This page lists the most recent publications related to the Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closure Program. It also includes key publications issued since November 1989. http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/brac.html Sun, 22 Nov 2009 18:34:49 -0500 GAO http://www.gao.gov/images/title_object.jpg http://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1046.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that cleaning up known hazards at the over 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS)--sites transferred to other owners before October 1986--will require more than 50 years and cost about $18 billion. This estimate excludes any additional needed cleanup of emerging contaminants--generally, those not yet governed by a health standard. DOD delegated FUDS cleanup responsibility to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). In addition to FUDS, DOD is responsible for cleaning up about 21,500 sites on active bases and 5,400 sites on realigned or closed bases. The House Armed Services Committee directed GAO to examine (1) the extent to which the Corps reevaluates sites to identify emerging contaminants; (2) how DOD allocates cleanup funds; (3) how the Corps prioritizes FUDS for cleanup; and (4) FUDS program overhead costs. GAO analyzed nationwide FUDS property and project data; policies, guidance and budget documents; and interviewed DOD and Corps officials. The Corps has not often re-examined sites after they have been cleaned up to determine whether emerging contaminants are present or need to be addressed. Generally, the Corps reevaluates sites only when requested by states or others, or when reviewing the completed remedy to ensure its continuing protectiveness. Such reviews are required every 5 years for sites where the chosen remedy does not allow for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure. Corps officials said that they had not received many requests to re-examine sites and few FUDS had required 5-year reviews. Reports on the 15 5-year reviews completed as of May 2009 within four Corps divisions indicated that the Corps has not consistently (1) conducted required 5-year reviews on time, (2) conducted reviews when they are not required but may be appropriate, as EPA recommends, and (3) submitted reports on these reviews for technical evaluation, as required by Corps policy. Also, DOD and the Corps lack accurate, complete information on the status of these reviews. Without timely, accurate, and complete reviews, the Corps cannot ensure that remedies continue to protect human health and the environment. DOD proposes funding to clean up defense sites based on the department's environmental restoration goals and obligations are generally proportional to the number of sites in each site category. Funding is directed toward reducing risks to human health and the environment, among other goals. The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency each determine the funding requirements to clean up sites based on these goals. The Corps prioritizes individual FUDS for cleanup on the basis of risk and other factors. The Corps assigns each site a risk level, considering such factors as the presence of hazards, the potential for human contact, and the concentrations of contaminants and their potential for migrating, among others. According to DOD officials, sites' risk levels are the single most important criterion in determining cleanup priorities. However, the Corps also takes into account specific FUDS program goals, and other factors--such as regulators' and the public's concerns--that can influence the Corps' decisions about which sites to address first. Consequently, high risk sites are not always addressed before low risk sites. Direct program management and support costs for the FUDS program have decreased slightly in recent years, mostly due to structural changes in the program. The Corps' obligations for FUDS direct program management and support costs have declined from 11.0 percent of total program obligations in fiscal year 2004 to 9.0 percent in fiscal year 2008. In addition, to further reduce certain components of these costs to make more funds available for FUDS cleanup, the Corps reduced the number of employees managing the program and the number of districts responsible for FUDS from 22 to 14. Furthermore, Corps officials told GAO that they have implemented a number of controls--such as assigning tracking codes--to ensure that program management and support funds are spent only on approved items. Thu, 29 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09750.pdf As part of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to relocate over 123,000 military and DOD civilian personnel, thereby increasing the staffing at 18 bases nationwide. In addition, DOD and local officials expect thousands of dependents and DOD contractor employees to relocate to communities near the BRAC 2005 growth bases. These actions will greatly increase traffic in the surrounding communities. BRAC recommendations must be implemented by September 2011. The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations directed GAO to assess and report on the impact of BRAC-related growth on transportation systems and on the responses of federal, state, and local governments. Accordingly, GAO determined the (1) expected impact on transportation in communities affected by BRAC decisions, and (2) federal, state, and local response to the expected impacts. To perform its work, GAO obtained information from the 18 communities with expected substantial BRAC growth; visited 8 of these communities; interviewed federal civilian and military officials and state and local officials; and reviewed DOD data, transportation plans, and environmental studies. GAO provided copies of this report to the Departments of Defense and Transportation for their review. The Departments provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. Growth resulting from BRAC decisions will have a significant impact on transportation systems in some communities, but estimates of the total cost to address those impacts are uncertain. In addition to BRAC, other defense initiatives will result in growth in communities and also add to transportation needs. BRAC growth will result in increased traffic in communities ranging from very large metropolitan areas to small communities, creating or worsening congested roads at specific locations. Traffic impacts can also affect larger relocation decisions, and were important in DOD's decision to acquire an additional site for Fort Belvoir, Virginia, an acquisition that DOD estimates will cost $1.2 billion. According to a DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) survey, 17 of 18 BRAC growth communities identified transportation as one of their top challenges. Near-term transportation projects to address these challenges could cost about $2.0 billion, of which about $1.1 billion is related to projects in the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area. BRAC-related transportation infrastructure costs are subject to a number of uncertainties. For example, not all potential projects are included in the estimate, military staffing levels at some growth installations are in flux and the location decisions of military and civilian personnel have not yet been made, and pre-existing, non-military community growth makes a direct link between transportation projects to military growth difficult. The federal government has provided limited direct assistance to help communities address BRAC transportation impacts, and state and local governments have adopted strategies to expedite projects within the time frame allowed by BRAC. For example, DOD's Defense Access Roads Program has certified transportation projects for funding at three affected communities. Also, OEA has provided planning grants and funded traffic studies and local planning positions. While federal highway and transit programs can be used for many BRAC-related transportation needs, dedicated funds are not available. Instead, BRAC-related transportation projects must compete with other proposed transportation projects. Communities had identified funding for about $500 million of the estimated $2.0 billion needed to address their near term project needs. Some state and local governments have adopted strategies to expedite highway projects, such as prioritizing short-term high-impact projects, because the time frames for completing BRAC personnel moves are much shorter than the time frames for such projects. While legislation mandates that BRAC growth be completed by 2011, major highway and transit projects usually take 9 to 19 years. To complete some critical projects before BRAC growth occurs, state and local officials are reprioritizing planned projects and implementing those that can be completed quickly. For example, Maryland prioritized certain lower-cost intersection projects that will improve traffic flow. In Texas, officials used an innovative financing approach to generate funding quickly for a major highway project at Fort Bliss. Wed, 09 Sep 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09703.pdf As a result of a 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is charged with consolidating supply, storage, and distribution functions at 13 military service depot maintenance locations to streamline operations and save money. The BRAC Commission data indicate that these consolidations would generate net savings of nearly $1 billion through 2011 and about $137 million annually thereafter. Because these actions could affect depot maintenance operations, the conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed GAO to assess implementation issues associated with the consolidations. GAO's objectives were to assess (1) DLA's progress and challenges to implement these consolidation actions and (2) the extent to which DLA's most recent cost and savings estimates related to these consolidations differ from those of the BRAC Commission. To meet these objectives, GAO visited three depot locations where consolidation actions had begun, interviewed service and DLA officials, and analyzed estimated cost and savings data. While DLA has made progress to consolidate supply-related functions at the 13 depot maintenance locations recommended by BRAC and has taken steps to minimize the risk to ongoing operations, some of the most difficult tasks are yet to be undertaken and pose implementation challenges for DLA. For example, the Army and DLA officials are still negotiating what specific functions and personnel will transfer to DLA and the information technology interfaces needed to consolidate DLA's and the services' supply inventories continue to evolve and have experienced delays. Nevertheless, DLA anticipates that the consolidation actions will be completed by the mandated September 2011 BRAC deadline for completing recommended actions. For the actions to be complete, DLA officials told GAO the military services must have transferred all related personnel positions to DLA and physically consolidated all applicable inventories with DLA. While personnel transfers are under way, DLA has not begun physically consolidating inventories. And, although DLA has taken several steps to mitigate risk to ongoing depot operations such as involving stakeholders in the decision-making process, ensuring high-level leadership to drive these transformational actions, and employing time-phased transfers, continued collaboration between the services and DLA and periodic monitoring by DOD are critical to ensure the timely completion of these BRAC actions. Compared to the BRAC Commission's 2005 cost and savings estimates, DOD expects to spend more and save significantly less by implementing the supply-related consolidation actions. DLA's current data indicate that the cost to implement the recommended consolidation actions has increased by about $158 million (378 percent) while estimated savings have decreased by $753 million (73 percent). Consequently, estimated net savings of about $82 million over the 2006-2011 BRAC implementation period are considerably less than the BRAC Commission's estimate of about $993 million. Further, net annual savings beyond 2011 are projected to be $52 million per year, rather than the Commission's $137 million estimate--an annual decrease of about $85 million (62 percent). Moreover, GAO found that DLA's most recent savings estimates are unrealistic because they are based on practices that count some savings that GAO believes are not attributable to BRAC actions, use 4-year-old data, assume an inventory reduction scenario that is unlikely to occur, and employ an overall methodology that has not been approved by senior-level officials. DOD's financial management regulation requires BRAC savings estimates to be based on the best projection of savings that will actually accrue, but GAO's analysis indicates that DLA could actually incur a net cost of $22 million during the implementation period if non-BRAC-related savings were removed from the estimate, compared to the $82 million in net savings that DLA currently projects. Although the potential exists for DLA to eventually realize savings over time as it assumes control over supply-related operations, updated savings estimates based on sound estimating practices would provide better information for congressional oversight and help maintain public confidence in the BRAC process. Thu, 09 Jul 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09336.pdf The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) establish 12 joint bases by consolidating the management and support of 26 separate installations, potentially saving $2.3 billion over 20 years. In response to a direction from the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, GAO evaluated DOD's (1) efforts and expected costs to deliver installation support at joint bases and (2) funding for facility sustainment, which includes the maintenance and repair activities necessary to keep facilities in good working order, at all installations. GAO compared new support standards with the current support levels, visited nine installations that will become four joint bases, and compared facility sustainment funding levels with requirements and goals. DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery of installation support at the planned joint bases, but the cost of installation support is expected to increase rather than decrease as forecasted by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In January 2008, DOD began issuing joint base implementation guidance that for the first time established a set of common definitions and standards for installation support. The guidance defined 47 installation support areas (e.g., airfield operations, grounds maintenance, custodial services, and child and youth programs) and provided 267 standards to define the expected level of service in each area. DOD officials stated that the standards represented the service levels needed to meet mission and personnel requirements in view of DOD policies and guidance, commercial standards, other federal agency guidance, or in some cases, military judgment. However, contrary to the expectations of the commission, for two primary reasons installation support costs at the joint bases are expected to increase above the cost of support provided by the separate installations before consolidation. First, DOD has required the joint bases to deliver installation support in accordance with the new standards even though the military services have not previously funded installation support in the amounts needed to meet each of the standards. GAO's comparison of 40 selected standards to the service levels currently provided at the nine installations it visited showed that on average service levels would have to increase to meet the standards in about 27 percent of the areas compared. Second, in some instances the services' approach to implementing joint basing will result in additional administrative costs and the loss of some existing installation support efficiencies. Although DOD officials stated that the increased support costs at the joint bases might be at least partially offset over time as experience is gained and new efficiencies are identified and adopted, it is unclear whether joint basing will result in actual savings. The military services have not budgeted and spent sufficient funds to meet their facility sustainment requirements and goals and prevent facility deterioration at the installation level. Citing other budget priorities as the reason, the military services did not budget funds to meet about $2.3 billion (9 percent) of their total facility sustainment requirements during fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and, according to DOD, needed sustainment work that is not performed may eventually result in damaged facilities, shortened facility service lives, and increased future costs for facility restoration. The services have further exacerbated the sustainment funding issue by using some budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes. During fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the military services used about $2.6 billion (14 percent) of the funds budgeted for sustainment for other purposes, primarily to pay for unfunded facility restoration and modernization projects. Although service officials stated that these projects were needed, the consequence was that sustainment requirements were not met. During visits to nine installations, GAO found backlogs of deferred sustainment needs and some facilities that were not in good condition because funds were not available to pay for all needed sustainment work. Mon, 30 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09217.pdf The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever. In addition to base closures, many recommendations involve realignments, such as returning forces to the United States from bases overseas and creating joint bases. However, anticipated savings remained an important consideration in justifying the need for the 2005 BRAC round. The House report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed GAO to monitor BRAC implementation. Therefore, GAO assessed (1) challenges that might affect timely completion of recommendations, (2) any changes in DOD's reported cost and savings estimates since fiscal year 2008, and (3) the potential for estimates to continue to change. