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    Subject Term: "Weapons systems"

    18 publications with a total of 45 open recommendations including 8 priority recommendations
    Director: Zina D. Merritt
    Phone: (202) 512-5257

    6 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the military departments, should assess whether risk mitigation actions have been identified in the event of a loss of each task critical assets (TCA) facility in the defense industrial base and, based on this assessment, develop risk mitigation actions with associated implementation plans and time lines, and provide this information to congressional and DOD decision makers. (Recommendation 1)

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with DCMA and the military departments, should provide congressional and DOD decision makers with information on potential effects on defense capabilities in the event of a loss of each TCA facility in the defense industrial base. (Recommendation 2)

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with DCMA and the military departments, should provide congressional and DOD decision makers with information on DOD organic facilities that have been identified as TCAs, similar to the information provided previously on commercial facilities. This information also should include (1) the potential effects on defense capabilities in the event of a loss of the facility and (2) risk mitigation actions and associated implementation plans with time lines. (Recommendation 3)

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with DCMA and the military departments, should take steps to share information on risks identified through the annual Critical Asset Identification Process with relevant program managers or other designated service or program officials. At a minimum, relevant officials should receive information on the most critical facilities (such as TCAs) that produce parts supporting their programs. This information-sharing could occur through service-specific channels of communication or another method of internal communication deemed appropriate by DOD. (Recommendation 4)

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the military departments, should develop a mechanism to ensure that program offices obtain information from contractors on single source of supply risks. (Recommendation 5)

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the military departments, should issue department-wide DMSMS policy, such as an instruction, that clearly defines requirements of DMSMS management and details responsibilities and procedures to be followed by program offices to implement the policy. (Recommendation 6)

    Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Director: Zina Merritt
    Phone: (202) 512-5257

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure that DOD's biennial core reporting procedures align with the reporting requirements in Section 2464 and each reporting agency provides accurate and complete information, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to update DOD's guidance--in particular DOD Instruction 4151.20--to require future Biennial Core Reports to include instructions to the reporting agencies on how to (1) report additional depot workload performed that has not been identified as a core requirement, (2) accurately capture inter-service workload, (3) calculate shortfalls, and (4) estimate the cost of planned workload.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To increase the transparency of future Biennial Core Reports, Congress should consider amending 10 USC 2464 to require DOD to include information such as (1) workload shortfalls at lower-level categories; (2) executed workload in similar categories that could be used to mitigate shortfalls; (3) progress on implementing mitigation plans; (4) data reported at the first-level category of the work breakdown structure, except for when shortfalls are identified; (5) explanations for first-level categories (i.e., Special Interest Items and Other) of the work breakdown structure; and (6) whether the core requirements reported in the previous Biennial Core Report have been executed.

    Agency: Congress
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we determine what steps the Congress has taken, we will provide updated information.
    Director: David Trimble
    Phone: (202) 512-3841

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that NNSA can better inform long-term planning and management decision making as well as to ensure that the Enhanced Surveillance Program complements NNSA's other efforts to assess the nuclear weapons stockpile, the NNSA Administrator should develop a long-term strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that incorporates outcome-oriented strategic goals, addresses management challenges and identifies resources needed to achieve these goals, and develops and uses performance measures to track progress in achieving these goals.

    Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: Fiscal year 2018 budget submission data indicates some new activities but not yet mention a strategy change.
    Director: Michele Mackin
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure a more accurate estimate of the expected cost savings under the fiscal year 2013-2017 multiyear procurement, Congress should consider requiring the Navy to update its estimate of savings, which currently reflects only Flight IIA ships, to increase transparency for costs and savings for Congress and the taxpayers, as well as provide improved information to support future multiyear procurement savings estimates.

