GAO Reports: Climate Change Issues

This page lists the most recent publications related to climate change. It includes publications issued since 1990.

http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/climate_change.html Sun, 22 Nov 2009 12:46:33 -0500 GAO http://www.gao.gov/images/title_object.jpg GAO logo http://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. Climate Change Adaptation: Strategic Federal Planning Could Help Officials Make More Informed Decisions, October 22, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10175t.pdf This testimony discusses our report to this committee on climate change adaptation and the role strategic federal planning could play in government decision making. Changes in the climate attributable to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases may have significant impacts in the United States and internationally. For example, climate change could threaten coastal areas with rising sea levels. In recent years, climate change adaptation--adjustments to natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate change--has begun to receive more attention because the greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere are expected to continue altering the climate system into the future, regardless of efforts to control emissions. According to a recent report by the National Research Council (NRC), however, individuals and institutions whose futures will be affected by climate change are unprepared both conceptually and practically for meeting the challenges and opportunities it presents. In this context, adapting to climate change requires making policy and management decisions that cut across traditional economic sectors, jurisdictional boundaries, and levels of government. This testimony is based on our October 2009 report, which is being publicly released today, and addresses three issues: (1) what actions federal, state, local, and international authorities are taking to adapt to a changing climate; (2) the challenges that federal, state, and local officials face in their efforts to adapt; and (3) the actions that Congress and federal agencies could take to help address these challenges. We also provide information about our prior work on similarly complex, interdisciplinary issues. Although there is no coordinated national approach to adaptation, several federal agencies report that they have begun to take action with current and planned adaptation activities. These activities are largely ad hoc and fall into categories such as information for decision making, federal land and natural resource management, and governmentwide adaptation strategies, among others. The challenges faced by federal, state, and local officials in their efforts to adapt fall into the following three categories: (1) available attention and resources are focused on more immediate needs, making it difficult for adaptation efforts to compete for limited funds; (2) insufficient site-specific data, such as local projections of expected changes, make it hard to predict the impacts of climate change, and thus hard for officials to justify the current costs of adaptation efforts for potentially less certain future benefits; and (3) adaptation efforts are constrained by a lack of clear roles and responsibilities among federal, state, and local agencies. Potential federal actions for addressing challenges to adaptation efforts fall into the following three areas: (1) training and education efforts could increase awareness among government officials and the public about the impacts of climate change and available adaptation strategies; (2) actions to provide and interpret site-specific information could help officials understand the impacts of climate change at a scale that would enable them to respond; and (3) Congress and federal agencies could encourage adaptation by clarifying roles and responsibilities. Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400 NASA: Briefing on National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Programs and Associated Activities, October 15, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1087r.pdf The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as the civilian agency that exercises control over U.S. aeronautical and space activities and seeks and encourages the fullest commercial use of space. NASA's activities span a broad range of complex and technical endeavors, from investigating the composition, evaluation, and resources of Mars; to working with international partners to complete and operate the International Space Station; to providing satellite and aircraft observations of Earth for scientific and weather forecasting; to developing new technologies designed to improve air flight safety. The agency currently engages in these endeavors against a backdrop of growing national government fiscal imbalance and budget deficits that are straining all federal agencies' resources. Although NASA's budget represents less than 2 percent of the federal government's discretionary budget, the agency is increasingly being asked to expand its portfolio to support important scientific missions, including the study of climate change. Therefore, it is important that these resources be managed as effectively and efficiently as possible. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-422)--directed us to review whether NASA's programs and associated activities with a fiscal year 2009 funding level over $50 million--are duplicative with other activities of the federal government. We identified 33 of 38 NASA programs that meet the mandate's $50 million threshold. These programs represent about 81 percent of NASA's fiscal year 2009 budget and support 226 projects, each of which may consist of numerous types of research and related activities. We focused on three areas within --Science, Aeronautics Research, and Education--for review and excluded other activities such as space operations and exploration missions that are unique to NASA. We judgmentally selected projects and activities from each of the three areas and compared them against similar activities in other organizations. We found no apparent duplication among the selected projects or activities. Although we did not look at all programs within NASA, policies, procedures and mechanisms are in place that facilitate the avoidance of duplication by engaging in collaboration and coordination between NASA and other federal agencies. For example, NASA coordinates its work with other agencies by participating in formal groups such as the National Science and Technology Council and various interagency working groups. The Office of Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, in conjunction with NASA and other federal agencies, facilitated the development of the Interagency Strategic Research Plan for Tropical Cyclones, which provides the strategy for improving the effectiveness of severe-weather forecasts and warnings through strategic coordination and collaboration among the major players working in meteorology research and development. NASA's Quarterly Roundtable with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides opportunities for the agencies' leadership to discuss efforts, resolve issues, conduct joint strategic planning and leverage resources. NASA also participates on the Fixed-Wing Executive Council with the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Office of Secretary of Defense. The council meets with industry three times a year to collaborate on strategies for meeting warfighter needs. To provide a forum for dialogue about issues related to aeronautics research, NASA's Fundamental Aeronautics Program convenes the Fundamental Aeronautics Annual Meeting, attended by researchers and members of other federal agencies and departments. NASA also has established many memorandums of understanding with other federal agencies that mitigate duplication and assist in the coordination of activities. For example, the agency's memorandum of understanding with the National Science Foundation facilitates collaboration between the two agencies by coordinating their education efforts. The memorandum outlines each agency's roles and responsibilities, areas for collaboration, and how to obtain resources and agency expertise. NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate participates in multiple agreements with the Federal Aviation Administration, the Air Force, and other federal agencies to coordinate efforts in aeronautics research and to facilitate the free exchange of information, reduce duplication, share resources, and assist with long-term planning. Thu, 15 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change Adaptation: Strategic Federal Planning Could Help Government Officials Make More Informed Decisions, October 7, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10113.pdf Changes in the climate attributable to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases may have significant impacts in the United States and the world. For example, climate change could threaten coastal areas with rising sea levels. Greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will continue altering the climate system into the future, regardless of emissions control efforts. Therefore, adaptation--defined as adjustments to natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate change--is an important part of the response to climate change. GAO was asked to examine (1) what actions federal, state, local, and international authorities are taking to adapt to a changing climate; (2) the challenges that federal, state, and local officials face in their efforts to adapt; and (3) actions that Congress and federal agencies could take to help address these challenges. We also discuss our prior work on similarly complex, interdisciplinary issues. This report is based on analysis of studies, site visits to areas pursuing adaptation efforts, and responses to a Web-based questionnaire sent to federal, state, and local officials. While available information indicates that many governments have not yet begun to adapt to climate change, some federal, state, local, and international authorities have started to act. For example, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments program supports research to meet the adaptation-related information needs of local decision makers. In another example, the state of Maryland's strategy for reducing vulnerability to climate change focuses on protecting habitat and infrastructure from future risks associated with sea level rise and coastal storms. Other GAO discussions with officials from New York City; King County, Washington; and the United Kingdom show how some governments have started to adapt to current and projected impacts in their jurisdictions. The challenges faced by federal, state, and local officials in their efforts to adapt fell into three categories, based on GAO's analysis of questionnaire results, site visits, and available studies. First, competing priorities make it difficult to pursue adaptation efforts when there may be more immediate needs for attention and resources. For example, about 71 percent (128 of 180) of the officials who responded to our questionnaire rated "non-adaptation activities are higher priorities" as very or extremely challenging. Second, a lack of site-specific data, such as local projections of expected changes, can reduce the ability of officials to manage the effects of climate change. For example, King County officials noted that they are not sure how to translate climate data into effects on salmon recovery. Third, adaptation efforts are constrained by a lack of clear roles and responsibilities among federal, state, and local agencies. Of particular note, about 70 percent (124 of 178) of the respondents rated the "lack of clear roles and responsibilities for addressing adaptation across all levels of government" as very or extremely challenging. GAO's analysis also found that potential federal actions for addressing challenges to adaptation efforts fell into three areas. First, training and education efforts could increase awareness among government officials and the public about the impacts of climate change and available adaptation strategies. Second, actions to provide and interpret site-specific information would help officials understand the impacts of climate change at a scale that would enable them to respond. For instance, about 80 percent (147 of 183) of the respondents rated the "development of state and local climate change impact and vulnerability assessments" as very or extremely useful. Third, Congress and federal agencies could encourage adaptation by clarifying roles and responsibilities. About 71 percent (129 of 181) of the respondents rated the development of a national adaptation strategy as very or extremely useful. Climate change is a complex, interdisciplinary issue with the potential to affect every sector and level of government operations. Our past work on crosscutting issues suggests that governmentwide strategic planning--with the commitment of top leaders--can integrate activities that span a wide array of federal, state, and local entities. Wed, 07 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change Adaptation: Information on Selected Federal Efforts To Adapt To a Changing Climate (GAO-10-114SP, October 7, 2009), an E-supplement to GAO-10-113, October 7, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10114sp.pdf This is a supplement to GAO-10-113. We obtained information from 13 selected federal departments and agencies on their current and planned climate change adaptation efforts as part of a broader review of climate change adaptation (see GAO-10-113). We present this information to provide a more complete picture of the activities that federal agencies consider to be related to climate change adaptation than has been available publicly. We obtained this information directly from the agencies participating in the U.S. Global Change Research Program. Importantly, we did not modify the content of the agency submissions (except to remove references to named individuals) or assess its validity. In addition, because this information represents the efforts of a selected group of federal agencies, the agency activities compiled in this report should not be considered a comprehensive list of all recent and ongoing climate change adaptation efforts across the federal government. Wed, 07 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change Policy: Preliminary Observations on Options for Distributing Emissions Allowances and Revenue under a Cap-and-Trade Program, August 4, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09950t.pdf Congress is considering proposals to establish a price on greenhouse gas emissions through a cap-and-trade program that would limit overall emissions and require covered entities to hold tradable emissions permits, or allowances, for their emissions. The purpose of such a program is to raise the cost of activities that produce emissions and thereby provide an economic incentive to decrease emissions. Carbon dioxide, which results from burning fossil fuels, is the primary greenhouse gas and accounts for about 80 percent of U.S. emissions. A cap-and-trade program would increase the cost of burning fossil fuels and other activities that generate emissions and potentially raise costs for consumers. A key decision is the extent to which the government offsets these costs. For example, the government could sell the allowances and then return the revenues to covered entities or households. The government could also give away some or all of the allowances. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the value of the allowances could total $300 billion annually by 2020. Today's testimony provides preliminary results of ongoing work assessing the potential effects of (1) allowance allocation methods, and (2) options for distributing program revenues or the economic value of allowances. GAO reviewed economic literature and interviewed experts in climate policy, including those involved in existing cap-and-trade programs. The method for allocating allowances in a cap-and-trade program can have significant economic implications for the government, regulated entities, and households. Most importantly, a cap-and-trade system would create a market for a valuable new commodity: emissions allowances. The government could allocate these allowances to regulated entities in three main ways. First, it could auction all of the allowances and collect a significant amount of revenue that it could use, for example, to compensate households affected by the cap-and-trade program. Second, it could give away the allowances to entities affected by the program and thereby transfer the value of the allowances to those entities. This could enhance the program's appeal to covered entities but could also increase the program's overall cost to the economy if it reduced incentives for those entities to decrease their emissions. Third, the government could give away some allowances and auction the rest. For example, studies have suggested that freely allocating 6 to 21 percent of the allowances created by a cap-and-trade program would be sufficient to compensate entities in energy-intensive industries for any profit losses incurred as a result of the cap-and-trade program. According to the economic literature and economists we interviewed, regardless of the mechanism for distributing allowances, consumers will bear most of the costs of a cap-and-trade system because most regulated entities will pass along their increased costs in the form of increased prices; however, these costs could be largely offset depending on how revenues are used. Available literature and economists we interviewed point to five main options for distributing a program's allowance revenues, although numerous other options exist. First, the government could lower the overall cost of the cap-and-trade program to the economy through accompanying reductions in taxes on income, labor, or investment. Second, auction revenues could be distributed to households through lump-sum payments, which could offset the higher consumer prices resulting from a cap-and-trade program and mitigate any disproportionate impacts on low-income households. Third, the government could expand the scope of the Earned Income Tax Credit to further benefit low-income working families. Fourth, the government could compensate regulated entities and their shareholders for lost profits by allocating them free allowances. Finally, revenues might be used to fund climate-related programs, such as research on low-carbon technologies, or used to support climate change mitigation activities in developing nations. Each potential use of revenues has trade-offs. For example, decreasing tax rates could lower the overall economic cost of the program; however, this approach may do little to compensate low-income consumers, who would receive greater benefit from a direct rebate. In addition, using revenues to dampen increases in energy prices may benefit ratepayers but reduce their incentives to conserve energy, potentially increasing the program's overall cost. Tue, 04 Aug 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change Trade Measures: Considerations for U.S. Policy Makers, July 8, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09724r.pdf Global climate change is one of the most significant long-term policy challenges facing the United States, and policies to mitigate climate change will have important economic, social, and environmental implications. Members of Congress have introduced several bills to address the problem of climate change, many of which establish domestic emissions pricing by requiring firms that emit greenhouse gases either to pay a tax or to hold emission allowances. Whichever approach is taken, domestic emissions pricing could produce environmental benefits by encouraging U.S. firms to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. But such pricing could also harm U.S. firms' competitiveness, especially in energy-intensive industries where firms compete internationally. Additionally, there could be increased emissions abroad if production were to increase in other countries as a result of increased domestic costs of production resulting from a U.S. climate policy (carbon leakage). To help reduce impacts on U.S. firms and prevent carbon leakage, several climate change bills have also included trade measures or output-based rebates. The bills have included trade measures that would require importers to purchase emission allowances or pay a border tax for the greenhouse gas emissions associated with their imports. They have also designed output-based rebates to financially rebate industries for the costs incurred under a domestic emissions pricing system. Estimating the potential effects of domestic emissions pricing for industries in the United States is complex. If the United States were to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, production costs could rise for certain industries and could cause output, profits, or employment to fall. Within these industries, some of these adverse effects could arise through an increase in imports, a decrease in exports, or both. Estimates of adverse competitiveness effects are generally larger for industries that are both relatively energy and trade intensive. In 2007, these industries accounted for about 4.5 percent of domestic output. Estimates of the effects vary because of key assumptions required by economic models. For example, models generally assume a price for U.S. carbon emissions, but do not assume a similar price by other nations. In addition, the models generally do not incorporate all policy provisions, such as legislative proposals related to trade measures and rebates that are based on levels of production. Proposed legislation suggests that industries vulnerable to competitiveness effects should be considered differently. Industries for which competitiveness measures would apply are identified on the basis of their energy and trade intensity. Most of the industries that meet these criteria are in primary metals, nonmetallic minerals, paper, and chemicals, although significant variation exists for product groups (sub-industries) within each industry. Additional variation arises on the basis of the type of energy used and the extent to which foreign competitors' greenhouse gas emissions are regulated. To illustrate variability in characteristics that make industries vulnerable to competitiveness effects, we selected example sub-industries within primary metals, non metallic minerals, paper products, and chemicals based on multiple factors. For example, we selected sub-industries that met both the energy and trade intensity criteria, examples that met only one criterion, and examples that met neither, but had significant imports from countries without greenhouse-gas pricing. Trade measures have been proposed to help address potential industry and environmental effects of a domestic emissions pricing system; however, questions exist about their proposed effectiveness. Supporters argue that trade measures may help prevent a decline in output by U.S. producers, prevent carbon leakage, and create leverage for other countries to reduce emissions. Opponents raise concerns that trade measures may motivate retaliatory actions, undermine efforts to secure multilateral consensus, and generate little leverage. In addition, potential implementation challenges may exist. A unilateral U.S. trade measure could have important international implications on U.S. bilateral and multilateral trade relations. For example, other countries could view U.S. trade measures as trade restrictions or sanctions, which could lead them to implement restrictions against U.S. exports. Attention also has focused on the potential for trade measures or output-based rebates to be challenged under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Assessing the international trade implications is difficult for a number of reasons. One is that it depends in part upon how other nations reduce their carbon emissions, and whether they perceive any U.S. measures as likely to affect their exports. In addition, the outcome of any WTO challenge, if any, would be uncertain and may depend on how the measure is implemented. Wed, 08 Jul 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change Trade Measures: Estimating Industry Effects, July 8, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09875t.pdf Countries can take varying approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Since energy use is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions, policies designed to increase energy efficiency or induce a switch to less greenhouse-gas-intensive fuels, such as from coal to natural gas, can reduce emissions in the short term. In the long term, however, major technology changes will be needed to establish a less carbon-intensive energy infrastructure. To that end, a U.S. policy to mitigate climate change may require facilities to achieve specified reductions or employ a market-based mechanism, such as establishing a price on emissions. Several bills to implement emissions pricing in the United States have been introduced in the 110th and 111th Congresses. These bills have included both cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals. Some of the proposed legislation also include measures intended to limit potentially adverse impacts on the international competitiveness of domestic firms. Estimating the potential effects of domestic emissions pricing for industries in the United States is complex. If the United States were to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, production costs could rise for certain industries and could cause output, profits, or employment to fall. Within these industries, some of these adverse effects could arise through an increase in imports, a decrease in exports, or both. However, the magnitude of these potential effects is likely to depend on the greenhouse gas intensity of industry output and on the domestic emissions price, which is not yet known, among other factors. Estimates of adverse competitiveness effects are generally larger for industries that are both relatively energy- and trade-intensive. In 2007, these industries accounted for about 4.5 percent of domestic output. Estimates of the effects vary because of key assumptions required by economic models. For example, models generally assume a price for U.S. carbon emissions, but do not assume a similar price by other nations. In addition, the models generally do not incorporate all policy provisions, such as legislative proposals related to trade measures and rebates that are based on levels of production. Proposed legislation suggests that industries vulnerable to competitiveness effects should be considered differently. Industries for which competitiveness measures would apply are identified on the basis of their energy and trade intensity. Most of the industries that meet these criteria are in primary metals, nonmetallic minerals, paper, and chemicals, although significant variation exists for product groups (sub-industries) within each industry. Additional variation arises on the basis of the type of energy used and the extent to which foreign competitors' greenhouse gas emissions are regulated. To illustrate variability in characteristics that make industries vulnerable to competitiveness effects, we include illustrations of sub-industries within primary metals that meet both the energy and trade intensity criteria; examples that met only one criterion; and examples that met neither, but had significant imports from countries without greenhouse gas pricing. Wed, 08 Jul 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Aviation and Climate Change: Aircraft Emissions Expected to Grow, but Technological and Operational Improvements and Government Policies Can Help Control Emissions, June 8, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09554.pdf Aircraft emit greenhouse gases and other emissions, contributing to increasing concentrations of such gases in the atmosphere. Many scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)--a United Nations organization that assesses scientific, technical, and economic information on climate change--believe these gases may negatively affect the earth's climate. Given forecasts of growth in aviation emissions, some governments are taking steps to reduce emissions. In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed (1) estimates of aviation's current and future contribution to greenhouse gas and other emissions that may affect climate change; (2) existing and potential technological and operational improvements that can reduce aircraft emissions; and (3) policy options for governments to help address commercial aircraft emissions. GAO conducted a literature review; interviewed representatives of government agencies, industry and environmental organizations, airlines, and manufacturers, and interviewed and surveyed 18 experts in economics and aviation on improvements for reducing emissions from aircraft. GAO is not making recommendations. Relevant agencies provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate and EPA said emissions standards can have a positive benefit to cost ratio and be an important part of policy options to control emissions. According to IPCC, aviation currently accounts for about 2 percent of human-generated global carbon dioxide emissions, the most significant greenhouse gas--and about 3 percent of the potential warming effect of global emissions that can affect the earth's climate, including carbon dioxide. IPCC's medium-range estimate forecasts that by 2050 the global aviation industry, including aircraft emissions, will emit about 3 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions and about 5 percent of the potential warming effect of all global human-generated emissions. Gross domestic product growth is the primary driver in IPCC's forecasts. IPCC also made other assumptions about future aircraft fuel efficiency, improvements in air traffic management, and airport and runway capacity. IPCC's 2050 forecasts for aviation's contribution to global emissions assumed that emissions from other sectors will continue to grow. If other sectors make progress in reducing emissions and aviation emissions continue to grow, aviation's relative contribution may be greater than IPCC estimated; on the other hand, if other sectors do not make progress, aviation's relative contribution may be smaller than estimated. While airlines currently rely on a range of improvements, such as fuel-efficient engines, to reduce emissions, some of which may have limited potential to generate future reductions, experts we surveyed expect a number of additional technological, operational, and alternative fuel improvements to help reduce aircraft emissions in the future. However, according to experts we interviewed, some technologies, such as advanced airframes, have potential, but may be years away from being available, and developing and adopting them is likely to be costly. In addition, according to some experts we interviewed, incentives for industry to research and adopt low-emissions technologies will be dependent to some extent on the level and stability of fuel prices. Finally, given expected growth of commercial aviation as forecasted by IPCC, even if many of these improvements are adopted, it appears unlikely they would greatly reduce emissions by 2050. A number of policy options to address aircraft emissions are available to governments and can be part of broader policies to address emissions from many sources including aircraft. Market-based measures can establish a price for emissions and provide incentives to airlines and consumers to reduce emissions. These measures can be preferable to other options because they would generally be more economically efficient. Such measures include a cap-and-trade program, in which government places a limit on emissions from regulated sources, provides them with allowances for emissions, and establishes a market for them to trade emissions allowances with one another, and a tax on emissions. Governments can establish emissions standards for aircraft or engines. In addition, government could increase government research and development to encourage development of low-emissions improvements. Mon, 08 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion, June 3, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf In December 2003, GAO reported that most of Alaska's more than 200 Native villages were affected to some degree by flooding and erosion (GAO-04-142). Since 2003, state officials have identified the growing impacts of climate change, increasing the urgency of federal and state efforts to identify imminently threatened villages and assess their relocation options. GAO was asked to report on (1) the flooding and erosion threats that Alaska Native villages currently face, (2) the federal programs that are available to assist villages facing potential disasters, (3) the status of village relocation efforts, and (4) how federal assistance to relocating villages is prioritized. GAO interviewed and gathered documentation from federal and state agency officials as well as regional organizations and village representatives. While the flooding and erosion threats to Alaska Native villages have not been completely assessed, since 2003, federal, state, and village officials have identified 31 villages that face imminent threats. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) March 2009 Alaska Baseline Erosion Assessment identified many villages threatened by erosion, but did not assess flooding impacts. At least 12 of the 31 threatened villages have decided to relocate--in part or entirely--or to explore relocation options. Federal programs to assist threatened villages prepare for and recover from disasters and to protect and relocate them are limited and unavailable to some villages. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has several disaster preparedness and recovery programs, but villages often fail to qualify for them, generally because they may lack approved disaster mitigation plans or have not been declared federal disaster areas. Although there is no single comprehensive proactive federal program to assist villages with their relocation efforts, individual federal agencies can assist villages on specific projects, such as funding the construction or relocation of homes. However, 64 villages do not qualify for affordable housing and relocation assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant program because the federal law governing the program does not recognize unincorporated Alaska Native villages in Alaska's unorganized borough as eligible units of general local government. Of the 12 villages exploring relocation options, Newtok has made the most progress in its relocation efforts. The Newtok Planning Group, formed in 2006 by federal, state, regional, and village partners, has helped to accelerate the relocation process that the village proactively initiated in 1994. The 3 other villages that will likely need to relocate all at once--Kivalina, Shaktoolik, and Shishmaref--have yet to identify sites that federal, state, and village officials agree are safe, sustainable, and desirable for the subsistence lifestyle of the villagers. Eight other villages have begun to gradually migrate to new locations over time or are evaluating options for doing so. In the absence of a lead entity, federal agencies individually prioritize assistance to villages on the basis of their programs' criteria. These criteria do not necessarily ensure that the villages in greatest peril get the highest priority, and although the Corps has assessed erosion threats, there is no lead federal entity to prioritize and coordinate assistance using this information. In 2007, the Newtok Planning Group reported that the lack of designated federal and state lead entities to guide, coordinate, and fund assistance impeded village relocation efforts and created uncertainty regarding the fulfillment of environmental analysis requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act. In 2008, the state designated a lead agency for village relocation assistance, and federal, state, and village officials told GAO that a similar lead federal entity is needed. Lead authority could be provided to an existing agency or commission, or a new entity could be formed for this purpose. Wed, 03 Jun 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Observations on Federal Efforts to Adapt to a Changing Climate, March 25, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09534t.pdf Changes in the climate attributable to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases may have significant environmental and economic impacts in the United States. For example, climate change could threaten coastal areas with rising sea levels, alter agricultural productivity, and increase the intensity and frequency of floods and storms. Federal, state, and local agencies are tasked with a wide array of responsibilities that will be affected by a changing climate, such as managing natural resources. Furthermore, climate change could increase the cost of federal programs, such as crop and flood insurance, and place new stresses on infrastructure. Greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will continue altering the climate system into the future regardless of emissions control efforts. Therefore, adaptation--defined as adjustments to natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate change--is an important part of the response to climate change. Today's testimony summarizes GAO's prior and ongoing work examining (1) actions that federal, state, local, and international authorities are taking to adapt to a changing climate, (2) the challenges that federal, state, and local officials face in their efforts to adapt, and (3) actions that the Congress and federal agencies could take to help address these challenges. Based on preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing adaptation work for the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, certain federal, state, local, and international government authorities are beginning to consider and implement climate change adaptation measures. Some federal programs are already helping officials make decisions in response to a changing climate. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments (RISA) program supports climate change research to meet the adaptation-related information needs of decision makers and planners at the regional level. In addition, certain state, local, and international governments are developing and implementing climate change adaptation plans. For example, GAO's recent site visit to Maryland examined the state's comprehensive strategy for reducing vulnerability to climate change focused on sea level rise and coastal storms. As part of ongoing work for the Select Committee, GAO plans to conduct four additional site visits to learn from international, federal, and local adaptation efforts. Several of GAO's recent reports on climate change examined a number of challenges faced by government officials in their efforts to adapt. First, climate change is one of many priorities competing for attention and resources. Second, a lack of guidance can constrain the ability of officials to consider climate change in management and planning decisions. Third, insufficient site-specific data, including a lack of local projections of expected changes, can reduce the ability of officials to manage the effects of climate change on the resources they oversee. Fourth, officials are struggling to make decisions based on future climate scenarios that may not reflect past conditions. Our ongoing work seeks to identify other challenges warranting the attention of policymakers. Some of GAO's recent climate change-related reports offer clues on the types of actions federal agencies and the Congress could take to assist states and communities in their efforts to adapt. A recent GAO report on federal land management, for example, recommended that certain agencies develop guidance advising managers how to address the effects of climate change on the resources they manage. Furthermore, a recent GAO report on the economics of climate change identified actions the Congress and federal agencies could take, such as reforming insurance subsidy programs in areas vulnerable to hurricanes or flooding. GAO's current effort for the Select Committee, which focuses more directly on adaptation, will obtain information and perspectives from diverse groups of knowledgeable federal, state, and local officials, and in particular will seek to learn from the experience of practitioners on the front lines working to adapt to a changing climate. This work will be completed by late 2009. Wed, 25 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Clean Coal: DOE Should Prepare a Comprehensive Analysis of the Relative Costs, Benefits, and Risks of a Range of Options for FutureGen, March 11, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09465t.pdf This testimony discusses our recent report on the Department of Energy's (DOE) decision to restructure the FutureGen program. The original FutureGen plant was to capture and store underground about 90 percent of its CO2 emissions. DOE's cost share was to be 74 percent, and industry partners agreed to fund the rest. Concerned about escalating costs, DOE announced in January 2008 that it had decided to restructure FutureGen. In October 2008, DOE received a small number of applications for the restructured FutureGen; however, some of these applications were for proposals outside the restructured FutureGen's scope. As we reported, DOE is currently assessing proposals received and stated it expected to announce a selection of projects by December 2008; however, as of the beginning of March 2009, it had made no decision. DOE requested supplemental information from restructured FutureGen applicants, which will be reviewed before any selection decision. As Congress may know, the recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, known as the stimulus law, provides DOE an additional $3.4 billion for "Fossil Energy Research and Development." Such a substantial amount of funding could significantly impact DOE's decisions about how to move forward with programs such as FutureGen. The overall goals of the original and restructured FutureGen programs are largely similar in that both programs seek to produce electricity from coal with near-zero emissions by using CCS, and to make that process economically viable for the electric power industry. However, the programs have different approaches for achieving their goals, which could have different impacts on the commercial advancement of CCS and, therefore, result in two largely distinct programs. First, the original program focused on researching and developing the integration of IGCC and CCS at a new, commercial-scale, coal-fired power plant, while the restructured FutureGen aims at demonstrating the use of CCS technology at one or more new or existing commercial coal-fired power plants. As a result, the restructured program could provide opportunities to learn about CCS at different plants, including those that use IGCC and conventional ones that use pulverized coal generating technology. However, under the restructured program, learning about the integration of IGCC and CCS would be possible only if DOE received applications proposing IGCC and selected one for funding. Second, it is unclear which of the two programs would advance the broader roll out of CCS across industry more quickly. The original FutureGen would have served as an operating laboratory host facility for (1) emerging technologies aimed at the goal of near-zero emissions (such as hydrogen fuel cells and advanced gasification) and (2) gaining broad industry acceptance for these technologies. In contrast, the restructured FutureGen would not include a facility for testing these technologies, and its ability to advance them would, therefore, be limited. DOE manages a portfolio of clean coal programs that research and develop CCS technology or demonstrate its application. The restructured FutureGen differs in important ways from most of DOE's other CCS programs, with the exception of one program--Round III of the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI). Both the restructured FutureGen and CCPI (1) fund the commercial demonstration of CCS at new or existing coal-fired power plants and (2) require industry participants to bear at least 50 percent of costs. We reported that the restructured FutureGen targets a higher amount of CO2 to be captured and stored (at least 1 million metric tons stored annually, per plant) than CCPI does (300,000 metric tons of CO2 stored or put to use annually, such as to enhance oil recovery, per plant). However, CCPI's goals may be more achievable for industry partners than those of the restructured FutureGen and, therefore, lead to more industry participation. Contrary to best practices, DOE did not base its decision to restructure FutureGen on a comprehensive analysis of factors such as the associated costs, benefits, and risks. DOE based its decision largely on its conclusion that costs for the original FutureGen had doubled and would escalate substantially. However, this conclusion was problematic because it was derived from a comparison of two cost estimates for the original FutureGen that were not comparable; DOE's $950 million estimate was in constant 2004 dollars, while the $1.8 billion estimate of DOE's industry partners was inflated through 2017. As a result, DOE has no assurance that the restructured FutureGen is the best option to advance CCS. In contrast, DOE's Office of Fossil Energy had identified and analyzed 13 other options for incremental, cost-saving changes to the original program, such as reducing the CO2 capture requirement. Wed, 11 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 Forest Service: Emerging Issues Highlight the Need to Address Persistent Management Challenges, March 11, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09443t.pdf The Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture, manages over 190 million acres of forest and grassland. The agency is responsible for managing its lands for various purposes--including recreation, grazing, timber harvesting, and others--while ensuring that such activities do not impair the lands' long-term productivity. Carrying out these often competing responsibilities has been made more difficult by the increasing cost of wildland fires and the budgetary constraints necessitated by our nation's long-term fiscal outlook. This testimony highlights some of the major management challenges the Forest Service faces in carrying out its land management responsibilities. It is based on numerous reports GAO has issued on a wide variety of the agency's activities. While the Forest Service has made improvements in many areas GAO has reported on in recent years, certain management challenges persist--with the agency struggling to manage a worsening wildland fire problem and spiraling fire costs, collect data on its activities and their costs, and demonstrate financial and performance accountability to Congress and the public. Several emerging issues facing the agency underscore the urgency of addressing these challenges. The Forest Service continues to lack strategies for using its wildland fire management funds effectively. In numerous reports over the past decade, GAO has highlighted the challenges the Forest Service faces in protecting the nation against the threat of wildland fires. While the agency has taken important steps to improve its wildland fire management, other key steps remain. Specifically, the agency needs to (1) develop a cohesive strategy laying out various potential long-term approaches for addressing wildland fire, the estimated costs associated with each approach, and the trade-offs involved; (2) establish clear goals and a strategy to help contain increasing wildland fire costs; (3) continue improving its processes for allocating funds and selecting projects to reduce potentially hazardous vegetation; and (4) take steps to improve its use of a new interagency budgeting and planning tool. Program management suffers from lack of data on activities and costs. GAO's work over the years points to a persistent shortcoming in the Forest Service's management of its activities: the lack of adequate data on program activities and costs. This shortcoming spans multiple land management programs, including programs for selling timber and rehabilitating and reforesting lands that have been burned, as well as administrative functions such as the competitive sourcing program, which aims to increase competition between federal entities and private sector organizations. Inadequate data have hindered field managers in carrying out their duties and prevented the agency from understanding how much its activities are costing. Financial and performance accountability have been inadequate. The Forest Service has struggled to implement adequate internal controls over its funds, generate accurate financial information, and provide clear measures of what it accomplishes with the appropriations it receives every year. GAO's concerns about these issues date back to the 1990s but have yet to be fully addressed. Several emerging issues underscore the need for the Forest Service to improve its management. The evolving effects of climate change, increasing development in and near wildlands, the aging of the federal workforce, and our nation's long-term fiscal condition likely will have profound implications for the agency and magnify the urgency of addressing these challenges. Wed, 11 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 NASA: Projects Need More Disciplined Oversight and Management to Address Key Challenges, March 5, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09436t.pdf This testimony discusses the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) oversight and management of its major projects. As you know, in 1990, GAO designated NASA's contract management as high risk in view of persistent cost growth and schedule slippage in the majority of its major projects. Since that time, GAO's high-risk work has focused on identifying a number of causal factors, including antiquated financial management systems, poor cost estimating, and undefinitized contracts. Because cost growth and schedule delays persist, this area - now titled acquisition management because of the scope of issues that need to be resolved - remains high risk. To its credit, NASA has recently made a concerted effort to improve its acquisition management. In 2007, NASA developed a comprehensive plan to address systemic weaknesses related to how it manages its acquisitions. The plan specifically seeks to strengthen program/project management, increase accuracy in cost estimating, facilitate monitoring of contractor cost performance, improve agency wide business processes, and improve financial management. While we applaud these efforts our recent work has shown that NASA needs to pay more attention to effective project management. It needs to adopt best practices that focus on closing gaps in knowledge about requirements, technologies, funding, time and other resources before it makes commitments to large-scale programs. For instance, the Mars Science Laboratory, which was already over budget, recently announced a 2-year launch delay. Current estimates suggest that the price of this delay may be $400 million--which drives the current project life-cycle cost estimate to $2.3 billion; up from its initial confirmation estimate of $1.6 billion. Also, in just one year, the development costs of NASA's Glory mission increased by 54 percent, or almost $100 million, because of problems NASA's contractor is having developing a key sensor. Total project costs for another project, Kepler have increased almost another $100 million within 2 fiscal years because of similar issues. Taken together, these and other unanticipated cost increases hamper NASA's ability to fund new projects, continue existing ones, and pave the way to a post-shuttle space exploration environment. Given the constrained fiscal environment and pressure on discretionary spending it is critical that NASA get the most out of its investment dollars for its space systems. The agency is increasingly being asked to expand its portfolio to support important scientific missions including the study of climate change. Therefore, it is exceedingly important that these resources be managed as effectively and efficiently as possible for success. The recent launch failure of the Orbiting Carbon Observatory is an all-too-grim reminder of how much time, hard work, and resources can be for naught when a space project cannot execute its mission. We assessed 18 projects in NASA's current portfolio. Four were in the "formulation" phase, a time when system concepts and technologies are still being explored and 14 were in the "implementation" phase, where system design is completed, scientific instruments are integrated, and a spacecraft is fabricated. When implementation begins, it is expected that project officials know enough about a project's requirements and what resources are necessary to meet those requirements that they can reliably predict the cost and schedule necessary to achieve its goals. Reaching this point requires investment. In some cases, projects that we reviewed spent 2 to 5 years and up to $100 million or more before being able to formally set cost and schedule estimates. Ten of the projects in our assessment for which we received data and that had entered the implementation phase experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth from their project baselines.3 Based on our analysis, development costs for projects in our review increased by an average of almost 13 percent from their baseline cost estimates--all in just two or three years--including one that went up more than 50 percent. It should be noted that a number of these projects had experienced considerably more cost growth before a baseline was established in response to statutory reporting requirements. Our analysis also shows that projects in our review had an average delay of 11 months to their launch dates. We found challenges in five areas that occurred throughout the various projects we reviewed that can contribute to project cost and schedule growth. These are not necessarily unique to NASA projects and many have been identified in other weapon and space systems that we have reviewed and have been prevalent in the agency for decades. (1) Technology maturity. Four of the 13 projects in our assessment for which we received data and that had entered the implementation phase did so without first maturing all critical technologies, that is they did not know that technologies central to the project's success could work as intended before beginning the process of fabricating the spacecraft. (2) Design stability. The majority of the projects in our assessment that held a critical design review did so without first achieving a stable design. If design stability is not achieved, but product development continues, costly re-designs to address changes to project requirements and unforeseen challenges can occur. (3) Complexity of heritage technology. More than half the projects in the implementation phase--eight of them--encountered challenges in integrating or modifying heritage technologies. (4) Contractor performance. Six of the seven projects that cited contractor performance as a challenge also experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth. (5) Development partner performance. Five of the thirteen projects we reviewed encountered challenges with a development partner. In these cases, the development partner could not meet its commitments to the project within planned timeframes. This may have been a result of problems within the specific development partner organization or as a result of problems faced by a contractor to that development partner. Thu, 05 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Climate Change: Observations on the Potential Role of Carbon Offsets in Climate Change Legislation, March 5, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09456t.pdf Carbon offsets--reductions of greenhouse gas emissions from an activity in one place to compensate for emissions elsewhere--can reduce the cost of regulatory programs to limit emissions because the cost of creating an offset may be less than the cost of requiring entities to make the reductions themselves. To be credible, however, an offset must be additional--it must reduce emissions below the quantity emitted in a business-as-usual scenario--among other criteria. In the U.S., there are no federal requirements to limit emissions and offsets may be purchased in a voluntary market. Outside the U.S., offsets may be purchased on compliance markets to meet requirements to reduce emissions. The Congress is considering adopting a market-based cap-and-trade program to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Such a program would create a price on emissions based on the supply and demand for allowances to emit. Under such a program, regulated entities could potentially substitute offsets for on-site emissions reductions, thereby lowering their compliance costs. Today's testimony summarizes GAO's prior work examining (1) the challenges in ensuring the quality of carbon offsets in the voluntary market, (2) the effects of and lessons learned from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), an international offset program, and (3) matters that the Congress may wish to consider when developing regulatory programs to limit emissions. In an August 2008 report, GAO identified four primary challenges related to the United States voluntary carbon offset market. First, the concept of a carbon offset is complicated because offsets can involve different activities, definitions, greenhouse gases, and timeframes for measurement. Second, ensuring the credibility of offsets is challenging because there are many ways to determine whether a project is additional to a business-as-usual baseline, and inherent uncertainty exists in measuring emissions reductions relative to such a baseline. Related to this, the use of multiple quality assurance mechanisms with varying requirements may raise questions about whether offsets are fully fungible--interchangeable and of comparable quality. Third, including offsets in regulatory programs to limit greenhouse gas emissions could result in environmental and economic tradeoffs. For example offsets could lower the cost of complying with an emissions reduction policy, but this may delay on-site reductions by regulated entities. Fourth, offsets could compromise the environmental certainty of a regulatory program if offsets used for compliance lack credibility. In a November 2008 report, GAO examined the environmental and economic effects of the CDM--an international program allowing certain industrialized nations to pay for offset projects in developing countries--and identified lessons learned about the role of carbon offsets in programs to limit emissions. While the CDM has provided cost containment in a mandatory emissions reduction program, its effects on emissions are uncertain, largely because it is nearly impossible to determine the level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of each project. Although a rigorous review process seeks to ensure the credibility of projects, available evidence from those with experience in the program suggests that some offset projects were not additional. In addition, the project approval process is lengthy and resource intensive, which significantly limits the scale and cost-effectiveness of emissions reductions. The findings from these two reports illustrate how challenges in the voluntary offset market and the use of offsets for compliance--even in a rigorous, standardized process like the CDM--may compromise the environmental integrity of mandatory programs to limit emissions and should be carefully evaluated. As a result of these challenges, GAO suggested that, as it considers legislation that allows the use of offsets for compliance, the Congress may wish to consider, among other things, directing the establishment of clear rules about the types of projects that regulated entities can use as offsets, as well as procedures to account and compensate for the inherent uncertainty associated with offset projects. Further, GAO suggested that the Congress consider key lessons from the CDM, including the possibility that, (1) due to the tradeoffs involving cost savings and the credibility of offsets, their use in mandatory programs may be, at best, a temporary solution to achieving emissions reductions, and (2) the program's approval process may not be a cost-effective model for achieving emission reductions. Thu, 05 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Environmental Protection Agency: Major Management Challenges, March 4, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09434.pdf The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) overarching mission is to protect human health and the environment by implementing and enforcing environmental laws intended to improve the quality of the nation's air and water and to protect its land. EPA's policies and programs affect virtually all segments of the economy, society, and government. As such, it operates in a highly complex and controversial regulatory arena. In recent years, GAO has identified several key challenges EPA faces and corrective actions that would enable the agency to more effectively accomplish its mission. GAO was asked to identify challenges at EPA that hinder its ability to implement its programs effectively, based on prior GAO work. These challenges include (1) improving agencywide management, (2) transforming EPA's processes for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals, (3) improving implementation of the Clean Air Act, (4) reducing pollution in the nation's waters, (5) speeding the pace of cleanup at Superfund and other hazardous waste sites, and (6) addressing emerging climate change issues. EPA faces the following challenges that hinder its ability to implement its programs effectively: (1) improving agencywide management, (2) transforming EPA's processes for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals, (3) improving implementation of the Clean Air Act, (4) reducing pollution in the nation's waters, (5) speeding the pace of cleanup at Superfund and other hazardous waste sites, and (6) addressing emerging climate change issues. EPA has launched various initiatives to address crosscutting general management issues, including environmental enforcement and compliance, human capital management, and the development and use of environmental information. However, these initiatives have generally fallen considerably short of their intended results. EPA has failed to develop sufficient chemical assessment information to limit public exposure to many chemicals that may pose substantial health risks. In January 2009, GAO added a new issue--the need to transform EPA's process for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals--to its list of high-risk areas warranting increased attention by Congress and the executive branch. EPA faces many important challenges related to implementation of the Clean Air Act, including those highlighted by GAO regarding its coordination with other federal agencies, analyses of health impacts from air pollution, and delays in regulating mercury and other air toxics. EPA also faces challenges relating to numerous regulatory proposals that have been overturned or remanded by the courts. EPA partners with federal, state, and local agencies and others to reduce pollution in the nation's waters. Among the most daunting water pollution control problems, the nation's water utilities face billions of dollars in upgrades to aging and deteriorating infrastructures that left unaddressed can affect the quality of our water. EPA will receive $6 billion in additional water infrastructure funding from the recently passed stimulus bill. Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, better known as Superfund, in 1980, giving the federal government the authority to ensure the cleanup of hazardous waste sites both on private and public lands. Nonetheless, several key management problems have not been resolved since that time. For example, citing competing priorities and lack of funds, EPA has not implemented a 1980 statutory mandate under Superfund to require businesses handling hazardous substances to provide financial assurances to pay for potential environmental cleanups. In GAO's view, the federal government's approach to climate change has been ad hoc and is not well coordinated across government agencies. For example, the federal government lacks a comprehensive approach for targeting federal research dollars toward the development and deployment of low-carbon technologies. Wed, 04 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Department of the Interior: Major Management Challenges, March 3, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09425t.pdf The Department of the Interior is responsible for managing much of the nation's vast natural resources. Its agencies implement an array of programs intended to protect these precious resources for future generations while also allowing certain uses of them, such as oil and gas development and recreation. In some cases, Interior is authorized to collect royalties and fees for these uses. Over the years, GAO has reported on challenges facing Interior as it implements its programs. In addition to basic program management issues, Interior faces difficult choices in balancing its many responsibilities, and in improving the condition of the nation's natural resources and the department's infrastructure, in light of the federal deficit and long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation. This testimony highlights some of the major management challenges facing Interior today. It is based on prior GAO reports. As GAO's previous work has shown, the Department of the Interior faces major management challenges in the following six areas: (1) Strengthening resource protection; (2) Strengthening the accountability of Indian and island community programs; (3) Improving federal land acquisition and management; (4) Reducing Interior's deferred maintenance backlog; (5) Ensuring the accurate collection of royalties; and (6) Enhancing other revenue collections and financial assurances. Interior has not yet developed a cohesive strategy to address wildland fire issues, as GAO recommended in 1999 and 2005. In addition, Interior faces challenges in managing oil and gas operations on federal lands, adapting to climate change, and resolving natural resource conflicts through collaborative management. Having a land base is important to Indian tribes. Concerns remain about delays in decisions about land that Interior will take into trust status. In addition, programs for seven island communities--four U.S. territories and three sovereign island nations--continue to have financial and program management deficiencies. As the steward of more than 500 million acres of federal land, land consolidation through sales and acquisitions and land management are important functions for the department. The Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act has had limited success and Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is unlikely to achieve its goals to protect certain migratory bird habitat and it is generally not managing a majority of its farmlands. While Interior has improved inventory and asset management systems, the dollar estimate of the deferred maintenance backlog has continued to grow. The 2008 estimate of between $13.2 billion and $19.4 billion is more than 60 percent higher than the 2003 estimate. The funds for Interior in the recently enacted stimulus package may reverse this trend. GAO and others have found many material weaknesses in their numerous evaluations of federal oil and gas management and revenue collection processes. These weaknesses place an unknown but significant proportion of royalties and other oil and gas revenues at risk and raise questions about whether Interior is collecting an appropriate amount of revenue for the rights to explore for, develop, and produce oil and gas from federal lands and waters. Additional revenues or financial assurances could be generated by (1) amending the General Mining Act of 1872 to collect federal royalties on gold, silver, copper, and other valuable minerals belonging to the United States, (2) requiring adequate financial assurances from hardrock mining operations to fully cover estimated reclamation costs, and (3) increasing the grazing fee for public lands managed by Interior's Bureau of Land Tue, 03 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Climate Change Science: High Quality Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data are a Cornerstone of Programs to Address Climate Change, February 24, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09423t.pdf Elevated levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the resulting effects on the earth's climate could have significant impacts in the United States and internationally. Potential impacts include a change in sea levels, ecosystems, and ice cover. The United States Congress is considering proposals to limit greenhouse gas emissions using market-based mechanisms that would place a price on emissions. Such programs would create an economic incentive for regulated entities to limit their emissions. Limiting greenhouse gas emissions requires an understanding of existing emissions as well as the development of a program to monitor, report, and verify emissions from entities that might be affected by a future regulatory program. A greenhouse gas mitigation program also requires an understanding of the numerous emissions sources and methods for calculating emissions of six major greenhouse gases--carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and several synthetic gases. This testimony focuses on (1) the importance of quality data on emissions in the context of a program intended to limit greenhouse gas emissions, and (2) key considerations in developing reliable data on greenhouse gas emissions. This testimony is based on several prior GAO reports and a review of related literature. Quality data on emissions are essential to the development and implementation of a system intended to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Domestic and international experiences with cap-and-trade programs, which place a price on emissions, demonstrate the importance of data quality in establishing baselines, monitoring results, and maintaining the integrity of a program. Existing cap-and-trade programs establish an overall allowable level of emissions and distribute allowances to regulated entities, which in turn are able to buy or sell excess allowances. The United States has operated a cap-and-trade program to limit emissions of sulfur dioxide--a pollutant that contributes to acid rain-- from electric utilities since 1995. Based on prior GAO work and independent studies, the program has benefited from the development of an accurate emissions baseline for regulated entities as well as strong monitoring, verification, and reporting requirements. The European Union has also employed a cap-and-trade system to limit emissions of carbon dioxide--the most prevalent greenhouse gas--from electricity generators and certain industrial sectors since 2005. In November 2008, GAO reported that the program has faced challenges because of a lack of facility-specific data on baseline emissions. While the program has addressed many of these challenges, the European Union's experience demonstrates the importance of data quality in establishing a market-based program to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Key considerations in developing reliable data on greenhouse gas emissions revolve primarily around the purpose and intended use of the data. In cases where the data are used to develop or implement a program to limit emissions, key considerations include (1) the scope of the program across emissions sources, such as whether it affects all emission-producing activities or a specified subgroup, and (2) the program's coverage across the six primary greenhouse gases. These considerations depend on the point of regulation--namely, whether the program affects a small number of "upstream" emitters such as fossil fuel producers and importers or instead affects smaller "downstream" emitters such as individual industrial facilities. Overall, the challenges in establishing baseline emissions data, as well as in monitoring, reporting, and verifying ongoing emissions will increase as the number of regulated entities, activities, and greenhouse gases increase. In some cases, existing emissions inventories (typically at the national, state, or industrial sector level) and registries (typically at the facility or project level) provide a starting point for understanding the challenges in establishing baselines and tracking emissions over time. For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency maintains an official U.S. emissions inventory that provides national-level emissions data and background on methods to calculate emissions. In addition, several inventories and registries maintained at the regional level or by private and nonprofit entities provide a useful starting point for understanding data needs and developing standards for monitoring, reporting, and verification. Tue, 24 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Federal Land Management: Potential Effects and Factors to Consider in a Move of the Forest Service into the Department of the Interior, February 24, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09412t.pdf The Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Forest Service, which manages almost a quarter of the nation's lands, is the only major land management agency outside the Department of the Interior (Interior). Four federal land management agencies--the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in Interior--manage most of the 680 million acres of federal land across the country. Growing ecological challenges, ranging from wildland fires to climate change, have revived interest in moving the Forest Service into Interior. GAO was asked to report on the potential effects of moving the Forest Service into Interior and creating a new bureau equal to Interior's other bureaus, such as BLM. GAO was also asked to identify factors that should be considered if such a move were legislated, as well as management practices that could facilitate a move. Moving the Forest Service into Interior could potentially improve federal land management by consolidating into one department key agencies with land management missions and increasing the effectiveness of their programs. At the same time, a move would provide few efficiencies in the short term and could diminish the role the Forest Service plays in state and private land management. According to many agency officials and experts, where the Forest Service mission is aligned with Interior's--in particular, the multiple-use mission comparable to BLM's--a move could increase the overall effectiveness of some of the agencies' programs and policies. Conversely, most agency officials and experts GAO interviewed believed that few short-term efficiencies would be realized from a move, although a number said opportunities would be created for potential long-term efficiencies. Many officials and experts suggested that if the objective of a move is to improve land management and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the agencies' diverse programs, other options might achieve better results. If the Forest Service were moved into Interior, USDA and Interior would need to consider a number of cultural, organizational, and legal factors and related transition costs, some of which could be managed by certain practices successfully used in the past to merge and transform organizations. For example, integrating the Forest Service's reporting, budgeting, and human capital processes and systems into Interior's could be time-consuming, costly, and disruptive. Nevertheless, Interior and USDA could implement some key merger and transformation practices to help manage any resulting disruptions and other transition costs. In considering a move of the Forest Service into Interior, policymakers will need to carefully weigh mission and management gains against potential short-term disruption and operational costs. Tue, 24 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Clean Coal: DOE's Decision to Restructure FutureGen Should Be Based on a Comprehensive Analysis of Costs, Benefits, and Risks, February 13, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09248.pdf Coal-fired power plants generate about one-half of the nation's electricity and about one-third of its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, which contribute to climate change. In 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated FutureGen--a commercial-scale, coal-fired power plant to incorporate integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), an advanced generating technology, with carbon capture and storage (CCS). The plant was to capture and store underground about 90 percent of its CO2 emissions. DOE's cost share was 74 percent, and industry partners agreed to fund the rest. Concerned about escalating costs, DOE restructured FutureGen. GAO was asked to examine (1) the original and restructured programs' goals, (2) similarities and differences between the new FutureGen and other DOE CCS programs, and (3) if the restructuring decision was based on sufficient information. GAO reviewed best practices for making programmatic decisions, FutureGen plans and budgets, and documents on the restructuring of FutureGen. GAO contacted DOE, industry partners, and experts. The original FutureGen program and the new restructured FutureGen program attempt to use CCS at coal-fired power plants to achieve near-zero CO2 emissions and to make CCS economically viable. However, they take different approaches that could affect CCS's commercial advancement. First, the original program aimed at developing knowledge about the integration of IGCC and CCS at one plant; in contrast, the new program could provide opportunities to learn about CCS at different plants, such as conventional ones that use pulverized coal generating technology. Second, the original program was operated by a nonprofit consortium of energy companies at one plant, while the new program called for CCS projects at multiple commercial plants. The new, restructured FutureGen differs from most DOE CCS programs. The new FutureGen would develop and integrate multiple CCS components at coal-fired plants (including CO2 capture, transportation, and storage underground). Other programs concentrate on only one CCS component and/or a related component (e.g., capture or capture and compression). However, Round III of DOE's Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI) is a cost-shared partnership with industry that funds commercial CCS demonstrations at new and existing coal-fired plants. The new FutureGen is most like CCPI in that both fund CCS commercial demonstrations at several plants to accelerate CCS deployment and require that participants bear 50 percent of the costs, but DOE expects the new FutureGen to have more funding for commercial demonstrations than CCPI. Moreover, the new FutureGen targets a higher amount of CO2 to be captured and stored (at least 1 million metric tons of CO2 annually per plant) than CCPI (300,000 metric tons). Contrary to best practices, DOE did not base its decision to restructure FutureGen on a comprehensive analysis of factors, such as the associated costs, benefits, and risks. DOE made its decision, largely, on the conclusion that costs for the original FutureGen had doubled and would escalate substantially. However, in its decision, DOE compared two cost estimates for the original FutureGen that were not comparable because DOE's $950 million estimate was in constant 2004 dollars and the $1.8 billion estimate of DOE's industry partners was inflated through 2017. As its restructuring decision did not consider a comprehensive analysis of costs, benefits, and risks, DOE has no assurance that the restructured FutureGen is the best option to advance CCS. In contrast to the restructuring decision, DOE's Office of Fossil Energy had identified and analyzed 13 options for incremental, cost-saving changes to the original program, such as reducing the CO2 capture requirement. While the Office of Fossil Energy did not consider all of these options to be viable, it either recommended or noted several of them for consideration, with potential savings ranging from $30 million to $55 million each. Fri, 13 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Transportation Research: The Department of Transportation Has Made Progress in Coordinating and Reviewing Its Research Activities, February 12, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09361t.pdf Research, development, and technology (RD&T) activities are vital to meeting the Department of Transportation's (DOT) priorities, such as increasing safety, enhancing mobility, and supporting the nation's economic growth. In fiscal year 2008, the department's RD&T budget totaled over $1.1 billion, primarily for highway and aviation projects. Over the years, concerns have been raised about DOT's capabilities to improve RD&T coordination and evaluation efforts across the agency. In 2004, Congress created DOT's Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) to coordinate and review the department's RD&T programs and activities for the purposes of reducing research duplication, enhancing opportunities for joint efforts, and ensuring RD&T activities are meeting goals. In 2006 GAO reported that RITA had made progress toward these ends, but needed to do more. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) the importance of coordinating and evaluating RD&T activities and (2) RITA's progress in implementing GAO's 2006 recommendations. GAO's statement is based on its 2006 report, a review of best practices for coordination and evaluation, and follow-up discussions with RITA officials on actions to implement GAO's recommendations. GAO did not assess whether RITA's actions have improved the effectiveness of the department's RD&T investment. Coordinating and evaluating research are important elements in ensuring that federal dollars are used efficiently and effectively. Coordinating research enhances collaboration, ensures that questions are explored, and reduces inefficiencies, such as from duplication of research. Evaluating research activities entails comparing research with established performance measures in agency strategic plans and using expert reviews to assess the quality of the research. With DOT's large RD&T budget--over $1.1 billion--coordination and evaluation are critical to making cost-effective investment choices in today's climate of expected trillion-dollar deficits. RITA has fully implemented five recommendations that GAO made in 2006 aimed at enhancing RITA's ability to manage and determine the effectiveness of RD&T activities, and partially implemented the remaining two. (See table below.) Regarding implemented recommendations, most notably, RITA has implemented a strategy to coordinate RD&T activities and look for areas where joint efforts would be appropriate. Results of its coordination efforts have identified a number of areas for cross-modal collaboration, including the areas of climate change and freight capacity. RITA has also developed a strategy to ensure that the results of DOT's research activities are evaluated against best practices, using governmentwide guidance and external stakeholder reviews. Regarding partially implemented recommendations, RITA has not yet developed an overall strategy, evaluation plan, or performance measures that delineate how its activities ensure the effectiveness of the department's RD&T investment. However, it has developed a process for doing so. In this regard, RITA plans to use an existing departmentwide strategic planning and budget process and collaborative meetings to develop an overall strategy and performance measures. RITA officials expect that it will fully implement activities related to this recommendation by 2012. GAO will continue to monitor RITA's activities. Thu, 12 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Federal Land Management: Observations on a Possible Move of the Forest Service into the Department of the Interior, February 11, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09223.pdf Growing ecological challenges ranging from wildland fires to climate change have revived interest in moving the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Forest Service into the Department of the Interior (Interior). The Forest Service manages almost a quarter of the nation's lands but is the only major land management agency outside Interior. GAO was asked to report on the potential effects of moving the Forest Service into Interior and creating a new bureau equal to Interior's other bureaus, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). GAO was also asked to identify factors that should be considered if such a move were legislated and management practices that could facilitate a move. GAO analyzed five historical proposals to reorganize federal land management agencies; interviewed USDA, Interior, and other officials and outside experts; and studied joint Forest Service- BLM programs to assess efforts to integrate the agencies' work. Moving the Forest Service into Interior could potentially improve federal land management by consolidating into one department key agencies with land management missions and increasing the effectiveness of their programs. At the same time, a move would provide few efficiencies in the short term and could diminish the role the Forest Service plays in state and private land management, a mission the agency has in common with USDA but not with Interior. According to many agency officials and experts, where the Forest Service mission is aligned with Interior's--in particular, the multiple-use mission comparable to BLM's--a move could increase the overall effectiveness of some of the agencies' programs and policies. For example, according to some officials, a move could help harmonize the Forest Service's and BLM's oil and gas, grazing, and other programs and potentially make the agencies' appeals processes similar. Conversely, most agency officials and experts GAO interviewed believed that few short-term efficiencies would be realized from a move, although a number said opportunities would be created for potential long-term efficiencies, such as consolidating information technology systems. Many officials and experts suggested that if the objective of a move is to improve land management and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the agencies' diverse programs, other options might achieve better results. For example, numerous officials and experts suggested leaving the Forest Service in USDA and increasing collaboration among the land management agencies. If the Forest Service were moved into Interior, Interior and USDA would need to consider a number of cultural, organizational, and legal factors and related transition costs, some of which could be managed by certain practices successfully used in the past to merge and transform organizations. The agencies' long histories and traditions have created distinctive cultures, which officials and experts predicted could clash under Interior, leading to reduced morale and productivity. Changes needed to departmental and agency organization in the event of a move could also present challenges. For example, officials and experts said that integrating the Forest Service's reporting, budgeting, and personnel processes and systems into Interior's could be time-consuming, disruptive, and costly. Further, complex legal issues, such as differing statutory authorities, may need reconciliation. GAO's previous work on merging and transforming organizations, however, identified some key practices that Interior and USDA could use to facilitate a move and manage the costs; several of the practices were also mentioned by a number of officials and experts GAO interviewed. For example, identifying goals for a move, up front, would enable planning to achieve those goals, and creating an effective communication strategy would help agency employees understand the reason for a move. Organizational transformations are inevitably complex, involving many factors and often creating unintended consequences. In considering a move of the Forest Service into Interior, policymakers will need to carefully weigh mission and management gains against potential short-term disruption and operational costs. Wed, 11 Feb 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Clean Air Act: Historical Information on EPA's Process for Reviewing California Waiver Requests and Making Waiver Determinations, January 16, 2009 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09249r.pdf Emissions from mobile sources, such as automobiles and trucks, contribute to air quality degradation and can threaten public health and the environment. Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates these emissions. The act generally allows one set of federal standards for new motor vehicle emissions and pre-empts states from adopting or enforcing their own standards. However, it also authorizes the EPA Administrator to waive this provision to allow the state of California1 to enact and enforce emission standards for new motor vehicles that are as protective, in the aggregate, as federal government standards. Other states may also adopt California's standards if they choose. The waiver provision was added to the Federal Air Quality Act (one of the precursors of the current Clean Air Act) in 1967 because of California's severe air pollution problems and because the state had already established its own emission standards for mobile sources. California has used this waiver provision regularly to establish and enforce standards for vehicle emissions more stringent than those required by federal law. However, California must request a waiver of federal pre-emption and the EPA Administrator must approve it before California or any other state can implement such standards. Since being given this authority, California has requested and been granted waivers more than 50 times. In December 2005, California requested a waiver from EPA to allow it to regulate motor vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases, which are closely linked to global climate change. At the time, EPA was responding to litigation initiated by environmental groups and state and local governments regarding whether greenhouse gas emissions were air pollutants that the agency had authority to regulate under the Clean Air Act. EPA delayed action on California's waiver request pending the outcome of that litigation. On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the question in Massachusetts v. EPA by holding that EPA did have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, on December 19, 2007, the EPA Administrator announced his intent to deny California's request. The Administrator subsequently formalized the denial in a decision document he signed and EPA published in the Federal Register on March 6, 2008. The decision has received a high level of attention for a number of reasons. For example, it departed in certain respects from EPA's previous waiver determinations--it was the first time that EPA denied a formal waiver request outright, and it also was the first time EPA used the "compelling and extraordinary conditions" criterion in the Clean Air Act as the basis for denying a waiver request. Due to the atypical outcome of EPA's decision regarding California's greenhouse gas waiver request, Congress asked GAO to review the decision to deny the waiver. As agreed with Congressional offices, we focused our work on the process for and outcomes of past waiver requests because the greenhouse gas waiver decision is the subject of ongoing litigation. Thus, we did not seek to examine the basis for the greenhouse gas decision itself or the process EPA used in reviewing this waiver request. This report summarizes the information about prior waiver requests and decisions provided to Congressional staff during our November 21, 2008, briefing. EPA's process for responding to waiver requests has typically consisted of an informal five-step process, through which staff evaluate the waiver request and review its adherence to criteria laid out in section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act. According to EPA officials, the agency (1) receives and begins review of the waiver request; (2) issues a notice in the Federal Register about the waiver request, including the opportunity for a hearing; (3) holds a hearing, if interest is expressed, and accepts public comments on the proposed waiver; (4) holds internal discussions and conducts internal analysis on the waiver request, including consideration of public comments; and (5) prepares a decision document and publishes the decision in the Federal Register. EPA officials said that as the draft decision document is routed through the approval chain at EPA, it is typically accompanied by a draft Federal Register notice, which lays out the decision and the three statutory criteria in section 209(b) and summarizes the analysis behind the decision. The draft decision document is also usually accompanied by an "action memorandum" that identifies the issues, examines the three Clean Air Act section 209(b) criteria, summarizes public comments, discusses anticipated reaction from external parties and potential for litigation, and provides a recommendation for action. For the past 15 years, several officials in EPA's Office of Transportation and Air Quality have been the primary staff involved in reviewing waiver requests and preparing documents supporting decisions. Typically, EPA's Office of General Counsel then reviews these documents before a final decision is made by EPA's Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation. According to the EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality officials involved in the process over the past 15 years, the approving official's decisions have generally aligned with staff recommendations to approve waivers, whether in full or in part. While some of these steps are documented in the Federal Register and the public docket that EPA maintains for each decision, others--specifically internal discussions, internal analyses, decision document drafts, and the documents that accompany the drafts through the approval chain--are generally not formally documented, retained, or made publicly available. In addition, the contents of the public dockets for waiver decisions are not standardized and vary from decision to decision. The majority of the dockets were prepared 10 or more years ago, and we could not determine the extent to which they are complete. Consequently, it is not feasible to identify the specific internal actions that EPA has taken or the discussions the agency has held with internal and external parties when deliberating previous waiver requests. Fri, 16 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 Natural Hazard Mitigation and Insurance: The United States and Selected Countries Have Similar Natural Hazard Mitigation Policies but Different Insurance Approaches, December 22, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09188r.pdf Natural hazards adversely affect hundreds of thousands of people worldwide each year and cause extensive property damage. In 2007, a year that was not considered an exceptional one for natural hazards, natural hazards caused an estimated 14,600 deaths and $70 billion in property losses. For that year, the insurance industry covered $23.3 billion in losses. In catastrophic loss years, such as 2005--the year that saw Hurricane Katrina--losses can be far greater. Scientific assessments indicate that climate change is expected to alter the frequency and severity of natural hazard events, and as a result, losses can be expected to climb. Given this scenario, examining policies that are used in other countries to reduce the loss of life and property caused by natural hazard events and examining insurance approaches that provide coverage for natural hazard losses can help identify practices in both areas that could benefit the United States. Similarly, given the ongoing challenges facing the United States, international cooperative efforts may provide instructive examples of risk management and disaster reduction. Because of Congressional interest in these areas, GAO was asked to (1) identify policies used by other countries to reduce losses caused by natural hazards; (2) examine the extent of international cooperation among selected countries, including the United States, to mitigate natural hazards; and (3) identify approaches that other industrialized countries use to insure natural hazard risk and regulate insurers. The countries that we studied use a variety of policies to reduce losses from natural hazards that are similar to policies used in the United States. As we have previously reported, mitigation policies, assessing and mapping hazard risk, land use planning, building codes, and public awareness, can be used to reduce the risk of losses from natural hazards. The countries we studied also participate in a variety of international efforts to minimize natural hazard risk. We found that these efforts are consistent with key practices in collaboration that we identified in prior GAO work. The six countries we studied use a variety of approaches to insure natural hazard risk and regulate insurers. Generally, their approaches involve both the government and the private sector. In four countries with government insurance approaches, property insurance policies include natural hazard insurance coverage at a fixed premium, and three of these countries have a government guarantee. All six countries have some type of private insurance approach, and four of these countries offer optional coverage of various natural hazards and have risk-based premiums. Finally, five countries have a centralized (federal-level) agency to regulate the private insurance industry. Three of these government agencies regulate the entire financial services industry--for example, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority oversees banks, building societies, insurance companies, and other entities. Some of the functions of some of these agencies include authorizing insurance companies to do business, assessing solvency, and determining whether insurance companies comply with regulations. Australia and Germany have private sector-only approaches to insurance, and government involvement in pricing insurance is limited. For example, in Germany, prices are controlled only with respect to the company's overall financial safety and the equal treatment of all policyholders. Mon, 22 Dec 2008 00:00:00 -0500 International Climate Change Programs: Lessons Learned from the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme and the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, November 18, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09151.pdf International policies to address climate change have largely relied on market-based programs; for example, under the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) phase I (2005 to 2007) carbon dioxide emissions reductions were sought by setting a cap on each member state's allowable emissions and distributing tradable allowances to covered entities, such as power plants. Beginning operation in 2002, the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has relied on offsets, allowing certain industrialized nations to pay for emission reduction projects in developing countries--where the cost of abatement may be less expensive--in addition to reducing emissions within their borders. Legislative proposals to limit greenhouse gas emissions are under consideration in the United States. In this context, GAO was asked to examine the effects of and lessons learned from (1) the ETS phase I and (2) the CDM. GAO worked with the National Academy of Sciences to identify experts in market-based programs and gathered their opinions through a questionnaire, interviewed stakeholders, and reviewed available information. According to available information and experts, the ETS phase I established a functioning market for carbon dioxide allowances, but its effects on emissions, the European economy, and technology investment are less certain. Nonetheless, experts suggest that it offers lessons that may prove useful in informing congressional decision making. By limiting the total number of emission allowances provided to covered entities under the program and enabling these entities to sell or buy allowances, the ETS set a price on carbon emissions. However, in 2006, a release of emissions data revealed that the supply of allowances--the cap--exceeded the demand, and the allowance price collapsed. Overall, the cumulative effect of phase I on emissions is uncertain because of a lack of baseline emissions data. The long-term effects on the economy also are uncertain. One concern about design and implementation was that the economic activities associated with emissions from covered entities would shift from the European Union to countries that do not have binding emission limits--a concept known as leakage. However, leakage does not appear to have occurred, in part because covered entities did not purchase allowances but received them for free. The effect of the ETS on technology investment also is uncertain but was likely minimal, in part because phase I was not long enough to affect such investments. Phase I of the ETS offers three key lessons: (1) accurate emissions data are essential to setting an effective emissions cap; (2) a trading program should provide enough certainty to influence technology investment; and (3) the method for allocating allowances may have important economic effects, namely, free allocation may distribute wealth to covered entities whereas auctioning could generate revenue for governments. According to available information and experts, the CDM has provided flexibility to industrialized countries with emission targets and has involved developing countries in efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions, but the program's effects on emissions are uncertain, and its effects on sustainable development have been limited. Nonetheless, the CDM's effects reveal key lessons that can help inform congressional decision making. Specifically, the CDM has provided a way for industrialized countries to meet their targets that may cost less than reducing emissions at home; however, available evidence suggests that some offset credits were awarded for projects that would have occurred even in the absence of the CDM, despite a rigorous screening process. Such projects do not represent net emission reductions and can compromise the integrity of programs--including the ETS--that allow the use of CDM credits for compliance. We also found that the cost-effectiveness and overall scale of emission reductions are limited by the current project approval process, although proposed changes may improve its effectiveness. Key lessons from the CDM include: (1) the resources necessary to obtain project approval may reduce the cost-effectiveness and quality of projects; (2) the need to ensure the credibility of emission reductions presents a significant regulatory challenge; and (3) due to the tradeoffs with offsets, the use of such programs may be, at best, a temporary solution. Tue, 18 Nov 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Climate Change: Federal Actions Will Greatly Affect the Viability of Carbon Capture and Storage As a Key Mitigation Option, September 30, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081080.pdf Key scientific assessments have underscored the urgency of reducing emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) to address climate change. Many have cited carbon capture and storage (CCS) as an essential technology because it has the potential to greatly reduce CO2 emissions from power plants while allowing for projected increases in electricity demand. CCS involves capturing CO2 from a power plant's emissions, transporting it to an underground storage location, and then injecting it into a geologic formation for long-term storage. As requested, GAO examined (1) key economic, legal, regulatory, and technological barriers impeding commercial-scale deployment of CCS technology and (2) actions the Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and other agencies are taking to overcome barriers to commercial-scale deployment of CCS technology. Among other things, GAO examined key studies and contacted officials from pertinent agencies, companies, and environmental groups, as well as research and other organizations. Nationally-recognized studies and GAO's contacts with a diverse group of industry representatives, nongovernmental organizations, and academic researchers show that key barriers to CCS deployment include (1) underdeveloped and costly CO2 capture technology and (2) regulatory and legal uncertainties over CO2 capture, injection, and storage. Key technological barriers include a lack of experience in capturing significant amounts of CO2 from commercial-scale power plants and the significant cost of retrofitting existing plants that are the single largest source of CO2 emissions in the United States. Regulatory and legal uncertainties include questions about liability concerning CO2 leakage and ownership of CO2 once injected. According to the National Academy of Sciences and other knowledgeable authorities, another barrier is the absence of a national strategy to control CO2 emissions (emissions trading plan, CO2 emissions tax, or other mandatory control of CO2 emissions), without which the electric utility industry has little incentive to capture and store its CO2 emissions. Moreover, according to key agency officials, the absence of a national strategy to control CO2 emissions has also deterred their agencies from resolving other important practical issues, such as how sequestered CO2 will be transported from power plants to appropriate storage locations and how stored CO2 would be treated in a future CO2 emissions trading plan. Federal agencies have begun to address some CCS barriers but have yet to comprehensively address the full range of issues that would require resolution for large-scale CCS deployment: (1) DOE's research strategy has, until recently, devoted relatively few resources to lowering the cost of CO2 capture from existing coal-fired power plants, focusing instead on innovative technologies applicable to new plants. In recent years, however, the agency has begun to place greater emphasis on CCS technologies applicable to existing facilities. (2) EPA issued in July 2008 a proposed rule to guide the permitting of large volume, or commercial-scale, CO2 injections. It addressed at least some of the key issues under the Safe Drinking Water Act but left other issues related to EPA's implementation of its air, hazardous waste and substance statutes unresolved. (3) Other agencies, such as Interior and Transportation, have jurisdiction over a number of interdisciplinary issues that could delay CCS deployment if unaddressed, but which have thus far received little attention. These include, among others, a legal and regulatory regime for a national CO2 pipeline infrastructure and a plan for addressing CO2 emissions reductions from CCS in a future emissions trading plan. In addition, unless the effects of CCS deployment are clearly explained, public opposition could delay future CCS projects. Tue, 30 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Carbon Offsets: The U.S. Voluntary Market Is Growing, but Quality Assurance Poses Challenges for Market Participants, August 29, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081048.pdf Carbon offsets--reductions of greenhouse gas emissions from an activity in one place to compensate for emissions elsewhere--are a way to address climate change by paying someone else to reduce emissions. To be credible, an offset must be additional--it must reduce emissions below the quantity emitted in a business-as-usual scenario--among other criteria. Assessing credibility is inherently challenging because it is difficult to make business-as-usual projections. Outside the U.S., offsets may be purchased on compliance markets to meet requirements to reduce emissions. In the U.S., there are no federal requirements and offsets may be purchased in the voluntary market. GAO was asked to examine (1) the scope of the U.S. voluntary carbon offset market, including the role of the federal government; (2) the extent to which mechanisms for ensuring the credibility of offsets are available and used and what, if any, related information is shared with consumers; and (3) trade-offs associated with increased oversight of the U.S. market and including offsets in climate change mitigation policies. This report is based on analysis of literature and data, interviews with stakeholders, and GAO's purchase of offsets. The scope of the U.S. voluntary carbon offset market is uncertain because of limited data, but available information indicates that the supply of offsets generated from projects based in the United States is growing rapidly. Data obtained from a firm that analyzes the carbon market show that the supply of offsets increased from about 6.2 million tons in 2004 to about 10.2 million tons in 2007. Over 600 organizations develop, market, or sell offsets in the United States, and the market involves a wide range of participants, prices, transaction types, and projects. The federal government plays a small role in the voluntary market by providing limited consumer protection and technical assistance, and no single regulatory body has oversight responsibilities. A variety of quality assurance mechanisms, including standards for verification and monitoring, are available and used to evaluate offsets, but data are not sufficient to determine the extent of their use. Information shared with consumers on credibility is also limited. Participants in the offset market face challenges ensuring the credibility of offsets, including problems determining additionality, and the existence of many quality assurance mechanisms. GAO, through its purchase of offsets, found that the information provided to consumers by retailers offered limited assurance of credibility. Increased federal oversight of the U.S. voluntary market could enhance the market's transparency and improve consumer protection, but may also reduce flexibility, increase administrative costs, and stifle innovation, according to certain stakeholders. Including offsets in regulatory programs to limit greenhouse gas emissions could also lower the cost of compliance, according to recent EPA analyses and economic literature. However, some stakeholders said that concerns about the credibility of offsets could compromise the environmental integrity of a compliance system. Fri, 29 Aug 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Food Insecurity Persists in Sub-Saharan Africa despite Efforts to Halve Hunger by 2015, July 17, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081007r.pdf At the 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) in Rome, the United States and more than 180 world leaders pledged to halve the total number of undernourished people worldwide from the 1990 level---a commitment that they reaffirmed in 2000 when they established the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which included a target to halve the proportion or the percentage of the world's population that is undernourished by 2015. More than a decade later, however, the number of undernourished people has not decreased significantly, and about 850 million people, including 170 million children, remain undernourished, according to the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Furthermore, the number of undernourished people in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from about 170 million in the period of 1990 to 1992 to over 200 million in the period of 2001 to 2003. Since early 2007, food-related riots have occurred in 15 countries, including 7 in sub-Saharan Africa, leading both the UN Secretary-General and the head of the World Food Program (WFP) to express concern about the impact of chronic undernourishment, or food insecurity, on world peace and security. In January 2008, world leaders meeting in Davos, Switzerland, for the World Economic Forum predicted that food insecurity would be among the top potential threats to the world economy this year and for decades to come. In April 2008, the President of the World Bank called for a New Deal for a Global Food Policy that would involve a combination of long-term efforts to boost agricultural productivity in developing countries and short-term emergency aid to address immediate food crises. GAO recently examined (1) factors that contribute to persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and (2) the extent to which host governments and donors, including the United States, are working toward halving hunger in the region by 2015. In May 2008, we reported on these issues as follows: (1) Chronic undernourishment (food insecurity) in sub-Saharan Africa persists primarily due to low agricultural productivity, limited rural development, government policy disincentives, and the impact of poor health on the agricultural workforce. Additional factors, including rising global commodity prices and climate change, will likely further exacerbate food insecurity in the region. (2) The efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to achieve the goal of halving hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 have thus far been insufficient. Some host governments have not prioritized food security as a development goal. Donors have reduced the priority given to agriculture and their efforts have been further hampered by difficulties in coordination and deficiencies in measuring and monitoring progress. Limited agricultural development resources and a fragmented approach have impaired U.S. efforts to reduce hunger in Africa. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding to address food insecurity in Africa has been primarily for emergency food aid, which has been crucial in helping to alleviate food crises but has not addressed the underlying factors that contributed to the recurrence and severity of these crises. The United States' principal strategy for meeting its commitment to halve hunger in Africa, the Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA), is limited to some of USAID's agricultural development activities and does not integrate other U.S. agencies' agricultural development assistance to the region. In our May 2008 report, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID (1) work in collaboration with the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, and the Treasury to develop an integrated governmentwide U.S. strategy that defines each agency's actions and resource commitments toward achieving food security in sub-Saharan Africa, including improving collaboration with host governments and other donors and developing improved measures to monitor and evaluate progress toward the implementation of this strategy, and (2) report on progress toward the implementation of this recommendation as part of the annual U.S. International Food Assistance Report submitted to Congress. Thu, 17 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data Continuity, June 19, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08899t.pdf The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition--managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--which has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing its complexity, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years. GAO was asked to summarize a report being released today that evaluates progress in restructuring the acquisition, assesses the status of key program components and risks, and assesses the agencies' plans for obtaining the data originally planned to be collected by NPOESS sensors, but eliminated by the restructuring. The NPOESS program office has completed most of the major activities associated with restructuring the acquisition, but key activities remain to be completed. In the past year, the program redefined the program's deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS contract. However, agency executives have not yet finalized selected acquisition documents. Without executive approval, the program lacks the underlying commitment needed to effectively manage a tri-agency program. In addition, given that DOD has stated it would not release fiscal year 2009 funds to the NPOESS program if key acquisition documents are not completed by August 2008, delays in completing these documents could affect the program's funding and schedule. In the past year, the NPOESS program has made progress in completing development and testing activities associated with the spacecraft, sensors, and ground systems. However, key milestones have been delayed and multiple risks remain. Specifically, poor workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the delivery of a complex imaging sensor called the Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite. This late delivery caused a corresponding 8-month delay in the expected launch date of the NPOESS Preparatory Project demonstration satellite, moving it from late September 2009 to early June 2010. Moving forward, risks remain in completing the testing of key sensors and integrating them on the spacecraft, resolving interagency disagreements about the appropriate level of system security, and revising outdated operations and support cost estimates--which program officials say could increase the lifecycle cost by about $1 billion. The program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but these issues could affect the program's overall schedule and cost. When the NPOESS restructuring agreement removed four climate and space environment sensors from the program and degraded four others, it led NASA, NOAA, and DOD to reassess their priorities and options for obtaining climate and space environment data. Since the June 2006 restructuring decision, the three agencies have taken preliminary steps to restore the capabilities of selected climate and space weather sensors that were removed from the NPOESS program by prioritizing the sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and making decisions to mitigate near-term data continuity needs by restoring two sensors to the demonstration satellite and one sensor to the first NPOESS satellite. However, the agencies have not yet developed plans on whether and how to replace sensors on a long-term basis as no plans have been made for sensors or satellites after the first satellite of the program. Until such a plan is developed, the agencies may lose their windows of opportunity for selecting cost-effective options or they may resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring these sensors. Almost 2 years have passed since key sensors were removed from the NPOESS program; further delays in establishing a plan could result in gaps in the continuity of climate and space data. Thu, 19 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Food Safety: Selected Countries' Systems Can Offer Insights into Ensuring Import Safety and Responding to Foodborne Illness, June 10, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08794.pdf Like other nations, the United States faces growing food safety challenges resulting from at least three major trends. First, imported food makes up a growing share of the food supply. Second, consumers are increasingly eating foods that are raw or have had minimal processing and that are often associated with foodborne illness. Third, changing demographic patterns mean that more of the U.S. population is, and increasingly will be, susceptible to foodborne illness. In 2005, GAO reported on the approaches and challenges seven countries faced in reorganizing and consolidating food safety functions. Since then, the European Union (EU) has taken on a larger role in overseeing food safety within its 27 member states. GAO was asked to describe how Canada, the EU, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK) (1) ensure the safety of imported food, (2) respond to outbreaks of foodborne illness, and (3) measure the effectiveness of their reorganized food safety systems. GAO also asked experts in these countries and the EU to identify emerging food safety challenges that they expect to face over the next decade. In doing this work, GAO did not evaluate the countries' management of their food safety systems or explicitly compare their efforts with those of the United States. The countries GAO examined have a comprehensive approach to ensuring the safety of imported food. Specifically, they focus on the entire food supply chain, from "farm to table;" place primary responsibility for food safety on producers; separate risk assessment and risk management; use a risk-based inspection system; and take steps to ensure that certain food imports meet equivalent safety standards. Under the farm-to-table approach, for example, food safety laws cover every stage of the food production process, starting with how animals are raised and ending when food reaches the consumer. All countries GAO reviewed focus import inspections on the foods likeliest to pose the greatest risk. The EU, for example, requires that all imports of live animals and products of animal origin--which are considered high risk--enter the EU through approved border inspection posts. Several of the selected countries reported that three elements of their food safety systems are critical in helping them respond to outbreaks of foodborne illness. These elements are traceback procedures, cooperative arrangements between government veterinarians and public health officials, and mandatory recall authority. In EU member states, all food must be traceable "one step forward and one step back" so industry and government can quickly track any food products to minimize harm to public health and reduce the economic impact on industry. Food and feed business operators must be able to document the names and addresses of the supplier and customer, as well as the nature of the product and date of delivery. Officials in several countries told GAO that mandatory recall authority--the legal authority to remove, or require another party to remove, a product from the market--is rarely used but is an important part of the food safety system because it is the last stop in the supply chain. None of the selected countries had comprehensively evaluated its reorganized food safety system, although several track certain indicators, such as the number of inspections, enforcement actions, and foodborne illness. However, some countries' national audit offices (GAO's counterparts) have evaluated specific aspects of their countries' systems. For example, the UK audit office found that the country's Food Standards Agency had improved public confidence, a stated objective. The EU's Food and Veterinary Office has conducted numerous reviews of aspects of all EU countries' food safety systems and identified areas needing improvement. Most of the selected countries use proxy measures, such as public opinion surveys, to assess their effectiveness. Public opinion in several countries has improved in recent years. Countries' industry and consumer stakeholders also generally had positive views of the reorganized food safety systems. Experts identified food safety challenges that they expect to face over the next decade. These include climate change; demographic change, with increases in elderly people and immigration; and new types of foods, such as ready-to-eat salads, that may result in more incidents of foodborne illness. Tue, 10 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 International Food Security: Insufficient Efforts by Host Governments and Donors Threaten Progress to Halve Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015, May 29, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08680.pdf In 1996, the United States and more than 180 world leaders pledged to halve the number of undernourished people globally by 2015 from the 1990 level. The global number has not decreased significantly--remaining at about 850 million in 2001-2003--and the number in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from about 170 million in 1990-1992 to over 200 million in 2001-2003. On the basis of analyses of U.S. and international agency documents, structured panel discussions with experts and practitioners, and fieldwork in four African countries, GAO was asked to examine (1) factors that contribute to persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and (2) the extent to which host governments and donors, including the United States, are working toward halving hunger in the region by 2015. Chronic undernourishment (food insecurity) in sub-Saharan Africa persists primarily due to low agricultural productivity, limited rural development, government policy disincentives, and the impact of poor health on the agricultural workforce. Additional factors, including rising global commodity prices and climate change, will likely further exacerbate food insecurity in the region. Agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa, as measured by grain yield, is only about 40 percent of that of the rest of the world's developing countries, and the gap has widened over the years. Low agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa is due, in part, to the limited use of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer and improved seed varieties, and the lack of modern farming practices. The efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to achieve the goal of halving hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 have thus far been insufficient. First, some host governments have not prioritized food security as a development goal, and, according to a 2008 report of the International Food Policy Research Institute, as of 2005, only a few countries had fulfilled a 2003 pledge to direct 10 percent of government spending to agriculture. Second, donors have reduced the priority given to agriculture, and their efforts have been further hampered by difficulties in coordination and deficiencies in measuring and monitoring progress. Third, limited agricultural development resources and a fragmented approach have impaired U.S. efforts to reduce hunger in Africa. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding to address food insecurity in Africa has been primarily for emergency food aid, which has been crucial in helping to alleviate food crises but has not addressed the underlying factors that contributed to the recurrence and severity of these crises. Also, the United States' principal strategy for meeting its commitment to halve hunger in Africa is limited to some of USAID's agricultural development activities and does not integrate other U.S. agencies' agricultural development assistance to the region. Thu, 29 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Expert Opinion on the Economics of Policy Options to Address Climate Change, May 9, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08605.pdf Elevated levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the resulting effects on the earth's climate could have significant environmental and economic impacts in the United States and internationally. Potential impacts include rising sea levels and a shift in the intensity and frequency of floods and storms. Proposed responses to climate change include adapting to the possible impacts by planning and improving protective infrastructure, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions directly through regulation or the promotion of low-emissions technologies. Because most U.S. emissions stem from the combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas, much of this report centers on the effect emissions regulation could have on the economy. In this context, GAO was asked to elicit the opinions of experts on (1) actions the Congress might consider to address climate change and what is known about the potential benefits, costs, and uncertainties of these actions and (2) the key strengths and limitations of policies or actions to address climate change. GAO worked with the National Academy of Sciences to identify a panel of noted economists with expertise in analyzing the economic impacts of climate change policies and gathered their opinions through iterative, Web-based questionnaires. The findings reported here represent the views of the 18 economists who responded to both questionnaires. All of the panelists agreed that the Congress should consider using a market-based mechanism to establish a price on greenhouse gas emissions, and 14 of the 18 panelists recommended additional actions as part of a portfolio to address climate change, such as investment in research and development of low-emissions technologies. Experts differed on the initial stringency of the market-based mechanism, with 14 of the 18 panelists recommending an initial price between less than $1 and $20 per ton of emissions. In addition, 14 of 18 panelists were at least moderately certain that the benefits of their recommended portfolio of actions would outweigh the costs. To establish a price on emissions, most of the panelists preferred either a tax on emissions or a hybrid policy that incorporates features of both a tax and a cap-and-trade program. A tax would set a fixed price on every ton of emissions, whereas a cap-and-trade program would limit or cap total emissions and establish a market for trading (buying and selling) permits to emit a specific amount of greenhouse gases. Under the cap-and-trade system, the market would determine the price of emissions. A hybrid system differs from a traditional cap-and-trade system in that the government would cap emissions, but could sell additional emissions permits if the permit price rose above a predetermined level. Panelists also identified general categories of benefits, such as avoided climate change damages, and costs, such as increases in energy prices, associated with their recommended actions. Overall the panel rated estimates of costs as more useful than estimates of benefits for informing congressional decision making, with some panelists citing uncertainties associated with the future impacts of climate change as limitations to estimating benefits. Further, the majority of panelists agreed that the United States should establish a price on greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible regardless of the extent to which other countries adopt similar policies. At the same time, the majority of panelists said it was at least somewhat important to participate in international negotiations on climate change. Panelists identified key strengths and limitations of alternative policy approaches that should be of assistance to the Congress in weighing the potential benefits and costs of different policies for addressing climate change. Many panelists said that a cap-and-trade program would be more effective in achieving a desired level of greenhouse gas emissions because, unlike a tax, it would provide certainty that emissions wouldn't exceed a certain level. However, some of the panelists also said that taxes would be more cost-effective than a cap-and-trade program because the price of emissions would be certain and not susceptible to market fluctuations. Eight panelists therefore preferred a hybrid approach that incorporates features of both a tax and a cap-and-trade program. On average, the panelists rated cost effectiveness as the most important criterion for evaluating various policy options. Finally, panelists said an important strength of using a market-based approach is the ability for the government to raise revenue through a tax or the sale of emissions permits and to use that revenue to offset the adverse effects of the policy. Fri, 09 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Aviation and the Environment: NextGen and Research and Development Are Keys to Reducing Emissions and Their Impact on Health and Climate, May 6, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08706t.pdf Collaboration between the federal government and the aviation industry has led to reductions in aviation emissions, but growing air traffic has partially offset these reductions. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), together with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and others, is working to increase the efficiency, safety, and capacity of the national airspace system and at the same time reduce aviation emissions, in part, by transforming the current air traffic control system to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). This effort involves new technologies and air traffic procedures that can reduce aviation emissions and incorporates research and development (R&D) on emissions-reduction technologies. Reducing aviation emissions is important both to minimize their adverse health and environmental effects and to alleviate public concerns about them that could constrain the expansion of airport infrastructure and aviation operations needed to meet demand. This testimony addresses (1) the scope and nature of aviation emissions, (2) the status of selected key federal efforts to reduce aviation emissions, and (3) next steps and challenges in reducing aviation emissions. The testimony updates prior GAO work with FAA data, literature reviews, and interviews with agency officials, industry and environmental stakeholders, and selected experts. Aviation contributes a modest but growing proportion of total U.S. emissions, and these emissions contribute to adverse health and environmental effects. Aircraft and airport operations, including those of service and passenger vehicles, emit ozone and other substances that contribute to local air pollution, as well as carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. EPA estimates that aviation emissions account for less than 1 percent of local air pollution nationwide and about 2.7 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, but these emissions are expected to grow as air traffic increases. Two key federal efforts, if implemented effectively, can help to reduce aviation emissions--NextGen initiatives in the near term and research and development over the longer term. For example, NextGen technologies and procedures, such as satellite-based navigation systems, should allow for more direct routing, which could improve fuel efficiency and reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Federal research and development efforts--led by FAA and NASA in collaboration with industry and academia--have achieved significant reductions in aircraft emissions through improved aircraft and engine technologies, and federal officials and aviation experts agree that such efforts are the most effective means of achieving further reductions in the longer term. Federal R&D on aviation emissions also focuses on improving the scientific understanding of aviation emissions and developing lower-emitting aviation fuels. Next steps in reducing aviation emissions include managing NextGen initiatives efficiently; deploying NextGen technologies and procedures as soon as practicable to realize their benefits, including lower emissions levels; and managing a decline in R&D funding, in part, by setting priorities for R&D on NextGen and emissions-reduction technologies. Challenges in reducing aviation emissions include designing aircraft that can simultaneously reduce noise and emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases; encouraging financially stressed airlines to purchase more fuel-efficient aircraft and emissions-reduction technologies; addressing the impact on airport expansion of more stringent EPA air quality standards and growing public concerns about the effects of aviation emissions; and responding to proposed domestic and international measures for reducing greenhouse gases that could affect the financial solvency and competitiveness of U.S. airlines. Tue, 06 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Economic and Other Implications of Switching from Coal to Natural Gas at the Capitol Power Plant and at Electricity-Generating Units Nationwide, May 1, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08601r.pdf Elevated concentrations of greenhouse gases--carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and several synthetic chemicals--in the atmosphere resulting from the combustion of fossil fuels and other sources have the potential to cause significant changes in the earth's climate. These potential impacts include shifts in sea level and weather patterns and could pose threats to coastal and other infrastructure. Concerns about the potential impacts of climate change have led the Congress to consider legislation that would place binding, nationwide limits on greenhouse gas emissions, and the House of Representatives' leadership has initiated efforts to decrease emissions attributable to its operations. Nearly all of the greenhouse gas emissions from House operations consist of carbon dioxide and are associated with electricity purchased from utilities and the combustion of fossil fuels in the Capitol Power Plant (CPP), which provides steam and chilled water for heating and cooling the Capitol building and 23 surrounding facilities. The Architect of the Capitol (AOC) operates CPP. In June 2007, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of the House of Representatives released the Green the Capitol initiative (the initiative) at the direction of the Speaker and the Majority Leader. Among other goals, the initiative calls for the House of Representatives to operate in a carbon-neutral manner by the end of the 110th Congress (December 2008). Based on an AOC estimate, the House's share of the cost of achieving the fuel-switching goal would total $2.75 million in fiscal year 2008. The Omnibus Appropriations Act for that year appropriated $85.3 million for CPP. The House Appropriations Committee Explanatory Statement directs $3.27 million of this amount to the Green the Capitol initiative. In addition to the House's efforts to implement the Green the Capitol initiative, the Congress is considering proposals that would create nationwide limits on greenhouse gas emissions from electricity-generating units and other sectors of the economy. Within this context, the House Committee on Appropriations directed GAO to determine, in consultation with the Department of Energy, (1) the expected increase in natural gas use for House operations and the associated costs at CPP that would result from the Green the Capitol initiative, and (2) the ability of existing U.S. coal-burning, electricity-generating units to switch to burning natural gas and the associated economic implications. According to our analysis, implementing the Green the Capitol initiative's fuel-switching directive to decrease carbon dioxide emissions from the CPP should lead to a 38 percent increase in natural gas use over the average annual quantity consumed between 2001 and 2007. We estimated that the fuel switching should cost about $1.4 million in fiscal year 2008 and could range from between $1.0 and $1.8 million depending on actual fuel costs, among other factors. Our cost estimates are less than the $2.75 million AOC budgeted for this purpose in fiscal year 2008, largely because we employed a different methodology than AOC when it prepared its estimates and maintained certain assumptions that AOC did not. Looking ahead, we estimate that the incremental cost of maintaining the adjusted fuel mix will range between $4.7 million and $8.3 million over the 2008 through 2012 time period, depending on fuel prices, the plant's output, and other factors. However, an important uncertainty with our estimates stems from the fact that AOC does not have complete, reliable information on the efficiency of its seven boilers in converting fuel into steam or on the full costs associated with the use of each fuel, taking into account factors such as fuel transportation and handling, and fuel-specific pollution control devices. With regard to the ability of U.S. coal-burning, electricity-generating units to switch to natural gas, according to available data and key stakeholders, the ability of these units to switch is limited by high natural gas prices, supply constraints, and existing infrastructure. In addition, increasing the nation's use of natural gas for electricity generation could result in adverse economic consequences. Fuel switching to natural gas also poses challenges related to existing infrastructure, including limited pipeline and storage capacity and technical and regulatory barriers to the conversion of existing coal plants. Large-scale fuel switching would require substantial investments in pipeline and storage capacity and new terminals to process imported natural gas--all of which would require regulatory approval. Because of these technical and other issues, large-scale shifting demand for electricity production from coal to natural gas would increase electricity prices, residential and commercial heating costs, and fuel costs for certain industries that consume large quantities of natural gas, including chemical and fertilizer manufacturers. Because of these and other concerns, key stakeholders said that switching coal plants to natural gas has occurred infrequently in the past and is not likely to occur in the future. Thu, 01 May 2008 00:00:00 -0400 Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Lack Key Long- and Short-Term Management Strategies for Using Program Funds Effectively, February 12, 2008 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08433t.pdf The nation's wildland fire problems have worsened over the past decade. Recent years have seen dramatic increases in the number of acres burned and the dollars spent on preparing for and responding to wildland fires. As GAO has previously reported, a number of factors have contributed to worsening fire seasons and increased firefighting expenditures, including an accumulation of fuels due to past land management practices; drought and other stresses, in part related to climate change; and an increase in human development in or near wildlands. Recent GAO reports have identified shortcomings in the approach to wildland fire management taken by the responsible federal agencies--the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and four agencies within the Department of the Interior. GAO was asked to testify on agency efforts to (1) develop a cohesive strategy for preparing for and responding to wildland fire, (2) contain federal expenditures related to wildland fire, and (3) improve the processes used to allocate funds for reducing accumulated fuels and to select fuel reduction projects. GAO also is providing preliminary findings from its ongoing review of an interagency budget allocation and planning model known as fire program analysis (FPA). This testimony is based on issued GAO reports, reviews of agency documents related to the development of FPA, and discussions with agency officials. In recent years, GAO has recommended a number of actions federal wildland fire agencies should take to better diagnose the extent of the nation's wildland fire problems and develop a strategic approach for addressing them. The agencies have taken some steps to respond to GAO's recommendations, but have not completed other needed steps. Specifically, the agencies should: (1) recommit to developing a cohesive strategy that identifies options and associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems. In several reports dating to 1999, GAO recommended that a cohesive strategy be developed that identifies the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing hazardous fuels and for responding to wildland fires. Such a strategy would assist Congress and the agencies in making informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term approaches to addressing the nation's wildland fire problems. As of January 2008, the agencies had not developed such a strategy and, in fact, had retreated from earlier commitments to do so. (2) Establish clear goals and a strategy to help contain wildland fire costs. In 2007, GAO reported that the agencies had taken several steps to contain wildland fire costs, including developing new decision support tools to help officials select the most appropriate strategy for fighting wildland fires, but lacked clearly defined cost-containment goals and a strategy for achieving them. As a result, we believe managers in the field lacked a clear understanding of the relative importance agency leadership placed on containing costs and were therefore likely to select firefighting strategies without duly considering the costs of suppression. Although the agencies have continued to implement individual cost-containment steps, they still have not developed clear goals or a strategy for achieving them. (3) Continue to improve their processes for allocating fuel reduction funds and selecting fuel reduction projects. Also in 2007, GAO recommended several improvements to the agencies' processes for allocating fuel reduction funds to field units and selecting projects. Specifically, GAO recommended that the agencies use a more systematic allocation process, improve the information they use to make allocation decisions, and clarify the relative importance of the various factors they consider when allocating funds. The agencies are currently taking steps to implement these improvements, although none have yet been completed. In addition, GAO's ongoing review of FPA suggests that the current model, which the agencies expect to complete in June 2008, may not allow the agencies to meet all of the key goals established for FPA. Specifically, preliminary results from GAO's review suggest that the model will not allow the agencies to analyze long-term trade-offs between annual fuel reduction treatments and future expected suppression costs for large fires. GAO intends to conduct a full assessment of FPA once it is completed. Tue, 12 Feb 2008 00:00:00 -0500 Climate Change Research: Agencies Have Data-Sharing Policies but Could Do More to Enhance the Availability of Data from Federally Funded Research, September 28, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071172.pdf Much of the nearly $2 billion annual climate change research budget supports grants from the Department of Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and National Science Foundation (NSF). Some of the data generated by this research are stored in online archives, but much remains in a less accessible format with individual researchers. As a result, some researchers are concerned about the availability of data. GAO analyzed (1) the key issues that data-sharing policies should address; (2) the data-sharing requirements, policies, and practices for external climate change researchers funded by DOE, NASA, NOAA, and NSF; and (3) the extent to which these agencies foster data sharing. GAO examined requirements, policies, and practices and surveyed the 64 officials managing climate change grants at these agencies. According to the scientific community--as represented by the National Academies and professional scientific associations--four key issues that data-sharing policies should address include what, how, and when data are to be shared, as well as the cost of making data available to other researchers. First, the information necessary to support major published results should be made available to other researchers. However, there are statutory limits on data sharing--such as intellectual property protections--as well as practical limits such as the lack of appropriate archives. Second, when the appropriate infrastructure exists, data should be made accessible through unrestricted archives. Third, data should generally be made available immediately or after a limited proprietary period to allow for analysis and publication of results. Fourth, data should be made available at no more than the marginal cost of reproduction and distribution. Finally, the extent to which specific policies address these key data-sharing issues may vary, depending on the type of research. Although some program managers at all four agencies have included data-sharing requirements in grant awards, these agencies rely primarily on policies and practices to encourage researchers to make climate change data available. An interagency policy, as well as numerous agency, program, and project-specific data-sharing policies, encourages researchers to make climate change data available. The policies range from broad statements calling for open and timely access to data to more detailed policies that define the mechanisms and timelines for making the data accessible. Further, these policies often vary according to the needs of specific research programs or projects. Beyond their written requirements and policies, all of the agencies also rely on unwritten practices to facilitate data sharing. For example, two program managers withhold grant payments if data have not been made available for use by other researchers. While the four agencies have taken steps to foster data sharing, they neither routinely monitor whether researchers make data available nor have fully overcome key obstacles and disincentives to data sharing. Because agencies do not monitor data sharing, they lack evidence on the extent to which researchers are making data available to others. Key obstacles and disincentives could also limit the availability of data. For example, one obstacle is the lack of archives for storing certain kinds of climate change data, such as some ecological data, which places a greater burden on the individual researcher to preserve it. Preparing data for future use is also a laborious and time-consuming task that can serve as a disincentive to data sharing. In addition, data preparation does not further a research career as does publishing results in journals. The scientific community generally rewards researchers who publish in journals, but preparation of data for others' use is not an important part of this reward structure. Consequently, researchers are less likely to focus on preserving data for future use, thereby putting the data at risk of being unavailable to other researchers. Fri, 28 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Natural Hazard Mitigation: Various Mitigation Efforts Exist, but Federal Efforts Do Not Provide a Comprehensive Strategic Framework, August 22, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07403.pdf The nation has experienced vast losses from natural hazards. The potential for future events, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, demonstrates the importance of hazard mitigation--actions that reduce the long-term risks to life and property from natural hazard events. GAO was asked to examine (1) natural hazards that present a risk to life and property in the United States, areas that are most susceptible to them, factors that may be increasing these risks, and mitigation activities that reduce losses; (2) methods for encouraging and impediments to implementing mitigation activities; and (3) collaborative efforts of federal agencies and other stakeholders to promote mitigation. To address these objectives, GAO collected and analyzed hazard data, reviewed population information, conducted site visits to locations with comprehensive mitigation programs, and collected information from relevant agencies and officials. Natural hazards present risks to life and property throughout the United States. Flooding is the most widespread and destructive of these, resulting in billions of dollars in property losses each year. Hurricanes, earthquakes, and wildland fires also pose significant risks in certain regions of the country. Tornadoes, landslides, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions can also occur in some areas. Population growth in hazard-prone areas, especially coastal areas, is increasing the nation's vulnerability to losses because more people and property are at risk. Climate change may also impact the frequency and severity of future natural hazard events. A variety of natural hazard mitigation activities exist, which are primarily implemented at the state and local level, and include hazard mitigation planning; strong building codes and design standards; and hazard control structures (e.g., levees). For example, strong building codes and design standards can make structures better able to withstand a hazard event and hazard control structures help protect existing at-risk areas. Public education, financial assistance, and insurance discounts can help encourage mitigation. For example, federal, state, and local governments provide financial assistance to promote mitigation and insurance discounts can encourage the use of mitigation measures. However, significant challenges exist to implementing natural hazard mitigation activities. Some of these challenges include the desire for local economic development--often in hazard-prone areas--which may conflict with long-term mitigation goals and the cost of mitigation may limit the amount of activities that occur. FEMA, other federal agencies, and nonfederal stakeholders have collaborated on natural hazard mitigation, but the current approach is fragmented and does not provide a comprehensive national strategic framework for mitigation. Collaboration typically occurs on a hazard-specific basis, after a disaster, or through informal methods. A comprehensive framework would help define common national goals, establish joint strategies, leverage resources, and assign responsibilities among stakeholders. Wed, 22 Aug 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Agencies Should Develop Guidance for Addressing the Effects on Federal Land and Water Resources, August 7, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07863.pdf Climate change has implications for the vast land and water resources managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Forest Service (FS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and National Park Service (NPS). These resources generally occur within four ecosystem types: coasts and oceans, forests, fresh waters, and grasslands and shrublands. GAO obtained experts' views on (1) the effects of climate change on federal resources and (2) the challenges managers face in addressing climate change effects on these resources. GAO held a workshop with the National Academies in which 54 scientists, economists, and federal resource managers participated, and conducted 4 case studies. According to experts at the GAO workshop, federal land and water resources are vulnerable to a wide range of effects from climate change, some of which are already occurring. These effects include, among others, (1) physical effects, such as droughts, floods, glacial melting, and sea level rise; (2) biological effects, such as increases in insect and disease infestations, shifts in species distribution, and changes in the timing of natural events; and (3) economic and social effects, such as adverse impacts on tourism, infrastructure, fishing, and other resource uses. Experts at the GAO workshop also identified several challenges that resource managers face in addressing the observed and potential effects of climate change in their management and planning efforts. In particular, BLM, FS, FWS, NOAA, and NPS have not made climate change a priority, and the agencies' strategic plans do not specifically address climate change. Resource managers focus first on near-term, required activities, leaving less time for addressing longer-term issues such as climate change. In addition, resource managers have limited guidance about whether or how to address climate change and, therefore, are uncertain about what actions, if any, they should take. In general, resource managers lack specific guidance for incorporating climate change into their management actions and planning efforts. Without such guidance, their ability to address climate change and effectively manage resources is constrained. While a broad order developed in January 2001 directed BLM, FWS, and NPS to consider and analyze potential climate change effects in their management plans and activities, the agencies have not yet provided specific direction to managers on how they are to implement the order. A BLM official stated at an April 2007 hearing that BLM is establishing policy and technical committees to address necessary actions and develop guidance to address climate change in agency management practices. FWS and NPS officials said that their agencies have not developed specific guidance but believe that they are operating in a manner consistent with the 2001 order. While NOAA and FS have not provided specific guidance to their resource managers, NOAA officials said that the agency is establishing a working group to determine what actions to take to address climate change effects. FS officials said that FS planning processes are designed to identify and respond to emerging issues such as climate change. Finally, resource managers do not have sufficient site-specific information to plan for and manage the effects of climate change on the federal resources they manage. In particular, the managers lack computational models for local projections of expected changes and detailed inventories and monitoring systems for an adequate baseline understanding of existing local species. Without such information, managers are limited to reacting to already-observed climate change effects on their units, which makes it difficult to plan for future changes. Tue, 07 Aug 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades are Potentially Significant, May 3, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07820t.pdf Weather-related events in the United States have caused tens of billions of dollars in damages annually over the past decade. A major portion of these losses is borne by private insurers and by two federal insurance programs-- the Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which insures properties against flooding, and the Department of Agriculture's Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which insures crops against drought or other weather disasters. In this testimony, GAO (1) describes how climate change may affect future weather-related losses, (2) provides information on past insured weather-related losses, and (3) determines what major private insurers and federal insurers are doing to prepare for potential increases in such losses. This testimony is based on a report entitled Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades are Potentially Significant (GAO-07-285) released on April 19, 2007. Key scientific assessments report that the effects of climate change on weather-related events and, subsequently, insured and uninsured losses, could be significant. The global average surface temperature has increased over the past century and climate models predict even more substantial, perhaps accelerating, increases in