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the services' BRAC offices, and the Army Corps of Engineers; visited installations implementing some of the more costly realignments or closures; and analyzed BRAC budget data for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. DOD has made progress in implementing the BRAC 2005 round but faces challenges in its ability to meet the September 15, 2011, statutory completion deadline. DOD expects almost half of the 800 defense locations implementing BRAC recommendations to complete their actions in 2011; however, about 230 of these almost 400 locations anticipate completion within the last 2 weeks of the deadline. Further, some of these locations involve some of the most costly and complex BRAC recommendations, which have already incurred some delays and thus have little leeway to meet the 2011 completion date if any further delays occur. Also, DOD must synchronize relocating about 123,000 personnel with an estimated $23 billion in facilities that are still being constructed or renovated, but some delays have left little time in DOD's plans to relocate these personnel by the deadline. Finally, delays in interdependent recommendations could have a cascading effect on other recommendations being completed on time. OSD recently issued guidance requiring the services and defense agencies to provide status briefings to improve oversight of issues affecting timely implementation of BRAC recommendations. However, this guidance did not establish a regular briefing schedule or require the services to provide information about possible mitigation measures for any BRAC recommendations at risk of not meeting the statutory deadline. DOD's fiscal year 2009 BRAC budget submission shows that DOD plans to spend more to implement recommendations and save slightly less compared to the 2008 BRAC budget. DOD's 2009 estimate of one-time costs to implement this BRAC round increased by $1.2 billion to about $32.4 billion. Net annual recurring savings estimates decreased by almost $13 million to about $4 billion. Also, GAO's calculations of net present value, which includes both expected cost and savings over a 20-year period ending in 2025 and takes into account the time value of money, show that implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations is expected to save $13.7 billion. This compares to an estimated $15 billion in net present value savings based on last year's BRAC budget and the BRAC Commission's reported estimate of about $36 billion. Although DOD is about 3? years into the 6-year implementation period, the potential remains for BRAC cost estimates to continue to increase, but the potential for changes in savings estimates is unclear. Greater than expected inflation and increased market demands for construction materials could cause estimated construction costs to increase, although the extent of this increase is uncertain given today's economic market conditions. However, the potential for changes in savings estimates is unclear because BRAC headquarters officials at both the Army and the Air Force told us they do not plan to update their savings estimates regardless of factors that may cause those estimates to change, and OSD is not enforcing its own regulation requiring them to do so. Hence, congressional and defense decision makers could be left with an unrealistic sense of the savings this complex and costly BRAC round may actually produce, an issue that could be important in considering whether another round of BRAC may be warranted. Fri, 30 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081010r.pdf In September 2005, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) close Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and realign most of its technical functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, as one of 182 recommendations in the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round. DOD must complete the closure and realignment actions specified in the recommendation within the statutory 6-year implementation period ending September 15, 2011. Representatives from communities surrounding Fort Monmouth, as well as elected officials, raised concerns during hearings before the BRAC Commission that a number of current employees would not move to Aberdeen Proving Ground, leading to a loss of expertise that could negatively affect ongoing support for military operations, including the Global War on Terrorism. The Secretary of the Army pledged that the Army would not allow the transfer of functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground to affect this ongoing support. Although some of the BRAC commissioners shared the concern about the potential loss of expertise, the commission concluded in its report that DOD could mitigate the adverse effects of moving existing programs over the implementation period. However, to ensure that future leaders understood this concern, the commission report included language recommending that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to Congress that the movement of functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground would be accomplished without disruption to their support to the Global War on Terrorism or other critical contingency operations. DOD issued its report in December 2007, which concluded that the department could accomplish the move without disruption to ongoing support efforts. Fort Monmouth currently hosts organizations that perform research, development, and acquisition of the Army's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. About one-third of the current C4ISR workforce consists of scientists and engineers, the largest single group, with logistics, contracting, and business occupations constituting most of the remaining federal government civilian workforce. Clerks and administrative assistant positions constitute about 5 percent of the workforce. This workforce is further supplemented by about 1,600 embedded contractor employees and more than 1,000 contractor employees located off the installation. This review is one in a series of reviews that we have undertaken on the implementation of the 2005 BRAC round recommendations. The Army is in the process of developing and implementing plans to transfer C4ISR functions from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground. The Army faces some significant challenges and has started to identify mitigation strategies that, if implemented as intended, may lessen the mission-disruption risks associated with the transfer. With about 3 years remaining before the planned closure of Fort Monmouth, the Army has developed high-level plans that are outlined in DOD's December 2007 report to Congress, which identified approaches to completing the transfer and general risk-mitigation strategies. However, DOD's December 2007 report did not include detailed plans for how the Army intends to complete the transfer. As planning efforts have evolved, the C4ISR organizations have started to develop detailed plans to manage the transfer and continue support for ongoing DOD missions. By its very nature, the BRAC process is complex. As such, the Army faces several significant challenges in completing the transfer, which officials have recognized, and the Army is developing strategies designed to lessen the associated risks. First, the Army is facing human capital challenges in hiring a projected 3,700 federal government civilian employees to fully reconstitute its expected workforce authorization of about 5,100 civilians at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 2011, which includes a large number of scientists and engineers with technical expertise. At the time of our review, the Army's request for direct hire authority was under review within DOD, but had not yet been submitted to the Office of Personnel Management, which grants the authority. To help mitigate the effects of the potentially smaller and less experienced workforce at Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Army has identified strategies, including focusing on the highest-priority workload and deferring some portions of the C4ISR workload, temporarily transferring some of the workload to other DOD organizations, or hiring additional contractors. Second, the Army faces challenges in obtaining personnel security clearances for nearly all of its newly hired employees in a timely manner. Third, the Army faces infrastructure challenges in completing the construction of facilities to accommodate C4ISR personnel and relocation of personnel and equipment to Aberdeen Proving Ground by the end of the BRAC implementation period. Finally, the Army faces challenges in funding the increasing costs of the transfer. These challenges are significant but are not unique to the closure of Fort Monmouth, as we have previously reported on similar challenges as they relate to the implementation of other BRAC recommendations. While the Army has begun to identify and implement mitigation strategies designed to lessen the risks associated with each of the challenges, it is too early to determine the effectiveness of these strategies in ensuring continued support to military missions. DOD plans to continue ongoing oversight of the implementation of this BRAC recommendation at the installation level, Army headquarters, and DOD, and to revise plans, as appropriate, which may also lessen potential mission-disruption risks. Wed, 13 Aug 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08665.pdf Due to several simultaneous Department of Defense (DOD) force structure and basing initiatives, 20 installations are expecting a combined net growth of over 173,000 military and civilian personnel, not including family members and all contractors, over fiscal years 2006-2012. Although communities surrounding these installations can expect to realize economic benefits in the long term, DOD has identified these 20 to be substantially and seriously impacted in terms of being able to provide infrastructure to accommodate the growth. In response to the House report to the fiscal year 2007 defense appropriations bill, GAO (1) examined the extent to which communities affected by DOD's actions have identified their infrastructure needs, and (2) assessed DOD's efforts and those of other agencies to assist affected communities. GAO reviewed applicable directives and executive orders, surveyed the 20 growth communities, and met with community and agency officials to discuss growth issues. Communities surrounding DOD growth installations have begun to identify infrastructure needs to help support expected personnel growth in general terms, but planning efforts have been hampered by a lack of consistent and detailed information about anticipated DOD personnel movements. When asked to identify their top infrastructure challenges, 16 of the 20 communities identified by DOD as substantially and seriously impacted cited transportation, 11 named school capacity, and 6 said affordable housing. However, communities lack the detailed planning information, such as the growth population demographics, necessary to effectively plan and obtain financing for infrastructure projects. A DOD directive requires the military services to develop guidance for providing planning information to installations, communities, and DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA), but GAO found that none had done so. While the consistency of the personnel relocation data DOD provides has improved, over half of the communities we surveyed expressed concerns about the completeness of the personnel data they receive and the lack of detailed demographic data, such as the number and ages of dependent children expected to accompany incoming service members and attend school. Until the military departments begin to disseminate consistent and more detailed information about planned defense personnel moves, it will be difficult for community, state, and federal officials to effectively plan for and provide necessary infrastructure to accommodate DOD personnel and their families relocating to growth-impacted communities. OEA, other DOD agencies, and some state, local, and federal agencies have provided grants and technical assistance to DOD growth communities, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not provided the high-level leadership critical to achieving effective interagency and intergovernmental coordination. To ensure that DOD-impacted communities receive assistance, the 22-agency Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC) was created by executive order over 30 years ago and amended as recently as 2005. The Secretary of Defense, or his designee, chairs the committee that is required to lead efforts to assist communities most affected by its activities and serve as a clearinghouse for sharing information about expected DOD impacts on the communities surrounding military growth installations, as well as information regarding possible government resources that could mitigate some of those impacts. As chair of the EAC, DOD could regularly convene full committee meetings and exercise the high-level leadership needed to help ensure that federal agencies are affording certain priority considerations to defense-affected communities. However, the full committee has not met since November 2006. Instead, DOD has left the workings of the EAC to OEA, which has been proactive in assisting impacted communities but can not guide interagency operations at a high enough level to promote effective interagency cooperation. Consequently, in the absence of high-level DOD leadership, the committee has not developed a clearinghouse for information sharing which could more effectively match government resources with the needs of DOD-impacted communities. Tue, 17 Jun 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08602r.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) is simultaneously implementing a number of force realignments that contribute to personnel growth at military installations throughout the United States. DOD plans to execute over 800 actions from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, which entail relocating over 123,000 personnel. Concurrent with its BRAC 2005 actions, DOD is also implementing or planning to implement other extensive worldwide transformation initiatives, which include relocating about 50,000 soldiers primarily from Europe and Korea to the United States; transforming the Army's force structure from an organization based on divisions to more rapidly deployable, brigade-based units (known as Army modularity); and increasing its active duty end strength by 92,000, all of which will affect DOD's facilities infrastructure. These force realignments will result in dramatic growth at some DOD installations across the United States. Based on data provided by the services, the DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) had identified, as of January 2008, 20 locations where expected growth as a result of force realignments in fiscal years 2006 through 2012 will adversely affect surrounding communities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 mandated that we assess the impact on military installations caused by an increase in assigned forces or civilian personnel as a result of the 2005 BRAC or other force realignments. Our specific objectives were to (1) determine whether military facility requirements (including quality-of-life projects) will be met before the arrival of assigned forces and (2) determine whether DOD has programmed sufficient funding to mitigate community traffic congestion in accordance with the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program. While DOD has made progress in initiating construction of military facilities to accommodate growth, it is too early to determine whether all required facilities will be constructed prior to arrival of assigned forces because contracts must still be let, the progress of construction may affect timelines for the arrival of forces, and the services are still requesting or expecting to request $6.4 billion in funding. At the 11 installations we reviewed, representing over 85 percent of expected population growth, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have received about $7.3 billion for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 for growth-related construction projects, which is approximately 54 percent of the total estimated funding requirement for growth related construction at those installations through 2011. As of March 2008, at the 11 installations we reviewed contracts have been awarded for approximately $4.1billion--about 56 percent of the available funds--and base officials plan to award contracts for most of the remaining funds in fiscal year 2008. The services have requested or plan to request just under $6.4 billion in funding to implement remaining growth: the services have requested about $4.2 billion in fiscal year 2009, and plan to request $2 billion in fiscal year 2010 and $196 million in fiscal year 2011 for growth-related projects at the installations included in our review. DOD has requested funding for off-base road improvements around growth installations for all projects that met the DAR program criteria and the DAR program office had already completed the assessment process at the time of our review. As of March 2008, DOD had requested $36.2 million for one project under the DAR program. In addition, four other projects totaling just over $37.7 million were still being assessed by the installation or DAR program officials to determine whether they meet DAR eligibility criteria. Although other off-base road improvements around growth installations have also been identified, few of these projects meet the criteria for funding under the DAR program and consequently will need other sources of funds. Generally, state and local government support is the primary means by which these off-base road improvements to mitigate traffic congestion at growth installations are funded. At the time of our review, base officials estimated that state and local governments were funding or plan to fund just over $657 million in growth related off-base road improvements around the 11 installations included in our review. Tue, 01 Apr 2008 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08315.pdf The 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission estimated that two supply-related recommendations now being implemented by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) would save the Department of Defense (DOD) about $4.8 billion over 20 years--about 13 percent of the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round's estimated long-term savings. These recommendations focus on business process reengineering by reconfiguring DLA's wholesale supply, storage, and distribution network and transferring procurement responsibility for depot-level reparables from the military services to DLA. This report is one in a series of reports on BRAC conducted under the Comptroller General's authority. It examines (1) the extent to which DLA's cost and savings estimates to implement these recommendations differ from those of the BRAC Commission and (2) DLA's progress and challenges in implementing the recommendations. GAO analyzed estimated cost and savings data and visited several of the military services' depots in its review. Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings estimates in 2005, DOD will spend more, save less, and take longer than expected to recoup up-front costs to implement two recommendations intended to improve DOD's logistics systems. Over the 2006-2011 BRAC time frame to implement these recommendations, GAO's analysis of DLA's data indicates that estimated net savings will be reduced by more than $1.8 billion compared to the BRAC Commission's estimate, with a net cost of about $222 million to DOD, because of increased estimated costs, decreased savings, and DLA's inclusion in the business plans of almost $243 million in expected savings that GAO believes should not be counted as BRAC savings. The $243 million in savings were to be achieved from inventory reduction initiatives that were not directly the result of BRAC actions and would have occurred regardless of BRAC. GAO's analysis further shows that the projected net annual recurring savings after 2011 have been reduced from nearly $360 million to almost $167 million, and that the savings over 20 years are expected to be $1.4 billion rather than $4.8 billion as estimated by the Commission. While some variances are to be expected, the magnitude of these variances is large and resulted from several factors, such as the use of inaccurate or outdated data, misinterpretation of terms, and changes in operational requirements that occurred during the decision-making process for formulating the recommendations. Because expected savings for the longer term are still large but subject to considerable variability, until net savings are tracked over time, decision makers will lack complete information to assess the financial performance of these recommendations. Although DLA has partially completed methodologies to accomplish this, they have yet to be implemented. While DLA has focused primarily on planning to date, it has identified several challenges as implementation proceeds that, if not properly addressed, may adversely impact the services' depot-level operations and impair readiness. One challenge raised by the services involves DLA's ability to continue the timely provision of supplies to industrial customers as it assumes management of supply operations. If repair parts are not available when needed, the services are concerned that mission readiness would be degraded. Another challenge concerns the identification of differences among the services' information technology systems and development and funding of solutions to bridge DLA's system with the services' systems. Resolving human capital issues is an additional challenge. Further, maintaining continuity of funding to match planned implementation milestones is a challenge that, if not addressed, could further delay implementation of planned BRAC actions. DLA has taken several actions to address these challenges, such as working closely with the services to resolve issues, but it is too soon to determine how effective these actions will be. Because of potential disruptions to the services' industrial operations, collaboration and monitoring of the execution of BRAC actions as implementation proceeds are essential to mitigate potential adverse effects to the services and readiness. Wed, 05 Mar 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08244r.pdf In September 2005, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) recommended closing Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, unless a new mission for the base could be identified by December 31, 2009. In June 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced that Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) would establish a new mission at Cannon Air Force Base and the command would take ownership of the base on October 1, 2007. As a result, Cannon Air Force Base will remain open. While DOD has satisfied the intent of the recommendation by finding a new mission for the base, this BRAC recommendation was unusual because it contained a contingency clause. Therefore, we reviewed DOD's implementation of this recommendation under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. This report (1) describes the factors underpinning the decision to house AFSOC at Cannon Air Force Base and (2) provides information on the cost estimate and timeline for the movement of personnel to establish the AFSOC mission. DOD's decision to establish an AFSOC mission at Cannon was the result of a confluence of events, chiefly, the BRAC 2005 contingency clause that provided urgency for finding a new tenant for the base and an AFSOC study pointing to Cannon Air Force Base as the best location for the AFSOC mission. In October 2005, AFSOC evaluated three alternatives to address the lack of existing capacity at Hurlburt Field and rated Cannon as most desirable. Subsequently, in response to the BRAC 2005 contingency clause, the Air Force began to look in January 2006 for another mission for Cannon Air Force Base. The Air Force solicited interest from DOD and other agencies that would consider selecting Cannon Air Force Base for their missions. According to Air Force officials, the intent was to identify a tenant that would make maximum use of the base facilities and the base's associated range, the Melrose Training Range. AFSOC was the only respondent out of six that expressed interest in using the entire base and the associated range. The remaining five planned to use portions of the base. In June 2006, DOD announced that a new AFSOC mission would be established at Cannon. Although AFSOC took ownership of Cannon Air Force Base on October 1, 2007, there is some uncertainty over the total cost and timeline of personnel growth required to establish the new mission, although AFSOC estimated the cost at about $517 million over the next 6 years at the time of our review. First, DOD has programmed about $283 million for military construction projects from fiscal year 2008 through 2013 to support the movement of units to Cannon. Second, AFSOC has identified about $233 million in additional required funding that has yet to be programmed. These funds would primarily be used to construct or modify existing mission-related facilities to accommodate aircraft that are larger and more varied than the ones previously located at the base. AFSOC originally projected that about 5,700 personnel would be moved to Cannon by the end of fiscal year 2010. However, because of funding constraints, the decision to move about 1,400 of these people is under review by DOD. Further, the expected number and pace of personnel growth may change further because AFSOC plans to bring fewer aircraft to Cannon than originally projected. Fri, 18 Jan 2008 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08341t.pdf The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently implementing recommendations from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, which is the fifth round undertaken by DOD since 1988. The 2005 round is, by GAO's assessment, the biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever, in part because, unlike previous rounds, the Secretary of Defense viewed the 2005 round as an opportunity not only to achieve savings but also to assist in transforming the department. GAO's testimony addresses (1) GAO's role in the BRAC process, and (2) how DOD's current cost and savings estimates to implement the 2005 recommendations compare to the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's (the Commission) cost and savings estimates. This testimony is based primarily on the report GAO issued yesterday (GAO-08-159) on the overall changes to DOD's cost and savings estimates for the 2005 BRAC round. To analyze these changes, GAO compared the Commission's estimates in its 2005 report to DOD's estimates in its fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission. This testimony is also based on several reports GAO has issued on the implementation of selected recommendations, and GAO's prior work assessing the 2005 decision-making process. GAO's work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. GAO has played two long-standing roles in the BRAC process. First, as requested by congressional committees in the 1988 round or mandated by law since 1990, GAO has served as an independent and objective observer of the BRAC process and has assessed and reported on DOD's decision-making processes leading up to proposed realignment and closure recommendations. GAO reported in its assessment of the 2005 round that DOD's decision-making process for developing its recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned. However, GAO identified some limitations with cost and savings estimates, some BRAC recommendations having lengthy payback periods, and some with limited savings relative to implementation costs. GAO's second role has focused on reviewing the implementation of realignment and closure actions once the BRAC recommendations became effective in November 2005. GAO has issued several reports on DOD's implementation of its 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO will continue to review the implementation of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, including a final report to be issued within 1 year after the end of the 6-year BRAC implementation period, which ends in September 2011. DOD plans to spend more and save less than originally estimated for the 2005 BRAC round. DOD's cost estimates to implement the 2005 recommendations, as reported in its fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission, have increased by 48 percent, from $21 billion to $31 billion, for the 6-year implementation period. Nearly two-thirds of the expected cost increase is due to increased military construction costs. For example, the expected military construction cost to close Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, has increased by more than $550 million, largely because the Army decided to build new facilities instead of renovating existing facilities at one location and share existing facilities at another location. GAO believes there is potential for further cost increases due to uncertainty in whether the Army's new initiative designed to reduce construction costs will achieve the planned results. While projected costs have increased, projected net annual recurring savings have decreased about 5 percent, from $4.2 billion to $4.0 billion annually. DOD attributed the decrease in its savings estimate primarily to changes in initial assumptions or plans. GAO believes that DOD's reported savings estimates may be overstated by $1.85 billion largely because the estimates include savings from military personnel entitlements without a corresponding reduction in end strength. As a result of the increases in costs and decreases in savings, GAO's analysis shows that accumulated savings are projected to offset accumulated costs in 2017 rather than 2013 as projected by the Commission. The time required for accumulated savings to offset accumulated costs would increase to 2025 with the exclusion of the expected savings from military personnel entitlements and Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, that GAO questions. While the overall payback period for DOD's BRAC recommendations is less than 20 years, the number of individual recommendations that are not expected to pay back within 20 years has increased from 30, as estimated by the Commission, to 73, based on DOD's fiscal year 2008 budget submission. Wed, 12 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08159.pdf The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the biggest, most complex, and costliest ever. DOD viewed this round as a unique opportunity to reshape its installations, realign forces to meet its needs for the next 20 years, and achieve savings. To realize savings, DOD must first invest billions of dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other up-front expenses to implement the BRAC recommendations. However, recent increases in estimated cost have become a concern to some members of Congress. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO (1) compared the BRAC Commission's cost and savings estimates to DOD's current estimates, (2) assessed potential for change in DOD's current estimates, and (3) identified broad implementation challenges. GAO compared the BRAC Commission's estimates, which were the closest estimates available associated with final BRAC recommendations, to DOD's current estimates. GAO also visited 25 installations and major commands, and interviewed DOD officials. Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings estimates in 2005, DOD plans to spend more and save less, and it will take longer than expected to recoup up-front costs. Compared to the BRAC Commission's estimates, DOD's cost estimates to implement BRAC recommendations increased from $21 billion to $31 billion (48 percent), and net annual recurring savings estimates decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion (5 percent). DOD's one-time cost estimates to implement over 30 of the 182 recommendations have increased more than $50 million each over the BRAC Commission's estimates, and DOD's cost estimates to complete 6 of these recommendations have increased by more than $500 million each. Moreover, GAO's analysis of DOD's current estimates shows that it will take until 2017 for DOD to recoup up-front costs to implement BRAC 2005--4 years longer than the BRAC Commission's estimates show. Similarly, the BRAC Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 implementation would save DOD about $36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025, whereas our analysis shows that BRAC implementation is now expected to save about 58 percent less, or about $15 billion. DOD's estimates to implement BRAC recommendations are likely to change further due to uncertainties surrounding implementation details and potential increases in military construction and environmental cleanup costs. Moreover, DOD may have overestimated annual recurring savings by about 46 percent or $1.85 billion. DOD's estimated annual recurring savings of about $4 billion includes $2.17 billion in eliminated overhead expenses, which will free up funds that DOD can then use for other priorities, but it also includes $1.85 billion in military personnel entitlements, such as salaries, for personnel DOD plans to transfer to other locations. While DOD disagrees, GAO does not believe transferring personnel produces tangible dollar savings since these personnel will continue to receive salaries and benefits. Because DOD's BRAC budget does not explain the difference between savings attributable to military personnel entitlements and savings that will make funds available for other uses, DOD is generating a false sense that all of its reported savings could be used to fund other defense priorities. DOD has made progress in planning for BRAC 2005 implementation, but several complex challenges to the implementation of those plans increase the risk that DOD might not meet the statutory September 2011 deadline. DOD faces a number of challenges to synchronize the realignment of over 123,000 personnel with the completion of over $21 billion in new construction or renovation projects by 2011. For example, the time frames for completing many BRAC recommendations are so closely sequenced and scheduled to be completed in 2011 that any significant changes in personnel movement schedules or construction delays could jeopardize DOD's ability to meet the statutory 2011 deadline. Additionally, BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds, included more joint recommendations involving more than one military component, thus creating challenges in achieving unity of effort among the services and defense agencies. Tue, 11 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0820.pdf The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) provision required the Department of Defense (DOD) to close the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP). GAO was asked to address the status and potential impact of implementing this BRAC provision. This report discusses (1) key services AFIP provides to the military and civilian communities; (2) DOD's plans to terminate, relocate, or outsource services currently provided by AFIP; and (3) the potential impacts of disestablishing AFIP on military and civilian communities. New legislation requires DOD to consider this GAO report as it develops its plan for the reorganization of AFIP. GAO reviewed DOD's plans, analysis, and other relevant information, and interviewed officials from the public and private sectors. AFIP pathologists perform three key services--diagnostic consultations, education, and research--primarily for physicians from DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and civilian institutions. AFIP provides consultations when physicians cannot make a diagnosis or are unsure of