    Agency: Congress
    Status: Open

    Comments: To ensure a more accurate estimate of the expected cost savings under the fiscal year 2013-2017 multiyear procurement, we asked Congress to consider requiring the Navy to update its estimate of savings, which currently reflects only Flight IIA ships, to increase transparency for costs and savings for Congress and the taxpayers, as well as provide improved information to support future multi-year procurement savings estimates. Neither the Senate nor House National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) reports for fiscal year 2018 direct the Navy to update its savings and both reports include language authorizing the Navy to pursue a DDG 51 Flight III multi-year procurement contract for fiscal years 2018-2022. We will continue to monitor the status of this matter at least until the NDAA for fiscal year 2018 is enacted, at which time we will close the matter as not implemented if the multi-year procurement is authorized and no savings update requirement is included.
    Recommendation: To better support DDG 51 Flight III oversight, the Secretary of Defense should designate the Flight III configuration as a major subprogram of the DDG 51 program in order to increase the transparency, via Selected Acquisition Reports, of Flight III cost, schedule, and performance baselines within the broader context of the DDG 51 program.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD agreed that visibility into DDG 51 Flight III cost, schedule, and performance is important for oversight, but does not plan to designate Flight III as a major subprogram. No further DOD action has been taken on this recommendation and congressional reports supporting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018--yet to be finalized and enacted--do not include any direction for the department to do so. Nevertheless, with construction of the lead Flight III ship only recently awarded (June 2017), we will continue to monitor any action taken to designate Flight III as a major subprogram.
    Director: Timothy J. DiNapoli
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    4 open recommendations
    including 3 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: Given that the intent of section 235 of Title 10 United States Code was to provide both DOD and Congress with increased oversight of the procurement of services, Congress should consider revising the section to require that DOD report on its projected spending beyond the budget year and consistent with the time period covered by the future year defense program.

    Agency: Congress
    Status: Open

    Comments: Congress has not revised section 235 of Title 10 United States Code. GAO will continue to monitor this matter for Congressional consideration.
    Recommendation: To ensure that senior leadership within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments are better positioned to make informed decisions regarding the volume and type of services that should be acquired over the future year defense program, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should revise their programming guidance to collect information on how contracted services will be used to meet requirements beyond the budget year.

    Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: As of July 2017, DOD staff from the programming and budgeting communities have initiated discussions on how to improve consideration of services beyond the budget year. The Air Force, however, has not identified any specific steps to modify their programming guidance.
    Recommendation: To ensure that senior leadership within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments are better positioned to make informed decisions regarding the volume and type of services that should be acquired over the future year defense program, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should revise their programming guidance to collect information on how contracted services will be used to meet requirements beyond the budget year.

    Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: As of July 2017, DOD staff from the programming and budgeting communities have initiated discussions on how to improve consideration of services beyond the budget year. The Air Force, however, has not identified any specific steps to modify their programming guidance.
    Recommendation: To ensure the military departments' efforts to integrate services into the programming process and senior service managers efforts to develop forecasts on service contract spending provide the department with consistent data, the Secretary of Defense should establish a mechanism, such as a working group of key stakeholders--which could include officials from the programming, budgeting and requirements communities as well as the senior services managers--to coordinate these efforts.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: As of July 2017, DOD has not taken specific action(s) to address the recommendation. We will continue to monitor this recommendation.
    Director: Michael J. Sullivan
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve DOD's use of portfolio management for its weapon system investments and ensure that its investment plans are affordable, strategy-driven, balance near- and long-term needs, and leverage efforts across the military services, as well as to provide a solid foundation for future portfolio management efforts at the enterprise-level, the Secretary of Defense should revise DOD Directive 7045.2 on Capability Portfolio Management in accordance with best practices and promote the development of better tools to enable more integrated portfolio reviews and analyses of weapon system investments. Key elements of this recommendation would include (1) designating the Deputy Secretary of Defense or some appropriate delegate responsibility for implementing the policy and overseeing portfolio management in DOD; (2) requiring annual enterprise-level portfolio reviews that incorporate key portfolio review elements, including information from the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes; (3) directing the Joint Staff, AT&L, and CAPE to collaborate on their data needs and develop a formal implementation plan for meeting those needs either by building on the database the Joint Staff is developing for its analysis or investing in new analytical tools; and (4) incorporating lessons learned from military service portfolio reviews and portfolio management activities, such as using multiple risk and funding scenarios to assess needs and re-evaluate priorities.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the Department of Defense partially concurred with this recommendation and has taken steps to implement one part of it. In October 2016, the Joint Staff informed GAO that it was updating two of its databases on military capabilities and capability requirements to provide DOD with better analytical tools to support portfolio management. The Department of Defense has not taken any other actions to implement this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve DOD's use of portfolio management for its weapon system investments and ensure that its investment plans are affordable, strategy-driven, balance near- and long-term needs, and leverage efforts across the military services, and to help ensure the military services' portfolio reviews are conducted regularly and effectively integrate information from the requirements, acquisition, and budget communities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to update or develop policies that require them to conduct annual portfolio reviews that incorporate key portfolio review elements, including information from the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, DOD partially concurred with this recommendation but has not yet taken any actions necessary to implement it.
    Director: David C. Trimble
    Phone: (202) 512-3841

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve NNSA's ability to choose the best alternative that satisfies the mission need for lithium production, the Secretary of Energy should request that NNSA's Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs take steps to ensure that NNSA objectively consider all alternatives, without preference for a particular solution, as it proceeds with the analysis of alternatives process. Such steps could include clarifying the statement of mission need for lithium production so that it is independent of a particular solution.