temperature in the future. Assessments by key governmental bodies generally found that rising temperatures are expected to increase the frequency and severity of damaging weather-related events, such as flooding or drought, although the timing and magnitude are as yet undetermined. Additional research on the effect of increasing temperatures on weather events is expected in the near future. Taken together, private and federal insurers paid more than $320 billion in claims on weather-related losses from 1980 to 2005. Claims varied significantly from year to year--largely due to the effects of catastrophic weather events such as hurricanes and droughts--but have generally increased during this period. The growth in population in hazard-prone areas and resulting real estate development have generally increased liabilities for insurers, and have helped to explain the increase in losses. Due to these and other factors, federal insurers' exposure has grown substantially. Since 1980, NFIP's exposure nearly quadrupled to nearly $1 trillion in 2005, and program expansion increased FCIC's exposure 26-fold to $44 billion. Major private and federal insurers are both exposed to the effects of climate change over coming decades, but are responding differently. Many large private insurers are incorporating climate change into their annual risk management practices, and some are addressing it strategically by analyzing its potential long-term industry-wide impacts. In contrast, federal insurers have not developed and disseminated comparable information on long-term financial impacts. GAO acknowledges that the federal insurance programs are not profit-oriented, like private insurers. Nonetheless, a strategic assessment of the potential implications of climate change for the major federal insurance programs would help the Congress manage an emerging high-risk area with significant implications for the nation's growing long-term fiscal imbalance. Thu, 03 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades are Potentially Significant, April 19, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07760t.pdf Weather-related events in the United States have caused tens of billions of dollars in damages annually over the past decade. A major portion of these losses is borne by private insurers and by two federal insurance programs-- the Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which insures properties against flooding, and the Department of Agriculture's Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which insures crops against drought or other weather disasters. In this testimony, GAO (1) describes how climate change may affect future weather-related losses, (2) provides information on past insured weather-related losses, and (3) determines what major private insurers and federal insurers are doing to prepare for potential increases in such losses. This testimony is based on a report entitled Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades are Potentially Significant (GAO-07-285) being released today. Key scientific assessments report that the effects of climate change on weather-related events and, subsequently, insured and uninsured losses, could be significant. The global average surface temperature has increased over the past century and climate models predict even more substantial, perhaps accelerating, increases in temperature in the future. Assessments by key governmental bodies generally found that rising temperatures are expected to increase the frequency and severity of damaging weather-related events, such as flooding or drought, although the timing and magnitude are as yet undetermined. Additional research on the effect of increasing temperatures on weather events is expected in the near future. Taken together, private and federal insurers paid more than $320 billion in claims on weather-related losses from 1980 to 2005. Claims varied significantly from year to year--largely due to the effects of catastrophic weather events such as hurricanes and droughts--but have generally increased during this period. The growth in population in hazard-prone areas and resulting real estate development have generally increased liabilities for insurers, and have helped to explain the increase in losses. Due to these and other factors, federal insurers' exposure has grown substantially. Since 1980, NFIP's exposure nearly quadrupled to nearly $1 trillion in 2005, and program expansion increased FCIC's exposure 26-fold to $44 billion. Major private and federal insurers are both exposed to the effects of climate change over coming decades, but are responding differently. Many large private insurers are incorporating climate change into their annual risk management practices, and some are addressing it strategically by assessing its potential long-term industry-wide impacts. In contrast, federal insurers have not developed and disseminated comparable information on long-term financial impacts. GAO acknowledges that the federal insurance programs are not profit-oriented, like private insurers. Nonetheless, a strategic analysis of the potential implications of climate change for the major federal insurance programs would help the Congress manage an emerging high-risk area with significant implications for the nation's growing long-term fiscal imbalance. Thu, 19 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades Are Potentially Significant, March 16, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07285.pdf Weather-related events have cost the nation billions of dollars in damages over the past decade. Many of these losses are borne by private insurers and by two federal insurance programs--the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which insures properties against flooding, and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which insures crops against drought or other weather disasters. GAO was asked to (1) describe how climate change may affect future weather-related losses, (2) determine past insured weather-related losses, and (3) determine what major private insurers and federal insurers are doing to prepare for potential increases in such losses. In response, among other things, GAO reviewed key scientific assessments; analyzed insured loss data; and contacted private insurers, NFIP, and FCIC. Key scientific assessments report that the effects of climate change on weather-related events and, subsequently, insured and uninsured losses, could be significant. The global average surface temperature has increased by 0.74 degrees Celsius over the past 100 years and climate models predict additional, perhaps accelerating, increases in temperature. The key assessments GAO reviewed generally found that rising temperatures are expected to increase the frequency and severity of damaging weather-related events, such as flooding or drought, although the timing and magnitude are as yet undetermined. Additional research on the effect of increasing temperatures on weather events is expected in the near future, including a highly anticipated assessment of the state of climate science this year. Taken together, private and federal insurers paid more than $320 billion in claims on weather-related losses from 1980 to 2005. Claims varied significantly from year to year--largely due to the effects of catastrophic weather events such as hurricanes and droughts--but have generally increased during this period. The growth in population in hazard-prone areas and resulting real estate development have generally increased liabilities for insurers, and have helped to explain the increase in losses. Due to these and other factors, federal insurers' exposure has grown substantially. Since 1980, NFIP's exposure quadrupled, nearing $1 trillion in 2005, and program expansion increased FCIC's exposure 26-fold to $44 billion. Major private and federal insurers are both exposed to the effects of climate change over coming decades, but are responding differently. Many large private insurers are incorporating climate change into their annual risk management practices, and some are addressing it strategically by assessing its potential long-term industry-wide impacts. The two major federal insurance programs, however, have done little to develop comparable information. GAO acknowledges that the federal insurance programs are not profit-oriented, like private insurers. Nonetheless, a strategic analysis of the potential implications of climate change for the major federal insurance programs would help the Congress manage an emerging high-risk area with significant implications for the nation's growing fiscal imbalance. Fri, 16 Mar 2007 00:00:00 -0400 Crude Oil: Uncertainty about Future Oil Supply Makes It Important to Develop a Strategy for Addressing a Peak and Decline in Oil Production, February 28, 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07283.pdf The U.S. economy depends heavily on oil, particularly in the transportation sector. World oil production has been running at near capacity to meet demand, pushing prices upward. Concerns about meeting increasing demand with finite resources have renewed interest in an old question: How long can the oil supply expand before reaching a maximum level of production--a peak--from which it can only decline? GAO (1) examined when oil production could peak, (2) assessed the potential for transportation technologies to mitigate the consequences of a peak in oil production, and (3) examined federal agency efforts that could reduce uncertainty about the timing of a peak or mitigate the consequences. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed studies, convened an expert panel, and consulted agency officials. Most studies estimate that oil production will peak sometime between now and 2040. This range of estimates is wide because the timing of the peak depends on multiple, uncertain factors that will help determine how quickly the oil remaining in the ground is used, including the amount of oil still in the ground; how much of that oil can ultimately be produced given technological, cost, and environmental challenges as well as potentially unfavorable political and investment conditions in some countries where oil is located; and future global demand for oil. Demand for oil will, in turn, be influenced by global economic growth and may be affected by government policies on the environment and climate change and consumer choices about conservation. In the United States, alternative fuels and transportation technologies face challenges that could impede their ability to mitigate the consequences of a peak and decline in oil production, unless sufficient time and effort are brought to bear. For example, although corn ethanol production is technically feasible, it is more expensive to produce than gasoline and will require costly investments in infrastructure, such as pipelines and storage tanks, before it can become widely available as a primary fuel. Key alternative technologies currently supply the equivalent of only about 1 percent of U.S. consumption of petroleum products, and the Department of Energy (DOE) projects that even by 2015, they could displace only the equivalent of 4 percent of projected U.S. annual consumption. In such circumstances, an imminent peak and sharp decline in oil production could cause a worldwide recession. If the peak is delayed, however, these technologies have a greater potential to mitigate the consequences. DOE projects that the technologies could displace up to 34 percent of U.S. consumption in the 2025 through 2030 time frame, if the challenges are met. The level of effort dedicated to overcoming challenges will depend in part on sustained high oil prices to encourage sufficient investment in and demand for alternatives. Federal agency efforts that could reduce uncertainty about the timing of peak oil production or mitigate its consequences are spread across multiple agencies and are generally not focused explicitly on peak oil. Federally sponsored studies have expressed concern over the potential for a peak, and agency officials have identified actions that could be taken to address this issue. For example, DOE and United States Geological Survey officials said uncertainty about the peak's timing could be reduced through better information about worldwide demand and supply, and agency officials said they could step up efforts to promote alternative fuels and transportation technologies. However, there is no coordinated federal strategy for reducing uncertainty about the peak's timing or mitigating its consequences. Wed, 28 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500 Climate Change: Federal Agencies Should Do More to Make Funding Reports Clearer and Encourage Progress on Two Voluntary Programs, September 27, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061126t.pdf The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports on federal funding for climate research and to develop technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, among other things. The Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), which coordinates many agencies' activities, also reports on science funding. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Climate Leaders and the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Climate VISION programs aim to reduce such emissions through voluntary industry efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2005 report Climate Change: Federal Reports on Climate Change Funding Should Be Clearer and More Complete (GAO-05-461) and its April 2006 report Climate Change: EPA and DOE Should Do More to Encourage Progress Under Two Voluntary Programs (GAO-06-97), which addressed (1) reported changes in federal climate change funding and (2) the status and progress of two federal voluntary climate programs. Federal funding for climate change, as reported by OMB, increased from $2.35 billion in 1993 to $5.09 billion in 2004 (117 percent), or from $3.28 billion to $5.09 billion (55 percent) after adjusting for inflation. OMB reports show that, during this period, funding increased for technology, science, and--before adjusting for inflation--international assistance. CCSP, which reports only science funding, generally presented totals that were consistent with OMB's, but provided more detail. However, changes in reporting methods used by both OMB and CCSP limit the comparability of funding data over time, and therefore it was unclear whether total funding actually increased as reported. Furthermore, we were unable to compare changes in the fourth category (climate-related tax expenditures), because from 1993 to 2004 OMB reported estimates for proposed but not existing tax expenditures. With regard to individual agencies' funding, OMB reported that 12 of the 14 agencies receiving funding for climate change programs in 2004 received more funding in that year than they had in 1993, but it is unclear whether funding changed as OMB reported because of unexplained changes in what was defined as climate change funding. Reported funding for DOE, the agency with the most reported climate-related funding in 2004, increased from $963 million to $2.52 billion (162 percent), or from $1.34 billion to $2.52 billion (88 percent) after adjusting for inflation. DOE and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration accounted for 81 percent of the reported increase in funding from 1993 through 2004. However, because agency funding totals are composed of individual accounts, changes in the reports' contents, such as the unexplained addition of accounts to the technology category, limit the comparability of agencies' funding data over time, making it difficult to determine if these are real or definitional increases. EPA and DOE expected participants in their voluntary climate programs to complete several program steps within general time frames, but participants' progress in completing those steps within the time frames was mixed. Furthermore, DOE did not have a system for tracking groups' progress in completing program steps, and neither DOE nor EPA had a written policy specifying the consequences for participants not proceeding as expected. In addition, EPA and DOE had both estimated the share of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions attributable to participants in their respective programs and were working through an interagency process to quantify emissions reductions attributable to their programs. However, determining reductions attributable to each program will be challenging because of the overlap between these programs and other voluntary programs and because it is difficult to determine how much of a participant's emissions reductions can be attributed to its participation in the program, since the participant's emissions in the absence of the program cannot be known. Wed, 27 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Greater Clarity and Consistency Are Needed in Reporting Federal Climate Change Funding, September 21, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061122t.pdf The Congress has required annual reports on federal climate change spending. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports funding for: technology (to reduce greenhouse gas emissions), science (to better understand the climate), international assistance (to help developing countries), and tax expenditures (to encourage emissions reduction). The Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), which coordinates many agencies' activities, also reports on science funding. This testimony is based on GAO's August 2005 report Climate Change: Federal Reports on Climate Change Should Be Clearer and More Complete (GAO-05-461). GAO examined federal climate change funding for 1993 through 2004, including (1) how total funding and funding by category changed and whether funding data are comparable over time and (2) how funding by individual agencies changed and whether funding data are comparable over time. According to OMB, from 1993 to 2004, federal funding for climate change increased from $3.3 billion to $5.1 billion (55 percent) after adjusting for inflation. During this period, reported inflation-adjusted funding increased for technology and science, but decreased for international assistance. However, it is unclear whether funding changed as much as reported because changes in the format and content of OMB and CCSP reports make it difficult to compare funding data over time. For example, over time, OMB expanded the definitions of some accounts to include more activities, but did not specify how it changed the definitions. OMB officials stated that it is not required to follow a consistent reporting format from year to year. Further, CCSP's science funding reports were difficult to compare over time because CCSP introduced new methods for categorizing funding without explaining how they related to previous methods. The Director of CCSP said that its reports changed as the program evolved. These and other limitations make it difficult to determine actual changes in climate change funding. Similarly, OMB reported that 12 of the 14 agencies that funded climate change programs in 2004 increased such funding between 1993 and 2004, but unexplained changes in the reports' contents limit the comparability of data on funding by agency. For example, reported funding for the Department of Energy (DOE), the agency with the most reported climate-related funding in 2004, increased from $1.34 billion to $2.52 billion (88 percent) after adjusting for inflation. DOE and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration accounted for 81 percent of the reported increase in funding from 1993 through 2004. However, because agency funding totals are composed of individual accounts, changes in the reports' contents, such as the unexplained addition of accounts to the technology category, make it difficult to compare agencies' funding data over time and, therefore, to determine if this is a real or a definitional increase. Furthermore, GAO found that OMB reported funding for certain agencies in some years but not in others, without explanation. OMB told GAO that it relied on agency budget offices to submit accurate data. These data and reporting limitations make determining agencies' actual levels of climate change funding difficult. Thu, 21 Sep 2006 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: EPA and DOE Should Do More to Encourage Progress Under Two Voluntary Programs, April 25, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0697.pdf To reduce greenhouse gas emissions linked to climate change, two voluntary programs encourage participants to set emissions reduction goals. The Climate Leaders Program, managed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), focuses on firms. The Climate VISION (Voluntary Innovative Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now) Program, managed by the Department of Energy (DOE) along with other agencies, focuses on trade groups. GAO examined (1) participants' progress in completing program steps, the agencies' procedures for tracking progress, and their policies for dealing with participants that are not progressing as expected; (2) the types of emissions reduction goals established by participants; and (3) the agencies' estimates of the share of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions that their programs account for and their estimates of the programs' impacts on U.S. emissions. EPA expects Climate Leaders firms to complete several program steps within general time frames, but firms' progress on completing those steps is mixed. For example, EPA asks firms to set an emissions reduction goal, generally within 2 years of joining. As of November 2005, 38 of the program's 74 participating firms had set a goal. Of the 36 firms that had not set a goal, 13 joined in 2002 and thus took longer than expected to set a goal. EPA is developing a system for tracking firms' progress in completing these steps, but it has no written policy on what to do about firms that are not progressing as expected. Trade groups generally established an emissions reduction goal before joining Climate VISION, and DOE generally expects them to develop a plan for measuring and reporting emissions within about 1 year of joining. As of November 2005, 11 of the 15 participating groups had such a plan, but 2 of the groups without a plan joined in 2003, the program's first year. DOE has no means of tracking trade groups' progress in completing the steps in their plans and no written policy on what to do about groups that are not progressing as expected. A tracking system would enable the agency to ascertain whether participants are meeting program expectations in a timely manner, thereby helping the program to achieve its goals. By establishing a written policy on the consequences of not progressing as expected, both agencies could better ensure that participants are actively engaged in the programs, thus helping to achieve the programs' goals. The types of emissions reduction goals established by Climate Leaders firms and Climate VISION groups vary in how reductions are measured and the time periods covered, among other things. For example, one Climate Leaders firm's goal is to reduce its domestic emissions by 5 percent over 10 years; another's is to reduce its worldwide emissions per dollar of revenue by 35 percent over 7 years. Similarly, one Climate VISION group's goal is to reduce emissions of one greenhouse gas by 10 percent, while another's is to reduce its emissions per unit of output by 12 percent. GAO noted that some Climate VISION groups said meeting their goals may be linked to reciprocal federal actions, such as tax incentives or regulatory relief. EPA officials estimated that the first 50 firms to join Climate Leaders account for at least 8 percent of U.S. greenhouse emissions. DOE estimated that Climate VISION participants account for at least 40 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. EPA and DOE are working through an interagency process to quantify the emissions reductions attributable to their programs; the process is expected to be completed in 2006. However, determining the reductions attributable to each program will be challenging because of the overlap between these programs and other voluntary programs, as well as other factors. Tue, 25 Apr 2006 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Federal Reports on Climate Change Funding Should Be Clearer and More Complete, August 25, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05461.pdf The Congress has required the administration to report annually on federal spending on climate change. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reports funding in four categories: technology (to reduce greenhouse gas emissions), science (to better understand the climate), international assistance (to help developing countries), and tax expenditures (to encourage reductions in emissions). The Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), which coordinates many agencies' activities, reports only on science. To measure funding, OMB and CCSP use budget authority, the authority provided in law to enter into financial obligations that will result in government outlays. GAO was asked to examine federal climate change funding for 1993 through 2004, as reported by both agencies, including (1) how total funding and funding by category changed and whether funding data are comparable over time and (2) how funding by agency changed and whether funding data are comparable over time. Federal funding for climate change increased from $2.4 billion in 1993 to $5.1 billion in 2004 (116 percent), as reported by OMB, or from $3.3 billion to $5.1 billion (55 percent) after adjusting for inflation. During this period, inflation-adjusted funding increased for technology and science, but decreased for international assistance. The share for technology increased (36 to 56 percent), while the shares for science and international assistance decreased (56 to 39 percent and 9 to 5 percent, respectively). However, it is unclear whether funding changed as much as reported because modifications in the format and content of OMB reports limit the comparability of funding data over time. For example, OMB reported that it expanded the definitions of some accounts to include more activities, but did not specify how it changed the definitions. Also, while OMB's totals for science funding were generally comparable to CCSP's totals, the more detailed data in CCSP reports were difficult to compare over time because CCSP introduced new categorization methods without explaining how they related to the previous methods. OMB officials stated that changes in their reports were due, in part, to the short timeline for completing them, and that it has not been required to follow a consistent reporting format from one year to the next. The Director of CCSP said that its reports changed as the program evolved. GAO was unable to compare climate-related tax expenditures over time because OMB reported data on proposed, but not on existing tax expenditures. For example, while OMB reported no funding for existing climate-related tax expenditures in 2004, GAO identified four such tax expenditures in 2004, including revenue loss estimates of $330 million to develop certain renewable energy sources. OMB reported that 12 of the 14 agencies that funded climate change programs in 2004 increased such funding between 1993 and 2004, but unexplained changes in the reports' contents limit the comparability of data on funding by agency. GAO found that OMB reported funding for certain agencies in some years but not in others, without explanation. For example, OMB reported funding of $83 million for the Department of Defense in 2003, but did not list any such funding in prior reports. OMB told GAO that it relied on agency budget offices to submit accurate data. Thu, 25 Aug 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change Assessment: Administration Did Not Meet Reporting Deadline, April 14, 2005 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05338r.pdf For many years, scientists have observed a warming trend in the earth's climate and have projected additional changes in the coming decades, with potential implications for human society. To provide for the development and coordination of a comprehensive and integrated U.S. research program that will assist the nation and the world in understanding, assessing, predicting, and responding to such changes, the Congress, in the Global Change Research Act of 1990 (act), required the administration to, among other things, prepare a national global change research plan, a summary of the achievements and expenditures in the area of federal climate change research, and a scientific assessment. The scientific assessment is to be prepared at least every 4 years and is to: (1) integrate, evaluate, and interpret research findings on climate change of the Global Change Research Program (implemented under the Global Change Research Plan) and scientific uncertainties associated with such findings; (2) analyze the effects of global change on the natural environment, human health and welfare, and other specified areas; and (3) analyze current trends in global change and project major trends for the next 25 to 100 years. In 2002, the President announced the creation of the interagency Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) to coordinate and direct U.S. research efforts in the area of climate change. CCSP is now responsible for producing and submitting the climate change assessment and is led by the Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere at the Department of Commerce. In July 2003, CCSP's strategic plan was transmitted to the Congress. The strategic plan contained a schedule for preparing the next assessment by publishing 21 reports, each focusing on a specific topic. Congress asked us to evaluate the extent to which CCSP's planned assessment meets the requirements of the act regarding the timing and content of such an assessment. CCSP did not submit a scientific assessment in November 2004, 4 years after the previous assessment, as required by the act. Instead, CCSP's July 2003 schedule called for issuing 21 shorter reports between 2005 and 2007. According to that schedule, the first 9 reports are due on or before September 30, 2005, and the other 12 are due on or before September 30, 2007. Thus, by the time the last of these reports is published, about 7 years will have elapsed since the publication of the 2000 report--nearly twice the interval specified in the act. Further, the CCSP Director told us that he was not certain that even the first 9 reports would be published in accordance with this planned schedule. It is unclear how the 21 reports proposed in CCSP's July 2003 strategic plan will address all three of the components of the assessment required under the act. The planned report topics generally appear to focus on either of these components: (1) the evaluation and interpretation of research findings on climate change and associated scientific uncertainties or (2) the analysis of current trends in global change and projection of major trends. However, CCSP has no comparable explicit plan for addressing the other major required component, assessing the effects of global change on the eight areas enumerated in the act: the natural environment, agriculture, energy production and use, land and water resources, transportation, human health and welfare, human social systems, and biological diversity. Thu, 14 Apr 2005 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Analysis of Two Studies of Estimated Costs of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol, January 30, 2004 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04144r.pdf In 1992 the United States ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was intended to stabilize the buildup of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere but did not impose binding limits on emissions. In July 1997, when preliminary negotiations on a new