their initial diagnosis. About half of its 40,000 consultations in 2006 were for DOD physicians, and the rest were nearly equally divided between VA and civilian physicians. AFIP's educational services train physicians in diagnosing the most difficult-to-diagnose diseases. Civilian physicians use these services more extensively than military physicians. In addition, AFIP pathologists collaborate with others on research applicable to military operations and general medicine, often using material from AFIP's repository of tissue specimens to gain a better understanding of disease diagnosis and treatment. To implement the 2005 BRAC provision, DOD plans to terminate most services currently provided by AFIP and is developing plans to relocate or outsource others. DOD plans to outsource some diagnostic consultations to the private sector through a newly established office and use its pathologists for consultations when possible. With the exception of two courses, DOD does not plan to retain AFIP's educational program. DOD also plans to halt AFIP's research and realign the repository, which is AFIP's primary research resource. The BRAC provision allows DOD flexibility to retain services that were not specifically addressed in the provision. As a result, DOD will retain four additional AFIP services and is considering whether to retain six others. DOD had planned to begin implementation of the BRAC provision related to AFIP in July 2007 and complete action by September 2011, but statutory requirements prevent DOD from reorganizing or relocating AFIP functions until after DOD submits a detailed plan and timetable for the proposed implementation of these changes to congressional committees no later than December 31, 2007. Once the plan has been submitted, DOD can resume reorganizing and relocating AFIP. Discontinuing, relocating, or outsourcing AFIP services may have minimal impact on DOD, VA, and civilian communities because pathology services are available from alternate sources, but a smooth transition depends on DOD's actions to address the challenges in developing new approaches to obtaining pathology expertise and managing the repository. For consultations, these challenges are to determine how to use existing pathology resources, obtain outside expertise, and ensure coordination and funding of services to avoid disincentives to quality care. While DOD has begun to identify the challenges, it has not developed strategies to address them. Similarly, whether the repository will continue to be a rich resource for military and civilian research depends on how DOD populates, maintains, and provides access to it in the future, but DOD has not developed strategies to address these issues. DOD contracted for a study, due to be completed in October 2008, of the usefulness of the material in the repository. DOD plans to use this study to help make decisions about managing the repository. Fri, 09 Nov 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08121r.pdf As a result of the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round, the military services are required to transfer to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) all of their supply, storage, and distribution functions at specified depot maintenance locations that are collocated with a DLA distribution depot. These transfer actions are part of a larger BRAC recommendation, commonly referred to as the Supply, Storage, and Distribution (SS&D) recommendation, that is intended to reduce both the number of supply distribution depots and related excess capacity, while providing the Department of Defense (DOD) with a logistics base that saves money and enhances the effectiveness of logistics support to operational forces. There has been disagreement among the services and DLA about whether certain personnel positions that include functions inherently involving both supply and maintenance operations at the services' industrial depots should transfer to DLA as part of this recommendation. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps reached agreement with DLA about these positions in January, February, and April 2007, respectively. After repeated opposition to the transfer of certain positions, in July 2007 the Army agreed to comply with direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on the specific functions and positions to transfer. DLA subsequently submitted its draft business plan for implementing the SS&D recommendation to OSD for approval on September 18, 2007. Because of the broad congressional interest in the implementation of the 2005 BRAC round recommendations, we prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Our work was in response to concerns raised by several congressional offices about possible inefficiencies and disruptions in depot maintenance production that could potentially generate higher costs at the department's depot maintenance activities and affect equipment readiness during a critical time for maintenance and support of our nation's warfighters. Our objectives were to determine (1) what efforts have been made to determine which supply-related functions will transfer to DLA, (2) what are the military services' key concerns in implementing the transfer of functions, (3) the extent to which DLA's plans establish a transfer process that minimizes disruptions depot maintenance, and (4) what are the estimated costs and savings associated with implementing this transfer of functions. DLA and the services have taken several actions in an effort to reach agreement on which SS&D functions and related positions and inventories are to transfer to DLA as a result of implementing the 2005 BRAC SS&D recommendation. These actions have been ongoing since late 2005 when DLA began its planning process for implementing the consolidation of SS&D functions across DOD. Some key actions include defining SS&D functions at the beginning of the planning process, contracting a study to assess the effects and risks associated with the transfers, establishing integrated process teams to work through problems and concerns and identify potential solutions, and conducting detailed analyses of depot positions to identify transfer candidates. DLA has also worked with the services to develop comprehensive action plans that include specific and detailed actions that identify each task's duration, including start and completion dates; percentage completed; organization and personnel assigned; criticality of task; and milestones. Although the services have reached agreement with DLA on the specific functions to be transferred, officials from all of the services have expressed concerns in four key areas regarding the transfers. First, officials from all of the services expressed concern that the insertion of DLA into the internal operations of their depot maintenance activities may hinder their ability to meet depot production schedules and maintain equipment readiness. Second, depot maintenance officials expressed concern that if the transfer of functions to DLA takes place using DLA's existing price structure, it would increase the cost of depot maintenance operations and the depots will have to pass these additional costs on to their customers by increasing their hourly rates, which, in turn, would affect their operation and maintenance budgets. Third, officials from each of the services expressed concern about the future maintenance, upgrades, and usage of service information technology systems transferring with depot maintenance supply functions to DLA. Fourth, depot maintenance and service officials expressed concerns about several human capital issues, ranging from turnover among affected employees and limited promotion potential to the possibility of outsourcing transferred positions to the private sector. The extent to which any of these concerns may actually materialize is unknown, as implementation has not yet begun. DLA is developing plans to minimize the risk of disrupting depot maintenance, but it faces several challenges. In addition, DLA plans to time phase the transfer of SS&D functions across the implementation period, which extends to September 2011. Our analysis of the BRAC Commission cost and savings estimates and DLA's planning documents shows that over the fiscal year 2006 to 2011 BRAC implementation period, estimated costs have increased by about $45 million and estimated savings have decreased--by about $1 billion--for transferring the SS&D functions and associated inventories from the military services' industrial depots to DLA. Fri, 26 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071007.pdf The Army expects significant personnel growth, more than 50 percent in some cases, at 18 domestic bases through 2011 because of the effect of implementing base realignment and closure (BRAC), overseas force rebasing, and force modularity actions. This growth creates the need for additional support infrastructure at these bases and in nearby communities. Military construction costs of over $17 billion are expected for new personnel, and communities will incur infrastructure costs as well. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. It addresses (1) the challenges and associated risks the Army faces in providing for timely infrastructure support at its gaining installations and (2) how communities are planning and funding for infrastructure to support incoming personnel and their families. GAO analyzed personnel restationing numbers, discussed planning efforts with Army and community officials, and visited nine of the larger gaining bases and nearby communities. The Army has developed plans to accommodate the growth of about 154,000 personnel at its domestic bases, but it faces several complex implementation challenges that risk late provision of needed infrastructure to adequately support incoming personnel. First, Army plans continue to evolve, and Army headquarters and each of the nine gaining bases we visited were relying on different numbers of personnel movements and were not fully aware of the causes for the variances. For example, Fort Benning officials expected more than 6,000 additional soldiers and military students than Army headquarters planned. Because consistency in the relocation numbers is important for properly determining not only base infrastructure support needs but those of nearby communities as well, inconsistent numbers could lead to an improperly sized facilities' infrastructure. Second, the Army faces challenges in synchronizing personnel movements with planned newly constructed on-base infrastructure improvements. Any significant delays in implementing planned actions could place the Army at risk of not meeting BRAC statutory deadlines. Third, competing priorities could lead the Army to redirect resources planned for needed infrastructure improvements and operations to such priorities as current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as has happened in the past. However, such redirection of resources could undermine the Army's ability to complete infrastructure improvements in time to support personnel movements and to meet planned timelines. Fourth, the Army Corps of Engineers, the primary construction agent for the Army, must manage an unprecedented volume of construction, implement a new construction strategy designed to save construction costs and time, and complete infrastructure improvements within available resources and planned timelines. The Army recognizes these challenges and is refining its implementation plans to overcome these challenges. While communities surrounding growth bases GAO visited have generally proactively planned for anticipated growth, they have been hindered in fully identifying additional infrastructure requirements and associated costs by the evolving nature of the Army's plans and different interpretations of the plans. For example, while Army officials at Fort Benning, Georgia, project an influx of about 10,000 school-age children, the Department of Defense's (DOD) November 2006 figures project only about 600. At the time of our review, these disparities remained unresolved. Communities surrounding growth bases have their own unique infrastructure improvement needs, such as schools, housing, or transportation, based on (1) the number of personnel to actually move to the nearby base, (2) the community's current capacity in its area(s) of need, and (3) the community's own capacity to finance additional infrastructure requirements and the availability of federal or state assistance to finance these needs. Some communities had already sought federal and state assistance to help finance construction efforts at the time of GAO's review even though the evolving nature of the Army's planning prevented the communities from having reasonable assurance that they knew the full scope of their infrastructure requirements. Thu, 13 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071040.pdf The Army is implementing 44 base realignment and closure (BRAC) recommendations to construct 125 new Armed Forces Reserve Centers (AFRC) and close 387 existing reserve components facilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) expects the new AFRCs to increase recruiting and retention and create greater efficiencies by fostering jointness and consolidating functions. GAO (1) assessed the extent DOD's cost and savings estimates to implement the recommendations have changed from BRAC Commission projections and (2) determined the extent the Army has identified potential challenges that could affect BRAC implementation and has developed a plan to address these challenges. GAO analyzed DOD's publicly available BRAC budget data and interviewed officials at Army offices, including Reserve Command, National Guard Bureau, and the National Guard in five states. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority to initiate evaluations, is one of a series related to the BRAC 2005 round. Since the BRAC Commission issued its projections in 2005, DOD's cost estimates for implementing the reserve component recommendations have increased at the same time savings estimates have decreased. Implementation cost estimates increased from $2.9 billion to $3.2 billion--a 13 percent or $363 million increase in constant dollars--mostly due to higher military construction cost estimates. Annual recurring savings estimates decreased from $323 million to $288 million--an 11 percent decrease in constant dollars. However, GAO analysis suggests that these savings could be significantly less than currently estimated because over 90 percent of these savings are associated with eliminating positions currently held by military personnel without corresponding decreases in end strength in the force structure. GAO and the BRAC Commission have previously reported that military personnel eliminations are not a true source of savings because DOD does not expect to reduce end strength correspondingly but rather intends to reassign or shift these personnel to vacant positions in other areas. Although GAO agrees that transferring personnel to vacant positions may enhance capabilities and allows DOD to redirect freed-up resources to another area of need, GAO does not believe that such transfers produce a tangible dollar savings that DOD can apply to fund other defense priorities outside the military personnel accounts because these personnel will remain in the end strength--continuing to receive salaries and benefits. However, DOD's treatment of military personnel savings represents a long-standing difference of opinion between DOD and GAO. The Army has identified several potential challenges in implementing the 44 reserve component recommendations. These include completing many construction projects in a compressed time frame, realizing efficiencies based on limited testing of new military construction processes, potential increasing land and supporting infrastructure costs, and changing force structure and mission requirements that may affect facility capacity. The Army has started construction on 5 of the 125 AFRC projects, and the extent these challenges might occur remains uncertain until the Army receives and evaluates more AFRC construction proposals and more AFRCs are built. However, because the Army does not have a plan to routinely bring together the various key stakeholders involved in the construction of these facilities, including the state Army National Guard when appropriate, the extent the Army is able to monitor and quickly address potential challenges is unclear. Best practices suggest that involving stakeholders in planning can help create a clearer understanding among the stakeholders of competing demands, the limited resources available, and how those demands and resources require continuous balancing. Without a plan that brings together key stakeholders, it could be more difficult for the Army to monitor for implementation challenges and work through alternatives to mitigate them in a timely manner. Thu, 13 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071203r.pdf This correspondence follows up an August 1, 2007, meeting to discuss concerns about changes in the cost and savings estimates and the potential loss of expertise and experience from the closure of Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, among other issues, since the recommendation to close Fort Monmouth as part of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round became effective. The work since the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's (the Commission) recommendations became effective has been done under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct reviews on his own initiative and has focused on the implementation of realignment and closure actions. This brief summary reviews our public observations made in 2005 about the 2005 BRAC round, specifically those related to Fort Monmouth. Also reviewed, under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct reviews on his own initiative, is the methodology of a forthcoming DOD report on the transfer of technical capabilities from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. While we concluded that DOD used a fundamentally sound overall process, we made numerous observations about the department's BRAC recommendations and decision-making process. On the one hand, DOD's decision-making process for developing its BRAC recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and reasoned, but we also identified limitations with cost and savings estimates and certain human capital challenges related to the potential loss of experience and expertise after certain recommendations were implemented, among other observations. Limitations with cost and savings estimates included the following (1) reassigning military personnel could provide a false sense of savings, (2) magnitude of savings from business process reengineering efforts was uncertain, (3) lengthy payback periods for many recommendations exist, (4) there are differences between communities and DOD on cost and savings estimates, (5) savings assumptions for some civilian and military personnel reductions lacked manpower studies, (6) full estimated environmental restoration costs were uncertain, (7)certain other expected costs and savings to the government were not accounted for, and (8) DOD's past efforts at tracking actual cost and savings had been limited. Thu, 06 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07304.pdf The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers was expected to yield more savings than any other of the 2005 BRAC recommendations. To achieve these savings the Navy plans to integrate civilian depot personnel to complete some repairs at intermediate maintenance departments to reduce aviation maintenance costs. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to the 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO's objectives were to (1) analyze the reasons for changes in costs and savings estimates since the recommendation was approved, and (2) identify challenges in implementing this BRAC recommendation. GAO analyzed Navy and BRAC Commission costs and savings estimates and interviewed officials at the Naval Air Systems Command and at three fleet readiness centers. The Navy has increased onetime costs, decreased onetime savings and increased annual recurring savings expected from the fleet readiness centers recommendation, but GAO believes the savings are likely overstated. In preparing a detailed business plan for implementing the recommendation, the Navy increased onetime costs by $31 million or 96 percent because of costs associated with relocating employees and inflation. The Navy also decreased expected onetime savings from reduced inventory levels by $594 million or 92 percent because Navy officials believed earlier estimates were too optimistic. GAO's analysis of inventory levels for a sample of aviation items indicates that the majority of the revised savings estimate will not occur during the 6-year BRAC implementation period and the amount of such savings are uncertain at this time. GAO believes the annual recurring savings are overstated by about $53 million or 15 percent because the Navy's estimate includes $28 million in savings from eliminating military personnel, which may be assigned elsewhere rather than taken out of the force structure, and $25 million in onetime savings that was erroneously reported as recurring savings. While projected savings would remain substantial, they are still subject to some uncertainties and further efforts will be required to assess actual savings as this recommendation is implemented. The Navy faces challenges in ensuring projected savings are realized and faces some workforce challenges in implementing the recommendation. Since the Navy has already included projected BRAC savings in its budget for fiscal years 2007 through 2011, it will be important for the Navy to monitor the extent to which these savings are actually achieved to prevent adverse affects on naval aviation readiness or the need for additional funding. The Navy also faces workforce challenges, such as identifying and moving about 150 depot artisans with the right skills to various intermediate maintenance departments and integrating a primarily civilian depot workforce with the military intermediate department workforce. This mixing of diverse cultures could pose some challenges in implementation but should help develop a better trained and more productive workforce. The Navy will need sustained leadership to successfully establish the fleet readiness centers. Fri, 29 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07641.pdf The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations affected 62 percent of the flying units in the Air National Guard (ANG) with 14 units losing their flying mission, and others converting from one type of aircraft to another, or increasing or decreasing assigned aircraft. To implement the recommendations, ANG must relocate hundreds of aircraft and retrain or recruit about 15,000 personnel by 2011. In this report, GAO addresses the status of efforts to implement the ANG BRAC actions. GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the process to provide replacement missions to units losing flying missions, (2) the progress and challenges in implementing the BRAC actions, and (3) changes to the cost and savings estimates. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO conducted its work at the Air Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11 states affected by BRAC 2005 Through a consultative process that involved key stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG assigned 30 replacement missions for affected units that supported either the future force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force developed a prioritized list of potential mission areas for ANG, but let ANG, with input from state leadership, decide which missions to assign to specific units. ANG assigned affected units 23 missions from the prioritized list. ANG also assigned 7 new flying missions to affected units on the basis of its leadership goal to have at least 1 flying mission per state and to maximize the number of flying missions where possible. ANG is making progress in planning to implement the BRAC recommendations, but lacks a strategy to address implementation challenges. Without such a strategy, several challenges could delay when some units are able to perform their new missions. ANG has developed programming plans for the BRAC-related actions affecting the ANG and a plan to move hundreds of aircraft. However, ANG faces challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions required to implement BRAC, such as developing manning documents that provide the specific skill mixes required, and in ensuring there is sufficient space in Air Force schools to accommodate personnel requiring training. For example, ANG projects that about 3,000 personnel need to be trained for intelligence missions, but the school can currently accommodate only a portion of this requirement. ANG has worked with the Air Force to develop potential solutions, but these have yet to be fully implemented. There may also be delays in obtaining security clearances for personnel due to the lengthy clearance process. Further, bridge missions have not been identified for some units that will face a gap between old and new missions. ANG also faces possible delays in obtaining required funding for new equipment, construction, and training. Finally, some ANG units believe there has been insufficient communication with ANG headquarters about new mission requirements, which impacts their ability to recruit and train personnel. GAO's analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there will be annual recurring costs of $53 million rather than estimated $26 million annual recurring savings for the ANG related actions. Further, the Air Force is not using BRAC funds for over $300 million for military construction, training, and equipment to establish replacement missions for units losing their flying mission. However, because these costs are not included in the Air Force BRAC budget submission, Congress does not have full visibility over BRAC-related implementation costs. Wed, 16 May 2007 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07166.pdf The cleanup of environmental contamination on unneeded property resulting from prior defense base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds has been a key impediment to the transfer of these properties and could be an issue in the transfer and reuse of unneeded property resulting from the 2005 BRAC round. GAO's analysis of available data indicates that, when completed, the cleanup for the four prior BRAC rounds is expected to cost about $13.2 billion and additional costs will be needed for BRAC 2005 property. These costs reduce BRAC savings, especially in the short term. Because of broad congressional interest in BRAC, GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. GAO's objectives were to examine costs to clean up 2005 BRAC properties, progress in transferring prior BRAC rounds properties to other users, and opportunities to expedite cleanups and transfers. To address these issues, GAO analyzed cleanup cost estimates, interviewed environmental officials and visited seven bases. While expected environmental cleanup costs for unneeded property arising from the 2005 BRAC round are not yet fully known, Department of Defense (DOD) data indicate that about $950 million will be needed to clean up these bases, adding to the estimated $13.2 billion total cleanup cost for the prior rounds. Although DOD's cleanup program has matured compared to prior BRAC rounds, there are still many unknowns and the cleanup estimate for the 2005 round should be considered preliminary. In fact, environmental cleanup costs are likely to increase as more intensive environmental investigations are undertaken, additional hazardous conditions are discovered, and future reuse plans are finalized. Furthermore, Congress does not have full visibility over the total cost of DOD's BRAC cleanup efforts because none of the four reports DOD prepares on various aspects of environmental cleanup present all types of costs--past and future--to complete cleanup at each base. Compiling a complete picture of all costs requires extracting information from multiple reports, as GAO has done to estimate the total cleanup cost for the four prior BRAC rounds. More complete and transparent cost information would assist Congress in conducting its oversight responsibilities for this multibillion dollar effort. While GAO's analysis shows that DOD continues to make progress in transferring over 502,500 acres of unneeded property from the four prior BRAC rounds--78 percent of the acres have now been transferred compared to 72 percent 2 years ago--over 112,300 acres remain untransferred. Comparatively, a total of about 102,000 acres are potentially transferable as a result of the 2005 BRAC round. Impediments to transfer continue to be related primarily to a variety of interrelated environmental cleanup issues, including limited technology to address unexploded ordnance and prolonged negotiations on compliance with environmental regulations. Opportunities exist to expedite the cleanup and transfer of unneeded 2005 BRAC properties compared with other BRAC rounds. Congress provided DOD with a wide range of property transfer authorities for prior BRAC rounds. In the past DOD did not use some tools as much as others out of deference to community land reuse plans. For example, low- and no-cost transfer tools accounted for 65 percent of all acres transferred, whereas public and negotiated sales accounted for 5 percent. DOD's March 2006 guidance now encourages the services to make full use of all tools for transferring properties resulting from both the 2005 and prior-year BRAC rounds. The services have processes in place to monitor their progress to clean up and transfer BRAC properties, but they are not required to report periodically to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on their successes and challenges in using various transfer authorities. Collectively, such lessons learned could help others expedite the cleanup and transfer of unneeded properties by maximizing the use of all available tools, thereby accelerating the economic benefits of property reuse to communities while also saving the ongoing caretaker costs being incurred by DOD for unneeded properties. Tue, 30 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05905.pdf On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted 222 base realignment and closure (BRAC) recommendations, involving an unprecedented 837 BRAC actions, to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission for its review. DOD expects the proposals, if approved, would generate net annual recurring savings of about $5.5 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012 and net savings of nearly $50 billion over a 20-year period, despite an expected cost of over $24 billion to implement the recommendations. The Commission is charged with reviewing these proposals and submitting its own list to the President by September 8, 2005. The Commission requested GAO to provide testimony before the Commission summarizing the results of its report, issued on July 1, 2005, on the 2005 BRAC process. This statement presents GAO views on (1)whether DOD's selection process in developing BRAC actions was logical and reasoned, (2) selected issues regarding the recommendations, and (3) certain challenges associated with implementing the BRAC recommendations, if approved. DOD established and generally followed a logical and reasoned process for assessing its bases and considering potential BRAC actions. The process was organized in a largely sequential manner with an emphasis on ensuring that reliable data were obtained and used, with special audit assistance from military service audit agencies and the DOD Inspector General. Despite some overlap in data collection and other phases of the process, the three military departments and seven joint cross-service groups generally followed the sequential BRAC process to evaluate facilities and functions, and identify recommendations in their respective areas. DOD's analytical process also addressed requirements of the BRAC legislation regarding the certification of data, basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure plan and emphasizing use of military value criteria as a primary basis for decision making--including consideration of such facets as homeland defense and surge capabilities--which the Congress added for emphasis in 2005. GAO did, however, identify a number of issues with the proposed recommendations that may warrant attention by the BRAC Commission. For example, while GAO believes savings could be achieved from DOD's proposals, there are certain limitations associated with the magnitude of the savings projected by DOD. About 47 percent, or $2.5 billion of DOD's projected net annual recurring savings is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also reduce or eliminate dollar savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings are also projected from efficiency measures and other actions related to a variety of recommendations, but underlying assumptions have not been validated and may be difficult to track and achieve over time. GAO also identified many recommendations requiring far longer periods of time for savings to offset the costs associated with implementing the recommendations than was typical in the 1995 BRAC round, raising questions about the cost/benefit ratio of selected recommendations. There are significant implementation challenges that lie ahead, to the extent proposed recommendations are approved, which could have a bearing on the ultimate savings realized and overall success of the BRAC round. They include the need for (1) transition planning to minimize the adverse impacts on operations, including steps to mitigate the potential loss of specialized human capital skills; (2) mechanisms to monitor implementation of recommendations in line with approved actions, along with mechanisms to ensure the tracking and periodic updating of savings that DOD expects from implementing the recommendations; (3) plans to address and adequately fund environmental restoration of unneeded property in order to expedite property transfer and put property to productive reuse; and (4) assistance for both losing and gaining communities affected by BRAC recommendations, including costs to DOD and other federal agencies. Mon, 18 Jul 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05785.pdf On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of Defense submitted proposed base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions to an independent commission for its review. The Commission must submit its recommendations to the President by September 8, 2005, for his acceptance or rejection in their entirety. Congress has final action to accept or reject these recommendations in their entirety later this year. The law requires that GAO issue a report on the Department of Defense's (DOD) recommendations and selection process by July 1, 2005. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which DOD's proposals achieved its stated BRAC goals, (2) analyze whether the process for developing recommendations was logical and reasoned, and (3) identify issues with the recommendations that may warrant further attention. Time constraints limited GAO's ability to examine implementation details of most of the individual recommended actions. DOD had varying success in achieving its 2005 BRAC goals of (1) reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings, (2) furthering transformation, and (3) fostering jointness. While DOD proposed a record number of closures and realignments, exceeding all prior BRAC rounds combined, many proposals focused on reserve bases and relatively few on closing active bases. Projected savings are almost equally large, but most savings are derived from 10 percent of the recommendations. While GAO believes savings would be achieved, overall up-front investment costs of an estimated $24 billion are required, and there are clear limitations associated with DOD's projection of nearly $50 billion in savings over a 20-year period. Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also limit dollar savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings were projected from efficiency measures and other actions, but underlying assumptions have not been validated and could be difficult to track over time. Some proposals represent efforts to foster jointness and transformation, such as initial joint training for the Joint Strike Fighter, but progress in each area varied, with many decisions reflecting consolidations within, and not across, the military services. In addition, transformation was often cited as support for proposals, but it was not well defined, and there was a lack of agreement on various transformation options. DOD's process for conducting its analysis was generally logical, reasoned, and well documented. DOD's process placed strong emphasis on data, tempered by military judgment, as appropriate. The military services and seven joint cross-service groups, which focused on common business-oriented functions, adapted their analytical approaches to the unique aspects of their respective areas. Yet, they were consistent in adhering to the use of military value criteria, including new considerations introduced for this round, such as surge and homeland defense needs. Data accuracy was enhanced by the required use of certified data and by efforts of the DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies in checking the data. Time limitations and complexities introduced by DOD in weaving together an unprecedented 837 closure and realignment actions across the country into 222 individual recommendations caused GAO to focus more on evaluating major cross-cutting issues than on implementation issues of individual recommendations. GAO identified various issues that may warrant further attention by the Commission. Some apply to a broad range of recommendations, such as assumptions and inconsistencies in developing certain cost and savings estimates, lengthy payback periods, or potential impacts on affected communities. GAO also identified certain candidate recommendations, including some that were changed by senior DOD leadership late in the process that may warrant attention. Fri, 01 Jul 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05614.pdf The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, authorized a new round of base realignment and closures (BRAC) in 2005, the fifth such round in recent years but the first since 1995. The legislation requires the Secretary of Defense to submit his list of bases recommended for closure and realignment to an independent BRAC commission by May 16, 2005. The Commission is charged with reviewing these recommendations and submitting its report with recommendations to the President for his acceptance or rejection of them in their entirety by September 8, 2005. Subsequently, the Congress has final action to accept or reject the recommendations in their entirety later this year. By law, GAO is mandated to review the Department of Defense's (DOD) process and recommendations and to report its findings by July 1, 2005. For the inaugural hearing of the 2005 BRAC Commission GAO was asked to address: (1) the status of implementing recommendations from previous BRAC rounds, (2) DOD's expectations for the 2005 BRAC round, and (3) the analytical framework for the 2005 BRAC round. GAO offers some suggestions for the Commission to consider as it prepares for the 2005 BRAC round. DOD indicates that recommendations from the previous BRAC rounds were implemented within the 6-year period mandated by law. As a result, DOD estimated that it reduced its domestic infrastructure by about 20 percent; about 90 percent of unneeded BRAC property is now available for reuse. Substantial net savings of approximately $29 billion have been realized. Most communities surrounding closed bases are continuing to recover from the impact of BRAC and faring well compared with average U.S. rates for unemployment and income growth. In examining DOD's proposed closures and realignments, the Commission may want to ensure that all proposed closure and realignment actions can be implemented within the mandated 6-year period recognizing property transfers may take longer. DOD's expectations for the 2005 BRAC round include the traditional emphasis on eliminating unneeded infrastructure and achieving savings. It also expects to use BRAC to further transformation and related efforts such as restationing of troops from overseas as well as efforts to further joint basing among the military services. DOD's preliminary assessment of excess capacity completed outside the BRAC process in 2004 to help justify the 2005 round has led to much speculation about the percentage of bases likely to close. While DOD's assessment gave some indication of excess capacity across certain functional areas, GAO's assessment showed the methodology had significant limitations, such as use of varying capacity metrics among the military services for similar type facilities. As a result, it is difficult to use that data to make a reliable projection of total excess capacity across DOD, or projections of number of bases likely to close. Further, the methodology neither fully considered the potential impact of major force structuring and other rebasing changes nor the impact of analyzing facilities or functions on a joint or cross-service basis, a priority for the 2005 round. We await the results of DOD's proposed closures and realignments to see the extent of potential capacity reduction and how the results of this round compare with prior rounds. The Commission may want to look at such measures as projected net reduction in plant replacement value or square footage of space as reduction indicators. The 2005 BRAC round process follows a historical analytical framework with many elements of the process being carried forward or building upon lessons learned from the past. A key part of that framework is the selection criteria which essentially follow a framework similar to that employed in prior BRAC rounds, with more specificity in selected areas mandated by Congress. The Commission may want to be aware of changes for the 2005 round based on lessons learned from the past related to such issues as privatizing functions in place as a closure option, considering total cost to the government in evaluating closure and realignment recommendations, clarifying the size of reserve enclaves that may be created, and strengthening the emphasis on cross-servicing of selected functions and increased jointness in basing decisions. Tue, 03 May 2005 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05138.pdf As the Department of Defense (DOD) prepares for the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round, questions continue to be raised about the transfer and environmental cleanup of unneeded property arising from the prior four BRAC rounds and their impact on cost and savings and on local economies. This report, which is being issued to the defense authorization committees that have oversight responsibility over defense infrastructure, describes DOD's progress in implementing prior BRAC postclosure actions. It addresses (1) the transfer of unneeded base property to other users, (2) the magnitude of the net savings accruing from the prior rounds, (3) estimated costs for environmental cleanup of BRAC property, and (4) the economic recovery of communities affected by base closures. As of September 30, 2004, DOD had transferred about 72 percent of 504,000 acres of unneeded BRAC property to other entities. This amount represents an increase over the 42 percent that GAO previously reported in April 2002 and is primarily attributable to two large property transfers. When leased acreage is added to the transferred property, the amount of unneeded BRAC property in reuse rises to 90 percent. Transfer of the remaining acreage has been delayed primarily because of environmental cleanup requirements. DOD data show that the department had generated an estimated $28.9 billion in net savings or cost avoidances from the prior BRAC rounds through fiscal year 2003 and expects to save about $7 billion each year thereafter. These savings reflect money that DOD would likely have spent to operate military bases had they remained open. Although the savings are substantial, GAO found that the estimates are imprecise because the military services have not updated them regularly despite GAO's prior reported concerns on this issue. This issue needs to be addressed in the 2005 round. Further, the estimates do not reflect all BRAC-related costs, such as $1.9 billion incurred by DOD and other federal agencies for redevelopment assistance. While estimated costs for environmental cleanup at BRAC sites remain within the range of prior estimates, these costs may increase if unknown or undetermined future cleanup liabilities, such as additional unexploded ordnance or other harmful contaminants, emerge. Through fiscal year 2003, DOD had spent about $8.3 billion on BRAC environmental cleanup. It expects to spend another $3.6 billion to complete the cleanup work. While most nearby communities have recovered or continue to recover from base closures, they, as well as other communities, have felt some impact from the recent economic downturn where the strength of the national, regional, or local economy can affect recovery efforts. Yet, key economic indicators--unemployment rates and average annual real per capita income growth rates--show that BRAC communities are generally faring well when compared with average U.S. rates. Of 62 communities that GAO studied, 69 percent had unemployment rates equal to or lower than the U.S. average and 48 percent had income growth rates higher than the national average. Thu, 13 Jan 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05207.pdf GAO's audits and evaluations identify federal programs and operations that, in some cases, are high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Increasingly, GAO also is identifying high-risk areas to focus on the need for broad-based transformations to address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. Since 1990, GAO has periodically reported on government operations that it has designated as high risk. In this 2005 update for the 109th Congress, GAO presents the status of high-risk areas identified in 2003 and new high-risk areas warranting attention by the Congress and the administration. Lasting solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, dramatically improve service to the American public, strengthen public confidence and trust in the performance and accountability of our national government, and ensure the ability of government to deliver on its promises. In January 2003, GAO identified 25 high-risk areas; in July 2003, a 26th high-risk area was added to the list. Since then, progress has been made in all areas, although the nature and significance of progress varies by area. Federal departments and agencies, as well as the Congress, have shown a continuing commitment to addressing high-risk challenges and have taken various steps to help correct several of the problems' root causes. GAO has determined that sufficient progress has been made to remove the high-risk designation from three areas: student financial aid programs, FAA financial management, and Forest Service financial management. Also, four areas related to IRS have been consolidated into two areas. This year, GAO is designating four new high-risk areas. The first new area is establishing appropriate and effective information-sharing mechanisms to improve homeland security. Federal policy creates specific requirements for information-sharing efforts, including the development of processes and procedures for collaboration between federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. This area has received increased attention but the federal government still faces formidable challenges sharing information among stakeholders in an appropriate and timely manner to minimize risk. The second and third new areas are, respectively, DOD's approach to business transformation and its personnel security clearance program. GAO has reported on inefficiencies and inadequate transparency and accountability across DOD's major business areas, resulting in billions of dollars of wasted resources. Senior leaders have shown commitment to business transformation through individual initiatives in acquisition reform, business modernization, and financial management, among others, but little tangible evidence of actual improvement has been seen in DOD's business operations to date. DOD needs to take stronger steps to achieve and sustain business reform on a departmentwide basis. Further, delays by DOD in completing background investigations and adjudications can affect the entire government because DOD performs this function for hundreds of thousands of industry personnel from 22 federal agencies, as well as its own service members, federal civilian employees, and industry personnel. OPM is to assume DOD's personnel security investigative function, but this change alone will not reduce the shortages of investigative personnel. The fourth area is management of interagency contracting. Interagency contracts can leverage the government's buying power and provide a simplified and expedited method of procurement. But several factors can pose risks, including the rapid growth of dollars involved combined with the limited expertise of some of agencies in using these contracts and recent problems related to their management. Various improvement efforts have been initiated to address this area, but improved policies and processes, and their effective implementation, are needed to ensure that interagency contracting achieves its full potential in the most effective and efficient manner. Sat, 01 Jan 2005 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04760.pdf The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, as amended, required the Department of Defense (DOD) to address several base realignment and closure (BRAC) issues in 2004 for the 2005 BRAC round to proceed. The requirements included reporting on a 20-year force structure plan, an inventory of military installations, and separately adopting selection criteria for the upcoming round. The legislation also required DOD to certify whether an additional BRAC round was needed, and, if so, that annual net savings would be realized not later than fiscal year 2011. If the certifications were provided, GAO was required to evaluate DOD's submissions and report to Congress. DOD reported on March 23, 2004, and provided the certifications. In this report GAO evaluates (1) DOD's responsiveness to legislative requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and selection criteria; (3) other key issues included in DOD's report; and (4) DOD's certification regarding the need for an additional BRAC round. DOD's report to Congress generally addressed all legislative reporting requirements in section 2912 of the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, as amended, and separately complied with requirements under Section 2913 in adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. The degree of coverage on some reporting requirements was limited to avoid prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 round. As directed, GAO analyzed DOD's worldwide installation inventory, force structure plan, and selection criteria. While all three are important in setting a framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in guiding DOD's analyses for the 2005 round. The unclassified portion of the 20-year force structure plan, extending through 2009, provides a macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions), and reflects limited changes across the military services, even though the services have initiatives under way that could affect future force structure and infrastructure requirements. Today's security environment is evolving, as are force structure requirements along with technology advancements, and defense transformation efforts. The department must consider these factors in its BRAC analyses with appropriate allowances for future uncertainties. DOD's selection criteria closely parallel criteria used in previous rounds, while incorporating the provisions required by legislation authorizing the 2005 round. The analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed through their application in the ongoing BRAC process. GAO addressed other BRAC-related issues such as excess defense infrastructure capacity and BRAC savings because of their importance to DOD's certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round. DOD's excess capacity analysis, completed for the 2004 report, has some limitations that could result in either overstating or understating excess capacity across various functional areas, and make it difficult to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD. While the analysis gives some indications of excess capacity within the department, the issue warrants a more complete assessment in the BRAC process. That process will also consider joint base use with the potential for better identifying excess capacity. DOD's historical financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 rounds, each of the military departments could achieve annual net savings by 2011, as stipulated by the mandate. While the potential exists for substantial savings from the upcoming round, it is difficult to conclusively project the expected magnitude of the savings because there are too many unknowns at this time. Additionally, improvements are needed in DOD's accounting for savings after BRAC decisions are made. GAO found no basis to question DOD's certification of the need for an additional BRAC round. While clear limitations exist in DOD's assessment of excess capacity, it does point to some areas that warrant additional analysis-and the current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing so. Mon, 17 May 2004 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04558t.pdf The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 authorized an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round in 2005. The legislation requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide Congress in early 2004 with a report that addresses excess infrastructure and certifies that an additional