    Agency: Department of Energy
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of December 2016, NNSA has not finalized its analysis of alternatives. However, documents provided and statements made by agency officials indicate that NNSA plans to construct a Lithium Production Facility. NNSA's preference for constructing a lithium production facility prior to finalizing its analysis of alternatives is not consistent with our recommendation.
    Director: Mike Sullivan
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    6 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in consultation with DOD components, to establish guidelines on what constitutes a "current" ACAT II or III program for reporting purposes; the types of programs, if any, that do not require ACAT designations; and whether the rules for identifying current MDAPs would be appropriate for ACAT II and III programs.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In September 2015, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition requested that DOD components review existing policies and determine whether they needed to be altered or supplemented to facilitate data collection and reporting on ACAT II and III programs. In November 2016, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics stated that, based on the results of these reviews, it does not plans to take any action to implement this recommendation. However, a planned DOD IG review in fiscal year 2018 could lead to further action on this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in consultation with DOD components, to determine what metrics should be used and what data should be collected on ACAT II and III programs to measure cost and schedule performance; and whether the use of DAMIR and the MDAP selected acquisition report format may be appropriate for collecting data on ACAT II and III programs.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In November 2016, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics reviewed information on DOD component efforts to collect data on the cost and schedule performance of ACAT II and III programs and stated that it does not plan to take any action to implement this recommendation. However, a planned DOD IG review in fiscal year 2018 could lead to further action on this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy and the Commander of SOCOM to assess the reliability of data collected on ACAT II and III programs and work with PEOs to develop a strategy to improve procedures for the entry and maintenance of data.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In September 2015, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition requested that DOD components evaluate the data they collect on ACAT II and III programs, report on their assessment of the data's reliability, and provide an update on their plans to improve the availability and quality of the data. In November 2016, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics stated that it does not plan to take any additional action to implement this recommendation. However, a planned DOD IG review in fiscal year 2018 could lead to further action on this recommendation.
    Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy and the Commander of SOCOM to develop implementation plans to coordinate and execute component initiatives to improve data on ACAT II and III programs.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, but the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics stated that it does not plan to take any additional action to implement this recommendation. However, we are keeping this recommendation open at this time.
    Recommendation: To help ensure compliance with relevant provisions of DOD acquisition policy with the purpose of improving DOD's ability to provide oversight for ACAT II and III programs, including those programs that may become MDAPs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force and Commander of SOCOM to establish a mechanism to ensure compliance with APB requirements in DOD policy.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In September 2015, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition requested that DOD components review their mechanisms for establishing and enforcing the APB requirements for all ACAT II and III programs. In November 2016, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics stated that, based on the results of these reviews, it does not plans to take any action to implement this recommendation. However, we are keeping this recommendation open at this time.
    Recommendation: To help ensure compliance with relevant provisions of DOD acquisition policy with the purpose of improving DOD's ability to provide oversight for ACAT II and III programs, including those programs that may become MDAPs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy to improve component procedures for notifying the Defense Acquisition Executive of programs with a cost estimate within 10 percent of ACAT I cost thresholds.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency partially concurred with this recommendation. The Army and Navy have reiterated existing guidance and the Air Force is evaluating additional actions it might take to improve its notification procedures.
    Director: Sullivan, Michael J
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help improve DOD's milestone decision process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in collaboration with the military service acquisition executives, program executive officers, and program managers to, as a longer-term effort, select several current or new major defense acquisition programs to pilot, on a broader scale, different approaches for streamlining the entire milestone decision process, with the results evaluated and reported for potential wider use. The pilot programs should consider the following: (1) Defining the appropriate information needed to support milestone decisions while still ensuring program accountability and oversight. The information should be based on the business case principles needed for well-informed milestone decisions including well defined requirements, reasonable life-cycle cost estimates, and a knowledge-based acquisition plan. (2) Developing an efficient process for providing this information to the milestone decision authority by (a) minimizing any reviews between the program office and the different functional staff offices within each chain of command level and (b) establishing frequent, regular interaction between the program office and milestone decision makers, in lieu of documentation reviews, to help expedite the process.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: The Office of the Secretary of Defense issued a policy directive called Better Buying Power 3.0 in April 2015, which addresses this recommendation to pilot acquisition programs for streamlining. In September 2015, DOD designated one Navy program, the Next Generation Jammer, as a pilot program with streamlined oversight, processes, and documentation. The program manager believes that implementation of this model has allowed for more focus on improving program execution by significantly shortening decision cycle time and appropriately tailoring acquisition requirements. The Air Force and Army have not designated pilot programs at this time.
    Director: Cary Russell
    Phone: (202) 512-5431

