of June 2004, 653 investors (not including dependents) had met this immigration category's requirements and received permanent legal resident status. The immigration officials and lawyers who represent immigrant investors that we interviewed attribute the low participation to the rigorous application process and the uncertainty of meeting the requirements that can result in the permanent residency benefit. They also cited, as a potentially negative impact on future applicants, the failure to issue implementing regulations to adjudicate hundreds of EB-5 permanent residence applications that have left investors in conditional resident status--some for as long as 10 years. In 2002, Congress mandated that the regulations be issued by March 2003. The regulations were initially drafted but continue to be under review by the Department of Homeland Security. DHS cited many difficult and competing demands associated with establishing the new department and meeting its mission challenges as reasons the regulations have not been completed. About 83 percent of investors and their dependents who were granted permanent resident status through the EB-5 category are from Asia. EB-5 participants have invested an estimated $1 billion in a variety of businesses (e.g., hotels/motels, manufacturing, restaurants, real estate, and farms). GAO estimates that 41 percent of the businesses were established in California. Fri, 01 Apr 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05440t.pdf The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) is an Internet-based system run by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to collect and record information on foreign students, exchange visitors, and their dependents--before they enter the United States, when they enter, and during their stay. GAO has reported (GAO-04-690) that although the system had a number of performance problems during the first year that its use was required, several SEVIS performance indicators were positive at that time (June 2004). Nonetheless, some problems were still being reported by educational organizations. In addition, concerns have been raised that the number of international students and exchange visitors coming to the United States has been negatively affected by the U.S. visa process. Accordingly, the Congress asked GAO to testify on its work on SEVIS and related issues. This testimony is based on its June 2004 report, augmented by more recent GAO work, reports that we issued in February 2004 and 2005 on student and visiting scholar visa processing, and related recent research by others. Indications are that SEVIS performance has improved and continues to improve. In June 2004, GAO reported improvement based on several indicators, including reports showing that certain key system performance requirements were being met, trends showing a decline in new requests for system corrections, and the views of officials representing 10 educational organizations. DHS attributed this performance improvement to a number of actions, such as installation of a series of new software releases and increased Help Desk staffing and training. However, GAO also reported that several key system performance requirements were not being formally measured, so that DHS might not be able to identify serious system problems in time to address them before they could affect the successful accomplishment of SEVIS objectives. Further, some educational organizations were still experiencing problems, particularly with regard to Help Desk support. GAO also reported that educational organizations were concerned about proposed options for collecting SEVIS fees. Accordingly, it made recommendations aimed at improving system performance measurement and resolving educational organizations' Help Desk and fee concerns. Since June 2004, DHS reports that it has taken steps to address GAO recommendations, and in particular it has taken a number of actions to strengthen Help Desk support. Moreover, educational organizations generally agree that SEVIS performance has continued to improve, and that their past fee collection concerns have been alleviated. However, these educational organizations still cite residual Help Desk problems, which they believe create hardships for students and exchange visitors. Most of these organizations, however, do not believe that SEVIS is the reason for the declining number of international students and exchange visitors coming to the United States. These declining numbers were cited in a recent report by the Council of Graduate Schools, which describes declines in foreign graduate student applications, admissions, and enrollments between 2003 and 2004, and further declines in these applications between 2004 and 2005. The report attributes the decline to increased global competition and changed visa policies. In this regard, GAO recently reported on the State Department's efforts to address its prior recommendations for improving the Visas Mantis program (under which interagency security checks are performed to identify applicants who may pose a threat to national security by illegally transferring sensitive technology). According to this report, a combination of federal agency steps resulted in a significant decline in Visas Mantis processing times and in the number of cases pending more than 60 days. The Council of Graduate Schools' report also recognizes the recent Visas Mantis program changes as positive steps. Thu, 17 Mar 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05202.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals who travel to the United States. By congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit for approval an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. Among other things, GAO was asked to determine whether the plan satisfied these conditions and to provide observations on the plan and DHS's program management. DHS's fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan and related documentation at least partially satisfied all conditions established by the Congress, including meeting the capital planning and investment control requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For example, DHS has developed a plan and a process for developing, implementing, and institutionalizing a program to manage risk. In its observations about the expenditure plan and DHS's management of the program, GAO recognizes accomplishments to date and addresses the need for rigorous and disciplined program practices. For example, US-VISIT has acquired the services of a prime integration contractor to augment its ability to complete US-VISIT. However, DHS has not employed rigorous, disciplined processes typically associated with successful programs, such as tracking progress against commitments. More specifically, the fiscal year 2005 plan does not describe progress against commitments made in previous plans (e.g., capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits). According to GAO's analysis, delays have occurred in delivering capability to track the entry and exit of persons entering the United States at air, land, and sea ports of entry. Such information is essential for oversight. Additionally, the effort to pilot alternatives for delivering the capability to track the departure of persons exiting the United States is faced with a compressed time line, missed milestones, and potentially reduced scope. In particular, the pilot evaluation period has been reduced from 3 to 2 months, and as of early November 2004, the alternatives were deployed and operating in only 5 of the 15 ports of entry scheduled to be operational by November 1, 2004. According to US-VISIT officials, this is largely due to delays in DHS granting security clearances to the civilian employees who would operate the equipment at the ports of entry. These changing facts and circumstances surrounding the pilot introduce additional risk concerning US-VISIT's delivery of promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Wed, 23 Feb 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05198.pdf In February 2004, GAO reported that improvements were needed in the time taken to adjudicate visas for science students and scholars. Specifically, a primary tool used to screen these applicants for visas (the Visas Mantis program) was operating inefficiently. We found that it took an average of 67 days to process Mantis checks, and many cases were pending for 60 days or more. GAO also found that the way in which information was shared among agencies prevented cases from being resolved expeditiously. Finally, consular officers lacked sufficient program guidance. This report discusses the time to process Mantis checks and assesses actions taken and timeframes for improving the Mantis program. Mantis processing times have declined significantly. In November 2004, the average time to process a Mantis check was about 15 days, far lower than the average of 67 days we reported previously. The number of Mantis cases pending more than 60 days has also dropped significantly. Although an action plan that the State Department (State) drafted was not fully implemented, State and other agencies took several actions in response to our recommendations to improve Visas Mantis and to facilitate travel by foreign students and scholars. These actions included (1) adding staff to process Mantis cases, (2) providing additional guidance to consular officers, (3) developing an electronic tracking system, (4) clarifying roles and responsibilities of agencies involved in the Mantis program, (5) reiterating State's policy of giving students and scholars priority interviews, and (6) extending the validity of Mantis clearances. Nonetheless, some issues remain unresolved. Consular officers at posts we visited continue to need guidance on the Mantis program, particularly through direct interaction with State officials knowledgeable about the program. Several agencies that receive Mantis cases are not fully connected to State's electronic tracking system. This can lead to unnecessary delays in the process. Finally, students and scholars from China are limited to 6-month, two-entry visas. The Chinese government has rejected a proposal by the United States to extend visa validities, on a reciprocal basis, for students and scholars. Fri, 18 Feb 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05154.pdf Each year, the Social Security Administration (SSA) receives millions of employer-submitted earnings reports (Form W-2s) that it is unable to place in an individual Social Security record. If the Social Security number (SSN) and name on a W-2 do not match SSA's records, the W-2 is retained in the Earnings Suspense File (ESF). SSA's ability to match earnings reports is essential to calculating Social Security benefits. Because of concerns about the size of the ESF, GAO was asked to determine (1) how SSA processes workers' earnings reports, (2) the types of errors in ESF reports and the characteristics of employers whose reports are in the ESF, (3) how often earnings from repeatedly used SSNs have been reinstated and who receives the earnings from theses reports, and (4) what key factors contribute to ESF postings. Upon receiving over 250 million earnings reports annually from employers, SSA uses various processes to post such reports to workers' Social Security records. For reports in which worker names and SSNs exactly match SSA's information, the earnings are credited to the appropriate Social Security record. When SSA encounters earnings reports that do not match its records, SSA attempts to make a match through various automated processes. Such processes have allowed SSA to identify valid records for an average of 15 million reports annually. However, about 4 percent of the reports still remain unmatched and are retained in the ESF. SSA uses additional automated and manual processes to continue to identify valid records. The most recent data show that SSA posted ("reinstated") over 2 million earnings reports in the ESF to valid records from such processes. Earnings reports in the ESF have serious data problems and are particularly likely to be submitted by certain categories of employers. Such problems include missing SSNs and employer use of the same SSN for more than one worker in the same tax year. Additional problems include missing surnames or names that include nonalphabetic characters. Forty-three percent of employers associated with earnings reports in the ESF are from only 5 of the 83 broad industry categories. Among these industry categories, a small portion of employers account for a disproportionate number of ESF reports. SSA has reinstated a substantial number of earnings reports with SSNs that appear repeatedly in the ESF. We analyzed the most frequently occurring 295 SSNs, which appeared in ESF 1,000 times or more between tax years 1985 and 2000. Of the earnings reports associated with these SSNs, SSA reinstated 13.1 million to the records of about 11.7 million workers. Although most reinstatements were for U.S.-born workers, in recent years the percentage of reinstatements to foreign-born workers has markedly increased. Also increasing is the percentage of foreign-born workers that received reinstatements for earnings in years prior to receiving a valid SSN--a potential indicator of unauthorized employment. Three major factors contribute to ESF postings. Under IRS regulations, employers must ask new hires to provide their name and SSN, but are not required to independently corroborate this information with SSA. DHS requires employers to visually inspect new workers' identity and work authorization documents, but employers do not have to verify these documents, and they can be easily counterfeited. Further, IRS regulations are minimal; IRS has no record of assessing a penalty for filing inaccurate earnings reports; and DHS enforcement efforts against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers has been limited in recent years because of shifting priorities following the events of September 11, 2001. Last, although SSA and DHS offer employers verification free of charge, these services are voluntary, have some limitations, and remain underutilized. Fri, 04 Feb 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05204.pdf Since 1940, Congress has provided a statutory framework that requires aliens entering or residing in the United States to provide address information. By 1981, aliens who remain in the United States for 30 days or more were required to initially register and report their address information and then to report their change of address only if they move. In the months immediately following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, federal investigators' efforts to locate and interview nearly one-half of the 4,112 nonimmigrant aliens they attempted to contact were impeded by lack of current address information. Nonimmigrant aliens are defined as those who seek temporary entry into the United States for a specific purpose, including those aliens who are in the country as students, international representatives, or temporary workers, or for business or pleasure. Because of growing concern over the government's need to locate aliens, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 directed GAO to study the feasibility and the utility of a requirement that each nonimmigrant alien in the United States self-report a current address on a yearly basis. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials told us that while implementing an annual address reporting requirement for nonimmigrant aliens is technically feasible, such a requirement would increase the number of reporting forms DHS would have to process. In turn, this increase would raise form-processing costs from an estimated $1.6 million to at least an estimated $4.6 million per year, according to DHS, which does not include the cost of enforcing the annual reporting requirement. The consensus of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, who investigate activities that may violate immigration law, was that a self-reporting system would be of limited use in locating aliens who are avoiding contact with the government. Nonimmigrant aliens who do not wish to be located are not likely to comply with an annual requirement to self-report address information. Consequently, agents use other databases to locate this class of alien as well as nonimmigrant aliens who may not be aware of address reporting requirements. Public and private databases that record information concerning benefits, an alien's department of motor vehicle records, or credit bureau information are examples of information sources that agents have used to locate nonimmigrant aliens. Despite the unreliability of self-reported information, some agents did recognize the possibility of limited enforcement benefits for implementing an annual address reporting requirement, such as verifying that compliant nonimmigrant aliens are still in the country and providing a basis for detaining noncompliant nonimmigrant aliens. However, existing systems are available for compliant nonimmigrant aliens to notify DHS of address changes. Also, DHS already has the authority to detain all aliens not in compliance with current change of address reporting requirements but has seldom used the authority. Consequently, it is questionable whether the usefulness of an annual reporting requirement would outweigh the cost of implementation and enforcement. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and had technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Fri, 28 Jan 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0581.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility for the immigration enforcement and services programs of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The three DHS bureaus with primary responsibility for immigration functions are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This transfer creates a great opportunity for DHS to address long-standing management and operational problems within INS. The Homeland Security Act requires GAO to review the transfer of immigration functions to DHS. In response, this report assesses the status of (1) communication and coordination of roles and responsibilities, (2) integration of immigration and customs investigators in ICE, and (3) administrative services and systems in CBP, CIS, and ICE. Most of the field officials with whom GAO spoke generally characterized communication and coordination with other DHS immigration programs in their geographic area as good or excellent. Other officials noted, that in some areas related to investigative techniques and other operations, unresolved issues regarding the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE give rise to disagreements and confusion, with the potential for serious consequences. According to headquarters and field officials, some guidance has been made available to the field, and there are plans to provide more. Most ICE field officials GAO contacted said they have taken initial steps toward integrating the former immigration and customs investigators, such as establishing cross-training and pay parity. Most of these officials said, however, that additional important steps remained to be completed to fully integrate investigators. They reported that the lack of uniform policies and procedures for some ICE operations has caused confusion and hindered the creation of a new integrated culture. Headquarters officials said they were responding to these challenges. Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE expressed confusion about a new shared services system for mission support when interviewed 3 to 4 months after the system was instituted. They also expressed frustration with problems they have encountered with travel, budget, and payroll systems, which are not a part of the shared services system. Additionally, the realignment of staff for shared services, along with other events, has resulted in some mission staff being assigned administrative work as a collateral duty, which may affect mission productivity. Key practices used by other public and private organizations that have undergone successful mergers and transformations may be helpful to DHS in addressing the challenges raised in this report and in transforming immigration enforcement and services. These key practices include establishing communication strategies to create shared expectations and involving employees to gain ownership for changes. Thu, 14 Oct 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0566.pdf The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had five interior (non-border-related) immigration enforcement objectives to address federal immigration law violations: identify and remove criminal aliens from the United States; deter and dismantle alien trafficking and smuggling; respond to community reports and complaints about illegal immigration; minimize immigration benefit fraud; and block employers' access to undocumented workers. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the INS and other federal agencies began merging their law enforcement functions into the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security. Congress sought information on how the newly formed ICE was addressing legacy INS's immigration enforcement objectives. GAO addressed the following questions: (1) What is the status of ICE's efforts to incorporate legacy INS's interior immigration enforcement objectives? (2) How is ICE developing budget needs, workforce plans, and performance measures for immigration-related objectives? Though ICE does not have a formal, distinct interior enforcement strategy, all of the objectives contained in the legacy INS interior enforcement strategy have been incorporated within a broader mission aimed at strengthening homeland security through joint customs and immigration investigations. Two ICE offices--the Office of Investigations (OI) and the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO)--have responsibility for addressing these objectives. Through six enforcement units in four operating divisions, OI is primarily responsible for addressing the following legacy INS objectives: deterring, dismantling, and diminishing the smuggling and trafficking of aliens; responding to community complaints about illegal immigration; minimizing immigration benefit fraud; and removing employers' access to undocumented workers. DRO is primarily responsible for identifying and removing criminal aliens, with some assistance from OI. DRO has begun to align its strategic goals with its budget requests and workforce plans in order to determine what resources it needs in fiscal year 2005 and beyond. DRO is also developing performance measures to help identify future workforce plans and budget requests. For example, DRO is measuring the percentage of the fugitive alien population that is apprehended annually to determine whether resource levels are adequate. DRO officials said that until performance measures have been developed for all activities, it will be difficult to determine which efforts are most effective. To develop its budget request and workforce plans for fiscal year 2007 and beyond, OI field offices conducted baseline threat assessments to identify risks--such as the presence of a business that transports biological materials and may employ terrorists--on a regional basis. Related performance measures have been developed, but are not in use, therefore, they will not be used for workforce planning in ICE's fiscal year 2006 budget request. OI's fiscal year 2005 budget request was based on other considerations, such as the need to monitor foreign visa holders. The Department of Homeland Security reviewed a draft of this report and had no official comments. Fri, 08 Oct 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041080t.pdf Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has made a concerted effort to strengthen border security by enhancing visa issuance policies and procedures, as well as expanding screening of the millions of foreign visitors who enter the United States annually. Consistent with the 9/11 Commission report that recommends a biometric entry-exit screening system for travelers, the Department of State's biometric program complements the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program--a governmentwide program to better control and monitor the entry, visa status, and exit of visitors. GAO was asked to present the findings of its report on State's Biometric Visa Program, as well as discuss other aspects of visa processing and border security that require coordinated, joint actions by State and DHS. Our report issued today finds that State is implementing the Biometric Visa Program on schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004, deadline for issuing visas that include biometric indicators, as mandated by Congress. As of September 1, 2004, State had installed program hardware and software at 201 visa issuing posts overseas and plans to complete the installation at the remaining 6 posts by September 30. Technology installation has progressed smoothly, however State and DHS have not provided comprehensive guidance to consular posts on when and how information from the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) on visa applicants should be considered by adjudicating consular officers. In the absence of such guidance, we found that these officers are unclear on how best to use the biometric program and IDENT information. Since September 11, State and DHS have made many improvements to visa issuance and border security policies. Nevertheless, in prior reports, we have found additional vulnerabilities that need to be addressed through joint, coordinated actions. For example, DHS has not adequately defined the operational context for US-VISIT, which affects the biometric program. In addition, we identified systemic weaknesses in information sharing between State and DHS in the visa revocation process. Moreover, we found related weaknesses in an interagency security check process aimed to prevent the illegal transfer of sensitive technologies. Thu, 09 Sep 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041001.pdf As a complement to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program--a governmentwide program to better control and monitor the entry, visa status, and exit of visitors--the State Department (State) is implementing the Biometric Visa Program at all 207 overseas consulates by October 26, 2004. This program, required by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, requires that all persons applying for U.S. visas have certain biometrics (fingerprints) and a digital photograph collected during the visa application interview. This information must be cleared through the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) before an applicant can receive a visa. GAO reviewed State's rollout of the program, including its implementation progress and how State and DHS envision the program being used to help adjudicate visas. State is installing the equipment and software for the Biometric Visa Program on schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004, implementation deadline. However, DHS and State have not fully developed guidance for the program's use. As of September 1, 2004, State had installed program hardware and software at 201 out of a total of 207 overseas posts and plans to complete the installation at the remaining 6 posts by September 30. The posts with the program are now collecting fingerprints of each visa applicant and processing the prints through the DHS IDENT database. Although the technology installation has progressed smoothly, DHS and State have not developed and not provided comprehensive guidance that includes directions to consular officers on when in the visa process prints are to be scanned and when and how information from the IDENT database on visa applicants should be considered by consular officers. In the absence of such guidance, GAO found that consular officers are unclear on how to use the program and the information available from IDENT on visa applicants. For example, officers are unclear about whether fingerprints of visa applicants should be collected before or during the visa interview, whether information on visa applicants from the DHS database should be considered by the visa-adjudicating officer during or after the interview, and who should have responsibility for reviewing the IDENT information before visa issuance. Answers to these questions could significantly affect how each post manages workflows and processes visa applicants, which could have staffing and resource implications. Thu, 09 Sep 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04702.pdf In 2003 GAO designated the merger of 22 separate federal entities into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a high risk area because of the criticality of the department's mission and the enormous transformation challenges that the department faced. Given that the effective use of information technology (IT) is a critical enabler of this merger, GAO has previously reported on a number of DHS efforts aimed at institutionalizing an effective information and technology governance structure and investing in new IT systems that are intended to better support mission operations. Now that DHS has been operating for over a year, GAO was asked to, based largely on its prior work, describe DHS's progress in meeting its information and technology management challenge. DHS's overall IT challenge is to standardize and integrate the legacy system environments and management approaches that it inherited from its predecessor agencies, while concurrently attempting to ensure that present levels of IT support for critical homeland security operations are not only maintained but improved in the near term. To accomplish this, the department is in the process of instituting seven information and technology management disciplines that are key elements of an effective information and technology management structure. DHS's progress in institutionalizing these key information and technology management elements has been mixed, and overall remains a work in progress. Such progress is not unexpected, given the diversity of the inherited agencies and the size and complexity of the department's mission operations. Nevertheless, because DHS has not yet fully institutionalized these governance elements, its pursuit of new and enhanced IT investments are at risk of not optimally supporting corporate mission needs and not meeting cost, schedule, capability, and benefit commitments. Accordingly, GAO has previously made recommendations relative to most of these areas to the department's chief information officer and other responsible DHS entities. Lastly, DHS has developed a draft IT strategic plan, which GAO finds lacking in explicit goals, performance measures, milestones, and knowledge of whether it has properly positioned IT staff with the right skills to accomplish these things. Fri, 27 Aug 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04881.pdf Several state and local government agencies and financial institutions accept consular identification (CID) cards, which are issued by foreign governments to their citizens living abroad. Mexico issued more than 2.2 million CID cards in 2002-2003 and Guatemala issued approximately 89,000 from mid-2002 to 2003. Critics of CID cards say their acceptance facilitates the unlawful stay within the United States of undocumented aliens and may provide opportunities for terrorists to remain undetected in this country. GAO examined (1) the purpose of a CID card and how Mexican and Guatemalan CID cards are being used in the United States, (2) steps Mexico and Guatemala have taken to verify the identities of CID card applicants and incorporate security features in CID cards now used in the United States, and (3) the positions and policies of federal agencies regarding CID cards. Consular identification cards are issued by some governments to help identify their citizens living in a foreign country. The cards do not certify legal residence within a country; thus, cardholders may be either legal or undocumented aliens. CID cards benefit the bearers by enabling them, in some instances, to use this form of identification to obtain driver's licenses, open bank accounts, show proof of identity to police, and gain access to other services. Mexico and Guatemala each take multiple steps to help ensure that the process for qualifying applicants seeking to obtain CID cards verifies the applicants' identities. After receiving criticism about the reliability of its CID card, Mexico took steps to improve identity verification procedures for its CID card issuance process. However, the Mexican issuance policy still relies on visual, rather than computer-based, verification of some documents used to obtain CID cards, including birth certificates that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) says may be fraudulently obtained. Both Mexico and Guatemala incorporate a variety of security features in their CID cards, such as holographic imagery. However, officials of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement warn that incorporating technical security features into identification documents such as CID cards does not guarantee their authenticity. Federal agencies hold different and, in some cases, conflicting views on the usage and acceptance of CID cards, and no executive branch guidance is yet available. A Homeland Security Council task force of executive branch agencies is reviewing identification document security but had not issued its findings at the time of GAO's review. The Department of the Treasury adopted a regulation in 2003 that, in effect, allows CID card acceptance, while an FBI official has stated that the Mexican CID card, in particular, is not a reliable form of identification and that its acceptance could support false identities. DHS expressed security concerns as well. The State Department has publicly expressed concerns about the impact restricting CID card use might have on U.S. citizens abroad, for example, if the United States had to issue its own CID cards in an emergency. Tue, 24 Aug 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041030r.pdf This report responds to certain requirements of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 that authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. Section 902(k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every 6 months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the number of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. Reports are to be provided until all applications have been finally adjudicated. This is our eleventh report. Through June 30, 2004, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), had received a total of 38,548 HRIFA applications and had approved 11,917 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) had 1,418 applications filed and had approved 454 of them. Fri, 13 Aug 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04972t.pdf Data sharing can be a valuable tool for federal agencies. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can use data from taxpayers and third parties to better ensure taxpayers meet their obligations. Likewise, Congress has authorized certain agencies access to taxpayer information collected by IRS to better determine eligibility for benefit programs. GAO determined (1) the extent to which the IRS and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) within the Department of Homeland Security share and verify data and (2) the benefits and challenges, if any, of increasing such activities. GAO also studied IRS's Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative (OVCI) to provide information on (1) the characteristics of the taxpayers who came forward under OVCI and (2) how those taxpayers became noncompliant. IRS and CIS do not share data with each other to ensure taxpayers meet their tax obligations or to determine immigration eligibility. IRS officials believe that data on taxpayers' income they currently use are more accurate and useful for enforcing tax law than CIS data. In a nationwide selection of 413,723 businesses applying to sponsor immigrant workers from 1997 through 2004, GAO found 19,972 (5 percent) businesses and organizations that were unknown to IRS. Information like this can be used to select taxpayers for audit or other enforcement efforts. Further, CIS officials believe IRS taxpayer data would useful for immigration decisions. In our nationwide selection, GAO found that 67,949 (16 percent) businesses applying to sponsor immigrant workers from 1997 through 2004 did not file one or more tax returns. Failure to file a return could be relevant to a CIS adjudicator's decision about whether a business meets the financial feasibility (ability to pay wages) and legitimacy (proof of existence) tests for sponsoring an immigrant. For data sharing to occur, challenges must be overcome, including I.R.C. Section 6103's limitation on IRS's ability to share data with CIS and technological problems like the lack of automated financial data at CIS. Because the confidentiality of tax data is considered crucial to voluntary compliance, executive branch policy calls for a business case to support sharing tax data. IRS and CIS have not analyzed data sharing benefits and costs. The OVCI program attempted to quickly bring taxpayers who held funds offshore illegally back into compliance while simultaneously gathering more information about them and the promoters of offshore schemes. Under OVCI, 861 taxpayers came forward and IRS received more than $200 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest. According to IRS data, OVCI applicants are a diverse group, with wide variations in income, geographic location, and occupation. Some applicants' noncompliance appears to be intentional, while others' appears to be inadvertent. Given this diversity, multiple compliance strategies may be needed to bring taxpayers holding money offshore back into compliance. Wed, 21 Jul 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04795.pdf The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa revocation process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report were addressed. GAO's analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security took some actions in the summer of 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in its June 2003 report. However, GAO's review of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses remained in the implementation of the revocation process, especially in the timely transmission of information among federal agencies. For example, delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to State. In at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or more to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country. In 10 cases, DHS either failed to notify or took several months to notify immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in the country. It then took over 2 months for immigration investigators to request field investigations of these individuals. After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004, additional actions were taken to improve the process, including revising procedures and reassessing the process. DHS and State believe these actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State revised its procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new written procedures and acted to ensure that immigration investigators are aware of all individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. State and DHS also took some steps to address legal and policy issues related to visa revocations. In April, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the FBI, identified the visa revocation process as a potential homeland security vulnerability and developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa revocation cases. However, weaknesses remain. For example, State's and DHS's procedures are not fully coordinated and lack performance standards, such as specific time frames, for completing each step of the process. Outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding the removal of individuals based solely on their visa revocation. Tue, 13 Jul 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04899t.pdf The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing foreign terrorists from entering our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in June 2003 that the visa revocation process needed to be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in conjunction with the Departments of State (State) and Justice, develop specific policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate agencies are notified of revocations based on terrorism grounds and take proper actions. GAO examined whether weaknesses in the visa revocation process identified in our June 2003 report were addressed. GAO's analysis shows that the Departments of State and Homeland Security took some actions in summer 2003 to address weaknesses in the visa revocation process that we identified in June 2003. However, GAO's review of visas revoked from October to December 2003, including a detailed review of a random sample of 35 cases, showed that weaknesses remained. Delays existed in matching names of suspected terrorists with names of visa holders and in forwarding necessary information to consular officials at State. In at least 3 of the 35 cases, it took State 6 months or longer to revoke visas after receiving a recommendation to do so. In 3 cases, State took a week or longer after deciding to revoke visas to post a lookout or notify DHS. Without these notifications, DHS may not know to investigate those individuals who may be in the country. In 10 cases, DHS either failed or took several months to notify immigration investigators that individuals with revoked visas may be in the country. It then took more than 2 months for immigration investigators to initiate field investigations of these individuals. After GAO initiated its inquiry for this report in January 2004, additional actions were taken to improve the process. DHS and State believe these actions will help avoid the delays experienced in the past. In April and May, State revised its procedures and formalized its tracking system for visa revocation cases. In March, DHS developed new written procedures and acted to ensure that immigration investigators were aware of all individuals with revoked visas who may be in the country. State and DHS also took some steps to address legal and policy issues related to visa revocations. Further, in April, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency group organized under the Federal Bureau of Investigation, identified the visa revocation process as a potential homeland security vulnerability and developed an informal process for TSC to handle visa revocation cases. However, weaknesses remain. For example, State's and DHS's procedures are not fully coordinated and lack performance standards, such as specific time frames for completing each step of the process. Moreover, outstanding legal and policy issues continue to exist regarding removing individuals based solely on their visa revocation. Tue, 13 Jul 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04733.pdf In 1982 the Supreme Court ruled that states and school districts cannot deny education to illegal alien children residing here. Issues in estimating the costs of providing education to them are of interest because (1) policy discussions concerning illegal immigration often focus on cost impacts; (2) potential costs are borne mostly at the state and local levels; and (3) the Congress could authorize federal reimbursement for benefits provided to illegal aliens, based on estimated state costs or numbers of illegal aliens. The foreign-born population is growing and is concentrated in certain states; the illegal immigrant component is thought to be substantial. Concerns about education costs may reflect "squeezed" state and local budgets, rising school enrollments, and overcrowded schools. To address the potential for estimating the costs of educating illegal alien schoolchildren, this report (1) identifies major government sources of relevant data, (2) describes a Census Bureau plan for developing new information, and (3) outlines costestimation approaches. GAO provided a draft of this report to the National Center for Education Statistics, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Census Bureau. The agencies informed GAO they had no formal comments. Current government information is not sufficient to directly estimate the state-by-state costs of educating illegal alien schoolchildren. Although a variety of data are available, no government source estimates the numbers of illegal alien schoolchildren for most or all states. Specifically, states and local areas record data on school enrollment and costs but not on immigration status. In response to GAO's survey, a few states estimated costs of educating illegal alien children, based partly on assumptions. The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) maintains enrollment and cost data--but has no information on immigration status. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed state-by-state estimates of the illegal alien population, but the estimates do not break out age groups and are subject to methodological limitations. The Census Bureau is developing a plan to estimate the size of the resident illegal alien population, indirectly by age group and state. This new information might help in developing state-by-state estimates of the number of school-age illegal alien children. However, the plan does not specify the age groups to be estimated, faces technical challenges, and depends upon future funding. Overall, it is too early to evaluate the Census Bureau's plan. The simplest approach to estimating the costs of educating illegal alien children is to multiply average current per pupil expenditures by the estimated number of illegal alien schoolchildren separately for each state. At present, government information is insufficient for developing reliable estimates based on this approach. If the Census Bureau's plan proves successful, relevant data would be available by 2007-09. Taking account of cost determinants such as variation in local area expenditures, student needs, and school capacity requires additional data. Mon, 21 Jun 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04590.pdf Since the mid-1990s--and especially since September 11--the government has focused attention and resources on preventing illegal aliens, drug smugglers, and potential terrorists from entering the United States across its land borders with Mexico and Canada. The Border Patrol is responsible for protecting the nation's borders. However, a significant portion of the borderlands are federal or tribal lands managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Forest Service. Realizing the importance of coordinating federal law enforcement efforts, GAO agreed to assess: (1) border-related law enforcement challenges for land management agencies in Arizona and Washington, (2) resources land management agencies have received to address these challenges, and (3) how the Border Patrol and land management agencies coordinate border-related law enforcement efforts. Illegal border activities, including alien border crossings and drug smuggling, on federal and tribal lands in Arizona have been increasing since the mid-to late-1990s, creating law enforcement challenges for land management agencies. This situation poses dangers to law enforcement officers, visitors, and employees and damages fragile natural resources. Rising illegal activity on these federal lands results from the Border Patrol's strategy to deter illegal entry by concentrating resources in populated areas--thus shifting illegal traffic to more remote federal lands, where Border Patrol has placed fewer resources. Although the problem is less acute along the Canadian border, land management agency officials in Washington are concerned that as the Border Patrol increases resources in populated areas, more illegal traffic will shift to remote federal lands. Officials from the five land management agencies believe their resource levels have not kept pace with increases in illegal border activities on their lands. Agencies have sought more federal funds to address these problems and have received varying levels of law enforcement staffing and resource increases. According to Office of Management and Budget representatives, agency funding is mission-driven. Thus, land management agencies' proposals for certain border projects have not been included in the administration's fiscal year 2005 budget because they were considered to be more in keeping with the border security mission of the Border Patrol. At the national level, interagency coordination of strategic plans and activities among Border Patrol and land management agencies is minimal regarding the Mexican and Canadian borders. Thus, limited funds may not be used most efficiently, and the impact of one agency's actions on another agency may not be considered. As of May 2004, the Border Patrol had not issued detailed plans to ensure that interagency coordination occurs, nor had it coordinated with land management officials regarding funding for infrastructure and technology improvements. Some coordination had occurred at the field level, as officials from the various agencies had begun meeting to improve operations and to share threat assessments in Arizona. Wed, 16 Jun 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04434.pdf The U.S. Supreme Court's June 2001 ruling, Zadvydas v. Davis, held that indefinite detention of certain removable aliens was unlawful if their removal was not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, even if they were deemed to be a threat to the community or a flight risk. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conducts post order custody reviews of removable aliens to determine if continued detention is in compliance with laws and regulations. ICE is to assure that aliens meet the conditions of their release. This report addresses (1) what information ICE has to assure that its custody reviews are timely and consistent with the Zadvydas decision and implementing regulations and (2) how ICE has assured that aliens released on orders of supervision have met the conditions of their release. ICE does not have information that provides assurance that its custody reviews are timely and its custody determinations are consistent with the Zadvydas decision and implementing regulations. One reason ICE has difficulty providing assurance is that it lacks complete, accurate, and readily available information to provide deportation officers when post order custody reviews are due for eligible aliens. In addition, ICE does not have the capability to record information on how many post order custody reviews have been made pursuant to regulations and what decisions resulted from those reviews. Therefore, ICE managers cannot gauge overall compliance with the regulations for aliens who have been ordered to be removed from the United States. Although ICE is in the process of updating its case management system, ICE officials said that they did not know when the system will have the capability to capture information about the timeliness and results of post order custody reviews. ICE also does not have readily available information on how many aliens have been released on orders of supervision pursuant to the Zadvydas regulations, or whether these aliens have met the conditions of their release (i.e., periodically report to ICE and continue to seek travel documents from their home country). One reason for this is that ICE does not have the capability to track aliens' actions required by the conditions of their release. ICE officials also reported that ICE has a shortage of deportation staff, but they did not know how many staff are needed to manage the supervision caseload. Despite ICE's challenges in this area, ICE has not provided guidance to its field offices to help them prioritize deportation officer duties and supervision cases. Such prioritization could help ICE target its resources on those supervision cases that present the highest risk to public safety. Thu, 27 May 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04472.pdf About 7 million undocumented aliens lived in the United States in 2000, according to Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates. Hospitals in states where many of them live report that treating them can be a financial burden. GAO was asked to examine the relationship between treating undocumented aliens and hospitals' costs not paid by patients or insurance. GAO was also asked to examine federal funding available to help hospitals offset costs of treating undocumented aliens and the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security) for covering medical expenses of sick or injured aliens encountered by Border Patrol and U.S. port-of-entry officials. To conduct this work, GAO surveyed 503 hospitals and interviewed Medicaid and hospital officials in 10 states. GAO also interviewed and obtained data from Homeland Security officials. Hospitals generally do not collect information on their patients' immigration status, and as a result, an accurate assessment of undocumented aliens' impact on hospitals' uncompensated care costs--those not paid by patients or by insurance--remains elusive. GAO attempted to examine the relationship between uncompensated care and undocumented aliens by surveying hospitals, but because of a low response rate to key survey questions and challenges in estimating the proportion of hospital care provided to undocumented aliens, GAO could not determine the effect of undocumented aliens on hospitals' uncompensated care costs. Federal funding has been available from several sources to help hospitals cover the costs of care for undocumented aliens. The sources include Medicaid coverage for emergency medical services for eligible undocumented aliens, supplemental Medicaid payments to hospitals treating a disproportionate share of low-income patients, and funds provided to 12 states by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. In addition, the recently enacted Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 appropriated $1 billion over fiscal years 2005 through 2008 for payments to hospitals and other providers for emergency services provided to undocumented and certain other aliens. By September 1, 2004, the Secretary of Health and Human Services must establish a process for hospitals and other providers to request payments under the statute. Border Patrol and U.S. port-of-entry officials encounter aliens needing medical attention under different circumstances, but in most situations, Homeland Security is not responsible for aliens' hospital costs. The agency may cover medical expenses only for those people in its custody, but border officials reported that sick or injured people they encounter generally receive medical attention without being taken into custody. Fri, 21 May 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0482.pdf Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come to the United States. Foreign visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis--that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a specific date--either (1) with temporary visas (generally for tourism, business, or work) or, in some cases, (2) as tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without visas. (The latter include Canadians and qualified visitors from 27 countries who enter under the visa waiver program.) The majority of visitors who are tracked depart on time, but others overstay--and since September 11, 2001, the question has arisen as to whether overstay issues might have an impact on domestic security. In this report, we (1) describe available data on the extent of overstaying, (2) report on weaknesses in the Department of Homeland Security's long-standing overstay tracking system, and (3) provide some observations on the impact that tracking system weaknesses and significant levels of overstaying may have on domestic security. Significant numbers of foreign visitors overstay their authorized periods of admission. Based in part on its long-standing I-94 system for tracking arrivals and departures, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated the overstay population for January 2000 at 2.3 million. But this estimate (1) excludes an unknown number of long-term overstays from Mexico and Canada, and by definition (2) excludes short-term overstays from these and other countries. Because of unresolved weaknesses in DHS's long-standing tracking system (e.g., noncollection of some departure forms), there is no accurate list of overstays. Tracking system weaknesses make it difficult to monitor potentially suspicious aliens who enter the country legally--and limit immigration control options. Post-September 11 operations identified thousands of overstays and other illegal immigrant workers who (despite limited background checks) had obtained critical infrastructure jobs and security badges with access to, for example, airport tarmacs and U.S. military bases. As of April 2004, federal investigators had arrested more than 1,360 illegal workers, while the majority had eluded apprehension. Together with other improvements, better information on overstays might contribute to a layered national defense that is better able to counter threats from foreign terrorists. A more comprehensive system, US-VISIT, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, is being phased in. The design and implementation of US-VISIT, however, face a number of challenges. It is important that this new program avoid specific weaknesses associated with the long-standing system. Checking for these weaknesses might help identify difficult challenges in advance and--together with other efforts--enhance USVISIT's chances for eventual success as a tracking system. Fri, 21 May 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04785t.pdf One of the primary functions of any security system is the control of people moving into or out of protected areas, such as physical buildings, information systems, and our national border. Technologies called biometrics can automate the identification of people by one or more of their distinct physical or behavioral characteristics. The term biometrics covers a wide range of technologies that can be used to verify identity by measuring and analyzing human characteristics--relying on attributes of the individual instead of things the individual may have or know. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, laws have been passed that require a more extensive use of biometric technologies in the federal government. In 2002, GAO conducted a technology assessment on the use of biometrics for border security. GAO was asked to testify about the issues that it raised in the report, the current state of the technology, and the application of biometrics to aviation security. Biometric technologies are available today that can be used for aviation security. Biometric technologies vary in complexity, capabilities, and performance, and can be used to verify or establish a person's identity. Leading biometric technologies include facial recognition, fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, and iris recognition. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), has been examining the use of biometrics for aviation security for several years. TSA has three current pilot projects that will study the use of biometrics to enhance aviation security: the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), registered traveler, and an access control pilot program designed to secure sensitive areas of an airport. It is important to bear in mind that effective security cannot be achieved by relying on technology alone. Technology and people must work together as part of an overall security process. Weaknesses in any of these areas diminish the effectiveness of the security process. The security process needs to account for limitations in biometric technology. For example, some people cannot enroll in a biometrics system because they lack the appropriate body part. Similarly, errors sometimes occur during matching operations. Exception processing that is not as good as biometric-based primary processing could be exploited as a security hole. Further, non-technological processes for enrollment are critical to the success of a biometrics-based identity management system. Before a person is granted a biometric credential, the issuing authority needs to assure itself that the person is eligible to receive such a credential. We have found that three key considerations need to be addressed before a decision is made to design, develop, and implement biometrics into a security system: (1) decisions must be made on how the technology will be used; (2) a detailed cost-benefit analysis must be conducted to determine that the benefits gained from a system outweigh the costs; and (3) a trade-off analysis must be conducted between the increased security, which the use of biometrics would provide, and the effect on areas such as privacy and convenience. Security concerns need to be balanced with practical cost and operational considerations as well as political and economic interests. A risk management approach can help federal agencies identify and address security concerns. To develop security systems with biometrics, the high-level goals of these systems need to be defined, and the concept of operations that will embody the people, process, and technologies required to achieve these goals needs to be developed. With these answers, the proper role of biometric technologies in aviation security can be determined. Wed, 19 May 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04708r.pdf On October 21, 2002, we reported that consular staff at posts around the world held different views on balancing national security and customer service in the process of adjudicating visas. Since then, the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs has underscored the importance of visa operations in protecting our nation's security and implemented many changes in visa processing to tighten security screening for applicants worldwide. Because of Canada's proximity to the United States and the fact that many nationals from countries of concern apply for U.S. visas in Canada, Congress asked us to obtain the views of U.S. consular officers in Canada regarding the visa process. In response, we are providing information from consular staff who adjudicate U.S. visas in Canada regarding their perceptions of the importance of national security in the visa process, including impediments that could interfere with efforts to make security a top priority in visa processing. Consular officers and managers at U.S. posts in Canada said that, despite rising workloads and more labor-intensive processing requirements, they are placing an emphasis on security in visa operations. All of the officers with whom we spoke reported that security was their first concern in visa adjudication. Some officers said security was their top priority because they would consider themselves personally accountable if they failed to notice an applicant who posed a security risk. Other officers cited the Bureau of Consular Affairs' standardized guidance as the source for their focus, while others credited post management with instilling a pro-security tone for visa operations. The officers acknowledged some challenges that could interfere with efforts to make security a top priority in visa processing. For example, some officers reported that new post-September 11 processing requirements for visas were more labor intensive, and they expressed concern that the requirements could reduce the time available for face-to-face interviews with some applicants. While most officers felt that they had enough time to screen applicants carefully for possible security risks, some of the newer officers at posts expressed concern about their ability to remain vigilant if the workload increased. This problem was most severe in Toronto, where workload was high and the consulate's poor space configuration cramped operations. Tue, 18 May 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04586.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals who travel to the United States. By congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit for approval an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. Among other things, GAO was asked to determine whether the plan satisfied these conditions, and to provide observations on the plan and DHS's program management. DHS's fiscal year 2004 US-VISIT expenditure plan and related documentation at least partially satisfies all conditions imposed by the Congress, including meeting the capital planning and investment control review requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). DHS developed a draft risk management plan and a process to implement and manage risks. However, DHS does not have a current life cycle cost estimate or a cost/benefit analysis for US-VISIT. The US-VISIT program merges four components into one integrated whole to carry out its mission. GAO also developed a number of observations about the expenditure plan and DHS's management of the program. These generally recognize accomplishments to date and address the need for rigorous and disciplined program practices. US-VISIT largely met its commitments for implementing an initial operating capability, known as Increment 1, in early January 2004, including the deployment of entry capability to 115 air and 14 sea ports of entry. However, DHS has not employed rigorous, disciplined management controls typically associated with successful programs, such as test management, and its plans for implementing other controls, such as independent verification and validation, may not prove effective. More specifically, testing of the initial phase of the implemented system was not well managed and was completed after the system became operational. In addition, multiple test plans were developed during testing, and only the final test plan, completed after testing, included all required content, such as describing tests to be performed. Such controls, while significant for the initial phases of US-VISIT, are even more critical for the later phases, as the size and complexity of the program will only increase. Finally, DHS's plans for future US-VISIT resource needs at the land ports of entry, such as staff and facilities, are based on questionable assumptions, making future resource needs uncertain. Tue, 11 May 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04569t.pdf US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) is a governmentwide program to enhance national security, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, contribute to the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies by (1) collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States; (2) identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials; (3) detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and (4) facilitating information sharing and coordination within the border management community. GAO was asked to testify on its completed work on the nature, status, and management of the USVISIT program. The US-VISIT program is inherently risky, both because of the type of program it is and because of the way it is being managed. First, US-VISIT is inherently risky because it is to perform a critical, multifaceted mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding implementation schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. That is, one critical aspect of the program's mission is to prevent the entry of persons who pose a threat to the United States; failing in this mission could have serious consequences. To carry out this mission, the program aims to control the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of millions of travelers--a large and complex process. In addition, through legislative mandate, it has challenging milestones (such as the system being implemented at all U.S. ports of entry by December 31, 2005). Finally, DHS estimated that the program would cost $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, but this estimate did not include all costs and underestimated some others. All these factors add risk. Second, several factors related to the program's management increase the risk of not delivering mission valued commensurate with costs or not delivering defined program capabilities on time and within budget. For example, the program is to rely initially on integrating existing systems with reported problems that could limit US-VISIT performance. In addition, the requirements for interim facilities at high-volume land ports of entry are not only demanding, they are based on assumptions that, if altered, could significantly affect facility plans. Further, DHS did not define the benefits versus costs of near-term program increments (that is, the interim versions of the program that are being pursued while the final version is being defined). Addressing these issues is the responsibility of the program office, which however was not adequately staffed, had not clearly defined roles and responsibilities for its staff, and had not established key processes for managing the acquisition and deployment of US-VISIT. Despite the program management challenges confronting US-VISIT, the first increment was deployed at the beginning of this year. However, the program still faces a number of risks, including the ones described above. To address these, GAO has made a series of recommendations regarding the planned scope of US-VISIT and its management. Addressing the identified risks increases the likelihood that the deployment of US-VISIT will be successful--the predictable outcome of sound management of a welljustified and designed program. Thu, 18 Mar 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04529t.pdf The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issues Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs) to those who are not eligible for a social security number (SSN) from the Social Security Administration (SSA). ITIN-related concerns include whether any weaknesses in IRS's controls would allow ITINs to be issued and used for illegal purposes and possible security breaches, whether employers are confused about their responsibilities to IRS, SSA, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for identifying their employees, and how IRS, SSA, and DHS share data when illegal resident aliens receive ITINs. Because of these concerns, GAO was asked to: (1) describe why IRS created the ITIN, (2) describe IRS's processes and controls for issuing ITINs, (3) do a limited test of IRS's processes and controls, and (4) describe certain concerns and problems for employers and government agencies when ITINs are issued to illegal resident aliens. IRS created the ITIN in 1996 to improve tax administration. IRS needed a better way to identify the tax reporting of those who could not obtain an SSN to use on tax returns and other tax documents. The cumulative number of ITINs issued exceeded 7 million by the end of 2003. IRS receives ITIN applications from the mail, applicants walking into IRS offices, and authorized non-IRS entities. In December 2003, IRS made changes to improve its ITIN controls. However, IRS remains limited in its ability to verify applicants' identities. For instance, IRS staff does not see most applicants and IRS does not verify the validity of documents. Before December 2003, GAO staff obtained an ITIN by submitting bogus documents through the mail and used the ITIN to open a bank account and obtain an ATM card. Staff also fabricated an ITIN and used it to obtain a voter registration card. While limited, this test indicates that IRS's controls could be bypassed and that an ITIN could be used for nontax purposes. Despite the December changes, the weaknesses GAO exploited remain. Resolving these limitations could be challenging. IRS has concluded that most resident aliens who have ITINs and earn wage income are not legally employed in the United States. Given this context, the use of ITINs raises various issues. Employers have raised concerns that when they identify employees and their work eligibility, they could have conflicting obligations to IRS, SSA, and DHS. These concerns appear to be largely unfounded if employers do what is specifically required. Data sharing--especially of IRS data--may help DHS to target immigration enforcement, but, among other things, officials cited legal restrictions and the potential for employment to be hidden from tax administrators as affecting their decisions about sharing data. Wed, 10 Mar 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04309r.pdf The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) established the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). CIS is responsible for several functions transferred from the former Immigration Services Division of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) under the Department of Justice. CIS's functions include adjudicating and processing applications for U.S. citizenship and naturalization, administering work authorizations and other petitions, and providing services for new residents and citizens. CIS collects fees from applicants to process the various immigrationrelated applications and petitions. CIS also receives appropriated funds to pay for administrative and overhead costs such as records management and backlog reduction. HSA requires that we report on whether CIS is likely to derive sufficient funds from fees to carry out its functions in the absence of appropriated funds. We determined that fees were not sufficient to fully fund CIS's operations. In part, this has resulted because (1) the current fee schedule is based on an outdated fee study that did not include all costs of CIS's operations and (2) costs have increased since that study was completed due to an additional processing requirement and other actions. While it is clear fees are insufficient to fully fund CIS's operations, there is insufficient cost data to determine the full extent of the shortfall. A fundamental problem is that CIS does not have a system to track the status of each application as it moves through the process. Accordingly, CIS does not have information on the extent to which work on applications in process remains to be finished. In addition, CIS does not know the current cost of each step to process each application. The effect is that CIS knows neither the cost to process new applications nor the cost to complete pending applications. Further, because DHS is still determining how administrative and overhead functions will be carried out and the related costs allocated, CIS does not know what future administrative and overhead costs will be. For the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through 2003, CIS's reported operating costs exceeded available fees by almost $460 million, thus creating the need for appropriated funds. CIS projects that this situation will remain in fiscal year 2004. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2001, the number of pending applications increased by more than 2.3 million (about 59 percent) to about 6.2 million at the end of fiscal year 2003. This increase occurred despite additional appropriations beginning in fiscal year 2002 of $80 million annually to address the backlog. In addition, CIS has not performed an analysis of the steps needed to reduce processing times to the 6-month average goal established in the President's backlog initiative. These times increased significantly in fiscal year 2003 to levels well above the 6-month target established in CIS's March 2002 Backlog Elimination Plan. Absent actions to increase fees, reduce processing costs and times, or both, as well as to improve the timeliness and completeness of fee schedule updates, CIS will continue to need appropriated funds to avoid even greater increases in the backlog of pending applications. The full costs of CIS's operations cannot be determined until analyses of the costs to process incoming and pending applications and administrative and overhead costs are completed. Mon, 05 Jan 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04189r.pdf This report responds to certain requirements of the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 that authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. Section 902(k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every 6 months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the number of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. Reports are to be provided until all applications have been finally adjudicated. This is our tenth report. Through September 30, 2003, the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), had received a total of 37,851 HRIFA applications and had approved 11,067 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) had 1,094 applications filed and had approved 273 of them. Fri, 17 Oct 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04170t.pdf Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come to the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis--that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a specific date--either (1) with temporary visas (generally for tourism,business,or work) or, in some cases (2) as tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without visas. (The latter group includes Canadians and qualified visitors from 27 countries who enter under the visa waiver program.) The majority of visitors who are tracked depart on time, but others overstay. Four of the 9/11 hijackers who entered the United States with legal visas overstayed their authorized periods of admission. This has heightened attention to issues such as (1) the extent of overstaying, (2) weaknesses in our current overstay tracking system, and (3) how the tracking system weaknesses and the level of overstaying might affect domestic security. Significant numbers of foreign visitors overstay their authorized periods of admission. The Department of Homeland Security estimates the resident overstay population at 2.3 million as of January 2000. Because the starting point for this estimate is the 2000 census, it does not cover short-term overstays who have not established residence here. It also omits an unknown number of potential long-term overstays from Mexico and Canada. Because of unresolved weaknesses in DHS's current system for tracking arrivals and departures (e.g.,noncollection of some departure forms and inability to match other departure forms to arrivals), there is no accurate list of overstays. Two new tracking initiatives are intended to address these weaknesses. NSEERS, the National Security Entry and Exit Registration System, does not cover most visitors. US-VISIT, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, a more comprehensive,automated program, is being phased in. While its design and implementation face a number of challenges, evaluating US-VISIT against the weaknesses GAO identifies here would increase its potential for success. The current tracking system's weaknesses limit control options and make it difficult to monitor potential terrorists who enter the country legally. Like other illegal immigrants, overstays obtain jobs with fraudulent identity documents, including jobs at critical infrastructure locations, such as airports. Thus, tracking issues can affect domestic security and are one component of a layered national defense. Improving the tracking system could work with intelligence, investigation, information-sharing, and other factors to help counter threats from foreign terrorists. Thu, 16 Oct 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0412.pdf In 2002, the Social Security Administration (SSA) issued nearly 6 million new Social Security numbers (SSNs), of which 1.3 million were issued to noncitizens. Despite its narrowly intended purpose, the SSN has in practice become the national identifier. SSNs are key pieces of information in creating false identities, underscoring the importance of issuing SSNs only to those eligible for them and of protecting those already assigned to individuals. The flow of noncitizens into the United States and the accompanying number of SSNs issued to them over the last several years add to the importance of having sound practices to avoid issuing SSNs to those who do not qualify for them. Congress asked GAO to describe and assess SSA's key initiatives to ensure the appropriate issuance of SSNs to noncitizens and identify vulnerabilities to error or fraud SSA has not yet addressed. SSA Has Increased Noncitizen Verifications and Begun New Initiatives: SSA has taken steps to prevent the inappropriate assignment of SSNs to noncitizens. SSA now requires field staff to verify noncitizens' identity documents with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in addition to continuing to require visual inspection of these documents, prior to issuing an SSN. However, many field staff GAO interviewed are relying heavily on DHS's verification while neglecting SSA's standard inspection practices, even though both approaches are necessary. SSA has also undertaken new initiatives to shift the burden of processing noncitizen SSN applications and verifying documents from its field offices. In 2002, SSA started implementation of a process called "Enumeration at Entry" (EAE), which relies on State Department and DHS expertise to authenticate information provided by SSN applicants. SSA is in the early stages of planning to evaluate EAE with the State Department and DHS. Also, SSA recently piloted a specialized center in Brooklyn, New York, which focuses on enumeration and uses the expertise of DHS staff and SSA's Office of the Inspector General investigators. Some Areas Affecting Issuance of SSNs Not Yet Addressed: While SSA has embarked on these new initiatives, it has not tightened controls in two key areas of its enumeration process that could be exploited by individuals--citizens and noncitizens alike--seeking fraudulent SSNs: the assignment of SSNs to children under age 1 and replacement Social Security cards. SSA changed its policy to require independent verification of birth records for U.S.-born children age 1 and over but still only relies on visual inspection of birth documents of children under age 1. This lack of independent verification remains an area vulnerable to fraud. In fact, by posing as parents of newborns, GAO investigators obtained two SSNs using counterfeit documents. SSA's policy for replacing Social Security cards, which allows individuals to obtain up to 52 replacement cards per year, and its documentation requirements for U.S. citizens to obtain such cards also increase the potential for misuse of SSNs. Of the 18 million cards issued by SSA in 2002, 12.4 million, or 69 percent, were replacements. While SSA requires noncitizens applying for replacement cards to provide the same identity and immigration information as if they were applying for a new SSN, its evidence requirements for citizens are much less stringent. The ability to obtain many replacement cards with relatively weak documentation may allow individuals to impersonate others by using counterfeit documents to obtain SSNs for a range of illicit uses, including selling them to noncitizens. Wed, 15 Oct 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03993.pdf Totalization agreements foster international commerce, protect benefits for persons who have worked in foreign countries, and eliminate dual social security taxes that employers and their employees pay when they operate and reside in countries with parallel social security systems. Because Mexicans are believed to represent a large share of the millions of unauthorized workers present in the United States, a totalization agreement with Mexico has raised concerns that they would become newly eligible for social security benefits. To shed light on the possible impacts, GAO was asked to (1) describe the Social Security Administration's (SSA) processes for developing the agreement with Mexico, (2) explain how the agreement might affect the payment of benefits to Mexican citizens, and (3) assess the cost estimate for such an agreement. SSA has no written policies or procedures it follows when entering into totalization agreements, and the actions it took to assess the integrity and compatibility of Mexico's social security system were limited and neither transparent nor well-documented. SSA followed the same procedures for the proposed Mexican agreement that it used in all prior agreements. SSA officials told GAO that they briefly toured Mexican facilities, observed how its automated systems functioned, and identified the type of data maintained on Mexican workers. However, SSA provided no information showing that it assessed the reliability of Mexican earnings data and the internal controls used to ensure the integrity of information that SSA will rely on to pay social security benefits. The proposed agreement will likely increase the number of unauthorized Mexican workers and family members eligible for social security benefits. Mexican workers who ordinarily could not receive social security retirement benefits because they lack the required 40 coverage credits for U.S. earnings could qualify for partial social security benefits with as few as 6 coverage credits. In addition, under the proposed agreement, more family members of covered Mexican workers would become newly entitled because the agreements usually waive rules that prevent payments to noncitizens' dependents and survivors living outside the United States. The cost of such an agreement is highly uncertain. In March 2003, the Office of the Chief Actuary estimated that the cost of the Mexican agreement would be $78 million in the first year and would grow to $650 million (in constant 2002 dollars) in 2050. The actuarial cost estimate assumes the initial number of newly eligible Mexican beneficiaries is equivalent to the 50,000 beneficiaries living in Mexico today and would grow sixfold over time. However, this proxy figure does not directly consider the estimated millions of current and former unauthorized workers and family members from Mexico and appears small in comparison with those estimates. The estimate also inherently assumes that the behavior of Mexican citizens would not change and does not recognize that an agreement would create an additional incentive for unauthorized workers to enter the United States to work and maintain documentation to claim their earnings under a false identity. Although the actuarial estimate indicates that the agreement would not generate a measurable long-term impact on the actuarial balance of the trust funds, a subsequent sensitivity analysis performed at GAO's request shows that a measurable impact would occur with an increase of more than 25 percent in the estimate of initial, new beneficiaries. For prior agreements, error rates associated with estimating the expected number of new beneficiaries have frequently exceeded 25 percent, even in cases where uncertainties about the number of unauthorized workers were less prevalent. Because of the significant number of unauthorized Mexican workers in the United States, the estimated cost of the proposed totalization agreement is even more uncertain than in prior agreements. Tue, 30 Sep 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031083.pdf The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to establish a program to strengthen management of the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of foreign nationals who travel to the United States. The goals of the program, known as the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), are to facilitate legitimate trade and travel, enhance national security, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies. By congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit for approval an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO was asked to determine, among other things, whether the plan satisfies these conditions and to provide observations about the plan and DHS's management of the program. DHS's fiscal year 2003 US-VISIT expenditure plan and related documentation partially satisfied the conditions imposed by the Congress, which include meeting the capital planning and investment control review requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For example, DHS fulfilled the OMB requirement that agencies state whether projects are approved by investment review boards and reviewed by Chief Financial and Procurement Officers; the plan was conditionally approved by DHS's review board, which includes DHS's Chief Financial and Procurement Officers. On the other hand, OMB guidance requires that agency plans summarize life cycle costs and include a cost/benefit analysis that covers return on investment. DHS has not yet established a date and plan for developing these for US-VISIT, although program officials stated that they intend to do so. GAO also identified 10 factors affecting US-VISIT and concluded that the program is a very risky endeavor. Some risk factors are inherent to the program, such as its mission criticality, its size and complexity, and its enormous potential costs. Others, however, arise from the program's relatively immature state of governance and management. For example, although the program has governmentwide scope, an accountable governance structure to direct and oversee the program that reflects this scope is not yet established. In addition, a US-VISIT program management capability has yet to be established, important aspects defining the program's operating environment are not decided, facility needs are unclear and challenging, and the mission value to be derived from the program's initial operating capability is unknown. Because of the risk factors, GAO concluded that it is uncertain that US-VISIT will be able to measurably and appreciably achieve DHS's stated goals for the program. Further, DHS's near-term investment in the program is at risk of not delivering promised capabilities on time and within budget and not producing mission value commensurate with investment costs. Fri, 19 Sep 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031035t.pdf Totalization agreements foster international commerce and protect benefits for persons who have worked in foreign countries. They eliminate dual social security taxes that multinational employers and their employees pay when they operate and reside in countries with parallel social security systems and fill gaps in benefit protection for persons who have worked in different countries. Because Mexicans are believed to represent a large share of the millions of unauthorized workers present in the United States, a totalization agreement with Mexico has raised concerns that they would become newly eligible for social security benefits. To shed light on the possible impacts, this testimony (1) describes the Social Security Administration's (SSA) processes for developing the agreement with Mexico, (2) explains how the agreement might affect the payment of benefits to Mexican citizens, and (3) assesses the cost estimate for such an agreement. SSA has no written policies or procedures it follows when entering into totalization agreements, and the actions it took to assess the integrity and compatibility of Mexico's social security system were limited and neither transparent nor well-documented. SSA followed the same procedures for the proposed Mexican agreement that it used in all prior agreements. SSA officials told GAO that they briefly toured Mexican facilities, observed how its automated systems functioned, and identified the type of data maintained on Mexican workers. However, SSA provided no information showing that it assessed the reliability of Mexican earnings data and the internal controls used to ensure the integrity of information that SSA will rely on to pay social security benefits. The proposed agreement will likely increase the number of unauthorized Mexican workers and family members eligible for social security benefits. Mexican workers who ordinarily could not receive social security retirement benefits because they lack the required 40 coverage credits for U.S. earnings could qualify for partial Social Security benefits with as few as 6 coverage credits. In addition, under the proposed agreement, more family members of covered Mexican workers would become newly entitled because the agreements usually waive rules that prevent payments to noncitizens' dependents and survivors living outside the United States. The cost of such an agreement is highly uncertain. In March 2003, the Office of the Chief Actuary estimated that the cost of the Mexican agreement would be $78 million in the first year and would grow to $650 million (in constant 2002 dollars) by 2050. The actuarial cost estimate assumes the initial number of newly eligible Mexican beneficiaries is equivalent to the 50,000 beneficiaries living in Mexico today and would grow sixfold over time. However, this proxy figure does not directly consider the estimated millions of current and former unauthorized workers and family members from Mexico and appears small in comparison with those estimates. The estimate also inherently assumes that the behavior of Mexican citizens would not change and does not recognize that an agreement could create an additional incentive for unauthorized workers to enter the United States to work and maintain documentation to claim their earnings under a false identity. Although the actuarial estimate indicates that the agreement would not generate a measurable long-term impact on the actuarial balance of the trust funds, a subsequent sensitivity analysis performed at GAO's request shows that a measurable impact would occur with an increase of more than 25 percent in the estimate of initial, new beneficiaries. For prior agreements, error rates associated with estimating the expected number of new beneficiaries have frequently exceeded 25 percent, even in cases where uncertainties about the number of unauthorized workers were less prevalent. Because of the significant number of unauthorized Mexican workers in the United States, the estimated cost of the proposed totalization agreement is even more uncertain than in prior agreements. Thu, 11 Sep 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03883.pdf The continuing use of H-1B visas, which allow employers to fill specialty occupations with highly skilled foreign workers, has been a contentious issue between U.S. workers and employers during the recent economic downturn. The H- 1B program is of particular concern to these groups because employment has substantially decreased within information technology occupations, for which employers often requested H-1B workers. In light of these concerns, GAO sought to determine (1) what major occupational categories H- 1B beneficiaries were approved to fill and what is known about H-1B petition approvals and U.S. citizen employment from 2000-2002; (2) what factors affect employers' decisions about the employment of H-1B workers and U.S. workers; and (3) what is known about H-1B workers' entries, departures, and changes in visa status. H-1B beneficiaries were approved to fill a variety of positions in 2002, and the number of approved petitions (i.e., employer requests to hire H-1B beneficiaries) in certain occupations has generally declined along with the economic downturn, as have U.S. citizen employment levels in these occupations. In contrast with 2000, most H-1B beneficiaries in 2002 were approved to fill positions in fields not directly related to information technology, such as economics, accounting, and biology. Both the number of H-1B petition approvals and U.S. citizens employed in certain occupations, such as systems analysts and electrical engineers, decreased from 2001 to 2002. GAO contacted 145 H-1B employers, and the majority of the 36 employers that agreed to speak with GAO said that they recruited, hired, and retained workers based on the skills needed, rather than the applicant's citizenship or visa status. Despite increases in unemployment, most employers said that finding workers with the skills needed in certain science-related occupations remains difficult. Although some employers acknowledged that H-1B workers might work for lower wages than their U.S. counterparts, the extent to which wage is a factor in employment decisions is unknown. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has incomplete information on H-1B worker entries, departures, and changes in visa status. As a result, DHS is not able to provide key information needed to oversee the H-1B program and its effects on the U.S. workforce, including data on the number of H-1B workers in the United States at any time. GAO also found that DHS's ability to provide information on H-1B workers is limited because it has not issued consistent guidance or any regulations on the legal status of unemployed H- 1B workers seeking new jobs. Allowing unemployed H-1B workers to remain in the United States may have implications for the labor force competition faced by U.S. workers. While DHS has long-term plans for providing better information on H-1B workers, policymakers in the interim need data to inform discussions on program changes. Wed, 10 Sep 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031084r.pdf The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 mandates that we track, monitor, and evaluate the Attorney General's strategy to deter illegal entry and report our findings to Congress. In response, we have evaluated immigration-related inspections at land border Ports of Entry (POE) and made recommendations regarding (1) the integrity of the inspections process; (2) the efficiency and effectiveness of inspections-related port operations; and (3) the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence information. Due to concern that the public release of our detailed findings could compromise law enforcement operations, our report is restricted to Limited Official Use. This letter is intended to summarize our overall findings and confirm agreement to take action to address vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in the inspections process. Most of our work was conducted before the Department of Justice's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Department of the Treasury's Customs Service were merged into the newly created Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However, the issues we address remain relevant as DHS merges the functions previously performed by the two agencies and implements major changes to its border inspections process. Our observations and interviews at 15 land border POEs identified several vulnerabilities in the integrity of the inspections process, which raise the risk of unlawful entry. For example, inspectors can experience difficulties in verifying the identity of travelers, traveler inspections were not always done consistently and according to policy, and inspectors did not always receive the training they needed. Inspections-related port operations were hampered by inefficiencies related to technology and equipment. Inspectors faced cumbersome procedures in order to access data systems, and the lack of automation for routine data collection cost time and resources. Furthermore, inspectors lacked a standard issue of equipment, which could create operational inefficiencies. On a positive note, planned expansion of dedicated commuter lanes for travelers determined to be low risk will increase efficiency and give inspectors more time to focus on travelers whose risk is unknown. Regarding the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence information, lack of time and training impedes intelligence development and use. In addition, there was no structure in place to support the analysis and use of intelligence information in the field, despite the fact that INS and others have long recognized this as a need. Given the threat of terrorism confronting the country, having and using intelligence information effectively at land border POEs has never been more important. Mon, 18 Aug 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031013t.pdf Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly important role in ensuring the national security of the United States. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as other agencies, are involved in the visa process. Each plays an important role in making security decisions so that potential terrorists do not enter the country. In two GAO reports, we assessed the effectiveness of the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa process if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and increased agency coordination and information sharing. In our October 2002 report on the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we found that State did not provide clear policies on how consular officers should balance national security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel when issuing visas; and State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds. In our June 2003 report, we found that State had revoked visas for terrorism concerns but that the revocation process was not being used aggressively to alert homeland security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who entered the country before their visas were revoked might be security risks; and the process broke down when information on revocations was not being shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement officials. These weaknesses diminish the effectiveness of the visa process in keeping potential terrorists out of the United States. Tue, 15 Jul 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03908t.pdf The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have entered the United States before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) assess the effectiveness of the visa revocation process and (2) identify the policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective actions in the process. Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process was not being fully utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process broke down when information on individuals with revoked visas was not shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke down even further when individuals had already entered the United States prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found that (1) appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notifications of all the revocations; (2) names were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; (3) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had entered the United States and may still remain; and (4) INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. These weaknesses resulted from the U.S. government's limited policy guidance on the process. None of the agencies have specific, written policies on using the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. Wed, 18 Jun 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03798.pdf The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and, where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have entered the United States before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) identify the policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective visa revocation actions and (2) determine the effectiveness of the process. The U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism grounds. Further, State, INS, and the FBI do not have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State Department. State and INS officials said they use the revocation process to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the country, but none of the agencies has a policy that covers investigating, locating, and taking action when a visa holder has already entered. This lack of formal written policies and procedures has contributed to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the possibility of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United States. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found that appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notifications of all the revocations; names were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had entered the United States either before or after revocation and may still remain; and INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. Wed, 18 Jun 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03902t.pdf Balancing our nation's security and commercial needs is a longstanding issue that is especially important in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that changed the nation's security environment. Addressing this challenge now falls principally to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Border and Transportation Security directorate. Within this directorate, responsibility has been assigned primarily to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). BCBP consists of the inspections component of the former U.S. Customs Service; the Border Patrol and Inspections component of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a former component of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Achieving the balance between security and commercial needs is greatly affected by BCBP's commercial and border and immigration control workload. Regarding commercial workload, in fiscal year 2002, the former U.S. Customs Services processed 24.9 million trade import entries valued at over $1.1 trillion and collected $23.8 billion in duties and fees; it also processed about 6 million cargo containers arriving at U.S. sea ports. While the cargo workload has stabilized somewhat as a result of the recent global economic slowdown, it is likely to begin growing again, when an economic recovery is underway at some point in the future, thus exacerbating the challenges BCBP faces. Regarding border and immigration control workload, in fiscal year 2002, inspectors at over 300 ports of entry inspected nearly 450 million travelers while the Border Patrol apprehended nearly 960,000 aliens trying to enter the U.S. illegally between the ports of entry. With respect to cargo, BCBP has attempted to select and inspect the highest-risk incoming cargo, while enabling legitimate cargo to be cleared in a timely manner. These efforts pose a range of challenges, from the availability of threat assessments and actionable intelligence to the capability of nonintrusive inspection technology to detect potentially harmful contraband. BCBP has made some progress in implementing initiatives that are designed to improve the efficiency of its regulation of legitimate commercial activities. But, additional challenges remain, including the need to improve its trade compliance program and to successfully implement its new trade processing information system. BCBP also faces many challenges with respect of preventing illegal entry by individuals into the United States. These challenges impact BCBP's ability to detect and deter illegal entry between ports of entry and to identify those individuals who should not be permitted entry at the ports. BCBP is faced with continuing to implement its southwest border strategy while simultaneously addressing emerging concerns over illegal entry along the northern border, mitigating the negatives affects the strategy may have on communities, and responding to continuing concern over the safety of aliens who cross in remote and desolate areas. At our nation's borders, the challenges include detecting false admissibility documents, unifying and enhancing inspector training, and providing timely intelligence to the field, and successfully implementing the new entry-exit system. In our recent Performance and Accountability series report, we designed implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk based on three factors. First, the implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. Second, components to be merged into DHS, including those forming BCBP, already face a wide array of existing challenges, some of which are described in this statement. Finally, failure to effectively carry out its mission would expose the nation to potentially very serious consequences. Mon, 16 Jun 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03563.pdf Pursuant to legislative direction, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department of Homeland Security, plans to acquire and deploy an entry exit system to assist in monitoring the flow of foreign nationals in and out of the United States. By separate legislative direction, INS must submit to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations a plan for this system that meets certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO, before funds can be obligated. This report satisfies GAO's mandated review obligation by (1) addressing whether the plan submitted by INS, along with related INS documentation and plans, meets required conditions and (2) providing observations about the plan and INS's management of the system. INS's initial expenditure plan and associated system acquisition documentation and plans for the entry exit system partially meet the legislative conditions imposed by the Congress. That is, INS has implemented or has defined plans for implementing most of the legislatively mandated requirements for the plan's content, which include such areas as capital planning and investment control, acquisition, and systems acquisition management. However, key issues related to understanding and implementing system requirements, such as developing a system security plan and assessing system impact on the privacy of individuals, remain to be addressed. Moreover, INS reported that it had obligated some entry exit funding before it submitted the plan to the Appropriations Committees. Since then, INS officials told GAO that they have de-obligated and reclassified these obligations to other available funding sources. GAO observed that INS has preliminary plans showing that it intends to acquire and deploy a system that has functional and performance capabilities that satisfy the general scope of capabilities required under various laws. These include the capability to (1) collect and match alien arrival and departure data electronically; (2) be accessible to the border management community (including consular officers, federal inspection agents, and law enforcement and intelligence agencies responsible for identifying and investigating foreign nationals); and (3) support machine-readable, tamper-resistant documents with biometric identifiers at ports of entry. Each of these capabilities is integral to supporting our nation's border security process. However, GAO also observed that the initial plan does not provide sufficient information about INS commitments for the system, such as what specific system capabilities and benefits will be delivered, by when, and at what cost, and how INS intends to manage the acquisition to provide reasonable assurance that it will meet these commitments. Without sufficiently detailed information on system plans and progress, the Congress will be impeded in its efforts to oversee the system. Mon, 09 Jun 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03713t.pdf This testimony discusses the results of security tests we performed in which agents of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), acting in an undercover capacity, entered the United States from various countries in the Western Hemisphere using counterfeit documentation and fictitious identities. This work was initially undertaken at the request of the Senate Finance Committee and was continued at the request of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, House Committee on the Judiciary. The purpose of our tests was to determine whether U.S. government officials conducting inspections at ports of entry would detect the counterfeit identification documents. In summary, we created counterfeit identification documents in order to establish fictitious identities for our agents by using off-the-shelf computer graphic software that is available to any purchaser. The agents entered the United States from Jamaica, Barbados, Mexico, and Canada using fictitious names, counterfeit driver's licenses and birth certificates. Bureau of Customs & Border Protection (BCBP) staff never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and our agents encountered no difficulty entering the country using them. On two occasions, BCBP staff did not ask for any identification when our agents entered the United States from Mexico and Canada. We have briefed BCBP officials on the results and methods of our work. Tue, 13 May 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03681r.pdf This report responds to certain requirements of the Haitain Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 that authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. Section 902(k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every 6 months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the number of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. Reports are to be provided until all applications have been finally adjudicated. Through March 31, 2003, the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, formerly part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, had recieved a total of 37,295 Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act applications and had approved 9,555 of these applications. The Executive Office of Immigration Review had 665 applications filed and had approved 183 of them. Mon, 21 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03459.pdf As one response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated a project to interview aliens whose characteristics were similar to those responsible for the attacks. The purpose was to determine what knowledge the aliens might have of terrorists and terrorist activities. GAO was asked to (1) determine the criteria DOJ used in compiling the list of aliens to be questioned, (2) whether law enforcement complied with DOJ guidance for the project, (3) the interview project's status, and (4) what information resulted from it. Between September 11 and November 9, 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) compiled a list of aliens whose characteristics were similar to those of the hijackers. DOJ searched its databases for aliens that fit certain characteristics relating to type of visa, gender, age, date of entry into the United States, and country that issued the passport, and identified 7,602 names for interview. According to law enforcement officials, attorneys for interviewees, and immigration advocates in six U.S. Attorney districts, law enforcement officers who conducted the interviews adhered to DOJ guidelines for the project. The guidelines stressed that the project's objective was information gathering, not criminal investigation, and that participation was to be voluntary. Attorneys for interviewees and immigration advocates agreed that the law enforcement officers adhered to project guidelines, but expressed the view that interviewed aliens did not perceive the interviews to be truly voluntary. They noted that although aliens were not coerced to participate in the interviews, they worried about repercussions, such as future INS denials for visa extensions or permanent residency, if they refused to be interviewed. Firm and complete information on the project's status is unavailable. As of March 2003, law enforcement officers had interviewed 3,216 aliens--about 42 percent of the names on the list. However, the list contained problems such as duplicate names and data entry errors, making it difficult to determine how many interviews remained to be completed. DOJ asserted that the project netted intelligence information and had a disruptive effect on terrorists. But the results are difficult to measure, and DOJ has not fully analyzed all the data obtained from the interviews or how effectively the project was implemented. Fri, 11 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03660t.pdf Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy's implementation is now the responsibility of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). This strategy was originally created by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In the 1990s, INS developed a strategy to control illegal immigration across the U.S. border and a strategy to address enforcement priorities within the country's interior. In 1994, INS's Border Patrol issued a strategy to deter illegal entry. The strategy called for "prevention through deterrence"; that is, to raise the risk of being apprehended for illegal aliens to a point where they would consider it futile to try to enter. The plan called for targeting resources in a phased approach, starting first with the areas of greatest illegal activity. In 1999, the INS issued its interior enforcement strategy designed to deter illegal immigration, prevent immigration-related crimes, and remove those illegally in the United States. Historically, Congress and INS have devoted over five times more resources in terms of staff and budget on border enforcement than on interior enforcement. INS's interior enforcement strategy was designed to address (1) the detention and removal of criminal aliens, (2) the dismantling and diminishing of alien smuggling operations, (3) community complaints about illegal immigration, (4) immigration benefit and document fraud, and (5) employers' access to undocumented workers. These components remain in the BICE strategy. INS faced numerous challenges in implementing the strategy. For example, INS lacked reliable data to determine staff needs, reliable information technology, clear and consistent guidelines and procedures for working-level staff, effective collaboration and coordination within INS and with other agencies, and appropriate performance measures to help assess program results. As BICE assumes responsibility for strategy implementation, it should consider how to address these challenges by improving resource allocation, information technology, program guidance, and performance measurement. The creation of DHS has focused attention on other challenges to implementing the strategy. For example, BICE needs to coordinate and collaborate with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) for the timely and proper adjudication of benefit applications, and with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) to assist in antismuggling investigations and sharing intelligence. In addition, BICE needs to assure that training and internal controls are sufficient to govern investigators' antiterrorism activities when dealing with citizens and aliens. Thu, 10 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03546t.pdf One of the primary missions of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) focuses on border control--preventing the illegal entry of people and goods into the United States. Part of this mission is controlling the passage of travelers through official ports of entry into the United States. Facilitating the flow of people while preventing the illegal entry of travelers requires an effective and efficient process that authenticates a traveler's identity. Generally, identifying travelers at the ports of entry is performed by inspecting their travel documents, such as passports and visas, and asking them questions. Technologies called biometrics can automate the identification of individual travelers by one or more of their distinct physiological characteristics. Biometrics have been suggested as a way of improving the nation's ability to determine whether travelers are admissible to the United States. GAO found that biometric technologies are available today that can be used for border control. However, questions remain regarding the technical and operational effectiveness of biometric technologies in applications as large as border control. Before implementing any biometric border control system, a number of other issues would have to be considered, including the system's effect on existing border control procedures and people, the costs and benefits of the system, and the system's effect on privacy, convenience, and the economy. Furthermore, technology is only part of the solution. Effective security requires technology and people to work together to implement policies, processes, and procedures. At land border ports of entry, DHS faces several challenges including ensuring that the inspections process has sufficient integrity to enable inspectors to intercept those who should not enter our country, while still facilitating the entry of lawful travelers; ensuring that inspectors have the necessary technology, equipment, and training to do their job efficiently and effectively; and providing inspectors the access to necessary intelligence information. Wed, 12 Mar 2003 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03438t.pdf This testimony discusses the weakness in screening entrants into the United States. This work was completed in response to a request that agents of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) attempt to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica at land, air, and sea ports of entry using fictitious identities and counterfeit identification documents. The purpose was to test whether U.S. government officials conducting inspections at the port of entry would detect the counterfeit identification documents. We created fictitious driver's licenses and birth certificates using off-the-shelf computer graphic software that is available to any purchaser. In addition, we obtained and carried credit cards in the fictitious names that were used in these tests. Our agents entered the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica through ports of entry using fictitious names and these counterfeit identification documents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service officials never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and our agents encountered no difficulty entering the country using them. On two occasions, INS officials did not ask for or inspect any identification documents when our agents entered the United States. On another occasion an agent was able to walk across a major border checkpoint and was not stopped or inspected by any government official. Thu, 30 Jan 2003 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/pas/2003/d03105.pdf In its 2001 performance and accountability report on the Department of Justice, GAO identified five major management challenges. Justice has since made progress on (1) developing measurable performance targets in reducing illegal drugs and (2) improving management of its asset forfeiture program. However, three challenges remain and a fourth managing the FBI's transformation was added. GAO prepared this report to bring these major challenges to the attention of the Congress and Justice. This is part of a special series of reports on governmentwide and agency-specific issues. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the nation forever and drew the country's attention to the mission of the Department of Justice (Justice). In fulfilling its mission, Justice and its components confront several performance and accountability challenges in 2003. Congress recently passed legislation calling for the new Department of Homeland Security to absorb certain functions currently performed by Justice'such as some information analysis and infrastructure protection capabilities and immigration enforcement and services. Regardless of which agency has responsibility for such functions, management challenges will persist. Transform the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): After September 11, 2001, the FBI began transforming its culture to be more proactive and preventive in responding to terrorism. The FBI faces several challenges in reorganizing, including realigning staff to address terrorism, building analytic capabilities, improving information sharing and information technology, recruiting employees with specialized skills, and managing the ripple effect of reorganization on the law enforcement community. Although the Department of Homeland Security will absorb some of the FBI's information analysis and infrastructure protection capabilities, the FBI still faces challenges that will require considerable attention. Enforce Immigration Laws and Provide Immigration Services: In carrying out its enforcement and service functions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) faces many challenges, including unfocused or ineffective efforts at combating benefit fraud, unauthorized employment, and alien smuggling; and problems with workload and information technology management. Although the INS will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security, these organizational, management, and programmatic challenges will remain. Support State and Local Efforts to Reduce Crime: While the Office of Justice Programs has taken steps to achieve more effective grant management procedures and systems, it has not resolved long-standing problems with monitoring grant programs, including data collection and sufficiently rigorous impact evaluation studies. Achieve Financial Accountability: Although Justice achieved an unqualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2001 financial statements, material weaknesses remain in general and application controls over financial management systems, recording financial transactions, and preparing financial statements. Wed, 01 Jan 2003 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03321.pdf GAO's work has repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and program overlap are widespread in the federal government. Implementation of federal crosscutting programs is often characterized by numerous individual agency efforts that are implemented with little apparent regard for the presence and efforts of related activities. GAO has in the past offered possible approaches for managing crosscutting programs, and has stated that the Government Performance and Results Act could provide a framework for addressing crosscutting efforts. GAO was asked to examine the actions and plans agencies reported in addressing the crosscutting issues of border control, flood mitigation and insurance, wetlands, and wildland fire management. GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2001 performance reports and fiscal year 2003 performance plans for the major agencies involved in these issues. GAO did not independently verify or assess the information it obtained from agency performance reports and plans. On the basis of the reports and plans, GAO found that most agencies involved in the crosscutting issues discussed coordination with other agencies in their performance reports and plans, although the extent of coordination and level of detail provided varied considerably. The progress agencies reported in meeting their fiscal year 2001 performance goals also varied considerably. For example, wetlands was the only area in which all of the agencies GAO reviewed met or exceeded fiscal year 2001 goals. Some of the agencies that did not meet their goals provided reasonable explanations and/or strategies that appeared reasonably linked to meeting the goals in the future. The agencies GAO reviewed generally planned to pursue goals in fiscal year 2003 similar to those in 2001, although some agencies added new goals, dropped existing goals, or dropped goals altogether. Many agencies discussed strategies that appeared to be reasonably linked to achieving their fiscal year 2003 goals. Fri, 20 Dec 2002 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0338.pdf Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress, the administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting national security. Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other criminals may exploit one of these programs--the Visa Waiver Program--to enter the United States. The program enables citizens of 28 participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa. It was created, in part, to promote the effective use of government resources and to facilitate international travel without threatening U.S. security. GAO was asked to review the Visa Waiver Program, including the process for assessing countries' eligibility to participate in the program. GAO was also asked to determine the implications--specifically those affecting national security, foreign relations, tourism, and State Department resources--of eliminating the program. GAO analysts traveled to several visa waiver countries, including Belgium, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay, as well as to Argentina, whose participation in the program was recently revoked. To ensure that countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program pose a low risk to U.S. national interests, the Departments of Justice and State verify each country's political and economic stability and the security of its passport issuance process. However, laws passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, affect the processes for determining eligibility for the program. The new laws expand passport requirements for visa waiver countries and call for a system to monitor visitors' movement into and out of the United States. Whether these requirements will be implemented by the specified deadlines remains uncertain. The implications for U.S. national security of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program are difficult to determine. It is clear, however, that eliminating the program could affect U.S. relations with other countries, U.S. tourism, and State Department resources abroad. Although the Departments of Justice and State generally agreed with our report, Justice was concerned that GAO did not fully take into account its progress in meeting certain requirements. State questioned whether GAO considered the border inspection process when discussing the national security implications of eliminating the Visa Waiver Program. Fri, 22 Nov 2002 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03135.pdf To help carry out its mission to protect the public from criminal activity, the Department of Justice invests about $2 billion annually in information technology (IT). In particular, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a Justice agency, invested about $459 million in IT in fiscal year 2002. GAO was asked to determine, for key INS IT system investments, whether Justice's oversight has been effective, ensuring that these systems deliver promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Justice has not effectively overseen INS's investment in IT systems. A key indicator of oversight effectiveness is the quality of the process followed in conducting oversight. In this regard, successful public and private organizations ensure that such processes, at a minimum, provide for measuring progress against investment commitments--that is, project agreements defining what system capabilities and benefits will be delivered, by when, and at what cost. Justice does not yet have such an oversight process. Moreover, for four key INS IT investments that GAO was asked to review (see table), oversight activities that Justice has performed have not included measuring progress against approved cost, schedule, performance, and benefit commitments. As a result, Justice has not been positioned to take timely corrective action to address its component agencies' deviations from established investment commitments, and adequately ensure that promised capabilities are delivered on time and within budget. According to Justice officials, the department has not conducted this level of oversight because it has not given enough priority to the task, and because INS does not have the data that Justice would need to conduct such oversight. Justice recognizes the need to strengthen its oversight of component agencies' IT investments, and has plans to do so. Among these is an initiative to develop steps and procedures for overseeing component agency IT investments so that they meet cost, schedule, and performance goals. However, these initiatives have not progressed to the point that the department has detailed plans governing what will be done and when it will be done. Moreover, the process improvements that these initiatives are intended to put in place must still be implemented and followed before they will produce real benefits. Fri, 22 Nov 2002 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03188.pdf Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government's need to locate aliens in the United States was considerably heightened. Without reliable alien address information, the government is impeded in its ability to find aliens who represent a national security threat or who could help with the nation's anti-terrorism efforts. Requesters from both the Senate and House asked GAO to review the reliability of INS's alien address information and identify the ways it could be improved. Recent events have shown that INS's alien address information could not be fully relied on to locate many aliens who were of interest to the United States. For example, the Department of Justice sought to locate and interview 4,112 aliens who were believed to be in the country and who might have knowledge that would assist the nation in its anti-terrorism efforts. However, as shown below, almost half of these aliens could not be located and interviewed because INS lacked reliable address information. The reliability of INS's alien address information is contingent, in part, on aliens' compliance with the requirement that they notify INS of any change of address. However, lack of publicity about the requirement that aliens should file change of address notifications, no enforcement of penalties for noncompliance, and inadequate processing procedures for changes of address also contribute to INS's alien address information being unreliable. Because INS does not publicize the change of address requirement, some aliens may not be aware of it and may not comply with it. Alternatively, some aliens who are aware of the requirement may not comply because they do not wish to be located. These aliens have little incentive to comply given that INS does not enforce the penalties for noncompliance. On the basis of our review of available data, INS does not appear to have enforced the removal penalty for noncompliance since the early 1970s. When aliens do comply with the requirement, INS lacks adequate processing procedures and controls to ensure that the alien address information it receives is recorded in all automated databases. Addressing these problems should help improve the reliability of INS's alien address information but would not necessarily result in a system that would allow INS to reliably locate all aliens, because some aliens will not likely comply. INS has recognized the need to increase the reliability of its alien address information and is taking some steps to improve it. Thu, 21 Nov 2002 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf As directed in the Fiscal Year 2002 Legislative Branch Appropriations Conference Report and subsequent support letters from interested members of Congress, GAO conducted a pilot program in technology assessment that examined the use of biometric technologies for border control. Biometric technologies are available today and are being used for a variety of applications such as access control and criminal identification and surveillance. GAO considered a number of leading and emerging biometric technologies that could potentially be used for securing the nations borders. The seven leading biometric technologies include facial recognition, fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, iris recognition, retina recognition, signature recognition, and speaker recognition. To evaluate the effectiveness of biometrics in border control, it is important to recognize that the use of biometric technology would be but one component of the decision to support systems that determine who is allowed to enter the United States and who is not. Biometric technology can play a role in associating a person with travel documents such as visas and passports. When used at a border inspection, the biometric comparison can be used to help decide whether to admit a traveler into the United States. Before any decision is made to implement biometrics in a border control system, the benefits of the system must be weighed against its costs. The purpose of any biometrics initiative is to prevent the entry of travelers who are inadmissible to the United States. The costs of biometric border control system will not be trivial. Important policy implications must be addressed in trade-offs between increasing security and the impact on areas such as privacy, economy, traveler convenience, and international relations. Civil liberties groups and privacy experts have expressed concern about the adequacy of protections under current law for biometric data and an absence of clear criteria governing data sharing. Thu, 14 Nov 2002 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03240r.pdf The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. Section 902(k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every six months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the numbers who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children; or as the eligible dependents of these applicants, including spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters. As of September 30, 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization Service had received a total of 36,774 HRIFA applications and had approved 8,410 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review had 339 applications filed and had approved 117 of them. Tue, 22 Oct 2002 00:00:00 -0400 Mon, 21 Oct 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02881.pdf In recent years, U.S. employers have complained of shortages of workers with higher-level skills in information technology, the sciences, and other fields. To find workers with these skills, employers often turn to foreign workers who enter the United States with H-1B visas to work in specialty occupations. Despite the recent economic downturn, employers report that they continue to need higher-skilled workers. Congress passed the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 to create a system connecting employment, education, and training services to better match workers to labor market needs. In 1998, Congress passed legislation raising limits on the number of high-skilled workers entering the United States and imposing a $500 fee on employers--which was later raised to $1000--for each foreign worker for whom they applied. Most of the money collected is to be spent on training that improves the skill of U.S. workers. The National Science Foundation (NSF) receives 22 percent of the funds to distribute as scholarship grants to post-secondary schools that distribute the funds as scholarships for low-income students in computer science, engineering, and mathematics degree programs. The grantees operating skill grant programs use the flexibility allowed by the Department of Labor to administer training through a variety of service delivery options to individuals whose skills need to be upgraded, whereas NSF's scholarship grant programs provide scholarships to low-income students for college degree programs. The training offered by the skill grant programs is based on local workforce needs, although sometimes for lower-skill jobs than those filled by H-1B visa holders, and the scholarship program's training is based on national workforce needs and the types of jobs that many H-1B visa holders fill. Although federal initiatives are not coordinated to strategically address high-skill needs at a national level, local skill grant programs increased coordination, though Labor provided limited assistance to enhance these efforts. Fri, 20 Sep 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02830t.pdf Identity theft involves "stealing" another person's personal identifying information, such as their Social Security number, date of birth, or mother's maiden name, and using that information to fraudulently establish credit, run up debt, or take over existing financial accounts. Another pervasive category is the use of fraudulent identity documents by aliens to enter the United States illegally to obtain employment and other benefits. The prevalence of identity theft appears to be growing. Moreover, identity theft is not typically a stand-alone crime; rather identity theft is usually a component of one or more white-collar or financial crimes. According to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials, the use of fraudulent documents by aliens is extensive, with INS inspectors intercepting tens of thousands of fraudulent documents at ports of entry in each of the last few years. These documents were presented by aliens attempting to enter the United States to seek employment or obtain naturalization or permanent residency status. Federal investigations have shown that some aliens use fraudulent documents in connection with more serious illegal activities, such as narcotics trafficking and terrorism. Efforts to combat identity fraud in its many forms likely will command continued attention for policymakers and law enforcement to include investigating and prosecuting perpetrators, as well as focusing on prevention measures to make key identification documents and information less susceptible to being counterfeited or otherwise used fraudulently. Tue, 25 Jun 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02861t.pdf The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) developed strategies in the 1990s to control illegal immigration across U.S. borders and to address enforcement priorities within the country. In 1994, INS's Border Patrol issued a strategy to deter illegal entry through "prevention through deterrence;" that is, to raise the risk of being apprehended for illegal aliens to where they would consider it futile to try to enter. The plan called for targeting resources in a phased approach, starting in areas with the greatest illegal activity. In 1999, INS issued its Interior Enforcement Strategy to focus resources on areas that would have the greatest impact on reducing the size and annual growth of the illegal resident population. The strategy established the following five areas: (1) identify and remove criminal aliens and minimize recidivism; (2) deter, dismantle, and diminish smuggling or trafficking of aliens; (3) respond to community reports and complaints about illegal immigration; (4) minimize immigration benefit fraud and other document abuse; and (5) block and remove employers' access to undocumented workers. For these to be effective, INS needs better data to determine staff needs, reliable information technology, clear and consistent guidelines and procedures for working level staff, effective collaboration and coordination within INS and with other agencies, and performance measures that help INS assess program results. Having an effective interior strategy is an essential complement to having an effective border strategy. Wed, 19 Jun 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02600r.pdf The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 authorized certain Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. Section 902(k) of the act requires the Comptroller General to report every six months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. The reports are to contain a breakdown of the numbers who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children, and unmarried sons or daughters. As of March 31, 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization Service had received a total of 36,420 HRIFA applications and had approved 7,351 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review had 198 applications filed and had approved 98 of them. Thu, 18 Apr 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0266.pdf Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials believe that some aliens are using the benefit application process to carry out illegal activities, such as crimes of violence, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. The extent of immigration benefit fraud is unknown, but INS officials and others believe that this problem will increase as smugglers and other criminal enterprises use fraud to bring illegal aliens, including criminals, into the United States. INS investigative units in both the service centers and the district offices investigate possible benefit fraud on the basis of information they receive from staff who process benefit applications, other INS units, the public, and law enforcement agencies. Providing immigration benefits in a timely manner may conflict with the goal of preserving the integrity of the legal immigration system. Although INS recognizes the need to balance these competing goals, it has not always succeeded. INS has several performance measures in place to gauge the results of its benefit fraud enforcement activities. However, INS has not established outcome-based performance measures to assess the results of fraud activities. Additionally, INS has not established goals or measurement criteria for the service center units that are responsible for fraud investigations. Thu, 31 Jan 2002 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02270t.pdf The Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands provides direct U.S. economic assistance and extends U.S. domestic programs and federal services to these two Pacific Island nations. The Compact also allows for migration from Micronesia and the Marshall Islands to the United States and establishes U.S. defense rights and obligations in the region. The Compact's economic assistance provisions were scheduled to expire in late 2001. However, the provisions will remain in effect for two more months while the United States and the two Pacific Island nations renegotiate them. Congress must renegotiate and reauthorize the expiring provisions by late 2003 for economic assistance to continue uninterrupted. The $1.6 billion provided under the Compact through 1998 has had little impact on economic development in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands and was subject to limited accountability. U.S. oversight was limited by interagency disagreements between the Departments of Interior and State, a lack of resources devoted to Compact oversight, and Interior's belief that Compact provisions restricted its ability to require accountability and withhold funds. Because of the lack of opportunities in the region, thousands of citizens in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands have migrated to the United States. Migrants to Guam, Hawaii, and the commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands generally work in unskilled, low-paying jobs. Between 1996 and 2000, the local governments have spent at least $371 million on assistance--primarily health care and education. Since 1987, several multilateral organizations and donor nations, including the United States, have given nearly $12 billion to the two Pacific island nations to promote economic self-sufficiency and alleviate poverty. The major donors believe that many Pacific Island nations will not be able to improve development without continued assistance. Thu, 06 Dec 2001 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02215r.pdf This report reviews the U.S. Customs Service's Compliance Measurement Examination (COMPEX) and Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Inspections Traveler Examination (INTEX). These programs, which help Customs and INS assess the nature and extent of enforcement risks at ports of entry, compare violations found during targeted inspections with violations found during random inspections. GAO found that both Customs and INS inspectors did not always adhere to guidance on sample selection and did not always conduct inspections with the minimum level of thoroughness required. As a result, statistical data generated by the programs may not reliably reflect the extent to which travelers who seek entry into the U.S. are in violation of customs or immigration laws. GAO also found that the COMPEX and INTEX programs both draw from the same population of international travelers; have similar purposes and goals; and often use Customs and INS inspectors who work side by side, particularly at land border ports of entry. Customs and INS might realize efficiencies if the two programs were combined. Mon, 03 Dec 2001 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02220t.pdf This testimony discusses the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) processes for denying aliens entry at airports and other points of entry, including the expedited removal and credible fear processes. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 included a provision--expedited removal--for dealing with aliens who try to enter the United States by engaging in fraud or misrepresentation (e.g. falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen or misrepresenting a material fact) or who arrive with fraudulent, improper, or no documents (e.g. visa or passport). The expedited removal provision reduces an alien's right to seek review of a determination of inadmissibility decision. The Act also allows expedited removal orders to be issued to aliens who have entered the United States without being inspected or paroled at a port of entry. INS and immigration judges implement the act's provisions on the expedited removal of aliens. Tue, 13 Nov 2001 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02114r.pdf The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 allows Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. The act requires the Comptroller General to report every six months on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved for legal permanent residence status. GAO found that, as of September 30, 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service had received 35,946 applications and had approved 5,072 of them. The Executive Office for Immigration Review had 107 applications filed and had approved 87 of them. Mon, 22 Oct 2001 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02168t.pdf The Immigration and Naturalization's (INS) organizational structure has led to recurring management problems, including an inability to balance competing priorities, poor communications, and weaknesses in the development and fielding of critical information technology. Although restructuring may help, INS will still need to assemble the basic building blocks essential to any organization. These building blocks include clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, policies and procedures that effectively balance competing priorities, effective internal and external communication and coordination, and computer systems that provide accurate and timely information. Until these element are in place, it will be difficult to enforce the nation's immigration laws effectively. Wed, 17 Oct 2001 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0240.pdf Migration from the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau has had a significant impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). The health and education needs of these migrants have particularly affected the budgetary resources of Guam and the CNMI. The budgetary impact on Hawaii is smaller but is expected to grow as Hawaii absorbs health care costs once covered by the U.S. government. Public health is an important concern for all three U.S. island areas. Migrants from the region with limited financial means are able to enter the United States with few restrictions, and U.S. island areas are absorbing much of the health care costs of this population. Furthermore, Guam, Hawaii, and the CNMI can be expected to continue to experience migration as long as weak economic conditions persist in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. Targeting future U.S. assistance to Micronesia and the Marshall Islands for education and health purposes could reduce some of the motivation to migrate. Improvements in migrant health and education status might be expected to reduce immigration to U.S. destinations. Fri, 05 Oct 2001 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01842.pdf To deter illegal entry between the nation's ports of entry, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) developed its Southwest Border Strategy. INS has spent seven years implementing the border strategy, but it may take INS up to a decade longer to fully implement the strategy. This assumes that INS obtains the level of staff, technology, equipment, and fencing it believes it needs to control the Southwest border. Although illegal alien apprehensions have shifted, there is no clear indication that overall illegal entry into the United States along the Southwestern border has declined. INS' current efforts to measure the effectiveness of its border control efforts could be enhanced by analyzing the data in its automated biometric identification system (IDENT). These data offer INS an opportunity to develop additional performance indicators that could be incorporated into its Annual Performance Plan review process and could help INS assess whether its border control efforts are associated with an overall reduction in the flow of illegal aliens across the border. Borderwide analysis of the IDENT data could be used to address several important questions related to illegal entry. The strategy's impact on local communities has been affected by the timing of INS, infusion of agent and other resources intended to protect the local community from a surge in illegal alien traffic; what routes the illegal aliens have used in crossing the border; and INS' involvement with the community. INS has learned the importance of outreach efforts in attempting to mitigate the potential negative effects the strategy can cause a community and the harm that can befall illegal aliens who risk injury and death to cross the border. Thu, 02 Aug 2001 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01488.pdf Congress, the media, and immigrant advocacy groups have criticized the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for its inability to provide immigrants with timely decisions on their applications for such benefits as naturalization and legal permanent residence. INS continues to experience significant problems managing its application workload despite years of increasing budgets and staff. Automation improvements would provide INS with the management information it needs to determine how long aliens have been waiting for their applications to be processed. Automation improvements would also help INS determine whether it is processing all the applications it receives, working on applications in the order in which they are received, and providing prompt and correct responses to applicants' inquiries about the status of their cases. INS does not know how to maximize the deployment of staff to process applications in a timely fashion because it lacks a systematically developed staff resource allocation model. Such a model could help INS determine the right number and types of staff it needs, efficiently distribute staff to the right locations, and ensure that resources are deployed commensurate with the workload to minimize backlogs and processing times. INS could reduce the need to revoke employment authorization documents by providing guidance and training on application screening to its district staff and taking steps to ascertain whether improvements could be made to the application screening process. INS' long-standing problems with its fingerprinting process appear to have been largely corrected. With digital technology now being used by INS to fingerprint aliens and transmit the fingerprints electronically to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, opportunities may exist to store the fingerprints electronically and save the time and expense associated with the refingerprinting process. Fri, 04 May 2001 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01651r.pdf The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 authorizes Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to adjust their status to legal permanent residence. This report contains a breakdown of the numbers of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, or abandoned children, or as the eligible dependents of these applicants. GAO found that as of March 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service had received 35,424 applications and had approved 1,454 of them. The Executive Office for Immigration Review had 107 applications filed and had approved 76 of them. Fri, 20 Apr 2001 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/pas/2001/d01251.pdf This report, part of GAO's performance and accountability series, discusses the major management challenges and program risks facing the Department of Labor (DOL). These challenges include (1) increasing the employment and earnings of America's workforce, (2) protecting the benefits of workers, and (3) fostering safe and healthy workplaces. Mon, 01 Jan 2001 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/pas/2001/d01250.pdf This report, part of GAO's performance and accountability series, discusses the major management challenges and program risks facing the Department of Justice (DOJ). These include (1) improving the enforcement of immigration laws and immigration naturalization services, (2) managing programs designed to support state and local efforts to reduce crime, (3) developing measurable performance targets to help the Drug Enforcement Agency determine its progress in reducing the availability of illegal drugs, (4) achieving excellence in financial management, and (5) improving management and accountability over DOJ asset forfeiture program. Mon, 01 Jan 2001 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01146.pdf The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) invests hundreds of millions of dollars each year in information technology (IT) to help (1) prevent aliens from entering the United States illegally and remove aliens who succeed in doing so and (2) provide services or benefits to facilitate entry, residence, employment, and naturalization to legal immigrants. The Clinger-Cohen Act requires agency heads to implement a process for maximizing the value and assessing and managing the risks of its IT investments. GAO examined leading private and public sector IT management practices to determine whether INS is effectively managing its IT investments and whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) is effectively promoting, guiding, and overseeing INS' investment management activities. GAO found that INS lacks the basic capabilities upon which to build IT investment management maturity. Furthermore, INS is not managing IT investments as a complete portfolio. By managing its IT investments as individual projects, INS will not be able to determine which investments contribute most to the agency mission. GAO also found that DOJ is not guiding and overseeing INS' investment management approach. Fri, 29 Dec 2000 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0178.pdf Department of Justice policy encourages cooperation among law enforcement agencies at all levels. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) participated in two such task forces, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) and the Violent Gang Task Force. These task forces have come under public and legal scrutiny for possible misconduct by law enforcement officers. Several convictions were overturned because evidence was tampered with or LAPD officers physically abused suspects. Media reports fueled concerns that LAPD and INS secretly worked together to illegally deport Latino immigrants. GAO concludes that INS was neither involved in nor observed any misconduct while working on these task forces. Interviews with INS officers, the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, and immigrants rights groups did not reveal any misconduct involving INS agents. GAO did note, however, that documentation in some arrest files was missing or incomplete and that funding set aside for use in the OCDETF program was improperly used for non-OCDETF activities. Thu, 26 Oct 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01118r.pdf The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 authorizes Haitian nationals and their dependents to apply to change their status to legal permanent residence. This report, the fourth done in response to the act, contains a breakdown on the numbers of Haitians who applied and the number who were approved as asylum applicants, parolees, children without parents, orphaned children, abandoned children, or as the eligible dependents of these applicants (i.e., spouses, children, and unmarried sons or daughters). The Immigration and Naturalization Service had received a total of 35,257 applications under the act and had approved 263 of these applications. The Executive Office for Immigration Review had 95 applications filed and had approved 65 of them. Fri, 20 Oct 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00201.pdf The U.S. Border patrol is procuring a new type of helicopter--the MD 600N--to replace its aging helicopter fleet. The MD 600N is expected to meet various air operations requirements, such as low and slow surveillance and transport of agents. This report provides information and analysis on the MD 600N procurement and whether the MD 600N has been effective in safely supporting the Border Patrol's primary air operations mission. Most Border Patrol pilots experienced in flying the MD 600N and most sector chiefs had strong reservations about the helicopter's suitability for key missions. The pilots were also concerned with the aircraft's safety, citing difficulty in performing emergency maneuvers. Two of the three law enforcement agencies with MD 600Ns that GAO spoke with shared many of the same concerns. GAO recommends that INS: (1) address issues raised by pilots and mechanics before buying more MD 600Ns; and (2) reassess its purchase decision. Fri, 29 Sep 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00185.pdf One of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) primary functions is to provide services or benefits that facilitate entry, residence, employment, and naturalization of legal immigrants. To recover the costs that it incurs in providing benefits, INS is authorized to charge fees to recipients of INS services. Federal agencies, including INS, are generally required by Department of the Treasury regulations to deposit fees totaling $5,000 or more on the same day or the day after they are collected. This report discusses: (1) the extent to which INS made timely deposits of fees collected from aliens who applied for benefits; and (2) the potential costs to the government if INS deposits were not timely. Because INS data were incomplete, GAO was unable to fully determine the extent to which INS complied with Treasury regulations requiring deposit on the same or next day after collection. However, in fiscal year 1999, INS service centers generally did not make timely fee deposits. According to GAO's conservative estimate, the resulting interest cost to the government, or the cost of interest incurred on debt or other obligations, was about $640,000 in fiscal year 1999. Fri, 29 Sep 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00157.pdf The H-1B visa program allows employers to hire skilled foreign workers for as long as six years to fill hundreds of thousands of jobs in the computer programming, engineering, education, and medical fields. In fiscal year 1999, these workers had a median age of 28 and were offered a median salary of $45,000; almost half were born in India. GAO found that the Department of Labor's limited legal authority to enforce program requirements--and weaknesses in the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) administration--leave the H-1B program vulnerable to abuse. For example, Labor can certify that an employer's application form for H-1B workers is error free, but it has no authority to verify the information on the form. Labor cannot take enforcement action even if it believes that employers are violating the law. INS is responsible for ensuring that H-1B that positions are specialty occupations and that workers granted entry are qualified for those jobs. INS staff are judged on the number of H-1B requests processed; they do not analyze a petitioner's merit. Labor and the National Science Foundation are trying to improve the information technology skills of the U.S. workforce through retraining programs for new and existing employees and through more computer training and mentoring for students in elementary and secondary schools. Thu, 07 Sep 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00176.pdf In fiscal year 1999, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) inspectors generally complied with the requirements of the expedited removal process, whereby aliens who have made false representations about themselves or who do not have visas or passports are removed from the United States. In the Los Angeles, Miami, and New York asylum offices, all cases concerning credible fear of persecution or torture were documented appropriately. In cases where aliens wished to withdraw a claim of fear of persecution or torture, they did not have to cite a reason for recanting until July 2000, when, after discussions with GAO, reason for recanting became a requirement. According to GAO's survey, an estimated 78 percent of the aliens determined to have a credible fear of persecution or torture were released from detention. Fri, 01 Sep 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00155r.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Justice's (DOJ) fiscal year (FY) 1999 performance report and FY 2001 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. GAO noted that: (1) overall, DOJ's progress in achieving desirable program outcomes cannot be readily determined since the agency has yet to develop performance goals and measures that can objectively capture and describe performance results; (2) DOJ's performance measures are: (a) more output than outcome oriented; (b) do not capture all aspects of performance; or (c) have no stated performance targets; (3) DOJ's measures in relation to the key outcome area--reducing violent crime, including organized crime and drug- and gang-related violence--do not cover the full range of issues that the goal covers and tend to be more output oriented than outcome oriented; (4) though limited in value, these measures show a mixed picture in relation to progress by DOJ in this area; (5) in the key outcome area, reducing the availability or use of illegal drugs, many key measures are problematic because they focus on outputs, such as increased amounts of drugs seized, which can either be a function of improved performance or of increases in the amounts of drugs in the environment that are available for seizure; (6) for most of the measures, targets were not set; (7) in relation to the key outcome area for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of providing benefit services that are timely, consistent, fair and of high quality, only the issue of timeliness is assessed as a performance measure, while consistency, fairness, and high quality has no measures; (8) DOJ did not achieve its goal of reducing average prospective case processing time to six months; (9) however, DOJ did report that in relation to naturalization cases, it reduced case time from 27 months to 12 months, which was a significant drop in wait time but shy of the 6-month processing time goal; (10) DOJ translated the key outcome area for INS to secure U.S. borders from illegal immigration into two performance goals: (a) secure the land borders, ports-of-entry, and coasts of the United States against illegal entry; and (b) hamper border and international smuggling; (11) performance measures for the first goal have yet to be set, so progress toward this goal remains unassessed; (12) measures set for the second goal are the number of interceptions of malafide migrants en route to the United States and the number of INS-assisted offshore prosecution of smugglers; (13) in both cases, these output-oriented goals were met; (14) DOJ continues to face a number of management challenges; and (15) GAO identified 16 issues in its observations on DOJ's FY 2000 performance plan that remain management challenges, except for the year 2000 computer problem. Fri, 30 Jun 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00207t.pdf A decade ago, Congress established special immigrant and nonimmigrant visa categories for religious workers, including religious professionals and ministers, because of domestic shortages in these positions cited by religious groups. In 1998, religious worker visas constituted about 11,000 of the 6.4 million immigrant (permanent) and nonimmigrant (temporary) visas issued. The State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) share responsibility for issuing visas and admitting aliens into the United States. As a result of fraud investigations in the mid-1990s, both agencies have expressed concern that some individuals and organizations that sponsor religious workers may take advantage of this category to help unqualified aliens to enter or stay in the United States illegally. This testimony focuses on (1) the extent and the nature of any fraud the State Department and INS have identified in the religious worker visa program and (2) any steps these two agencies have taken or plan to take to change the visa screening process. Thu, 29 Jun 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00134t.pdf A sudden, widespread farm labor shortage requiring the entry of large numbers of foreign workers is unlikely now or in the near future, although localized shortages could emerge for specific crops or geographic areas. Although many farm workers are not legally authorized to work in the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) enforcement efforts are unlikely to significantly reduce the aggregate number of unauthorized farm workers. While comparatively few agricultural employers seek workers through the H-2A program, those that do are generally successful in obtaining workers. In 1997, GAO determined that poor information on H-2A program access and the involvement of many agencies in the program could result in redundant oversight and confuse employers that are considering participation and that the Department of Labor was not always processing applications in a timely manner. While Labor and INS have made progress in taking the steps GAO recommended to improve the program's operations, key changes remain to be implemented, particularly those that would permit Labor to assess the timeliness of its applications processing and to improve protections for domestic and H-2A agricultural workers. Thu, 15 Jun 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00097.pdf The Northern Mariana Islands are a U.S. territory with commonwealth status in the western Pacific. Since 1984, Members of Congress and successive administrations have raised concerns about the Islands' ability to effectively implement their immigration laws and control the export and import of goods. This report provides data on the Islands' procedures for controlling the flow of aliens and goods into and out of their territory. GAO provides data on the aliens' use of public health care and education and their involvement in crime in the Islands. Fri, 26 May 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00132r.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) naturalization application processing, focusing on: (1) the disposition of naturalization cases from the Chicago District Office that were lost at the Nebraska Service Center in 1997 or 1998; and (2) determining if INS employee performance appraisals included a dimension pertaining to the courteousness with which staff provide service to customers. GAO noted that: (1) recurrent problems with transferring naturalization case data from one automated system used by the service centers to another used by district offices caused cases to be inadvertently dropped at the Nebraska Service Center, as well as the other three INS service centers, according to an INS Nebraska Service Center official; (2) data were not available on the number of cases that were inadvertently dropped during transfer; (3) an official from the Nebraska Service Center estimated that about 4,000 naturalization cases were inadvertently dropped during the data transfer for the Chicago district during fiscal years 1997 and 1998; (4) an official from the California Service Center also told GAO that this problem occurred at all four service centers; (5) the official estimated that all over 44,000 naturalization cases were inadvertently dropped at the California Service Center during the data transfer for the Los Angeles district during fiscal years 1997 and 1998; (6) officials from both of these service centers said that staff identified the cases that were inadvertently dropped during the data transfer and manually entered the case data into INS' automated case management system; (7) since INS did not have a list of the specific cases that were inadvertently dropped, it could not determine how many of these cases had been adjudicated; (8) on May 1, 2000, INS directed its field offices to undertake new initiatives to ensure that all individuals who submitted naturalization applications before July 1, 1998, would be interviewed by September 30, 2000; (9) although the particular problem that caused naturalization cases to be inadvertently dropped during data transfers in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 no longer exists, according to INS Nebraska and California Service Center officials, new instances of dropped cases during data transfers have occurred with INS' deployment of a new naturalization automated case tracking system; (10) GAO plans to include further information on this issue as part of GAO's ongoing review of INS' application processing; (11) the INS offices that GAO contacted generally had courtesy or tactfulness as a performance standard on the appraisal forms of employees who routinely deal with the public; (12) INS' Chicago District Office, Nebraska Service Center, and California Service Center included this standard for employees who routinely deal with the public at those offices; and (13) the Los Angeles District Office included this standard for one of the three positions that routinely deal with the public at that office, but did not include it for the other two positions. Tue, 23 May 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00103.pdf Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data show that during the last two fiscal years, alien smuggling has increased, and INS predicts that the smuggling will continue to grow. INS issued an anti-smuggling strategy in 1997 that contains domestic and international components. The domestic component calls for (1) INS to focus its investigations on major smuggling operations and (2) INS' anti-smuggling investigative field units to coordinate their activities and share anti-smuggling intelligence with each other. INS' initial efforts will be directed at South/Central Texas, which is one of the three major alien smuggling corridors in the United States. The international component calls for INS to cooperate with foreign governments to disrupt alien smuggling in countries that are either major sources of illegal immigration or transit routes for aliens seeking to enter the United States. Several factors may have impeded INS' ability to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of the domestic component of its strategy. These factors include a lack of program coordination, the absence of an automated case-tracking and management system, and limited performance measures. INS' intelligence program has been impeded by a lack of understanding among field staff on how to report intelligence information, a lack of staff to carry out intelligence work at most INS district offices, and a cumbersome process of organizing data that does not allow for rapid retrieval and analysis. As a result, INS is limited in its ability to identify targets for enforcement and to focus its resources on efforts that would have the greatest impact. In the international area, INS may not be having more than a temporary impact on alien smuggling overseas. Impediments in this area include corruption among some foreign officials and the lack of laws against alien smuggling in some countries. Without improvements in its programs, INS' ability to disrupt and deter increasingly sophisticated and organized alien smugglers and dismantle their operations will continue to be hampered. Mon, 01 May 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00110r.