BRAC round is needed and that annual net savings will be realized by each military department not later than fiscal year 2011. GAO is required to assess this information as well as the selection criteria for the 2005 round and report to Congress within 60 days of DOD's submission. The legislation also retains the requirement for GAO to assess the BRAC 2005 decisionmaking process and resulting recommendations. This testimony addresses (1) the BRAC process from a historical perspective, (2) GAO's role in the process, and (3) GAO's initial observations on key issues DOD is required to address in preparation for the 2005 round. Because DOD had not submitted its required 2004 report at the time we completed this statement, this testimony relies on our prior work that addressed issues associated with excess capacity and BRAC savings. GAO's work in examining lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds found that the prior legislation and the framework it outlined served the process well, and that it should provide a useful framework for a future round. Furthermore, the legislation and its implementation provided for checks and balances to ensure the integrity of the process. GAO has played a long-standing role as an independent and objective observer of the BRAC process. GAO has operated in a real-time setting and has had access to significant portions of the process as it has evolved, thus affording DOD an early opportunity to address any concerns GAO might identify. GAO's role in the 2005 round remains the same, and GAO has been observing the process since DOD began work on the 2005 round. Timely access to DOD data is key to fulfilling GAO's role. GAO's initial observations on key issues DOD is required to address in its 2004 report are as follows. The selection criteria for the 2005 round are basically sound and provide a good framework for assessing alternatives. Nevertheless, GAO provided DOD with comments on the draft criteria that focused on the need for clarification of how DOD intends to consider total costs to DOD and other federal agencies and environmental costs in its analyses. The department has indicated that it would be issuing clarifying guidance. DOD plans to estimate its excess capacity using a methodology that it used in 1998 for similar purposes. While this methodology provides a rough indication of excess capacity for selected functional areas, it has a number of limitations that create imprecision when trying to project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD. A more complete assessment of capacity and the potential to reduce it must await the results of the current BRAC analyses being conducted by DOD during the 2005 round. DOD financial data suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, each military department could achieve annual net savings by 2011. While we believe that the potential exists for significant savings to result from the 2005 round, there are simply too many unknowns at this time to say conclusively to what extent annual net savings will be realized by 2011. For example, in 2005 DOD is placing increased emphasis on jointness and transformation and is likely to use BRAC to incorporate any force redeployments from overseas locations that may result from ongoing overseas basing reassessments. This suggests a need for caution in projecting the timing and amount of savings from a new BRAC round. Thu, 25 Mar 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04288.pdf The Department of Defense's (DOD) military construction program provides funding for construction projects in the United States and overseas, and funds most base realignment and closure costs. Recent Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) estimates indicate that it would cost as much as $164 billion to improve facilities to a level that would meet the department's goals. GAO was asked to report on the (1) steps OSD has taken to enhance program management, (2) process of prioritizing and resourcing military construction projects, and (3) advantages and disadvantages of increasing the current funding thresholds for constructing and repairing facilities. Recognizing the need to halt the degradation of defense facilities, OSD took a number of steps to enhance the management of the military construction program by providing guidance through a facilities strategic plan and by standardizing practices through selected management tools. However, some of these tools are not completed, and others have weaknesses that further hinder efforts to improve facilities. OSD's strategic plan outlines long-term goals but lacks comprehensive information on the actions, time frames, responsibilities, and resources that are needed to meet DOD's vision for facilities. OSD has also established key financial objectives for the services to improve the condition of their facilities. Given competing funding pressures and that the process of realigning and closing bases to reduce excess infrastructure will take several years to accomplish, improvements in facilities will likely require much longer than suggested by OSD's objectives. DOD's process of prioritizing and resourcing military construction projects provides an important means of improving whole categories of facilities but can repeatedly postpone addressing important projects outside of those categories. If left unchecked without periodic reassessments, the process can continually defer projects important to installations' ability to accomplish their mission and improve servicemembers' quality of life. As much as 77 percent of military construction funds appropriated in any one year are distributed among specific areas of emphasis, such as housing, leaving a significantly smaller portion that is insufficient to repair the remaining categories of facilities. Some projects are not submitted for funding consideration because they do not fall within the specific areas of emphasis and thus are perceived as being highly unlikely to receive funding. Also, some high-cost priority projects are postponed for future years' funding because their addition would exceed the services' funding level established for that year. Congress may add projects during the appropriations process, addressing what it has considered as inadequate requests for funding. These projects may require adjustments in DOD's plans since they may not always align with DOD's short-term priorities. Increasing current funding thresholds for unspecified minor military construction projects would give DOD installations more flexibility, but might need to be balanced against reducing congressional oversight. Construction costs have increased as much as 41 percent since the thresholds were last adjusted upward. As a result, fewer projects that are smaller in scope can now be completed using these types of funds. Additionally, installation officials often scale back the scope of a project in order to meet the current thresholds, compromising design characteristics in the process. However, if the thresholds were increased, Congress could lose oversight of the additional projects funded under these thresholds because such construction projects are not specifically identified in the President's budget submissions. Yet, there are alternatives, such as coupling the increased thresholds with periodic reports on the usage of those funds. Tue, 24 Feb 2004 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03723.pdf While four previous base closure rounds have afforded the Department of Defense (DOD) the opportunity to divest itself of unneeded property, it has, at the same time, retained more than 350,000 acres and nearly 20 million square feet of facilities on enclaves at closed or realigned bases for use by the reserve components. In view of the upcoming 2005 base closure round, GAO undertook this review to ascertain if opportunities exist to improve the decision-making processes used to establish reserve enclaves. Specifically, GAO determined to what extent (1)specific infrastructure needs for reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment and closure decision making and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain enclaves were considered in deriving net estimated savings for realigning or closing bases. The specific infrastructure needed for many DOD reserve enclaves created under the previous base realignment and closure process was generally not identified until after a defense base closure commission had rendered its recommendations. While the Army generally decided it wanted much of the available training land for its enclaves before the time of the commission's decision making during the 1995 closure round, time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying specific training acreages and facilities until later. Subsequently, in some instances the Army created enclaves that were nearly as large as the bases that were being closed. In contrast, the infrastructure needed for Air Force reserve enclaves was more defined during the decision-making process. Moreover, DOD's enclave-planning processes generally did not include a cross-service analysis of military activities that may have benefited by their inclusion in a nearby enclave. The Army did not include estimated costs to operate and maintain its reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated base realignment or closure savings during the decision-making process, but the Air Force apparently did so in forming its enclaves. GAO's analysis showed that the Army overestimated savings and underestimated the time required to recoup initial investment costs to either realign or close those bases with proposed enclaves. However, these original cost omissions have not materially affected DOD's recent estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings from the previous closure rounds because the Army subsequently updated its estimates in its budget submissions to reflect expected enclave costs. Fri, 27 Jun 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03516.pdf GAO prepared this report under its basic legislative responsibilities. Its objectives are threefold: (1) to examine the reserve forces' trends for facility maintenance and construction funding and the condition of their facilities, (2) to assess the likelihood that they will meet the Department of Defense's (DOD) objectives for improving facilities, and (3) to discuss the challenges in implementing two potential cost saving initiatives--joint construction projects and real property exchanges. Funding for maintaining and constructing reserve component facilities has increased. Obligations for facility maintenance rose by about 70 percent from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2002 and annual appropriations for military construction rose 49 percent from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2003. Despite the increases, reserve components rated the condition of 64 percent of their facilities as inadequate, and GAO's visits to installations document the deteriorated condition of facilities. While GAO did not see any facilities that were not in use, the upcoming base realignment and closure round is expected to include an evaluation of reserve component facilities. The reserve components are unlikely to meet all of DOD's three objectives for improving facilities: achieve 100 percent sustainment funding starting in fiscal year 2004; reach a 67-year average recapitalization rate by fiscal year 2007; and improve the condition of facilities so that deficiencies have only a limited effect on mission performance by fiscal year 2010. Furthermore, some officials acknowledged that even when their components have expressed intent to meet DOD's objectives, their funding plans might include unrealistically high rates of increases during the out-years when compared to previous funding trends and against other defense priorities. The reserve components face challenges in implementing two potential cost saving initiatives--joint construction projects and real property exchanges. Reserve component officials said that funding joint construction projects--where two or more components share space requirements and build one facility--is difficult to coordinate. In addition, while Congress has provided the components with authority to exchange real property with other public or private entities in return for the construction of new facilities of equal or greater value--the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not provided overall direction for the program, thus risking the exchange of property that may be needed by other DOD components. Thu, 15 May 2003 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03274.pdf GAO prepared this report in response to its basic legislative responsibilities. Its objectives are threefold: (1) to examine the historical funding trends and their impact on the condition of the active forces' facilities, (2) to evaluate the consistency of the services' information on facility conditions, and (3) to assess the Department of Defense's (DOD) long-term strategic plan and objectives to improve facility conditions. While the amount of money the active forces have spent on facility maintenance has increased recently, DOD and service officials said these amounts have not been sufficient to halt the deterioration of facilities. Too little funding to adequately maintain facilities is also aggravated by DOD's acknowledged retention of facilities in excess of its needs. From fiscal year 1998 to 2001, obligations for facility maintenance rose by 26 percent with increases coming from higher annual budget requests, congressional designations that exceeded those requests, supplemental appropriations, and the services' movement of funds to maintenance projects. Funding for military construction also increased during this period. However, military reports and testimonies state that these amounts have been insufficient, and GAO's recent visits to installations document the deteriorated conditions of facilities. There is a lack of consistency in the services' information on facility conditions, making it difficult for Congress, DOD, and the services to direct funds to facilities where they are most needed and to accurately gauge facility conditions. Although DOD developed a standard rating scale to summarize facility conditions (C-ratings), each service has the latitude to use its own system for assessing conditions, including the types of facility raters, assessment frequencies, appraisal scales, and validation procedures. Although DOD has a strategic plan for facilities, it lacks comprehensive information on the specific actions, time frames, responsibilities, and funding needed to reach its goals. Also, DOD has set up three objectives to improve its facility conditions--to fully fund sustainment, to achieve a 67-year average recapitalization rate by fiscal year 2007, and to improve facility conditions so that deficiencies have limited effects on military mission achievement by fiscal year 2010. However, the services have not proposed to fully fund all the objectives and have developed funding plans to achieve others that have unrealistically high rates of increase during the out-years. At the same time, the services have not developed comprehensive performance plans to implement DOD's vision for facilities. Wed, 19 Feb 2003 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02475.pdf The military services face significant challenges in addressing facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization needs with limited funds. These challenges are magnified by the 20 to 25 percent of the Department of Defense's (DOD) real property that it views as not being needed to meet current mission requirements, but that adds to costs. To reduce these costs and acquire additional resources to maintain its facilities, DOD has developed a multi-part strategy involving base realignment and closure, housing and utility privatization, competitive sourcing of non-inherently governmental functions, and demolition of facilities that are no longer needed. Although the services continue to use the leasing authority provided for traditional type of leases, they have made limited efforts to use the expanded leasing authority enacted by Congress in fiscal year 2001. The services have identified a number of impediments that have limited the use of the expanded leasing authority and that could adversely affect the program in the future. Thu, 06 Jun 2002 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02433.pdf Through military base realignment and closures rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, the Pentagon significantly reduced its domestic infrastructure and freed up needed dollars for high-priority programs. By the end of last round in fiscal year 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) had closed or realigned hundreds of bases, generated savings, and transferred unneeded property to other users. The communities surrounding the former bases continue to recover economically from the closures. Congress recently authorized another round of base realignments and closures beginning in 2005. DOD has saved $16.7 billion through fiscal year 2001, and expects to save $6.6 billion in annually in future years. Although DOD plans to transfer nearly all of the 518,500 acres of unneeded base property to federal and nonfederal users, it has completed only some of the transfers. Environmental cleanup is the primary impediment to conveying the remaining property titles. The military services are using early transfer authority and leasing to make property available for reuse sooner. Although successful redevelopment of base property plays a key role in the economic recovery of neighboring communities, broader regional economic growth also is important to the process. Two economic indicators--the unemployment rate and average annual real capita income growth rate--show that most communities are doing well compared with average U.S. rates, despite delays in the transfer or reuse of former base property. But questions remain about some communities' ability to sustain their economic recovery over time, particularly in light of the recent downturn in the national economy. Fri, 05 Apr 2002 