    6 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: To help DOD develop an affordable sustainment strategy for the F-35, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics to direct the F-35 Program Executive Officer to establish affordability constraints linked to, and informed by, military service budgets that will help guide sustainment decisions, prioritize requirements, and identify additional areas for savings by March 2015, at which point the Future Support Construct decision will be approved.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated in April 2017 that the F-35 Program Executive Officer and the F-35 enterprise have expanded their collaborative effort to reduce F-35 operating and support (O&S) costs to ensure that they deliver affordable readiness for the F-35 fleet. In an effort to reduce overall O&S costs, the department has undertaken several initiatives. For example, according to DOD, as of January 2017, a program office "cost war room" initiative had reduced the 2012 F-35 annual cost estimate by $60.7 billion. Additionally, according to DOD, a Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program has resulted in a $1.7 billion O&S cost avoidance through the program's life cycle. Other efforts are also under way that aim to help reduce O&S costs by better informing sustainment decision-making. While the department is taking steps to try to reduce overall O&S costs, the program has yet to develop affordability constraints linked to the military services' budgets. Without affordability constraints that are linked to military service budgets, it remains unclear the extent to which the military services can afford to operate and sustain the F-35 throughout its life cycle as currently planned.
    Recommendation: To help DOD address key risks to F-35 affordability and operational readiness, and to improve the reliability of its O&S cost estimates for the life cycle of the program, the Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 Program Executive Officer, to enable DOD to better identify, address, and mitigate performance issues with the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) that could have an effect on affordability, as well as readiness, to establish a performance-measurement process for ALIS that includes, but is not limited to, performance metrics and targets that (1) are based on intended behavior of the system in actual operations and (2) tie system performance to user requirements.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to DOD officials, the ALIS Integrated Product Team (IPT) is continuing to work with the Joint Program Office's Performance Based Logistics (PBL) team to further develop and refine appropriate metrics for inclusion into future sustainment contracts. Although DOD has made progress in developing performance metrics for ALIS, as of September 2017, DOD has yet to develop metrics that are based on intended behavior of the system and tie system performance to user requirements. Until this progression is made, this recommendation will remain open.
    Recommendation: To help DOD address key risks to F-35 affordability and operational readiness, and to improve the reliability of its O&S cost estimates for the life cycle of the program, the Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 Program Executive Officer, to develop a high level of confidence that the aircraft will achieve its R+M goals, to develop a software reliability and maintainability (R+M) assessment process, with metrics, by which the program can monitor and determine the effect that software issues may have on overall F-35 R+M issues.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD has an R&M assessment process in place, but as of September 2017, had not developed a process that would focus directly on software reliability and maintainability. Until DOD develops a process more focused on software and its effects on overall R&M issues, this recommendation will remain open.
    Recommendation: To help DOD address key risks to F-35 affordability and operational readiness, and to improve the reliability of its O&S cost estimates for the life cycle of the program, the Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 Program Executive Officer, to promote competition, address affordability, and inform its overarching sustainment strategy, to develop a long-term Intellectual Property (IP) Strategy to include, but not be limited to, the identification of (1) current levels of technical data rights ownership by the federal government and (2) all critical technical data needs and their associated costs.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD has still not developed an overall strategy that would identify data rights ownership, needs, and costs. As of September 2017, the program had taken some steps to develop an Intellectual Property Strategy, but has not identified all critical needs and their associated costs. Program office officials said that they are currently working with the prime contractor to develop a list of technical data requirements. Until this strategy is developed, this recommendation will remain open.
    Recommendation: To help DOD address key risks to F-35 affordability and operational readiness, and to improve the reliability of its O&S cost estimates for the life cycle of the program, the Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 Program Executive Officer, to understand the potential range of costs associated with the JPO F-35 O&S cost estimate, to conduct uncertainty analyses on future JPO estimates.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of September 2017, DOD had not applied risk/uncertainty analyses to its cost estimates. Until it does so, this recommendation will remain open.
    Recommendation: To improve the reliability of the CAPE F-35 O&S cost estimate, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Director of CAPE, for future F-35 O&S cost estimates, to conduct uncertainty analyses to understand the potential range of costs associated with its estimates to reflect the most likely costs associated with the program.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to DOD officials, the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has not updated its F-35 estimate subsequent to the release of GAO-14-778. Pending a major program change, CAPE will update the F-35 O&S estimate for the full-rate production decision point in the second quarter of fiscal year 2019. Until CAPE updates its F-35 estimate, we will not be able to determine if they will perform any uncertainty analyses on its cost estimate; therefore, this recommendation will remain open as of September 1, 2017.
    Director: Pendleton, John H
    Phone: 202) 512-3489