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on tax-motivated expatriation, focusing on: (1) the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) procedures relevant to the enforcement of tax-motivated expatriate rules related to income, estate, and gift taxes; (2) IRS' procedures for using the private letter ruling process; and (3) Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Department of State procedures for preventing tax-motivated expatriates from reentering the United States. GAO noted that: (1) IRS' enforcement of tax-motivated expatriate rules has focused on collecting and publishing data on recent expatriates, establishing a process for expatriates to request letter rulings--that is, an IRS determination that they are not tax-motivated expatriates--and maintaining a database of certain information concerning expatriates; (2) IRS does not yet have a systematic compliance effort aimed at enforcing income, estate, or gift tax laws related to tax-motivated expatriation; (3) according to IRS officials, expatriates are subject to IRS' normal enforcement programs for nonresident aliens; (4) in December 1999, IRS initiated a project to assess compliance among expatriates who have self-reported information concerning their income tax liability and assets as required; (5) the project is scheduled to conclude by July 2000; (6) IRS' private letter ruling process provides expatriates with the opportunity to overcome the treatment of being tax motivated under the law; (7) expatriates in certain categories described by statute can request a review of the facts and circumstances of their expatriation in order to avoid the tax consequences of being treated as a tax-motivated expatriate; (8) as of December 15, 1999, IRS had issued 113 rulings concerning expatriation; (9) State and INS have not implemented procedures to prevent former U.S. citizens who are tax-motivated expatriates from reentering the United States; (10) according to INS officials, this inaction has resulted primarily from the lack of any existing mechanism for the Attorney General to obtain the taxpayer information from IRS necessary to carry out the programs; (11) IRS and INS have now identified and agreed upon such a mechanism, and INS has recently drafted proposed regulations; (12) these draft regulations have been reviewed by IRS and State and are currently under review by the INS Office of General Counsel, which is then to send them to the Department of Justice for review; and (13) according to INS officials, the proposed regulations will also be subject to public comment. Mon, 01 May 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00122r.pdf Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to legal permanent residence under the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998. GAO noted that: (1) on March 24, 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) published final regulations on implementing HRIFA; (2) Haitian nationals have been able to submit applications for adjustment of status under HRIFA since interim regulations went into effect on June 11, 1999; (3) as of February 29, 2000, INS had received a total of 23,706 HRIFA applications and had approved 14 of these applications; and (4) EOIR had 56 applications filed and had approved 32 of them. Fri, 14 Apr 2000 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00081t.pdf The Community and Migrant Health Center program and the National Health Service Corps, administered by the federal Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), are designed, respectively, to increase the availability of primary and preventive health care services for low-income people living in medically underserved areas and to offer scholarships and educational loan repayments for health care professionals, some of whom, in turn, agree to work in these centers. GAO found that HRSA could increase the centers' effectiveness by establishing a systematic best practices program for their learning and by improving the completeness and accuracy of the data its uses to monitor them. Also, the Health Care Financing Administration could help ensure the centers' ability to continue serving Medicaid beneficiaries and uninsured persons by monitoring state Medicaid programs' compliance with federal requirements for reimbursing the centers. Shifting resources would help provide more National Health Service Corps loan repayments, and a better system is needed for identifying and measuring where health care professional placements are needed. Thu, 23 Mar 2000 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00047.pdf The Census Bureau has added several initiatives to improve the accuracy and completeness of the population count in the 2000 Census. These initiatives include the "Be Counted" program as well as walk-in Questionnaire Assistance Centers. The Be Counted program is designed to count people who believe that they did not receive a census questionnaire, or who were otherwise omitted from the census. Aimed at traditionally hard-to-enumerate population groups, the Be Counted program is to make its forms available in various public locations, such as community centers, churches, and businesses. Questionnaire Assistance Centers are to help people--especially those who speak little or no English--complete their census questionnaires by providing assistance in several languages on a walk-in basis. The centers are also to distribute Be Counted forms. This report provides information on the status of these two programs, focusing on the steps that the Bureau has taken to address shortcomings that it encountered during the dress rehearsal. Fri, 25 Feb 2000 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/r200079.pdf The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is a U.S. territory with commonwealth status in the western Pacific. The covenant establishing the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands places them under U.S. sovereignty and grants U.S. citizenship to people born there, but pledges self-government for local affairs. The Islands control their own immigration policy and set their own minimum wage, which, at $3.05 per hour, is substantially below the minimum wage in the United States. Businesses in the Islands, particularly in the garment and tourist industries, employ many foreign workers who have work permits that do not lead to citizenship. This report answers the following questions: What has been the impact of the garment and tourist industries and the use of foreign workers on the economy of the Mariana Islands? How do the revenue-raising efforts of the Mariana Islands and the payments that they receive from the U.S. Treasury compare with those of other U.S. territories and freely associated states? How do the taxes and fees paid by the garment industry in the Mariana Islands, expressed as a percentage of gross receipts, compare with the taxes and fees paid by the garment industry in the United States? Mon, 14 Feb 2000 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ai00055.pdf The nationwide demand for skilled programmers to cope with the Year 2000 computing problem has raised questions about whether key organizations, such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have resorted to using foreign nationals for Y2K remediation. Of 153 mission critical FAA systems that were remediated, 15 had foreign involvement, including Chinese, Ukranian, and Pakistani nationals. FAA was unable to provide any information on the individuals who did code remediation for four of its 153 computer systems. With regard to code review, 20 key mission-critical systems have been, or are in the process of being, reviewed by two contractors who use foreign nationals. One code contractor employed 36 mainland Chinese nationals, while the other employed one Canadian national. FAA did not perform background searches--investigations or checks--on all of its contractor employees, as required by its policy. This situation increased the risk that inappropriate persons may have gained access to FAA's facilities, information, or resources. As a result, the air traffic control system may be more vulnerable to intrusion and malicious attacks. GAO recommends that FAA improve its security controls, identify the risk of malicious attacks on its critical systems, and mitigate that risk. FAA agrees with GAO's recommendations and is moving to implement them. Thu, 23 Dec 1999 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00039.pdf Although the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) met its goal of increasing the strength of the Border Patrol by 1,000 agents in both 1997 and 1998, it saw an increase of only 369 agents in 1999 because it was unable to recruit enough qualified applicants and retain them through the hiring process. Although INS attracts large numbers of applicants, few who apply to the Border Patrol successfully complete the application process. Some fail to pass the rigorous entry examination, medical examination, or background check, while others withdraw from the process. INS assigns all new Border Patrol agents to the southwest border, where 92 percent of all agents are stationed. As hiring has increased, the experience level of Border Patrol agents has declined agencywide, as well as along the southwest border. The percentage of agents along the southwest border with two years of experience or less tripled?from 14 percent to 39 percent?between 1994 and 1998. Also, most of the southwest border sectors saw an increase in the average number of nonsupervisory agents assigned to each GS-12 supervisory agent. By relying on a temporary training facility in Charleston, South Carolina, the Border Patrol Academy has been able to provide newly hired agents with the required training and, according to a Border Patrol official, is prepared the meet the training needs associated with future growth. Fri, 17 Dec 1999 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00025r.pdf Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved to adjust their status to legal permanent residence under the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998. GAO noted that: (1) on May 12, 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) published interim regulations to implement HRIFA and requested public comments; (2) the comment period ended July 12, 1999; (3) between May 12, 1999, and July 23, 1999, INS conducted nationwide HRIFA training for INS employees, representatives of community-based organizations, and attorneys who plan to assist Haitian nationals in completing and filing their applications; (4) INS and EOIR also established application filing procedures and internal processing procedures to adjudicate the applications and track their status, including numbers of applications received or filed and approved by category of applicant; (5) as of October 1, 1999, INS had received 8,769 HRIFA applications and EOIR had 9 HRIFA applications filed; (6) INS had not approved any applications, and EOIR had approved eight applications; and (7) details on the categories of the applicants and approvals are provided in this report. Tue, 19 Oct 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00004.pdf The Department of Education's Migrant Education Program (MEP) and the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Migrant Head Start Program (MHS) provide a range of health, educational, nutritional, and social services to migrant children. MEP's primary goal is to give the children of migrant crop workers a chance to meet the same state educational standards as other children. Its services vary across states, districts, and schools. MHS funds infant and preschool centers that serve the preschool-age children of migrant crop workers. MHS's narrower population definition results in service gaps for some preschool children and for children of different ages in the same family. A broader definition would mean that MEP and MHS could work together to provide more orderly transitions for children moving from MHS into school and greater service coverage for all the children in a family. Analysis of the adequacy and the targeting of MHS's resources and federal leadership to develop a system for each program to support the exchange of essential student information and coordination of services are needed. Neither Education nor HHS has measured how well the two programs are achieving their goals. GAO believes that it would be economically feasible to include a sample of migrant children in ongoing national data collection efforts. GAO recommends that the types of activities included in MHS's definition of agricultural work be expanded to harmonize with those included in MEP's definition. GAO also recommends that both Education and HHS develop nationwide systems to transmit children's tracking information and that they include studies that measure MEP's and MHS's outcomes in their research and evaluation plans. Fri, 15 Oct 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99183.pdf The Legal Services Corporation (LSC), operating through grantees, provides legal assistance in civil matters to low-income persons. In the past year, LSC's Office of Inspector General and GAO have cited misreporting by grantees on both the number of cases they closed in 1997 and the number they had open at the end of that year. The accuracy of the data is important because LSC has used case statistics to seek higher funding and Congress has considered these statistics in setting funding for LSC. This report determines (1) what efforts LSC and its grantees have made to correct problems with case service reporting and (2) whether these efforts are likely to resolve the case reporting problems that occurred in 1997. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Legal Services Corporation: More Needs to Be Done to Correct Case Service Reporting Problems, by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director of Administration of Justice Issues, before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, House Committee on the Judiciary. GAO/T-GGD-99-185, Sept. 29 (11 pages). Mon, 20 Sep 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99148t.pdf The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) mission is twofold. First, the agency seeks to prevent aliens from entering the United States illegally and remove those who succeed in doing so. Second, INS provides services to facilitate the entry, residency, employment, and naturalization of legal immigrants. This testimony summarizes GAO's work on management and program challenges at INS. These challenges involve INS' strategic planning process, organizational structure, communications and coordination, financial management, and program implementation. Thu, 29 Jul 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/f0902b/162489.pdf The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) established an employment verification system to prevent employers from hiring aliens who are unauthorized to work. Yet large numbers of unauthorized aliens are obtaining jobs through the widespread use of fraudulent documents. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is trying to reduce the number of documents that can be used for employment verification and improve the integrity of the documents that it issues. However, these efforts will not substantially affect unauthorized aliens' ability to obtain employment. The most common counterfeited documents will still remain on the list of acceptable documents. In addition, counterfeiters may be able to manufacture "passable versions" of even the most secure INS documents, undermining employer confidence in their authenticity. Providing a more secure Social Security card to all current number holders could cost as much as $9.2 billion. Alternatives that could reduce the cost require legislative action. The steps being considered to improve document security could make it more difficult for an unauthorized alien to obtain employment, but the employment verification process can still be circumvented or easily thwarted by the use of widely available fraudulent documents. Thu, 22 Jul 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/f0902b/162392.pdf Jobs are a magnet drawing illegal aliens to the United States. Many immigration experts believe that reducing the availability of employment for illegal aliens must be a central part of any comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration. Significant numbers of aliens unauthorized to work in the United States have used fraudulent documents to circumvent the employment verification process. Employers seeking to comply with the law can be deceived by these fraudulent papers, while those seeking "cheap labor" can intentionally hire unauthorized aliens under the guise of having complied with the employment verification process. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has taken steps to improve the employment verification process, yet considerable obstacles remain. Worksite enforcement efforts by INS and the Department of Labor have been limited, and INS' employer investigation efforts have yielded modest results. INS is changing its approach to worksite enforcement, but it is too soon to gauge its success. Thu, 01 Jul 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/f0902b/162399.pdf Members of Congress have expressed concern about the overall well-being of the border region and what appears to be limited progress in addressing border issues. In particular, Members have noted that the border region has had to shoulder a disproportionate share of the cost of U.S.-Mexican economic integration. This report (1) outlines the nature of major border issues and (2) provides information on U.S. and Mexican efforts underway to address them. Thu, 01 Jul 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/f0902b/162269.pdf GAO found that recently naturalized citizens generally used Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicaid, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits at a higher rate in 1997 than did the native-born. For example, 8.3 percent of the 927,338 immigrants who were recently naturalized received SSI benefits during 1997. The rate for native-born citizens is 2.4 percent. The benefits paid by the federal and state governments in 1997 to the recently naturalized citizens included in GAO's review totaled about $735 million for four programs. This figures reflects nationwide data for the SSI program, as well as data from five states for the Medicaid and Food Stamp programs and from four states for the TANF program. Overall, the percentage of benefits paid to recently naturalized citizens in each program was about one percent or less of the total benefits paid to all recipients. Wed, 23 Jun 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/162220.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO investigated the allegations that Adolfo Franco, Senior Vice President and General Counsel for the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), violated contracting regulations and personnel policies in his attempts to hire Carlos Urquidi for the auditor position at IAF, focusing on if IAF violated: (1) Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) in procuring the services of Mr. Urquidi; and (2) Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations or personnel policies in its attempts to fill the auditor position. GAO noted that: (1) IAF improperly issued a sole source purchase order to a temporary-help firm in violation of the FAR; (2) IAF also violated an OPM regulation that limits an agency's use of an individual employee of a temporary-help firm to 240 days; (3) in addition to IAF's violation of the FAR and OPM regulation, Mr. Franco manipulated the hiring process in an unsuccessful attempt to appoint Mr. Urquidi to the permanent auditor position; (4) Mr. Franco cancelled a vacancy announcement, delayed issuing another vacancy announcement, and then allowed the resulting certification to expire in order to allow Mr. Urquidi to obtain his U.S. citizenship and resolve outstanding criminal allegations in Bolivia; (5) throughout this process, IAF contracted for Mr. Urquidi to temporarily fill the auditor position until Mr. Franco could appoint him to the permanent position; (6) due to Mr. Franco's actions, IAF did not appoint a permanent auditor despite receiving applications from a total of 20 applicants in response to 3 vacancy announcements over a period of almost 2 years; (7) the position remains vacant; (8) GAO requested assistance from the Department of State to determine whether Mr. Urquidi is a fugitive wanted by the Bolivian government; (9) the State Department is investigating the matter; (10) GAO also contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to determine whether Mr. Urquidi had failed to disclose his pending criminal complaint in Bolivia on his application for U.S. citizenship; and (11) INS is investigating the matter. Thu, 20 May 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99044.pdf The long-standing problem of illegal immigration has been exacerbated by the pull of the strong U.S. economy, economic and political turmoil in the developing world, and recent natural disasters in Central America. The Attorney General announced a broad, five-part strategy in 1994 to strengthen the nation's immigration laws, including beefing up border enforcement. This report discusses (1) the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) progress in implementing the southwest border strategy during fiscal year 1998, (2) the interim results of the strategy, and (3) actions taken in response to GAO's recommendation that the Attorney General develop and implement a plan for a formal, cost-effective, comprehensive, and systematic evaluation of the strategy. Wed, 19 May 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99086t.pdf The corruption of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service employees along the Southwest border by drug traffickers is a serious and continuing threat. Some of these employees have waved drug loads through ports of entry, coordinated the movement of drugs across the border, transported drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, sold drugs, and revealed drug intelligence information. Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures to help ensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to address the rising threat of employee corruption on the Southwest border. For example, although the agencies generally completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some cases by as much as three years. The Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs, which deal with allegations of drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs employees, are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases. However, GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees along the Southwest border who had been convicted of drug-related crimes between 1992 and 1997 found internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported or corrected. These weaknesses included instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the inspection lane at a port of entry, (2) INS and Customs employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting persons with whom they had close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel were allowed to cross the Southwest border or pass Border Control checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs have not formally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness. For example, GAO found that financial information required for background investigations and reinvestigations was either limited or not fully reviewed. This testimony summarizes the April 1999 report, GAO/GGD-99-31. Wed, 21 Apr 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/162052.pdf Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the number of Haitian nationals who have applied and been approved for adjustment of their status to legal permanent residence. GAO noted that: (1) the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have not yet received or approved any applications for adjustment of status under the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998; (2) INS and EOIR expect to jointly publish interim regulations by the end of April or early in May; (3) according to INS officials, 30 days after the publication of the interim regulations, Haitian nationals will be able to file applications for adjustment of status; (4) accordingly, data on the number of applications received and the types of applicants should be available for GAO's next report, due October 21, 1999; (5) applications filed with INS are to be sent to INS' Nebraska Service Center; (6) INS has prepared draft procedures for adjudicating the applications; (7) to facilitate processing, INS plans to provide training for examiners, who are to adjudicate the applications, and for staff of nongovernmental organizations, who plan to assist Haitian nationals in completing and filing the applications; (8) data from the applications are to be coded according to the type of Haitian applicant; (9) the codes are to be entered in INS' Computer Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS); (10) according to INS officials, CLAIMS has been modified to accept the codes; (11) generally, applications properly filed with EOIR by eligible Haitian nationals in proceedings are to be adjudicated by the immigration court; (12) according to EOIR, Haitian nationals who qualified for deferred enforced departure had their cases administratively closed following the President's announcement of the policy on December 23, 1997; (13) the deferred enforced departure policy delayed for 1 year the removal of qualifying Haitian nationals; and (14) it applied to any Haitian national who, prior to December 31, 1995, was paroled into the United States or applied for asylum, and who had been continuously present in the United States since that date. Wed, 21 Apr 1999 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99033.pdf More than 12 years after the Immigration Reform and Control Act created an employment verification process to prevent employers from hiring illegal aliens, significant numbers of unauthorized workers are still obtaining jobs. The widespread use of fraudulent documents by unauthorized workers has undermined the effectiveness of the current verification process, which relies on identity and employment eligibility documents that applicants must show employers when applying for jobs. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has undertaken several initiatives to improve the employment verification process to make it less vulnerable to fraud, but significant obstacles remain. First, INS has started to test three pilot programs in which employers electronically verify an employee's eligibility to work. However, employers' participation in the pilot programs has been significantly less than expected. Second, INS has made little progress in reducing the number of documents that employers can accept to determine employment eligibility. Since 1994, INS has devoted about two percent of its enforcement workyears to its worksite enforcement program, which is designed to detect noncompliance with the law. INS completed about 6,500 investigations of employers in 1998--about three percent of the U.S. employers believed to have unauthorized workers on their payrolls. INS' worksite enforcement program has infrequently imposed sanctions on employers. More than eight out of 10 investigations completed during the period GAO reviewed did not result in a penalty. INS is now changing its approach to worksite enforcement, but it is too soon to know how these changes will be implemented or to assess their impact on the hiring of unauthorized workers. Fri, 02 Apr 1999 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99031.pdf The corruption of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service employees along the Southwest border by drug traffickers is a serious and continuing threat. Some of these employees have waved drug loads through ports of entry, coordinated the movement of drugs across the border, transported drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, sold drugs, and revealed drug intelligence information. Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures to help ensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to address the rising threat of employee corruption on the Southwest border. For example, although the agencies generally completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some cases by as much as three years. The Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs, which deal with allegations of drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs employees, are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases. However, GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees along the Southwest border who had been convicted of drug-related crimes between 1992 and 1997 found internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported or corrected. These weaknesses included instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the inspection lane at a port of entry, (2) INS and Customs employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting persons with whom they had close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel were allowed to cross the Southwest border or pass Border Control checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs have not formally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness. For example, GAO found that financial information required for background investigations and reinvestigations was either limited or not fully reviewed. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More to Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption, by Richard M. Stana, Associate Director for Administration of Justice Issues, before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. GAO/T-GGD-99-86, Apr. 21 (16 pages). Tue, 30 Mar 1999 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99067.pdf In response to concerns from the U.S. religious community about the shortage of domestic religious workers to fill vacancies for religious positions, Congress established special immigrant and nonimmigrant visa categories in 1990 for religious workers, religious professionals, and ministers. Religious worker visas constituted about 11,000 of the 7 million immigrant and nonimmigrant visas issued in fiscal year 1997. As a result of recent fraud investigations, both the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have raised concerns that some individuals and groups that sponsor religious workers may be exploiting this category to enable unqualified aliens to enter or stay in the United States illegally. Although INS and the State Department have uncovered some fraud, they lack the data and analysis to firmly establish its extent in the religious worker visa program. The fraud uncovered typically involved (1) applicants making false statements about their qualifications as religious workers or their plans in the United States or (2) conspiracy between an applicant or a sponsoring group to misrepresent facts about the applicant's qualifications or the nature of the position to be filled. To increase the availability of information needed to determine the eligibility of visa applicants and sponsors, INS, with State's support, is considering changes to the visa-screening process. These changes include having an applicant submit additional evidence of his or her qualifications, having the sponsoring organization submit additional evidence on its ability to financially support the applicant, and incorporating new software applications that alert reviewers to organizations filing petitions for many workers. INS is also proposing a regulatory change to require that the prior work experience specific for immigrant religious worker visa applicants be full-time and that the persons work for the religious organizations in the United States on a full-time basis. Fri, 26 Mar 1999 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99047t.pdf Through its Institutional Hearing Program (IHP), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) can complete removal proceedings for criminal aliens in federal and state prisons while the aliens are still serving their sentences, thus eliminating the need for INS to locate the aliens after their release and freeing up INS detention space for other cases. With the proceedings complete, expeditious removal of criminal aliens upon completion of their sentences can occur. GAO reported in 1997 that INS needed to improve its efforts to identify potentially deportable criminal aliens in federal and state prisons and complete the IHP for these aliens before they were released. (See GAOT-GGD-97-154). Although INS performance has shown some improvement, GAO continues to have many of the same concerns about the IHP. In 1997, INS still had not identified how may potentially deportable aliens while they were in prison. Most of these released criminal aliens were aggravated felons, some of whom were reconvicted for new felons. INS completed the IHP for about half of the released criminal aliens it identified as potentially deportable while they were in prison. Because INS had to detain aliens who did not complete the hearing process in prison, INS spent about $40 million on avoidable detention expenses. In addition, INS has not fully implemented GAO's 1997 recommendations for improving the IHP. Thu, 25 Feb 1999 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99003.pdf The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) efforts to identify potentially deportable criminal aliens in federal and state prisons and complete removal proceedings before their release have shown limited improvement since 1995, and GAO continues to have concerns about INS' Institutional Hearing Program (IHP). In 1995, INS' database of deportable aliens lacked records on 34 percent of the released inmates included in GAO's analysis who had been identified by the states and the Bureau of Prisons as foreign born. About 32 percent of these were later determined to be potentially deportable criminal aliens. In 1997, INS lacked records on 36 percent of such aliens, 27 percent of whom were found to be potentially deportable criminal aliens. In GAO's analysis of 1997 data, 63 percent of the potentially deportable criminal aliens for whom INS lacked records were identified as being aggravated felons. This is significant because federal law requires INS to begin removal proceedings for aggravated felons while they are imprisoned and to complete deportation proceedings for these felons before their release. In 1995, INS did not complete the IHP before prison release for 57 percent of the potentially deportable criminal aliens for whom INS had records; as a result, the agency spent about $37 million on avoidable detention costs. Two years later, INS did not complete the IHP for half of these aliens; the avoidable detention costs totaled $40 million. Congress has urged INS to fully implement GAO's recommendation for improving the IHP. As of September 1998, INS had made limited progress in doing so. Fri, 16 Oct 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99028t.pdf Almost 10 years after GAO issued a report on problems with foreign visitors to nuclear weapons laboratories, the Department of Energy's controls over these visitors remain ineffective. Essentially, the problems GAO cited in 1988 persist. A September 1997 report (GAO/RCED-97-229) describes how, at two of three laboratories GAO visited, few background checks were done on visitors from countries that DOE considers sensitive. As a result, visitors suspected of having foreign intelligence connections gained access to the laboratories without DOE's or the laboratories' advance knowledge of these connections. Moreover, sensitive subjects, such as the detection of unsanctioned nuclear explosions, may have been discussed with foreign visitors without DOE's knowledge or approval. Weak security controls allowed foreign nationals to enter buildings unescorted or after hours. In some cases, they obtained sensitive and classified information. DOE's counterintelligence programs may not be fully effective in combating foreign intelligence efforts. In GAO's view, these problems could lead to sensitive information being passed on to foreign countries considered a risk to U.S. national security. These concerns have been heightened by recent events in India and Pakistan. Wed, 14 Oct 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99019t.pdf Almost 10 years after GAO issued a report on problems with foreign visitors to nuclear weapons laboratories, the Department of Energy's controls over these visitors remain ineffective. Essentially, the problems GAO cited in 1988 persist. A September 1997 report (GAO/RCED-97-229) describes how, at two of three laboratories GAO visited, few background checks were done on visitors from countries that DOE considers sensitive. As a result, visitors suspected of having foreign intelligence connections gained access to the laboratories without DOE's or the laboratories' advance knowledge of these connections. Moreover, sensitive subjects, such as the detection of unsanctioned nuclear explosions, may have been discussed with foreign visitors without DOE's knowledge or approval. Weak security controls allowed foreign nationals to enter buildings unescorted or after hours. In some cases, they obtained sensitive and classified information. DOE's counterintelligence programs may not be fully effective in combating foreign intelligence efforts. In GAO's view, these problems could lead to sensitive information being passed on to foreign countries considered a risk to U.S. national security. These concerns have been heightened by recent events in India and Pakistan. Tue, 06 Oct 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/161115.