climate agreement were under way, the Senate passed a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Clinton administration should not agree to limits on U.S. greenhouse gas emissions if such an agreement did not include economically developing nations or if it could seriously harm the U.S. economy. In December 1997 the United States participated in drafting the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement to specifically limit greenhouse gas emissions. The Protocol did not impose limits on developing nations' emissions, and its possible effect on the U.S. economy was the subject of numerous studies during that period, including the two studies that are the subject of this report. Although the U.S. government signed the Protocol in 1998, the Clinton administration did not submit it to the Senate for advice and consent, which are necessary for ratification. In March 2001, President Bush announced that he opposed the Protocol. At a July 2002 hearing on the administration's climate initiative, the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) testified that implementing the Kyoto Protocol would reduce U.S. economic output by "up to $400 billion" in 2010. This estimate is similar to a $397 billion estimate that appeared in a 1998 report by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), an independent statistical and analytical agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. The EIA estimate differed from another, well-publicized estimate prepared the same year by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), which found that the costs of implementing the Protocol could be as little as $7 billion to $12 billion a year in economic output, depending on the extent of international emissions trading allowed and the participation of developing countries. Congress asked us to identify likely reasons for the differences between the two cited cost estimates ($397 billion from EIA and $7 billion to $12 billion by CEA), based on (1) the economic models used to prepare these estimates and (2) the assumptions incorporated into these models, including economic assumptions and assumptions about how the Protocol would be implemented. Two likely reasons why the cost estimates differed based on the economic models are that (1) the models focus on different time periods, with different assumptions about how the economy adjusts to new policies, and (2) they measure costs differently. CEA used a type of model that typically focuses on longer time periods and generally assumes that the economy adjusts smoothly to new policies over the longer-term, while EIA used a type of model that typically focuses on a more immediate time period and highlights the near-term costs of economic adjustments (such as unemployment). The different types of models produce different types of cost estimates; EIA's model used a more comprehensive cost measure than CEA's model and was thus able to capture certain costs that CEA's model could not capture. It was likely that EIA's cited cost estimate would be higher than CEA's estimate because of two assumptions the agencies made about the U.S. economy and about the Protocol's operations. First, the cited EIA estimate assumed that all reductions would be achieved domestically, while the cited CEA estimate allowed for the purchase of emissions reductions from other nations. Second, the economic growth rate assumed by EIA (2.3 percent a year for 1995 through 2010) was higher than the growth rate assumed by CEA (2.1 percent for the same time period). A higher growth rate results in more growth in emissions and would require larger reductions to reach an emissions target. In testifying that implementing the Kyoto Protocol "would have cost our economy up to $400 billion" in 2010, the CEQ Chairman was relying on the highest of six cost estimates prepared by EIA. This scenario would have required reductions in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to 7 percent below the 1990 level--the most restrictive of the six EIA estimates. Following the hearing, the Chairman noted that certain provisions in the Kyoto Protocol could require smaller reductions (specifically, to 4 percent below the 1990 level), but he did not cite a cost estimate corresponding to this smaller reduction. Fri, 30 Jan 2004 00:00:00 -0500 Climate Change: Selected Nations' Reports on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Varied in Their Adherence to Standards, December 23, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0498.pdf In 1992, the United States and other parties, including both developed and developing nations, agreed to try to limit dangerous human interference with the climate by participating in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The parties agreed, among other things, to report on their emissions of carbon dioxide and five other gases whose buildup in the atmosphere is believed to affect the climate. The parties developed standards for these reports and processes for periodically evaluating the reports. Expert teams selected by the parties review the developed nations' reports; staff of the Framework Convention's administrative arm (the Secretariat) assess developing nations' reports. GAO agreed to describe the results of the most recent reviews and assessments of reports from selected economically developed and developing nations, as well as the parties' plans to improve the reports. For the developed nations, GAO agreed to study four geographically dispersed nations with high levels of emissions--Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For the developing nations, GAO studied China, India, and Mexico, which also have high emissions levels and are geographically dispersed. These nations are not representative of others; therefore, GAO's findings cannot be generalized. In their most recent reviews, expert teams found that the United Kingdom's 2000 and 2002 reports on greenhouse gas emissions and the United States's 2000 report were largely complete, although the teams noted minor findings, such as the lack of information on quality assurance methods, which the nations were encouraged, but not required, to include in their submissions. In contrast, they found that Germany's 2001 and Japan's 2000 reports lacked critical elements, such as the required documentation that was essential to understanding them. Preliminary checks found that all four nations' 2003 reports were largely complete. Secretariat staff have not assessed inventories from China and India because these nations have not submitted them. According to Secretariat records, China and India plan to submit inventories in February 2004 and November 2003, respectively. Secretariat staff assessed Mexico's most recent inventory, but they reported few details about it because their policy is to consolidate the findings of all the developing nations' inventories submitted during a year. To improve the inventories, the parties are changing the reporting standards and review process. For example, starting in 2004, developed nations must present their inventory reports in a standardized format to facilitate review, and developing nations must report data for more years and gases than before. Also, in 2003, the parties began conducting more rigorous reviews of developed nations' inventories, but no such changes for developing nations are planned. Tue, 23 Dec 2003 00:00:00 -0500 Climate Change: Trends in Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Emissions Intensity in the United States and Other High-Emitting Nations, October 28, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04146r.pdf In February 2002, the President reaffirmed a previous U.S. commitment to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases at a level designed to prevent dangerous human interference with the earth's climate. At the same time, he announced a Global Climate Change Initiative to reduce the rate of increase of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States between 2002 and 2012. Specifically, he established the goal of reducing the "emissions intensity" of the U.S. economy by 18 percent, a reduction 4 percentage points greater than would be expected absent any new policy. Congress asked us to describe how U.S. emissions and emissions intensity compare to the world's other highest emitters. Specifically, this report focuses on (1) how greenhouse gas emissions and the emissions intensity of the United States and the nine nations with the next-highest emissions changed from 1980 to 2000, (2) how such emissions and the emissions intensities of the same nations are expected to change between 2001 and 2025, and (3) how meeting the administration's goal of reducing emissions intensity by 18 percent would affect cumulative U.S. emissions between 2002 and 2012. Between 1980 and 2000, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions increased in the United States and six of the other nine highest-emitting nations. Emissions increased 22.5 percent in the United States, while the largest increase occurred in South Korea (231.4 percent). Emissions decreased in the United Kingdom (10.1 percent), France (19.9 percent), and Germany (22.3 percent). During the same period, emissions intensities fell in the United States (34.7 percent) and the other nations reviewed except India. The decrease was the smallest in Italy (19.6 percent) and the greatest in China (68.9 percent). In India, emissions intensity increased slightly but was essentially stable. Between 2001 and 2025, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are expected to increase in all 10 nations. U.S. emissions are projected to rise 43.5 percent, not counting any reductions from the administration's initiative. The smallest increase is expected in Germany (15.2 percent), and the largest increase is expected in China (121.6 percent). During the same period, emissions intensities are expected to decrease in all 10 nations. In the United States, the expected decrease is 30.1 percent. Decreases in intensities are expected to be smallest in Japan (20.8 percent) and largest in China (47.6 percent). If the administration's goal of reducing U.S. emissions intensity by 18 percent between 2002 and 2012 is met, cumulative emissions for that 11-year period would be about 500 million metric tons of carbon equivalent lower than the 23,162 million metric tons that would otherwise be expected, according to an EIA projection. Specifically, achieving the administration's goal would limit emissions to no more than 22,662 million metric tons--2 percent below the level that would otherwise be expected over the period. Tue, 28 Oct 2003 00:00:00 -0500 Climate Change: Preliminary Observations on the Administration's February 2002 Climate Initiative, October 1, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04131t.pdf In 2002, the Administration announced its Global Climate Change Initiative. It included, among other things, a goal concerning U.S. carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions, which are widely believed to affect the earth's climate. The Administration's general goal was to reduce the growth rate of emissions, but not total emissions, between 2002 and 2012. Its specific goal was to reduce emissions intensity 18 percent, 4 percentage points more than the 14 percent decline already expected. Emissions intensity measures the amount of greenhouse gases emitted per unit of economic output. In the United States, this ratio has generally decreased for 50 years or more. Under the Initiative, emissions would increase, but less than otherwise expected. GAO was asked to testify on whether the Administration's publicly available documents (1) explain the basis for the Initiative's general and specific goals, (2) identify elements to help reduce emissions and contribute to the 18 percent reduction goal, as well as their specific contributions, and (3) discuss plans to track progress in meeting the goal. This testimony is based on ongoing work, and GAO expects to issue a final report on this work later this year. Because of time constraints, GAO's testimony is based on its analysis of publicly available Administration documents. The Administration stated that the Initiative's general goal is to slow the growth of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, but it did not provide a basis for its specific goal of reducing emissions intensity 18 percent by 2012. Any reduction in emissions above the 14-percent reduction already anticipated would contribute to this general goal. However, GAO did not find a specific basis or rationale for the Administration's decision to establish a 4-percentage-point reduction goal beyond the already expected reductions. The Administration identified 30 elements that it expected would reduce U.S. emissions and contribute to meeting its 18 percent reduction goal by 2012. The 30 elements include a range of policy tools (such as regulations, research and development, tax incentives, and other activities) that cover four broad areas: (1) improving renewable energy and certain industrial power systems, (2) improving fuel economy, (3) promoting domestic carbon sequestration (for example, the absorption of carbon dioxide by trees to offset emissions), and (4) challenging business to reduce emissions. GAO found that the Administration provided estimates of the reductions associated with 11 of the 30 elements, but not with the remaining 19 elements. Of these 11 estimates, GAO found that 3 estimates represented future emissions reductions related to activities that occurred after the Initiative was announced. However, the other 8 estimates represented past or current emissions reductions or related to activities that were already underway before the Initiative was announced. Specifically, in five cases, an estimate is provided for current or recent reductions, but no information is provided about the expected additional savings to be achieved by 2012, the end of the Initiative. In two cases, the elements are expected to yield savings over many years, but it is not clear what emissions reductions will be achieved by 2012. In one case, savings are counted for an activity that began prior to the announcement of the Initiative. It is, therefore, unclear to what extent the 30 elements will contribute to the goal of reducing emissions and, thus, lowering emissions intensity by 2012. The Administration plans to determine, in 2012, whether the 18-percent reduction goal was met. Unless the Administration conducts one or more interim assessments, it will not be in a position to determine, until a decade after announcing the Initiative, whether its efforts are having the intended effect or whether additional efforts may be warranted. Wed, 01 Oct 2003 00:00:00 -0400 Freshwater Supply: States' View of How Federal Agencies Could Help Them Meet the Challenges of Expected Shortages, July 9, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03514.pdf The widespread drought conditions of 2002 focused attention on a critical national challenge: ensuring a sufficient freshwater supply to sustain quality of life and economic growth. States have primary responsibility for managing the allocation and use of water resources, but multiple federal agencies also play a role. For example, Interior's Bureau of Reclamation operates numerous water storage facilities, and the U.S. Geological Survey collects important surface and ground-water information. GAO was asked to determine the current conditions and future trends for U.S. water availability and use, the likelihood of shortages and their potential consequences, and states' views on how federal activities could better support state water management efforts to meet future demands. For this review, GAO conducted a web-based survey of water managers in the 50 states and received responses from 47 states; California, Michigan, and New Mexico did not participate. National water availability and use has not been comprehensively assessed in 25 years, but current trends indicate that demands on the nation's supplies are growing. In particular, the nation's capacity for storing surface-water is limited and ground-water is being depleted. At the same time, growing population and pressures to keep water instream for fisheries and the environment place new demands on the freshwater supply. The potential effects of climate change also create uncertainty about future water availability and use. State water managers expect freshwater shortages in the near future, and the consequences may be severe. Even under normal conditions, water managers in 36 states anticipate shortages in localities, regions, or statewide in the next 10 years. Drought conditions will exacerbate shortage impacts. When water shortages occur, economic impacts to sectors such as agriculture can be in the billions of dollars. Water shortages also harm the environment. For example, diminished flows reduced the Florida Everglades to half its original size. Finally, water shortages cause social discord when users compete for limited supplies. State water managers ranked federal actions that could best help states meet their water resource needs. They preferred: (1) financial assistance to increase storage and distribution capacity; (2) water data from more locations; (3) more flexibility in complying with or administering federal environmental laws; (4) better coordinated federal participation in water-management agreements; and (5) more consultation with states on federal or tribal use of water rights. Federal officials identified agency activities that support state preferences. While not making recommendations, GAO encourages federal officials to review the results of our state survey and consider opportunities to better support state water management efforts. We provided copies of this report to the seven departments and agencies discussed within. They concurred with our findings and provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. Wed, 09 Jul 2003 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Information on Three Air Pollutants' Climate Effects and Emissions Trends, April 28, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0325.pdf Solar radiation is absorbed by the earth and is subsequently reemitted. The buildup of carbon dioxide and certain other gases in the earth's atmosphere traps some of that radiation. This is known as the greenhouse effect and is believed to contribute to a warming of the earth's climate. Concerns are growing that, in addition to carbon dioxide and other conventional greenhouse gases, certain air pollutants may affect the climate. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent of agreement among scientists regarding the effect on the climate of three air pollutants--black carbon (soot), ground-level ozone, and sulfate aerosols--and (2) seven countries' efforts to control these pollutants, trends in these substances in these countries over the past 2 decades, and estimates for the next decade. GAO was also asked to summarize the relationship between economic growth and environmental pollution. The seven countries include four that are economically developed--Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States--and three that are developing--China, India, and Mexico. These countries were chosen because they have large economies with a high potential to emit these pollutants. The two federal agencies asked to comment generally agreed with the information presented in this report. Scientists generally agree that sulfate aerosols have a cooling effect on climate, while ozone in the lower atmosphere has a warming effect. Black carbon tends to warm the atmosphere but cool the earth's surface. Sulfate aerosols also affect how much and where it rains. Considerable uncertainty remains about the size of these effects. All seven countries are taking steps to reduce the amounts of the three pollutants. The four economically developed countries have well-established efforts underway. In these countries, the amounts of the three substances generally declined over the last 2 decades and are expected to decline over the next decade. In contrast, the three developing countries' efforts are less well established. In these countries, the amounts of the three substances generally increased during the years for which information is available. GAO found few projections for these three countries. An extensive body of research has examined the possible connection between economic development and environmental pollution, but the results of this research are inconclusive. Researchers also caution that economic growth by itself may help support environmental improvements but is not, by itself, sufficient to ensure them. Mon, 28 Apr 2003 00:00:00 -0400 International Environment: U.S. Actions to Fulfill Committments Under Five Key Agreements, January 29, 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03249.pdf Environmental problems do not respect national boundaries. These problems include (1) climate change, (2) drought and the expansion of degraded land, (3) environmental cooperation among the countries of North America, (4) illegal trade in endangered species, and (5) substances that deplete the earth's protective ozone layer. To address such problems, the United States and other nations have entered into numerous international environmental agreements. In implementing these agreements, the parties typically commit to establish domestic programs and report periodically on their progress. Developed nations like the United States may also pledge to provide funds to assist developing nations. GAO was asked to examine (1) U.S. actions to fulfill its commitments under five international agreements identified by the requesters, (2) the means used to track these actions, and (3) the results of others' evaluations of these actions for the selected agreements. The United States is generally taking actions to meet its commitments under the five specified agreements. Federal agencies established domestic programs, reported periodically on progress, and provided funding to other nations. For example, the United States committed to stop producing and importing certain substances that deplete the earth's ozone layer by 1996 and did so. Although the United States did not make a treaty commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the President set a goal in 1993 to reduce emissions to their 1990 level by 2000 and the United States spends over $1 billion a year to do so. However, U.S. emissions in 2001 exceeded the 1990 target level by about 12 percent. GAO also found that, while the United States provided $1.4 billion between fiscal years 1991 and 2002 to assist other countries in addressing their environmental problems related to three agreements, it provided less than it pledged relating to two agreements. Specifically, the shortfall was 25 percent for the fund that finances climate change and other environmental projects and 6 percent for ozone depletion. Federal agencies generally use informal means, such as meetings and informal communications, to track their actions to fulfill commitments under the five agreements. Officials at the Department of State and other agencies said informal means are effective and cost less than establishing a formal tracking system. The few studies that evaluated the effectiveness of U.S. actions concluded that the actions had positive effects on the environment. The agencies involved generally agreed with the facts presented in this report. Wed, 29 Jan 2003 00:00:00 -0500 International Environment: U.S. Actions to Fulfill Commitments Under Five Key Agreements, July 24, 2002 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02960t.pdf The United States is bound by five international environmental agreements related to climate change (Framework Convention), desertification (Desertification Convention), the earth's ozone layer (Montreal Protocol), endangered species (CITES), and North American environmental cooperation (North American Agreement). However, the United States fell short of meeting a commitment or pledge in two areas--providing financial assistance to other nations and timely reporting. Agencies use informal means, such as meetings and informal communications, to track their actions to fulfill commitments under the five agreements. GAO found few studies that evaluated the effectiveness of the U.S. actions. These few studies generally concluded that the actions examined had positive effects. Wed, 24 Jul 2002 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Observations on EPA's March 2000 Climate Change Report, June 5, 2000 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rc00166r.pdf Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) March 2000 climate change report, focusing on: (1) the agency's climate change programs for fiscal year (FY) 2001; (2) the programs' goals, strategies, and procedures to verify and validate performance information; (3) EPA's justification for requested funding increases; and (4) how the programs are justified independently of the Kyoto Protocol agreement. GAO noted that: (1) EPA's March 2000 report on its climate change activities is generally comprehensive and explains the activities for which EPA is seeking $258 million for FY 2001; (2) the report explains how the many individual programs relate to broader program groups and still-broader sectors and areas; (3) EPA's report generally includes all of the major sectors and areas included in EPA's FY 2001 budget justification for its climate change activities; (4) moreover, the report includes a table that shows how the 26 individual programs relate to 8 program groups and how the 8 program groups relate to 3 key sectors and 5 other broad areas; (5) EPA's report uses reductions in greenhouse gas emissions as the principal yardstick for measuring the success of its climate change efforts; (6) the report provides more information about the efforts to verify and validate the programs' performance, but it provides little information at the individual program level on goals and objectives; (7) the report provides information on 2 ongoing studies that are designed to validate the specific benefits attributable to EPA's programs; (8) EPA's report provides a justification for the requested $125.8 million increase in funding for its climate change activities overall as well as the funding increases requested for all 3 key sectors and 4 of the 5 broad areas; (9) the report provides information on the incremental benefits expected to be achieved from an increase in funding for those activities that are aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions; (10) the report also provides information on additional activities expected to result from full funding; (11) the report does not specify funding levels or expected benefits at the individual program level; (12) EPA's report explains that its climate change activities are legally justified by long-standing agency goals and objectives and are not intended to implement the Kyoto Protocol; and (13) specifically, the report explains that these activities are justified by an international convention on climate change that was ratified by the Senate in 1992 and by 9 specific environmental laws. Mon, 05 Jun 2000 00:00:00 -0400 Aviation and the Environment: Aviation's Effects on the Global Atmosphere Are Potentially Significant and Expected to Grow, February 18, 2000 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rc00057.pdf Aviation emissions are a potentially significant and growing percentage of greenhouse gases and other emissions that are thought to contribute to global warming. Aircraft emissions are potentially significant for several reasons. First, jet aircraft are the main source of human emissions deposited directly into the upper atmosphere, where they may have a greater warming effect than if they were released at the earth's surface. Second, carbon dioxide--the primary aircraft emission--is relatively well understood and is the main focus of international concern. For example, it survives in the atmosphere for nearly 100 years and contributes to global warming, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The carbon dioxide emissions from worldwide aviation roughly equal those of some industrialized countries. Third, carbon dioxide emissions, combined with other gases and particles emitted by jet aircraft, could have two to four times as great an effect on the atmosphere as carbon dioxide alone. Fourth, the Intergovernmental Panel recently concluded that the rise in aviation emissions due to growing demand for air travel would not be fully offset by reductions in emissions achieved solely through technological improvements. Experts GAO interviewed, as well as the report of the Intergovernmental Panel, have cited several options for better understanding and mitigating the impact of aviation as the industry grows. These options include (1) continuing research to improve the scientific understanding of aviation's effects on the global atmosphere as a basis for guiding the development of aircraft and engine technology to reduce them, (2) promoting more efficient air traffic operations through the introduction of new technologies and procedures, and (3) expanding the use of regulatory and economic measures to encourage reductions in emissions. Fri, 18 Feb 2000 00:00:00 -0500 International Environment: Experts' Observations on Enhancing Compliance With a Climate Change Agreement, August 23, 1999 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99248.pdf Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed nations--such as the United States, France, and Japan--have pledged to limit their emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases between 2008 and 2012. If the U.S. Senate approves the protocol, the United States would have to significantly reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. Ratification has been much debated. Two main concerns are the cost of complying with the protocol and the possibility that U.S. businesses that invest in reducing their emissions may have to raise the price of their goods, making them less competitive with goods produced by nations that do not limit their emissions. GAO convened a panel of nine experts--from the federal government, industry, academia, and environmental groups--to identify issues that could enhance compliance with the protocol or any climate change agreement. This report presents the results of the panel's discussions. GAO focuses on the following three issues that could influence compliance with the protocol or other international environmental agreements on climate change: (1) the clarity of the goals and procedures, (2) the use of incentives that encourage compliance to supplement punitive measures to punish noncompliance, and (3) the role of environmental and industry groups. Mon, 23 Aug 1999 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Observations on EPA's April 1999 Climate Change Report, July 14, 1999 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/162456.pdf Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Climate Change Report, which was submitted to the Senate Committee on Appropriations in April 1999, focusing on the extent to which it: (1) provides a comprehensive explanation of the agency's climate change programs for fiscal year (FY) 2000; (2) justifies requested increases in funding for that fiscal year; (3) explains how the climate change activities are justified independently of the Kyoto Protocol; and (4) includes performance measures and goals and similar elements, as would be required by the Government Performance and Results Act. GAO noted that: (1) EPA's report on its climate change programs is not comprehensive and provides little information about its programs' funding and expected results; (2) the report covers seven of the nine broad initiatives listed in EPA's FY 2000 budget justification for climate change programs, which account for about $240 million; (3) the report does not discuss two broad initiatives, which account for about $23 million, or about 