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To assist DOD and DOE in synchronizing plans for modernizing the nuclear weapons enterprise and for assessing the feasibility of the interoperable warhead concept, and to ensure that DOD and NNSA are able to consider the possibilities of potentially designing and developing an interoperable warhead as directed by the Nuclear Weapons Council during the W78/88-1 life-extension program, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to identify the long-term resources needed to implement the W78/88-1 life-extension program once the warhead feasibility study is completed, should the Nuclear Weapons Council approve of an interoperable warhead design.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. In September 2014, agency officials stated that the Nuclear Weapons Council formally delayed the W78/88-1 Life Extension Program first production unit 5 years to Fiscal Year 2030. As a result, officials stated that the warhead feasibility study has been delayed. The recommendation remains open. As of September 2017, the status of this recommendation has not changed.
    Recommendation: To assist DOD and DOE in synchronizing plans for modernizing the nuclear weapons enterprise and for assessing the feasibility of the interoperable warhead concept, and to ensure that the services are able to support the consideration of interoperable warhead concepts during future life-extension programs, the Secretary of Defense should issue or revise existing guidance to require the services to align their programs and resources before beginning concept or feasibility studies jointly with another service.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. In December 2015, DOD and DOE published the revised Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process and is in the process of updating the DOD implementing instructions. In August 2016, DOD officials told us that the updated instruction will include a provision to require the services to align their programs and resources before beginning concept or feasibility studies jointly with another service. Officials expect the revised instruction to be finalized and published in mid-2017. As of September 2017, the updated DOD manual (DODM 5030.55) is undergoing final coordination within the department. This recommendation remains open pending the approval and issuance of the revised instruction.
    Director: Mackin, Michele
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    2 open recommendations
    including 2 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure Ford-class carrier acquisitions are supported by sound requirements and a comprehensive testing strategy, and to promote the introduction of reliable, warfighting capable ships into the fleet, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following action prior to accepting delivery of Gerald R. Ford CVN 78. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on (1) currently required capabilities, including increased sortie generation rates and reduced manning and (2) the time and money needed to field systems to provide these capabilities, in light of known and projected reliability shortfalls for critical systems. This analysis should be informed by demonstrated system performance from land-based testing, including updated reliability growth projections, and should identify trade space among competing cost, schedule, and performance parameters. The analysis should also consider whether the Navy should seek requirements relief from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, to the extent necessary, to maximize its return on investment to the warfighter. The Navy should report the results of this analysis to Congress within 30 days of CVN 78 commissioning.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: We recommended that DOD conduct a cost-benefit analysis on currently required capabilities, and report the results to Congress within 30 days of CVN 78 commissioning. DOD agreed with our recommendation for a cost-benefit analysis, but disagreed with the timing of it, stating that it plans to measure CVN 78 capabilities through completion of operational testing after ship delivery. Since the release of our report, the Navy completed cost-benefit analyses to determine the acquisition strategy for CVN 79, making two major changes to the ship (replacing the Dual Band Radar (DBR) with a different radar solution and introducing a phased construction and delivery approach.) While these are major program changes, the department did not evaluate the fundamental reason for conducting a cost-benefit analysis, namely that known and projected reliability shortfalls make it unlikely that the program will achieve its sortie generation requirements. In December 2016, an Independent Review Team commissioned by the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics completed a comprehensive assessment of the CVN 78's systems, but did not recommend any capability trade-offs or requirements relief.