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the recent experiences of individual onion growers in the proximity of Vidalia, Georgia, focusing on: (1) the experience of these growers with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of Labor H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program, and the Georgia State Employment Service; (2) the wages, benefits, and working and living conditions offered to prospective domestic and H-2A workers; (3) recruitment efforts proposed and conducted regarding domestic and H-2A workers; and (4) whether the information obtained for this review is consistent with the information GAO reported in December 1997. GAO noted that: (1) in response to earlier INS warnings that it was planning to target illegal farmworkers in the Vidalia onion producing area of Georgia, growers filed an application for H-2A workers in February 1998 with Labor and the Georgia State Employment Service; (2) however, the growers GAO spoke with told it that they dropped this application because they believed the program was too costly and left them vulnerable to lawsuits from labor advocates; (3) because growers had withdrawn their application and INS officials believed that growers were employing many workers unauthorized to work in the United States, INS conducted an enforcement action in the Vidalia, Georgia, area in May 1998, during the height of the onion harvest; (4) growers had not known that, in the event of an unexpected shortage of workers such as that caused by the INS enforcement action, Labor could certify an H-2A emergency application quickly by waiving the requirement that growers apply 60 days before the date workers were needed; (5) the wages and benefits growers offered to domestic workers differed from those that would have been required had the growers hired workers under the H-2A program; (6) under the H-2A program, the growers would have been prohibited from charging a maintenance fee and would have had to provide housing to all workers--both H-2A and domestic--who lived too far from the worksite to commute; (7) if the growers had pursued their application to bring in workers from outside the United States through the H-2A program, their efforts to recruit domestic workers would have had to be more extensive than they were for the 1998 harvest; (8) Labor had accepted the growers' plan for how they would first actively recruit domestic workers before obtaining H-2A workers; (9) this plan included the provision that growers use farm labor contractors and pay them a reasonable fee of $8 per worker for their services; (10) because the growers dropped their H-2A application early in the process, however, the recruitment plan was never used, and the growers relied on their traditional recruitment strategy; (11) the growers GAO spoke with did not attempt to recruit workers directly from onion-growing regions in Texas because they considered the recruitment fees to be too high, although officials at Texas farm labor employment agencies GAO interviewed contend they had large numbers of workers available; and (12) the information GAO obtained during this review is consistent with the information it reported in December 1997. Thu, 10 Sep 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98193.pdf According to one estimate, about 116,000 15- to 17-year-olds worked as hired agricultural workers in 1997--a number that may be understated because of methodological limitations in making the estimate. Children employed as migrant and seasonal agricultural workers face greater risk of serious injury and death than do children working in other industries, yet they receive less protection under the law, working at younger ages and for longer hours than children employed in other industries. Weaknesses in current enforcement and data collection procedures limit the Department of Labor's ability to detect violations involving children working in agriculture. Changes to better protect children's health are needed, along with measures to address educational needs. Fri, 21 Aug 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98170.pdf Since legislation was enacted in 1986 requiring employers to review documents of prospective employees to establish their right to work in the United States, the Social Security card has become one of the primary documents used to determine employment eligibility. However, concerns have deepened that the card is easily counterfeited and does not prevent individuals from illegally working in the United States. As a result, some Members of Congress have asked, on several occasions, the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate the cost of issuing a counterfeit-resistant card. In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act required SSA to develop a prototype counterfeit-resistant card made of a durable tamper-resistant material with various security features that could be used to establish reliable proof of citizenship or legal noncitizenship status. That Act also required SSA and GAO to estimate and compare the cost of producing and disseminating several types of enhanced cards to all living number holders over 3-, 5-, and 10-year periods. Earlier that year, a Member of Congress asked CBO to estimate the cost of issuing a counterfeit-resistant card, believing an earlier SSA estimate of producing such a card was high. This report (1) explains differences in CBO's and SSA's estimates for replacing the Social Security card, (2) evaluates SSA's estimates for the cost of issuing a more secure card, and (3) presents additional issuance options. Thu, 20 Aug 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98164.pdf Immigration issues are high on the national policy agenda. But there have been repeated indications that statistics that could inform key debates are lacking, misleading, or otherwise inadequate. This report discusses (1) policy-related information needs for immigration statistics; (2) federal statistics (and information gaps) on the full range of demographic concepts relevant to immigration policy decisions and what is known about the quality of these statistics; and (3) strategies to improving immigration statistics. Fri, 31 Jul 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98132.pdf Although welfare reform allowed states to drop immigrants from their welfare rolls, most states have opted to provide some welfare benefits to part of this population. Nearly all states have chosen to continue providing federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and Medicaid benefits to prereform immigrants as well as provide these benefits to new immigrants after five years of U.S. residency. About one-third of the states use state funds to provide similar benefits to some new immigrants during the five-year bar. The greatest economic impact of welfare reform for most of these immigrants is the loss of food stamps. After the implementation of food stamp restrictions, an estimated 940,000 immigrants who had received food stamps in 1997 were no longer eligible to receive them. Almost one-fifth of this group consisted of immigrant children. With the implementation of the welfare reform restrictions for immigrants, state and local governments face added responsibilities. States' future challenges include verifying the citizenship or immigration status of applicants for all federal public benefits and enforcing affidavits of support for new immigrants sponsored by relatives. Fri, 31 Jul 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98155.pdf The makeup of the foreign-born population living in the United States continues to interest policymakers as they debate immigration issues. These policymakers have expressed concern that the information needed to make informed decisions on immigration policy either has been unavailable or inadequate. This report, one in a series, identifies federal guidance on the production of demographic information on foreign-born residents and provides information on agencies' status relative to that guidance. GAO (1) identifies the federal guidance available to the agencies responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on the foreign-born and (2) provides information that compares the agencies to federal guidance on independence, capacity to provide information, and efforts to coordinate the production of information, which includes statistical data on the foreign-born. Wed, 22 Jul 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98200t.pdf The H-2A agricultural guestworker programs provides a way for U.S. agricultural employers to bring nonimmigrant foreign workers into the United States to perform seasonal agricultural work on a temporary basis when domestic workers are unavailable. During fiscal year 1996, agricultural employers used the program to bring in about 15,000 workers--less than one percent of the U.S. agricultural field workforce. During fiscal year 1997, the number of workers brought into the country under the program rose to nearly 21,000--just over one percent of the total farm labor workforce. GAO testified that a sudden, widespread farm labor shortage requiring the importation of large numbers of foreign workers is unlikely to occur in the near future, although localized labor shortages may exist for specific crops or geographic areas. Few agricultural employers seek workers through the program, but those that do generally are successful in obtaining foreign agricultural workers on both a regular and an emergency basis. Although enforcement efforts by the Immigration and Naturalization Service are unlikely to significantly increase demand for H-2A workers, GAO recommends changes to the program that could improve the ability of growers to obtain workers when needed and to better protect the wages and working conditions of both domestic and foreign workers. These changes include reducing both the time required to process applications and the period of time that the worker must be employed to qualify for a wage guarantee. Wed, 24 Jun 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98119.pdf The quality of immigration statistics has been a long-standing concern of experts in the public and private sectors. The National Academy of Sciences issued two reports in which it made recommendations aimed at improving the collection and management of immigration statistics. The recommendations were directed to various groups, including Congress, the Justice Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Census Bureau. GAO provides information on the implementation status of the reports' major recommendations to Congress, the agencies, and OMB. GAO's summarizes the National Academy of Science's recommendations and discusses what actions Congress, the agencies, and OMB took in response to the 13 major recommendations in the 1985 report and all six recommendations in the 1996 report. Tue, 09 Jun 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/160548.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed KPMG Peat Marwick LLP's approach to overseeing and monitoring the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) review of the improper naturalization of aliens. GAO noted that: (1) INS officials reviewed 5,438 randomly selected case files from the 1,049,867 naturalization cases approved between August 31, 1995, and September 30, 1996; (2) according to KPMG, the purposes of the randomly selected case file review were to: (a) evaluate to what degree INS adjudicators correctly processed and documented their initial naturalization decisions; and (b) determine if any of the case files contained documentation that provided a prima facie basis for disqualifying an alien's naturalization; (3) INS' review focused on the documentation concerning the naturalization requirements--good moral character, knowledge of English and civics, eligibility period, and residency; (4) in addition, INS looked for administrative errors in the processing of the case files; (5) INS' review identified that 4,939 of the 5,438 case files contained at least one documentation error; (6) in addition, INS determined whether any of the case files contained documentation that provided a basis to disqualify an alien's naturalization; (7) it classified the case files as proper, insufficient documentation, or presumptively ineligible; (8) using the results for INS' case file review, KPMG projected that of the 1,049,867 aliens naturalized between August 31, 1995, and September 30, 1996, 920,733 case files had insufficient documentation, 90,289 case file decisions were proper, and 38,845 aliens were presumptively ineligible to be naturalized; and (9) in carrying out its monitoring responsibilities, KPMG used generally accepted social science standards. Thu, 28 May 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/160565.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided additional information on its work on the prevalence of elevated blood lead levels associated with harmful health effects in children aged 1 through 5 and particularly in children who receive their health care coverage through Medicaid, focusing on: (1) Medicaid children aged 1 through 2; (2) Hispanic children aged 1 through 5 compared with other children; and (3) immigrant children aged 1 through 5. GAO noted that: (1) nearly 10 percent of Medicaid children aged 1 through 2 had elevated levels of lead in their blood; (2) this was more than double the mean prevalence rate for non-Medicaid 1- and 2-year-olds and slightly higher than the rate for the larger group of Medicaid children aged 1 through 5; (3) although Medicaid policy requires that early and periodic screening, treatment, and diagnostic services include lead screening for all Medicaid children aged 1 through 2, only about 21 percent of Medicaid children in that age group had been screened; (4) for nearly 80 percent of the Medicaid children aged 1 and 2 identified through survey blood tests as having elevated blood levels, this was the first screening for lead that they had ever received; (5) projected to the entire Medicaid population of 1- and 2-year-olds, this represents about 206,000 of the estimated 262,000 Medicaid children aged 1 through 2 with elevated blood levels who have not been screened; (6) the prevalence of elevated blood lead levels in Hispanic children aged 1 through 5 was 4.8 percent, compared with 11.2 percent for black non-Hispanic children and 2.3 percent for white non-Hispanic children; (7) when comparing the risk of elevated blood levels by poverty status and age of housing, GAO found differences in how Hispanic, black, and white children were affected; (8) in particular, while residing in older housing was associated with an increased risk for children in each racial and ethnic group, poverty status was associated with an increased risk among black and white children but not Hispanic children; (9) the data from the Department of Health and Human Service's survey are not sufficiently detailed to determine the specific reasons why these differences exist; (10) however, the results add support to the concern that lead exposures may vary between different racial and ethnic groups; and (11) a statistically reliable estimate of the number of immigrant children with elevated blood levels could not be developed, because the survey sampled a relatively small number of children who were born outside the United States. Mon, 18 May 1998 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/160214.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO addressed congressional concerns on its work on the Department of Labor's H-2A program, focusing on clarifying aspects of the report, including the definitions of certain terms it used, the data it reviewed, and its general analytical approach. GAO noted that: (1) to enable GAO to assess Labor's performance in meeting the H-2A program's statutory and regulatory deadlines, Labor collected data from its regional offices and provided those data to GAO; (2) in addition, GAO independently collected and analyzed data from Labor's regional offices; (3) GAO is unaware of any efforts by Labor to contact the Department of Agriculture (USDA) or to respond to USDA's review of GAO's draft report; (4) one component of GAO's analysis was a review of county unemployment rates but not the raw data--that is, the number of unemployed persons--behind those rates; (5) the five Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) worksite enforcement efforts were conducted not only in Georgia but also in Alabama and North and South Carolina; (6) during its review, GAO consulted the INS district office in Atlanta, which said that officials there rarely conducted inspections at agricultural worksites and, given the agency's inspection priorities, have no plans to do so in the near future; (7) INS completed 6,804 worksite enforcement investigations in all industries in fiscal year 1997; (8) of these, 89, or 1.3 percent, were in the Atlanta district, which includes North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia; (9) forty-seven of the 89 inspections were in Georgia, and 6 of 89 were in agriculture; (10) of the 41 investigations at nonagricultural worksites for which INS provided location information within the state, 10, or 24 percent, were in zip code areas designated by the 1990 census as entirely urban; 25, or 61 percent, were in areas designated as both urban and rural; and 6, or 15 percent, were in areas designated as rural; (11) GAO spoke with numerous government officials at agencies and regional district offices at both the federal and state levels; (12) GAO also spoke with 76 growers in 15 states; (13) in addition, GAO was in continuous contact with staff of the many members of Congress who had expressed an interest in its review of the H-2A program; (14) an employer who hires illegal aliens who present documentation will be abiding by the law unless he or she knows, or should know, based on an apparent irregularity in the alien's documentation, that the alien is in this country illegal; (15) INS primarily targets only employers known to have intentionally hired illegal workers, to have been involved in criminal wrongdoing like alien smuggling, to be prior offenders, or to have subjected their employees to substandard working conditions. Thu, 02 Apr 1998 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98081.pdf A 1996 immigration reform law established new procedures for dealing with aliens entering the country with false or improper documents and for deciding who may be eligible for asylum. Known as "expedited removal," the new process gives Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials, rather than immigration judges, the authority to formally order these aliens removed from the country. The process also limits the rights of aliens to appeal a decision of exclusion. Aliens who fear being persecuted or tortured if they are returned to their home country are to be granted an interview, known as a "credible fear interview," to determine if their claims of asylum stand a reasonable chance of success. This report discusses (1) how the expedited removal process and INS procedures to implement it differ from the procedures used to exclude aliens before the 1996 act; (2) the implementation and results of the process for making credible fear determinations during the seven months following the implementation of the expedited removal process in April 1997; and (3) the mechanisms that INS established to monitor expedited removals and credible fear determinations and to improve these processes. GAO discusses estimates by INS and immigration judges of the costs to implement the expedited removal process and the time needed to adjudicate expedited removal cases and credible fear determinations. Tue, 31 Mar 1998 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98062.pdf Concerns about whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) may have improperly naturalized aliens with criminal histories prompted the INS to review its case files of aliens who were naturalized between August 31, 1995, and September 30, 1996, and who the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had identified as having criminal history records. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) at the Justice Department was charged with providing quality assurance that INS' judgments were unbiased by reviewing a sample of the cases. The Justice Department also contracted with KPMG Peat Marwick LLP to monitor and validate INS' review. INS reviewed the case files of 16,858 aliens who were naturalized during the period in question and whose records included felony arrest or serious conviction. INS found 369 cases that it considered "presumptively ineligible." Another 5,954 cases were judged to be in need of additional action, and the remaining 10,535 were designated as proper. In its review, EOIR concurred with INS' assessment in 79 percent of the cases. Although there was a 21-percent disagreement rate between the INS and EOIR reviewers, GAO could not conclude that a statistically significant difference existed between the INS and EOIR decisions. Mon, 23 Mar 1998 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98093.pdf Health insurance has become an increasingly important way to provide children with access to adequate health care. Yet in 1996, 10.6 million children were uninsured. Congress has sought to insure more children by committing more than $20 billion to fund state expansions of children's health insurance--either through the Medicaid program or through insurance programs developed by the states. However, many uninsured children who are eligible for Medicaid are not enrolled. This report (1) examines the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of children who qualify for Medicaid and identifies groups in which uninsured children are concentrated and to whom outreach efforts might be targeted; (2) determines the reasons these children are not enrolled in Medicaid; and (3) identifies strategies that states and communities are using to boost enrollment. Fri, 20 Mar 1998 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98069.pdf Visa processing backlogs are a problem for some U.S. consulates, including the one in Sao Paulo, Brazil. The visa backlogs at the consulates GAO reviewed ranged from eight to 52 days. The longest delays occurred during peak travel periods, such as the summer months and winter holiday season. Factors that affected the consulates' ability to process nonimmigrant visas promptly included inadequate staffing as well as poor computer systems and other equipment. An increased emphasis on preventing the entry of illegal immigrants, terrorists, and other criminals also led to delays. The State Department has initiatives under way to address staffing problems, upgrade equipment, and implement practices to improve visa processing at overseas posts. However, it does not systematically gather data on visa processing turnaround times and has not yet set specific timeliness standards to help guide its improvement program. Fri, 13 Mar 1998 00:00:00 -0500 http://archive.gao.gov/auditpapr2pdf4/160074.pdf GAO presented its Administration of Justice issue area plan for fiscal years 1998 through 1999. GAO plans to assess the: (1) efficiency and effectiveness of the federal courts and corrections systems, given the increasing demands placed on them and current budgetary constraints; (2) Immigration and Naturalization Service's ability to effectively and efficiently enforce immigration laws and enhance service delivery; (3) development, implementation, and evaluation of the federal drug control strategy; and (4) federal law enforcement's response, in partnership with state and local governments, to violent crime, terrorism, and other major threats facing society. Sun, 01 Mar 1998 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98062.pdf Meatpacking plants in the United States, which are today often found in rural areas, are experiencing changes in the composition of their workforces. Increasingly, workers are coming from areas outside where the plants are located--from areas with high unemployment and from abroad. Some of these workers are illegal aliens. In response to congressional concerns about the impact of this trend on communities in Nebraska and Iowa, this report answers the following questions: (1) What population changes have occurred in communities with large meatpacking plants? (2) What changes have occurred in school enrollments, health care costs, economic conditions, and crime rates? (3) What are the housing conditions of plant workers and their families? (4) Does evidence exist that meatpacking companies have hired illegal aliens? Fri, 27 Feb 1998 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98020.pdf A sudden widespread farm labor shortage requiring the importation of large numbers of foreign workers is unlikely to occur in the near future. GAO's review of the H-2A nonimmigrant guestworker program--which allows the U.S. agricultural sector to bring foreign workers into the United States to do seasonal agricultural work on a temporary basis when domestic workers are unavailable--found that there appears to be no national agricultural labor shortage now but that localized shortages may exist for specific crops or geographic areas. Although an estimated 600,000 farmworkers are not legally authorized to work in the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service does not expect its enforcement efforts to significantly reduce the supply of farmworkers. Few agricultural employers seek workers through the H-2A program, but those that do generally succeed in obtaining foreign agricultural workers on both a regular and an emergency basis. However, both employers and Labor Department officials have had difficulty meeting time frames set by law and regulation. Changes in the program's operations could improve the ability of growers to obtain workers when needed and better protect the wages and working conditions of both domestic and foreign workers. These changes include reducing both the time required to process applications and the period of time that the worker must be employed to qualify for a wage guarantee. Wed, 31 Dec 1997 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98041.pdf Welfare reform significantly changed the food stamp program, reducing benefits for many and eliminating benefits for able-bodied adults without dependents and for legal immigrants. Many state governments are taking steps to meet the food assistance needs of those affected, but the extent to which these measures will meet those needs remains unclear. For able-bodied adults, some of these actions--employment assistance and training--may help them achieve self-sufficiency. For legal immigrants, citizenship could restore federal food stamps to those who meet income and work eligibility requirements. However, because of the length of time it takes to process citizenship applications, many individuals have likely lost their food stamps. Thu, 18 Dec 1997 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98021.pdf In 1994, the Attorney General launched a major effort to deter illegal immigration along the southwest U.S. border. This strategy called for the Border Patrol to (1) allocate additional resources in a four-phased approach starting first with the areas of highest known illegal activity; (2) make maximum use of physical barriers; (3) increase the amount of time that agents spend on border enforcement; and (4) identify the appropriate mix of technology, equipment, and personnel needed for the Border Patrol. Although there has been some progress in implementing this strategy, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has no formal plan to evaluate efforts to reduce illegal immigration. Without such data, there is no way to know whether billions of dollars spent on this effort have produced the intended results. Thu, 11 Dec 1997 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98030.pdf In fiscal year 1995, about $1.1 billion in welfare and food stamp benefits were provided to illegal aliens with citizen children. This amount equals about three percent of overall welfare benefits and two percent of food stamp benefits. A vast majority of the households receiving these benefits lived in California, New York, Texas, and Arizona. Although illegal aliens also received supplemental security income and housing assistance for their citizen children, data with which to develop estimates for these two programs were unavailable. Comprehensive national statistics on any misrepresentation or fraud perpetrated by illegal aliens receiving benefits on behalf of their citizen children are unavailable. However, a few studies done by California counties on welfare households suggest that the rates and types of potential misrepresentation or fraud are similar for both households headed by illegal aliens and for the general welfare population. Wed, 19 Nov 1997 00:00:00 -0500 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/159527.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the resources: (1) used by the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to monitor freight service on operating rail lines from San Diego to Tecate, Mexico; and (2) that Customs and INS believe would be necessary to detect and deter illegal activities associated reopening the rail line. GAO noted that: (1) Customs and INS officials said that they would need as many as 31 to 35 staff and related equipment once the Desert Line is reopened; (2) Customs has assigned two inspectors for both the trains, but has no available inspection facilities; (3) the INS Border Patrol generally has two agents stationed in the area, but not specifically because of the train crossing; (4) the San Diego and Imperial Valley (SD & IV) Railroad has agreed to modify an existing building in San Ysidro for use by Customs; (5) to process the proposed basic freight service associated with reopening the Desert Line, Customs said that, at San Ysidro, it would require five inspectors, one canine enforcement officer, and additional equipment; (6) the Border Patrol would not require additional agents at San Ysidro, unless the number of illegal aliens discovered were to increase; (7) neither inspection facilities nor equipment are available in Campo, California; (8) Customs said its resource needs at Campo were similar to those at San Ysidro; (9) SD & IV Railroad has agreed to provide inspection facilities; (10) the Border Patrol said it would require at least two agents to observe the train at Campo and at least two agents to observe the train as it enters the United States, and that it would need to pull these agents from other border areas to provide train coverage; (11) the Border Patrol said it would need up to 10 agents to observe the train as it travels between Campo and Jacumba, California, and if necessary, at least four agents to physically board and check railcars at Jacumba; (12) Customs said that, along with inspectors, it would need additional special agents to handle and investigate potential smuggling activities; (13) for modern freight service, Customs and the Border Patrol may need additional resources, depending on the volume, frequency, and composition of the freight shipped; and (14) a draft report of a Border Patrol assessment identified resource levels similar to those the Patrol had already provided GAO. Wed, 05 Nov 1997 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/rc97229.pdf With the end of the Cold War, secret weapons research at the Energy Department's weapons laboratories has waned while unclassified cooperative research with various nations is rising. With this research has come an increase in the number of foreign visitors at the laboratories. DOE has various controls to minimize the risk of foreign espionage, but earlier work by GAO and the U.S. intelligence community has cited shortcomings in these controls. This report discusses (1) DOE's procedures for background checks on foreign visitors and controlling the dissemination of sensitive information to them, (2) security controls over foreign visitor's access to sensitive areas and information within the laboratories, and (3) counterintelligence programs for mitigating the potential threat posed by foreign visitors. Thu, 25 Sep 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/159309.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO studied the extent to which illegal immigrants operate motor vehicles in California without automobile insurance, focusing on whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Criminal Alien Identification Pilot Program, and the city of Anaheim, California, detention facility, had any information available on illegal immigrants driving without automobile insurance. GAO noted that: (1) it identified estimates of: (a) U.S. illegal immigration; (b) California uninsured motorists; and (c) costs to California consumers from uninsured motorists; (2) GAO was, however, unable to find any information on the extent to which illegal immigrants in California were also uninsured motorists; (3) at the Anaheim detention facility, GAO found that, while some criminal aliens in detention were charged with driving without automobile insurance, the officials did not know whether other illegal aliens who drove had insurance; and (4) consequently, data were not available to show the percentage of illegal immigrants in California who did not have automobile insurance. Fri, 05 Sep 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97153.pdf The process for preventing ineligible noncitizens from obtaining federal student financial aid involves identifying applicants with questionable eligibility and referring their names to financial aid administrators at colleges for follow-up. The Education Department checks all financial aid applicants for U.S. citizenship, using records at the Social Security Administration (SSA). For applicants who are not U.S. citizens, the Department checks records at the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to determine eligibility. The INS and SSA screening techniques identified more than 500,000 potentially ineligible noncitizens in award year 1996-97. However, financial aid administrators at four colleges GAO contacted estimated that virtually all the applicants flagged through SSA and INS screening were ultimately able to demonstrate their eligibility for student aid. No one knows whether or how many ineligible citizens are nonetheless able to qualify for student financial aid. The Education Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has not opened and resolved any investigations of applicants who falsified their citizenship status and received aid since the SSA verification process was introduced last year. The OIG did, however, identify 26 cases in which ineligible noncitizens received $332,000 in financial aid between 1993 and 1995. Almost half of these recipients were illegal aliens. These cases were referred to the Justice Department for prosecution. Wed, 06 Aug 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97132.pdf The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has received considerable attention in recent years, especially as concerns have mounted over illegal immigration. From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 1997, INS' budget more than doubled, and its staffing level increased by about 45 percent to more than 26,000 positions. GAO reported in 1991 that INS was experiencing severe management problems. (See GAO/GGD-91-28.) This follow-up review discusses INS' progress in addressing these issues. GAO examines whether INS has (1) developed goals and priorities to guide planning and resource allocation, (2) revised its organizational structure, (3) improved its internal communications and updated its field and administrative manuals, (4) improved the process for allocating budgetary resources, and (5) improved its ability to monitor its financial status. Tue, 22 Jul 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/158955.pdf GAO reviewed an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) demonstration project to help employers verify work eligibility for newly hired noncitizen workers. GAO noted that: (1) under the Employment Verification Pilot project, in response to nearly 45,000 queries over about a 16-month period, the INS electronically verified 80 percent of self-certified noncitizen new hires as authorized to work; (2) the remaining 20 percent did not receive electronic verification either because the INS could find no information on the noncitizens or the INS determined that documentation presented by noncitizens was counterfeit, had expired, or indicated that employment was not authorized; and (3) of those noncitizens who did not receive electronic verification, only 3 percent contacted the INS to resolve their status. Thu, 17 Jul 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97154t.pdf The Institutional Hearing Program (IHP) is the Justice Department's main vehicle for placing aliens who are incarcerated in federal and state prisons into deportation proceedings so that they can be expeditiously deported upon release from prison. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has not fully complied with the law's requirements concerning criminal aliens who have committed aggravated felonies, nor has it realized the full potential of the IHP. INS did not identify many deportable criminal aliens before their release from prison. For the second half of fiscal year 1995, this resulted in nearly 2,000 criminal aliens, including some aggravated felons, being released into U.S. communities without an INS determination of the risk they posed to public safety. GAO asked INS to determine whether 635 of these aliens had committed crimes following their release. INS found that 23 percent had been rearrested for crimes, including 183 felonies. Tue, 15 Jul 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/158814.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO responded to questions from Senator Spencer Abraham and Senator Kennedy regarding the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) responses to the recommendations GAO made in its 1994 report, and provided GAO's views on Senator Kennedy's proposals to INS to improve the naturalization program. GAO noted that: (1) after providing INS with a copy of its draft report, GAO obtained their oral comments on November 9, 1994; (2) at the November 9, 1994 meeting, INS and Department of Justice officials agreed with GAO's findings, conclusions, and recommendations; (3) at the meeting, however, the INS officials did not provide details on the specific actions that would be taken to address GAO's recommendations or who would be responsible for their implementation; (4) a November 29, 1996, memorandum from the Office of the Commissioner on naturalization quality procedures, if fully implemented, should go a long way toward responding to GAO's recommendations; (5) the Commissioner's memorandum instructed INS' field units to not complete naturalization cases until a definitive response had been received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (6) in addition, INS established a process to be used to review field office operations (INSpect); (7) however, a Peat Marwick report showed that INS had not ensured that its field units were carrying out the Commissioner's November 1996 instructions; (8) it also highlighted the need for INS to do a better job of monitoring its field offices to ensure that they are properly and completely meeting the Commissioner's instructions; (9) Senator Kennedy's proposal included steps to improve the efficiency, accuracy, and oversight of the naturalization program and to encourage innovation and future progress; and (10) two items in the plan may need further consideration: (a) the establishment of an efficiency goal to complete the entire naturalization process of a qualified legal permanent resident in 6 months or less may not be consistent with the goal of having the fingerprint process as accurate as possible, given the level of resources; and (b) although the centralization of the naturalization process to facilitate effective oversight of the fingerprint procedures, including the Designated Fingerprint Services Program (DFS), naturalization testing centers, and final INS interviews, could improve the internal controls over naturalization, it may also present some obstacles. Wed, 04 Jun 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/158747.