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    Results:

    Subject Term: "Roadside inspections"

    2 publications with a total of 6 open recommendations including 1 priority recommendation
    Director: Cary B. Russell
    Phone: (202) 512-5431

    4 open recommendations
    Recommendation: To help ensure that DOD effectively evaluates the safety performance of carriers entrusted to transport security-sensitive materials in the Transportation Protective Services (TPS) program, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in collaboration with the U.S. Transportation Command to update TPS program guidance to clarify (1) how to address carriers with absent or dated Safety Ratings and poor Safety Measurement System scores, and (2) what specific actions should be taken when carriers do not meet program requirements.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To help ensure that DOD effectively evaluates the safety performance of carriers entrusted to transport security-sensitive materials in the Transportation Protective Services (TPS) program, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in collaboration with the U.S. Transportation Command to establish and document an approach for conducting reviews of available violation data, such as analyzing violations incurred while transporting TPS shipments.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
    Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to identify and effectively mitigate public safety risks of TPS carriers transporting security-sensitive materials, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in collaboration with the DOD Explosives Safety Board, the U.S. Transportation Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and the Army Headquarters Safety Office, to develop department-wide guidance requiring the evaluation of the Defense Transportation Tracking System TPS carrier incident data to identify trends and patterns that could suggest systemic weaknesses such as mechanical breakdowns or unusual delays that represent a heightened potential public safety risk and take action to address any identified weaknesses.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to TRANSCOM officials during our visit on April 2016--they are working on implementing these actions with a goal of completing them in Fall 2017.
    Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to identify and effectively mitigate public safety risks of TPS carriers transporting security-sensitive materials, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in collaboration with the DOD Explosives Safety Board, the U.S. Transportation Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and the Army Headquarters Safety Office, to develop department-wide guidance requiring the identification and full investigation of TPS carrier incidents, including mishaps and near misses involving security-sensitive shipments, to determine potential root causes and identify corrective actions that could mitigate the recurrence of the mishap or the potential for more significant ones.

    Agency: Department of Defense
    Status: Open

    Comments: According to TRANSCOM officials during our visit on April 2016--they are working on implementing these actions with a goal of completing them in Fall 2017.
    Director: Fleming, Susan A
    Phone: (202) 512-2834

    2 open recommendations
    including 1 priority recommendation
    Recommendation: To improve the CSA program, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to revise the SMS methodology to better account for limitations in drawing comparisons of safety performance information across carriers; in doing so, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to conduct a formal analysis that specifically identifies: (1) limitations in the data used to calculate SMS scores including variability in the carrier population and the quality and quantity of data available for carrier safety performance assessments, and (2) limitations in the resulting SMS scores including their precision, confidence, and reliability for the purposes for which they are used.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open
    Priority recommendation

    Comments: As of October 2016, FMCSA continues to maintain that they do not agree with our methodology or conclusions. While FMCSA's position about our specific recommendation is unchanged, FMCSA noted that Section 5221 of the FAST Act directed the National Academies of Science (NAS) to conduct a safety correlation study of the CSA program, and specifically FMCSA's Safety Measurement System's (SMS) methodology. FMCSA stated that if the outcome of the NAS study results in recommendations for SMS changes, they will address those recommendations accordingly. We continue to believe this recommendation has merit and could help the agency better target FMCSA's resources to the carriers that pose the highest risk of crashing, as we demonstrate in our report. For example, we reported that FMCSA requires a minimum level of information for a carrier to receive an SMS score; however, this requirement is not strong enough to produce sufficiently reliable scores. As a result, GAO found that FMCSA identified many carriers as high risk that were not later involved in a crash, potentially causing FMCSA to miss opportunities to intervene with carriers that were involved in crashes. FMCSA's methodology is limited because of insufficient information, which reduces the precision of SMS scores. GAO found that by scoring only carriers with more information, FMCSA could better identify high risk carriers likely to be involved in crashes. This illustrative approach involves trade-offs; it would assign SMS scores to fewer carriers, but these scores would generally be more reliable and thus more useful in targeting FMCSA's scarce resources.
    Recommendation: To improve the CSA program, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to ensure that any determination of a carrier's fitness to operate properly accounts for limitations we have identified regarding safety performance information.

    Agency: Department of Transportation
    Status: Open

    Comments: While FMCSA does not agree with our methodology or conclusions, we believe this recommendation has merit and could help the agency better target FMCSA's resources to the carriers that pose the highest risk of crashing, as we demonstrate in our report. For example, we reported that FMCSA requires a minimum level of information for a carrier to receive an SMS score; however, this requirement is not strong enough to produce sufficiently reliable scores. As a result, GAO found that FMCSA identified many carriers as high risk that were not later involved in a crash, potentially causing FMCSA to miss opportunities to intervene with carriers that were involved in crashes. FMCSA's methodology is limited because of insufficient information, which reduces the precision of SMS scores. GAO found that by scoring only carriers with more information, FMCSA could better identify high risk carriers likely to be involved in crashes. This illustrative approach involves trade-offs; it would assign SMS scores to fewer carriers, but these scores would generally be more reliable and thus more useful in targeting FMCSA's scarce resources.