    Recommendation: To ensure Ford-class carrier acquisitions are supported by sound requirements and a comprehensive testing strategy, and to promote the introduction of reliable, warfighting capable ships into the fleet, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following action prior to accepting delivery of CVN 78. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to adjust the planned post-delivery test schedule to ensure that system integration testing is completed prior to entering initial operational test and evaluation.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: Until the Navy updates the test plan in February 2018, we will not know if it will fully address our recommendation. However, recent test schedules suggest an overlap remains between integration testing and the start of initial operational test and evaluation.
    Director: Chaplain, Cristina T
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    3 open recommendations
    including 2 priority recommendations
    Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to add risk reduction non-intercept flight tests for each new type of target missiles developed.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: Despite partially concurring with our recommendation in 2013, MDA has not adjusted its test plans to include risk-reduction (i.e., non-intercept) flight tests for new target types prior to their inclusion in an intercept flight test. MDA officials have not done so because such decisions must be balanced against potential cost, schedule, and programmatic impacts and flight test preparation processes, like dry-runs and quality control checks, are sufficient to discover issues prior to an intercept test. While test preparation processes are valuable, they are not a substitute for risk reduction flight tests. This was proven in June 2015 when MDA launched a new intermediate-range target that had 6 different test preparation processes but not a risk-reduction flight test and the target failed, which resulted in significant cost, schedule, and programmatic impacts. Moving forward, despite the impacts from its recent target failure, MDA plans to use a new medium-range target during its third, and most complex operational test in the second quarter of fiscal year 2019. We maintain our stance that risk reduction flight tests would reduce the risk for the associated test and the overall flight test plan; however, MDA's action to-date suggest that it has no intention of including risk-reduction flight tests for new targets. However, we will continue to monitor its progress in this regard.
    Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to include in its resource baseline cost estimates all life cycle costs, specifically the operations and support costs, from the military services in order to provide decision makers with the full costs of ballistic missile defense systems.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that decisionmakers should have insight into the full lifecycle costs of MDA's programs. However, as of August 2017, MDA is still not including the military services' operations and sustainment costs--which are a part of the full lifecycle costs--in the resource baselines it reports in the Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report. MDA is trying to determine how to report the full lifecycle costs to decisionmakers, but has indicated that the Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report is not the appropriate forum for reporting the military services' operation and support costs. We continue to believe that including the full lifecycle costs of MDA's programs enables decisionmakers to make funding determinations that are based on a comprehensive understanding of the depth and breadth of each program's costs.
    Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to stabilize the acquisition baselines, so that meaningful comparisons can be made over time that support oversight of those acquisitions.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation regarding the need for MDA to stabilize its acquisition baselines, but also noted MDA's need to adjust its baselines to remain responsive to evolving requirements and threats; both of which are beyond MDA's control. Further, DOD highlighted the MDA Director's authority to make adjustments to the agency's programmatic baselines, within departmental guidelines. Our recommendation, however, is not designed to limit the Director's authority to adjust baselines or to prevent adjusting baselines as appropriate. Rather, our recommendation is designed to address traceability issues we have found with MDA's baselines, which are within its control. Specifically, for MDA to be able to effectively report longer-term progress of its acquisitions and provide the necessary transparency to Congress, it is critical that the agency stabilize its baselines so that once set, any revisions can be tracked over time. At this point we have not seen any indication that MDA is working to implement this recommendation. For example, in 2016, MDA's Director made changes to the Targets and Countermeasures program's baseline that omit the costs of some targets and may make tracking progress against prior years and the original baseline very difficult, and in some instances, impossible. We will continue to monitor MDA's baselines to determine any progress in this area or implementation of this recommendation.
    Director: Merritt, Zina Dache
    Phone: (202) 512-5257