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011054t.pdf This testimony reviews the progress of the Department of Defense's (DOD) base realignments and closures (BRAC) in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 and the implementation of the BRAC Commissions' recommendations. Although some communities surrounding closed base areas are faring better than others, most are recovering from the initial economic impact of base closures. The short-term impact can be very traumatic for BRAC-affected communities, but the long-term economic recovery of communities depends on several factors, including the strength of the national and regional economies and successful redevelopment of base property. Key economic indicators show that the majority of communities surrounding closed bases are faring well economically in relation to U.S. unemployment rates and show some improvement since the time closures began in 1988. Implementation of BRAC recommendations is essentially completed, but title to only 41 percent of unneeded base property has been transferred. As of August 20, 2001, DOD reported that it has essentially implemented all of the BRAC Commission's 451 recommendations. Although DOD has made progress and established numerous initiatives to expedite cleanup, many cleanup activities remain. Cleaning up environmental contamination on BRAC-affected installations has proven to be costly and challenging for DOD and can delay the transfer of the title of property to other users. DOD expects to continue its environmental efforts well beyond fiscal year 2001, the final year of the base closure implementation authority. Tue, 28 Aug 2001 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01971.pdf Through four rounds of base closures and realignments between 1988 and 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) expected to reduce its domestic infrastructure and provide needed dollars for high priority programs, such as weapons modernization. Although DOD projects it will realize significant recurring savings from the closures and realignments, Congress continues to raise questions about how much, if any, money has been saved through the base closure process. Two GAO reports issued in late 1998 concluded that net savings from the four closure rounds were substantial but that the cost and savings estimates used to calculate the net savings were imprecise. This report reviews (1) the basis for DOD's recent increase in net savings projected to be realized from the closure process and (2) GAO's previous observations on the basis for savings from base closure and realignment actions and the precision of the cost and savings estimates. DOD's fiscal year 2001 budget request and documentation show that it now expects net savings of about $15.5 billion through fiscal year 2001 and about $6.1 billion in annual recurring savings thereafter, an increase from the $14.2 billion and about $5.6 billion, respectively, DOD reported in fiscal year 1999. GAO's analysis of the data showed that the net savings increase through fiscal year 2001 was due primarily to an overall reduction of about $723 million in reported costs and an increase of about $610 million in expected savings resulting from the closures. The net savings for the four rounds of base closures and realignments are substantial and are related to decreased funding requirements in specific operational areas. Reviews by the Congressional Budget Office, the DOD Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency have affirmed that net savings are substantial after initial investment costs are recouped. However, those same reviews also showed that the estimates are imprecise and should be viewed as a rough approximation of the likely savings. Tue, 31 Jul 2001 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00023.pdf Privatization-in-place is a concept in which a private sector entity takes over the operations of a facility that was once run by the government. So far, privatization-in-place has been associated with the base closure process and has been used by the Defense Department (DOD) to transfer industrial work to the private sector. With legislative constraints affecting DOD's ability to close military facilities, privatization-in-place is not likely to be used outside the base realignment and closure process. Three privatization-in-place efforts have resulted so far from the base closure process: the Air Force Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center in Newark, Ohio; the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Louisville, Kentucky; and the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, Indiana. These facilities primarily provide industrial services for the military. This report assesses the status, the cost, and the effectiveness of DOD's three privatization-in-place actions. GAO (1) determines how contractors are reacting to falling workloads at these privatized facilities, (2) compares the cost-effectiveness of the privatization-in-place operations to the former government-run operations, and (3) identifies the impact of privatization on excess capacity in DOD's industrial infrastructure. Mon, 20 Dec 1999 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99036.pdf By September 1998, the Defense Department (DOD) had completed actions on about 85 percent of the 451 recommendations made by the four base realignment and closure commissions. DOD declared about 464,000 acres of base property as excess. Forty-six percent of the unneeded property was to be kept by the federal government; 33 percent was slated for nonfederal users, such as state and local authorities or private parties; and the disposition of the rest was undecided. By 2001, DOD estimates that it will have spent $23 billion on base realignments and closures and saved $37 billion, for a net savings of $14 billion. Beyond 2001, when the last of the four rounds of base closures and realignments is complete, DOD expects to save $5.7 billion annually. However, the cost estimates omit some federally incurred costs, while the savings estimates have not been routinely updated and are thus imprecise. A major cost factor in base realignments and closures, as well as a major obstacle to the disposal of unneeded property, is the need for environmental cleanup at these bases. Available military data suggest that the total environmental cost will top $9 billion; the cleanup efforts, including monitoring, will extend well beyond 2001; and the potential for higher costs exists. Most communities adjoining closed bases are faring well economically in relation to the national average. Fri, 11 Dec 1998 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99017.pdf The Defense Department's (DOD) report to Congress on the costs and savings attributable to base realignments and closures contained most but not all of the information required by law. For example, although DOD provided aggregate estimates of savings in support costs due to base closures and realignments, it did not provide this information by service, type of facility, and fiscal year. DOD concludes that the four prior rounds of base closures, taken in aggregate, are saving the military billions of dollars each year. However, because of data and records weaknesses, DOD's reports should be viewed as providing a rough approximation of costs and savings rather than a precise accounting. Because the methodology used to identify excess capacity has several limitations, DOD's report gives only a rough indication that excess capacity has increased relative to force structure since 1989. However, other DOD studies, statements by DOD officials, and prior GAO work support the report's general conclusion that DOD continues to retain excess capacity. DOD's analysis of operational and readiness indicators has shown no long-term problems affecting military capabilities that can be related to base realignment and closure actions. This conclusion is consistent with earlier GAO work. DOD's report emphasizes that communities affected by prior base realignment and closure actions appear to be rebounding economically. GAO also found this to be the case, although some communities are faring better than others. Fri, 13 Nov 1998 00:00:00 -0500 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97052.pdf Costly excess capacity in the Navy depot infrastructure has been aggravated by the recent privatization-in-place of the Louisville depot. In comparing privatization-in-place to the transfer of workloads to other Navy facilities, the Navy understated the annual savings from transferring the work and overstated the one-time transfer fee. GAO estimates that transferring the workload rather than privatizing-in-place would have saved $48.6 million during the first five years. After that time, transferring would yield annual savings of nearly $30 million. One of the contractors at Louisville could take over part of Louisville's workload at another industrial facility it operates that has significant excess capacity. GAO included defense infrastructure in its list of government areas at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. (See GAO/HR-97-7, Feb. 1997.) GAO's main concern relates to inefficient business processes and excess capacity. The Defense Department needs an overall plan for addressing the problem. The situation at Louisville is representative of this overall concern. Thu, 31 Jul 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97151.pdf In its review of lessons learned from four rounds of military base closures and realignments, GAO found that many neighboring communities have been able to absorb the economic losses stemming from closed bases. Several federal programs appear to have helped cushion the impact of closing bases on individuals and communities. However, the Defense Department (DOD), which projects billions of dollars in annual savings from closed bases, has yet to produce firm data on expected savings. Given the historical difficulty of closing bases, new legislation will be needed if there are to be future base closures. DOD has proposed that Congress authorize two additional rounds of military base closures and realignments. If future rounds are authorized, decisions will be needed on the number of rounds, when they should be held, and how they will relate to other legislation dealing with downsizing and restructuring DOD's laboratories and test and evaluation facilities. The outcome of future rounds could be improved by resolving, in advance, key organizational and policy issues, such as which military service will be responsible for which support functions and whether some facilities will be managed jointly. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will have to exercise strong leadership to overcome the services' long-standing parochialism and inability to agree on significant cross-service consolidations in common support areas. Fri, 25 Jul 1997 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96172.pdf As of March 1996, the Defense Department (DOD) had set aside $3.4 billion for environmental cleanup at bases being closed under the base realignment and closure process. However, as more bases are closed and more cleanup efforts are undertaken, program costs are likely to rise significantly. Available DOD data suggest that program costs are likely to exceed $11 billion. The key reasons for the high cost of closing base cleanups are (1) the large number of contaminated sites and difficulties arising from the types of contamination, (2) requirements of federal and state laws and regulations, (3) lack of cost-effective cleanup technology for some contaminants, and (4) intended property reuse. Options for reducing cleanup costs at closing bases include deferring or extending cleanup actions, modifying existing laws and regulations, adopting more-effective cleanup technologies, and sharing costs with the ultimate user of the property. All of these options, however, have the potential for adversely impacting the goals of the program. Thu, 05 Sep 1996 00:00:00 -0400 http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96067.pdf Savings from military base closures and realignments should be substantial. The Pentagon's accounting systems, however, do not provide Congress with an accurate picture of actual savings. The Defense Department (DOD) is counting on significant savings to pay for a host of initiatives--from force modernization to child care support. DOD will have difficulty funding these programs should the savings fall short of expectations. This report examines cost and savings estimates for past base closures and realignments. GAO discusses (1) the extent to which the Defense Department (DOD) is achieving actual savings from the base closures and realignments and (2) the adequacy of DOD's process for developing the cost and savings estimates reported in its annual budget submissions. Mon, 08 Apr 1996 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154008.pdf During the 1995 round of base closures, the Pentagon's recommendations to close surplus military bases were generally sound, although GAO questions the reasonableness of specific recommendations. For example, some excess facilities were spared only because of high up-front shutdown costs. GAO singles out the Air Force process as particularly subjective and poorly documented. Also, the Navy did not consistently apply Defense Department (DOD) criteria when it decided to retain some facilities because of the economic impact their closure would have on local communities. Meanwhile, DOD's estimate of $1.8 billion in annual savings did not take into account potentially costly environmental cleanup activities at military bases. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Military Base Closures: Analysis of DOD's Process and Recommendations for 1995, by Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General for National Security and International Affairs Programs, before the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. GAO/T-NSIAD-95-132, Apr. 17, 1995 (15 pages). Fri, 14 Apr 1995 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/d44t15/148948.pdf The Defense Department's (DOD) selection process for military base closures and alignments--165 installations have been targeted as of March 1993--is generally sound, but savings estimates were overstated by nearly $1 billion and questions can be raised about the reasonableness of some specific recommendations. For example, (1) because the Navy stressed reducing excess capacity, cases arose in which bases were slated for closure even though other bases were considered of less military value; (2) the Army chose not to recommend a base for closure because of environmental cleanup costs--a reason excluded from calculations of closure costs; (3) existing documentation provides little insight into the reasoning behind some of the Air Force's final decisions, although Air Force officials' oral explanations seemed to make sense; and (4) the Defense Logistics Agency overstated estimated realignment savings. Furthermore, oversight by the Secretary of Defense during the base closure process was weak. The standards used for DOD's cumulative economic impact analyses were not supportable, and DOD continued to ignore government cost implications despite earlier GAO recommendations to the contrary. The effect of DOD's recommendations on federal agencies could be substantial, especially if the military moves out of General Services Administration buildings into new DOD facilities. In addition, hospital closings would also boost government Medicare costs. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures and Realignments, by Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General for National Security and International Affairs Programs, before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-11, Apr. 19, 1993 (10 pages). Thu, 15 Apr 1993 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/d20t9/143937.pdf Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reported on the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and the military services' selection process for base closures and realignments. GAO found that: (1) the Army and the Air Force adequately documented their use of the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan and the four military criteria in their selection process; (2) the Navy did not adequately document its site selection process and did not establish the required internal controls to ensure the accuracy of the data it used; (3) the services inconsistently employed the cost of base realignment action model to estimate the costs and savings associated with their recommended closures and realignments; (4) the services used budgets from different fiscal years as their baselines in estimating costs and savings and used different cost factors; (5) the services' net present-value factors for inflation and discount rates were too conservative; (6) the services used inaccurate input data to calculate costs and savings estimates; and (7) the services differed in the extent to which they examined the local or regional economic impact of base closure or realignment. Wed, 15 May 1991 00:00:00 -0400 http://archive.gao.gov/d26t7/140130.pdf GAO reviewed the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure's methodology, findings, and recommendations for realigning or closing military installations. GAO found that the Commission: (1) made methodology errors in ranking the bases on their relative military value, because it lacked adequate management controls for data verification; (2) overstated total savings estimates by about $170 million and omitted relevant cost estimates, primarily because it lacked sufficient evaluation time; (3) misapplied its cost base realignment actions model in calculating cost estimates; (4) omitted environmental cleanup and Medicare cost estimates from its recommendations; (5) did not include economic impact as a decision factor in its recommendations, and omitted indirect job loss and other economic cost estimates from its analysis; (6) did not specify economic evaluation criteria, and incorrectly calculated direct job loss estimates; and (7) could not use a comprehensive economic model because of time constraints. Wed, 29 Nov 1989 00:00:00 -0500