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the number of undocumented alien women who enter the United States to give birth, focusing on Medicaid-funded births to undocumented aliens in California and Texas. GAO did not independently verify the information provided to it by state health departments. GAO noted that: (1) in 1995, Medicaid-funded births to undocumented alien mothers were estimated to number over 78,000 in California and 24,000 in Texas; (2) the births in California represented 14 percent of all births and 34 percent of Medicaid-funded births in the state; (3) from 1992 to 1995, the number of Medicaid-funded births to undocumented alien mothers in California declined 18 percent, with a significant decrease form 1993 to 1994; (4) in contrast, from 1992 to 1995 in Texas, the number of Medicaid funded births to undocumented alien mothers more than doubled, while the total number of births remained fairly stable; (5) as a result, during these years, undocumented alien births funded by Medicaid increased from 4 to 8 percent of all births and from 9 to 16 percent of Medicaid funded-births in the state; (6) undocumented aliens may seek U.S. citizenship for their children for a variety of reasons, including the prospects of enhanced educational and economic opportunities for them; (7) although many factors motivate undocumented aliens to give birth in this country, state and county welfare officials in California stated that they believe that, in many instances, pregnant women have crossed the border to receive free medical services and, after bearing a U.S.-citizen child, other public benefits on behalf of their children; (8) state welfare officials in Texas also noted that the provision of health benefits to undocumented aliens can serve as an incentive for women to give birth in this country; and (9) however, Texas officials also said that public benefits might serve as less of an incentive to cross the border in Texas than in California, where the dollar amount of cash assistance for needy families with children is much greater. Fri, 30 May 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/f0902b/158730.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the citizenship and immigration status of uninsured children under 18 years old. GAO noted that its analysis of the Current Population Survey showed that for 1995: (1) among uninsured children, almost 9 out of 10 children were born in the United States and most of the rest were foreign-born noncitizen residents; (2) although foreign-born noncitizen children constituted only 3.3 percent of U.S. children in 1995, they accounted for over 9 percent of all uninsured children, (3) almost 37 percent of foreign-born noncitizen children were uninsured in 1995, about 847,000 children; (4) in comparison, only 12.5 percent of U.S.-born children were uninsured, but this group numbers over 8,250,000 children; (5) a parent of an uninsured child was more likely to be foreign born than were his or her children; (6) almost 3 out of 10 of the parents who matched with uninsured children were foreign born; and (7) four-fifths of these foreign-born parents were not citizens. Tue, 27 May 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97047.pdf The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) collects fees for processing aliens' applications for such things as naturalization and adjustment of status (to become permanent residents). Eighteen percent of INS' fiscal year 1997 budget, or $566 million, is earmarked for processing applications. The number of applications received by INS is growing, and there are indications that some INS field units are faster than others at processing applications. In fiscal year 1996, INS received nearly 5.4 million new applications and completed about 5.6 million applications--a 115 percent increase over the number of applications received and completed in fiscal year 1989. At the end of fiscal year 1996, INS had an inventory of about 1.7 million applications waiting to be processed. This represents an increase of about 2.5 times the pending caseload at the end of fiscal year 1989. A recent INS report found differences in application production rates and projected processing times among its district offices. This report examines differences in production rates and processing times among INS field units. GAO also asked officials at nine district offices and two service centers about the factors that accounted for the differences GAO found. Tue, 20 May 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97167t.pdf At the time GAO issued its report in May 1996 (GAO/NSIAD-96-99), the State Department was attempting to make its visa-issuing process more efficient and less vulnerable to fraud by (1) issuing visas that were machine readable, (2) expanding automated name-check capability to all posts, (3) forming "lookout" committees to identify suspected terrorists and others ineligible for visas, and (4) strengthening compliance with management controls. Since then, the State Department's efforts to combat visa fraud at diplomatic posts by introducing a machine-readable visa system have been hampered by technical problems, a lack of cooperation from other government agencies, and weak management controls at many U.S. embassies. Tue, 20 May 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97098t.pdf Aliens who apply to become naturalized citizens must meet certain requirements, such as being of good moral character. To determine whether an alien has been convicted of a crime that would preclude citizenship, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) submits the alien's fingerprints to the FBI, which researches whether that person has a criminal history on file. Between September 1995 and September 1996, some aliens with disqualifying felony convictions were improperly naturalized, probably because INS adjudicators were unaware of the results of an FBI check. In addition, both the Justice Department's Inspector General and GAO have found problems with the fingerprinting part of the process. For example, persons intent on hiding their criminal backgrounds could have someone else complete the INS fingerprint card and submit the prints as their own. In November 1996, the INS Commissioner announced changes intended to strengthen the naturalization process. However, an April 1997 report by Peat Marwick showed that INS has not ensured that its field units were carrying out the Commissioner's instructions. Thu, 01 May 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97057t.pdf Aliens who apply to become naturalized citizens must meet certain requirements, such as being of good moral character. To determine whether an alien has been convicted of a crime that would preclude citizenship, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) submits the alien's fingerprints to the FBI, which researches whether that person has a criminal history record on file. Between September 1995 and September 1996, some aliens with disqualifying criminal felony convictions were improperly naturalized, probably because INS adjudicators were unaware of the results of an FBI check of the aliens' criminal history records. In addition, both the Justice Department's Inspector General and GAO have found problems with the fingerprinting component of the process. For example, persons intent on hiding their criminal backgrounds could have someone else complete the INS fingerprint card and then submit the prints as their own. In November 1996, the INS Commissioner announced changes intended to strengthen the naturalization process. However, an April 1997 report by Peat Marwick showed that INS has not ensured that its field units are carrying out the Commissioner's instructions. Wed, 30 Apr 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97051t.pdf Between September 1995 and September 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) received about 1.3 million naturalization applications; about 1 million aliens were naturalized. During that time, INS streamlined the naturalization process. Although these efforts greatly increased the volume of applications processed and approved, the Justice Department has identified errors in the naturalization process. Concerns have been raised that INS may have improperly naturalized aliens with felony convictions. According to the Justice Department, among the 1 million aliens who were naturalized between September 1995 and September 1996 were (1) about 71,500 aliens who had criminal history records on file with the FBI and (2) about 179,500 aliens whose fingerprint records were unclassifiable by the FBI or whose records for other reasons may not have been checked by the FBI for their criminal history. The Justice Department and INS are reviewing records to determine the extent to which aliens were improperly naturalized. Wed, 05 Mar 1997 00:00:00 -0500 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/158200.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) efforts to prevent and detect the fraudulent receipt of government benefits by noncitizen nonresidents in Mexican border towns; and (2) the extent to which government agencies have detected this type of fraud in the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Food Stamp programs. GAO did not independently verify the information officials provided for this report. GAO noted that: (1) federal, state, and local Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Social Security Administration (SSA) offices, responsible, respectively for administering the AFDC, Food Stamp, and SSI programs, all have a variety of procedures in place to prevent the inappropriate receipt of benefits by noncitizen nonresidents; (2) as even the best prevention procedures are not fail-safe, these agencies also undertake periodic investigations to detect ongoing fraud; (3) periodic investigations have detected some cases involving noncitizen nonresidents' inappropriate receipt of government benefits through post office boxes in Mexican border towns; (4) however, statistics on inappropriate benefits receipt do not identify cases involving the use of post office boxes; (5) these statistics only identify failure to meet eligibility criteria, such as income, age, and household composition, as well as residency; (6) to prevent fraud before it occurs, procedures require checks of immigration status and residence; (7) specifically, the SSI, AFDC, and Food Stamp programs are required to use the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system, maintained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), to compare applicants' claimed immigration status with that recorded by INS; (8) furthermore, all applicants for and recipients of SSI, AFDC, and Food Stamp benefits are required to provide a residence address if they elect to receive benefits through a post office box; (9) physical verification of applicants' or recipients' residence, such as home visits or residence surveillance, is not routinely undertaken, unless there is reason to suspect fraud; (10) some investigations are done on a case-by-case basis, such as when a suspicious case is referred to fraud investigators by benefit eligibility workers; (11) periodic investigations are also done on groups of cases sharing certain characteristics, which may or may not raise suspicions of fraud, such as cases of benefit recipients in certain zip codes or multiple benefit recipients at the same address; (12) investigations of groups of cases are usually conducted jointly by several program and law enforcement agencies, such as the SSA, INS, USDA, local program offices, and state fraud units; (13) each agency usually contributes some investigative or data base resources; and (14) further investigative work, usually by an interagency team of investigators, typically involves home visits, interviews, and, sometimes, residence surveillance. Fri, 21 Feb 1997 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97051.pdf In response to congressional concerns about the implementation and outcomes of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for Vietnamese asylum seekers in Southeast Asia, GAO reviewed selected cases from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and evaluated how the process for determining refugee status worked for these individuals. Specifically, GAO examined family unity and victim-of-violence cases as well as general refugee (merit) cases. This report (1) reviews factual information about these cases from the perspective of the international refugee criteria used under CPA and (2) examines how the screening process was implemented. Tue, 31 Dec 1996 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97026.pdf Placing enough doctors in underserved areas is a long-standing problem in the United States. A growing number of locations are turning to non-U.S. citizens who have just finished their medical education in the United States. Waivers that allow foreign graduates of U.S. medical schools to remain in the United States if they agree to practice in areas with shortages of medical personnel have grown dramatically--from 70 in 1990 to more than 1,300 in 1995. However, the program is rudderless, with no single agency responsible for managing and coordinating waiver requests. Monitoring efforts to ensure that physicians fulfill the terms of their agreements remain spotty. In addition, physicians who end up practicing in underserved areas may not actually target those segments of the population that are underserved. Mon, 30 Dec 1996 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97012.pdf The United States has a continuing special interest in the protection and welfare of many Vietnamese and other ethnic groups in Southeast Asia (including former employees of the U.S. government and others closely linked to the U.S. presence in Vietnam before 1975) and family members of persons now in the United States. Since 1975, the United States has resettled hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers from the region, including nearly 13,000 Indo-Chinese refugees under the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), which was an arrangement for achieving a long-lasting solution to the continuing flow of asylum seekers in Southeast Asia. This report reviews the implementation of the CPA. GAO (1) determines whether the first-asylum countries of Hong Kong and Indonesia implemented CPA refugee status determination procedures in accordance with international standards and criteria, (2) provides information on alleged corruption in the program, and (3) ascertains whether asylum seekers returning to Vietnam were persecuted. GAO also discusses U.S. and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees costs associated with implementing the CPA. Mon, 21 Oct 1996 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96149t.pdf Noncitizens are one of the fastest growing groups of recipients of supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. They represent nearly one-third of aged SSI recipients and about six percent of disabled recipients. Although the growth rate for noncitizen caseloads has slowed, it is still higher than that for citizens, and the proportion of noncitizens relative to other SSI recipients continues to rise. About two-thirds of noncitizens recipients--roughly 520,000--live in three states: California, New York, and Florida. On the whole, noncitizens are more likely to receive SSI than are citizens, but this may be primarily true for refugees and asylees. Adult children of aged immigrants and others who say they are willing to financially support them sometimes do not. Eventually, some of these older immigrants receive SSI. Also, some translators have helped noncitizens to fraudulently obtain SSI disability benefits. Thu, 23 May 1996 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96099.pdf Technical problems and the failure of overseas consular staff to comply with internal management controls have hampered State Department efforts to modernize its visa and passport operations and make them less vulnerable to fraud. After initial delays, State has made steady progress in installing its machine-readable system--the primary initiative for eliminating visa fraud--and provided all visa-issuing posts with automated access to its global database containing the names of persons ineligible for visas. Operational problems, however, have diminished the effectiveness of these efforts. Meanwhile, State's modernization program to reduce passport fraud is behind schedule. State originally planned to install a new wide-area network, develop a system to print a digitalized passport photograph, and install a system to verify the multiple issuance of passports by December 1995. However, only the installation of the wide-area network, upon which the other two projects depend, has been completed. Full implementation also depends on modernizing the passport production system, which according to State depends on funding availability. Thu, 09 May 1996 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96108.pdf GAO reviewed six successful employment training projects with a variety of characteristics, including diverse geographic locations, client populations, program sizes, and funding sources. Despite these differences, the six training projects shared a common strategy to prepare clients for self sufficiency. This strategy--resulting in placement rates of more than 90 percent for three of the projects GAO visited--incorporated four key features: ensuring commitment to training and landing a job, removing barriers that might hinder a client's ability to finish training and get and keep a job, improving employability skills, and linking occupational skills training with the local labor market. Although the projects implemented them differently, together these features ensure that clients are ready, willing, and able to participate in and benefit from training and employment assistance and become self-sufficient. Tue, 07 May 1996 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96065.pdf The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 increased funding for the Border Patrol to help stem the flow of illegal aliens crossing the southwest border. The legislation authorized increases in the number of Border Patrol agents and support staff to carry out the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) new border enforcement strategy of "prevention through deterrence." Under this strategy, more Border Patrol agents are to be stationed directly on the border to discourage aliens from entering the United States illegally. GAO analyzed the Border Patrol's enforcement activities nationwide. This analysis is intended for use in congressional deliberations on the number of Border Patrol agents to patrol the southwest border. Further, GAO's analysis provides baseline data on the (1) locations where the Border Patrol carried out its enforcement duties, (2) number of Border Patrol staff at each location, (3) specific enforcement activities carried out at each location, (4) views of INS officials on the contributions of the Border Patrol to INS enforcement activities, and (4) factors that could affect decisions on hiring or relocating agents for assignment to the southwest border. Mon, 11 Mar 1996 00:00:00 -0500 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/156284.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Customs Service's progress in implementing its reorganization and modernization plan. GAO noted that Customs has: (1) reduced the number of headquarters positions by 233, 40 percent of its 1999 goal of 600 reductions; (2) closed its 7 regional offices and 42 district offices, replacing them with 20 Customs Management Centers; and (3) identified trade compliance, outbound, and passenger processes as three core business processes and has plans to define and redesign those processes. Fri, 23 Feb 1996 00:00:00 -0500 http://archive.gao.gov/papr2pdf/156125.pdf Noncitizens are among the fastest growing groups receiving benefits from the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI), which provides means-tested benefits to eligible blind, elderly, or disabled persons. Noncitizens represent nearly one-third of aged SSI recipients and 5.5 percent of disabled recipients. About two-thirds of noncitizen SSI recipients live in three states--California, New York, and Florida. On the whole, noncitizens are more likely to receive SSI than citizens, but this may be true primarily for refugees and asylum seekers. Adult children of aged immigrants and others who say they are willing to financially support them sometimes do not. Eventually, many of these aged immigrants receive SSI. Also, some translators help noncitizens to fraudulently obtain SSI disability benefits. Tue, 06 Feb 1996 00:00:00 -0500 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/155693.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) border crossing cards (BCC), focusing on the: (1) changes in INS policies for processing BCC; and (2) number of BCC applications received and the percentage that are approved or denied. GAO noted that: (1) INS has drafted a proposed regulation to clarify and standardize procedures for issuing BCC; (2) in fiscal year (FY) 1994, the San Ysidro port received around 25,000 BCC applications, but denied about 50 percent of these applications; (3) the percentage of BCC applications denied decreased significantly because San Ysidro allowed applicants to use other forms of documentation proving residence and financial solvency; (4) INS has problems with the quality of data in its Central Index System and its Deportable Alien Control System because it does not have the proper procedures to direct its staff in updating its files; and (5) in August 1995, INS began requiring inspectors to check all BCC applicants against criminal history databases to prevent ineligible aliens from obtaining a BCC. Wed, 29 Nov 1995 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96007.pdf According to records at the Education Department, about 390,000 legal immigrant students received Pell grant aid in academic year 1992-93. This was about 10 percent of all students receiving Pell grants. In total, immigrants received $662 million, or about 11 percent, of Pell grant aid in that year. GAO was unable to determine the total number of legal immigrants who received Stafford loans because citizenship data are not maintained in the Education Department's loan files. Some immigrants who received Pell grants, however, also received Stafford loans totalling $257 million. About 82 percent of the immigrants who received student aid lived in seven states, led by California and New York. Sixty-one percent attended public colleges, 19 percent attended private colleges, and 21 percent attended for-profit vocational schools. The 100 schools with the most immigrant Pell grant recipients accounted for about half of all such students, and 91 percent of these schools were located in the seven states with the highest concentration of immigrant students. Fri, 24 Nov 1995 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/pe95020.pdf Reliable and valid estimates of the number of overstays--persons who entered the United States legally as visitors but did not leave under the terms of their admissions--are important to public policy-making. Higher number of overstays might suggest, for example, the need for stricter policies or laws for issuing temporary U.S. visas to citizens of those countries whose travelers tend to overstay their visas in significant numbers. Overstay data are also needed to monitor travel from countries whose citizens are not required to obtain a U.S. tourist visa. This report examines the basis for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates of overstays and suggests ways in which estimates of immigrant overstays can be improved by INS. Tue, 26 Sep 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ns95211.pdf This report reviews the U.S. government's efforts to cope with the mass exodus of people from Cuba in the summer of 1994. GAO (1) describes how U.S. policy toward those seeking to leave Cuba has changed since then, (2) identified the agencies and the costs to the U.S. government associated with the exodus of Cubans, (3) assesses the capabilities of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to process applicants seeking legal entry into the United States, and (4) evaluates the adequacy of living conditions at the Cuban safe haven camps at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay. Mon, 18 Sep 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/he95116.pdf Some ineligible applicants who cannot speak English have obtained Social Security Income (SSI) benefits illegally by using middlemen. These middlemen, who provide translation services, have allegedly coached SSI claimants on how to appear mentally disabled, used dishonest health care providers to submit false medical evidence for those seeking benefits, and provided false information on claimants' medical and family histories. By 1990, the Social Security Administration (SSA) had become aware of the middleman problem. For example, a Washington State middleman arrested for fraud had helped at least 240 immigrants obtain $7 million in SSI benefits by coaching them on which medical symptoms to claim and providing false information on their medical conditions and family histories. This report describes factors that contribute to the SSI program's vulnerability to fraudulent applications and describes federal and state initiatives to combat such fraudulent activities. Thu, 31 Aug 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ai95147.pdf Identifying persons arrested for aggravated felonies as aliens is critical to joint efforts by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and local law enforcement agencies to prevent the release of these persons before INS can take action. INS' Law Enforcement Support Center, whose pilot operations began in July 1994, is an attempt to provide this identification capability. This approach, however, it inherently limited by the name-based systems that it depends upon. Until INS successfully implements a system that identifies persons on the basis of biometric information, such as fingerprints, INS' ability to quickly identify arrested persons as aliens will be limited. INS' planned move to an automated fingerprint database is intended to address the need for better ways to identify persons who will be processed for either enforcement or benefit purposes. Further, accurate and complete criminal alien data in INS' Deportable Alien Control System and the Central Index System are essential. Unless INS' data reliability problems are resolved, INS risks making decision on the basis of inaccurate and incomplete information. Mon, 21 Aug 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/he95133.pdf In recent years, growing public concern about illegal aliens in the United States has focused on their use of public benefits and their overall cost to society. The three national studies that GAO reviewed represent the initial efforts of researchers to estimate the total public fiscal impact of illegal aliens. The limited data available make it hard to develop reasonable estimates on such a broad subject. Moreover, the national studies varied considerably in the range of items they included and their treatment of some items, making their estimates difficult to compare. As a result, a great deal of uncertainty remains about the national fiscal impact of illegal aliens. Obtaining better data on the illegal alien population would help improve the national net cost estimates. Such data should focus on characteristics of illegal aliens, such as geographic distribution, age distribution, income distribution, labor force participation rate, tax compliance rate, and school participation, that are helpful in estimating the largest net cost items. Clearer explanation of which costs and revenues are appropriate to include would also help improve the usefulness of the estimates. The expert panel convened by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform could serve as a forum for discussing some of these data and conceptual issues. Tue, 25 Jul 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154566.pdf The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program is the largest cash assistance program for the poor and one of the fastest growing entitlement programs; program costs have risen 20 percent annually during the least four years. SSI provides means-tested income support payment to aged, blind, or disabled persons. Last year, more than 6 million persons received about $25 billion in federal and state benefits. In response to SSI's rapid growth, Congress passed legislation limiting drug addicts' benefits, and this year it is considering further restrictions for these recipients as well as for children and noncitizens. This report provides an overview of the SSI program and its recent history. Specifically, it examines factors contributing to caseload growth and changes in the characteristics of SSI recipients. Fri, 07 Jul 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154430.pdf The earned income tax credit is a major federal effort to help the working poor. As of May 1995, 17.3 million returns claimed nearly $20 billion in earned income credit for tax year 1994. Over the years, the credit has been extended to (1) offset the impact of social security taxes on low-income workers and (2) encourage low-income persons to seek employment rather than welfare. Overall noncompliance with the credit's provisions has not been measured since 1988. Nonetheless, noncompliance appears to be a problem. Further, although the credit is intended to assist the working poor, eligibility criteria have not considered all the resources recipients may be able to draw on to support themselves and their families. Finally, no one knows how many illegal aliens receive the credit. Thu, 08 Jun 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154380.pdf This fact sheet provides information on aliens applying to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to adjust their status to lawful permanent residents. Recent legislation allows aliens who entered without inspection, worked illegally, or overstayed their visas to apply for permanent resident status without leaving the country. GAO provides data on (1) the number of aliens applying for permanent resident status under the legislation, (2) revenue that has been received as a result of these aliens' applications, (3) denial rates for these applications, and (4) the impact of these applications on INS' workload. Thu, 08 Jun 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ia95014.pdf GAO presented its Administration of Justice issue area plan for fiscal years 1995 through 1997. GAO plans to: (1) assess federal progress in implementing major crime control initiatives and enforcement programs; (2) identify ways to improve federal cooperation with state/local enforcement efforts; (3) develop approaches for analyzing enforcement budgets and identify opportunities for resource consolidation and cost savings; (4) periodically report judiciary initiatives to Congress; (5) identify and track the Bureau of Prisons' efforts to reduce prison construction and operation costs; (6) ensure that prison construction standards are implemented; (7) ensure that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is addressing management weaknesses and improving its enforcement efforts against illegal and criminal aliens; (8) assess the effectiveness of Customs' reorganization and cargo and trade enforcement efforts; and (9) determine if Customs is maximizing its opportunities to reduce costs and generate revenue. Thu, 01 Jun 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/154210.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed four agencies' services to nonEnglish speaking customers. GAO noted that: (1) there is no evidence that the agencies cannot meet the needs of their nonEnglish-speaking customers; (2) although there is a shortage of bilingual staff at certain agency offices, these agencies can obtain bilingual services from their communities as needed; (3) the Social Security Administration's strategic plan specifically addresses the need for bilingual services, while two of the other agencies include foreign language needs in their customer service standards; and (4) the agencies believe that they have sufficient numbers of bilingual staff to meet their nonEnglish-speaking customers' needs. Fri, 21 Apr 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/154048.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of State Inspector General's recent report on nonimmigrant visa processes and procedures at two U.S. embassies. GAO noted that the Inspector General's report reasonably concluded that State improved the nonimmigrant visa process by: (1) installing machine readable visa equipment in overseas posts; (2) creating a program to proactively include the names of suspected terrorists in its lookout system; and (3) participating in a data exchange system with other border control agencies. In addition, GAO noted that the Inspector General's report did not focus on problems existing at embassies that would affect nonimmigrant visa issuance, such as: (1) system, software, and equipment problems that have resulted in delays in visa issuance and weakened visa controls; (2) terrorist lookout committees that meet too infrequently and committee members that are reluctant to share information on individuals who might be ineligible to receive visas; and (3) an insufficient number of embassy officials to process the large number of visa applicants, resulting in some ineligible individuals receiving visas. Mon, 17 Apr 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/153909.pdf The earned income credit, which is expected to provide about $22 billion in tax credits in 1995, is a major federal effort to assist the working poor. The credit is intended to offset the impact of Social Security taxes on low-income workers and to encourage the poor to seek employment rather than welfare. GAO testified that a reliable overall measurement of noncompliance with the earned income credit provisions has not been made since 1988, but noncompliance appears to be a problem. The Internal Revenue Service estimates that 29 percent of the returns that it examined in January 1994 claimed too much earned income credit and that about 13 percent of them may have done so intentionally. Although the credit is intended to help the working poor, the credit's eligibility criteria do not consider all of the resources that recipients may have to support themselves and their families. No one knows how many illegal aliens receive the earned income credit. If the all credit recipients needed valid Social Security numbers for work purposes, illegal aliens would no longer qualify. Tue, 04 Apr 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg95122b.pdf The earned income credit, which is expected to provide about $22 billion in tax credits in 1995, is a major federal effort to assist the working poor. The credit is intended to offset the impact of Social Security taxes on low-income workers and to encourage the poor to seek employment rather than welfare. GAO testified that a reliable overall measurement of noncompliance with the earned income credit provisions has not been made since 1988, but noncompliance appears to be a problem. The Internal Revenue Service estimates that 29 percent of the returns that it examined in January 1994 claimed too much earned income credit and that about 13 percent of them may have done so intentionally. Although the credit is intended to help the working poor, the credit's eligibility criteria do not consider all of the resources that recipients may have to support themselves and their families. No one knows how many illegal aliens receive the earned income credit. If the all credit recipients needed valid Social Security numbers for work purposes, illegal aliens would no longer qualify. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Earned Income Credit: Targeting to the Working Poor, by Lynda D. Willis, Associate Director for Tax Policy and Administration Issues, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. GAO/T-GGD-95-136, Apr. 4, 1995 (10 pages). Fri, 31 Mar 1995 00:00:00 -0500 http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/153834.pdf The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides means-tested income support pa