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To ensure that Congress has visibility over the status of DOD's core depot-level maintenance and repair capability, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Maintenance, Policy, and Programs) to include in the Biennial Core Report to Congress detailed explanations for why services do not have the workload to meet core maintenance requirements for each shortfall identified in the report.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of July 2016, recent GAO work on this issue shows that DOD has not fully implemented this recommendation. In DOD's 2016 Biennial Core Report, DOD did not provide detailed explanations for all of the services shortfalls identified in its report. We are waiting until DOD's 2018 Biennial Core Report to further update the status of this recommendation.
    Director: Martin, Belva M
    Phone: (202) 512-4841

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: Recognizing that there are widespread requirements to know what is militarily critical, the Secretary of Defense should determine the best approach to meeting users' needs for a technical reference, whether it be MCTL, other alternatives being used, or some combination thereof.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In commenting on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation but has not yet implemented it. As of August 2017, multiple approaches to maintaining a technical reference are still being considered.
    Recommendation: Recognizing that there are widespread requirements to know what is militarily critical, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that resources are coordinated and efficiently devoted to sustain the approach chosen.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: As of August 2017, multiple approaches to maintaining a technical reference are still being considered.
    Director: Chaplain, Cristina T
    Phone: (202)512-3000

    2 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To strengthen its baselines, facilitate external and independent reviews of those baselines, ensure effective oversight of the BMDS, and further improve transparency and accountability of its efforts, and to improve clarity, consistency, and completeness of the baselines reported to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that MDA, for resource baselines, obtain independent cost estimates for each baseline.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on our report, the agency concurred with this recommendation but has not yet taken all actions necessary to implement it. Although the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has received independent cost estimates from its internal independent cost group for some programs and components that support the baselines provided in MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), MDA officials told us they have not yet completed independent estimates for all the BAR baselines. In addition, the independent estimates will not have full lifecycle costs which will hamper their effectiveness. We will continue to monitor MDA's progress over the course of our next annual review.
    Recommendation: To strengthen its baselines, facilitate external and independent reviews of those baselines, ensure effective oversight of the BMDS, and further improve transparency and accountability of its efforts, and to improve clarity, consistency, and completeness of the baselines reported to Congress, the Secretary of Defense should ensure that MDA, for schedule baselines, in meeting new statutory requirements to report variances between reported acquisition baselines, also report variances between the test plan as presented in the previous acquisition baseline and the test plan as executed that explain the reason for any changes.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the Department of Defense concurred with our recommendation and has taken initial steps to report the test variances, by laying out the dates of the proposed changes. However, the variances do not include all changes to test objectives, detail when tests are deleted, nor when the altered objectives will be satisfied. MDA has initiated an effort with DOT&E and the OTA to track the movement of test objectives, however these changes are not reported and are only used internally. In addition, MDA utilizes a "mid-year" test change memorandum. The change explains the difference from the prior master test plan, but is not reported. Thus, changes that are included in the mid-year memorandum can not be tracked if one only receives the annual test plan. We will continue to monitor MDA's progress in fiscal year 2017 and determine whether MDA lays out the changes in its upcoming integrated master test plan.
    Director: Aloise, Eugene E
    Phone: (202)512-6870

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To allow Congress to better oversee management of the nuclear security enterprise and to improve NNSA's management information with respect to the base capabilities necessary to ensure nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and reliable, the Administrator of NNSA should, once the Stockpile Services work breakdown structure reflects a product or capability basis, use this work breakdown structure to develop product/capability cost estimates that adequately justify the congressional budget request for Stockpile Services.

    Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
    Status: Open

    Comments: In process: NNSA has significantly improved its work breakdown structure for Stockpile Services. The work breakdown structure now reflects a product or capability basis to a much greater extent than it did previously. NNSA is continuing to work to develop cost estimates for these products and capabilities to adequately justify the congressional budget request for Stockpile Services. In 2014, the Senate Appropriations Committee's Energy and Water Development Subcommittee suggested changes to NNSA's budget structure to align it more closely with products and capabilities beginning with fiscal year 2016 appropriations. GAO will continue to monitor whether NNSA develops cost estimates for Stockpile Services products and capabilities that inform future years' budget requests and justifications.
    Director: Chaplain, Cristina T
    Phone: (202)512-3000

    1 open recommendations
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct MDA to ensure that developmental hardware and software changes are not made to the operational baseline that disrupt the assessments needed to understand the capabilities and limitations of new BMDS developments.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation. In the June 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), Missile Defense Agency (MDA) provided some operational baselines and continues to do so annually. Nonetheless, configuration changes continue to pose challenges to a thorough assessment of the BMDS architecture. For example, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation stated that the many configurations of the fielded ground-based interceptor inhibits a full evaluation of the GMD program. Moreover, some changes to BMDS elements are still delivered while testing of the architecture is already underway. We will continue to assess whether MDA fully adopts an approach allowing time for the warfighter and testers to fully understand hardware and software before placing it in the operational baseline.