10 percent, of EPA's total request for climate change programs; (4) according to an agency official, EPA understood the Committee's directive as relating only to programs that are part of the Climate Change Technology Initiative and omitted the two broad initiatives that are not part of the technology initiative; (5) whereas the directive was linked to the technology initiative, the colloquy called for a comprehensive explanation of the agency's programs; (6) GAO read the colloquy as seeking information on all of the agency's climate change programs, not just those that are part of the technology initiative; (7) the report generally provides data on funding and expected results only for the broad initiatives but does not explain how the individual programs that make up the initiatives will contribute to the initiatives' expected results; (8) although EPA was directed in the colloquy to issue the report by the time it submitted its FY 2000 budget justification, the report was not issued until April 8, 1999, about 2 months late; (9) EPA's report does not provide justifications for the proposed funding increases for individual climate change programs for FY 2000; (10) instead, it provides justifications only for the total funding level requested, and this for only four of the six initiatives for which an increase was requested; (11) for the other two of the six initiatives for which an increase was requested, the report does not provide estimates of the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions expected to result from the combined requested increase of $13.8 million or explain why there are no such estimates; (12) EPA's report explains that its climate change activities are justified by long-standing agency goals and objectives and are not intended to implement the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol; (13) the report explains that these activities are justified by an international convention on climate change that was ratified by the Senate in 1992 and by seven specific environmental laws that EPA implements; and (14) EPA's report includes information on performance measures and goals and related information, which is similar to the information required by the Results Act. Wed, 14 Jul 1999 00:00:00 -0400 International Environment: Information on Global Environment Facility's Funding and Projects, June 15, 1999 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99149.pdf The Global Environment Facility was established in 1991 to help address climate change, threats to biodiversity, and other environmental problems. The facility is funded by the United States and other countries and provides funds for projects in developing nations to help protect the global environment. This report provides information on the facility's funding and activities. Tue, 15 Jun 1999 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Observations on the April 1999 Report on Climate Change Programs, May 20, 1999 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99199t.pdf Climate change policy has been a key congressional concern recently, focusing especially on the Kyoto Protocol, which the United States and 37 other countries agreed to in principle in December 1997. Under the protocol, the United States agreed to substantially reduce its greenhouse gas emissions during the five-year period beginning in 2008. This testimony discusses activities relating to climate change programs and congressional requests for information on (1) the administration's April 20, 1999, report on federal expenditures for climate change activities and (2) a limitation that was designed to prevent the agency from taking specified regulatory actions to implement the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. Thu, 20 May 1999 00:00:00 -0400 International Environment: Literature on the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, May 1, 1999 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99148.pdf In December 1997, the United States and 37 other nations adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. They agreed in principle to significantly reduce their future greenhouse gas emissions. The advice of and consent of the Senate would be needed to commit the United States to the emissions reductions. Whether the Senate should take that step has been widely debated, mainly because the reductions could be costly to the U.S. economy and their effectiveness in addressing the problem of global climate change has been questioned. GAO convened a panel of experts in December 1998 to discuss the issues surrounding the Kyoto Protocol. GAO also prepared a background paper on ensuring compliance with international environmental agreements. GAO is publishing that background paper as a staff study. Sat, 01 May 1999 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Basic Issues in Considering a Credit for Early Action Program, November 27, 1998 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99023.pdf Under the Voluntary Reporting Program, as directed by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, organizations could voluntarily submit information on their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the Department of Energy (DOE) and have that information entered into a public database. DOE specifically designed the program to encourage voluntary participation by offering potential participants flexibility in what they reported and how they estimated their emissions reductions. This report answers the following questions: (1) What are some of the basic issues that will have to be addressed by any effort to develop a credit for early action program? (2) How might claims for reductions of greenhouse gas emissions that are reported to the Voluntary Reporting Program fare under a credit for early action program that has less flexible reporting criteria? GAO also discusses other issues about a credit for early action program that may need to be addressed before the program can be finalized. Fri, 27 Nov 1998 00:00:00 -0500 Environmental Protection: EPA's Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request, September 29, 1998 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/161230.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the underlying support for the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) requested fiscal year (FY) 1999 budget increases for the Superfund, climate change, and Environmental Monitoring for Public Access and Community Tracking (EMPACT) programs, focusing on whether: (1) supporting documentation existed for the requested budgetary increases; and (2) the supporting documentation establishes a clear link between the increased funding and the results that EPA anticipates for the three programs. GAO noted that: (1) the supporting material for EPA's FY 1999 budget for the Superfund, climate change, and EMPACT programs does not establish a clear link between the requested increased funding and the results--more Superfund cleanups, lower emissions of greenhouse gases, and better community access to environmental risk information--that EPA anticipates for the three programs; (2) for the Superfund program, EPA's requested increase of $586.4 million was to meet the estimated cost of cleaning up 136 additional sites during FY 1999; (3) planning data that EPA considers to be primary budgetary support addresses only 114 of the 136 sites that EPA states it will clean up during FY 1999; (4) in fact, not all of the 114 sites were ready for cleanup when EPA submitted its FY 1999 budget request; (5) furthermore, EPA did not designate 136 specific sites but, rather, estimated that 136 (out of 900 candidate sites) would be cleaned up; (6) because an unknown portion of these sites will be cleaned up at the expense of parties other than EPA, the link between the requested budget increase and the 136 additional sites to be cleaned up is uncertain; (7) for the climate change programs, EPA estimated that its requested increase of $85.6 million would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40 million metric tons of carbon equivalent annually; (8) however, EPA has not identified the net impact of the Green Lights and Energy Star Buildings programs on emissions reductions; (9) other factors, independent of EPA's climate change programs, may also affect the annual levels of greenhouse gas emissions; (10) consequently, the supporting material does not establish a clear link between the requested increase and the anticipated results; (11) for the EMPACT program, EPA requested an increase of $19 million to improve the dissemination of information on pollutants at the local level; and (12) however, EPA could not furnish documentation supporting the program's anticipated milestones, criteria for monitoring and evaluating the program's performance, or the program offices' spending plans. Tue, 29 Sep 1998 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Information on Limitations and Assumptions of DOE's Five-Lab Study, September 8, 1998 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98239.pdf Human activities, primarily those involving energy production and use, are increasing the concentrations of carbon dioxide and other "greenhouse gases" in the atmosphere. These heat-trapping gases are believed to contribute to global warming. To address the possible consequences of climate change, the United States has entered into international negotiations and agreements, the most recent of which is the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which calls for reductions in U.S. greenhouse gases. Before the Kyoto Conference, a September 1997 study by five Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories quantified the potential for energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies to reduce U.S. carbon emissions to 1990 levels by 2010. The study concluded that an aggressive national commitment to these technologies, coupled with an increase in the price of carbon-based fuels of $50 per metric ton, could reduce carbon emissions to 1990 levels, with energy savings estimated to roughly equal or exceed costs. This report discusses (1) how the study's scope and methodology may limit its usefulness, (2) key assumptions that may have influenced the study's results, and (3) the study's role in the formulation of the administration's October 1997 climate change proposal and the Kyoto Conference's emission-reduction goals for the United States. Tue, 08 Sep 1998 00:00:00 -0400 Climate Change: Information on the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, June 29, 1998 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98154.pdf In 1994, the United States established a pilot program, the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, to evaluate different approaches to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by using a concept that allows a developed country to meet at least part of its obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by receiving credit for investing in a project that reduces emissions in another country. This program encourages investments by U.S. entities (largely private sector firms) in projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions outside the United States. Under the Initiative, U.S. entities, in cooperation with non-U.S. partners, develop project proposals and submit them to the Initiative for review and evaluation to determine which projects will be accepted into the program. This report provides information on the criteria used to accept proposed projects, the number and the types of projects accepted, the status of the seven projects accepted in the first round of proposals in February 1995, and the estimated benefits of pilot projects in terms of emissions reductions. Mon, 29 Jun 1998 00:00:00 -0400 Global Warming: Administration's Proposal in Support of the Kyoto Protocol, June 4, 1998 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/rc97219t.pdf The President announced a three-stage proposal on climate change in October 1997 in anticipation of an international agreement to be negotiated two months later in Kyoto, Japan. He listed voluntary measures to be taken during the next five years (stage 1) to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by stimulating the development and use of energy-efficient products and technologies. The administration proposes to increase spending for climate change by $6.3 billion during this period. The agreement, known as the Kyoto Protocol, was negotiated in December 1997 by the United States and other nations. It must be signed by the President and ratified by the Senate before its provisions apply to the United States. To comply with the Kyoto Protocol, the United States will need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about 31 percent by 2010, according to the Department of Energy. This testimony answers the following questions: (1) Does the administration have an overall goal for stage 1 and a plan to achieve that goal? (2) If funded, to what extent will the $6.3 billion stage one climate change proposal help the United States meet the protocol's emissions target? (3) What are the implications for the United States if the Senate ratifies the protocol, given the current status of the administration's efforts to implement the climate change proposal. Thu, 04 Jun 1998 00:00:00 -0400 Department of Energy: Proposed Budget in Support of the President's Climate Change Technology Initiative, April 10, 1998 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98147.pdf In his State of the Union address, the President noted that the United States has agreed with other nations to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions through market forces, new technologies, and energy efficiency. The President has proposed spending $6.3 billion during the next five years for the Climate Change Technology Initiative, which would fund research and development and the deployment of new technologies to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere. The Energy Department (DOE) is expected to undertake most of this initiative. This report provides (1) information on how DOE plans to alter its climate change research and development spending from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 1999 and (2) GAO's observations on funding for research and development. Fri, 10 Apr 1998 00:00:00 -0400 Federal Workforce: Agencies' Policies and Views on Flexiplace in the Federal Government, July 3, 1997 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97116.pdf On the basis of a pilot project that tested flexiplace among more than 500 workers at 13 federal agencies, a January 1993 report from the Office of Personnel Management and the General Services Administration concluded that flexiplace provided significant benefits to participants, worked well with employees who were proven performers, and was ready for governmentwide implementation. GAO reviewed the implementation of flexiplace since completion of the pilot project. This report (1) describes federal efforts to promote flexiplace; (2) reviews federal agencies' policies and the extent to which they permit flexiplace; (3) determines the extent to which federal workers have used flexiplace, as well as the characteristics of these individuals and the work they have done under flexiplace; (4) ascertains whether agencies and federal employees' unions have identified any barriers to flexiplace implementation; and (5) determines whether agencies believe that flexiplace has caused operational difficulties, including abuse of flexiplace. Thu, 03 Jul 1997 00:00:00 -0400 Global Warming: Information on the Results of Four of EPA's Voluntary Climate Change Programs, June 30, 1997 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/rc97163.pdf In an effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions primarily through voluntary efforts by companies, state and local governments, and other groups, the federal government issued its Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) in 1993. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for 20 CCAP programs. GAO reviewed four of these programs to determine (1) what EPA has done to ensure that the greenhouse gas reductions it reports are solely the result of its actions and (2) whether EPA's projected reductions are consistent with experience to date. The four programs reviewed are the Coalbed Methane Outreach Program, which encourages coal mining companies to capture and use methane that would otherwise be vented to the atmosphere; the Green Lights Program, which encourages businesses and other organizations to install energy-efficient lighting in their buildings; the Source Reduction and Recycling Program, which encourages businesses to reduce the amount of waste they generate and increase the amount they recycle; and the State and Local Outreach Program, which helps these governments understand the reasons for and possible solutions to global warming. Mon, 30 Jun 1997 00:00:00 -0400 Environmental Protection Issue Area: Active Assignments, April 15, 1997 GAO provided information on its active assignments in the Environmental Protection issue area as of April 15, 1997. Tue, 15 Apr 1997 00:00:00 -0400 International Environment: U.S. Funding of Environmental Programs and Activities, September 30, 1996 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/rc96234.pdf In recent decades, nations have entered into an increasing number of agreements to address environmental concerns, both regional and global. Since 1972, when more than 130 countries took part in the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the number of such agreements in which the United State participates or in which it has a significant interest has swelled from fewer than 50 to more than 170. Accompanying the rise in the number of international agreements has been an increase in spending by the world community to deal with transboundary environmental issues. Members of Congress have raised concerns about the absence of consolidated budget information on the funding of international environmental activities by the federal government. This report discusses the overall level of federal funding for international environmental activities, including specific programs, treaty negotiations, information exchanges, conferences, and research. GAO identifies (1) funding by individual federal agencies and (2) federal financial support for the environmental programs and activities of the United Nations, the World Bank, and other multilateral financial institutions. Mon, 30 Sep 1996 00:00:00 -0400 Global Warming: Difficulties Assessing Countries' Progress Stabilizing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases, September 4, 1996 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/rc96188.pdf Industry, transportation, and agriculture are all responsible for increasing amounts of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping "greenhouse gases" in the earth's atmosphere. Climate models project a rise in the earth's average surface temperature of between two and six degrees Fahrenheit by 2100. To counter the potentially harmful consequences of climate change, the United States, other developed nations, the former Soviet Union, and other Eastern European states--collectively known as the countries of Annex I to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change--agreed to return to 1990 levels their emissions of greenhouse gases by the year 2000. This report evaluates (1) the progress of the United States and other Annex I countries toward meeting their goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2000 and (2) major factors that affect their ability to reach that goal. Wed, 04 Sep 1996 00:00:00 -0400 Environmental Protection Issue Area: Active Assignments, September 3, 1996 http://archive.gao.gov/auditpapr2pdf4/157438.pdf GAO presented information on its active assignments in the Environmental Protection issue area as of September 3, 1996. Tue, 03 Sep 1996 00:00:00 -0400 Information on EPA's Air and Radiation Program's Budget, 1990-95, July 1, 1996 http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf1/157165.pdf GAO reviewed the funding for the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) air and radiation program. GAO noted that: (1) funding for the EPA Office of Air and Radiation (OAR) increased from less than $249 million for fiscal year (FY) 1990 to over $483 million for FY 1995; (2) most of the increase occurred between FY 1990 and FY 1992, and the four program offices within OAR had different rates of increase; (3) EPA requested $516 million for OAR programs for FY 1995, and then adjusted planned funding for individual programs to match the lower FY 1995 funding level; (4) Congress targeted reductions for certain OAR programs and EPA protected those programs from further budget cuts except for cuts applied agencywide; (5) the percentage of budget reductions varied widely among the four program offices, but each office's FY 1995 appropriation was more than its FY 1994 appropriation; and (6) EPA officials believe the budget reductions hampered their ability to meet legislative requirements such as meeting deadlines for issuing pollutant standards and data collection to revise standards and determine effective control measures. Mon, 01 Jul 1996 00:00:00 -0400 Global Warming: Limitations of General Circulation Models, November 16, 1995 http://archive.gao.gov/papr2pdf/155615.pdf When discussing the implications of global warming and the steps needed to control greenhouse gas emissions, one needs to consider the range of projected temperature increases and the degree of uncertainty in these estimates. In July 1995, GAO reported (see GAO/RCED-95-164) on the limitations of general circulation computer models used to make such predictions. This testimony is based on the findings of that report. Although the accuracy of general circulation models has improved during the past decade, these models are still limited by incomplete and inaccurate representations of the processes affecting climate and by insufficient computing power. These limitations do not change the likelihood that the climate will change as a result of increased greenhouse gas emissions. They do, however, limit the ability to predict with certainty how the climate will respond--how much warming will occur, how soon it will happen, and what the regional effects will be. Efforts are under way to collect and analyze data, improve representations of various climatic processes, and develop and use more powerful computers. These efforts, which could take a decade or more, should improve the accuracy of the models. Thu, 16 Nov 1995 00:00:00 -0500 Global Warming: Limitations of General Circulation Models and Costs of Modeling Efforts, July 13, 1995 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/rc95164.pdf Increasingly, emissions of heat-trapping greenhouse gases from energy production, industry, transportation, agriculture, and other human endeavors are concentrating in the earth's atmosphere. Many scientists believe that the buildup of these gases is creating a greenhouse effect that will lead to global warming. The most highly developed tools now available to predict climatic changes are complex computer models called general circulation models. These models, whose development is supported by the U.S. Global Change Research Program and five federal agencies, have become more accurate in recent decades, but major uncertainties still limit their predictive abilities. This report identifies (1) factors limiting the accuracy of general circulation models' estimates of future climatic changes and (2) federal outlays for general circulation models for fiscal years 1992-94. Thu, 13 Jul 1995 00:00:00 -0400 Air Pollution: Reductions in EPA's 1994 Air Quality Program's Budget, November 29, 1994 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/rc95031b.pdf This briefing report provides information on (1) reduction in the Environmental Protection Agency's fiscal year 1994 budget for its air quality program, (2) how the agency allocated reductions among various components of the air quality program, and (3) the extent to which the reductions affected efforts to meet requirements and deadlines set by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Tue, 29 Nov 1994 00:00:00 -0500 High Performance Computing: Advanced Research Projects Agency Should Do More to Foster Program Goals, May 17, 1993 http://archive.gao.gov/d44t15/148923.pdf The Advanced Research Projects Agency's goal of achieving a thousand-fold increase in useful computing power by 1996 will likely not be met without greater emphasis on the development of system software. High performance computing refers to the use of advanced computing technologies, especially supercomputers, to quickly solve very complex, numerically intensive problems. Topics being studied range from global climate change to molecular structure. The Advanced Research Projects Agency has the largest budget--$275 million in fiscal year 1993--of any single agency participating in the $800-million federal initiative to accelerate the introduction of high performance computers and networks. This report examines (1) the agency's distribution of advanced computers to research sites, (2) interaction with the research community, and (3) the balance between hardware and software investments in the program. Mon, 17 May 1993 00:00:00 -0400 EOS Data Policy: Questions Remain About U.S. Commercial Access, June 25, 1992 http://archive.gao.gov/d33t10/146963.pdf Although the Earth Observing System (EOS) is mainly a scientific venture focusing on global climate change, data from several EOS instruments could have commercial applications in oil and mineral exploration, forest management, and geological mapping. It is unclear, however, whether the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) policy of providing data at cost to scientists and at a market-based cost to commercial users will make it hard for U.S. companies to obtain access to these data. While NASA has made a general commitment to provide EOS data commercially, it has neither formally defined its plans for doing so nor considered commercial needs in early planning for the system that will store EOS data. International principles governing the exchange of data between international users have not yet been formally approved, although draft principles suggest that it would be unlikely for Japanese and European participants to release data collected at U.S. expense sooner in those countries than in the United States. EOS program officials recognize that some data will likely have commercial value but believe that the program's highest priority is scientific and climate change research. NASA has no plans to address commercial interests until later in this decade. GAO believes that NASA should further emphasize commercial access by seeking industry input now to verify which data instruments have potential commercial value and how best to make data available from them. Thu, 25 Jun 1992 00:00:00 -0400 Global Warming: Emission Reductions Possible as Scientific Uncertainties Are Resolved, September 28, 1990 http://archive.gao.gov/d22t8/142718.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined global warming research and policy issues, focusing on: (1) the increase in greenhouse gases; (2) the strengths and limitations of enhanced global warming estimates; and (3) possible policy responses to address global climate change. GAO found that: (1) although carbon dioxide was responsible for almost half of the enhanced greenhouse effect, combinations of other gases had a comparable effect on global warming; (2) although atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases increased over time, their future growth rates were uncertain due to a lack of sufficient information; (3) scientists needed a better understanding of processes controlling greenhouse gases, along with improved observational data on their atmospheric concentrations; (4) general circulation models (GCM) estimated an increase in the average global temperature over the next century with the radiative equivalent of a doubling of carbon dioxide; (5) such GCM limitations as widely spaced grids, oversimplification of natural processes, poor or no representation of climate feedbacks, and exclusion of ocean processes hindered scientists' ability to accurately study regional effects of global warming; (6) scientists expected such GCM improvements as increased research efforts and more observational data and computer resources; (7) the United States and over 35 other nations and organizations established an international panel to respond to global warming; (8) Congress introduced over 20 bills to address global warming; (9) policymakers looked at adaptive strategies that involved adjusting the environment to reduce the consequences of a changing climate and at such limitation strategies as improving energy efficiency, replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy sources, limiting reforestation, and increasing use of nuclear energy; and (10) although the federal government had several options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, actions were desirable as soon as possible due to lengthy policy development and implementation schedules. Fri, 28 Sep 1990 00:00:00 -0400 Greenhouse Effect: DOE's Programs and Activities Relevant to the Global Warming Phenomenon, March 5, 1990 http://archive.gao.gov/d21t9/141336.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information about Department of Energy (DOE) programs and activities associated with global warming and DOE efforts to incorporate global warming into its energy policy and planning activities, focusing on: (1) scientific understanding of the global warming phenomenon and its research efforts to fill information gaps; (2) DOE program planning and criteria it used for evaluating research and development; and (3) proposed policy or program changes for improving energy efficiency or reducing energy-related emissions with potential climate change effects. GAO found that: (1) scientific understanding of global climate systems has increased in the past few years, but uncertainties remain regarding cloud cover, oceans, and vegetation growth; (2) DOE requested $28 million for fiscal year (FY) 1990, an increase of $5 million over FY 1989; (3) DOE requested about $1.3 billion for FY 1990 indirectly related research, development, and demonstration programs, an increase of $330 million over FY 1989; (4) DOE established six principles to guide its approach to global warming and made the issue a central part of its National Energy Strategy; and (5) public and private organizations' proposals addressing global warming included increasing energy efficiency, switching to non-fossil fuels, and reducing emissions from fossil fuel use. Mon, 05 Mar 1990 00:00:00 -0500 Global Warming: Administration Approach Cautious Pending Validation of Threat, January 8, 1990 http://archive.gao.gov/d27t7/140532.pdf Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the adequacy of coordination and extent of federal agencies' participation in encouraging an international response to the problem of global climate change. GAO found that: (1) the administration did not establish a coordinated national policy to guide federal efforts related to global climate change; (2) the President did not designate any individual or agency to assume overall leadership or management responsibility for global climate change activities; (3) in the absence of executive direction, agencies conducted climate change research activities without effective central and strategic planning and without full use of existing policy structures and resources; and (4) despite indications that it was ready to act and give high priority to the global warming threat, the administration has continued to emphasize the need for further research and has not agreed to specific targets and timetables for reducing and controlling greenhouse gas emissions. Mon, 08 Jan 1990 00:00:00 -0500